

## SUMMARY IN ENGLISH

*Johs. Mørk Pedersen: Illusion and Reality.*

*Illusions are traps for our cognition of reality. Even if guarded by a materialistic point of view, one is apt to be trapped by the illusion, that the attributes of reality are given by everyday experiences. The article argues, that everyday experiences are an indispensable basis for the cognition of reality, but neither a prescript nor a criterion of what is to be understood by reality altogether. It is proposed that artists like M. E. Escher and O. Reutersvård, through their works, give un an insight into some strange trends of reality.*

*Aksel Larsen: Visual recognition*

Our capacity for visual recognition on the basis of shape but regardless of size or orientation has been investigated by reaction time methods in numerous studies in the past several years. The general finding is that if two visual patterns differ with respect to size or orientation but not otherwise, then the time taken to decide that the patterns are identical increases approximately linearly as a function of the linear size ratio or the angular orientation between the patterns. According to the transformational account of these results it is assumed that recognition is achieved by first encoding one of the patterns as a visual image and then mentally transforming the image to fit the impression of the other pattern. Mentally transforming the image, i.e. processes of mental rotations and mental size transformations may be considered as basic visual routines which may be assembled to programs that will allow us to identify patterns that differ with respect to both size and orientation. The transformational account of simple visual pattern recognition is introduced by way of short and necessarily highly selective reviews of the classical studies of Mach, Høffding and others.

*Ole Bredo: Experiments on cognition*

The purpose of this article is to touch up some of the topics within cognitive psychology which have been dealt with in the Psychological Laboratory of the University of Copenhagen.

It is emphasized as a historical characteristic of the scientific argumentation in the Psychological Laboratory that sometimes this argumentation has been so consistently radical in its criticism that beyond serving as a basis for a justified rejection of speculative sketches in approaches to cognitive psychology, it must also be said that it has impeded the development of an original cognitive psychology on a phenomenological foundation.

Some examples from the psychology of »set« are examined for illumination of the above mentioned matters. The way of presenting the problem is the topical subject in the second main section of the article, where it is attempted to unite phenomenological criticism with examples of a formalized description of thinking. It is argued that a gain of knowledge is obtained by considering a formalized description as a potential extension of the individual's lines of actions.

*N. Praetorius & K. D. Duncan: Verbal reports in psychological investigations: A logical and psychological analysis*

Since the era of Wundtian introspectionism the status and usefulness of verbal reports from subjects in psychological investigations have been a recurring topic of heated debate and controversy in the international psychological literature. In order to untangle and clarify some of the uncertainties and confusions in this debate, an analysis is attempted of some of the *logical* and *psychological* conditions for research involving verbal reports. In the course of this analysis we argue first that any psychological investigation logically presupposes, that communication takes place in a shared language in which both the investigator and the subject know correct statements and descriptions and their correct uses. It is argued, more over, that different areas of psychological research differ distinctively with regard to the opportunities of observation and description - for the investigator and the subject - and, consequently, in the amount of control exercised over events and variables by the investigator and the subject. Examples are given of different psychological conditions and problems encountered in different areas of research and their implications for the development of different research methods and programmes.

*Henrik Poulsen: Conations.*

In accordance with Cartesian and empiricist philosophy conations have within psychology been conceived as phenomena of consciousness behind actions. Conations were by structuralist psychology studied through introspection of phenomena of will. This concept of conations has been unacceptable to modern psychology, but conations have been discussed behind the cover of a scientifically respectable concept of motivating drives. The paper contains a critical discussion of drive theories. In connection with remarks on the psychology of the danish philosopher Høffding attention is drawn to german-romanticist theory. This theory constitutes a clear alternative to Cartesian-empiricist theory. A conceptual clarification of the basic concepts of conation, motivation, need, cognition and emotion is a precondition of the development of a psychology of conation. Such a clarification has been attempted by the drawing of a sketch of the phylogenetic development of conations leading to their position and forms within the mind of human beings.

*Thomas Nielsen: Body and soul in contemporary empirical science.*

The Classical philosophical problem of the relationship between body and soul (mind and matter, psyche and soma) is related to the modern research areas of »stress« and »psychosomatic illness«. Stress is discussed in terms of two relatively separate but interacting bodily response systems: Cannon's fight/flight reaction and Selye's general adaptation syndrome, which seems related to psychological states of »excitement-effort« and »dysphoria-helplessness« respectively. These stress reactions are further seen as the main mechanisms that may translate mental agony into several bodily health problems, including the present-days major sources of untimely death in the western world, cardiovascular disorders and cancer.

*Erik Schultz: Intentions*

The concept »intention« is first illustrated from three angles. Partly as a principle of explanation in relation to causality. Partly as an epistemological principle in knowledge in rela-

tion to an ontological trait at the observed psyche. And finally is intentions in »coping« illustrated in relation to »being«.

With this frame of reference it is shown, how the danish psychology has developed from regarding »intentions« as mainly an epistemological problem toward an ontological viewpoint. In this development the concept of »being« has been increasingly stressed.

*Svend Erik Olsen: Consciousness*

The concept of consciousness is closely tied to the basic image of man in our society. Consciousness is conceived within a privatizing and introjecting individualistic framework. Alfred Lehmann's phenomenologically oriented concept of consciousness illustrates this. Taking departure from Edgar Rubin and Karl Duncker it is possible to point out an alternative concept of consciousness.

*Arne Poulsen: Self-reflection and classical reflections on the self.*

Sociocentric theories about the self can be distinguished from idiocentric theories, and psychological (indirect) reflectivity from radical (direct) reflectivity. Classical theories were sociocentric, by and large, and sceptical towards radical reflectivity. Today there are two incompatible mainstreams, one sociocentric, the other idiocentric, the latter allowing the possibility of radical reflectivity. Migration, urbanization, and new media are responsible for the historical development of self-awareness, self-reflection and meta-cognition. Self-reflection can be boosted, but only to a definite limit.