

## SUMMARIES IN ENGLISH

### *Arne Poulsen: Bilingualism, cognitive development, and metalinguistic skills*

Additive bilingualism is positively, subtractive bilingualism negatively, associated with school achievement and cognitive development. However, the terms additive and subtractive bilingualism are not designative of two kinds of bilingualism, but of two ways to encourage bilingualism, a fact that explains some contradictory findings in the literature. The dominant theories about the relation between bilingualism and cognitive development are discussed, and it is argued that variations in the ways to encourage bilingualism and metalinguistic awareness, rather than the level of bilingualism itself, are the causal factor in determining the effect on cognitive development.

### *Arne Thing Mortensen: Language and reality.*

On the basis of the distinction between »langue« and »parole«, well-known from structural linguistics, it is argued that philosophical questions concerning the relation between language and reality can be answered without assuming relations of representation or correspondence between words and things/qualities.

### *Ib Ulbæk: Language and Cognition in Human Evolution.*

This paper demonstrates the usefulness of evolutionary analysis in understanding the relation between language and cognition and their origins. It is claimed that language and the other cognitive phenomena consists in individual competences on which the behavior is founded. Natural selection is considered the prime cause in bringing these competences about. Cognitive competences have a biological function in adapting the organism to its physical and social environment, and is existing in other species than the Homo sapiens. Why is language existing only in the human species considering the great advantage it seems to confer on its owner? It is shown that there is a major difference in language and the other cognitive competences. Language depends on special social interaction because of its altruistic nature. Other cognitive competences are selfish, serving the individual. Language could only develop in a group where cooperation is widespread. Cooperation is not a general phenomena in nature but existing in the early hominds. The prerequisites of language is an advanced cognitive protohuman on whose propositional thinking the language could be shaped. From the possibility of making reliable communication the language module could evolve. The language origin in this theory is not connected to animal communication systems but to the prior development of an intelligent being: a cognitive animal.

*Kim Plunkett: Psychological & Linguistic Approaches to Language Acquisition.*

Language acquisition research experienced a boom following the Chomskyan revolution. The focus of attention centred primarily on the English child's acquisition of syntax. In the seventies, the range of problem areas in language acquisition began to diversify and alternative perspectives (non-nativist) on how the child acquires language began to emerge. It is argued that socio-cognitive approaches to language acquisition, though providing an important prerequisite for the acquisition of linguistic structure, cannot themselves account for the acquisition of the complex mapping relation between grammar and meaning that is required for full-blooded linguistic communication. Recent trends in language acquisition research including Learnability theory, Individual differences and Cross-linguistic approaches are reviewed. The article concludes with speculation about the future role of non-nativist approaches in language acquisition research. Although much current detailed work would seem to point to the existence of a Language Acquisition Device that is specifically tuned to the processing of linguistic information, it is premature to conclude that a more general cognitive learning mechanism that is able to account for both universal and particular properties of linguistic development, cannot provide a more parsimonious explanation of acquisition.

*Michael May: Cognitive schemas, basic imaging systems and naive physics: an introduction to cognitive semantics.*

*Frans Gregersen: Historicity and Situation*

Taking as his point of departure a critique of the traditional means of doing empirical research within the psychology of language, viz. the experiment, the author proceeds to diagnose a problem in the book on *Marxism and the philosophy of language* by V.N. Volosjinoff (written in 1929, an english translation was published in 1973). On the one hand, **the word** is seen as the ideological unit *par excellence*, on the other hand, meaning may only be studied as part of **verbal interaction**. This dilemma continues in modern pragmatic linguistics and – it is argued – still mars contemporary sociolinguistics in that the historicity of semantic structures and their variation as determined by socialization processes are simply not studied. Based on Vygotsky's socio-historical approach, the author calls for an empirical sociolinguistics focussing on ideology as meaning structures.

*Jacob L. Mey: 'Sesame Sesame'*

Are there limits to AI? Is 'new' AI better than 'old'? And why? What is the difference, anyway?

This paper examines some of the claims made by the proponents of the 'connectionist' or (PDP) model. In particular, it criticizes the implicit assumption present in much of Cognitive Science today that humans are properly modeled as 'information processors'.

Two essential characteristics of humans which make computer modeling difficult are: *intentionality* and *sociality*. The individual human rests his/her identity on the former notion; the social human on the latter.

Another problem is posed by the indiscriminate use of the notion 'functional equivalence' in connectionist modeling. Here, the output is not the only valid criterion: the way one obtains that output is important, too.

Also, much of connectionist thinking, while explicit at lower levels (the 'subsymbolic'), fails to take the higher levels of mental representation seriously.

Finally, a possibility of dividing up the territory of AI between classical 'GOFAI' and new connectionist paradigms is suggested.

I conclude with ten 'theses' for summation and further discussion.

*Peter Harder: Cognition and Intersubjectivity*

The article takes up the issue of the 'practical ground' (Poulsen 1980) or 'background' (Searle 1983) as opposed to 'cognitive content', with particular reference to the concept of 'mutual knowledge'. A view is presented according to which human subjects relate to the world both as 'practical ground' for action and as 'cognitive content' of the mind, so that the well-functioning subject is able to co-ordinate the two spheres: 'knowing-how' is activated on the basis of 'knowing-that' the conditions of action are satisfied. A view of 'mutual knowledge' is put forward, arguing that the bottomless series of assumptions is neither harmless (as claimed by adherents of the notion) nor invalidating (as claimed in relevance theory). It is furthermore argued that the problem arises because of a lack of awareness of the place of cognitive ('intellectual') content in relation to action. Finally, the view argued is briefly contrasted with some positions where either practice or theory is insufficiently treated, in the light of the position of this paper.