

SUMMARIES IN ENGLISH

Boje Katzenelson: Consciousness: A survey.

After some introductory sections on among other things the mind-body problem the article reviews the no less than 21 or more mental functions that seems to be tied up with the concept of consciousness. Next consciousness is related to the mind as a whole.

Henrik Høgh-Olesen: UNIO MYSTICA – and altered states of consciousness:

The various states of altered consciousness are presented together with a short resumé of the history and the main research results in the area. UNIO MYSTICA – the mysterious experience of unity is thereafter explained in more detail. The phenomenology of the experience is elucidated and a distinction between the contents and the quality of the experience is introduced. Furthermore the conditions linkage to psycho-physiological, somato-psychic and psychological functional processes are discussed. Finally the ontological status of the experience and its importance for our understanding of the human consciousness are encircled.

Niels Ole Finnemann: On the Idea of the finite Mind

In the course of time reflections on the relation between the concepts of physical, biological and mental phenomena have given rise to a number of paradigmatic innovations in science and philosophy. The paper discuss general aspects of the issue with special regard to basic assumptions in the 20th century neo-mechanical theories of the finite mind and artificial intelligence. As a result of the discussion it is suggested that the mind – like ordinary language and informational systems – should be understood as a system of redundant structures or patterns, provided by the neurophysiological system, and allowing the development of new meanings and rules more or less independent of preexisting rules.

Jette Fog: To become conscious.

The topic of this paper is the knowledge-getting process of the psychotherapist in the therapeutic encounter. The awareness and the becoming conscious about what is going on happens on several levels – from tacit knowledge to knowledge that can be articulated. In the first part of the article I am concerned with and demonstrate through an example the figure-ground relationship between the perceptual awareness of the therapist and her practical and theoretical background knowledge. She is primarily aware of the concrete process between her and the other person, and she is aware of the process in the light of all her background of practical and theoretical knowledge. What she sees and senses is »theoryladen«. In the second part of the article I am concerned with »the therapeutic sense«. The action taken in the process is mostly spontaneous, and its conceptualization low. The knowledge folded into the action is tacit. This means that the empathic knowledge is vulnerable to whatever unacknowledged feelings that the therapist harbours. Finally, I describe how the becoming conscious is felt, and how one can know that what has been reached is actually an insight.

Arne Poulsen: Consciousness in the light of developmental psychology.

To be conscious about something is to be able to comment something about it. This ability develops in 6 stages: Triadic communication, self-awareness, metarepresentations, the distinction between perceptual appearance and reality, the conscious relation to algorithms for the regulation of own behaviour, and abstract thinking.

Ole Fogh Kirkeby: About the possibility of a post- (de)constructivistic concept of consciousness on the basis of Phenomenology.

In this paper a *phenomenological* conception of consciousness is presented where the double dualisms, that between consciousness and world, and that between mind and body, have been abolished. To postmodernism the subject of perception and knowledge seemed to be nothing but the linguistical processes. But the situatedness and incorporatedness of consciousness do not have to enforce us to conceive of consciousness as a faculty inherent in the language games. Consciousness is a *conditio activa*, it is a »I am able to do«. Following Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty the paper focuses on the role of this condition in modelling a theory of consciousness which shall neither be satisfied by the images of realism nor of (de-)constructivism.

Anton Aggernæs: Normal and abnormal experiential life. A psychological, psychiatric and philosophical interpretation.

Experiences are the experiences of individuals. They consist in experienced items, experienced qualities connected to the items, plus other qualities of the experiences. The distinction between experiences and experienced items is important.

Both normal experiences and experiences during depressive, delirious, and schizophrenic states are codetermined by stimuli from both environment, memory, motivational and other stimuli from the individual's present state. Emotions are seen as informers of the state of the needs, and feelings as evaluations of the value of objects for one's life.

Integration of biological and psychological concepts is vital in ethiological and therapeutic research. Experiences are some qualities of some brain processes. This conception does not underestimate the importance of experiences, including spiritual ones. Material existence is ontologically important, but experiences are equally important.

The position taken means that concepts of soul, consciousness, determinism, indeterminism, behaviourism, logical empiricism, and solipsism become superfluous, if not harmful. Furthermore, such concepts lead to a lot of pseudoproblems.

Hanne Udesen & Anders Gade: Brain damage and consciousness

Some patients with brain damage have access to knowledge which they are unaware of, and which they cannot consciously express. Others lack access to knowledge about being ill. Yet other brain damaged patients lack access to knowledge of parts of the self or their surroundings. The article describes a number of these »diseases of consciousness« and their significance for our understanding of the relationship between the brain and consciousness.

Rune Skovgaard Rasmussen: The Function and Development of Human Consciousness

Human consciousness may be described as a representational system consisting of 3 interacting levels: (1) *The presentation*, which is the part of the physical reality that influences the human senses. (2) *The representation*, which is defined by; (2a) a selective mental reflection of the presentation; (2b) a mental reflection of stored phenomena from long term memory; (2c) a selective mental reflection of the presentation in relation to stored phenomena from long term memory. (3) *The meta-representation*, which is an abstraction and/or an expansion of an original representation. It is argued that the *function* of the human representational system must be understood in relation to *problem solving*.

New evidence concerning the mental and cultural level of chimpanzees is examined in relation to an understanding of the *phylogenetic development* of the human representational system. The basic assumption is that the chimpanzees do possess a representational system, which is *different* in *capacity* from the human representational system.

Evidence concerning the mental and cultural level of chimpanzees is further extended in the light of archaeological findings, which indicate that the development of the capacity of the human representational system is related directly to phylogenetic development of larger *brain size*.

Martin Johansen: The Joy and the Tear.

Certain intense feelings of joy are often accompanied by an outburst of tears to which momentarily belongs a singular slightly grieflike shade of emotion that has never been named. The point is that there are types of joy where this cannot happen.

The conditions of ejaculation of tears in relation to joy seem to consist in the joy's object being only obtained after great pains have been taken, and after doubt as to succeeding in getting it. – Or when somebody you have been in great danger of losing, yet is regained. – A life-threatening situation that has suddenly and unexpectedly been lightened. – An applause for reappearance after a disabling illness. Etc. Here the tearful joy will arrive.

Joys without that kind of factors will never result in moist eyes. Ordinary pleasure of working, love of good food, joy at dominating, joy at rageing, – at snobbing, etc. On the other hand certain joys of sensuously clear impressions as of music and of considerable natural phenomena may – without the factors mentioned – lead to outburst of tears.

A number of examples of the phenomena pointed out has been described. – A principal division of joy-phenomena is suggested.