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Redaktionen lægger vægt på faglighed, formidling og politisk relevans. Derfor er alle
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Introduction: the sound(s) of politics

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Livingston, March/April 2020

We often lose so much of ourselves in the pursuit of science, in the writing of knowledge, in the production of (a) 'truth'. So much so that, more often than not, the aesthetic and affective registers through which we come to know and engage with the (global) political issues that we study fall out of the final products we produce—the articles, book chapters, edited volumes, lectures, and so on (Bleiker 2009; Åhäll 2018). That is why this special issue on music and politics starts with my own aesthetic and affective encounters with music and its politicality. For readers, this will hopefully serve less as a self-indulgent exercise and more as an exploration of (global) politics, music, and the personal. What follows is a bricolage of personal memory snippets about how music and (international) politics intersect[1].

As I write the introduction to this insightful, inspiring collection of essays and conversation pieces that centre on the sound(s) of politics, we are in the midst of the coronavirus pandemic. In fact, I write this from the small pavilion in my parents' back garden where I am quarantined for fourteen days. At times like these existential questions arise, productivity (rightly) nosedives, and we start to reassess what is important as the people around us are differentially affected by the virus. It becomes important just to make it through, not to produce ground-breaking scholarship. However, this special issue on the sound(s) of politics offers an apt space to comment on one of the things to come out of the Covid-19 pandemic that I am struck by: how music has been a central feature of our response.

Upon noticing that music was a central feature to weathering the Covid-19 storm, I was provoked to trace my thoughts and ways of encountering the relationship between music and politics over the years. In this introduction, I will first elaborate on some of the ways that music is being used during the pandemic to illustrate the links between music—a seemingly mundane part of popular culture—and (international) politics. Then, reifying the feminist mantra that the personal is political, I reflect on my own encounters with music as (international) politics.

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[1] Thanks to Laura Holderied for constructive feedback and conversation on this point.

Music, Politics, Coronavirus

As the potential scale of coronavirus started to become clear, the UK's NHS[2] and USA's CDC[3] told its citizens to ensure they washed their hands for a full twenty seconds by singing 'Happy Birthday'. One social media user created a website called 'Wash Your Lyrics', which generates a hand-washing technique poster complete with lyrics to any song of your choosing, allowing you to sing along while you scrub[4].

As Europe went into lockdown, videos emerged of Italians having collective singalongs from their balconies—as had also happened in Wuhan but with much less European media attention—sparking a global trend in music as a way of 'getting through' (Kearney 2020). Since then music has become one of the unacknowledged beacons of the pandemic, at least in Europe. Testament to this, Rotterdam's Philharmonic Orchestra, the Orchestre National de Lyon, La Scala's Philharmonic Orchestra, Orchestre National de France, and the UK's Royal Opera House Orchestra and Chorus have all used social media to put on virtual concerts (Tilden 2020). Both to distract some attention from the pandemic in a moment of respite and to fulfil cancelled concerts.

In the UK, the BBC's Radio arm has coordinated a cross-station singalong for key workers "designed to lift spirits during the lockdown" (BBC 2020a). This inadvertently exposed the overwhelmingly white, middle-to-upper class Radio 2 listeners to the sounds of the BBC Asian Network. This alone speaks to the ways that sound is political. In Glasgow, an Elvis impersonator performed a coronavirus gig from his balcony before being interrupted by police (Hammil 2020). The accompanying video suggests this was from a social housing estate, raising questions about class inequalities and access to outdoor (green) spaces such as a personal garden. On this, UK policing strategies have been criticised for the discriminatory punishment of those without private gardens as many were berated for using communal parks for activities other than their government-sanctioned sixty minutes of daily exercise (Moore 2020). Such inequalities and the governments' presumption about the ease of working from home have been addressed variously across social and news media (Hanley 2020). In another important turn, which speaks to the emotional and political power of music, Queen Elizabeth II referenced Vera Lynn's wartime classic 'We'll Meet Again', professing that: "we will be with our friends again, we will be with our families again, we will meet again" (BBC 2020b).

More globally, music streaming services from Spotify to Apple Music have launched lockdown playlists. Apple, for example, launched 'At home with Apple Music', which features interviews with artists about their specially curated playlists. Some of these critique governments' responses to the crisis either directly or implicitly. Two notable music artists—Troye Sivan and Charli XCX—have used the lockdown to collaborate with creatives who would ordinarily be excluded from the music industry (Buzzfeed 2020; Rolling Stone 2020). Others still have remixed popular songs to spread messages

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[2] https://www.nhs.uk/live-well/healthy-body/best-way-to-wash-your-hands/
[3] https://www.cdc.gov/handwashing/when-how-handwashing.html
[4] https://washyourlyrics.com/

of solidarity and to reiterate lockdown guidelines[5]. In the case of the latter, they've almost become involuntary spokespeople for the government—an inherently political act, even if well intended and essential in "flattening the curve". Lady Gaga, who I discuss later, partnered with the World Health Organisation and Global Citizen to curate a digitally broadcast gig 'One World: Together at Home' to support the fight against Covid-19.

These examples are not exhaustive of the ways music has been used during the coronavirus pandemic and I list them to show the extent of music's impact in these testing times across all political spatialities from the individual, national (UK), regional (Europe), to the global. The politics of some of these examples may not be clear on the surface. One might suggest that music is simply filling the role of entertainment, a distraction from the news and scenes in hospitals the world over; just more mundane popular culture. Yet, all of these examples are political in their own ways, touching on themes such as empire (the Queen's speech), social inequality, race and ethnicity, capitalism, and the (international) political economy of music, amongst many others. Here, I will take the BBC singalong example, which focuses on celebrating key workers, and Troye Sivan and Charli XCX's lockdown music projects.

First, let's look at BBC Radio. Each week, one group of workers is celebrated in this national singalong. As I write this, we've just had a singalong for delivery drivers, those keeping us stocked up on essentials and supplying the books, newly repopularised jigsaw puzzles, games consoles, garden games, and the like to get us through the pandemic. The BBC's celebration of key workers, which has mostly focused on healthcare staff, comes in the context of parliament's rejection of pay rises and proposed post-Brexit immigration rules, which would class so many of these newly categorised 'essential workers' (in waste management, supermarkets, nursing, transport, factories) as 'unskilled' and unable to migrate to the UK. During the pandemic, these "unskilled" workers, as the British government had previously labelled them, have rightly been recognised as those who keep the country running (O'Carroll et al. 2020). And not just in times of crisis. In this sense, music has become a site for exploring societal inequalities and class politics. Music has become a way of subtly demanding increased funding for the NHS, which under the Tory government has been gutted, and it has become a way of reintroducing a sense of community with our neighbours, families, and peers through community singalongs and dancing that has been almost eradicated in the past two decades.

Also highlighting global socioeconomic inequalities, Troye Sivan and Charli XCX's respective 'lockdown' music projects sees both artists creating music with fans and those in the creative arts that they would otherwise have never connected with pre-lockdown. Their projects highlight the drastic inequalities in the creative arts and how the sector has become even more precarious in the years since the global financial crisis. These inequalities persist not just in terms of barriers to access but also in terms of personal and global economy. Many in the creative arts rely on the so-called 'gig economy'

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[5] https://www.instagram.com/p/B_ABffbodac/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link
https://twitter.com/thekillers/status/1239362297304207361
https://www.refinery29.com/en-us/2020/03/9593092/handwashing-songs-changed-lyrics

and are in unsecured work: this lockdown leaves many without a source of income, leading to further (gendered, racialised, and classed) inequalities, particularly vis-à-vis health care in this moment. Most governments have yet to announce bailouts or safety nets for (those in) the arts sector, still cash strapped from cuts and disdain for government-backed arts projects since 2008. Yet those same governments have been fast to secure big corporations. This raises questions about who wins, who loses, power, precarity, inequality, and political-economic priorities not just during this pandemic but in 'normal' times. The gendered-racialised-classed politics of the music industry—how music is distributed, its political economy, access, rights, who listens to what, and so on—are similar to that in the film industry, which I have too little space to explore in depth (for an interesting discussion on the political economy of film, see Harman 2019).

I started with this example of coronavirus to highlight one of the various ways music can be political and how politics runs deep in the way we 'cope' with coronavirus. Next, I turn to other encounters with music as politics.

Livingston, May 2011

Turning back to a different period in my musical and political life, it's May 23, 2011. I've recently turned seventeen and I'm preparing to sit the most important exams of any Scottish teenagers' life; they'll determine whether I get into university or not. I'm at home studying and I'm listening to BBC Radio 1. Apart from it being a regular Monday, today Scott Mills gets the first play of the lead single from Lady Gaga's third studio album. Little to my knowledge the album had already leaked in its entirety. I don't remember the exact time but there's a big build up and then Gaga's voice sings: "It doesn't matter if you love him, or capital H-I-M…'cause you were born this way, baby," later continuing "no matter gay, straight, or bi, lesbian, transgender life, I'm on the right track baby, I was born to survive". This wasn't the first time Gaga had explored queerness in her music— recall Poker Face and her proclamation that she was "bluffin' with [her] muffin"—but it was the first time *I* had heard a mainstream artist offer up a queer space, an anthem that I could, at least then, identify with.

Today, I can see how the song has many flaws and can be problematic. One being how it essentialises sexuality, making it innate, unchanging, fixed, and some biologically pre-determined 'identity' (Altman 2019: 19). While its goals may be emancipatory and celebratory, the song is somewhat a product of its time, ignoring the possibility that sexuality, like gender, is a practice, a doing, that is fluid and evolving. However, it did receive critical acclaim. Elton John lauded it as "new gay anthem" (Jonze 2011). Anyone who frequents queer spaces will know this to be true: it is indeed one of the queer bops of the millennial era, despite its potentially problematic messaging. Out of every sound I'd listened to, this was one of the most overtly political songs, and albums, that I could identify with and carved out a queer space of self-acceptance. This is quite the feat given that I fell asleep listening Bob Marley as a baby/toddler and grew up surrounded by the sounds

of other incredibly political artists such as The Clash, Ramones, Madness, The Who, The Kinks, The Specials, and Crass.

Importantly, the 'Born This Way' album came on the back of Gaga's fierce campaigning for the repeal of the infamous 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' policy in the US armed forces, which allowed members to serve so long as they were not openly homosexual. Again, supporting a repeal of DADT is somewhat problematic and antithetical to some queer feminist politics, which problematise militarism for all the gendered, racialised, sexualised power politics it underpins and (re)produces. That said, for all the talk of "jumping on the queer bandwagon," Gaga, though not the first pop artist to do so, has been an advocate of equality and supporting the queer community. A repeal of DADT and same-sex marriage are both symbolic wins for queer people, even if problematic for supporting heteronormative (militarised) structures.

This all speaks to the (musical) politics of power. While the execution of her support for the queer community may be flawed at times and the music at times problematic, if we take a step back from academe and elitist, often exclusionary, queer studies (Brim 2020), that song, the album (which makes implicit reference to *Hair* that Dennis Altman discusses later), and Gaga's openly political stance, did something for those exploring their sexual 'self', figuring out their political space in the world, and fighting for acceptance and the right to live and thrive. There's a politics both in celebrating such work and in writing it off as problematic and refusing to engage it for what it is: an artist's desire to stick it to the heteropatriarchal system.

As JJ Halberstam argues: "This punk or wild [Gaga] feminism hints at a future rather than prescribing one; it opens out onto possibilities rather than naming them; it gestures toward new forms of revolt rather than patenting them" (2012: xiii). It pushes feminisms towards queer as well. My confrontation with Lady Gaga's music and its politics also highlights Annika Bergman Rosamond's point in this issue that: "musical activism is often associated with mainstream popular culture rather than plights of indigenous musicians" (Bergman Rosamond in this issue, 71).

St Andrews, September 2015

During my final undergraduate year, I took Caron Gentry's course on Gender and Terrorism. Caron showed us two music videos to establish the gendered nature of politics: Kasey Musgraves 'Follow Your Arrow'[6] and Grace Petrie's 'Farewell to Welfare'[7]. Both were folk/country singers, relatively conservative genres, of roughly the same age who took different approaches to being political in their music. Kacey Musgraves is quite cleverly outspoken, albeit in a sanitised and cautious manner, with her lyrics "if you don't save yourself for marriage you're a ho—rrible person," which explicitly targets political

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[6] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kQ8xqyoZXCc
[7] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CkNT3ktaX7Y

questions around religion, sex, marriage, and by extension patriarchy. Grace Petrie's body reads as queer, gender non-conforming. Petrie sings about the UK welfare system and its ravaging at the hands of the Conservative government. While slightly different in their approaches, they both sing about gendered and sexualised norms, and how supposedly more inclusive, diverse politics marginalises and affects.

Petrie's performance and appearance read as 'masculine' in a heteropatriarchal matrix, opening up questions about our perceptions of masculinity/femininity, gender/sex, identities. Musgraves' is quite stereotypically 'feminine', perhaps a political move to play within the gendered logics of the system as a means of subverting it. Both sing about different, albeit similar, political issues in their respective countries (US and UK). While Musgraves' work might be considered as mainstream, Petrie does not have a multimillion dollar record deal and their work might be read as more political because of its anarchistic lyrics and titles. These two artists push us to think: Why do we categorise some music as political and some as apolitical? What makes it political? Did they intend it as political or did it become so? Did we receive it as political? Were we aware it was political? And, if we take seriously Barthes' (1977, 142-148) point about polysemy and the death of the author, what does that mean in terms of audience, production, and circulation? These questions speak to the goals of this special issue, which explores how music is not just political in its lyrics but its performance, reception, and composition.

Copenhagen/Melbourne, 2020

When teaching gender, sexuality, and sex, I often use clips from *RuPaul's Drag Race* to demonstrate the social construction of gender/sex and to explain Judith Butler's performativity (Butler 1990). In my own work on the politics of belonging and identity in the USA, I have explored what it means to 'be American' in ways that are different from the Geroge W. Bush Administration's construction of white, heterosexual, cisgendered Americanness (Cooper-Cunningham 2020). In Season 10 of RuPaul's Drag Race (2018), the four final contestants are tasked with recording and performing a version of RuPaul's 'American'[8], which speaks to this very question: what is it to be 'American'?

All four contestants wrote their own lyrics. Some of these reproduce standard Americanisms about liberty, freedom, and the American Dream but they also simultaneously push against the racialised, heteropatriarchal, immigrant-loathing structures governing what 'American' means. This all takes place in the context of a Trump presidency, which adds an obvious layer of politicality to the performance of lyrics that I need not unpack here.

The lyrics, performance, and composition of this Drag Race finale are key to destabilising—queering—the logics of 'Americanness' and asserting the ways that the nation is performed through and upon individual bodies. I could write at length on this song

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[8] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sTakd0y0Qnc

and its performance but let me highlight just a few aspects. In performance terms, this is four queer men dressed in drag—a highly politicised and often problematic practice—singing about being American, "the red, white, and blue," in a way that destabilises the popular image of acceptable US-American citizenship (see: Puar and Rai 2002; Puar 2007; Weber 2011). It is replete with salutes and military-style dance moves (see Baker in this issue) but it is also gender-norm-subordinating; it is queer through and through.

In its musical composition (see Franklin in this issue), a military parade-style drumbeat underpins key parts of the song where contestants sing "I am American…the red, white, and blue" (ca. 1min20s), highlighting the inseparability of Americanness and militarised culture. In lyrical terms, Eureka is perhaps the most (queerly) political: "It's not about your color, gender, or size / But if we come together, we can rise / I came from nothing, made me wanna scream / But I fought for my piece of the American Dream / You can be a stripe and get in line / Or be a star and not be defined" (ca. 1min 40s). The reference to the US flag, here, highlights the identity politics of difference in the US as well as the imagined nature of the nation: you can be a star or get in line but at the end of the day, we are all American. These lyrics emphasise the struggle in being recognised as an acceptable body, an acceptable American citizen in ways that confound a Trumpian vision of Americanness.

Livingston, April 2020

Turning to the contents of the special issue rather than engaging with its subject, there are three article-length takes on the politicality of music and three conversation pieces, all centring on *the sound(s) of politics.* Catherine Baker takes a queer approach to the study of music and politics, drawing on work from IR on popular culture as well as feminist and queer theories. Baker offers an analysis of militarism in Rihanna's *Hard* music video, connecting visual politics, aesthetics, and feminist and queer approaches on militarism that unpacks how this video and other popular-cultural artefacts using militarised aesthetics do political work. Drawing on a queer and feminist curiosity, Baker's article links nicely to Marianne Franklin's by introducing a focus on "elements of audiovisual and musical meaning which are rarely appreciated as significant in international politics: the synchronisation of sound, moving image and performance" (Baker in this issue: 31).

Franklin's focus on music-making and performance emphasises that we must examine the politics of production and composition as well as modes of performance, musical arrangements, and performance contexts in addition to reception and lyrics. In her article, Franklin uses the song 'My Way' and its various incarnations to reveal the underlying politics of music-making, arguing that: "the making of music can both reveal and resist incumbent powers at the nexus of political and cultural life" (Franklin in this issue 52).

Then, Annika Bergman Rosamond ties together postcolonial and feminist work with her interest in celebrity to study Sweden's colonial subordination of the Sami people.

Exploring mining, colonisation, and music, Bergman Rosamond analyses Sami musician Sofia Jannok's efforts to decolonise the Sapmi area of Sweden through music. She shows how Jannok uses musical alongside activist political statements to destabilise hegemonic tales of the Swedish nation as an exceptional 'good state' and its moral credentials as a rights-giving, caring welfare state.

Turning to the *Conversations* section of the special issue, authors were given free reign to do as they so wished. The aim of this section was to provoke interesting discussions and push boundaries through shorter think pieces. First in the section, and following Bergman-Rosamond's postcolonial approach, Dina AlAwadhi and Jason Dittmer examine the relationship between Led Zeppelin's *Immigrant Song* and the Marvel Cinematic Universe's *Thor: Ragnarok*. In an important provocation, the authors examine how music inspires the politics of other media, such as film. They go on to argue that using *Immigrant Song* twice in the Marvel film highlights the theme of empire that runs through much of the Marvel cinematic universe. In this sense, the soundtrack is part of a postcolonial subversion of the superhero genre.

Simon Philpott turns to musical politics in Australia. Exploring Indigenous artists' work and the negotiation of racialised colonial legacies, Philpott argues that "along with sports, music is one way that Indigenous peoples have found their way into the hearts, and minds, of other Australians" (Philpott in this issue: 94). This thorough *conversation* piece prompts questions about imagining the nation's pasts, presents, and futures through music as well as the ways that music is used to navigate, bring attention to, and protest highly exclusionary and racist politics. In apt conclusion, which highlights the polysemous politics of all discourse, Philpott notes the unending challenge of knowing "there may be something happening here, but what is not exactly clear" (Philpott in this issue: 98).

And, lastly, Dennis Altman takes us through the politics of musicals, noting that *Hamilton*, although lauded for its politicality, is not the first to engage with politics. Altman deftly traces how the musical is a key site (and sight) of politics from Broadway to London's West End and beyond. By showing how musicals bring together multiple genres of music, Altman demonstrates the transboundary nature of the musical, how it defies rigid music genres and confronts politics in many different ways. Doing so, he argues that the musical is not just light entertainment but "a form which sometimes allowed politically difficult subjects to be put before a wider audience" (Altman in this issue: 100). Altman unpacks the various politics at play in several productions, knitting together several key political themes touched on in the issue—sexuality and gender, race, class, war, and revolution—and reiterating the key argument running through this special issue: music is political and we must tune into the sound(s) of politics.

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'Couture military' and a queer aesthetic curiosity: music video aesthetics, militarised fashion, and the embodied politics of stardom in Rihanna's 'Hard'[1]

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Music video is an underappreciated type of audiovisual artefact in studies of the aesthetics of world politics, which typically privilege linear narrative storytelling and struggle to communicate how sonic and embodied practices also constitute world politics as sensory experiences through which individuals make sense of the world. Yet the ways in which music video invites spectators' senses to work together, and to filter meaning through their knowledge of stars' own 'meta-narratives', expose an intimate and affective continuum between the politics of stardom and attachments to collective projects such as militarism. This paper explores that continuum through a study of Rihanna's video 'Hard' and the aesthetic strategies it used to visualise her performance of a 'female military masculinity' in a fantasised space employing signifiers of US desert war.

In December 2009, at the end of a year in which Rihanna had been forced into a struggle to control and redefine her public persona after being assaulted by her then partner, the second single from her image-redefining album *Rated R* appeared with a video proclaiming her resilience and invulnerability, placing her in a succession of haute-couture-styled military-themed outfits in the middle of a fantastic version of a desert war. 'Hard', released while fans and journalists were still debating the meanings of the BDSM imagery around *Rated R*'s lead single 'Russian Roulette', asserted Rihanna's triumphs in the music industry and the luxury they had earned her result with a defiant message to her online haters and the repeated declaration in the chorus 'I'm so hard'. Its video translated the innuendo of this symbolic appropriation of masculinity into a military setting, showing

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Rihanna both in command of displaying her own sensuality and in dominant positions over men – inviting the viewer to co-operate in "telling stories" (Shepherd 2013) about gender, race, geopolitics, violence and survival while subverting, reinscribing, exploiting and/or queering the association between 'hardness', masculinity and military power. While the video's entanglements with the gendered and racialised world politics of the Obama presidency's "avant-garde militarism" (Cannen 2014) now make it a historic artefact, it exposes an affective continuum between militarisation and stardom that can be explored further for other political moments including our own. The insights into music video aesthetics necessary to perceive this continuum at work highlight a relationship between music and visuality which suggests that articulations between senses are important for understanding not just the embodied politics of militarisation but the wider field of aesthetic politics itself.

Just as much as the better-researched audiovisual genres of film and serial television, music video is also a site through which viewers and listeners encounter narratives about gender, race, geopolitics, violence and security which form part of their everyday experience of international politics and their everyday entanglements of war. Yet music, as Matt Davies and M. I. Franklin (2015) argue, is still underappreciated in studies of world politics due to the methodological challenges of perceiving the political work of sound – with rare exceptions such as Susanna Hast's argument that music can itself be a form of knowledge production about war (Hast 2018, 5). Emblematically, even authors as attentive to the intimate and embodied dimensions of politics as Darcy Leigh and Cynthia Weber refer only to "distillations of shared meanings in words *or images*" (2019, 83, my emphasis) in defining the gendered and sexualised "figurations" around which ideas and practices of security are organised. The sonic dimension of musical meaning in world politics is essential and even then, this paper argues, insufficient for understanding the aesthetics of contemporary popular music, which make songs not just auditory artefacts but audiovisual ones. Exploring how viewers might have made sense of the "military chic" (Tynan 2013) of 'Hard' illustrates much about the aesthetics of music video as a genre: particularly its use of embodied performance to produce meaning in synchronisation with sound, language and moving images, and its reliance as an element of meaning on stars' biographies, or what the music video scholar Andrew Goodwin (1992, 98) termed stars' "metanarratives". These assemblages of musical and visual representations show that the mediated sensory experiences of encountering world politics in the everyday are *multi*-sensory: the meanings of audiovisual artefacts cannot be read simply from sound, language, still image *or* moving video, but exist in the synchronicities and dissonances between them, mediated by what audiences know about the bodies they contain.

The first step towards demonstrating this is however to establish that music itself – let alone music video – still deserves more recognition as an aesthetic and embodied form of creativity and meaning-making that circulates through and mediates people's experiences of international politics. The "soundscapes" and "musickings" of International Relations (IR) are, Franklin (2005, 6–10) argues, just as important as the visual practices and metaphors through which the international is much more often perceived, and many

uses that individuals and institutions have made of music have indeed been acknowledged as internationally politically significant acts. These include the use of national anthems as instruments of state-building and symbols of a state's sovereignty and distinctiveness in international society (Kelen 2014); music as a component of and occasion for cultural diplomacy (Ramel and Prévost-Thomas (ed.) 2018); punk and hip-hop as transnational forms of oppositional politics and protest (Lock 2005; Dunn 2008); music as a tool of polarisation and separation during ethnopolitical conflict (Baker 2013), or as a resource in post-conflict peacebuilding (Pruitt 2013); the actions states take against musicians they see as security threats (Côté 2011); the international political economy of gender, militarism and imperialism that entertainers such as Carmen Miranda negotiated in becoming stars (Enloe 2014, 213–18); human rights campaigns mobilising around oppressed musicians such as Pussy Riot (Street 2013; Wiedlack 2016), or being led by musicians as celebrity humanitarians (Repo and Yrjölä 2011); international musical competitions such as Eurovision as platforms for promoting desired versions of national identity (Jones and Subotić 2011) or making international LGBTQ political claims (Baker 2017); and the music of the black diaspora as a site of anti-colonial resistance and knowledge production (Gilroy 1993; Shilliam 2015, 109–30). The sensory and embodied aspects of music are nevertheless still not explored as deeply or as often as their visual equivalents, despite the pronounced turn in international politics research towards theorising aesthetics and emotions.

Revealing what music can add to an aesthetic approach to international politics, Roland Bleiker (2005, 179–80) argues, involves going beyond the places "where references to the political are easy to find" – that is, beyond lyrics, which as text and language are the most accessible elements of meaning within conventional epistemologies for studying world politics, and also beyond political contentions involving musicians as actors. While scholars are being called upon to think beyond the affective meanings of language in world politics by considering other aesthetic and sensory experiences as well (Sylvester 2013; Solomon 2015, 59), and it is testament to how far studies of visuality in global politics have outstripped other senses that Kyle Grayson and Jocelyn Mawdsley (2019, 436) are also urging IR to overcome an "ocular-centrism" which privileges sight (Grayson and Mawdsley 2019, 436). Bleiker (2005, 179) himself has transcended language and visuality by studying instrumental classical music rather than music with lyrics, asking "What can we hear that we cannot see? And what is the political content of this difference?" The methodological challenge of studying popular music, however, is only firstly to recognise the importance of the sonic; it is then to reckon with the way that sound and visuality in popular music have become not just incidentally but also structurally intertwined. Beyond the incidental visuality of music that already exists in audiences' "witnessing and response" to live performance (Slee 2017, 153), broadcast television's promotion of popular music and music video's emergence as a genre of cultural artefact created an audiovisual aesthetics of popular music which has carried over into, while also being transformed by, the age of digital and social media.

Music video's origin as a genre and product is typically, though simplistically, ascribed to the launch of MTV on North American satellite television in 1981 and in Europe in 1987 (Arnold et al. 2017, 1). Its aesthetics have developed through two main phases, each linked to technological innovations and their surrounding configurations of capital, power and creativity. The first, televisual and analogue, phase of music video aesthetics arose from MTV creating a new promotional platform which required hit singles to have audiovisual accompaniments to be shown. Foundational works on music video aesthetics from the turn of the 1980s–90s divided into cultural critique explaining music video's editing, content and style through theories of postmodernism (Kaplan 1987), and studies of its distinctive ways of producing meaning, including Andrew Goodwin's ground-breaking work theorising stardom and embodiment as well as sound and image into the structural analysis of music video (Goodwin 1992). Since the 1990s, digital editing techniques and computer-generated imagery have permitted music video creators to visualise settings, movements and montages unrestricted by analogue recording and editing constraints, while broadband internet, online streaming platforms such as YouTube, and mobile internet devices have delinked music video from state-regulated broadcast television, editorially mediated playlisting, and proximity to television sets, creating a new "digital audiovisual aesthetics" (Vernallis 2013, 74; see Richardson, Gorbman and Vernallis (ed.) 2013). While analogue music video functioned largely to advertise recorded tracks (Goodwin 1992, 28), and was usually harder to access and lower in quality than audio recordings, music videos today "are now clearly primary products in their own right", capable of reaching greater audiences than the audio of the same song (Railton and Wilson 2012, 7). Rather than displaying what we hear and *cannot* see, music video aesthetics concern what we hear and what we see at once, and their politics are the politics of how these senses converge.

As well as being an audiovisual medium, music video is also fundamentally an embodied one, centred around the meanings of the performer as star. Not all videos feature their stars (some solely contain other dancers or actors), and they need not even depict bodies at all; nevertheless, deciding not to feature a performer in music video is as conscious an aesthetic choice about how their stardom will structure the video as it is to decide how a performer will be embodied in it. Music as a purely sonic phenomenon is, of course, embodied already: it is the result of the body producing sound through the vocal cords, through gestures, and through interaction with other found or manufactured material objects, and audiences hear, see and experience it through the gendered and racialised lenses of their own socially-situated embodied knowledge (McClary 2000): while racialised practices of distinction and categorisation are usually seen as based on visual difference, race can also be heard, producing what Jennifer Lynn Stoever (2016, 4) calls "the sonic color line". When music becomes an audiovisual artefact, however, it additionally involves the representation of performing bodies through techniques and gazes with prior histories in cinema and television – but also through conventions which are unique to or considered typical of music video, to the extent that they can make other audiovisual

artefacts 'look like a music video' or 'look like MTV' when employed elsewhere (Vernallis 2004). Before asking what imaginations of gender, violence and militarisation might have been at work in Rihanna's 'Hard', therefore, we should consider what is distinctive about music video aesthetics and how they might enhance methodologies for understanding visual and digital media in international politics.

Music video aesthetics and international politics

Studies of music video aesthetics, combined with existing approaches to making sense of popular cultural artefacts (more and more of which are audiovisual) in international politics, emphasise aspects of audiovisual meaning typically underappreciated in analyses of linear fictional narratives on screen. The obstacles to perceiving music video as a kind of cultural artefact capable of being "constitutive" (Grayson, Davies and Philpott 2009, 157) of people's affective relations towards world politics likely stem not just from residual perceptions that songs' most 'real' forms are their audio recordings, or the lingering effects of critics' dismissals of music video as postmodern, but also from the fact that music video depends far less than film or television on narrative – the concept around which methods for interpreting popular culture in world politics have chiefly been organised (see Shepherd 2013). Narrative, in the sense of a plot with a protagonist, obstacles and change, is not a structural prerequisite of music video and often is absent altogether; even if the digital video era with relaxed content restrictions, new post-production tools (using the same technology that provides backdrops and special effects for films and video games, so that music videos' action can increasingly unfold in the same digitally-generated settings as these (Jenkins 2006, 104)) and more capacity for pre/post-song film sequences *might* (and do) enable 'novel forms of narrative' in music video (Vernallis 2013, 27), the form itself has not been rebuilt around narrative in such a way.

Viewers do, nevertheless, make meaning out of music video through narrative – both the narrative they try to construct through organising videos' montages of images and sound/image convergences into an interpretive web (Adriaans 2016, 22), and narratives about the public personas of their stars. These "metanarratives", Goodwin (1992, 103) argued using Richard Dyer's theory of star "texts" (see Dyer 1998), are composed of audiences' knowledge about stars' past performances, publicity and public representations of their private life. While music video's convergence of music and image distinguishes it both from narrative audiovisual formats and from still visual images, the importance of star metanarratives in music video aesthetics distinguishes them from other forms of short video with musical soundtracks as well. Explicitly discerning star metanarratives in audiovisual artefacts which harness the politics of stardom or celebrity to any degree should thus be among our methodological tools for observing world politics at work through media and popular culture.

Moreover, music video is also renowned for making the aesthetics of embodiment an essential element of meaning, raising complex questions about what viewers hear and

see which can also be posed of other audiovisual forms. Most music videos put bodies in the metaphorical, and sometimes literal, spotlight, as featured performers, supporting dancers, actors, and/or crowds at actual or simulated live performances; the choice to make a music video without bodies is equally possible using audiovisual technology but creates a statement about that video's relation to the form. The pleasures of watching music video depend on spectatorial gazes which are simultaneously gendered and racialised (Railton and Watson 2012), and as Sunil Manghani (2017, 32) observes, "the editing of the *gendered* body […] has arguably become the most prevalent and recognizable characteristic of the pop video aesthetic". Alongside (or rather, contributing to and informed by) star meta-narratives themselves, the style and dress of the performer(s) and the "[m]ovement, dance, and embodied action" (Slee 2017, 147) shown on screen are equally constitutive elements of meaning within music video as lyrics, spatial setting, instrumentation or sound. As "points of identification" (Goodwin 1992, 117) for the viewer, stars provide a particularly powerful affective hinge between the viewer and the (geo)political narratives and imaginations that a video contains.

Studying audiovisual popular music thus helps to highlight the importance of embodiment, performance and spectatorship, as well as sound, to studies of "visual global politics" (Bleiker (ed.) 2018), digital media (Shepherd and Hamilton (ed.) 2016), and popular culture and world politics (Grayson, Davies and Philpott 2009). These fields' methodological paradigms for making political sense of audiovisual popular culture were largely developed through analysing cinema and serial television, and more recently also video games. Applying Annick Wibben's "narrative approach" to feminist security studies (see Wibben 2011) to popular television drama, Laura Shepherd (2013, 12) was thus able to demonstrate that the "ideas and ideals about gender and violence" embedded made these entertainment shows "profoundly political". Nevertheless, although her methodology did offer the potential for studying "the embodied performance of narrative identity" (Shepherd 2013, 9) through factors such as body language and non-linguistic visual tropes as well as spoken words, in practice most popular culture and world politics studies of television still emphasise plot and dialogue, that is, what can most easily be contained in text. The interactivity of video games, where players must physically manipulate devices in order to advance and co-produce the aesthetic experience on screen (see Jarvis and Robinson, in press), has challenged scholars to reconfigure their methodologies around the aesthetic practices that set this genre apart.

A growing literature on digital media in international politics has meanwhile called attention to various types of short-form video as significant artefacts in the "mediatized everyday" (Åhäll 2016, 162) of international politics. These include military (Newman 2013) and extremist (Leander 2017) recruitment videos, arms manufacturers' promotional videos (Åhäll 2015), tribute videos to fallen soldiers (Knudsen and Stage 2013), soldiers' own front-line video production (Andén-Papadopoulos 2009) and musical parodies (Shafer 2016), viral clips documenting news events (Saugmann Andersen 2017), and ISIS videos of execution and beheading, around which there is already an established literature (Friis 2015; Patruss 2016; Chouliaraki and Kissas 2018). Mette Crone (2014,

294), for instance, acknowledges ISIS videos as not simply visual texts but also "aesthetic assemblages", that is, "technologies that juxtapose linguistics, sound, images and matter" just as is the case for music video. The prevalence of studies on these topics hints at what International Relations most readily recognises as political, that is, armed conflict, violence, terrorism and unrest. Yet online video platforms and social media, technologies which have made "video […] central to security politics" (Saugmann Andersen 2017, 355) place these in the same digital spaces as entertainment artefacts like music video: within a few minutes, users can be equally likely to see, watch or interact with any of them on an algorithmically generated social media feed.

Understanding that the distinctive meaning-making feature of music video is its mode of producing metanarratives through the performing bodies of stars simultaneously links them into world politics through studies of embodied performance and celebrity. Critical studies of celebrity humanitarianism have deconstructed the visual spectacles stars create through stars' off-stage performances of aid, especially the coloniality inherent to the trope of the benevolent white visitor to Africa (Repo and Yrjölä 2011; Müller 2018). The affective politics of celebrity and stardom amplify spectators' identification with political narratives. M Evren Eken (2019, 223), discussing actors' methods for creating the semblance of emotional and physical authenticity in war films, argues that the emotions they communicate facilitate the audience "affectively embod[ying] and empathis[ing] with" the hegemonic geopolitical narratives that war films dramatise, in a more "visceral engagement" than the narrative's bare bones would produce. Katarina Birkedal (2019, 188), similarly, explores how embodied and fashioned performances can charge "everyday emotional attachments to martial discourses" in superhero/supervillain cosplay, whose characters have first been personified by stars and who come from storyworlds that revolve around geopolitical narratives of security, violence and war. Fashion itself – an essential component of embodied performance in music video – has also been written into international politics by Cynthia Enloe's feminist questioning of military uniforms and camouflage fashion (Enloe 2000) and more recent studies of phenomena such as the embodied performances of female political leaders and gendered religious struggles over dress (Behnke (ed.) 2017). While music video aesthetics could deepen insights into as many domains of international politics as a selection of videos seems to depict, what stands out at once from 'Hard' is its 'military chic' styling and its setting in a fantastic version of a US desert military base: particularly important for making sense of it, therefore, are perspectives on the embodied aesthetic politics of militarisation.

Music video and the embodied aesthetic politics of militarisation

Militarisation, as defined by Enloe (2000, 3), denotes the processes through which "an individual or society […] comes to imagine military needs and militaristic presumptions to be not only valuable but also normal". Perceiving it requires turning a critical "feminist curiosity" (Enloe 2016, 152) towards the taken-for-granted, including the "fascination

with militarized products" that advertising and consumer industries largely treat as unproblematic and natural (Enloe 2000, 2). Unquestioned, such fascination feeds the political economy of desire that fuels what Anna Agathangelou and L. H. M. Ling (2009, 46–7) termed the "neoliberal imperium" of coloniality and hypermasculinity. It is through the everyday, including people's encounters with popular culture, that much of this normalisation of military power and its racialised gender order as a solution to insecurity occurs, creating the "everyday geopolitics" (Basham 2016, 884) of militarisation. These everyday politics are also an aesthetic politics, in which visual practices – including fashion – inform "how people see themselves, others and war" (Shepherd 2018, 213).

Critical military studies' turn towards exploring the *affective* politics of popular militarism (see Rech and Williams 2016) provides further ground for explaining how embodied performance, a constitutive element of so much popular music and music video, can have political significance by intimately linking the individual spectator to imaginations of war, security and the international. Linda Åhäll's work, in particular, paves the way to do so: using the metaphor of dance, Åhäll argues that feminists' curiosity about "how bodies matter politically" has offered them "a *different way into* 'the political'", that is, starting with "stories, experiences and representations of peoples/individuals/bodies rather than states or political elites" (Åhäll 2016, 158). The "dance" of militarisation, as an often-unconscious ideological practice communicating ideas about security and politics as common sense, is the "gendered logic" of socially and culturally preparing society for war, a process that occurs "through the mediatized everyday" (Åhäll 2016, 162). Åhäll (2019a, 149) goes on to extend the metaphor into "the intersecting political sphere of bodies, affect and movement" in everyday encounters between military and civilian bodies, through which individuals "feel and possibly […] resist the politics of normalisation of war'. Among these encounters are the spectatorial gazes – which are themselves embodied experiences (Sobchack 2004) – of viewers watching stars taking on roles in mimetic or fantastic representations of war. The aesthetics of music video and other genres where star meta-narratives are elements of meaning invite viewers to project their identification with performers/characters on to what they are embodying in that audiovisual artefact, while interpreting that artefact and its representations of geopolitics, violence and security through the lens of what they already know about the star.

In certain cases, music video has even operated as a vehicle for "militainment" (Stahl 2010), a term which – like James Der Derian's reference to the "military–industrial–media–entertainment network" (Der Derian 2009) – conveys the networks of capital, ideology, technology, representation and power in which the defence and entertainment industries are mutually implicated (Hozic 1999). Popular music's place within these structures is itself underappreciated, at least in IR, though popular music studies and ethnomusicology have done more to problematize popular music's entanglements with militarism in settings such as the USA and elsewhere after 9/11 (Ritter and Daughtry (ed.) 2007; Boulton 2008; Fisher and Flota (ed.) 2011) or Croatia during the Yugoslav wars (Pettan (ed.) 1998). Music video, popular music's distinctive audiovisual medium, is appreciated even less. And yet the performances and fantasies of

music video lend themselves to the same feminist and queer questions as other media. A methodological start could be as follows: what narratives of gender, race, sexuality and violence, or gender, race, sexuality and security, are at work in them? Who and what do they imply needs protecting, who should do it and how, what kind of power should be used and what kind of violence might that require? What or whom are being imagined as targets and threats? Which people and bodies ought (not) to be exercising military power, and how should they be trained and disciplined to do it, within which gender regimes? And how are these ideas about bodies mapped on to geopolitical imaginations of the globe? Even more than in other media, the answers to these questions in music video lie in the embodied performance of the star.

Music video's conventions for establishing action is taking place in a military setting are often intertextually derivative of film, sometimes drawing cinematic tropes such as the shouting drill instructor face-to-face with a recruit (famous from films such as *Full Metal Jacket* (Swofford 2018)) directly into the visual text. They also adopt visual practices of fashion photography (see Tynan 2013, 78–9), abstracting the military base into the same kind of fantasised chronotope as other stock music video locations, such as the club, the spaceship or the beach (Vernallis 2004, 75). Such ideal-type spaces can work to position songs and stars within specific musical genres, with "different modes of address […] available to different constituencies" along gendered and racialized lines (Vernallis 2004, 73). Music video as a technology of militarisation also differs from film in that music video cinematography and spectacle emphasises the performing *body* more than the featured *character*: the aesthetics of *Top Gun* (1986) are a vehicle for the viewer to follow how Maverick becomes a fighter pilot and gets the girl, and the spectacular rupture that Demi Moore enacted in her public persona by training her body into a hard athletic shape and shaving her head to star in *GI Jane* (1997) was similarly an instrument for narrating the story of Jordan O'Neill's acceptance as a female SEAL (Tasker 2011, 243–7). Music video, even though it *can* take the form of short films telling stories, does not depend on overtly emplotted narrative at all. The movement, discipline, dress and styling of the body in music video, as well as the recreation of physical space, all help to code a setting's theme as 'military' but also ask to be interpreted through viewers' meta-narrative about the star.

Music video is thus embedded in processes of militarisation primarily on an aesthetic level that operates *beneath* narrative: it condenses its representation into assemblages of sound, setting, movement and style in a context which, as part of the popular music industry, is inherently charged with producing affects of desire, identification or both. As a technology of fascination, fantasy and desire, or what Goodwin (1992, 74) called a "technocracy of sensuousness", music video condenses the militarising potential of narrative audiovisual narrative artefacts on to an aesthetic and stylistic fulcrum. Amid the "increasingly explicit visualisation" of warfare (Chouliaraki 2013a, 315) in the contemporary world, where digital media have produced a 'qualitatively new' expression of the longer-standing "feedback loop" between military and civilian technology (Der Derian 2009, xxxvi), music video and its practices of representing spaces and bodies are

a unique component within what Rachel Woodward and Karl Jenkings (2012, 495) term "popular geopolitical imaginaries of war".

While more sustained relationships between music video and the military have existed in contexts such as the beginning of the Croatian war of independence (Baker 2010), where US-centric music video has come closest to the 'militainment' paradigm is arguably Katy Perry's March 2012 video for 'Part Of Me', produced in 2011 in collaboration with the US Marine Corps (USMC). This was certainly not the first music video to require military cooperation: in 1989, for instance, the US Navy had facilitated Cher making the video for 'If I Could Turn Back Time' on the *USS Missouri*. Collaborating with Perry to make 'Part Of Me', however, directly served what was then a USMC recruitment priority, persuading more women to enlist in a service that famously cultivated an elite warrior masculinity (see Zeeland 1996) so that the USMC could deploy more Female Engagement Teams on counter-insurgency missions in Iraq and Afghanistan (see Dyvik 2014). During the video's narrative, Perry's character leaves her cheating boyfriend, spots a recruitment ad for the Marines in a neighbourhood store, physically prepares herself to enlist in the store's bathroom (by cutting her hair, bandaging her breasts and putting on a hoodie – actions that a trans or genderqueer gaze might well see as risky rather than empowering in a women's bathroom), and progresses through basic training with a multiracial group of fellow female Marines. Such a "generically familiar montage of transformation" (Tasker 2011, 67) through military basic training lasts for only a few minutes as a trope in narrative feature film but can, in music video, become the logic of the video's *entire* text.

Intertextually, 'Part Of Me' remediated the fulfilment narrative of 1980s US militainment cinema such as *Top Gun* or *An Officer and a Gentleman* (a protagonist who is downtrodden in civilian life fulfils their potential through successfully passing through military training) to women viewers who could pleasurably identify with the recruit–protagonist. This pleasure was especially available to white women, given the whiteness structuring Perry's star image, but extended more conditionally to women of colour through the multi-racial (legible as supposedly 'post-racial') composition of the group of Marines. The spectacle of the female protagonist achieving empowerment and repairing her past through military training as self-realisation is further accentuated through the contrast between Perry's embodiment of this character and her established image as a star. While not as radical a bodily transformation as Demi Moore's during *GI Jane* (1997) – Perry's military haircut is still an unremarkable civilian length, and what she is cutting is not even her own hair – it nevertheless echoes the spectacle of a glamorous female star embodying military masculinity and the production of the character as a "masculinized subject" whose supposedly naturally feminine reproductive or sexualised qualities must be removed in order to fit into this masculine institution (Åhäll 2019b, 300). The performance gained authenticity through Perry's own star meta-narrative for viewers who knew that she had broken up with her own husband the previous year.

Taking 'Part Of Me' as an example of how to study the visual gender politics of popular culture (though limiting the analysis to lyrics and to action on screen), Linda

Åhäll (2019b, 299) breaks down its storytelling into "what we *hear*, what we *see*, and what we (are supposed to) *feel*" about what different gendered bodies are supposed to embody and what makes certain bodies matter more than others – not to mention what we are supposed to forget, that is, "that militaries are designed to fight wars, [and] that weapons and military equipment are designed to kill" (Åhäll 2019b, 304). 'Part Of Me' could indeed valuably be read alongside US military recruitment advertising's own constructions of "militarized femininity" (Brown 2012, 152; see Sjoberg 2007). Tanner Mirrlees (2016, 4–7) places Perry's video alongside contemporaneous US military cooperation with the production of superhero and science fiction films as a convergence of interests between the US security state and US media conglomerates that seeks to "project positive images of American power to readers, listeners and viewers" around the world – and as an asset for Marine recruiters seeking to recruit more women. Åhäll (2019b, 299) thus makes an important advance for visual global politics in investigating "meaning-making" and "sense-making" in music video, especially meanings and senses connected to affective investments in war. And yet, as argued above, song lyrics and narrative action are only two of the elements of audiovisual meaning on which music video aesthetics depend. Even to begin asking what narratives about gender, race, violence and security 'Hard' might tell involves dealing with other elements, including music video editing conventions, the synchronisation of sound and moving image with embodied performance, and the meta-narrative of Rihanna as a star.

Fashioning female violence: militarised fashion and music video aesthetics in 'Hard'

'Hard', appearing two and a half years before 'Part Of Me' near the beginning of Obama's presidency, resembled 'Part Of Me' in using music video to tell a story about gender, race, geopolitics, security and US military power, the set of stories it could be viewed as telling *about* those things appears dramatically different once one analyses the interplay between star metanarrative and the aesthetics of militarisation on which the video drew. Directed by Melina Matsoukas (whose credits include five further videos for Rihanna and twelve for Beyoncé, including 2016's 'Formation' (see Wallace 2017)), the video for 'Hard' placed Rihanna in several contemporary and futuristic militarised settings within a desert landscape, singing and posing in eight haute-couture-styled uniforms and warrior outfits suggesting ranks from enlistee to general. While making the video, Rihanna described its aesthetic to MTV as "couture military" ("Everything is surrounded around the idea of something military […] We've got lots of cute outfits, lots of bullets") (Montgomery 2009), directly framing it within the visual and embodied practices of "military chic" (Tynan 2013). The capacity for violence and aggression in Rihanna's character(s) in this spectacle is far greater than what Perry would embody in 'Part Of Me', despite that video's near-obligatory training-montage scene of Perry stabbing a dummy with a bayonet, allowing a viewer who is concerned with gendered narratives of violence and security

to draw an immediate contrast between the two star personas. Indeed, the stylised and provocative performances of 'Hard' permit us to examine "embodied choreographies of war in the everyday" (Åhäll 2019a, 149) much more literally than Åhäll might intend.

The numerous costumes, characters and personas introduced during this four-minute video[2], each dotted around a distinctive corner of its battlefield, are unified thematically through their military associations and extra-textually through the established convention in music video aesthetics of creating multiple dispersed sequences that combine into a song's general theme (see Vernallis 2013, 97). Unlike the design of 'Part Of Me', which claims authenticity through purporting to depict the civilian and military everyday, 'Hard' offers the viewer a hyperbolic composite of militarised signifiers: its spectacle invites viewers to recognise resemblances to science fiction film franchises such as *Star Wars* and *Mad Max*, and to fashion photography (especially the iconic persona of Grace Jones and the performances of sexual dominance, hardness and androgyny she made famous in her 1982 video collection *A One Man Show* (see Kershaw 1997)), as well as contemporaneous warfare in the desert. The song's lyrics boast of Rihanna's triumphs over and disregard for those who are jealous of her success, framing her as tough, ambitious, "brilliant" and "resilient", and each chorus declares six times "I'm so hard", reinforced by deep backing vocals affirming in call and response "So hard" or "Too hard". Rihanna would scarcely need to grab her crotch in the armoury during the first rendition of this chorus to illustrate the phallic symbolism of juxtaposing these embodied and material fantasies of militarised power; and yet this is exactly what she does.

Lyrically, the only line connecting the audio song to any imaginary of state power belongs to the guest rapper Jeezy, whose words recall his youthful career as a drug dealer capable of enforcing his status through violence ("I used to run my own block like Obama did", likening his control of a street corner (see Nielson 2009, 352) to Obama's time as a community organiser in Chicago). A gendered distribution of physical movement emerges from the fact that the most dynamic action in the video occurs during Jeezy's screen time rather than Rihanna's (as Jeezy raps sitting in the roadside wreckage of a military vehicle, another convoy drives past and troops follow the car or leap off the side of the road): Rihanna's sequences, conversely, place the attention on her dancing, moving, singing and performing body, and sometimes her interactions with men. While the song's lyrics imagine much about being a multimillion-selling musician in hip-hop culture and make an autobiographical performance of resilience, at a time when military thinking as well as neoliberal economics were seeing individuals' resilience as an "indispensable resource" (Howell 2015, 15), the words do not attach it to specifically military power: it is the video that turns 'Hard' into a text about militarised masculinity and the hardness of the military as the symbol of a characteristic Rihanna performs wanting to embody.

The spectacle of the video as both military and provocatively kinky is thus framed from the very first few seconds of 'Hard' through how music, visual setting and embodied performance work together. The song's first sound, a four-to-the-floor side-drum beat

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[2] Rihanna's 'Hard': https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xcwd_Nz6Zog

that could also double as the rhythm of a military march, is synchronised with a close-up of Rihanna pulling a helmet over her eyes, then a medium-range shot showing Rihanna standing between two rockets (wearing an open green field-jacket, knee-pads, and a low-cut top the same colour as her skin with black tape over its nipple areas), against the backdrop of an armoury. Synchronised with the first words, the video cuts to its second sequence, where Rihanna takes the role of a commanding officer inspecting male troops, in mirrored aviator sunglasses, a green garrison cap, and a white suit jacket with exaggerated shoulder-pads and a cinched waist: the shoulder-pads, the line of the jacket and the sunglasses all echo the "both seductive and dominant" image of Grace Jones (with its own echoes of masculine military hardness and discipline) in the 'Warm Leatherette' sequence of *A One Man Show* and associated publicity (Kershaw 1997, 21). Off-stage, the shoulder-pads and diamante epaulettes of the Balmain dresses Rihanna wore throughout the turn of 2009–10, and the jaw-length undercut she wore while promoting *Rated R*, both became fashion trends, making militarised fashion part of her persona in a more lasting way.

    The remainder of the video, placing Rihanna in various high-fashion outputs in material spaces which all connote desert warfare, likewise depends far less than 'Part Of Me' on staging a diegetic narrative, far more on staging tableaus exhibiting the pastiche, excess, provocativeness and transgression of haute-couture fashion photography; indeed, Rihanna implied as much when calling the video's style "couture military". (Its sequences place Rihanna in futuristic warrior costume amid sand-dunes; a pastiche commander's outfit in a squad tent; a metallic bikini on a pile of sandbags; a veiled dress of netting at a checkpoint; a Mickey Mouse-eared helmet straddling a pink tank; and, finally, in a crested helmet waving a black flag with the white letter 'R'). Appearing in 2009, it exemplified the way in which fashion media was then turning its "tendency […] to exploit the excitement of military conflict", and the possibilities for creating striking images by stylising and eroticising the military body, towards fascination with the sites, spaces and embodiments of the Global War on Terror (see Tynan 2013, 78). This fascination is as much at play in 'Hard' as in Tynan's example of Steven Meisel's 2007 *Italian Vogue* editorial 'Make Love Not War', which incorporated First Gulf War desert combat fatigues into its models' couture outfits and appeared to be set on a US military base in Iraq.

    Rihanna's claims to 'hardness' in the video are performed not just through the declarative lyrics but simultaneously through outfits aligning her with military attributes and choreographies of strutting, weapons handling and dominance over men. Among these are commanding male subordinates in the parade ground sequence, walking unscathed through explosions in the sand-dunes sequence, outwitting men at poker in the tent sequence, and proximity to and use of weapons throughout, including the rifle she fires off on the parade ground and the gun-barrel she straddles on the tank. Her body is simultaneously sexualised as feminine through costumes emphasising her breasts and thighs, her grinding dance movements, and the camera's concentration on her waist, behind and hips. Two further levels of masculine hardness can be seen as contributing to the video's presentation of what it means to be 'hard'. One is the performance of gangsta

masculinity incorporated through the integration of Jeezy's autobiographical narrative into the audio and video versions of the song (the video links Rihanna herself to it via the brief cut to the sand-dunes sequence, where Rihanna turns to the camera through her shoulder-spikes as Jeezy begins to rap "If I wasn't doing this, you know where I'd be"). A deeper but inescapable layer of masculine hardness behind the video, however, is the aesthetics of US-led desert war.

These aesthetics are mobilised in the video in both directly apparent and subtler ways. The Humvees and a water-truck with US Air Force (USAF) markings used as background props, or the Arabic graffiti painted on the side of the house (the Qur'anic verse in honour of the dead, "We belong to God, and to Him we shall return" (Aidi 2011: 37)), are immediately apparent visual referents; the black and green tones of the parade-ground sequence, in contrast, are an echo but not a replication of the night-vision lenses effects which have filmed nocturnal battlefield action in Iraq. A further type of allusion to the aesthetics of warfare in Iraq is achieved through the use of sound to reinforce the significance of a visual shot, making the meaning of that moment inextricably *audio*visual in the way that an appreciation of music video aesthetics enables us to perceive: such is the case for instance when the song's deep, ominous bassline begins at 0.11 and is synchronised with the first armoury shot in which Rihanna's rifle appears. All these elements of meaning would be missed if one only approached music video through lyrics or even how the characters in the video tell a story – and so would another element of music video aesthetics which is essential for understanding 'Hard', the meta-narrative of Rihanna as a star.

Several methods could be used for researching this meta-narrative, including one important set of methods this paper does not attempt: analysing fans' and critics' reactions at the time and/or conducting fresh audience research to reveal what different interpretations viewers might have formed from these ingredients. The circuit of meaning-making within cultural texts is, of course, not complete without considering viewers' own subjectivities and the multiplicity of possible meanings that then result – the very spectatorial experiences that make "the geopolitical […] emotionally personal" (Eken 2019, 212). Nevertheless, this paper suggests (engaging in its own acts of meaning-making as it does so) that an additional way to understand audiovisual artefacts which rely on star meta-narratives for meaning is to explore the prior incidents, texts and cultural forms that may have informed their production. These relate firstly to Rihanna's own biography and then to the performance of what could be termed 'female military masculinity' that this video entails.

Hardness and the continuum of violence: the meta-narrative of *Rated R*

The stardom of Rihanna, a worldwide celebrity since she released her debut album in 2004 aged sixteen, exemplifies Goodwin's argument that the "meta-narratives" (Goodwin 1992, 98) musicians build up over time through their performances, styling, albums

(which often symbolise new chapters in a star's diachronic celebrity persona) and publicity appearances are themselves elements of meaning in music video aesthetics, even as they advance the meta-narrative themselves. Rihanna's persona had already advanced past her initial image as an attractive young Bajan girl (see Russell 2012) through the songs, videos and publicity surrounding her 2007 album *Good Girl Gone Bad*, taking over "the image of the stereotypically hypersexual black female as über-'bad girl'" in a narrative of sexual and artistic maturity (James 2008, 404). *Rated R* (named after the most adult age classification in US cinema, as well as Rihanna's initial) joined violence to sex through an aesthetics of BDSM power-play, revenge fantasy and, in 'Hard', militarisation.

The recording of Rated R, named after US cinema's most adult age classification as well as Rihanna's initial, began in April 2009, two months after Rihanna had been assaulted on the night of the Grammy Awards by her then partner. A photograph of her injuries released by the gossip website TMZ had been widely and controversially republished, forcing the attack to become part of her embodied public narrative against her will. Her videos and artwork for the *Rated R* singles and later songs with Def Jam Records fused performances "of hardcore masculinity and dominatrix-type femininity" (Hobson 2012, 82). Black feminists including Janell Hobson (2012), Nicole Fleetwood (2012) and Esther Jones (2013) have argued that these strove to regain agency over her public persona, resignify the meanings of her image and body, and indeed produce an explicit dialogue with the facts and visual images of her assault by attaching themes of "violence in intimate relations and sexual practices" (Fleetwood 2012, 420) to her star image through means that would appear to be under her creative control.

Compared to 'Hard', other songs and videos from *Rated R* and later albums dramatizing "sexuality, violence and revenge" (Ferreday 2017, 264) have received much more attention in feminist scholarship. 'Russian Roulette', the lead single from *Rated R* released in October 2009, represented a "deployment of illicit sexuality through BDSM imagery" which arguably sought to overturn the narrative that Rihanna had been a victim or complicit in her abuse (Jones 2013, 75). Her styling throughout the *Rated R* phase made frequent use of peaked caps and fetish wear. The lyrics of one album track with no video, 'G4L (Gangsta 4 Life)', described leading a gang of young women to the house of a man who had beaten one of them, referred to having "got these girls like a soldier", and ended its chorus with "we an army, better yet a navy, better yet crazy, guns in the air". The video for *Rated R*'s last single, 'Rockstar 101', styled Rihanna "in several androgynous costumes, including a semi-drag impersonation of heavy metal guitarist, Slash [the track's guest artist], as she gyrates sexually with a guitar" (Houlihan and Raynor 2014, 337). 'Love The Way You Lie', her duet on an Eminem album, appeared very shortly afterwards in June 2010, with Rihanna singing as an abuse survivor and Eminem, himself a reported perpetrator of intimate partner violence (Bierria 2011, 115), as her abuser): this complex song, with a video starring Megan Fox and Dominic Monaghan as a mutually abusive couple, has made feminists debate whether or not its story blamed the victim (Enck and McDaniel 2012; Thaller and Messing 2014), and permitted educators to design activities exposing societal narratives about intimate partner violence (Rodier et al. 2012;

Cassar 2019), including its use by Christina Rowley and Laura Shepherd (2012, 157) in teaching gender in IR.

Later songs and videos recorded as Rihanna reconciled with then separated from Brown also pursued these themes, concentrating ever more on violent female revenge. 'Man Down', from her 2011 album *Loud*, cast Rihanna as "both victim and perpetrator" (Fleetwood 2012, 430) of different forms of violence in telling the story of Rihanna's character shooting her rapist, and the "escalation" (Ferreday 2017, 268) of violence and excess in the performances constructing her star narrative continued into her 2015 video 'Bitch Better Have My Money' ('BBHMM'), a seven-minute pastiche of pulp cinema where Rihanna and a multi-racial group of women vigilantes torture and kill a fraudulent white accountant and his wife. By 2015, Robin James (2015, 144–5, 155) could describe the "corporate person" of Rihanna as performing a "melancholic" subject who retained the very attachments to and identifications with "non-bourgeois black masculinities" that resilience discourse would have demanded she overcome. Both BDSM aesthetics and appropriated "symbols of violent masculinity", as Hobson observes in the dancehall setting of 'Man Down', have served in this phase of Rihanna's star narrative as expressions of female survivorship and rage (Hobson 2012: 82–3). In consistently embodying the role of vengeful and kinky perpetrator, Rihanna's star persona has both drawn from and contributed to the "storied fantasies" (Sjoberg and Gentry 2015, 4) that shape popular understandings of women's violence. And yet, throughout feminist responses to this aspect of Rihanna's stardom, military violence and the international are curiously absent: if her videos, songs and photographs intertextually produce a fetish-like, pulpy space for exploring fantasies of female revenge, what is the effect of placing the military, US desert warfare and the figure of the military woman in a continuum with the rest of these?

'Female military masculinities' and star meta-narratives: making feminist and queer sense of 'Hard'

The militarised aesthetics of 'Hard', though strikingly absent from the feminist literature on Rihanna, can be seen through the idea of star meta-narrative as complementing and extending the narrative and strategy of *Rated R*. Its 'couture military' fantasy setting which nevertheless indexes Arabic language and the USAF, extends the song's web of references around what it means to be 'hard', via a geopolitical imagination anchored within the contemporary space and time of the US military and the War on Terror. At a time when US military women were participating in killing at all ranges from close quarters to piloting drones, and women's very capacity to kill was being debated within and around the armed forces as the military began to revisit the combat exclusion, the question of how far representations of military women in music video invite viewers to imagine their stars' characters as women capable of exercising violence and killing was and is directly political. The invitation is much stronger in Rihanna's case than Perry's, and reinforced intertextually when 'Hard' is heard and seen alongside other tracks from *Rated*

R; retrospectively, it has been reinforced retrospectively through later videos such as 'Man Down' and 'BBHMM' continuing to associate her persona with survivorship and violent revenge. Since stars' creation of "character identities" (Slee 2017, 153) in music video provides viewers with points of identification as well as objects of desire (Goodwin 1992, 103), among the identifications that 'Hard' invites viewers to make from their own socially situated subject positions is an identification with a (Caribbean) woman taking on to and into her body iconic masculine-coded signifiers of (largely US) military power. In evoking a woman taking hardness and masculinity into her body to battle back from assault by a man, 'Hard' in fact performs a strikingly similar discursive move to the plot of, and Demi Moore's embodied performance in, *GI Jane*. Moore's Jordan O'Neill, after being beaten and threatened with rape by her unit's instructor during a Survival, Evasion, Resist and Escape exercise, fights back at him and defies his warning that her presence would put the men at risk by shouting "Suck my dick" (Youngs, Lisle and Zalewski 1999); Rihanna declares, repeatedly, "I'm so hard". If the audio already makes this move, the video does so even more emphatically, harnessing the military's aesthetics as an institution that has been made to conventionally symbolise masculinity in order to exemplify what it means to be 'hard' – fusing the body made hard through training and resilience (see Jeffords 1994) and the hardness of having a phallus and becoming aroused.

The imagination of hardening the body through militarising it expresses, as Jesse Crane-Seeber (2016, 42) notes, a "complicated psycho-sexual dynamics" that infuse militarisation with emotions of "power, desire, pleasure and agency" within the military as well as representations of that process outside it. In these two audiovisual texts both Moore and Rihanna, to different extents and distinct but overlapping purposes, are "performing" military masculinities in Judith Butler's sense of expressing bodily signifiers that typically code bodies as masculine (see Butler 1990). Simultaneously, these are performances of what the queer theorist Jack Halberstam (1998, 1) termed "female masculinities", that is, identifications with and embodiments of aspects of masculinity from gendered subject positions where such identifications would conventionally not be open. The mystique of identification and desire with which the military–civilian "dance of militarisation" (Åhäll 2016) invests *military* masculinities makes the military a particularly powerful and attractive symbol in this regard. The convergence of these ideas makes it possible to theorise 'female military masculinities' as a way of thinking about embodied identifications with military masculinities on the part of those who are not men: indeed, it is via Yvonne Tasker's work on *GI Jane* (Tasker 2011) as an artefact telling a story about "military masculinity without the male body", alongside Mokua Ombati's work on Kenyan women combatants (Ombati 2015), that Marsha Henry (2017, 188) suggests the study of international politics has engaged with "female military masculinities" at all.

Rihanna's performance of female military masculinities in 'Hard', unlike Moore's or indeed Perry's, also however operates through aesthetics of fetish, camp and drag. As Valerie Steele (1996, 180) notes, fetish culture and style has long understood that military uniforms owe their "erotic connotations" to the "sexual excitement" associated with violence and dominance/submission, the capacity for boots and weapons to become "phallic

signifiers", and the attention dress uniforms draw to the line and shape of the male body (see Crane-Seeber 2016, 47). Steele (1996, 174) argues that men's choices of clothing associated with "ultra-masculine roles", including military archetypes, in fetish play serve "as a kind of armor against the world that protects the wearer's inner self, while projecting an image of aggressive masculinity"; indeed, as Halberstam (1998) and C. Jacob Hale (1997) show, such choices and projections are not just made by men. The aesthetics of fetish inform 'Hard' because, throughout the *Rated R* period, fetish style was a key component of the aesthetic transformations Rihanna and her stylists were employing in order to reassert control over her public persona and convert it from victim to survivor, as were her references to the image of Grace Jones (Russell 2012), a fellow Caribbean diasporic star whose persona played with evocations of dominance, racialised desire and sexual control (Fulani 2012). The luxurious pastiche of Rihanna's *Rated R*-era outfits, including those in 'Hard', continues traditions of 'black camp' (see Chatzipapatheodoridis 2017) as embodied by previous generations of stars including Jones, Michael Jackson, Prince and Jimi Hendrix, and perhaps even the racialised queering of the military through the category of 'military realness' in ballroom drag (see Hilderbrand 2013, 50–1).

'Hard' as mediated through Rihanna's stardom thus uncomfortably combines its narrative about her own persona with reinscribing the US military, its troops and its desert operations as 'hard'. As such, it exemplifies the limitations of queer projects of reading "separating masculinity from men" (Halberstam 1998, 50) as liberatory. Yet, Amy Stone and Eve Shapiro (2017, 254) argue through research on drag kinging and leather subcultures in the USA, identifications with masculinities may be "radically transgressive" for individuals on an affective level and still "simultaneously re-create gendered systems of inequality" in structural terms. This entanglement of "empowerment and reinscription" (Stone and Shapiro 2017, 254) is exemplified in 'Hard', and the gendered system of inequality it reinscribes is the logic of militarisation itself.

The larger constellation of meaning around 'Hard', mediated through Rihanna's star meta-narrative and the composite persona of all the songs, images and videos that constituted *Rated R*, arguably undercuts that logic somewhat more, since the position she embodies in the "continuum of violence" (Cockburn 2004) is not that of white masculine power. A less sustained, casual engagement with the video would be more likely to suggest that the sexualised association between hardness, masculinity and the military is 'what it means'. For Rihanna and her persona, 'Hard' might perform a "disidentification" in José Esteban Muñoz's sense of reading one's self and narrative "in a moment, object, or subject that is not culturally coded to 'connect' with" oneself (Muñoz 1999: 12); but how the viewer affectively perceives it, what aspects of it they might (dis)identify with and how they might do so depends on their own positionality and attachments, such as how they relate to Rihanna as a star or how far they question the gender order and security agenda of US militarism. Appreciating the synchronisations, the embodied performances and the star meta-narratives of music video are all necessary to perceive these politics at work.

Conclusion

Since 2009, 'Hard' has become not just a (complex) story about gendered, racialised and sexualised "figurations" (Leigh and Weber 2019) of security, geopolitics, violence and militarisation, but also a *historical* text, one that was imagining the projection of US power under Obama rather than under Trump. This was a moment when black musicians in the USA were reflecting on what it meant for their country to have its first black president – indeed Jeezy had already paralleled Obama's historic access to the White House and his own upward mobility as a hustler and gangsta in a track he released with Nas during Obama's campaign (Nielson 2009) – and when Obama himself was establishing a 'post-hip-hop' presidential masculinity which ostensibly demilitarised the presidency compared to George W. Bush yet masked the further institutionalisation of the US-led War on Terror across the globe, a phenomenon Emma Cannen (2014) has called "avant-garde militarism". The narratives of gender and security told by and about a US state embodied internationally by Obama as president and Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State were replaced after November 2016 by a narrative of masculinist and white supremacist protectionism and retraditionalisation (see Eroukhmanoff 2017; Graff, Kapur and Walters 2019). While the video no longer belongs to the present of the gender politics of security, it does still exemplify the complex contradictions of the political dimensions that video and its aesthetic practices bring to popular music.

While the creation of fantasies of retributive female violence has remained part of the meta-narrative of Rihanna's celebrity, Rihanna's chief association with the military is likely for many viewers/listeners to be her starring in the 2012 film *Battleship* (an adaptation of the Hasbro board game), playing one of a group of US Navy sailors who find themselves fighting alien battleships near Hawaii. Rihanna's online fan base began calling itself the 'Rihanna Navy' around the same time, likely referencing both *Battleship* and the description of her girl gang as a "navy" in one line of 'G4L' (Satran 2016). Commenting briefly on this film in her essay on military women in cinema, Yvonne Tasker (2017, 503) observes that Rihanna's role embodied the convention of the tough Black or Latina female soldier as supporting character established by Vasquez in *Aliens* (1986) and personified by Michelle Rodriguez, in whose stardom the chapter is much more interested – indicative of how much more attention film receives compared to popular music in international politics, even though (and more so than ever in the digital era) these genres' aesthetics and affective economies are intertwined.

'Hard' might not have structured space for critical reflection on militarism into its form in the same way as the vein of "critical military shooters" Lee Jarvis and Nick Robinson (in press, 9) that several games developers released around the same time in 2007–12. Neither, however, does it operate in the same way as the militarisation of women's emotions about themselves and their relationship in order to create positive sentiments about military recruitment that feminist analysis readily reveals in 'Part Of Me' (Åhäll 2019b), even though both depict a wronged woman reclaiming agency by embodying aspects of military masculinity. Moreover, Perry as a star embodies *white* femininity, and

her videos characteristically create "fantastic visions of whiteness", including fantasies of temporarily becoming the exotic Other that she can then divest (Clark 2014, 322); Rihanna enters the field of celebrity *as* an exotic Other, putting her in a similar relationship towards her white contemporaries to the one Grace Jones occupied in relation to Madonna (Jelača 2017, 454). Though this contrast between two celebrities does not go as far as Marsha Henry argues is necessary in connecting studies of militarised masculinities to "a focus on *poor* black women" (Henry 2017, 183, my emphasis), it nevertheless shows that the fusion of race and gender are necessary for making feminist sense of embodied performance, popular culture and militarisation.

In understanding how this video and other popular-cultural artefacts using militarised aesthetics do political work, it would be reductive to frame the question as simply one of whether something is "militarized or not" (see Kraska 2007, 503) – not least because the very concept, as Alison Howell (2018) shows, rests on an assumption that social institutions have ever existed outside the structures that have enacted state violence on racialised populations and other groups that threaten white socio-economic order. The embodied performances, scenarios and language of 'Hard' do employ logics on which militarisation depends: eroticising military bodies, spaces and objects, and implying that appropriating the hardness of militarised masculinity is the solution to the crisis and lack constructed through the song's lyrics in conjunction with Rihanna's star narrative. In this sense it is part of the "neoliberal imperium" (Agathangelou and Ling 2009, 46) of desire, and could even have been more seductive because – echoing the Obama presidency's "avant-garde militarism" (Cannen 2014) – it did not centre white performers. This too becomes more apparent through the song's audiovisual text.

Using the idea of star meta-narrative to ask what stories about gender, violence and security (see Shepherd 2013) this video tells, meanwhile, brings to the foreground what feminist security studies understands as the "continuum of violence" (Cockburn 2004) in patriarchal structures that enable insecurities from everyday and intimate forms of gendered violence to the militarised violence of the state. In this continuum, Rihanna as an individual has occupied a very different position to the US military as an institution. 'Hard' tells a story of how a black woman has used imagination and fantasy to take control of her sexuality and public persona after surviving intimate partner violence, and offers viewers the pleasure of identifying with such a fantasy themselves, but it also tells a story in which the hardest and most masculine thing imaginable is the (US) military and in which Rihanna's provocative and dominant sensuality are tied to military weaponry, military uniform and the spaces in which the US military was projecting power in the Middle East. If Rihanna's presence as a popular cultural icon is as "an unnerving figure who remains something of an enigma" (Jelača 2017, 454), impossible to reduce to just one meaning, this extends to her meaning(s) in the international racialised gender politics of security. We might read this as the kind of refusal "to signify monolithically" through which, Cynthia Weber (2016, 159) suggests, certain subjects in international politics are able to make the very borders they cannot stay stably on one side of into "point[s] of contestation", yet what is contested and how depends on each viewer's listening gaze.

Making sense of 'Hard', therefore, shows how a feminist and queer curiosity can be brought to bear on music video aesthetics, including elements of audiovisual and musical meaning which are rarely appreciated as significant in international politics: the synchronisation of sound, moving image and performance (what creates its *audio*visuality), and the meta-narratives of stars as the performing bodies with whom viewers are invited to identify. Even the many music videos not framed as narratives still invite viewers to co-create a narrative through interpreting their montages and through relating them to the meta-narratives of their stars. Indeed, spectators' affective relationships to the performing body can themselves be considered an element of audiovisual meaning, infusing the geopolitical imaginations of audiovisual artefacts with an emotional charge through the intimate politics of identification and desire involved in the spectatorial gaze. Like any other popular-cultural form, music video can be seen as part of the "bricks and mortar" from which individuals construct their senses of self and world (Railton and Watson 2012, 20) – including their senses of gender and 'race' – just as the literature on popular culture and world politics contends. But music video's harnessing of the emotions of socially defining personal identity through musical preferences and the imaginative work necessary to assemble montaged sequences into a narrative (see Vernallis 2013, 160) gives music video a particularly intimate place in the affective fabric of how individuals experience international politics in the everyday.

Applying the key themes of music video aesthetics to help make feminist and queer sense of media and popular culture in international politics thus enriches the methodological toolkit for making sense of international politics itself, by demonstrating how the "mediatized everyday" (Åhäll 2016, 162) is not just a sensory phenomenon but a *multi*sensory one – that is, how meaning is able to emerge from the juxtaposition and synchronisation of what is offered to the different senses at once. A widely remediated intertextual vocabulary for alluding to and referencing the military, established through the transnational imaginative continuum of mimetic and fictional representations of war, has furnished music video with ready resources for attaching symbolic resonances of war and the military as an episode in their stars' meta-narratives, yet the dynamics of militarisation in 'Hard' were not identical to those in 'Part Of Me' even if both were underpinned by the gendered security politics of the Obama presidency. A decade later, the contexts for viewing and understanding them are significantly and troublingly different, for those whose socially and geopolitically situated circumstances allowed them to experience the turn of the 2000s and 2010s as years of progress and peace. The emotions of contrasting the present and recent past indeed lend an extra dimension of temporality to the spectatorial experience, at least for viewers to whom they are apparent or meaningful. Yet the realisation that 'Hard' and other videos of its era are now historic texts hints that historicity itself is an underappreciated element of meaning-making in audiovisual aesthetics – yet a deeply political one that deserves to be further theorised and researched, showing how spectators are positioned not just in space but also in time.

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Appendix 1: Synchronisations of settings, performances and sound in Rihanna's 'Hard'

Time	Setting	Performance	Noteworthy sounds
0.00	Armoury (A)	Rihanna pulls dark green netting-covered helmet over her face with both hands, showing her long black nails, "Shhh" singer tattoo, diamond rings and red lipstick	Snare drums in dancehall rhythm
0.02		Camera pulls back to show Rihanna standing between two rockets, wearing open green field jacket, knee-pads, and low-cut beige top with black tape over nipples	Snare drum phrase repeats
0.03	Parade ground at night, lit in night-vision tones of black and green (B)	Rihanna wearing mirrored sunglasses, forage cap, and white jacket with giant shoulder-pads, singing in drill-instructor pose to light-skinned male soldier	Rihanna sings "Yeah, yeah, yeah"
0.04		Multi-racial line of male soldiers in green dress uniform	Men sing "Yeah, yeah, yeah"
0.05		Male soldier and Rihanna face-to-face	"Yeah, yeah, yeah" call-and-response repeats throughout the sequence
0.06		Camera pulls back to show rocky landscape and Humvee behind the line of soldiers and Rihanna	"Yeah, yeah, yeah" phrases repeat
0.08		Close-up on Rihanna's face	
0.09		Scene fades out	
0.10	Armoury	Rihanna with eyes hidden by helmet, red lips in centre of frame	Rihanna sings "Ah, yeah, yeah, yeah"
0.11		Rihanna standing between the rockets, M-16 rifle propped up to her right	Deep synthesised bass line begins
0.12	Parade ground	Rihanna reviewing troops contemptuously	Ominous bass line continues; Rihanna singing "Yeah, yeah, yeah"
0.14	Armoury	Rihanna between the rockets, hands between her thighs	

0.15		Rihanna with helmet up, brushing hair back from her face with sultry expression, leaving smoky mark on her cheek	
0.16	Parade ground	Rihanna inspecting troops, seen from behind	
0.17		Men present their rifles	
0.18	Armoury	Rihanna provocatively adjusts her top	
0.19	Parade ground	Camera semi-fades-in on men holding rifles across bodies	
0.19	Armoury	Rihanna touches helmet brim, showing two thick metal bracelets	
0.20		Camera judders; Rihanna crosses legs	
0.22	Parade ground	Rihanna struts along the line of troops as men march on the spot	First verse begins
0.25	Armoury	Brief close-up of black dog-tags between Rihanna's breasts	
0.26	Parade ground	Men saluting Rihanna	
0.26	Armoury	Rihanna climbing on footlocker to dance	
0.27	Parade ground	Rihanna struts along the line	
0.31	Armoury	Out-of-focus close-up on Rihanna's profile with red lips, helmet over eyes	Rihanna interjects "You know this", male voice gives affirming shout
0.32	Parade ground	Rihanna struts along the line, close-up on gloved hand on hip	
0.35	Armoury	Rihanna sings with eyes visible	
0.36	Parade ground	Rihanna struts along the line	
0.41	Armoury	Rihanna brushes hair back	
0.42	Sand dunes, lit in bright orange tones (C)	Rihanna looks sternly at camera with hair combed over face and a hooked black mask painted around her eyes; the black spikes on her shoulder-pads are as high as her head	Second verse begins
0.43		Long shot of Rihanna standing to the left of an explosion in the sand; Rihanna begins to march	First line continues: "Imma rock this shit like fashion"
0.44		Medium-length shot of Rihanna marching	
0.45		Rihanna looks at camera over shoulder, revealing backless dress	

0.46		Rihanna looks away, refusing the camera's gaze	
0.47		Rihanna walks through more explosions	Verse continues: "My runway never looked so clear"
0.51		Rihanna stands with hands on hips	
0.52		Rihanna points to herself, showing long black nails	"The hottest bitch in heels right here"
0.53		Rihanna continues walking forward, addressing camera	Chorus 1 begins at end of sequence (1.04) and carries into next
1.05	Armoury	Rihanna holds jacket open/closed	First line of Chorus 1 ends: "I'm so hard"
1.05	Parade ground	Rihanna struts, close-up on her behind	Men sing: "So hard"
1.06	Armoury	Rihanna dances, dog-tags swinging	Rihanna: "I'm so hard"
1.08	Parade ground	Men doing jumping jacks	Men: "So hard"
1.09	Armoury	Rihanna dances, holding helmet on head	
1.10		Close-up on Rihanna's face, as she tugs helmet-strap	
1.11	Parade ground	Men drilling	
1.12	Armoury	Rihanna leans back between rockets	
1.14	Parade ground	Men drilling	Men: "Too hard"
1.14	Armoury	Rihanna dances, grabs crotch	Rihanna: "I, I, I'm so hard"
1.16	Parade ground	Rihanna marches between two lines of troops	
1.17	Armoury	Close-up on Rihanna's face	
1.18	Parade ground	Rihanna marches between two lines of troops	
1.20		Rihanna holds her lapels and smiles	
1.20	Armoury	Rihanna dancing out-of-focus between rockets	
1.22	Parade ground	Rihanna walks past troops	
1.23		Close-up on Rihanna's waist, thighs, gloves, boots and tights	
1.23		Rihanna gives dominant glance over her shoulder and walks back	

1.25	Armoury	Rihanna dancing with hand over crotch	
1.26	Parade ground	Rihanna fires off rifle with her back to the troops	Chorus 2 begins: "br-r-r-p, that Rihanna rain just won't let up"
1.27	Armoury	Rihanna dancing, camera points down her chest	
1.28	Parade ground	Rihanna marches with rifle in front of the men	
1.30	Armoury	Close-up on Rihanna's face, helmet over eyes	
1.31	Parade ground	Rihanna marches with rifle in front of the men	
1.33	Armoury	Rihanna dancing on footlocker with grinding motions	
1.34	Parade ground	Rihanna struts with rifle, troops lined up behind her	
1.35	Armoury	Rihanna opens and closes her jacket	
1.36	Parade ground	Rihanna fires off the rifle	"br-r-r-p, br-r-r-p"
1.37	Armoury	Rihanna puts finger to her lips	
1.40	Parade ground	Rihanna holds rifle, ready to fire	
1.40	Sand dunes	Rihanna struts through explosions	"So hard, so hard" (continues into next)
1.41	Pile of sandbags in desert, lit in orange tones (D)	Rihanna rolls in wet sand, wearing dark leather mini-skirt, cupped metal bikini, one belted shoulder-plate with two knives strapped to it, a different black mask painted across her eyes, and her hair smoothed back	
1.43	Sand dunes	Rihanna strutting in semi-silhouette	
1.44	Pile of sandbags	Rihanna with head thrown back; soldier behind her points rifle to right of camera	
1.45	Sand dunes	Rihanna looks to camera through her shoulder-spikes	
1.46	Pile of sandbags	Rihanna stands on 'podium' of sandbags between squad of four armed male soldiers wearing vests, fatigue trousers with knee-pads, helmets with goggles on top; chiffon train trails from the back	Second verse begins

		of her bikini as she dances and shakes her behind	
1.48		Rihanna sits up from rolling in sand	
1.50		Rihanna sings to camera	
1.51		Rihanna sings in dominant pose, flanked by two of the squad	
1.52		Rihanna crawls over the sandbags	
1.53		Rihanna sings from the 'podium'	
1.55		Rihanna writhes in sand and arches back	
1.57	House in desert (E)	Soldier wearing green vest and red head-wrap, carrying beige rifle, walks past side of house with Arabic graffiti from the Quran ("To Allah we belong and to Him we shall return")	Second verse continues: "Who think they test me now"
1.57		Camera pulls back to show footlockers outside house, soldier walks in past another guard	
1.59	Armoury	Rihanna dancing between rockets	"Run through your town, I shut it down"
2.00		Close-up of Rihanna's face	
2.01		Rihanna points down	Vocoder slows the word "down"
2.02	Interior of tent (F)	Off-duty male soldier slams cards on to a table where Rihanna and other male soldiers are gambling	Bass drops
2.02		Close-up of a luxury liquor bottle, Rihanna's hands dealing cards, what seems like bandolier of bullets on her chest	"Brilliant, resilient…"
2.03		Rihanna looks over cards, wearing high black/white/red peaked cap and large hoop earrings	
2.04		Squad playing cards	
2.05		Close-up on dog-tags and Poker Stars chips on table	"Fan mail from 27 million…"
2.06		Soldier and Rihanna looking over cards; ruched straps of her dress, eagle-like insignia on cap	
2.07	Armoury	Rihanna opens jacket	

2.09	Tent interior	Close-up on dog-tags and poker chips	
2.10	Armoury	Rihanna dancing, holding helmet down	
2.11		Rihanna makes 'small' sign with two fingers, smiles sardonically, gives dismissive wave	"It's gonna take more than that, hope that ain't all you got"
2.13	Tent interior	Black soldier lifts on webbing	
2.14		Rihanna gathers chips towards her	"I need it all"
2.15		Close-up on dog-tags and poker chips	
2.16		Black soldier puts on camo-print Skull Candy headphones	
2.16		Close-up on dog-tags, poker chips and $100 bills	"The money, the cars, the clothes…"
2.17		Rihanna starts dancing on her chair	
2.18		Unseen hand throws down Poker Stars playing cards	
2.19	Armoury	Close-up on Rihanna's face	"I can't just let you run up on me like that"
2.20		Rihanna dancing in front of upturned rifle, shot at 90° angle	
2.21		Rihanna dancing between rockets	
2.24	Tent interior	Close-up of soldier's headphones	
2.25		Rihanna overturns table, tossing bank-notes into air	
2.25		Male soldiers on another table arm-wrestling	
2.27		Rihanna walks away from the men, waving her winnings	
2.28	Pink tank in desert (G)	Rihanna's head and shoulders with pink tank in background, wearing black helmet with Mickey Mouse ears, pink lipstick and four bandoliers of bullets	Chorus 1 starts
2.29		Rihanna standing on tank, with its gun-barrel pointing forward; she dances slowly, swaying hips	
2.31		Rihanna tugs straps of helmet	
2.31		Rihanna stands on gun-barrel of tank, both hands between her legs	

2.32		Rihanna looks over her shoulder to camera, revealing nothing but a very fine mesh top under the bandoliers	
2.33	Roadside scene (H)	Rihanna wearing olive-green cape, netting and high black boots, holding rifle, standing by US Air Force water-tank	
2.34	Pink tank	Rihanna dances on tank	
2.35	Roadside	Camera pans up Rihanna's chest and head, Rihanna looks to camera wearing netting like veil	
2.38	Pink tank	Rihanna glances up from under helmet	
2.38	Roadside	Rihanna walks past line of trucks	
2.40	Pink tank	Rihanna tugs helmet-straps, sways hips, pink gun-barrel in foreground	
2.40		Rihanna straddles gun-barrel	"So hard"
2.42	Roadside	Rihanna walks away from water-tank, rifle pointing down, and changes places with soldier she is relieving (Jeezy)	
2.48		Rihanna walks to checkpoint, holding rifle which reflects the light	
2.48	Mountain road (I)	Long shot of burning vehicle	
2.49		Close-up of Jeezy, wearing black leather jacket, black do-rag with goggles on top; flames behind him	Jeezy begins rapping
2.51		Jeezy seen sitting among wrecked tyres as other military vehicle drives by	
2.55		Two soldiers run down hill to join the vehicle	
2.56		Jeezy continues rapping	"I used to run my own block like Obama did"
2.57		Two soldiers advance, pointing rifles	
2.58		Close-up on Jeezy	"You ain't gotta believe me"
3.00	Sand dunes	Rihanna struts through explosions	"Go ask my mama then"
3.00	Mountain road	Jeezy sitting on the tyres	"You couldn't even come in my room, it smelled like a kilo"

3.01		Soldier runs through wreckage, pointing rifle	
3.02		Soldier tries to revive another in seat of wrecked vehicle	
3.03		Close-up on face of male soldier wearing camo-print headphones, three streaks of black paint on cheek	
3.04		Close-up on Jeezy rapping	
3.04	Sand dunes	Rihanna turns to camera	
3.05	Mountain road	Two dark green tanks drive up road	
3.06		Jeezy standing with one foot on gun-barrel of tank	
3.08		Jeezy tugs his lapels and raps	
3.09		Convoy drives	
3.10		Jeezy sitting on tyres	
3.10	Sand dunes	Camera pans up from Rihanna's feet as she struts	
3.12	Mountain road	Jeezy smokes a cigar in bright lens-flare	
3.13		Jeezy sitting on tyres, soldiers exploring wreckage	
3.16		Fireball explodes	
3.17		Jeezy stands and walks away with fireball in background	
3.19		Jeezy sitting on tyres	
3.20	Sand dunes	Rihanna strutting past explosions	
3.21	Mountain road	Jeezy sitting, gesturing with cigar	
3.22		Soldier wearing camo headphones lifts rifle	
3.23		Jeezy sitting on tyres as soldiers leap past him	"Yeah, they say they hard, they ain't as hard as this"
3.25		Soldiers circle wrecked vehicle	
3.28		Jeezy stands, smoking cigar	"Hard, the one word that describes me" (continues into next)
3.28	Sand dunes	Rihanna turns and looks through shoulder-spikes	"If I wasn't doing this…"

3.30	Mountain road	Jeezy sitting on tank, holding jacket collar	"…you know where I'd be" (Jeezy's last line)
3.31		Close-up of Jeezy on tank, holding two fingers to camera	End of Jeezy's section
3.32	Parade ground	Rihanna struts in front of the troops	Rihanna begins singing again: "Where dem girls talking trash, where dem girls talking trash?"
3.35		Rihanna mimes scanning horizon	"Where they at, where they at, where they at?"
3.36	Armoury	Rihanna dancing	"Where dem bloggers at…?"
3.39	Parade ground	Close-up of Rihanna scanning horizon, bright searchlight behind her	"Where they at, where they at, where they at?"
3.42	Pink tank	Rihanna dancing on tank, swaying hips	
3.47	Parched plain (J)	Rihanna wearing black bodice with pointed shoulders, centurion's helmet, knives strapped to hips, carrying large black flag with white letter R	Chorus 1 begins for last time
3.52	Armoury	Close-up on Rihanna's face	
3.53		Rihanna crouches between rockets	
3.55	Parade ground	Rihanna turns to camera, men out of focus, camera highlights hair braided into tram-lines on one side of her cap	"I'm so hard"
3.57		Rihanna leads men in marching dance	
3.57	Plain	Rihanna swirls flag, looks to camera, camera picks out leopard-print fur on helmet	
3.59		Close-up of knives on Rihanna's hips	
4.00		Rihanna swirls flag	
4.01	Parade ground	Rihanna turns to camera	"I'm so hard"
4.02		Rihanna stands between ranks of men	
4.03	Armoury	Close-up of Rihanna's face, hands behind her head, swinging her hips	
4.04	Mountain road	Convoy driving past smoking wreckage	

4.04		Jeezy sitting on tank	Jeezy: "So hard" (accompanying chorus for first time)
4.05	Sand dunes	Rihanna strutting past explosions	
4.06	Armoury	Rihanna dancing between rockets, from thighs up	
4.07	Mountain road	Jeezy standing by wreckage	
4.08	Armoury	Close-up on Rihanna's face, helmet over eyes, with red lips open	Rihanna: "I, I, I" (last words)
4.09		Scene quickly fades to black	

Music making politics: beyond lyrics

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In this article I argue that considering how any sort of music is made more closely - as sonic material, performance cultures, for whom and on whose terms, is integral to projects exploring the music-politics nexus. The case in point is "My Way", a seemingly apolitical song, as it becomes repurposed: transformed through modes of performance, unusual musical arrangements, and performance contexts. The analysis reveals a deeper, underlying politics of music-making that still needs unpacking: the race, gender, and class dichotomies permeating macro- and micro-level explorations into the links between music, society, and politics. Incorporating a socio-musicological analytical framework that pays attention to how this song works musically, alongside how it can be reshaped through radical performance and production practices, shows how artists in diverging contexts can 're-music' even the most hackneyed song into a form of political engagement.

Introduction

In 2016, Bob Dylan was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature. In 2018 Kendrick Lamar became the first Rap artist to win the Pulitzer Prize for Music. Between these two mediatized moments of public recognition, across the race and genre divides of contemporary culture lie many musico-political timelines, recording careers, playlists, and embodied musicalities. This article aims to show why, and how theory and research into the relationship between (the study of) politics and music-making need to move beyond indicators of political relevance that are based on lyrics, an artist's public persona, public profile or critical acclaim. It explores how one particular song can become an act of resistance, politicized in, and as music in ways that go beyond lyrical content.

Scene-Setting

It was an uncharacteristic move for the Nobel Committee to award awarded singer-songwriter Bob Dylan the 113th Nobel Prize for Literature, the first American since the African American novelist, Toni Morrison, in 1993. The prize went to Dylan for his work as a "great poet in the English-speaking tradition" (Danius in Smith-Spark 2016) rather than for his work as a groundbreaking musician. Dylan's seeming indifference created headlines as he delegated Patti Smith, another singer-songwriter and 'punk poet' to receive the prize on his behalf. Smith's rendition of "A Hard Rain's A-Gonna Fall", released in

1962 and, since then, prominent on protest-music playlists, generated more controversy after a less-than-word-perfect performance. Inferences drawn about Dylan's political stance towards the Nobel as a cultural institution, about whether this award closed the gap between 'high 'and 'popular' culture were somewhat overshadowed by Donald Trump's election as US President[1]. The Trump inauguration in early 2017 saw a peak in protests, in the US and around the world, against the xenophobic and socioculturally divisive agenda presaged by his campaign. These calls resonated with direct actions, online and in public award ceremonies, against the endemic lack of diversity along race/ethnicity, gender, sexuality, and class axes of inclusion and exclusion that continues to characterize public recognition for artistic and cultural achievement.

Aims and Argument

The scenario sketched above is this contribution's point of entry for this special issue, conceived for students of the politics-culture nexus interested in music matters[2]. The argument I want to put forward here is that, from this perspective, explorations of music - a diverse research domain as well as cultural artefact, art form, and performance practice - need to engage with the full spectrum of classical and popular music research. Scholars along this spectrum have also been considering, through a musicological prism, musico-political issues of the day if not the role of musical arts in the *longue durée* of 'modernity' and its discontents at the macro-level of analysis (Ross 2010, 2011; Said 1993; Attali 1989; Griffiths 2010). The primary aim in this context is to demonstrate - rather than assert by allusion – musically, through close listening to how the making of music can both reveal and resist incumbent powers at the nexus of political and cultural life.

The Nobel Prize for literature was for Dylan's *lyrics*, not his musical output, nor for his performance art. In this way the award reinforces the idea that aesthetic and cultural value resides in the written or sung *logos*. In this understanding the materials of 'music', those variously organized 'sounds', serves simply as an accompaniment. Overlooking where and how politics may lie embedded in the musical substance as well as the performance genealogy of any particular piece of music or community of practice means sidestepping a multitude of musical cultures as they crossover into mainstreams (e.g. Jamaican *Reggae* and *Soundsystems* cultures, Nigerian *Afrobeat*, or Brazilian *Tropicalismo*). These dynamics are not immediately apparent when considerations of music politics/political music focus only on literality—lyrical manifestations. Engaging with musicological modes of analysis can offer students of (international) politics interested in exploring how musicians 'music politics' conceptual and empirical avenues of inquiry[3].

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[1] The future of the Nobel Prize as a cultural institution and its international prestige after revelations of sexual harassment, and various sorts of malpractice in 2018 remains to be seen.

[2] This article draws on Franklin (2019; 2020b)

[3] "The word "analysis" easily associates itself in music with the idea of all that is dead, sterile and farthest removed from the living work of art. One can well say that the general underlying feeling toward musical analysis is not exactly friendly" (Adorno 2002b, 162)

A third aim is to consider how artists – musicians – have always pushed back against efforts to steer and control their creative and, where apposite, explicitly or implicit political practice for other agendas (Ross 2011; Miller/DJ Spooky 2008). Musicians, as social actors if not activists and artists work intuitively, and consciously to produce artefacts (albums, tracks, works) and performances (live and recorded) in ways that are more than reflections of *Realpolitik*, reducible to the mimetic in domains, historical periods deemed, or seen as "political" (Hall 1996; Feldman 2017; Rai and Reinelt 2014). The playlist of anti-Vietnam War protest music is one case in point, indeed one in which Dylan's lyrics have been considered formative vehicles for mobilization. For this intervention, however, the main point of critique is that a singular focus on lyrics, literality, is not sufficient to develop analytical frameworks that can apprehend "what makes music work" (Byrne 2012, 10) in politically significant ways. There is a much wider and more diverse repertoire, of performance as well as musical material, within mainstream and marginalized musical cultures, now accessible in concomitant video archives and discographies online than has been assumed for music-based investigations in political research.

These stipulations beg the question of demarcation as well as of definition for projects that are by predilection multidisciplinary undertakings. Music and politics are both areas of scholarly, practical and technical expertise even as their respective performance mores, methodologies, and theoretical canons run along parallel lines in contemporary academe. In the case of political science, particularly the study of international relations - *world politics* or *global politics* (Caso and Hamilton 2015; Zehfuss and Edkins 2019), intra-disciplinary debates are anchored in the historiography of the nation-state and the Westphalian state-system, recent transformations through critique in both respects notwithstanding. Such reconsiderations of main objects, modes and levels of analysis have their counterparts in music research: comparable shifts around core objects of analysis (the music 'work' as artefact), empirical categories, privileging of the musical form and substance of western tonality. These have led to shifts in the Eurocentric musical centre of gravity to consider race, class, gender and sexuality as constituent elements rather than epiphenomena of music theory and research[4].

Organization

Two conceptual, historiographical points underpin the argument driving this analysis in this regard: First is the ethnocentric teleology of what are often unquestioning emotional ties to the tonal 'home' upon which *western* music-making cultures are based, standardized systems of major and minor scales (even when other scales are deployed across the musical spectrum). This (acquired) way of hearing only certain sonic organizations as music (or not) undergird theories, and histories of western music and society within a narrative of inevitability that posits the western European experience of (musical and

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[4] I discuss these matters more fully in Franklin (2020a; 2020b)

political) modernity as the peak of political and cultural achievements. Jacques Attali (1989) is a prominent example of this line of thought. Alex Ross (2010; 2011) provides a more nuanced exploration of the relationship between (late) modernity, twentieth century ideologies, and western classical/popular music, as do Barenboim and Said (2003), and Said (1992). Barrett (2016) deconstructs this whole enterprise by questioning the very supposition that 'music' is defined only by its sonic qualities, as variously organized sound. The writings of Theodor Adorno on music weave in and out of these treatises by virtue of his provocative critiques of the sociocultural and political legacy of the western classical music tradition in the wake of how exponents of 20th century - "new" or modern - music can atone for the cultural establishment's complicity with totalitarian and capitalist forces of oppression (Adorno 2002a; 2002b).

Second, these associations undergird a widespread assumption that there is but a limited repertoire in aesthetic positions, experience and musical (gendered and racialized) prowess from which to evaluate diverse music-making as cultural and politically significant forces. There is still much light to be shone on the uneven cultural geographies of musical taste - aesthetics and criticism, given the ethnocentric filters that evaluate, and tabulate ways of making music and politics from either side of what remains the ethnocentric, western musical norm. The flipside to this conceptual blind spot is how, despite its market power and capriciousness, the global music industry of today cannot completely control the ways in which music operates as transferable, polysemic politics. Record companies and radio DJs cannot entirely dictate where and how a piece of music, a performance becomes political/politicized, or how people and communities respond as music artefacts-as-performance circulate through diverse locations of experience and sociopolitical polarization (Rühlig 2016; Zuberi 2017). Third, how political power and resistance become intimately part of how musicians change, adapt or reconstruct any part of their own - or others' - repertoire offers possibilities for unpacking the politics of *familiar* music. Doing so requires analytical approaches that can consider music/s as mobile rather than static artefacts or cultural practices, as more than passive instruments for domination, or as a machine-readable soundtrack for liberation struggles reflected through lyrical intentionality.

The article proceeds as follows, moving along the spectrum that spans the so-called 'levels of analysis' problem as it goes. The empirical focus is an example of one particular, apolitical and barely regarded as potentially political song, "My Way". It serves as a rich vein of inquiry for explorations of how music works politically in ways that go beyond manifest lyrical content or performance genealogies marked as appropriate contributions to political spectacle. Before exploring selected performances of "My Way" the article first considers some of the conceptual points that arise at this disciplinary intersection. It then unpacks how this song works musically, on its own terms and in the case of three artists who have reworked it across historical time, geocultural space, race and gender divides in particular. This popular standard, one that many 'love to hate', underscores how, in the right hands, it can trounce the performance conventions attributed to its designation as schmaltz, a 'Crooner Classic', much loved in Karaoke bars and

funerals. This tripartite analysis pivots on the invidious ways in which the notion of an incommensurable (rather than a socio-politically constructed) race-divide that keeps Black epistemologically segregated from White music-making, music scholarship and journalism continues to play a formative role: not only in prize-giving ceremonies, mainstream or self-designated "alternative" radio and streaming playlists but also in scholarly debates around revisionist histories of twentieth century music, as an art form, entertainment industry, and social engagement.

Conceptual and Contextual Relays

Imagine being in the audience, back in the winter of 2016 in Stockholm, as Patti Smith takes to the stage, dressed in a formal-like white shirt under her trademark black overcoat and waits at the microphone for her cue to the first verse of Nobel Laureate, Bob Dylan's "A Hard Rain".. What happens next, and whether as audience or YouTube viewer you would rate this version of the song as either great poetry, great music, or a great performance notwithstanding, the gender-race infused cultural politics of this moment are palpable even at a distance. Both Smith and Dylan were born in the 1940's, and made their mark in mid-20th century, New York underground cultural scenes as these intersected with the rapid internationalization of anti-Vietnam war and civil rights protest movements of the time. Yet here 'they 'are, accepting an honour in a European cultural institution whose official preclusion of music as an award category underscores the global reach, hegemonic power that Anglo-American popular culture exerts on everyday and politically aware playlists. The extensiveness of this reach, through the market dominance of Anglo-American film, television, and music conglomerations, and of English as a world language, goes hand-in-hand with the historical trajectory of US military and geopolitical power. It also traces global imaginaries of individual, community, and organized resistances to abuses of power for which these playlists provide familiar soundtracks, notable exceptions notwithstanding (Miller/DJ Spooky 2004, 2008; Gilroy 1993; Krims 2000). In this respect those rooted in the African American experience, of slavery and racial segregation, continue to express and challenge the racial cleavage that still defines American public life. In so doing they constantly re-echo these other histories, invert the triumphant narrative of Anglo-American (read: white, settler) economic and military prowess, political and cultural *exceptionalism*. Dylan's œuvre encapsulates one musical-narrative arc of experience and possible dissent to these forces, even though he has publicly rejected being labelled a political artist.

The literature is only just beginning to consider the sonic dimensions to waves of mobilization around civil rights, women's liberation, and anti-racism from other parts of the world (Dillon et al 2020). These new areas of inquiry follow in the wake of a major shift in how "music" has been conceptualized, in classical art music and popular music studies, from a static object to a mobile practice, from artefact to relationships. *Muiscking*

is a much-cited term coined by Christopher Small (1998, 13) who was at the vanguard of this shift.

Small lays the stress on *music-making* as a process and set of relationships, rather than 'music 'as a noun, a static, ahistorical object of analysis, or field of intellectual, aesthetic appreciation in isolation. Small's conceptualization encapsulates moves in this period away from the "absolute music" tradition that dominated theory and analysis in the classical art music tradition (Barrett 2016) towards the study of musicking - music - as multivariate forms, and communities of practice that comprise social - and, thereby, political - communication.

These socially constructivist approaches have been formative in popular music theory and research with its focus on lyrical meanings, reception/audience studies and *affect*. Regarding music as socially embedded has also informed critiques of the *World Music* business model, and related debates in ethnomusicology around the limits to western conceptual models of musical form when looking to apprehend how the music of other cultures works (Feld 1996; Mowitt 2002, 211; Franklin 2005). This shift in emphasis need not exclude paying close attention to how any piece of music, or categories of music-making co-constitute these relationships as sonic artefacts, ways of (re)organizing, if not manipulating sounds by adapting some of the tools of musicological analysis (Davies and Franklin 2015).

How does this shift from noun to verb work as/in any piece of music, or musical practice? By way of illustration a singer-songwriter-author who was much less coy about the political reverberations in which they worked, is Gil Scott-Heron; an exemplar of these dynamics (1949-2011). Scott-Heron, heralded as a "New Black Poet" with the release of his first album, *Small Talk at 125th and Lenox*, in 1970, was from the same generation as Bob Dylan and Patti Smith.

Scott-Heron devoted his whole career to voicing these contradictions, re-scoring and so making audible silences in the official play-list, and business model of the largely US-owned global arts and entertainment industry. He also played no small part in the success of mobilization, led by Stevie Wonder, to establish a national holiday to commemorate Dr Martin Luther King. Scott-Heron did this as a pioneering exponent of another sort of "musicking" to those that comprise the western classical and popular music canon, now a global market-leader in music sales and a multidimensional commercial and cultural force in its own right. The *musicking* that Gil Scott-Heron's work came to encapsulate, in its earlier articulations, is Rap and Hip Hop through he preferred to call himself a "Bluesologist" (Scott-Heron 2012).

Emerging from poor, Black urban neighbourhoods in the US East and then West Coast in the 1970's – 1980's, Rap music and concomitant Hip-hop culture are intimately connected to a form and style of socio-politically *conscious* music-making. These commentaries on the frustrations, violence and injustices of socio-economic deprivation, and racism in the everyday lives of millions of Black Americans continue to resonate with ethnic minorities in other parts of the world. As a musical and spoken-word practice Rap draws on African/African diasporic musical cultures (rhythms, beats, and instruments),

Jamaican reggae and dub traditions (improvisation, 'scratching' techniques with record turntables, the dialogue between *MC* and audience, and the 'selector' influence of *Dee-jaying*).

From the outset it made free use of tropes from African American blues and jazz musical cultures through a range of lo-tech and, later, digital forms of musical "borrowing" from previous recordings, now called *sampling*. Borrowing, directly or indirectly through figurative and literal forms of musical quotations, said 'sampling', generates a complex interplay between horizontal and vertical layers that move the track along, and hold it together (Katz 2004; Laderman and Westrup 2014). Lyrically, Rap and Hip-hop is based on delivering material that is spoken/sung as both rhythmic and substantive, figurative meaning making with, and alongside sampled material. These are contemporary, musicalized expressions of longstanding cultures of intra-cultural and intergenerational conversation comprised of the tropes, and (self/community) consciousness of Black vernacular speech. Scholars study these communicative cultures as exemplars of *signifyin(g)* as spoken, and musical practices (Gates 1988, xxix-xxxiii; Rose 1994; Krims 2000).

Musicking Politics in Practice – "My Way"

We can now turn the case in point in light of the conceptual and musico-historical points made so far. The discussion herein considers what happens when, and how a song is *made* to sound, how it *sounds*, in different musical ways that reverberate with the respective changes in sociocultural or political contexts and the artist's own sensibility. Even without lyrics that are explicitly political, or forms of social commentary on current events, a pop song can also emerge as a 'conscious' contribution to wider issues.

The example, "My Way", was a hit in the 1960's. It originated in France, embedded in the French-language *chanson* tradition and its pantheon of superstars (Claude François, France Gall, Jacques Brel for instance). The song has come a long way since then. Travelling, first, across the Channel to the UK briefly but then onwards across the Atlantic, "My Way" was a chart-topper for both Frank Sinatra in 1969 and Elvis Presley in 1973; covered and caricatured countless times since.

The original song, "*Comme d'habitude*", co-written by Jacques Revaux and Claude François, was first released in 1967. The melancholy title ('As usual' or, rather, to fit the melodic line; 'like you/I always do') and lyrical storyline are carried by a simple, sing-able melody which is based on the upward movement of an interval called a *rising sixth*. The original lyric ruminates on the pending end of a relationship, a common theme in pop songs. It was the American singer-songwriter, Paul Anka, who bought the rights to adapt the song. David Bowie attempted his own text over the original melody with considerably less success (according to Bowie) at about the same time. Anka changed the words, the number of stanzas, and the title. The first line, "And now, the end is near, and so I face the final curtain…" shifts the sentiment from bittersweet ruminations on a

relationship ending to an, arguably, defiant affirmation of individual agency and determination: "I did it my way" [5].

      This malleability is one clue, perhaps, to the song's longevity. As we will see below, it seems to enable artists to articulate an inner world of emotions and at the same time - in the same bar, or breath even, gesture towards broader societal issues. The melodic structure and basic harmonic lines did not change significantly between the original and Anka's adaptation, however. But this is not why this example is of interest to this inquiry, the immediate impact that changing a lyric can have on how people can respond to a song notwithstanding. It is the geocultural and symbolic border-crossing qualities to this song's inter-national, and intra-cultural trajectory over the last fifty years that provide insights, on listening again, into the dynamism, the porousness of any musical tradition, or artefact, as it travels through time and (cyber)space. These shifts emerge as performers re-adapt, and then re-deploy the musical elements in question. Precisely because the lyrics of this song are not overtly political, neither in the original French nor English versions, how these shifts in register resonate with not only the socio-political but also the commercial context in which they emerge becomes possible to follow and hear.

Sid Vicious' Way

In 1978, the song took on a completely different, socially antagonistic demeanour when Sid Vicious, from the British Punk band, The Sex Pistols, covered it. The video-clip of this version, taken from the album, and film called *The Great Rock 'n' Roll Swindle* (Dir. Julien Temple 1980), opens with Vicious descending a staircase onto the stage to a descending orchestral glissando. In a white blazer (crooner-style), Vicious (born John Simon Ritchie) takes to the microphone and sneeringly sings, off-key, the first four verses; "And, now, the end is near". At the moment of the next four more verses his subversive intentions become clear. There is brief pause, orchestral glissando again, and then the electric guitar takes off, doubling the beat as Vicious modulates from croon to scream to complete the song. The audience is pictured as both shocked, and in raptures as Vicious riffs on the lyrics with copious expletives.

      The effect of this break from the archetypical delivery of this song was electrifying at the time and it still is, for more reasons than the visual cues might suggest. The double-target is clear, mainstream classical concert cultures and, on the other hand, the trappings of fame and fandom - punk made audience-confrontation an intrinsic element in the performance - that sustains the music business. The video ends with Vicious pulling a gun, and then shooting into the audience of mostly older white, well-dressed

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[5] Paul Anka negotiated the rights to adapt and record the song, sharing the proceeds with Revaux and Francois, until the French entrepreneur Xavier Niel bought the French rights in 2009. Anka apparently considered the original a "shitty" song but one with potential. Frank Sinatra apparently despised this "self-indulgent" version (BBC 2000).

concertgoers. Pandemonium, punk-style, ensues. Vicious gestures obscenely to his 'victims', to then re-ascend the staircase.

He did it not just '*His* Way' 'but 'Another Way'. Vicious - 20 years old at the time - takes this crooner-classic well out of its comfort-zone, and original social context in order to sound another sensibility about status, value, and what counts musically. This *mise-en-scène* encapsulates the challenge of Punk as the transgressive youth movement of the day. It also signals some of its future contradictions as a musical innovation, and shifting status over the next forty-odd years; from a grassroots form of socio-economic protest against the vested order of class and privilege to a global, and commercial phenomenon encompassing fashion, alternative media, and major publishing outlets, and archive for subsequent counter-cultural statements (Davies 2005; Dunn 2016; Reddington 2007).

Nina Simone's Way

Issues of class-exclusion and identity politics are evoked in this Punk version of "My Way". Other approaches to the song trace the race dimensions at the intersection of class and gender axes of exclusion, in life and in the music business. The first is characterized by the formative musical contribution, not only the commercial success, of Black artists across the racially encoded commercial divide that still governs the global business model of music marketing and its African/African American centres of gravity (Gilroy 1993; Gates 1988).

These other examples throw into relief inter-generational dynamics of race, gender and sexuality when considered in light of the entrenched under-representation of women composers and musicians, in classical art-music and popular music domains as well as in writing about music. The African American singer-songwriter, and classically trained musician, Nina Simone, exemplifies these dynamics. Like Gil Scott-Heron, Simone (born Eunice Kathleen Waymon) was raised in the southern states of the USA. She became prominent during the 1960's civil rights struggles led by Martin Luther King, at his side in the March on the Selma to Montgomery (Alabama) marches in 1965. Simone penned a number of world-renowned anthems of the Civil Rights movement and was politically outspoken all her life. She eventually left the US (claiming that she was pursued and threatened by the authorities) to live and perform in exile, in Liberia, and France where she died in 2003, at the age of seventy.

In 1971, Simone, released her (single) version of "My Way", with RCA Victor Records. It was included on the *Here Comes the Sun* album of the same year. The audio of this release is (currently) available on YouTube[6]. One of the hundreds of comments on this clip, posted by Gérard Derwael in 2017, goes to some length to articulate what makes

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[6] The single was released in France, Spain and the Netherlands between 1971 and 1972 with the original French title on the first two releases' sleeve.

it so striking. Nina Simone had "the good sense not to make a schmaltzy version as is often the case… Rather to give it a crazy ("*dingue*") rhythm…that is punctuated along the way as if to show that life is also made up of brutal accidents" (2017, my translation). I will discuss these 'punctuations' below.

Simone's vocal on the title-line is never quite the same on each return and it is these variations on those five words, those nuances on the rising 6ths, chromatic lines, in her melodic shaping, that are worth concentrating on whilst listening. It is another clip, of a more stripped-down, live studio-session of this arrangement with only keyboard and rhythm sections (no orchestra, no backing vocals), that makes it possible to see, as well as hear how Simone re-situates this song, taking it into quite a different place than versions had to date [7]. She stays true to Anka's lyrics, but it is the intense rhythm that accompanies her vocal delivery as she shifts from the quietly melodic to the more emphatic, dynamically urgent.

In this manner Simone is able to convey quite another sentiment; not one that is "self-indulgent" as Sinatra would have claimed. What is so "crazy" about the rhythmic power of this studio mix of the single, for anyone accustomed to the standard version, is the prominence of the percussion. Afro-Caribbean bongos provide a rapid, challenging counterpoint to the melodic line from Simone as it creates a counterweight to a recurring, sweetly rising melodic phrase on piano. These three lines – vocal, keyboard, and percussion - generate a complex texture, and quite another pulse. The galloping, increasingly intense rhythmic patterns on the bongos take Simone's vocals, and her body as it happens, not only forwards but also around. For she also moves, dances in and out towards the pull of the percussion as the song builds to its rhythmic rather than the usual, melodic climax, and harmonic resolution.

One more sort of punctuation, another interpolation also sets this version apart. This is the interlude - interruption - between sections in which Simone changes the accent on the delivery of the title line. Briefly pausing, she rat-a-tat-tats the phrase "I did it my way" as it fuses with a rapid rhythmic motif, played in unison, from the percussion and keyboards:

> "I did it *my*way
> da da da *DA*
> da da da *DA*
> da da da *DA*"

Simone's inversion of the usual hierarchy between dominant vocal line/lyric and supporting instrumentation changes the emphasis entirely. Her repertoire of ways to intonate, embellish the melodic and rhythmic inflections on the almost swallowed phrasing, "*my*way", in both these versions notwithstanding, the stress here is somewhere else.

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[7] The audio of the aforementioned French release is at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=45BqY0cpapQ. The film of the studio session discussed here is at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E5slKnOULnU.

It is no longer on the penultimate syllable – I did it MYYYY way, reiterated any number of times in grand finales (these five words-syllables are usually held for at least four beats, extended and modulated upwards in varying degrees of volume, or emotional embellishment by the vocalist). In so doing, the addressee and positioning of the subject/object relations within the manifest content shifts as well; *myway* as rage but also as part of an intimate conversation with another (male) other as Simone then subtly shifts the line 'what is a man, what has he got' to 'what is a man what have you got---' in the last third of this studio performance.

The Afro-Caribbean rhythm, jazz keyboard inflections, and Gospel-based delivery are part of three, interwoven yet equal sonic lines. "My Way" has crossed the racialized genre-gender divide, redrawn it, thrown it back, and "*spat* it out". Simone delivers those lines (one minute, forty-four seconds into the track),"I *ate* it up, and *spat* it out, I ----------- stood tall, I did it my-way" by roaring, figuratively spitting the words out, to then hold the first person for four beats before moving into the aforementioned rhythmic motif on "*my*way". In these respects, her delivery, from a different musico-time and politico-cultural place, presages later punk, and Rap/Hip-hop versions[8].

Nina Hagen's Way

One other version should suffice to show another dimension to how music-making becomes politics. It is by another Nina, Nina Hagen. Hagen also improvises, extends, and reshapes the piece in a way quite similar to the Punk version now identified with Sid Vicious. Hagen, raised in East Berlin and trained as an opera-singer with a complex relationship to her East German roots and career in the West, has been covering this song for some time. One of two versions can be heard in the live recording of one of the many concerts held as the Berlin Wall collapsed in 1989. The one that Hagen took part in was a rock concert. The other was a classical concert, of Beethoven and Mozart, conducted by Daniel Barenboim[9].

There is, however, an earlier version from 1978 that comes very close to the Sid Vicious cover, recorded in April 1978 in Paris though only released in 1979 according to one source (Géant-Vert 2004). The similarities (if not in the vocal pyrotechnics) include the opening glissando on synthesizer in the Hagen's version, slow intro and transition to loud, fast, and raucous, albeit with a different sort of guitar riff to segue from ballad to punk-rock anthem. In both performances, Hagen also proceeds to improvise, in German[10].

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[8] Rapper Jay-Z released his version of "My Way", a rap-inflected dialogue interpolated between the Anka lyrics and entitled "I Did it My Way" on his 2002 album, *The Blueprint 2: The Gift & The Curse.*
[9] *The 1989 concert for citizens of the GDR* this classical concert *t*ook place on 12th November 1989. Hagen performed her version of *My Way* at a free concert organized by the radio station, Senders Freies Berlin (SFB), two days earlier, released in 2014 as a compilation with Universal Music's Panorama label as *Mauerfall – Das legendäre Konzert für Berlin '89* (KlassikAkzente 2014).
[10] The clip from Hagen's 1978 performance is taken from a show in Dortmund, in December of that year, also available on YouTube at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MHEwCagBtN0. Lyrically, this

The years separating these two performances provide their own slant on her lyrics, then and in retrospect. The first person, "I" of "My Way", becomes the communal 'we' of 'our way' in the geopolitical and cultural aftermath of the collapse of the Berlin Wall and associated demise of the Soviet Union.

'Recap' - Whose music-politics is (made) audible?

This discussion has aimed to show, *socio-musicologically*, how political forces modulate as *musicalized* expressions of resistance, as much as compliance. These modulations can become discernible within the most hackneyed of examples along with others considered "living works of art" (Adorno 2002b, 164) in the literature. Aware of the limits to Adorno's own, infamously delimited playlist, I have followed his cue that musical analysis need not only be about describing formal structures (harmony, melody, rhythm and other 'materials of music'). Rather that it also entails developing ways to engage in "structural listening [to] what is going on, musically, *underneath* these formal schemata" (Adorno 2002b, 164).

Getting underneath also involves considering what is going on, culturally as well as musically *around* the analytical, or commercial categories that distinguish one musical form, communities of practice, and measure of creativity, from one another. This means breaking the habit of locking the political, or any other meaning in the manifest – literal - lyrical content alone.

Several conclusions can be drawn for future explorations in to musicking politics that go beyond lyrical reductionism on the one hand and, on the other, the anti-musicality of positivist empiricism. First, the cultural and political spheres, however demarcated these may be from one another in the literature or through institutionalized communities of practice and taste, are not *a priori* separate domains of human endeavour with mutually exclusive hierarchies of power, privilege, and influence. But this does not mean to say that these two domains are synonymous, or to deny that music/s can be manipulated or repressed for political agendas. The historical record shows many examples of musicians, like other artists, grappling with the impositions, indeed dangers, of upsetting incumbent powers (Şener 2013; Ozturkmen and Martin 2014; Rühlig 2016; Miller/DJ Spooky 2004, 2008).

Through the case of "My Way", we can now hear *how* a piece of music, musicking dynamics (re-)articulate politics in ways that can both conforms to - and defy - powerful forces of control and obedience. For analysis these dynamics can be couched as literality only up to a point given how musicians use the power of suggestion, connotation, and interplays between familiar and introduced sonic, performance, and (as the case may be) lyrical elements.

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version is mostly her own, German take on the lyrics ("*Die Welt ist so kaputt….*") after delivering the first verse of the English lyric

In the second instance, the Nobel Prize 'rebranding' of Bob Dylan's musico-poetics as 'high art' throws it into relief the gatekeeping powers of cultural institutions at home and abroad as they seek to control cultural agendas, mitigate sociopolitical critique. In this case the honour of inclusion is reserved for a global superstar whose career is as much embedded in the trajectory of political and social commentary on his work as it is in the economic hegemony of the Anglo-American "Culture Industry" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1944). Much ink has been spilt to argue that whilst art may want to be political it may not necessarily 'work' as good 'art'.

Such concerns are political as much as they are aesthetic and, thereby, cultural and ethical questions. Many artists and musicians, several of whom have been discussed here, have combined their political and artistic commitments effectively, and without any sense that there need be a compromise. Vested interests, political and economic powers of ownership and control continually look to take charge of any cultural agenda from funding through to programming. For centuries, musicians, like any other artists, have been navigating these minefields of patronage, copyright, legitimacy, creative autonomy, and obstacles to dissemination.

Third, this discussion reconsiders questions about how music communicates, and for what purpose, in order to suggest that such an inquiry, whatever the disciplinary perspective or musical preference, needs rephrasing. Different sorts and communities of music, apprehended as more than the sum of formalized, theoretical properties, have always travelled; geographically and now via informal and commercialised computer-networked domains.

The communities of practice, and the artefacts that are produced when people, as individuals, groups or communities, come together to make and listen to any sort of music, need to be considered not in isolation. Rather, they need to be apprehended as complex wholes, "travelling cultures" that are not entirely reducible to their socio-historical timelines, or politico-cultural associations (Clifford 1998). Moreover, as a predominantly sonic, spontaneous and yet also consciously crafted force, music/s also travel physically; through the airwaves as beat, pulsations in varying frequencies, vibrations, as acoustic or amplified volumes of sound organized as melody, chord clusters, vocal or instrumental configurations, pitch and rhythm.

People were singing, making and playing 'found' or crafted instruments, and sonically-poetically articulating the world around them long before the portable audio cultures that emerged with the invention of recording technologies; from the phonograph, through to the tape recorder, Walkman, Discman, iPod and, 24/7 live-streaming services. In this respect, it is a truism to observe that music is everywhere, even when it is being heard in places some might prefer it not be – from the thud of the neighbour's sound-system on the other side of the wall, to tailor-made forms of background *muzak* in lifts, hotel lobbies or shopping malls. It may be everywhere but the diversity, and richness of audio cultures in the round is unevenly available.

So, fourth, whilst it is, indeed, an audible world, not everyone is listening and/or is able to practice or experience the diversity of these sonic cultures in equal measure.

This skewed geocultural terrain is shaped by the preferences for the music of some segments of society. The ability to hear, to be able to listen to music that is unfamiliar in form (neither three-minute pop-song, folk standard, nor classical symphony) or content (unusual harmonies or melodic lines, lyrics in another language, atypical instruments or instrumentation), is also shaped by habit and fashion, socialized by the play-lists of commercial and cultural institutions; from public radio stations through to school and university curricula through to funding for community centres, to concert-hall programs.

A key problem in this regard is the undertow in the literature that assumes that there is an "isomorphism" between any music, as practice and artefact, and its provenance, then reduced to reified indicators of race, gender, class, and sexuality (let alone religious affiliation). Like all cultural forms, art included, the sociopolitical, if not economic conditions of inception, realization, and reception by others are reconfigured in the act of *musicking*, listening, or remixing. These conditions can affect, and do inflect, what an audience or circumstantial listener might (be able to) hear. This is where most of the fiercest debates that patrol the boundaries of writing on western classical art music and other kinds of music - those from other cultures are lumped together under the *world music* rubric of commercial marketing genres - can be found.

Scientists, psychologists, and philosophers of music still argue over whether any sort of music can directly influence attitudes and actions, in an unmediated or decontextualized way. As noted above, the historical record shows that both incumbent and emerging powers - be they social, political, or religious authorities – seek to control cultural life. This includes punitive responses to musical forms of expression and communities deemed culturally suspect, transgressive, or a direct challenge to the status quo. Silencing opposition is, particularly in the case of sound waves, a physical as well as a political act of violence.

Here lies the paradox, the moment of possibility. Once physical distance made access to the music/s of others difficult for potential, non-accredited listeners. In a time when all sounds can arrive through the airwaves, live-streamed or replayed on analogue (vinyl records and turntable cultures are alive and well) or digital recording devices, symbolic and material borders can be traversed and repurposed. Back-catalogues and innovations can be made accessible by ordinary people wanting others to hear something they want to share, and by musicians (Byrne 2012, 81-145; Katz 2004; Stratton and Zuberi 2016; Zuberi 2017).

As powerful agents look to control agendas, responses from artists to the imposition of cemented, rather than the encouragement of 'invented' traditions are integral to apprehending how music is made, how it 'works', and for whom. These counter-cultural forces can be traced in the objectives of the avant-garde and experimental schools on classical art music from the mid-20th century to challenge the rigidities of the western classical canon, setting up an international network of musical centres on doing do and collaborating with popular music exponents as well. Another sort of pushback is evident in the way that the Do-It-Yourself musical and visual cultures of punk politics and the *signifyin(g)* practices of conscious Rap/Hip-hop reinvent themselves for contemporary

contexts. These sorts of *musicking*, and many more, initially made their mark by challenging the way that corporations benefit from the revenues raised by licensing and copyright arrangements.

Challenges to direct (bans), or indirect (media panics) forms of censorship also include contemporary expressions of cultural - racial and religious – music diversity by successive generations of former colonial subjects living in Europe and, more recently, brought by the 65 million people around the world suffering, and surviving the hardships of forced displacement. Music is listened to and made in refugee camps, in besieged cities as bombs fall, in detention centres on the borders, and in penal institutions. These *musickings* are also travelling cultures and, thereby, have political resonance. These phenomena need not be confined to the category of overtly political song, such as Simone's "Young, Gifted, and Black". It can also happen with the most mainstream examples of music, emanating from any vested order, as artists transform, and reinvent these sounds, musical structures and idioms, in ways that challenge, rather than reproduce sociocultural, economic and political divides along race, class, gender and, nowadays, religion. As they do, these soundings (with or without words) can, and do travel outwards as they move through, and around all possible worlds, evoking multiplex – mixed, not fixed - cultural imaginaries along the way.

'Outro': Are times a-changing? [11]

In an interview in 1985, Nina Simone speaks about her musical politics, and with that her political philosophy of music, making here no *a priori* distinction between "masters" such as JS Bach and key figures in the canon of what she calls "Black Classical Music" such as John Coltrane or Miles Davis. Her love and knowledge of the classical canon is clear in this conversation. Simone, trained as a classical pianist, was refused entry to the music Conservatorium in the still segregated south, which is a recurring theme in her interviews. This interview takes place alongside her performing in the studio a version of her "first civil rights song" from 1964, "Mississippi Goddam". What she does midway through playing this, relatively introspective, version of the song encapsulates the complexity of this subject matter.

In this performance, Simone transitions in and out of the musical-spoken commentary as she moves sonically, and figuratively, outwards and back between two historical and socio-political points of reference [12]. The way she plays, and speaks, exemplifies her artistry, anti-racism politics, and embodied performance practice infused with her commitment and ability to draw on multiple traditions (Gaines 2013). Midway in this

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[11] With no apologies for borrowing from Bob Dylan's "The Times They Are A-Changin" (1964)

[12] Feldstein considers some of the possible reasons why Simone's artistic and political contribution to key events in American public culture in light of that of others from her generation of artists and activists remains under-recognized; down to more than the official narrative of her being a "difficult woman" (Feldstein 2005, 1351).

performance Simone pauses at the piano. Over the (pre-country music associations of) 'honky-tonk' chords and rhythm upon which "Mississippi Goddam" is based, she states that this song is written; "as you know, by Nina Simone; very much like in 1932 … in which at that time Bertolt Brecht and Kurt Weill wrote another song called "Moon Over Alabama" … What we're going to do is combine "Mississippi Goddam" with "Moon Over Alabama"".

Without missing a beat Simone then segues effortlessly into her rendition of "Moon Over Alabama along to the same rhythmic pulse as "Mississippi Goddam" adjusting but also riffing on Weil's melodic line. The former song, sung in English for an otherwise German libretto, opens with the lines, "Show me the way to the next whiskey bar …I tell you we must die"[13]. With a fistful of dissonant chords serving as a bridge, she then modulates back to the first line of "Mississippi Goddam", "Alabama's got me so upset..."[14]. As the interview continues Simone explains why she chose this track to perform:

> "I sing it for two reasons… First it's one of the biggest songs I ever made. Secondly … no one really commemorated or remembered, in my opinion, enough Martin Luther King and "Mississippi Goddam" brings him back …Because youth need to know the history of America…They need to know what we did there…is still alive in the minds and ears of young people. And that is my contribution."

A national holiday commemorating the life and work of Martin Luther King Jr. eventually passed into American law in 1986. It is observed on the third Monday of January every year. Along with Stevie Wonder, artist-campaigners like Gil Scott-Heron and Nina Simone were able to take part in this inaugural holiday. Twenty years for this to happen was, back then, indeed a very long time (Scott-Heron 2010, 5). And since then, in light of the public recognition of Rap and Hip-hop with Kendrick Lamar's 2018 Pulitzer Prize for Music, Nina Simone's outrage still resonates today: "Too Slow!"

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[13] This is from the 2003 DVD, *Nina Simone – Live at Ronnie Scott's* (Dir. Steve Cleary and Rob Lemkin: Quantum Leap), recorded in November 1985. "Moon Over Alabama", or the "Alabama Song", is the best-known number from Kurt Weill and Bertolt Brecht's *Rise and Fall of the City of Mahagonny (Aufstieg und Fall der Stadt Mahagonny)*

[14] Feldstein goes into more detail about the political undertones of this song in with lyrics "filled with anger and despair … in stark contrast to the fast-paced and rollicking rhythm" (2005, 1349-50).

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Music, mining and colonisation: Sámi contestations of Sweden's self-narrative

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Sweden's dominant self-narrative has tended to marginalise its historical colonisation of Sápmi. This aspect of Swedish history sits uncomfortably with prevalent understandings of that self-identity. Indeed, there has been little emphasis on the historical subordination of Sámi people in political science scholarship on Swedish exceptionalism and internationalism. This article problematises this absence by centring the analysis on Sámi musician Sofia Jannok's efforts to decolonise Sápmi through her music. The first part examines Sweden's colonisation of Sápmi and the tensions between Sámi reindeer herding communities, mining interests and the Swedish state. This is followed by an exploration of the constitutive relationship between music, politics and celebrity, as sites of political communication. A two-step analysis follows, investigating the broad themes in Sofia Jannok's personal narrative and the discursive markers defining her music and politics. The analysis shows how her narrative intersects with the discursive themes of her musical expression and other engagements.

Sweden's self-identity is habitually couched within notions of being a 'good state' (Lawler 2013) that is committed to the welfare and rights of its own citizens and those of other nations (Bergman 2007). This has been expressed in support for the United Nations, human and minority rights, gender equality and comparably generous levels of overseas development assistance (Bergman Rosamond 2015). However, that self-narrative rarely includes critical reflections on the country's implication in the colonisation of Sápmi, the land of the Sámi, in the north of Sweden (Lawrence & Mortiz 2018, 1; Salminen 2018). Nor does it seriously consider Sweden's implicit role in other forms of European colonialism worldwide (Mulinari, Keskinen, Irni and Tuori 2009, 18). Rather the Swedish national narrative has been told through the lens of the majority population (Salminen 2018). Here 'national narratives' are understood as the "story of the state" and a channel through which its normative goals, values, historical past and ambitions are articulated to multiple audiences (Miskimmon, O'Loughlin, & Roselle 2013).

The Swedish story has skipped over less commendable aspects of its history that are inconsistent with prevalent understandings of the self. Nor has there been emphasis

on the historical subordination of Sámi people in political science scholarship on Swedish exceptionalism and internationalism (Lawler 2013; Bergman Rosamond 2015). However, research on the politics of extraction has identified an inconsistency between Sweden's support for global human rights and its negligence of the rights of Sami people (Lawrence & Mortiz 2018). My intention here is to cast light on this absence by centring the analysis on Sámi musician Sofia Jannok's efforts to decolonise Sápmi through her music (Lovesey 2016). Her ambition is captured in her song 'Snow Lioness':

> "Antiracist my ass .. You don't even recognize the people from whom you've stolen all your cash … Once you stole this land from me. A native empress, the rainbow you see, a snow lioness, well all that is me" (Jannok 2016).

Underpinning this article is the assumption that there is a constitutive relationship between music and political communication (Street 2017), enabling artists to articulate their stances on national and international injustices. Such individuals are well placed to communicate their ethical messages to their fanbase and society at large by having access to sizeable audiences and enjoying recognition within popular culture.

I commence the article by accounting for my own role as a non-indigenous researcher and the ethical concerns emerging from that position. To situate the study, I then explore the historical and political context in which Sofia Jannok's musical and other interventions take place. This includes reflecting on Sweden's colonisation of Sápmi and the tensions between Sámi reindeer herding communities, commercial interests and the Swedish state.[1] The second part of the article starts by exploring the constitutive relationship between music, politics and celebrity, as sites of political communication (Street 2017). I note that musical activism is often associated with mainstream popular culture rather than plights of indigenous musicians. Sofia Jannok nonetheless enjoys a dual presence within Sámi and mainstream popular culture which enables her to advocate her decolonising message across multiple audiences. In the last part, I provide a two-step analysis, by investigating some of the broad themes in Sofia Jannok's personal narrative and the discursive markers defining her music and politics. The intention is to show the ways in which her narrative intersects with the discursive themes of her musical expression and other engagements. The conclusion reiterates the contention that there is a co-constitutive relationship between music and politics and that the former can help to challenge dominant stories about the nation and allow voices at the margin to be heard.

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[1] I employ the term Sápmi throughout this article. It is not confined to the north of Sweden, but is a transnational region embracing Sámi communities in Finland, Norway and Russia. I use Sámi to describe the indigenous people living in Sápmi in the North of Sweden, while recognising that there are several subgroups within this wider community. Sápmi is a geographical territory that has been inhabited by Sámi people for at least 6000 years. The Sámi people is a distinct, although, not heterogenous socio-cultural indigenous group, traditionally regarded as a nomadic reindeer herding people. Although the Sámi people of today are no longer nomadic, reindeer herding remains an essential signifier of their traditions and cultural identity (Castro, Hossain, and Tytelman 2016).

Sapmi: a site of Swedish colonisation

Before I account for the historical and political context of the present study I should eth-ically reflect on my own position within the study as a non-indigenous scholar. I have not personally experienced any of the injustices that Sámi people have encountered, and this gives rise to the ethical question whether I am in a position to investigate their plights for justice. While I recognise that I cannot draw on lived experiences I hope that the analysis below can somewhat nuance political science scholarship on Swedish exceptionalism, ethical foreign policy and internationalism by considering the country's implication in the colonisation of Sápmi (Bergman 2007; Aggestam, Bergman Rosamond & Kronsell 2019).

Until the end of WWII many officially sanctioned forms of discrimination and subordination of Sámi people were intact in Sweden. Throughout the 1930s and in the early years of the 1940s the country engaged in racialised practices of eugenics. For ex-ample, scientists measured Sámi people's facial features and the size and shape of their heads to scientifically prove their inferiority (*Sameblood* 2016). During the same time period the Swedish government forcefully displaced Sámi children, placing them in spe-cial nomadic schools where they were forced to speak Swedish (*Sameblod* 2016). The idea was to ensure that Sámi children would be kept apart from non-Sámi school children as a way of ensuring their return to traditional life to avoid them mixing with the majority population (Mörkenstam, Josefsen & Nilsson 2016; Lawrence & Mörkenstam 2016).

These racist experiments ended in the post-WWII era, as Sweden sought to recon-stitute its self-identity within the language of internationalism being wedded to the liber-ation of African and other colonies (Bergman 2002). To systematically repress the rights of indigenous people within borders would have been inconsistent with that decolonisa-tion process. As Hough notes (2013, 759): "attitudes towards indigenous minorities grad-ually changed after the Second World War as both the Nordic Social Democracies and the Sami themselves embraced emergent international notions of economic and social rights and multiculturalism" (Hough 2013, 759). The retelling of the Swedish self-narra-tive has nonetheless tended to disregard the "subaltern pasts' of Sámi communities (Chakrabarty 1998,18). The Swedish public and its political elites were more likely to subscribe to the notion of Sweden as a moral superpower at home and abroad, defined by its pronounced 'moral worth' (Attwood, 2005, 243) and internationalist ambitions (Agius 2006).

By implication, the colonisation of the Sámi was blanked out from Sweden's col-lective memory bank for a long time. Össbo and Lantto (2011, 327) note that: "Sweden can be said to have adopted a 'the blue water thesis', according to which colonialism happens across oceans and is not something that occurs within the perceived borders of a state." However, "regarding the indigenous Sami people and their rights to land and wa-ter, the actions of the Swedish state are characteristic of colonial policy." Sámi politicians and activists, on the other hand, habitually describe the racialised repression of their peo-

ple within the language of colonialism, with Sofia Jannok frequently using such discursive markers (SVT 2016a, b).

This is also a discursive logic that has found its way into Swedish popular culture, whereby historical traumas are increasingly being made visible through media, film and music. Those stories challenge the Swedish 'good state' logic that underpins Sweden's self-narrative. A recent example is the award-winning feature film *Sameblod* (Sámi Blood), directed by Amanda Kernell, herself Sámi. Its plot centres on the racialised and gendered ways in which the Swedish state treated the Sámi in 1930s and 40s. The leading actors in the film are Sámi and daughters of reindeer herders, which brings authenticity to the story telling. The willingness to openly debate Sweden's colonising and racist practices in popular culture has not been accompanied by an official apology on the part of the state. Nor has Sweden signed the ILO convention on Indigenous and Tribal people.

However, Sápmi was given indigenous status in Swedish law in 1966, and, in year 2000 Sámi languages were given formal minority status. In 1993 the Sámi parliament was established in Sweden, and 8000 Sámi individuals are on the electoral register and, as such, are entitled to vote (Sametinget 2020). This was followed by an official recognition of the Sámi as a distinct people in 2011. Members of the Swedish parliament have also sought to more actively promote Sámi rights (Bah Kuhnke 2018). Sweden's former Minister for Culture and Democracy, Alice Bah Kuhnke, a member of the Green Party, has openly supported Sami people's self-determination and land rights. On the occasion of the Sámi
National Day in 2018, she noted that the Swedish state "must update its Sami policy" and revisit its repressive past (Bah Kuhnke 2018).

Sámi activists and politicians, moreover, are given more space in public debate and life with Sofia Jannok's singing at the official opening of the Swedish national parliament in 2009 being testament to this claim. Less pronounced, however, is the readiness to debate controversial subjects such as land rights and the granting of exploration permits to Swedish and international mining companies in mineral-rich parts of Sápmi.

Swedish colonialism in Sápmi is intimately linked with the extraction of natural resources in the North of the country, a practice that dates back approximately 1000 years (Sveriges Geological Undersökning 2020). Many of Sweden's mineral-rich areas are geographically located in Sápmi territory. Out of the estimated 20,000-40,000 Sámi people in Sweden, there are about 4,600 owners of reindeer (Lawrence & Mortiz 2018). To own reindeers and engage in herding, individuals need to belong to a Sámi village and that right is not afforded everyone; this sometimes creates tensions within Sámi communities (Lawrence & Mörkenstam 2016). Still, a rather sizeable proportion of Sámi people work in the reindeer herding industry. However, the exploration and exploitation of minerals and iron ore are often inconsistent with Sami subnational claims for land ownership and participation in key decision-making processes (Rico 2008). This has not prevented the Swedish state from granting exploitation and exploration permits to mining companies in Sápmi.

The dispute over the Gállok Iron Deposit is of particular significance here - it has been closely followed in media and has been the site of many protests. It is geographically located near the UNESCO world heritage site of Laponia and the Sami villages Sirges and Jåhkågasska tjiellde. Laponia was awarded world heritage status in 1996 on the basis of its unique nature and Sami heritage. Indeed, it is "the largest area in the world (and one of the last) with an ancestral way of life based on the seasonal movement of livestock. Every summer, the Saami lead their huge herds of reindeer towards the mountains through a natural landscape hitherto preserved." (UNESCO World Heritage Centre, Undated, see also Laponia undated a, b).

Laponia stretches 94,000 square kilometres across forests, mountains and bogland, and hosts four natural parks, two nature reserves, and nine Sami villages (Laponia undated, a, b). Though protected by international law due to its UNESCO status, the distinctiveness of Laponia is currently under threat by the ongoing and planned exploration and exploitation activities conducted by the British owned mining firm Beowulf. Since 2010, the firm has conducted explorations in the area, predicting large assets of iron ore if the actual exploitation process goes ahead.

The Swedish government has not yet decided whether to grant the British company the right to go ahead with the exploitation of ore because of the controversies surrounding such a decision (Dagens Nyheter 2020). The company states on its website that its "flagship project is the Kallak magnetite iron ore deposit in northern Sweden" (Beuwulf Mining 2020). A future establishment of a working mine in Gallok is likely to endanger reindeer herding by preventing the animals from grazing in the area (Mustonen and Syrjämäki 2013). Indeed, for Sámi reindeer herders' access to the land is a condition for the continuity of their lifestyle, heritage and cultural identity.

However, the same land is viewed as a site of national social and economic development, enabling Sweden to meet the global demand for iron ore (Langston 2013). This dispute over Gallok is further complicated by the mining industry's key role in the economic development of Sweden since the 17th century (Ojala and Nordin 2015). In the north of Sweden, new mines lead to jobs, tax revenues and the revival of unpopulated regions (Persson, Harnesk, and Islar 2017), causing many non-Sámi locals to support the exploitation of ore (Persson, Harnesk and Islar, 2017; Lawrence and Moritz, 2018). In a similar fashion, the Swedish state has generally supported mining companies by promoting "pro-mining policies, low mineral taxation, and investments in mining-related infrastructure" (Ojala and Nordin 2015, 7).

The mining industry also has significance in constituting Sweden's industrial identity with Sweden's former prime minister Fredrik Reinfeldt noting that "our iron ore is for us what oil is for Norwegians. An amazing wealth, an opportunity to build future investments, future development" (Reinfelt 2018 cited in Persson, Harnesk, and Islar 2017, 23). Though reindeer herding and key land and water areas of particular interest for the husbandry
Profession and industry are protected, in the case of national interest, those areas could be used for mining and as such might jeopardise reindeer herding (Koivurova,

Masloboev, and Petre 2015). Sámi herding communities do not enjoy full legal ownership over the land but are entitled to use it for herding purposes. While reindeer herding is protected by Sweden (and UNESCO) it is associated with cultural heritage, rather than commercial gains and often mining interests are privileged over Sámi rights.

The Gállok conflict should also be situated within the particularities of its historical context - the current disputes over the land use are part of a historically rooted struggle for Sapmi's right to self-determination and access to land and resources. There is also a pronounced relationship between the extraction of natural resources and the colonialisation of Sámi territories (Lawrence and Åhrén 2016). I will revisit this relationship in the last part of the paper by unpacking the musical expression and political communication conducted by Sofia Jannok.

Music and celebrity as platforms for political activism

Scholarship on popular culture and politics holds that the two fields are constitutively linked rather than existing in separate realms (Weldes & Rowley 2015). What is more "(c)ulture is not opposed to politics. Culture is political, and politics is cultural" (Weber 2005, 188). By implication, music and other cultural expressions are "serious sites of enquiry" (Hamilton 2016). Increasingly, it is through popular culture that discourses and practices of politics are constituted and communicated. Such representations "matter" (Griffin 2015, 1) and enable us to make sense of world events and developments around us.

Music constitutes such a site of communication, providing channels through which serious messages can be communicated to audiences. The constitutive power of music emerges from the lyrics of the song in question, and/or its distinct beats and sounds. There is a long trend of music being used to protest against injustices in national and global society, with Sofia Jannok's protests against mining and colonisation being instructive examples here. John Street (2017, 2) notes that the "ubiquity of the protest song owes much to music's particular characteristics. Lyrics, like poetry, allow for meaning to be hinted at, rather than stated explicitly … [a]nd unlike film or television, music … it is a more democratic art form … [m]usic … in its uses of melody and rhythm, has the capacity to move people directly". Moreover, "protest and propaganda" are channels through which political messages are communicated (Street 2017, 3).

Music has been employed to combat global poverty, with Band Aid, led by Irish musician Bob Geldof being key here. The latter released the Christmas single "Do they know it is Christmas" to raise awareness about the then famine in Ethiopia (1982-1984). Such campaigns play a "central role in the campaign to alter economic and political relationships between the developed and developing worlds" (Hague, Street and Savigny 2008, 5). Band Aid, however, has been critiqued for relying "heavily on simplistic and graphic images of starving African children" and as such endorsing the savior logic of "[w]estern celebrities and donors … consolidating a colonial image of the global South

as helpless." (Jones 2017, 189). That savior logic is gendered within masculinist protection, with white (often male) musicians assigning rescuing qualities to themselves. Female artists have also used their musical expression to critique contemporary society, however, often as a way of taking issue with the misogynous undertones of the aforementioned masculinist protectionist music. Examples here include Beyonce's song Flawless, which delivers an unequivocal feminist message. The song challenges gendered and often misogynous conceptions of female beauty in favour of acceptance of different body types and looks.

Such musical interventions are nonetheless located within mainstream popular culture with the artists having access to big record contracts, transnational audiences, recognition and star power. As such they tend "to reinforce prevailing power structures" while "resistant forms of popular culture do frequently and subversively contradict convention and orthodoxy" (Griffin 2015, 9). One such music genre is punk, often used as an expression of rebellion, associated with "angry young men" and "misogyny" (Reynolds & Press 1995, 2). The employment of "grim social realism" by the Clash, lyrically expressed in songs about "tower blocks and dole queues", is an instructive example of social criticism of Britain in the 1970s, but also boredom and 'homosocial' values (Reynolds & Press 1995).

However, music can also "naturalise or normalise a certain social order by entrenching the expectations of social behaviour upon which … dominant ideologies of … policy are founded" (Kiersey and Neumann 2013, 5). Some artists actively seek to disrupt the entrenchment of prevalent societal or national power relations, including indigenous musicians such as Sofia Jannok. As will be shown below she uses her dual position at margins of mainstream and indigenous popular culture to challenge prevalent stories of Sweden's exceptionalism and moral worth.

Most studies of celebrity activists and humanitarians, whether musicians, TV personalities or actors, tend to focus on individuals who enjoy global fame, rather than those who are mainly known to national or subnational audiences. Nonetheless, a growing number of scholars have come to recognise the significance of studying celebrity activism across contexts, genres, professions and nations (Richey 2015; Cooper 2008; Bergman Rosamond & Gregoratti 2019).

Deconstructing the ethical interventions and political communication by indigenous artists is in line with this ambition. Even if Jannok is not a global household name she has access to a sizeable audience offering her opportunities to communicate her messages of decolonisation and land rights beyond her own community (2016a, SVT 2016a, Aftonbladet 2016). While music is her primary artistic expression her participation in several national TV productions on Sápmi has added both authenticity and recognition to her distinct brand (SVT 2016a). Below, I will briefly reflect on Jannok's personal narrative and the way it intersects with the discursive framing of her musical and visual expression and other engagements.

Sofia Jannok – the intersection between her story and her musical activism

Here I provide a two-step analysis of the connections between Jannok's self-narrative and the discursive framing of her music and humanitarian engagements. In the first place I investigate some aspects of Sofia Jannok's personal narrative, which enables me to situate the study "within a wider discursive field" (Hansen 2006, 7). Personal narratives bring together the collective and the personal as well as the intersubjective and the individual (Wibben 2011, 2). Analysing such narratives enables investigating how people – especially marginalised groups - make sense of their lives and developments around them. I couple this analysis with broad poststructural techniques (Hansen 2006; Shepherd 2008, 2013).

Discourses give "meanings to social and physical realities', and it is through discourse that individuals … and states make sense of themselves, of their ways of living, and of the world around them." (Epstein, 2008, 2). What is more, material reality is always mediated through discourse (Hansen 2006). The analysis below draws on Laclau's and Mouffe's (1985, 112) discourse theory and the ontological position that the most relevant units of analysis in any discourse are signifiers. Nodal points are privileged signifiers around which we construct meanings.

Below I focus on two discursive themes: first, Jannok's opposition to Sweden's implication in the colonisation of Sápmi, and, second her opposition to the mining industry in Gallok. Such stories are told across texts because "texts build their arguments and authority through references to other texts: by making direct quotes or by adopting key concepts and catchphrases" (Hansen 2006, 9). I draw upon Lene Hansen's (2006) careful elaborations of research design as they relate to the selection of texts, in particular the ways in which popular cultural texts can be productively used to highlight marginal stories (Hansen 2006, 73). The material investigated below includes Jannok's songs and visual expressions as well as interview material in which she offers her ethical reflections on Sápmi,

Sofia Jannok – a Sámi artist and political communicator

Sofa Jannok was born and brought up in Gällivare, which is one of the municipalities in which the world heritage site Laponia is located. Because her parents are Sámi and owners of reindeer she was exposed to herding early in life and is herself the owner of such animals (SVT 2016a). Sofia's mother tongue is Sámi and she attended Sámi school until she was 12 when she moved to a mainstream Swedish school (Blomvist 2016). Sofia started performing the traditional Sámi musical genre of Jojk at that age and became known to a larger audience when she performed the Abba song Waterloo during the interlude of the Swedish Eurovision song contest final in 2009 (Feministiskt Perspektiv 2016). She has twice been nominated for the Swedish Grammy and received the World Music Award (Sweden) in 2014.

While Jannok is often defined as an 'activist' by Swedish commentators who reflect on her music and politics, she does not identify as such. Rather, she sees herself as an artist and notes that her music is a continuation of "what previous generations started: mirroring the contemporary world – as art always does" (Blomqvist 2016, 3). That political communication is expressed in a strong commitment to the decolonisation of the stories told about Sápmi so as to challenge Sweden's dominant self-identity (Salminen 2018; Mulinari et.al. 2009; Jannok 2016, 2013). Decolonisation, here, is "associated with Indigenous voices in the Americas and other settler colonial contexts" and, as such, seeks to "denaturalize this dehumanization intrinsic to colonial and settler colonial logics and all the violences arising from them" (Runyan 2018, 3). Sofia Jannok seeks to "denaturalise the dehumanisation" of her people through music which "has always been an essential part of the decolonisation work that Sápmi has undertaken for as long as I have lived and long before my time." Blomqvist 2016, 2). In her view music can disrupt colonial narratives that tell the story about a particular community in singular language, and, thus, contribute to "a more fair and true image of reality because it is told through the eyes of the ones who experience it" (Blomqvist 2016, 2).

Jannok's music is deeply rooted in the tradition of Jojk, which was outlawed by the Swedish authorities for generations, though Sámi communities resisted that prohibition and performed it in secrecy. However, Jannok did not learn Jojk at home. but rather acquired skills from teachers along the way (Blomqvist 2016). Jannok mixes Jojk with jazz and pop music and sings in Sámi, English and Swedish. Her music was initially poetic and she "allowed art to be art" but increasingly she has moved towards being more direct in delivering her message that Sápmi is her land and that it is indigenous land so as to avoid any "misinterpretation" (Blomqvist 2016, 9). Thus, she has recently sought to make her music more accessible, also by writing in multiple languages. In so doing she ensures that her decolonising messages reach wider audiences (SVT 2013, SVT 2016a, c). Music, according to Jannok, evokes sentiments and feelings in people that are hard to ignore and stick to their memory (SVT 2016a, Blomqvist 2016).

Coupled with her musical expression Jannok has figured in several TV productions, giving her further opportunities to portray Sweden's colonisation of Sápmi and the repression of indigenous people globally. In the three-part documentary *Världens Sofia Jannok* (The World's Sofia Jannok), broadcast by Swedish state television, she makes a strong claim for indigenous rights worldwide (SVT 2016a). She also played a main part in the French-Swedish TV series *Midnight Sun* (Midnattsol). In that series she portrayed a 'Nåjd' – a Sámi spiritual guide with healing powers that border on the paranormal (SVT 2016b) adding authenticity to her artistic production. It is fair to say that such appearances have added visibility to her persona and strengthened her celebrity status within Swedish popular culture. In what follows I unpack the discursive themes that prevail in Jannok's musical and non-musical interventions.

Contestation of colonisation

Sweden's colonisation of Sápmi throughout history is a pronounced discursive theme in Sofia Jannok's music and political communication. It is rooted in a strong sense of wishing to use her music to push for the decolonisation of Sápmi and is politically expressed in her opposition to the extraction industry in her land. Here, Jannok contends that: "The colonial history of Sweden, with the oppression and violence toward the Saami, is not covered at all in the Swedish school system. But I can put it in a song and tell the truth through arts" (Jannok cited in Arctic Portal 2017). The song 'Noadi' on her record 'This is My Land' is of particular importance in this part of the article in that it is a cry for the decolonisation of Sápmi and tells the story of lost land and nature (Jannok 2016; Blomqvist 2016).

In an effort to contest the Swedish 'good state' non-colonising self-narrative Jannok employs a range of nodal points pertaining to grief, racism, the love of her land, as well as transnational indigenous solidarity and mining. She employs these discursive markers intertextually across lyrics and visuals. Her music is defined by her people's sense of grief and loss of land, while pointing out that this is not an emotion shared by the Swedish majority population. This is expressed in the lyrics of her song 'Grieving: Oappaide':
"not grieving the loss of you home sweet home. Not grieving your walls that for all times are gone … I'm grieving the wide-open wound that I can see. When will they understand to let be?" (Jannok 2016). That sense of grief and loss, moreover, is coupled with a feeling of not belonging to the majority population, with Jannok having on occasions noted that she does not self-identify as Swedish (Aftonbladet 2016).

Denouncing her Swedish identity could be seen as a response to Sweden's radical and racist othering of Sápmi. Her music then challenges Sweden's self-narrative as an exceptionally other-regarding, non-racist state by locating it within the language of colonialism and loss. The song 'Snow Lioness' offers a critique of Sweden's racialised discrimination of Sámi individuals by provokingly stating "non-racist my arse" to disrupt Sweden's self-identity (Jannok 2016). This is also visible in her song 'This is My land':

> "This is my land: Sápmi. This is my land this is my country ... If you say
> that this girl is not welcome in this country if she must leave because her
> face is brown. Well, then I say you go first, cause frankly this is my land"
> (Jannok 2016).

The nodal points of grief and racism are intimately linked with Jannok's discursive use of land across lyrics and interview material. Her record 'Orda This is My land' is explicit in its questioning of land rights and propriety, while celebrating Sápmi's distinctive nature which is bound up in Sámi identity and heritage (Blomqvist 2016). She clarifies this position by noting that her people "depends on the right to land and water and the reindeer ad our settlements. Every day that you infringe on these rights it becomes a little harder

for us to survive!" (Blomqvist 2016). The nodal point of land is surrounded by signifiers pertaining to home and belonging with Jannok noting that "this is my home, this is my heaven, this is the earth where I belong" (Jannok 2016).

Running through Jannok's musical expression and political communication is also a strong sense of transnational indigenous solidarity, which is a key nodal point around which her decolonising efforts are positioned (Blomqvist 2016; Aftonbladet 2016). She uses her music not only to highlight the historical maltreatment of her people, but also the justice-based plights of other indigenous peoples across the world (SVT 2016a, b). In this context, she notes that we "share the same history ... we are alike" and music creates "awareness of indigenous rights" (SVT 2016a).

Engaging in indigenous rights also provides an opportunity for Jannok to "draw parallels to other indigenous peoples precisely to debunk the option that Sami people aren't indigenous" (Blomqvist 2016, 22). To act on her philosophical stance, she visits indigenous communities worldwide and performs at world music festivals where she teams up with indigenous musicians (Aftonbladet 2016; SVT 2016a). On those occasions she often emphasises the universality of indigenous people's struggles for land and recognition (Aftonbladet 2016; SVT 2016a). In her words "I have met many indigenous people, often at festivals... I have felt at home everywhere I've been." (Rehlin 2017). This message is articulated by Jannok in the public service three-part documentary *Världens Sofia Jannok* (The World's Sofia Jannok) from 2016. Jannok's self-representation in the documentary is that of an artist wedded to global environmental and intergenerational justice, politically committed to questioning and challenging the exploitation of indigenous land, which I shall turn to now.

Mining

Jannok's decolonising interventions are intimately linked with her opposition to the extraction industry in Sápmi which she considers to be the political issue that concerns her the most, in particular "the ways in which the mines destroy our land" (Lundberg 2013, my translation). The discursive links between colonisation, genocide and mining are captured in her song 'I ryggen på min kolt' (at the back of my kolt), in which she defines the selling of the "land to mines" as a form of "genocide" (Jannok 2016). The song also contains references to ownership, land rights and racism, indicating Jannok's wish to contest the dominant Swedish self-narrative that is couched within notions of national and international justice.

Jannok's anti-mining engagements have tended to focus on the site of Gallok which figures in her music and visual material. In an interview with Swedish Television she argues that the events in Gallok have "become a symbol of the exploitation of the entire Sápmi" and that "Sámi people have always opposed extraction, but nobody has listened" (SVT 2013, my translation). At the structural level Jannok has critiqued the Swedish Mining Inspectorate's decision to grant the British mining firm Beowulf the

right to conduct exploration in Gallok. In so doing she points to the ways in which such exploitation will jeopardise the future of Sami villages' subsistence, traditions, heritage and land rights (SVT 2013). Her song 'We are still here' directly takes on board the damaging effects of the mining industry on Sápmi: "this is my home, this is my heaven, this is the earth where I belong and if you want to ruin it all with big wounds in the mountains then you're not worthy of listening to this song" (Jannok 2016). Presumably, the use of "big wounds" in the lyrical expression symbolises the damage that the exploration and exploitation of iron ore cause affecting the livelihood of Sámi people.

Jannok couples her musical and lyrical expressions with visual effects and performances, for instance by participating in anti-mining protests on the Gallok site. In 2013, she performed the song 'We are still here' as part of a demonstration against the establishment of the mine in the territory (Jannok 2013). Inspired by the song she also recorded a music video titled 'Ahpi- Wide as Oceans' which contains recordings from the Gallok mining court case (SVT 2013). The issue of land rights prevails in the production and Jannok ends the video with the words "we are still here", further reinforcing her support for Sápmi land rights (SVT 2013; Jannok 2013).

Moreover, Jannok's opposition to the extraction industry in Sápmi is intimately linked with her solidarity with other indigenous people's plight for environmental justice and land rights. In the aforementioned documentary 'Sofia Jannok's World' Jannok travels to the USA to meet up with indigenous people in Minnesota. On several occasions in the documentary she notes that such human encounters leave her "touched" giving her a sense of Sápmi people not being "alone" in their struggle for justice (SVT 2016a). As a way of showing her solidarity with the land claims of the indigenous Sioux people in Dacota Jannok participated in the protests against the Dakota Access Pipeline at the Standing Rock. In a radio interview she notes that the protest offered opportunities for many of the world's indigenous people to gather together with their "sisters and brothers" (Sveriges Radio 2016). Moreover, she notes that the struggle in Dakota bears resemblance to the those facing Sami people (Sveriges Radio 2016). She adds that music in particular is a productive way of bringing to the fore the ways in which commercial interests jeopardise the subsistence, traditions and heritage of indigenous people worldwide (Sveriges Radio 2016). Indeed, her song 'We are still here' reflects the pronounced tensions between indigenous people worldwide and the economic interests of the extraction and other industries:

> "Kill the bison, dig out the reindeer's land
> Gold and iron, blood on greedy hands
> Drown the lávvu, burn the tipi down
> we raise new ones, survivors we are now
> We are still here, we are still here
> 100 years back in the USA
> killed my sisters, cut their breasts away
> In Peru my brothers always stayed" (Jannok 2015).

The song reflects the parallels Jannok draws between the planned mining activities in Gallok and other parts of Sápmi and those of other parts of the world. Having identified the key nodal points prevalent in Jannok's musical expression, visual effects and statements I will offer a set of concluding remarks below.

Concluding remarks

Underpinning this article is the ontological position that music and politics are co-constitutively linked and do not exist in separate realms. Rather than offering neutral descriptions of the world around us music provides venues for political activism and contestation by touching people's emotions, souls and thought processes. In this piece I have focused on the musical and visual expressions of Sofia Jannok, an indigenous artist who is located at the boundaries of mainstream popular culture and the indigenous music scene. As has been contended above this dual position makes her well placed to communicate her messages to multiple audiences as well as posing critical questions about the historical subordination of her people.

Moreover, Sofia Jannok uses her musical and visual expressions as well as activist statements to disrupt embedded stories about the Swedish nation and its moral credentials. Those interventions often centre on Sweden's implication in the colonisation of Sápmi, a story that is rarely, if ever, touched on in the country's official self-narrative. That story rather centres on Sweden's record as a 'good state' wedded to justice within and beyond borders (Lawler 2013). What is more, the historical repression of the Sámi people has been neglected in research on Swedish internationalism and exceptionalism (Bergman Rosamond 2015). This article is an attempt to further this conversation with the hope of nuancing such research.

While the first part of the article focused on the political and historical contexts in which Jannok's music and political communication have emerged, the latter part turned to the artist's personal story, as told by herself and others. By getting a little closer to her lived experiences, as a platform for her music and political messaging, it is possible to explore the connections between her personal narrative and the discursive framing of her work. Because Jannok wishes to employ her music to draw attention to indigenous plights for justice, at home and abroad, it is productive to trace the ways in which that political communication is articulated in her personal story as well as her music. That plight would appear to be more genuine and authentic given that she has grown up and still lives in the community whose history she seeks to highlight. The likes of Madonna and Bob Geldof appear to be far removed from their audiences or the communities that they seek to assist through their humanitarian interventions. While there is a whole register of injustices experienced by Sámi people, past and present, Jannok's humanitarian efforts tend to focus on the colonisation of Sápmi and the related question of mining, both of which figure in her music.

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TÆNKESTYKKER

"We come from the land of the ice and snow": De-colonising superhero cinema through music

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In this short intervention we examine the relationship between Led Zeppelin's Immigrant Song and the Marvel Cinematic Universe's Thor: Ragnarok. We do this to highlight the doubleness of both texts' meaning, which gives each an aura of postcolonial subversion. This relation is important because in this case Immigrant Song was central to the production of Ragnarok, with director Taika Waititi allowing the song to suffuse the film from its inception. When we speak of music in film, we must also consider the deeper role of music in inspiring the tone of various filmic productions.

> "Hammer of the Gods, it's the perfect song isn't it?"
> – Taika Waititi, *Thor: Ragnarok* commentary

Superheroes and 'cock rock': an intersection which should surprise nobody

As is attested to by the many excellent articles in this special issue, the intersection of music and politics has been a fruitful one for academic analyses. From classic studies of catchy music as a way of introducing (geo)political lyrics to impressionable audiences (Marcus 1975; Jarvis 1985), to more recent work that considers the ability of music to entrain bodies (Gilroy 1993), to the proliferation of neoliberal culture that surrounds music (singing competitions, etc. [see, for example: Stahl 2013]), music has revealed itself as something whose politics can be conceptualised in many different ways. In this brief intervention we argue that one aspect that has been neglected in this voluminous literature is the role that music plays in inspiring the politics of other media. Our case study comes from the repeated use of Led Zeppelin's Immigrant Song in the Marvel Cinematic Universe's instalment, *Thor: Ragnarok* (2017). While we will briefly attend to the use of the song in the film, the crux of our argument is that the song's (post)colonial themes infused the production of the entire film, at the insistence of the Maori director Taika Waititi.

As one of the reigning figures of 'cock rock' during the 1970s, Led Zeppelin's music represented "a male-oriented regime of power and pleasure" (Waksman 2001, 239). With "aggressive" and "dominating" performers like Robert Plant and Jimmy Page, cock rock heavily relied upon "male bodies on display, plunging shirts and tight trousers, a visual emphasis on chest hair and genitals" (Frith and McRobbie 1990, 319). It is not a stretch to argue that Led Zeppelin and cock rock parallel the superhero genre, which is similarly dominated by aggressive and dominating male figures with bulging muscles, bare chests, and tight suits, whose powers are inherently linked to their hypermasculinity. Led Zeppelin and the superhero are both driven by the male gaze and display a kind of preening masculinity.

In addition to this male gaze, both Led Zeppelin and the superhero genre function as colonial fantasies. Famously, many of Led Zeppelin's songs were adaptations of African American blues music. Guitarist Jimmy Page has also often referred to the band's musical influence from other cultures as the 'C-I-A Influence': Celtic, Indian, and Arabic music. As Waksman (2001) importantly notes, these three influences were once under the control of the British Empire. As an English band, Led Zeppelin comes to function as an enforcer of empire, appropriating this music while invoking landscapes of overthrowing and subjugating the villainous Other in many of their songs, including for instance these lyrics from *Immigrant Song*:

> "How soft your fields so green
> Can whisper tales of gore
> Of how we calmed the tides of war
> We are your overlords"

The superhero genre has similarly relied upon such fantasies since its inception in comics during the late 1930s and early 1940s (Gavaler 2018; Singer 2002; DiPaolo 2011). For instance, *Captain America Comics* during World War 2 featured a highly racialised Other in the Japanese, who were portrayed with fangs and other inhuman physiognomy. In one story the blonde, white Captain America destroyed a tunnel beneath the Pacific, drowning one million Japanese soldiers (Dittmer 2007).

Immigrant Song and Thor: Ragnarok

Immigrant Song was written by Plant and Page in June 1970 while the band was touring in Iceland. The song originated from a cultural mission in which Led Zeppelin was meant to represent contemporary British culture to the Icelandic people. At the last minute a strike cancelled their concert and a new concert was set up at the university for students to attend; their rhapsodic reception of the band inspired *Immigrant Song*. The band was inspired by fantasies of pillaging Vikings who "come from the land of the ice and snow," driving their "ships to new lands" to take over as "overlords" and bring the conquered

masses to heel; an aggressive narrative for cultural diplomacy but not necessarily far off the mark. This role inversion – with Led Zeppelin themselves the Vikings who conquer, and the Icelandic students as the recipients of British cultural power – presages the use of *Immigrant Song* in *Ragnarok.*

"From the beginning," said Kevin Fiege, president of Marvel Studios, *Immigrant Song* "kind of defined what [director] Taika [Waititi] was going to do with this," playing a fundamental role in *Ragnarok's* foundations (Erao 2017, n.p.). Before Waititi was even given the job, he created a 'sizzle reel' with the song itself playing over clips from films that would inspire the spirit of *Ragnarok*. This reel included shots from *Big Trouble in Little China*, with Kurt Russell embodying the type of hero Waititi wanted Thor to be, a more relatable, humanized protagonist driven by a single goal throughout the film; scenes from *Due Date* and *Withnail & I* that represented the buddy film feel of *Ragnarok*; and even a clip from the most recent *Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles* because it simply looked cool. And so, "from the start," as Waititi has explained, "we'd always talked about playing *Immigrant Song*… because it just makes perfect sense for that character" (Leane 2017, n.p.). Led Zeppelin are infamously known for being stingy with their songs; however, after the song was featured in *Ragnarok's* first explosive trailer, Waititi and the Marvel team showed the trailer to the band, and Led Zeppelin "understood just how perfect the song was for this character" (Guerrasio 2017, n.p.).

Weaving together *Ragnarok's* tone, narrative, and themes, *Immigrant Song* would (unusually) feature twice in the film. Tonally, *Ragnarok* is quite different from the first two *Thor* films as well as earlier iterations of the superhero in the Marvel Cinematic Universe. Lead actor Chris Hemsworth explained that *Ragnarok* aimed to be funnier and unpredictable; departing from the somewhat monotonous Shakespearean tone of the first two films, it would "tonally… just wipe the table" (Robinson 2017). Waititi's background in indie comedies would bolster this new offbeat comedic tone, with *Ragnarok* matching Plant's derisive comment about *Immigrant Song*: "It was supposed to be powerful *and* funny" (Dolan et al., 2019). The song directly referenced *Ragnarok's* 1970s and 1980s retro-vibe, but more importantly this doubleness of *Immigrant Song* serves as a meta-framework for the plot's main revelation.

Over the course of the first two *Thor* films, Asgard functions as the main superpower of the Nine Realms, and its empire establishes a cultural hegemony with its king, Odin, as a beneficent sovereign. Just as the superhero in a broad sense functions as a defender of the state and the geo-political status quo (Dittmer 2013), so too does Thor staunchly enforce this empire, armed with his "hammer of the gods", Mjolnir. As Robert Plant sings: "We," the Asgardian Empire, "are your overlords," who "drive [their] ships to new lands / to fight the horde, and sing and cry / Valhalla, I am coming!".

Ragnarok, as a radical superhero text, subverts this hegemony by bringing the audience's attention to the colonial and imperial past of the Asgardian Empire. Built off the back of enslaved peoples by Odin and his first-born, Hela, through the destruction of any and all who oppose their empire, including the Frost Giants of *Thor* (2011)*,* the Dark Elves of *The Dark World* (2013), Asgard's very foundations are presented as unsound

and corrupt. Where once they created refugees by invading their neighbouring realms, through an ironic twist of justice the Asgardians themselves become refugees as that very system is turned against them by the primary villain in *Ragnarok*, Hela.

The use of *Immigrant Song* twice in the film, first when Thor still is part of that very same cruel system, and later, when his eyes have been opened to the injustices wrought by the Asgardian empire, highlight the ways in which audiences are interpolated by the song. *Ragnarok*'s first battle sequence begins with a chained-up Thor being confronted by the Fire Demon, Surtur, whose crown was stolen by Odin and was then exiled to Muspelhiem. *Immigrant Song* starts playing once Thor has escaped from his chains and begins to attack the swarms of grunting, roving "hordes" of fire demons. Thor takes on *Immigrant Song's* persona as the invading force; as this realm's new overlord he cuts down its ruler, steals their source of power, and indiscriminately kills all who opposed him. The colonial fantasy so explicit within Led Zeppelin's music further reveals itself during this scene, as Surtur and the fire demons are dehumanized and othered as an oriental horde. The affective power of the song sweeps the audience along with it, as they thrill to the colonial violence.

The second time the audience hears *Immigrant Song* is after Thor has undergone a journey of self-discovery and discovered the true history of the Asgardian Empire. As he and his allies battle Hela and her inhuman forces to protect the people of Asgard, with audiences affectively drawn in to the battle by *Immigrant Song*'s sweeping melody, Thor's character development results in an exchange of roles in the song's lyrics, as Thor – once centred as the conqueror, the Self – becomes the marginalized Other. The song's narrator becomes Hela, with her earlier declaration that "Our destiny is to rule over all others" reinforcing *Immigrant Song's* imperial tone and revealing the darker meaning of the song. All throughout the battle, Asgard's once privileged citizens are transformed into refugees fleeing the very system from which they had once benefitted. Ultimately, Hela is only defeated through the destruction of Asgard, and the system it once represented, and the Asgardian refugees turn to Earth to find a new home, echoing *Immigrant Song's* final words: "You'd better stop and rebuild all your ruins / For peace and trust can win the day despite of all your losing".

Onward to Valhalla

In this brief intervention we have hoped to make a specific argument for the consideration of the politics of music and the music of politics. Admittedly we have taken a case study that might seem unimportant. But what is important about it is the way in which it demonstrates how music is not just the affective soundtrack to (geo)political films like *Thor: Ragnarok*, goosing the audience to thrill to the battle scenes (although it can be that, too). Rather in this case, *Immigrant Song* was embedded in the production process from the beginning, both in terms of convincing studio execs of the overall plan for the film (via the sizzle reel) and in the director's personal vision of a postcolonial subversion of the

superhero genre. The doubleness of *Immigrant Song* – both 'powerful *and* funny' – mirrors the doubleness of its use in *Ragnarok* (in which it is both Thor's berserker fight theme *and* a song that identifies with immigrants, refugees, and those oppressed by the hegemon). That is, the music is embedded in the very political ethos of the film project. Only deeper attention to production processes of films or other cultural artefacts can explicate the role of music in moving and shaping wider political projects.

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Of country and country: Twang and trauma in Australian Indigenous popular music

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Over the last half century, as part of a wider struggle for recognition, respect, reconciliation and justice, Indigenous Australians and others supporting their claims have increasingly been heard in popular music. Indigenous musicians are increasingly insistent that white Australia must change.

By the time Jimmy Little released his much loved song, 'Royal Telephone', in 1963, he had long been Australia's most prominent Indigenous recording artist. His music was out of the US gospel tradition via Nat King Cole and Jim Reeves. The "royal telephone" of the song describes the direct line between believer and god. With one exception, Little was silent in his music on the plight of Indigenous Australians although his earliest years were spent on a reservation that a large number of people eventually walked off, so poor were the living conditions. Little was a rare Indigenous presence in Australian music, respected for his individual talent and probably liked because his work did not raise uncomfortable questions about the past.

Liking and respecting individual Indigenous people while disliking and rejecting their culture is something white Australians have successfully psychologically negotiated for decades. For example, Christine Anu's (1995) cover of 'My Island Home' (1987), which celebrates Anu's love of her Torres Strait island home and was a major hit in the year of its release, featured as one of the songs in the closing ceremony of the Sydney Olympics, and now has well over 1 million views on Youtube. Yet, arguably, many Australians find no contradiction in recognising their own relationship with their island (continent) home and the dispossession of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders. Indigenous artists rarely pierced, with popular music, white Australian consciousness half a century ago. How many white Australians know of Wilma Reading who, in the 1960s and 1970s, performed on The Johnny Carson show, had a residency at the Copacabana club in New York, and toured with Duke Ellington among many other career highlights? Nonetheless, over the years, and along with sports, music is one way that Indigenous peoples have found their way into the hearts, and minds, of other Australians.

In the early 1970s, Aboriginal boxing world champion, Lionel Rose, whose exploits commanded national recognition, used his moment of fame to record a couple of innocuous country-music tracks and an album. Auriel Andrew, in 1970, became just the second Indigenous woman to release an album in Australia. Both were silent on the politics of disadvantage, of massacres, of the practice of removing Aboriginal children from their families, and of the other forms of structural and personal violence endured by Indigenous Australians. However, Bob Randall's (himself one of the Stolen Generations), recording of 'My Brown Skin Baby They Take Him Away' came to public attention in 1970 when it featured as part of an Australian Broadcasting Corporation documentary on the practice of separating Aboriginal children from their families, something few non-Indigenous Australians knew of. This song too forms part of the Aboriginal country music tradition.

The later 1970s and early 1980s saw a sea-change in curiosity about the experience of life for Indigenous Australians. Bands like No Fixed Address with their 1982 Reggae infused song 'We Have Survived' ("we have survived the white man's world/ and you know/ you can't change that") drew upon the consciously political genre of reggae. Coloured Stone's 'Black Boy' (1984), celebratory, and upbeat about black identity and the Warumpi Band's 'Blackfella Whitefella' (1985) ("Blackfella/whitefella/ it doesn't matter/ what your colour/so long as you are/ good fella"), a similarly upbeat, pop-rock appeal to "stand up and be counted" tapped into a growing white Australian questioning of the country's past and future.

It was not only Aboriginal bands prodding at the consciences of white Australians. In 1982, Goanna, released 'Solid Rock', a now beloved rock anthem, introduced by a digeridoo, underpinned by a rock drum beat and plainly spelling out the theft of the country from Aboriginal Australians ("they were standing on the shore one day/ saw the white sails in the sun/ wasn't long before they felt the sting/ white man/white law/ white gun/ Don't tell me that it's justified/ because somewhere/ someone lied"). Australian musicologist, Ian McFarlane, describes the song as a "…damning indictment of the European invasion of Australia" (McFarlane 1999, 257).

Two other non-Indigenous acts helped prise open white Australian minds. Midnight Oil, one of Australian music's most successful bands, combined a positive experience of the Australian landscape, with universal concerns about the impact of mining and environmental degradation in ways that also managed to highlight the plight of Indigenous peoples. In songs like 'The Dead Heart' (1986) and 'Beds are Burning' (1987) the Oils lay bare the choice white Australians face and must make ("the time has come to say fair's fair/ to pay the rent, to pay our share/ the time has come, a fact's a fact/ it belongs to them, let's give it back"). These were profoundly important songs in shaping what might be called left-wing, popular Australian nationalism, folding and blending themes of environmental awareness, anti-US feeling, anti-corporate sentiment and Indigenous issues.

The other significant white performer is Paul Kelly who after a career spanning 40 years is now an Australian national treasure. Kelly has written numerous songs about

the predicament of Indigenous Australians including 'From Little Things Big Things Grow' (1991) (co-written with Indigenous musician Kev Carmody), which documents the Gurindji people's walking off Wave Hill station, their subsequent fight for land rights, and the eventual ceding of control over portions their land in the mid-1970s. This was the first such Commonwealth government recognition of Aboriginal land rights. Kelly also mocked complaints that Aborigines are somehow treated differently, better, than other Australians. In a series of verses in his song 'Special Treatment' (1992) he sings of various forms of Aboriginal mistreatment and underpins them with the ironic chorus "He, she, I or they got special treatment/ special treatment/ very special treatment". There is little doubt that the popularity of the Oils and Kelly facilitated growing awareness of injustice and support for some form of recognition and reconciliation in sections of the Australian community. However, Kelly, in particular, also identified and fostered talent amongst Aboriginal musicians introducing to a national audience singer song-writers such as Archie Roach and Kev Carmody. Carmody's 1988 album *Pillars of Society* is a searing, unsparing critique of the treatment of Aboriginal Australians by whites. Bruce Elder of *Rolling Stone* (Australia) described it as the best protest album ever made in Australia (see Stafford 2018). Upon appearing as support for Kelly in 1989, Roach's song 'Took the Children Away' was met with stunned silence followed by enthusiastic applause (Marshall 2019).

By the early 1990s, Indigenous Australians were increasingly impatient with the Commonwealth Labor government's promise of a treaty between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians. The mixed ethnicity band, Yothu Yindi, released the first ever song by a predominantly Indigenous band to chart and the first in any Aboriginal language to gain international recognition. The song's danceable urgency captures the impatience of Indigenous peoples for recognition and legal standing after decades of frustration ("treaty yeah/ treaty now/ treaty yeah/ treaty now"). The song now sits among the 30 most important Australian songs of all time as selected by the Australasian Performing Right Association and forms part of the National Film and Sound Archive's Sounds of Australia Registry. However, 30 years on, no such treaty has been concluded and, indeed, the decade after the mid-1990s was marked by a sharp reversal in relations between Indigenous Australians and government. The Howard administration (1996-2007) was actively hostile to what the Prime Minister referred to as the black armband view of history and severely retrenched material support of Aboriginal organisations and undermined the discourses of respect and reconciliation. John Howard bluntly refused a state apology in the wake of the *Bringing Them Home* report (1997) that documented the extent and horrors of forced separation.

Yet this grim period in Australian history is marked by an efflorescence of Indigenous musical talent with an ever broadening embrace of different musical genres. Whereas much of the earliest recorded popular music made by Indigenous Australians forms part of the fairly politically conservative country music tradition, both reggae with its focus on dispossession and injustice, and rock with its protest heritage, provided established pathways to giving voice to discontent and demands for justice. But from the

1990s onwards, Australia's interpretation of hip-hop included distinctive Indigenous approaches to the genre. It is an open question as to whether the predominantly oral cultures that characterise Indigenous Australia make hip-hop a particularly suitable form of storytelling, but there are a notable number of Aboriginal hip-hop performers. Music by The Last Kinection and A.B. Original provide two simple examples of a significant change in their complete disregard for artefacts that a considerable number of white Australians hold dear.

Peter Allen's much loved anthem *I Still Call Australia Home* (1980) begins: "I been to cities that never close down/ From New York to Rio and old London town/ But no matter how far or how wide I roam/ I still call Australia home". The opening was reworked by The Last Kinection (2007) as: "They invaded, degraded, polluted our land/ Stole all the children and raped our women/ But no matter how long or how far I roam/ I still call Australia home". The song also samples racist material from Rolf Harris's 'Tie Me Kangaroo Down, Sport' (1960) ("Let me Abos go loose, Lou/ Let me Abos go loose/ They're of no further use, Lou/ So let me Abos go loose"). In other words, at least some contemporary Australian Indigenous hip-hop has moved on from critical observation or asking for change to blunt rejection of white Australian shibboleths.

For example, the music of A.B. Original (Always Black, Original), a hip-hop duo, is described by one music journalist as "…angry, polemical, brutally frank and meant to inspire a response…" (Zuel 2016). Indeed, their debut album, *Reclaim Australia*, (2016), takes for its title the name of an extreme right wing, anti-Islamic group operating around the fringes of Australian politics and directly confronts the racism of white Australia. Reviewing the album for *beat.com.au*, Ariana Norton notes that it immediately invokes the rage of hip-hop group NWA and is wholly unapologetic in its ferocious presentation of the deep pain and anguish of Indigenous Australians. As Norton notes, it demands that "…we sit up, take notice and take action" (Norton 2016). Australia's controversial national day, January 26th, is a particular target. Briggs and Trials sing:

> "You can call it what you want/ But it just don't mean a thing/ No, it just
> don't mean a thing/ Fuck that homie/ You can come and wave your flag/
> But it just don't mean a thing to me…/They screamin' 'love it or leave it'
> (love it)/ I got more reason to be here, if you could believe it/ Won't salute
> a constitution or whose underneath it/ Turn that flag to a noose, put a cease
> to your breathin'".

While the sentiment is familiar in much hip-hop, it is unthinkable that even a generation ago, Indigenous Australians would threaten to lynch white Australians with their own flag. And this while achieving significant critical recognition, and sympathy, for the political positions expressed! Does the success of A.B. Original and many other Indigenous artists articulating multiple ongoing injustices in their work suggest a growing acceptance among white Australians that a reckoning must be undertaken? Or, worryingly, might Ghassan Hage's suggestion that white Australian enjoyment of the creative endeavours

of Aboriginal musicians is indicative of the containment of their collective demands for justice, a recognition that Indigenous peoples "…no longer constitute a communal counter-will in themselves" (Hage 1998, 111)? Despite the glacial progress of policies and practices of genuine respect, recognition and reconciliation in Australia, I am increasingly inclined to the view that governments are falling further behind wider community sentiment in favour of the taking of significant steps to address long-standing injustices. That said, the polarisation of the US and UK finds its own expression in Australia and that complicates the tasks even for governments of goodwill. The ever growing presence of Indigenous popular music artists in Australian culture may, or may not, endure. Certainly, I do not mean to imply a necessary progressive trajectory from 'Royal Telephone' to 'January 26'. To paraphrase Buffalo Springfield, there may be something happening here, but what is not exactly clear.

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Musical theatre and politics

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The musical is in some ways the most significant contribution of the United States to theatre. Musicals have long been a space for considerable political expression, which is often overlooked in the tendency to view them as no more than light popular entertainments.

The most discussed piece of musical theatre in the last few years has been Lin-Manuel Miranda's *Hamilton*, the story of one of the United States founding fathers told through a range of musical styles including hip-hop. By consciously casting mainly non-white actors the show interrogates the meaning of America in an era of growing political polarisation.

But Washington politics are not unusual in the American musical. There are precursors to *Hamilton* in Leonard Bernstein's *White House Cantata* and the 1969 musical *1776*, both of which cover some of the same terrain as *Hamilton*. More interesting is the unstated political agenda of musical theatre, given its enormous popularity: if one thinks of major theatre centres such as Broadway or London's West End the most popular and expensive shows are usually musicals, and film adaptations—think *Mamma Mia* or *Cats*—bring these shows to millions of viewers. One Wikipedia estimate has at least ten films based upon stage musicals topping 25 million ticket sales worldwide, led by *Phantom of the Opera* and *The Lion King*.

I suspect most of you reading this piece will regard musicals with scorn, or at best as light entertainment, suitable for maiden aunts and office parties. But the musical is a complex genre, bridging opera, pop and rock music: while the demands on the voice are different there are many musicals that cross over between classical and popular traditions, ranging from George Gershwin's *Porgy and Bess* to The Who's *Tommy: The Musical.* Music for the American musical *Kismet* [1953] was based on compositions of the Russian Alexander Borodin.

Even music without words will reflect the politics of its day, whether through music composed to please religious and monarchical authority or music that expresses support for revolutionary and nationalistic movements. Beethoven originally dedicated his Third Symphony to Napoleon, then withdrew the dedication in protest when Napoleon crowned himself Emperor. The choral section of his Ninth Symphony, the *Ode to Joy*, became a symbol of liberation at the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Much of nineteenth century European music was connected with the rise of nationalisms as certain composers - Grieg [Norway]; Smetana [Czechoslovakia]; Sibelius

[Finland] - became identified with national aspirations. One of the best examples is Giuseppe Verdi, whose chorus of the Hebrew Slaves in his 1841 opera *Nabucco* became the unofficial anthem of the Italian Risorgimento. And Richard Wagner's increasing reliance of German mythology provided rich material for the Nazis.

Political themes are most evident in opera because they relate a story, and those stories often revolve around political events. Verdi again: his opera *The Masked Ball* was originally set in the Swedish court, but censors in Rome and Naples, alarmed at the depiction of the assassination of a king, forced him to change the setting to Boston. Interestingly the slain king, Gustavo III of Sweden, is believed to have been homosexual and some contemporary productions have made this explicit.

Throughout the twentieth century the musical was a form which sometimes allowed politically difficult subjects to be put before a wider audience. This was explicit in the collaborations of Kurt Weill with Bertolt Brecht, most notably their *Threepenny Opera* [1928]. The very successful collaboration of Richard Rogers and Oscar Hammerstein in *South Pacific* [1949] spotlighted American racism and was attacked by some southern politicians for espousing intermarriage. Hammerstein had also written lyrics and book for *Carmen Jones* [1943], which transposed Bizet's opera to an African American setting.

It is not an accident that Hammerstein, like Gershwin before him, was Jewish; there is a whole literature on the formative role of American Jews in creating the musical (Lawson 2013, PBS n.d.) This may explain the apparent leftism of many of the most successful shows, and Jewishness itself is a theme in several well-known musicals. Bock and Harnick's *Fiddler on the Roof* takes place against the background of a pogrom, while Kander and Ebb's *Cabaret* evokes the looming shadow of Nazism and Mel Brooks' *The Producers* features the ersatz musical, *Springtime for Hitler* .

There are complex lines connecting Weill and Hammerstein to Bernstein and Stephen Sondheim who collaborated on the musical *West Side Story* [1957] which again took up questions of racial tension, adapting the story of Romeo and Juliet to street gangs in New York. Shakespeare has inspired literally dozens of operas, but also musicals such as Cole Porter's *Kiss Me Kate,* although I am dubious of the claim that *Hamlet* inspired *The Lion King*.

Sondheim would go on to write a string of daring musicals, a couple of which have explicitly political themes: *Assassins* brings together nine attempted assassinations of American Presidents in a complex web of discontent with the American Dream. His *Pacific Overtures* revolves around western attempts to open up Japan in the nineteenth century, a far more critical view than the caricatures of Gilbert and Sullivan's *Mikado*. Even in the conformist 1950s musicals sometimes adopted surprising themes such as union organising in *The Pyjama Game*.

Hamilton has had the same impact on the Trump era as *Hair* did in the Johnson years. For those of us who came of age politically during the Vietnam War *Hair* was an extraordinary revelation; as a New South Wales state politician pronounced when it premiered in Sydney in 1970: "I cannot accept the way *Hair* lampoons accepted standards

of morality, and loudly proclaims every known vice, from blasphemy to drug-taking to homosexuality and draft dodging." (as quoted in Altman 2012).

Not all creators of musicals see themselves as doing more than creating entertainment. At some point in the early 1980s the librettist Tim Rice came to Sydney for the performance of his musical *Evita*, and I was part of a small workshop with the master. After he'd spoken, I asked him what the political implications were of writing a musical about Eva Peron, who had, after all, been the first lady of Argentina between 1946 and her death in 1952. He seemed perplexed by the question, even though the musical uses the character of Che, a sort of Greek chorus, to puncture some of the claims of the Peronistas. Ten years later Rice collaborated with two of the group Abba to write the musical *Chess,* based on a famous Cold War chess match between an American and a Soviet player.

Nor do audiences necessarily grasp the politics of musicals: *Les Mis[erables]* is based on Victor Hugo's novel of that name which culminates in the popular uprising of 1832: Hugo intended it as a blow against human inequality but I doubt many of the people who are stirred by its revolutionary song ["Do you hear the People sing"] are inspired to rush out and take to the streets. Nor does the fact that bankers are the villains in *Mary Poppins* suggest that the film unleashed a major backlash against capitalist exploitation. The creators of *Les Mis*, Claude-Michel Schoenberg and Alain Boubil also wrote *Miss Saigon*, based to some extent on Puccini's opera *Madam Butterfly*, and again with an explicit political message. Their success is a reminder that much of what we lazily assume to be American culture is in fact produced in Europe: maybe Schoenberg's and Boubil's career was inspired by Jacques Morali, who created that apparently totally American phenomenon, the Village People.

Musicals, too, almost always reaffirm very conservative images of sexuality and gender, with the almost obligatory happy heterosexual coupling at the finale. [*West Side Story* is an exception, but Maria lives, unlike Juliet.] The anarchic attitude to sex of *The Rocky Horror Show* has barely re-emerged since that show premiered in 1973, and while there have been several homosexual themed musicals they tend to reinforce stereotypes both of homosexuality and conventional marriage, as in *La Cage aux Folles,* which produced the near iconic song *I Am What I Am.*

Trans* characters are common in musicals—think *Priscilla*—but they usually end up reinforcing traditional concepts of gender: the apparently daring *Kinky Boots* has a conventionally happy heterosexual ending. In *The boy from Oz* the singer, Peter Allen, struggles to comes out before dying of AIDS at the end. It's one of a number of AIDS-themed musicals, notably *Rent* and *Book of Mormon*.

But even where musical end with death they almost always end in celebration: audiences may be moved to tears, but they leave the theatre with a sense that, as Pangloss sings in Bernstein's *Candide,* this is "the best of all possible worlds". Even musicals produced in the Soviet Union under Stalin followed this imperative; as one commentator wrote: "Despite the ideological message, these musicals were entertaining because they

lifted the spirits of ordinary citizens and provided a utopian fantasy, an illusion of happiness" (Patel 2018).

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ARTIKLER UDEN FOR TEMA

Fairness og statsborgerskab

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De danske krav til statsborgerskab begrundes ofte med et ideal om at belønne personlig indsats og individuelt ansvar. Et lignende ideal kendes fra held-egalitarismen, som er blandt de mest udbredte og anerkendte retfærdighedsteorier indenfor nutidig politisk teori. Denne artikel opstiller et held-egalitaristisk argument for de danske krav for tildeling af statsborgerskab, og undersøger i lyset heraf, hvorvidt kravene i relevant forstand afspejler indsats og ansvar. Artiklen konkluderer afvisende, og foreslår nogle måder hvorpå den danske statsborgerskabspolitik kan gøres mere fair[1].

Introduktion

"Vi fører en stram, men fair udlændingepolitik", slog statsminister Mette Frederiksen fast i valgkampen sidste år. Denne og lignende vendinger anvendes jævnligt, når særligt Venstre og Socialdemokratiet præciserer principperne bag deres udlændingepolitik. Når dette princip uddybes i forhold til reglerne omkring statsborgerskab – som kun angår de, som har opholdstilladelse – så handler det om personlig indsats (ofte benævnt "vilje til integration" i debatten). Statsborgerskab er noget man skal gøre sig fortjent til ved at yde en tilstrækkelig indsats; noget "specielt" man skal "række ud efter", som det også ofte formuleres. Man skal tage ansvar for egen integration og gøre sit bedste for at lære sproget, få sig et arbejde og lære landet og kulturen at kende. En tilstrækkelig indsats belønnes med statsborgerskab. Dette afspejler en grundlæggende intuition om fairness – at fordelingen af ressourcer skal afspejle individers indsats – som er bredt delt på tværs af kulturer og aldersgrupper (Hansen 2018, 16-18).

I hvilken grad dette udtrykker et reelt og tungtvejende politisk ønske om fair statsborgerskabskrav – og udlændingepolitik mere generelt – og i hvilken grad, der blot er tale om retorik, skal vi lade stå åbent. Men interessant er det, at sloganet præger den brede midte af dansk politik. Der er selvfølgelig partier, særligt på højrefløjen, som stiller sig kritiske over for ambitionen om åbenhed, alt imens partier på venstrefløjen ønsker en mindre stram politik.

På trods af den brede opslutning bag ideen om en stram og fair politik, er det uklart, om de danske krav til statsborgerskab – som i et europæisk perspektiv er endog

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meget stramme (Goodman 2014; Jensen et al. 2019) – i tilstrækkelig grad belønner personlig indsats og ansvar. Dette spørgsmål forfølger artiklen ved at foretage en normativ analyse af de eksisterende statsborgerskabskrav. Analysen baseres på held-egalitarismen, en normativ politisk teori med grundsynspunktet, at en fair fordeling af goder afspejler folks individuelle ansvar og udligner forskelle, som skyldes held og uheld. Som vi skal se, er der ikke nogen nødvendig modsætning imellem et ønske om en stram statsborgerskabspolitik og et hensyn til held-egalitaristisk fairness. Men det kræver afgørende revisioner af de krav, vi i dag stiller til indvandrere uden dansk statsborgerskab.

I det følgende diskuterer vi først, hvorfor statsborgerskab er vigtigt og præsenterer kort de danske krav. Herefter opridses nogle grundideer fra held-egalitarismen, og vi opstiller et argument for statsborgerskabskrav, som det ville se ud baseret på held-egalitaristiske præmisser. Argumentet afslører, at de eksisterende statsborgerskabskrav ikke tilfredsstillende afspejler personlig indsats. Det følger ikke af denne normative analyse, at der nødvendigvis er noget galt med de danske krav, men analysen problematiserer antagelsen om, at de danske krav indeholder en mulighedslighed, som i relevant forstand afspejler et hensyn til fairness. De resterende sektioner diskuterer, hvordan man kan indrette henholdsvis et sprogkrav, et selvforsørgelseskrav og et videnskrav, så de bedre afspejler og måler personlig indsats.

Hvorfor er statsborgerskab vigtigt?

Hvilke rettigheder opnås med statsborgerskab (eller indfødsret, som er den juridiske term)? Faktisk ikke mange. Særligt er det retten til at stemme og opstille ved nationale valg, sikkerhed fra at blive deporteret (selvom der nu er åbnet op for, at man kan fratage det danske statsborgerskab fra personer med dobbelt statsborgerskab som 'fremmedkrigere' eller særligt hårde kriminelle), ingen begrænsninger i forhold til hvilke erhverv man kan besidde (eksempelvis kræver politiet, at ansatte har statsborgerskab), større bevægelsesfrihed i udlandet (man kan altid vende tilbage til Danmark efter udlandsophold af enhver varighed, og det danske pas giver visumfritagelse i en række lande). At der alligevel ikke er tilknyttet flere rettigheder – eksempelvis sociale rettigheder – til statsborgerskabet, ses af visse forskere som del af en udvikling, hvor internationale konventioner og menneskerettighedsnormer begrænser mulighederne for at differentiere rettigheder på baggrund af nationalitet, og som en nærmest nødvendig konsekvens af det liberale demokratis ligheds- og frihedsforpligtelser på tværs af etniske og kulturelle skel (Joppke 2010; Soysal 1994).

Ud over disse rettigheder kan statsborgerskab have en positiv betydning for indvandreres livskvalitet og muligheder. En række sociologiske og økonomiske studier, hvoraf flere anvender eksperimentelle metoder, viser, at statsborgerskab har en positiv effekt på politisk integration (Bevelander 2015; Hainmueller et al. 2015; Street 2017), social integration (Hainmueller et al. 2017) samt arbejdsmarkedsintegration (Bevelander og Pendakur 2012; Corluy et al. 2011; Gathmann og Keller 2018; Peters et al. 2018). Det

tyder således på, at statsborgerskabet er forbundet med en form for anerkendelse fra det omkringliggende samfund samt en følelse af større samhørighed fra indvandrernes side.

Hvilke krav skal indvandrere så leve op til for at få dansk statsborgerskab? For det første, skal man bestå en danskprøve på B2 niveau (såkaldt Dansk 3 eksamen), man må ikke have modtaget hjælp efter lov om aktiv socialpolitik eller integrationsloven[2] indenfor de sidste to år samt ikke mere end højst 4 måneder indenfor de sidste fem år, og man skal bestå en indfødsretsprøve, hvor man på 45 minutter skal svare korrekt på mindst 32 af 40 'multiple choice'-spørgsmål (hvoraf fem spørgsmål ikke kan læres via pensum). Herudover er der karensperioder for kriminalitet (ved særligt hårde domme afskrives ens mulighed for statsborgerskab fuldstændigt), krav om ingen offentlig gæld, og at man skal afgive en loyalitetserklæring og deltage i en kommunal grundlovsceremoni. Særligt for det danske system er, at tildelingen af statsborgerskab ikke er en ren forvaltningsafgørelse, men afgøres halvårligt af Folketinget gennem lovforslag om indfødsretsmeddelelse. Skønt det yderst sjældent forekommer, så kan indfødsretsudvalget vælge at tage personer af lovforslaget selvom, de opfylder alle krav.

Der er næppe tvivl om, at sprogkravet og selvforsørgelseskravet udgør de største barrierer for adgangen til statsborgerskab (Jensen et al. 2019), samt at ikke-vestlige flygtninge og indvandrere, for hvem statsborgerskabet givetvis har større værdi, da deres hjemlande i højere grad er præget af usikkerhed og ustabilitet (Peters, Vink og Schmeets 2016), har sværere ved at efterleve kravene, fordi de generelt har lavere uddannelse.

De danske statsborgerskabskrav er blandt de mest krævende i Europa, og det kan diskuteres, om de ikke endda er de mest restriktive overhovedet (se Goodman 2014 og Jensen et al. 2019). Kravene gælder endda også for personer født i Danmark, hvis forældre ikke har dansk statsborgerskab eller ikke får det i løbet af pågældendes barndom. De fleste held-egalitarister vil stille sig kritiske overfor en praksis, hvor kun nogle af de, som (tilfældigt) fødes i et givent land, opnår statsborgerskab automatisk (eller ved erklæring). Det er dog en separat diskussion (men se Brezger og Cassee 2016; Ferracioli 2017). Denne artikel fokuserer på de krav, der stilles til førstegenerationsindvandrere.

Før vi kommer til diskussionen af, hvorvidt de danske krav til sprog, selvforsørgelse og viden er følsomme over for forskelle i indvandreres personlige integrationsindsats, præsenteres først nogle grundlæggende held-egalitaristiske tanker om forholdet mellem personligt ansvar og fordelingsretfærdighed samt et overordnet held-egalitaristisk argument for at have statsborgerskabskrav.

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[2] Dette dækker blandt andet over følgende ydelser: kontanthjælp, uddannelseshjælp, revalideringsydelse, ressourceforløbsydelse, ledighedsydelse og integrationsydelse.

Fairness og statsborgerskabskrav

Spørgsmål om, hvilken betydning individers egne frie valg og indsats bør spille for fordelingen af vigtige goder, undersøges ofte i held-egalitaristiske diskussioner. Den grundlæggende tanke i held-egalitarismen er, at det er uretfærdigt, hvis naturlige eller sociale omstændigheder, som individet ikke kan kontrollere, påvirker fordelingen af vigtige goder (Roemer 1994, 147). Fordelingen burde i stedet afspejle individers indsats og valg – to hensyn som ofte, men ikke nødvendigvis, er overlappende. Fundamentet herfor findes ofte i John Rawls' indflydelsesrige intuitive argument for differensprincippet – hans fordelingsprincip for ressourcer og goder i samfundet – som hævder, at et retfærdigt samfund bør kunne udligne forskelle, som skyldes det naturlige og det sociale lotteri (Rawls 1971, 74-75). Når ens stilling og muligheder i samfundet påvirkes negativt af sådanne omstændigheder, snakker man ofte om "bad brute luck". Ulighed på baggrund af dårlige omstændigheder, som det ikke med rimelighed står individet for at ændre, bør udlignes, fordi individet ikke kan holdes ansvarlig for at være dårligere stillet relativt til andre i samfundet. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen opsummerer dette i én kernepåstand, som man ifølge ham skal kunne bekræfte, hvis man vil kalde sig en held-egalitarist:

> "It is unjust if some people are worse off than others through their bad luck." (Lippert-Rasmussen 2015, 1)

Samtidig påpeger held-egalitarismen, at ulighed, der opstår som en konsekvens af folks frie, kalkulerede valg – hvad ofte benævnes "option luck" – ikke er problematisk ud fra et retfærdighedsmæssigt synspunkt, og at det dermed kun kan være af andre grunde, at sådan ulighed bør udlignes (Lippert-Rasmussen 2015, 3). At gøre personligt ansvar til en kilde til retfærdig ulighed udgør både en teoretisk korrektion til Rawls' differensprincip såvel som et modsvar til højrekritikken af den klassiske egalitarismes indifferens over for menneskers forskelligartede præferencer, dispositioner og villighed til arbejde hårdt (Albertsen 2013).

Den held-egalitaristiske retfærdighedsteori rækker i udgangspunktet langt ud over det spørgsmål om statsborgerskabskrav, som vi rejser i denne artikel, og der findes mange forskellige udformninger af held-egalitarisme. Nogle forsvarer held-egalitarismen udelukkende som en teori om social retfærdighed, som er nationalt afgrænset, men den mest udbredte version forsvarer held-egalitarismen som en global kosmopolitisk teori. Hvorvidt man i første omgang er indvandrer eller ej, er i sig selv et spørgsmål, som involverer en del tilfældighed. Af den grund er Rawls' intuitive argument og held-egalitarismen også ofte blevet anvendt til at problematisere den ekstremt ulige globale fordeling af ressourcer og muligheder. Inden for studier af global retfærdighed hævder kosmopolitter med den held-egalitaristiske intuition i ryggen, at velstående vestlige demokratier har omfattende omfordelingspligter overfor mindre velstående ikke-vestlige lande, da den nuværende fordeling ikke skyldes faktorer, som individerne selv har haft kontrol over (Tan 2012).

Nogenlunde parallelt hermed hævder globalister indenfor statsborgerskabsstudier, ligeledes med henvisning til den held-egalitarismen, at det generelt er uretfærdigt, at ens statsborgerskab, som er afgørende for ens livsmuligheder, tildeles ved fødslen, når ingen kan påvirke, hvor de fødes (Shachar 2009). Held-egalitarismen rejser således helt fundamentale spørgsmål om retfærdighed i henhold til statsborgerskab, migration og den internationale orden.

Men disse spørgsmål ligger uden for den politiske kontekst, som danske politikere taler ind i, når de udtaler sig om deres forventninger og krav til indvandrere. Her tages det for givet, at den danske stat og den danske befolkning er moralsk legitimeret i at sætte rammerne for, hvem der skal, og hvem der ikke skal, tilbydes statsborgerskab. Det betyder dermed ikke, at disse mere fundamentale spørgsmål er uinteressante eller uvidenskabelige, men blot at vores fokus her er på at evaluere styrken og gyldigheden af det argument om fairness, som politikerne leverer, i lyset af de faktisk gældende politiske omstændigheder. Vores udgangspunkt er derfor ikke de fundamentale normative spørgsmål eksemplificeret ovenfor, men om der kan gives en rimelig held-egalitaristisk begrundelse for at vurdere indvandreres ret til statsborgerskab på baggrund af indsats.

At danske politiske partier insisterer på, at statsborgerskab er noget, man gør sig fortjent til ved at gøre sit allerbedste for at integrere sig, virker til at kunne finde et forsvar i held-egalitarismen. Formen på sådan et argument vil være noget i denne stil:

P1 En ulige fordeling af vigtige sociale goder er (alt andet lige) retfærdig, hvis den afspejler folks indsats og fortjeneste, mens den er uretfærdig, hvis den skyldes faktorer, som folk ikke selv har kontrol over.

P2 Statsborgerskab er et vigtigt socialt gode.

P3 Hvorvidt man lever op til de danske krav for at blive tildelt statsborgerskab – sprogkrav, selvforsørgelseskrav, indfødsretsprøven mv. – afspejler egen indsats og fortjeneste

K (fra P1-P3) Den ulige fordeling af statsborgerskab, som følger af de danske krav for tildeling af statsborgerskab, er (alt andet lige) retfærdig.

P1 er en normativ præmis, som udtrykker held-egalitarismen i sin grundform. At den er normativ, vil sige, at dens sandhedsværdi afhænger af plausibiliteten af en moralsk påstand, i dette tilfælde et held-egalitaristisk princip om retfærdighed. Præmissen påstår noget om, hvad der er moralsk sandt. Man kan således ikke måle eller teste P1 empirisk eller på anden vis give observerbar dokumentation for den. Snarere har præmissen karakter af at være et moralsk princip, som hviler på accepten af givne evaluative grunde (Nielsen 2013), herunder den hypotetiske intuitive grund, at hvis princippet er falsk, så fører det implikationer med sig, som vi ikke er villige til at acceptere. Man kan selvfølgelig være kritisk overfor, om P1 er sand, men det spørgsmål må således afklares i en analyse af de moralske grunde, som taler for og henholdsvis imod held-egalitarisme. At anfægte (eller forfægte) P1 kræver således saglig moralsk argumentation.

Det er ikke vores ærinde her at diskutere P1, men det vil være gavnligt helt kort-fattet at bemærke den oftest rejste grund til skepsis. Nogle kritikkere af held-egalitarismen mener, at vi bør afvise P1, fordi der kan gives eksempler på fordelingsmæssige udfald, som faktisk afspejler individers indsats, men som alligevel synes uretfærdige. Et kendt eksempel er motorcyklisten Bert, som fuldt informeret om risiko altid kører uden hjelm, fordi han elsker følelsen af vind i håret (Albertsen 2013; Fleurbaey 1995). Hvis Bert kom-mer alvorligt til skade og har brug for akut medicinsk behandling, så synes det for de fleste intuitivt uretfærdigt ikke at tilbyde Bert behandling, selvom hans tilstand skyldes egen indsats og fortjeneste. Held-egalitarister forsvarer sig blandt andet ved at henvise til andre moralprincipper, som retfærdighedsprincipper må suppleres med – hvorfor P1 også indeholder "alt andet lige" klausulen.

Andre kritikere mener, at der også findes eksempler på ulige fordelingsmæssige udfald, som ikke afspejler individers indsats, men som alligevel ikke synes uretfærdige, fx forskel i folks højde og dermed mulighed for bestemte jobs (Daniels 2008). Hvorvidt det taler imod P1, er uden for vores fokus her. Vi anerkender, at det er omstridt hvorvidt held-egalitarisme i sig selv er sand, men finder, at der er tilstrækkelig grunde til at accep-tere, at P1 i de fleste tilfælde er et plausibelt udgangspunkt for en retfærdig fordeling.

P2 er sådan set også en normativ præmis. Den tager måske mere karakter af at være en definitorisk afgrænsning end et egentligt moralsk princip, men den har ligesom P1 også et normativt indhold. Den siger noget om, hvad statsborgerskab er, men også indirekte hvad det bør være. Hvorvidt P2 er sand afhænger af, hvad vi forstår, og bør forstå, ved statsborgerskab. Der er i litteraturen om statsborgerskab rimelig stor uenighed om, hvilken status statsborgerskabet egentlig bør have – både i juridisk, social, og moralsk forstand. Nogen statsborgerskabsforskere mener, at statsborgerskab bør gives automatisk til indvandrere med permanent opholdstilladelse, fordi det er udtryk for manglende re-spekt for individer, eller simpelthen fundamentalt udemokratisk, ikke at inkludere fast-boende, som er er underlagt landets love, i det politiske liv (Dahl 1989, 129; Seglow 2009, 798; Carens 2013). Nogle mener sågar, at statsborgerskabet skal være ikke bare automa-tisk men også obligatorisk, fordi der med rettighederne følger vigtige borgerskabspligter (De Schutter og Ypi 2015). Men selvom der er uenighed om, hvilken indsats der kræves, så er der bred enighed om, at statsborgerskabet er et vigtigt socialt gode, som stiller visse krav til de indvandrere, som søger at opnå det (Jensen og Nielsen 2019).

I lyset af disse overordnede betragtninger, synes argumentet i høj grad af afhænge af P3. Denne præmis er i modsætning til de to foregående en empirisk påstand. Den hæv-der, at det er et spørgsmål om personlig indsats og fortjeneste, om man lever op til de danske krav for tildeling af statsborgerskab. Det er således et spørgsmål, som i princippet vil kunne finde en afklaring ved at kigge på data i lyset af, hvad det rimeligvis vil sige, at noget er udtryk for egen vilje og indsats. Det spørgsmål søger vi at svare på i nedenstående afsnit.

Om indsats og fortjeneste

At sige at indvandrere kun kan få adgang til det fulde sæt af rettigheder, som følger med statsborgerskab, ved at tage et vist ansvar for deres integration og gøre en tilstrækkelig indsats herfor, synes at stille dem over for et klart valg. De kan vælge at investere en høj grad af personlig indsats for at tilpasse sig det danske sprog, arbejdsmarked og samfund, eller de kan reducere deres indsatsniveau og alligevel håbe på, at det er nok til, at de kan få adgang til statsborgerskab på et tidspunkt. Indvandrere kan givetvis ikke på forhånd kalkulere præcist, hvad de kan opnå med en given indsats, men må operere med nogle forestillinger om, hvad der er sandsynligt. Disse sandsynlighedsbetragtninger kan selvfølgelig være forkerte, og det er en del af det sats, man laver, når man vælger sin indsats. Vil man være på den sikre side, investerer man sig fuldt ud i integrationsprocessen. Som minimum bør alle, der investerer sig fuldt ud i integrationsprocessen og yder en stor indsats, kunne efterleve kravene til statsborgerskab. Ellers er kravene *ikke* følsomme over for personlig indsats og frie valg.

Hvis danske politikere ønsker at forsvare statsborgerskabskrav, der er ufølsomme over for personlig indsats, skal de forsvare, at indvandrere ikke skal have lige muligheder for statsborgerskab. Altså at andre hensyn opvejer eller trumfer hensynet til fairness. Det er ikke et udtryk for fairness, hvis to indvandrere, som har ydet den samme indsats for at efterleve kravene, ikke har samme muligheder for at få statsborgerskab. De har begge udvist et sammenligneligt højt niveau af vilje til integration. John Roemer opsummerer det i denne generelle påstand:

> "[E]quality of opportunity for X holds when the values of X for all those who exercised a comparable degree of responsibility are equal, regardless of their circumstance." (Roemer 1994, 149).

Roemer fremhæver, at det ikke lader sig gøre at afdække den præcise grad af indsats individer investerer for at opnå et givent gode, men det er muligt at afdække, om to personer har ydet et tilstrækkeligt sammenligneligt indsatsniveau. Roemers forslag er at inddele populationen (indvandrere i denne diskussion) i grupper baseret på de for individet upåvirkelige baggrundsfaktorer, som samfundet ved påvirker individers evne til at omsætte ressourcer til adgang til et givent gode (statsborgerskab i denne diskussion). Al variation i opnåelsen af det givne gode, der opstår *inden for* grupper, som er ens i forhold til disse baggrundsfaktorer, kan så siges at afspejle variation i indsats. Variation *mellem* grupperne afspejler variationen i de bagvedliggende baggrundsfaktorer.

Hidtil har debatten og litteraturen om indvandringspolitik udelukkende fokuseret på en dikotomi imellem statsborgere og indvandrere, og dermed betragtet alle indvandrere (og alle statsborgere få den sags skyld) som værende medlemmer af samme gruppe i Roemers forstand. Men det involverer en klar og helt uberettiget undervurdering af forskellige baggrundsfaktorer. Som Lea Ypi påpeger, fører et system som det danske, hvor ind-

vandrere skal leve op til bestemte og relativt høje krav, til, at indvandrere fra højere sociale klasser altid vil få privilegeret adgang til statsborgerskab på bekostning af indvandrere fra lavere klasser (Ypi 2018).

Set i dette lys synes det oplagt at problematisere den empiriske præmis (P3) i det held-egalitaristiske argument ovenfor. Det danske system stiller krav til egenskaber – sprog, selvforsørgelse og viden – som oplagt varierer på tværs af forskellige relevante grupper af indvandrere, så indvandrere fra forskellige baggrunde har meget ulige muligheder for at leve op til kravene. Dertil kommer, at kravene er så stramme, at kun de allerfærreste (og dermed de allermest privilegerede indvandrere) kan opnå statsborgerskabsgodet. Dog er der fra et held-egalitaristisk synspunkt ikke i sig selv noget uretfærdigt i, at kravene er stramme, og at kun få kan få adgang. Problemet opstår, når kravene samtidig ikke er differentierede i forhold til ansøgernes arbitrære udgangspunkt for at kunne leve op til dem.

Derfor kan den danske proces ikke forsvares med det held-egalitaristiske argument. Hvis det er et ideal, at statsborgerskabskravene skal være fair, og at processen for tildeling af statsborgerskaber skal være åben og lige for alle, så er en differentiering af kravene baseret på indvandrernes forskellige udgangspunkter derfor påkrævet. De kommende afsnit problematiserer den empiriske præmis (P3) mere konkret i forhold til hver af de tre statsborgerskabskrav, idet det diskuteres, hvorvidt de enkelte krav hver især afspejler personligt ansvar, og det undersøges, hvordan kravene eventuelt kan udvikles til at differentiere på tværs af irrelevante baggrundsfaktorer.

Sprogkrav

Som beskrevet tidligere er de danske statsborgerskabskrav særdeles krævende sammenlignet med andre landes regler. Sprogkravet er ingen undtagelse. I dag skal alle indvandrere leve op til det samme høje sprogkrav på B2-niveau for at få adgang til dansk statsborgerskab. At bestå en prøve på B2-niveau kræver, at man kan tale, forstå og skrive dansk på et niveau, så man uhindret kan kommunikere med andre. Man forventes ikke at være så flydende i sproget, at man forstår implicit mening i tekster, at man ikke søger efter ord i samtale, eller at man kan producere tekst til professionel brug (Council of Europe 2001).

Danskundervisningen er indrettet således, at nyankomne flygtninge og familiesammenførte til flygtninge placeres på en af tre danskuddannelsesprogrammer – Dansk 1, 2 eller 3 – alt efter deres uddannelsesniveau. Dansk 1 afsluttes med en dansk-eksamen på A2-niveau, Dansk 2 afsluttes med eksamen på B1-niveau, mens Dansk 3 afsluttes med en eksamen på B2-niveau. Kun efter at have succesfuldt afsluttet ét danskuddannelsesforløb, kan man tilmeldes det næste. Hvert forløb er inddelt i seks moduler, som hver afsluttes med en prøve, som også skal bestås, før man kan rykke videre i programmet. Staten finansierer op til fem års danskundervisning fra første dag, man begynder på sit første danskuddannelsesprogram. Fem år efter denne dato ophører statens finansiering af

danskundervisning. Det vil sige, at eventuelle mellemliggende pauser i personers dansk-
undervisning ikke fraregnes.

Forskning i tilegnelse af et andetsprog viser ret entydigt en betydelig negativ ef-
fekt af alder (se fx Hakuta, Bialystok og Wiley 2003; Hou og Beiser 2006; van Tubergen
2010) og en betydelig positiv effekt af uddannelse (se fx Dustmann 1997; Hakuta, Bialy-
stok og Wiley 2003; van Tubergen 2010). *Alders*-relaterede forandringer i kognition på-
virker vores mulighed for at tilegne os et nyt sprog. Med alderen nedsættes evnen til at
lære "paired associates", evnen til at afkode og bearbejde ny information og vi får mindre
arbejdshukommelse (Craik and Jennings 1992; Kemper 1992; Salthouse 1992). *Uddan-
nelse* træner til gengæld de kognitive evner, hjælper med tilegnelsen af gode læringsstra-
tegier og skaber større selvtillid i forhold til at tilegne sig ny viden og sprog (Banks and
Mazzona 2012; Ceci 1991). Således er yngre og bedre uddannede indvandrere i højere
grad disponerede for at lære et nyt sprog. Analyser af sproguddannelserne i både Danmark
og Norge bekræfter dette billede. Ældre indvandrere opnår i langt mindre grad en eksa-
men på B2-niveau, og kun en brøkdel af lavt uddannede indvandrere, som begynder på
Dansk 1-programmet og det tilsvarende norske program, opnår over tid en eksamen på
B2-niveau (Djuve et al. 2017; Jensen et al. 2019).

Hvis alder og uddannelse er baggrundsfaktorer, som indvandrere ikke kan kon-
trollere med deres personlige indsats, så bør sprogkravet differentieres i forhold til disse
to faktorer, hvis vi accepterer præmissen om, at fordelingen af statsborgerskaber skal af-
spejle fairness. Alder er af åbenlyse grunde en baggrundsfaktor, som mennesker ikke kan
kontrollere. Det er mindre åbenlyst med uddannelse. Hvilket uddannelsesniveau, indvan-
drere opnåede i deres oprindelsesland før deres ankomst til Danmark, har til dels været et
resultat af deres egen indsats. At uddannelsesniveau alligevel skal behandles som en
ukontrollerbar baggrundsfaktor skyldes to forhold: *For det første*, at indvandrere har haft
forskellige muligheder for uddannelse i deres oprindelsesland. De vil derfor have opnået
forskellige uddannelsesniveauer på trods af lignende indsatser – og nogle har været stærkt
begrænsede i den indsats, de overhovedet har haft mulighed for at investere for at fremme
deres uddannelse. Eksempelvis vil kvinder i en række lande have dårligere muligheder
end mænd af andre grunde end personlig indsats. *For det andet*, ingen indvandrere har
med rimelighed kunnet forudse, at det var nødvendigt at satse stort på uddannelse i hjem-
landet, hvis de fremadrettet skulle have en god chance for dansk statsborgerskab. De har
således ikke haft mulighed for at inddrage dette element som en del af et frit, kalkuleret
valg. Desuden ville det kræve en ekstraordinær, hvis ikke umulig, indsats, hvis man først,
som lavt uddannet indvandrer, skal opøve sine kognitive evner gennem mange års yder-
ligere uddannelse på sit eget sprog for så at kunne deltage i et Dansk 3 forløb og i sidste
ende bestå B2-prøven.

Hvad kan man så gøre for at gøre sprogkravet følsomt over for alder og uddan-
nelse? En første mulighed er at differentiere sprogkravet, så de ældre og lavt uddannede
skal bestå en sprogprøve på et lavere niveau end de yngre og højtuddannede. En oplagt
mulighed er at kræve, at indvandrere består den afsluttende prøve på det danskforløb de
placeres på. Det er allerede sådan, at kommunerne skal screene nyankomne flygtninge og

familiesammenførte til flygtninge med henblik på at placere dem på det danskforløb, som svarer til deres uddannelsesniveau og forventede indlæringshastighed (hvor alder givet er en vigtig faktor). Dette kan udvides således, at alle indvandrere, som ønsker at begynde på et danskforløb, skal gennemgå en lignende screening. Ved således at kræve at de som begynder på Dansk 1 skal bestå en danskprøve på A2-niveau, hvorimod de som begynder på Dansk 3 skal bestå en prøve på B2-niveau, får man effektivt differentieret sprogkravet på baggrund af uddannelse og alder (hvis det specificeres, at dette skal indgå som et væsentligt kriterium i vurderingen af indlæringshastigheden).

Et alternativ eller supplement til at differentiere selve kravet er at differentiere på den offentlige sprogstøtte, som indvandrere modtager. Ældre og lavt uddannede skal således tilbydes flere års, flere timers og/eller mere støttende sprogundervisning end yngre og højtuddannede. Eksempelvis kan man oprette mindre klasser med to-lærer-ordninger til de indvandrere, som starter på Dansk 1 forløbet, samt gøre forløbet mere intenst med flere ugentlige timer. Det er dog nødvendigt, at den valgte tilgang ikke gør det sværere at imødekomme andre statsborgerskabskrav. Eksempelvis vil det, alt andet lige, være sværere at tage sig et arbejde, hvis man samtidig skal bruge en stor del af ugens timer på sprogundervisning.

Videnskravet

Foruden sprogkravet skal indvandrere, som ønsker dansk statsborgerskab, bestå indfødsretsprøven. Dette er en 'multiple choice' prøve, hvor man har 45 minutter til at besvare 40 spørgsmål om det danske samfund og dansk kultur. Svarene på 35 af spørgsmålene kan læses i det dertilhørende pensum (en bog på dansk om det danske samfund på ca. 200 sider) hvorimod de sidste fem spørgsmål er uden for pensum.

Indvandreres muligheder for at tilegne sig den nødvendige viden om samfundet samt forstå spørgsmålene i prøven forudsætter relativt gode danskkundskaber. De samme faktorer, som påvirker sprogtilegnelsen, vil således også indvirke på mulighederne for at bestå indfødsretsprøven. Indfødsretsprøven skal derfor også gøres følsom over for forskelle i alder og uddannelse, hvis den faktisk skal belønne personlig indsats. Ligesom ved sprogkravet kan det gøres ved at differentiere sværhedsgraden af prøven alt efter alder og uddannelse. De ældre og lavere uddannede vil så skulle bestå en prøve, hvor spørgsmålene er nemmere, er stillet i et mere simpelt sprog, hvor de får mere tid til at besvare, og/eller skal have færre svar rigtige for at bestå. En anden mulighed er, at prøverne og pensum udformes på flere sprog, samt at undervisningen i samfundsforhold foregår på flere sprog for de, som har sværere ved at tilegne sig dansk. Således vil man kunne fastholde et højere ambitionsniveau i forhold til den viden om det danske samfund, indvandrere skal tilegne sig, og hæve sværhedsgraden af prøven.

Selvforsørgelseskravet

Statsborgerskab kræver også, at ansøgere ikke har modtaget hjælp efter lov om aktiv socialpolitik eller integrationsloven indenfor de sidste to år samt ikke mere end højst 4 måneder indenfor de sidste fem år. Ens muligheder for at få og beholde et arbejde, så man kan leve op til kravet, handler dog ikke blot om ens personlige indsats i forhold til at søge arbejde og efteruddanne sig. Igen viser forskning med tydelighed, at alder gør en betydelig forskel, men også de økonomiske konjunkturer samt diskrimination rammer nogle grupper hårdere end andre. Sprogtilegnelse, som vi ved påvirkes af alder og uddannelse, er afgørende for ens muligheder for at få fodfæste på arbejdsmarkedet (Dustmann og Fabri 2003; Himmler og Jäckle 2018). Indvandrere, som har sværere ved at lære sig det danske sprog, vil kunne søge et mindre udbud af jobs og være mindre eftertragtede blandt arbejdsgivere. Herudover er aldersdiskrimination på arbejdsmarkedet veldokumenteret (Truxillo et al. 2015; Wood, Wilkinson og Harcourt 2008). Særligt ældre mennesker har generelt sværere ved at få og fastholde et arbejde, hvilket man må formode også gør sig gældende blandt indvandrere.

Økonomiske konjunkturer er ligeledes afgørende for muligheden for arbejde. Under højkonjunkturer er efterspørgslen på arbejdskraft stor, mens den falder under lavkonjunkturer. Den enkelte indvandrer har selvfølgelig ingen kontrol over de makroøkonomiske forhold, hvilket bør afspejle sig i selvforsørgelseskravet, hvis det skal belønne personlig indsats. Således vil det kræve en større indsats at finde et arbejde under en lavkonjunktur, og selvforsørgelseskravet bør derfor lempes tilsvarende i sådanne perioder. Eksempelvis kan selvforsørgelseskravet differentieres alt efter arbejdsløshedsprocenten i de forudgående år, det relaterer sig til for den, som ansøger på et givent tidspunkt. Forskning viser dog, at lavt uddannede er i større risiko for at miste deres arbejde under lavkonjunkturer (Ammermueller, Kuckulenz og Zwick 2009). Ved at differentiere selvforsørgelseskravet i forhold til uddannelse vil man således kunne tage højde for en del af effekten fra lavkonjunkturer på mulighederne for at imødekomme selvforsørgelseskravet.

Endelig er der god evidens for etnisk diskrimination på arbejdsmarkedet, som særligt rammer bestemte etniske grupper. Indvandrere, som migrerer fra lande uden for Europa og Nordamerika, udsættes i højere grad for diskrimination i ansættelsesprocesser, men selv blandt disse eksisterer der også etniske hierarkier, hvor særligt indvandrere fra Mellemøsten og Afrika er i højere risiko for at blive diskrimineret (Midtbøen 2015; Zschirnt og Ruedin 2016). Så længe arbejdspladser i højere grad fravælger bestemte indvandrergrupper uden basis i indsats, bør indvandrere fra disse grupper stilles over for et mindre restriktivt selvforsørgelseskrav, hvis formålet med statsborgerskabsloven er, at indvandrere skal have lige muligheder for statsborgerskab og belønnes ligeligt for den samme indsats.

Konklusion

Som vi har argumenteret for i denne artikel, kræver en fair procedure for tildelingen af statsborgerskab, at statsborgerskabskravene differentieres, så de bedre afspejler reel indsats fremfor ukontrollerbare baggrundsfaktorer. Selvom det umiddelbart lyder som en udvikling i retning af lempeligere udlændingepolitik, så er denne konklusion faktisk forenelig med en politik, som stiller meget høje krav til statsborgskab, så længe kravene afspejler indsats fremfor arbitrær privilegeret adgang. Artiklen har diskuteret nogle måder og områder, hvorpå en sådan differentiering kunne finde sted. En alternativ løsning, hvis statsborgerskabskravene i højere grad skal afspejle indsats, er også at give mulighed for dispensation fra kravene, hvis man kan påvise at have gjort sit bedste for at leve op til kravene, men at det simpelthen ikke kan lade sig gøre. Dette er også en mulighed i Danmark i dag selvom det er svært at få. Differentiering af kravene vil utvivlsomt gøre dispensation til et mindre nødvendigt værktøj, men gruppen af flygtninge hvis mentale helbred lider under traumatiske oplevelser vil stadig have behov for denne mulighed. I denne gruppe vil der være personer, hvis indlæringsevne er så begrænset, at meget lidt kan lade sig gøre i forhold til sprog, viden og selvforsørgelse.

Kritikere ville indvende, at de danske politikeres udtalelser ikke skal tolkes som indeholdende et ideal om held-egalitaristisk fairness, og at dette er helt rimeligt, da man i sammenhængskraftens navn nødvendigvis må stille høje krav til dem, som kommer til. Det vil sige, at på trods af indvandreres indsats og fortjeneste, så er der også bare noget, de skal kunne for at blive statsborgere – såsom at tale Dansk på B2 niveau. Men hvis man står fast på, at der er et absolut niveau af sprog eller selvforsørgelse, som man skal nå, så må man også sige, at indsats og fairness betyder mindre. Sætter man barren højt, så er der sandsynligvis kun en lille gruppe af de, som investerer sig fuldt ud, der faktisk kan leve op til kravene. Det vil kun være for denne lille gruppe, at politikken i så fald efterlever princippet om, at indsats skal belønnes. Resten udelukkes fra statsborgerskabet upåagtet deres arbejde for at integrere sig. Dette er givetvis en position, mange politikere vil forsvare, men i så fald kan de ikke gøre det med henvisning til fairness principper; at alle indvandrere skal gives nogenlunde lige muligheder i forhold til at få statsborgerskab.

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"Danmark er danskernes land": Højrepopulistisk diskurs i Danmark

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Denne artikel undersøger dansk højrepopulisme anno 2019 gennem en kvalitativ diskursanalyse af en række centrale tekster fra partierne Nye Borgerlige og Dansk Folkeparti. Det konkluderes, at begge partier konstruerer en folkelig identitet i form af 'danskerne' i en antagonistisk relation til de muslimske indvandrere og en elite, om end antagonismen til eliten er stærkest hos Nye Borgerlige.

Introduktion

Med en tilbagegang på 12,4 procentpoint til Dansk Folkeparti kan folketingsvalget i 2019 siges at være et nederlag for højrepopulismen i Danmark. På den anden side opnåede det mere højreradikale parti Nye Borgerlige valg for første gang, mens Stram Kurs lige akkurat ikke fik et mandat. Kombineret med situationen i resten af Europa samt USA tyder intet på, at højrepopulismen alt i alt er på tilbagetog.

Hverken i den offentlige eller den akademiske diskussion er der dog enighed om, hvad populisme er, hvem der er populister, og hvorfor. For at undersøge højrepopulismen i Danmark benytter denne artikel Laclau og Essex-skolens diskursive populismebegreb til at foretage en komparativ diskursanalyse af partierne Nye Borgerlige og Dansk Folkeparti med henblik på at afdække, hvordan de konstruerer 'danskerne' som et *os,* det vil sige en folkelig, kollektiv identitet i modsætning til *dem,* der ekskluderes fra 'folket.' Netop disse partier er valgt, fordi de jævnligt associeres med højrepopulismen i den offentlige debat, men det defineres sjældent, hvad denne association indebærer. Denne artikel svarer på netop dette spørgsmål: *Hvorledes* udtrykker højrepopulistisk diskurs sig gennem de to partier?

Forskningslitteraturen om dansk populisme er vokset stødt de sidste 20 år (se fx Andersen 2000; Bächler og Hopmann 2017; Dyrberg 2001; Green-Pedersen og Odmalm 2008; Grys 2005; Judis 2016; Klages 2003; Kosiara-Pedersen 2019; Meret og Siim 2013; Mudde 2007; Mudde og Kaltwasser 2015; Southwell og Lindgren 2013; Svåsand 1998; Vigsø 2011), men den foretager enten ikke en systematisk diskursanalyse (men undersøger fx et partis opbygning eller vælgerbase) eller fokuserer på politiske enkeltområder. Derudover er meget af forskningen af ældre dato, hvorfor den ikke analyserer nyere

aktører som Nye Borgerlige, eller overfladisk, eksempelvis fordi dansk populisme analyseres som en lille del af skandinavisk eller nordeuropæisk populisme. Ambitionen med denne artikel er at give et billede af dansk højrepopulistisk diskurs, som den ser ud aktuelt, ved at se på året 2019.

Indledningsvis karakteriseres og kritiseres en række af de dominerende tilgange i populismelitteraturen, der efterfølgende forkastes til fordel for Laclau og Essex-skolens populismebegreb, der derefter bruges til at analysere den højrepopulistiske diskurs i Danmark anno 2019. Her argumenteres det, at identiteten 'danskerne' ikke synes at have noget klart definerbart positivt indhold men konstrueres som en kollektiv identitet i modsætning til folkets *konstitutive udenfor* udgjort af en elite (især bestående af politikere fra andre partier) og de muslimske indvandrere.

Et omstridt begreb

Populisme er notorisk svært at definere, og forskellige tilgange har gennem tiden givet og giver stadig forskellige svar på, hvad det er. Den *socioøkonomiske tilgang* definerer det som "et svar på modernitetens problemer og konsekvenser" fra 'moderniseringens tabere' (Stewart 1969, 180–81; se også Cardoso og Faletto 1979; Germani 1978). Den *politisk-strategiske tilgang* ser på tværs af sine forskellige versioner populismen som en politisk organisationsform eller mobiliseringsmetode præget af 1) en lav grad af institutionalisering og 2) en personalistisk leder, der legemliggør folkets vilje, og 3) et direkte, umedieret forhold mellem lederen og dennes følgere (Barr 2009; Jansen 2015; Roberts 1995; Weyland 2001, 14). Den *idémæssige* tilgang anser populismen for værende "en ideologi, der ser samfundet som grundlæggende inddelt i to homogene og antagonistiske grupper, 'det rene folk' versus 'den korrupte elite', og som argumenterer for, at politik skal være et udtryk for folkets fællesvilje" (Mudde 2004, 543; se også Canovan 1999; Jagers og Walgrave 2007; Knight 1998; Moffitt og Tormey 2014; Müller 2016; Stanley 2008).

De nævnte tilgange har hver deres meritter men er alligevel utilstrækkelige til at forstå den danske højrepopulisme. Fordelen ved den socioøkonomiske tilgang er, at den som *efterspørgselsorienteret* tilgang i højere grad end de *udbudsorienterede* tilgange forsøger at svare på *hvorfor* populismen aktuelt nyder stor opbakning (Mudde 2007). Ulempen er, at det er svært at etablere en kausal relation mellem et sæt af socioøkonomiske forhold (eksempelvis stigende ulighed og indvandring) og fremkomsten af populistiske partier eller bevægelser, medmindre man antager en økonomisk determinisme (Laclau 2011; Westlind 1996, 52ff, 77). Styrken ved den politisk-strategiske tilgang er, at den etablerer nogle let operationaliserbare, nødvendige og tilstrækkelige betingelser for populismen, der både klargør, hvad man skal lede efter samt hvilke tilfælde, der *ikke* kategoriserer under populisme. Ulempen er, at den ikke kan 'rejse'; de organisatoriske aspekter, som tilgangen etablerer som nødvendige betingelser for populismen, kendetegner langt fra alle populister. Typen af lederskab og graden af institutionalisering synes at være

en kontingent snarere end en nødvendig egenskab ved populisme. (Aslanidis 2017, 269; Hawkins 2010, 40; March 2007, 65; Mudde og Rovira Kaltwasser 2013, 154). Styrken ved den idémæssige tilgang er, at den er afgrænset og dermed tydelig vedrørende hvad der *ikke* er populisme, og at den er let operationaliserbar. Ulempen er, at den ved at modstille populisme med elitisme og pluralisme synes at begå en kategorifejl. Det er en rudimentær metodologisk regel, at man, når man diskuterer antitetiske begreber, skal sammenligne begreber på samme begrebshierarkiske niveau. Hvis populisme er en ideologi, må det medføre, at elitisme og pluralisme også er ideologier. Men medmindre vi er villige til at strække disse begreber ud over det rimelige, synes det ikke at kunne være tilfældet (se Aslanidis 2016, 91)

Essex-skolen og den diskursive tilgang

I stedet for de ovennævnte tilgange anvendes i denne artikel den *diskursive* tilgang, der særligt er influeret af Laclau og den såkaldte Essex-skole. Ifølge Laclaus definition

> "involverer populismen en inddeling af den sociale scene i to lejre. Denne opdeling antager […] tilstedeværelsen af nogle priviligerede signifianter, som i sig selv kondenserer betegnelsen af en hel antagonistisk lejr ('regimet', 'oligarkiet', 'de magtfulde grupper', og så videre for fjendens vedkommende; 'folket', 'nationen', 'det tavse flertal' og så videre for den undertrykte *underdog* – disse signifianter kræver selvfølgelig en artikulation i forhold til den kontekstuelle historie." (2005a, 87)

For Laclau er populismen ikke en ideologi med et konkret indhold men derimod en *artikulationslogik*: En populistisk aktør er "ikke populistisk, fordi den har noget populistisk *indhold* i sin politik eller ideologi, men fordi den viser en særlig *artikulationslogik* for dette indhold – uanset hvad dette indhold er" (Laclau 2005b, 33). Dette populismebegreb er *kontinuert* i modsætning til *diskret:* Populisme er et gradsspørgsmål eller spektrum, på hvilket en aktør kan agere mere eller mindre populistisk, alt efter i hvor høj grad man benytter sig af de populistiske værktøjer (Laclau 2005a, 154).

Hegemoni og folket som tom signifiant

Folket som figur spiller åbenlyst en central rolle i populismen, hvilket allerede fremgår af selve begrebet *populisme*, der er afledt af det latinske ord for folk, *populus.* I moderne vestlig politisk teori har folket traditionelt været anset som det, hvorudfra politisk legitimitet vokser (Canovan 2005; Marchart 2007). Folket er dog med Laclaus terminologi en *tom signifiant* (Laclau 2005a, 162), det vil sige et udtryk, der ikke betegner nogen allerede givet og empirisk verificerbar entitet. 'Folket' refererer i politiske sammenhænge aldrig

til alle bosiddende på et givet territorium, men involverer altid en eksklusion (Abts og Rummens 2007; Agamben 2015; Bosteels 2016; Canovan 1984; 2005; Näsström 2007). Derfor er det populistiske folk mindre end alle, men hævder at være alle: "For at få 'folket' i en populistisk forstand, har vi brug for […] en *plebs,* der hævder at være den eneste legitime *populus* – en del, der gerne vil fungere som fællesskabets helhed." (Laclau 2005a, 81). Populismens folk betegner således en del, der på synekdokisk vis hævder at fungere som hele folket.

Populismen er i sine forskellige varianter et forsøg på at give den tomme signifiant 'folket' betydning og sedimentere denne. *Hvilken* identitetsgruppe, der får succes med at kunne "være" folket er et spørgsmål om *hegemoni:* "En klasse eller en gruppe opfattes som hegemonisk, når den ikke er lukket i et snævert korporativt perspektiv, men præsenterer sig selv som indfrier af de bredere målsætninger om enten frigørelse eller sikring af orden for brede masser af befolkningen." (Laclau 2007, 43). Den hegemoniske kamp er altså en kamp for få anerkendt sit eget politiske projekt og sine egne interesser som 'de universelle' eller 'alles' interesser, altså få anerkendt sig selv som værende den sande referent for signifianten 'folket'.

Differens- og ækvivalenslogik

Man kan med Laclau skelne mellem to forskellige måder at anskue det politiske på: En *differenslogik* og en *ækvivalenslogik.*

Ifølge differenslogikken er der ingen uoverkommelige sociale modsætninger i samfundet og ingen modsatrettede interesser eller krav, der ikke kan tilfredsstilles af de politiske institutioner. Forskelle kan leve side om side og indgå kompromiser. Denne logik kan også kaldes institutionel, fordi den så at sige er administrationens eller forhandlingsbordets logik (Laclau og Mouffe 2014, 117; Laclau 2005b, 36).

Populistisk diskurs kendetegnes derimod af en ækvivalenslogik, der italesætter samfundet som et konfliktfelt opdelt i et *dem* og et *os*, der ikke kan forenes. I denne logik forbindes heterogene krav og identiteter, der ikke umiddelbart har noget med hinanden at gøre, i en ækvivalenskæde, der kan forstås som én kollektiv identitet eller *blok* i form af 'folket' og 'eliten'. (Laclau 2005b, 36–37). Hvor differenslogikken kunne kaldes forhandlingsbordets logik, kan ækvivalenslogikken på grund af dens kompromisløshed siges at være krigens logik.

På grund af signifianternes mangel på fælles positivt indhold, har en ækvivalenskæde brug for noget uden for sig selv til at stabilisere sig, det vil sige et *konstitutivt udenfor,* som identiteterne i ækvivalenskæden er sammen om at ekskludere og være *antagonistiske* til (Laclau 1990, 32; 2005a, 117). En antagonistisk relation defineres som en situation, i hvilken *A*'s tilstedeværelse forhindrer *B* i fuldt og helt at være sig selv (Laclau og Mouffe 2014, 111). Her ses en bemærkelsesværdig dobbelthed: På den ene side umuliggør *de* ('eliten') folkets bliven 100% sig selv. *De* er skyld i *vores* miserable tilstand.

På den anden side har *vi* netop brug for *dem,* så de kan ekskluderes*.* Fjendtliggørelsen af *dem* er en nødvendig betingelse for *os*.

Nodalpunkter og artikulationer

De tomme signifianter 'folket' og 'eliten' fungerer som *nodalpunkter* for populismens ækvivalenskæder (Laclau 2005a, 96). Et nodalpunkt er en signifiant, der midlertidigt stopper og fikserer den frie strøm af tegn og betydning i en diskurs ved at antage en universel, strukturerende funktion, det vil sige 'skabe orden' i diskursen (Laclau og Mouffe 2014, 100). Et nodalpunkt kommer således til at fungere som et center for en ækvivalenskæde; et privilegeret moment, der giver betydning og struktur til diskursens andre momenter, og som fungerer som et 'navn' for ækvivalenskæden. Nodalpunkterne fastsættes gennem en politisk *artikulation*. En artikulation er en omorganisering af diskursen, der gør denne og dens momenter forståelig ved at sammenkæde elementerne på en måde, der ikke på forhånd er bestemt (Laclau og Mouffe 2014, 55). Forholdet mellem nodalpunkter, diskurs og artikulation kan forstås billedligt, hvis man forestiller sig verden før den diskursive artikulation som en bunke garn, der ligger kaotisk filtret sammen på en plade. Nodalpunkterne fungerer som søm, der slås i pladen, mellem hvilke garnet spændes ud, hvilket former et ordnet mønster. Artikulation som praksis er selve denne slåen søm i pladen (hvormed der indstiftes et nyt nodalpunkt), flytningen af et søm eller en omorganisering af garnet.

Dislokation

Selvom populismen (modsat hvad flere versioner af den socioøkonomiske tilgang hævder) ikke er knyttet til et bestemt historisk stadie, opstår den ikke af ingenting. Tværtimod har populismen brug for en krise eller en *dislokation* (Laclau og Mouffe 2014, 117; Laclau 1990, 39) i systemet ved hvilken den gamle (magt)orden og de etablerede identiteter og diskurser rystes (A. D. Hansen 2017a, 16) og desedimenteres. Det kunne for eksempel være økonomiske kriser, krige eller pandemier. Laclau skriver: "En vis grad af krise i den gamle struktur er en nødvendig betingelse for populismen, for som vi har set, kræver de folkelige identiteter ækvivalenskæder af uopfyldte krav" (2005a, 177). Når det etablerede system, der fungerer efter en differenslogik, ikke længere kan tilfredsstille de forskellige krav til det i samfundet, tenderer kravene til at blive ækvivalente med hinanden og se selve systemet som problemet (Laclau 2014, 149). Populismen intervenerer ved at (a) hævde at kunne tilfredsstille de krav, det etablerede system ikke kan efterkomme, og (b) udpege det gamle system i form af eliten som årsag til, at kravene ikke aktuelt kan efterkommes, hvorfor denne må væltes.

Højrepopulisme

I populismeforskningen er det gængs at skelne mellem *højrepopulisme* og *venstrepopu-lisme*, da populismen ikke i sig selv er højre- eller venstreorienteret (Canovan 1984, 313). Denne distinktion findes dog ikke hos Laclau. I *On Populist Reason* diskuterer han kort, hvad han kalder *etnopopulisme* (2005a, 196), men dels minder det om den følgende ka-rakteristik af højrepopulisme (A. D. Hansen 2017a, 14), og dels giver han ikke nogen fyldestgørende definition af det. Derfor vil jeg nu forklare forskellen på venstre- og høj-repopulismen og særligt fokusere på sidstnævntes specificitet.

        Venstrepopulismen har en vertikal dyadisk struktur: Man identificerer *os* som fol-ket, der lokaliseres på bunden, i opposition til *dem,* der identificeres som eliten og loka-liseres på toppen i en dominansstruktur (Judis 2016, 15; March 2007, 66; Mouffe 2018; Stavrakakis og Katsambekis 2014). Venstrepopulismen opererer med en ækvivalenslo-gisk antagonisme mellem eliten og folket, men har typisk samtidig et begreb om folket præget af stor differens, hvad angår nationalitet, race og religion, da den ofte er multikul-turalistisk og sætter inklusion af forskelle højt.

        Højrepopulismen har en triadisk struktur: Man identificerer *os* som folket, der lo-kaliseres på bunden af samfundet, som modsættes eliten på toppen, *samt* en tredje gruppe, nemlig *de fremmede*, som eliten siges at hjælpe og prioritere over folket. Højrepopulis-men opererer med en ækvivalenslogisk antagonisme mellem eliten og de fremmede på den ene side og folket på den anden, men den har samtidig et begreb om folket præget af stor differens hvad angår klasse. Højrepopulismens folke-begreb er stort set altid klasse-løst, og folket konstrueres i stedet omkring den nationalitet eller hvad Wolkenstein (2019, 334) kalder et *kulturelt-nationalistisk* folkebegreb. At folket konstrueres omkring natio-nalitet, betyder, at det specifikke ord 'folket' ikke behøver at indgå i diskurs, før den kan kaldes populistisk. Som Laclau skriver i citatet ovenfor, kræver nodalpunkterne "selvføl-gelig en artikulation i forhold til den kontekstuelle historie", eller med Howarths ord, kan ordet 'folket' erstattes af en *funktionel ækvivalent* (2014, 13). Ofte sættes en etnisk gruppe på 'folkets' plads, eksempelvis den tomme signifiant 'danskerne' for den danske højre-populismes vedkommende, der, som den følgende analyse vil vise, italesætter 'dan-skerne' som helheden (det legitime folk), selvom de ikke udgør alle bosiddende i landet og derfor kun udgør en del.[1] 'De fremmede' kan siges at være en inferiør restkategori, da de bor på territoriet men ikke er i toppen, hvor eliten lokaliseres, og samtidig ikke er en

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[1] At ordet 'folket' ikke behøver at optræde i en populistisk tekst er ikke ukontroversielt i populismeforsk-ningen, selv ikke inden for Essex-skolen. Det udtrykker med Stavrakakis' ord en formalistisk tendens i populismeforskningen, der især udfoldes i Laclaus monografi *On Populist Reason* og hans essay *Populism: What's in a Name?*, begge fra 2005. I denne tendens forskydes vægten fra referencen til 'folket' til kon-struktionen af tomme signifianter og den antagonistiske relation mellem disse. Det har gjort Laclaus teori aldeles populær men også åbnet for en del kritik. Jeg har ikke plads til at gå i dybden med denne diskussion her, men at fokusere på form frem for indhold øger teoriens brugbarhed i Danmark, da ordet 'folket' stort set ikke optræder i dansk politik, men her synes at have en arkaisk, uddateret klang (ligesom et begreb som 'arbejderklassen', der stort set heller ikke optræder i dansk politik længere). Se fx Howarth (2014), Stav-rakakis (2004) samt Stavrakakis og Katsambekis (2014) for en diskussion af drejningen og dens konse-kvenser.

del af folket men derimod er central i elitens undertrykkelse af folket (Dyrberg 2001; Judis 2016, 15; Mouffe 2005, 66ff; Müller 2014, 485; Pelinka 2018, 622; Rydgren 2005; Thorup 2009, 79).

Metodiske overvejelser

For at undersøge hvordan højrepopulistisk diskurs manifesterer sig i Danmark, udføres en kvalitativ diskursanalyse af en række offentlige, politiske tekster fra partierne Dansk Folkeparti (DF) og Nye Borgerlige (NB). Artiklen prætenderer ikke at kunne analysere partiernes diskurs udtømmende men må ses som et punktnedslag. Analysen foretager følgende parametrisering:

1) Hvordan etablerer teksterne nodalpunkter for diskursens ækvivalenskæder?
2) Hvordan konstrueres den folkelige blok på den ene side og magtblokken og de fremmede på den anden side som ækvivalenskæder?
3) Hvordan artikuleres antagonismen mellem blokkene?

At ville karakterisere en diskurs generelt ved at studere dens konkrete instanser stiller naturligvis krav til valget af, hvilke instanser, der skal studeres. Valg af empiri er et velkendt problem for diskursteorien, der ofte bliver anklaget for at basere sig på anekdotisk og/eller selektivt udvalg af empiri (Howarth 2004, 337). Poststrukturalismen hævder dog ikke at kunne give et 1:1-billede af virkeligheden, som den er i sig selv. Verden meddeler sig aldrig umedieret til iagttageren, og analysen af den vil derfor altid være farvet af forskerens udgangspunkt (Dyrberg, Hansen, og Torfing 2001; Esmark, Bagge Laustsen, og Åkerstrøm Andersen 2005; A. D. Hansen 2001; Stormhøj 2013). Dét betyder også, at det at tale om repræsentativitet i en streng statistisk forstand er udelukket. Der er derfor ikke nogen objektive eller universelle kriterier for valg af empiri til en diskursanalyse, hvilket fordrer, at analytikeren ekspliciterer sine overvejelser om sit valg af empiri. Angående kriterier fremhæver Dyrberg, Hansen og Torfing (2001, 325) *centralitet* forstået som teksternes grad af vigtighed eller repræsentativitet for den analyserede diskurs. Der er ikke noget eksakt kriterium for centralitet, men det må antages, at eksempelvis et partiprogram er mere centralt for et partis diskurs end en enkelt statusopdatering på Facebook.

For at sikre centralitet er der foretaget tre valg. For det første er der valgt forskellige tekstgenrer, hvilket minimerer risikoen for, at der er tale om momentvis eller forbigående brug af populistiske diskursive redskaber. For det andet er der valgt samme type tekster for hvert parti, hvilket tillige sikrer sammenlignelighed. For det tredje er der valgt materiale fra partiernes respektive formænd. Det ville være nemt at finde eksempler på lokalpolitikere, der sagde farverige og politisk ekstreme ting, men det ville ikke være sikkert, at de var repræsentative for partiet. Denne repræsentativitet tilstræbes ved at undersøge formændenes diskurs. Det indsamlede analysemateriale fra hvert parti udgøres af:

Årsmødetaler: På partiets årsmøde møder den politiske leder sine følgere. Derfor adresserer årsmødetaler typisk netop disse og interpellerer dem som en del af partiet. Her samler lederen op på det forgangne år både i og uden for partiet og præsenterer partiets plan det kommende år. Samtidig er årsmødetaler utvetydigt offentlige. De dækkes af journalister i nyhedsudsendelser og -artikler, uploades på sociale medier og transmitteres endda til tider direkte i fjernsynet. Årsmødetalen er typisk lang og dybdegående, hvilket gør årsmødetalen mere ideologisk funderet end taler i folketingssalen.

Partiprogrammer: Alle partier har et partiprogram, der ikke forholder sig til dagsaktuelle spørgsmål men til kernen i partiets politik. Disse opdateres sjældent. Derfor kan de i diskursanalysen bruges til at kontrollere for, at de i det følgende fremhævede passager og pointer udtrykker partiets politik frem for blot at være udtryk for en midlertidig kampagne.

Kronikker: Op til Folketingsvalget 2019 fik alle partiledere plads i Dagbladet Information til at skrive en længere kronik om deres partis projekt. Disse kronikker er oplagte at inddrage som empiri, fordi de både forholder sig til dagsaktuelle spørgsmål *og* kobler disse til partiernes grundideologi.

Med disse tre typer tekster forsøges at lave et centralt nedslag i den højrepopulistiske diskurs anno 2019 uden dog at foregive en streng repræsentativitet qua poststrukturalismens grundlæggende påstande. Hvad angår udvælgelsen af passager fra de nævnte tekster, der anvendes i det følgende, eksisterer samme problematik som ved udvælgelsen af teksterne. Også denne udvælgelse må nødvendigvis være teoridrevet og foretaget med henblik på at sige noget om den højrepopulistiske diskurs ved at fremhæve passager, der bidrager til at svare på spørgsmål (1)-(3) ovenfor.

Som nævnt opererer populismen ud fra en ækvivalenslogik modsat en differenslogik. Der er dog ikke nogen stringent måde at operationalisere dette skel på og dermed sige med præcision, at nogen er mere populistisk end andre, især ikke i en kvalitativ analyse, der ikke (modsat fx Hawkins (2009)) "måler" populisme kvantitativt. Desuden prætenderer denne artikel ikke at kunne svare endegyldigt på, hvem der er "mest populistisk." Ikke desto mindre kan man kigge efter indikatorer på, at de forskellige logikker svækkes henholdsvis øges. Der er ikke plads til en udtømmende liste af indikatorer her, men alt andet lige trækker det i en ækvivalenslogisk retning, når Nye Borgerlige opstiller en skarp modsætning mellem eliten og danskerne og således opdeler samfundet i to lejre. Omvendt trækker det i en differenslogisk retning, når både Nye Borgerlige og Dansk Folkeparti en sjælden gang taler om samarbejde og roser de andre politikere. Den følgende analyse vil kigge efter begge dele.

Nye Borgerlige

"Aldrig mere et 2015" står der med store bogstaver på Nye Borgerliges Facebook-cover-billede, hvis beskrivelsestekst slår fast, at "aldrig skal politikernes store svigt fra 2015 få lov at gentage sig" (NB 2020). "2015" henviser til flygtningestrømmene i september 2015, hvor 1,2 millioner mennesker krydsede Middelhavet og over 3000 kom til Danmark (Ritzau 2015). NB blev stiftet samme år af de to tidligere konservative politikere Pernille Vermund og Peter Seier Christensen, og flygtningekrisen har fra grundlæggelsen spillet en afgørende rolle i partiets narrativ om, hvorfor der var behov for det. Centralt står på-standen om de etablerede politikeres svigt, heriblandt DF, der ifølge NB's formand Per-nille Vermund "sad på hænderne, holdt sine mandater i ro og lod det ske" (Vermund 2019a). NB italesætter kontinuerligt flygtningekrisen i 2015 som et moderne syndefald, hvor magthaverne endegyldigt viste sig ude af stand til at tilfredsstille de folkelige krav om tryghed og sikkerhed, og den synes derfor at være den dislokation, som NB er et svar på.

NB's højrepopulisme fremtræder tydeligt hen imod slutningen af Vermunds års-mødetale, hvor hun siger: "Vi er ikke i politik for at få magt over andre. Vi er i politik for at forsvare vores danske værdier og give magten tilbage til danskerne. Vi ønsker ikke magt for magtens skyld. Vi bliver aldrig som de andre" (2019b). Især set i lyset af sæt-ningen "vi bliver aldrig som de andre", hvor "de andre" er politikerne, det vil sige eliten, synes det implicit i udsagnene "vi er ikke i politik for at få magt over andre" og "vi ønsker ikke magt for magtens skyld", at det gør *eliten.* Eliten er magtbegærlig. Brugen af ordet "forsvare" konnoterer et igangværende angreb, og "vores danske værdier", der er under angreb, konnoterer en relativ homogenitet. Det erklærede mål "at give magten tilbage til danskerne" italesætter danskerne som ét subjekt med én vilje og interesse, som NB kan tale på vegne af, og implicerer, at nogen (eliten) har taget magten fra danskerne.

Talen artikulerer både folket ("danskerne") som nodalpunkt, eliten og dens angreb på folket, det vil sige en antagonisme, og NB som folkets forsvarere. Den er derfor et slående eksempel på populistisk diskurs. Disse nodalpunkter og antagonismen mellem blokkene findes også i resten af det analyserede materiale fra NB, der artikulerer en klar antagonisme mellem på den ene side et *vi,* en homogen, folkelig blok, og på den anden side et *dem*, der dels består af en magtblok, som hovedsagelig udgøres af *politikerne*, samt en fremmedblok, der udgøres af de muslimske indvandrere.

De fremmede

Danmark, det vil sige folket, er i Vermunds optik under voldsomt angreb udefra. I sin kronik skriver hun om "den katastrofe, som 35 års fejlslagen udlændingepolitik har påført det danske samfund" (2019a) Selvom islam ikke fylder så meget i det analyserede mate-riale, synes der ikke at være nogen tvivl om, at NB's konstruktion af de fremmede har *muslimske indvandrere* som nodalpunkt. I NB's partiprogram står der: "Erfaringen viser,

at de store flygtningestrømme fra afrikanske og arabiske lande skaber kulturelle og øko-
nomiske problemer i modtagerlandene" (NB 2015). Og i sin kronik skriver Vermund:
"Udlændinge fra de mellemøstlige og nordafrikanske lande bidrager ikke positivt til sam-
fundet", fordi "[d]e er langt mindre aktive på arbejdsmarkedet, mere kriminelle og deler
i mindre omfang værdier med danskerne, hvad angår demokrati, ligestilling og folke-
styre" (Vermund 2019a). Her bliver antagonismen mellem muslimerne og folket også
tydelig: "Ved siden af den økonomiske belastning er det væsentligere med den udfor-
dring, som et stigende antal indvandrere fra især de *muslimske* lande er for de værdier,
der knytter os sammen som *folk*" (kursivering tilføjet). Med andre ord: Styrkes de frem-
mede gennem flere muslimske indvandrere, svækkes den folkelige blok ("de værdier, der
knytter os sammen som folk").

De fremmede italesættes som havende nogle essentielle egenskaber, der muliggør
at forudse præcis, hvad der vil ske, hvis de lukkes ind. Vermund skriver i sin kronik om
de 22.000 indvandrere, der fik midlertidig opholdstilladelse i 2015:

> "De midlertidige migranter vil blive til indvandrere. En vis del af dem vise
> sig ganske uvillige til at integrere sig. Samlet set vil de få en ringere til-
> knytning til arbejdsmarkedet end danskere. Dobbelt så mange af dem vil
> blive kriminelle og antallet af religiøse muslimer, der modarbejder vores
> værdier som demokrati, ligeværd og folkestyre, vil stige." (2019a)

De fremmedes essentielle egenskaber muliggør at foretage induktive slutninger om, hvor-
dan de vil opføre sig og hvilken effekt, de vil have på samfundet. De medbringer en op-
førsel og en række værdier qua islam og vil ikke blive påvirket af at blive en del af det
danske samfund, der karakteriseres ubetinget positivt ved "demokrati, ligeværd og folke-
styre." Det peger selvfølgelig i en ikke-essentialistisk retning, at Vermund siger "en vis
del af dem" og ikke "alle", men det synes ikke at spille nogen rolle i det store billede.

Der er alt i alt en tydelig antagonisme på spil mellem de fremmede og folket,
hvilket ses i den klare nulsums-tænkning: Får man flere indvandrere, betyder det mindre
danskhed, det vil sige "demokrati, ligeværd og folkestyre" – begge dele kan ikke vokse
samtidig, og man må vælge side.

Magtblokken

Nodalpunktet for NB's konstruktion af magtblokken er i det analyserede materiale *poli-
tikerne.* I kronikken skriver Vermund eksempelvis, at der er brug for, at "vi siger fra over
for politikernes svigt og løser problemerne" og at "Nye Borgerlige vil sætte politikerne
stolen for døren" (2019a). Det er bemærkelsesværdigt, at hun omtaler dem i tredjeperson
bestemt flertal, når man med rette kan argumentere for, at hun som partiformand selv
tilhører denne gruppe. Som diskursivt greb har det to funktioner:

1) Den bestemte flertalsform gør Vermunds modstandere til én samlet blok uagtet deres forskelligheder og uenigheder.

2) Tredjepersonsformen italesætter dem som noget *uden for* Vermund og folket. Vermund er ikke politiker, hun er en del af folket, og politikerne er noget markant andet end folket, selvom alle i princippet har mulighed for at stille op til Folketinget.

Det er nærliggende at tro, at tredjepersonformen skyldes, at kronikken og partiprogrammet er skrevet *før* Nye Borgerlige kom i Folketinget og dermed blev (folketings)politikere. Men denne italesættelse af politikerne som magtblokken er stadig meget present i Vermunds årsmødetale, der blev holdt i oktober 2019, det vil sige *efter* folketingsvalget i juni. Her siger hun eksempelvis, at "politikerne har udset sig én gruppe i samfundet, der særligt skal holde for, når de går i gang med deres vilde klimaridt" (2019b). Her stilles politikerne op over for landmændene, hvis side NB er på. NB er stadig ikke politikere, selvom de er kommet i Folketinget.

　　Magtblokkens undertrykkelse af folket kendetegnes af tre strategier: Svigt, hemmeligholdelse og ignorering. At magtblokken svigter folket, fremgår af Vermunds kronik, når hun skriver, at "politikerne har ikke løst problemerne", og at problemerne vil fortsætte, "hvis ikke vi siger fra over for politikernes svigt". Hun skriver også, at DF under flygtningestrømmen i 2015 "sad på hænderne, holdt sine 37 mandater i ro og lod det ske", og at de 114 stramninger på udlændingeområdet blot er "lappeløsninger" (2019a).

　　Det fremgår også af Vermunds årsmødetale, at magtblokken holder noget skjult for danskerne. Vermund siger eksempelvis, at "vi vil fortsætte med at tale åbent og ligefrem om rigets tilstand" og senere, at de vil "insistere på at sige tingene, som de er" – underforstået, det gør de andre ikke. Hun påpeger også, at det "ikke så almindelig i politik at holde, hvad man lover." Desuden italesættes politikerne som nogen, der ignorerer folket. Vermund refererer eksempelvis i sin årsmødetale til Morten Dahlin fra Venstre for at sige, at "han personligt ikke ville lade danskerne komme til orde" hvad angår en folkeafstemning om udlændingepolitikken, som Nye Borgerlige vil kræve (2019b).

　　I en passage i Vermunds årsmødetale etablerer hun en bemærkelsesværdig ækvivalenskæde:

> "Men Danmarks velstand er ikke noget, man snakker så meget om i de kredse, der svinger taktstokken i dansk politik. Nogle gange får man indtrykket af, at velstand ligefrem er noget, man skal skamme sig over. Familievirksomheder, som er kernen i dansk erhvervsliv og sammen med landbruget fundamentet under vores velstand, har regeringen sammen med venstrefløjen besluttet sig for at trække pengene ud af og overføre til staten ved generationsskiftet. Lige meget med, at det vil koste jobs, investeringer og vækst. Og hvad vil man sætte i stedet? En større offentlig sektor, flere projektansatte og flere puljer, som politikerne kan dele ud af til dem, der i deres øjne har fortjent pengene. Dem, der har tjent pengene; dem, der

skaber værdierne og fremskridtet – de mistænkeliggøres og omtales som onde mennesker." (2019b)

Passagen artikulerer en kamp mellem magtblokken: "De kredse, der svinger taktstokken" – regeringen – venstrefløjen – politikerne – den offentlige sektor – projektansatte – "dem, der i [politikernes] øjne har fortjent pengene", der forbindes og gøres ækvivalente i en antagonistisk relation til den folkelige blok: Familievirksomheder – landbruget – "dem, der har tjent pengene; dem, der skaber værdierne og fremskridtet". De to blokke har forskellige, modsatrettede interesser, og magtblokken har ingen respekt for folket men udskammer og mistænkeliggør det. Samtidig påkalder Vermund en modsætning, som kendes fra den traditionelle amerikanske populisme, mellem samfundets produktive sektorer (folket) og parasitære, ikke-produktive elementer (eliten). William Manning opdelte for eksempel befolkningen i *the Many,* der arbejdede for at leve og *the Few,* der levede uden at arbejde men bestemte over *the Many* (Kazin 1998). Vermund artikulerer den samme ækvivalens mellem magthavere = uproduktive og folket = produktivt, hvilket får den konsekvens, at den offentlige sektor placeres på magtsiden af den antagonistiske relation.

Elitens moralske underlegenhed står tydeligt frem, når Vermund i sin årsmødetale siger: "For de fleste politikere på Christiansborg handler det alt for meget om magten og alt for lidt om værdierne. Det er ikke nogen tom påstand. Det er et faktum, som kan aflæses af politikernes manglende mod til at gøre det rigtige" (2019b). Politikerne vil altså have magten for magtens skyld. Det kan ses ved, at de ikke fører NB's politik, som udtrykker folkets vilje. Der er således ikke blot tale om, at eliten er politisk uenig med NB, men at den er magtbegærlig og moralsk forfalden.

På trods af den populistiske antagonisme mellem folket og eliten (legemliggjort af politikerne), peger det dog i en ikke-populistisk retning, når Vermund i sin årsmødetale roser andre politikere. Hun siger eksempelvis, at hun har et "forholdsvis positivt" indtryk af statsminister Mette Frederiksen, som synes at have "forstået mere af udfordringen i udlændingepolitikken end hendes forgænger Lars Løkke Rasmussen forstod". I samme tale roser Vermund Søren Espersen fra DF for at bakke op om NB's krav om folkeafstemning om udlændingepolitikken. Så selvom politikerne udgør én blok, er denne stadig præget af en vis intern differens.

Den folkelige blok

Nodalpunktet for NB's konstruktion af den folkelige blok er *danskerne*. I sin årsmødetale bekendtgør Vermund, at "[v]ores børnebørn skal vokse op i et land frit og trygt og dansk." Hun lægger flere steder vægt på, at folket er én homogen enhed, for eksempel når hun taler om "vores kulturelle fællesskab" og om "danskerne" i bestemt flertal. Eller til sidst i sin kronik, hvor hun kalder Danmark "et lille, homogent land" og skriver, at denne homogenitet kan bevares, "hvis vi forstår at holde sammen på os selv og bevare vores danske

værdifællesskab" (2019a). *Danskerne* udgør med andre ord én homogen kollektiv identitet med fælles værdier.

Disse fælles værdier er værd at undersøge nærmere. Ser man på de egenskaber, Vermund knytter til Danmark, finder man i årsmødetalen troper som "frihed", "demokrati", "tryghed", "virkelyst," "innovation", "kreativitet" og "stoltheden ved at forsørge sig selv og sin familie". I kronikken skriver hun, at danskerne går ind for demokrati, ligestilling og et "tillidsbaseret" folkestyre (2019a).

Disse værdier karakteriserer Vermund som specielle for Danmark. I sin kronik skriver hun: "De værdier, som binder os sammen som et folk, er bygget op gennem mange generationer. Vi har tillid til hinanden, og der eksisterer en borgerlig solidaritet mellem danskerne, som gør, at vi tager vare på hinanden." Og senere: "Det er unikke værdier skabt af tidligere generationer og et særkende ved Danmark" (ibid.). Hvis det er tilfældet, vil de kunne fungere som et godt udgangspunkt for at definere, hvad det danske folk er.

Snarere end at være særlige for Danmark synes disse værdier dog at være relativt universelle plusord, som ikke defineres yderligere, men som stort set alle ville kunne gå ind for. Samtidig uddyber eller forklarer hun dem aldrig men lader dem stå tilbage som brede og vage udtryk. Det peger på, at der er tale om tomme signifianter, altså betegnere uden nogen empirisk referent. Deres funktion er ikke at beskrive en objektiv virkelighed, men at fungere som tegn, om hvilke NB's 'folk' kan danne og identificere sig i modsætning til det, det *ikke* er.

Dette rejser spørgsmålet om, hvem der er med i fællesskabet, da folket som nævnt aldrig er alle indbyggere. I Vermunds årsmødetale artikuleres en ækvivalenskæde, der inkluderer en lang række elementer på tværs af socialklasseskel: Familievirksomheder, "landmanden ved Sønderborg", "robotfabrikanten på Mors", "iværksætteren", "pædagogen," "sygeplejersken" samt "de syge og nedslidte, der i dag piskes rundt i jobcentrene" (2019b). I NB's partiprogram inkluderes desuden identiteter som virksomheder, læger, politifolk, lærere, "de svageste", de ældre, udsatte børn, "folk, der er syge i krop eller sind" og fiskere (2015).

Vermund har et meget bredt begreb om det danske folk, hvad angår socialklasse, hvilket indikerer, at nationalitet er det vigtigste. Det viser sig dog, at folket ikke dækker over alle, der bor i Danmark. Som nævnt ekskluderes politikerne og muslimerne men også den offentlige sektor og projektansatte, som politikerne hellere vil give penge til end folket. Heller ikke statsborgerskab er en tilstrækkelig betingelse for at være en del af folket. Ifølge Vermunds årsmødetale var det godt, at man hastebehandlede et lovforslag om at fjerne statsborgerskabet fra Islamisk Stat-krigere (2019b).

Således synes der ikke at eksistere nogen fast definerede eller objektive grænser for, hvornår man er en del af folket, og hvornår man ikke er. Kombineret med den vaghed og udefinerbarhed, der kendetegner de begreber, der efter sigende skulle kendetegne det danske, indikerer dette, at den folkelige bloks ækvivalenskæde i mindre grad stabiliseres af en positiv essens internt til ækvivalenskæden og i højere grad konstitueres af dens udenfor: Magtblokken og de fremmede. NB's danske folk defineres ved ikke at være alt det, der ekskluderes fra det.

Vi er folket

Vermund skriver i både sin kronik og sin årsmødetale, at NB ikke er som de andre partier i Folketinget, og som nævnt omtaler hun dem konsekvent i tredjeperson flertal, hvilket underbygger denne pointe. Hvad er NB så? Svaret er ifølge Vermunds årsmødetale: "[v]i er meget mere end et parti. Vi er meget mere end Christiansborg. Vi er de danskere, der siger tingene, som de er. Som holder, hvad vi lover, og som ikke giver op og bliver som de andre" (2019b). Her ses dels en identifikation ("vi er de danskere") og en eksklusion i form af, at man ikke vil blive som "de andre." Nye Borgerlige er danskerne. Denne identifikation ses også ved, at *vi*'et i hele det analyserede materiale har to referenter, der løbende skiftes ud med hinanden, nemlig *vi = Nye Borgerlige* og *vi = danskerne.*

Vermund skriver i sin tale, at "de borgerlige værdier lever – ikke i politik og ikke på Christiansborg. Men de lever i danskerne" (ibid.). Der er dog ingen tvivl om, at NB legemliggør disse værdier, hvorfor de i hvert fald må findes på Christiansborg, så længe NB er der, og i politik, så længe NB laver politik. Således både lever og ikke-lever de borgerlige værdier på Christiansborg og i politik. Denne tilsyneladende selvmodsigelse kan ophæves ved at læse Vermunds udsagn som udtryk for en populistisk diskurs, der ikke forstår 'Christiansborg' som et fysisk sted i København og ikke forstår 'politik' som det at beskæftige sig med parlamentarisk politik som sådan, men begge dele som signifianter for *eliten.* Igen iscenesætter NB sig som danskerne, det vil sige folket, i modsætning til politikerne. Modsat politikerne kan NB være på (det fysiske sted) Christiansborg uden at blive en del af magtblokken, og NB bedriver ikke politik, det vil sige bliver en del af magtblokken, men forfægter folkets vilje i form af de borgerlige værdier.

Ligesom rosen til andre partier, der nedtoner ækvivalenslogikken og den antagonistiske relation, peger det tilsyneladende i en ikke-populistisk retning, når Vermund i sin årsmødetale siger: "Vi bliver større. Ikke ved at flytte partiet derhen, hvor vælgerne er, men ved at flytte den offentlige debat i en borgerlig retning" (ibid.). Her ses et tydeligt skel mellem partiet og vælgerne (folket), altså en svækkelse af identifikationen, selvom partiet ellers tidligere blev gjort næsten identisk med danskerne.

Umiddelbart efter siger Vermund: "Vi er i politik for at forsvare vores danske værdier og give magten tilbage til danskerne." Vermund vil altså på én og samme tid *ikke* flytte sit parti hen til folket *og* give magten til folket. Dette peger på, at man må bør skelne mellem *vælgernes vilje* (udtrykt gennem de ved valget afgivne stemmer), der ikke har givet Nye Borgerlige så godt et valg, og *folkets vilje*, der er en form for renere eller sandere vilje, og som NB legemliggør. Dette skel anes også tidligere i talen, hvor Vermund siger: "Nye Borgerlige vokser – ikke så hurtigt som Danmark fortjener – men vi har fat i den lange ende." Ifølge Müller (2014, 487) og Kazin (1998, 222ff) kendetegner det populister, at de typisk ikke ser valgresultater som udtryk for folkets *sande* vilje. Netop det synes at kunne anes her, når Vermund tilsyneladende skelner mellem et Danmark (danskernes vilje) og de afgivne stemmer (vælgernes vilje). Der er dog ikke belæg for at sige, at NB ikke anerkender legitimiteten af valgresultatet, hvilket ifølge Müller ellers er typisk for populister. NB har ingen påstande om valgfusk og kræver ikke omvalg. Det er derfor

ikke entydigt, hvilke konsekvenser NB's skel mellem folket og vælgerne skal have i prak-
sis.

Dansk Folkeparti

Dansk Folkeparti blev stiftet i 1995 af fire udbrydere fra Fremskridtspartiet. Partiets stra-
tegi har fra starten været at agere talerør for borgere, der var bekymrede over globalise-
ringen og indvandringen fra ikke-vestlige lande, der havde været stigende siden
1960'erne (Bächler og Hopmann 2017; Southwell og Lindgren 2013). Netop disse to
sammenhængende udviklinger i samfundet synes at være den dislokation, DF præsenterer
sig som svar på. Indvandringen desedimenterede den sociale orden ved at konfrontere det
etablerede danske fællesskab med nye identiteter som 'gæstearbejderen' og 'muslimen',
hvilket rejste spørgsmålet: Hvem er 'vi,' og hvordan stiller vi os til 'de andre', der nu bor
inden for 'vores' grænser? Denne dislokation accelereredes med terrorangrebet den 11.
september 2001, der globalt satte fokus på militant islamisme og åbnede for diskurser om
en vestlig pol, der stod for demokrati, frihed, fred og ligestilling, i decideret krig med en
islamistisk pol, der stod for præcis det modsatte af den vestlige, opsummeret i den davæ-
rende amerikanske præsident George W. Bushs tale til Kongressen: "Enten er i med os,
eller også er i med terroristerne" (Marker og Hendricks 2019, 39).
      Hos DF findes som hos NB en skarp antagonisme mellem folket i form af dan-
skerne og de fremmede i form af de muslimske indvandrere. DF's altoverskyggende krav
er "at få styr på indvandringen", som det hedder i Kristian Thulesen Dahls årsmødetale
(Thulesen Dahl 2019b). Der er imidlertid ikke tale om en hvilken som helst indvandring,
men den muslimske. At "få styr på indvandringen" handler om at "standse islamiserin-
gen", som han skriver i sin kronik (2019a).
      At det er denne antagonisme, DF's diskurs centrerer sig om, ses både kvantitativt
og kvalitativt. Det ses kvantitativt ved, at det fylder meget i det analyserede materiale:
Det er det gennemgående og altoverskyggende tema i kronikken, og selvom årsmødetalen
også berører andre emner, bliver den muslimske indvandring ved med at vende tilbage
som tema. Kvalitativt ses det ved, at kravet om at "få styr på indvandringen" overdeter-
minerer alle andre mulige politiske krav: "Hvis vi som land ikke har styr på indvandrin-
gen, skrider alt andet også. Vores velfærdssamfund, vores sammenhængskraft, vores vær-
dier" (2019b). I sin kronik skriver Thulesen Dahl direkte: "Min allervigtigste mission som
formand for Dansk Folkeparti er fortsat at styre indvandringen, så vi kan opretholde vores
gode gamle Danmark, som vi kender det" (2019a). Med andre ord er dette krav ikke et
krav på linje med Dansk Folkepartis modstand mod bankunionen, retskrav på en pleje-
hjemsplads til ældre over 80 år eller nærhed i sundhedsvæsenet, som Thulesen Dahl næv-
ner i sin årsmødetale. At "få styr på indvandringen" er en forudsætning for alle de andre
krav.

Den folkelige blok

Thulesen Dahl artikulerer gennem sin tale og sin kronik et tydeligt *vi*. Som han skriver i sin kronik: "*Vi* har *vores* fællesskab, *vores* retningslinjer, *vores* måde at leve med hinanden på, som jeg anser som værende en af de bedste måder at leve på i hele verden" (2019a; kursivering tilføjet). Thulesen Dahls folk eller 'vi' italesættes som "moderne," hvilket blandt andet betyder, at vi har et afslappet forhold til religion. 'Vi' italesættes også som frisindede og fredelige, eksempelvis når Thulesen Dahl skriver i sin kronik, at "for en dansker kan det virke verdensfjernt, at der er mennesker her i Danmark, som går ind for, at ægteskabsbrydere og homoseksuelle skal stenes ihjel. At vantro skal dræbes. Men det er i ramme alvor det, som prædikes i moskeer i Danmark." (Ibid.)

Det er her bemærkelsesværdigt, at identiteten 'dansker' (dvs. en nationalitet) italesættes som antitetisk til en specifik holdning til ægteskabsbrud, homoseksualitet og vantro (dvs. en række værdier). Umiddelbart ville det være mere oplagt at modstille begreber af samme type, eksempelvis *dansker* vs. *svensker* for nationalitet og *for stening* vs. *mod stening* for værdier. Men her gøres danskere antagonistiske til en række specifikke værdier, selvom en nationalitet og en værdi teknisk set kan haves samtidig. Disse værdier gøres derefter ækvivalente med moskéer, som fungerer som en synekdoke for muslimske indvandrere, og moskéerne ses som udanske, selvom de ligger i Danmark. Det danske folk defineres derfor af noget andet, end hvor man er født og/eller bor. Det defineres af, at man ikke er som *de fremmede.*

I DF's principprogram står der: "Kristendommen har århundredes hævd i Danmark og er uadskillelig fra folkets liv. Den betydning, kristendommen har haft og har, er umådelig og præger danskernes levevis. Den har gennem tiderne været retningsgiver og vejviser for folket. […] Dette anfægter ikke den almindelige trosfrihed, som vi er tilhængere af – og beskyttere af." (DF 2002) At kristendommen er "uadskillelig fra folkets liv" synes umiddelbart at pege på, at ikke-kristne ikke er en del af folket. Resten af passagen åbner dog for, at der snarere er tale om, at kristendommen præger samfundet som helhed og derfor alle, der bor i samfundet, kristne eller ej.

I sin årsmødetale taler Thulesen Dahl om at stoppe en "krig – eller hetz – der er mellem landsdelene" og "en kamp mellem forskellige dele af landet" (2019b). Efterfølgende taler han om både at gavne landdistrikterne og øge livskvaliteten i de store byer. Der er derfor ikke her tale om en antagonisme over en *geografisk* akse, hvilket ellers også kan findes i dansk populistisk diskurs blandt eksempelvis politikere fra Socialdemokratiet og Liberal Alliance (Marker og Hendricks 2019, 67). Folket bør ifølge Thulesen Dahl forenes på tværs af geografi i Danmark. Ligeledes synes der, ligesom hos NB, ikke at være nogen socialklasse-konflikt mellem lavindkomster og højindkomster at finde i det analyserede materiale. Thulesen Dahl appellerer til grupper som "de udsatte," "de arbejdsløse" og "de nedslidte", men aldrig i opposition til eksempelvis "de rige", som er fraværende i materialet, eller "erhvervslivet", som man ifølge Thulesen Dahls årsmødetale (2019b) skal samarbejde med.

De fremmede

I DF's principprogram slås det fast, at "Danmark er ikke et indvandrerland og har aldrig været det. Vi vil derfor ikke acceptere en multietnisk forvandling af landet. Danmark er danskernes land, og borgerne skal have mulighed for at leve i et trygt retssamfund, der udvikler sig i overensstemmelse med dansk kultur." (2002). Her ses en tydelig antagonisme mellem to blokke: Danskerne eller "borgerne," det vil sige den folkelige blok, og det *vi*, der gennemstrømmer principprogrammet, og de fremmede, det vil sige indvandrerne. Man er enten det ene eller det andet, og "multietnisk forvandling" og "indvandrerland" står i modsætning til "et trygt retssamfund". De fremmede artikuleres yderligere i Thulesen Dahls årsmødetale, hvor den består af elementerne "flygtninge", "udlændinge", "muslimer", "indvandrere" og "migranter" (2019b).

Gennem hele kronikken etableres en ækvivalenskæde med muslimske indvandrere som nodalpunkt, der kobler momenterne "stigende voldtægt og kriminalitet", "bandekonflikter", "skudepisoder", "parallelsamfund", "tvangsægteskaber", "terror", "genopdragelsesrejser", "æresrelateret vold", "kvindeundertrykkelse", "voldelige salafistgrupperinger" og en række andre fænomener (Thulesen Dahl 2019a). Muslimer er nodalpunkt i denne ækvivalenskæde, fordi de fungerer som betydningsgivende signifiant for de andre signifianter: Når Thulesen Dahl taler om "kvindeundertrykkelse" handler det ikke om den historiske, strukturelle undertrykkelse af kvinder i de vestlige samfund, som feminismen taler om (Marker og Hendricks 2019, 47). Dette er konsistent med nyere forskning, der peger på, at Dansk Folkeparti primært bruger ligestillingsdagsordenen som et negativt projekt ved gennem italesættelsen af ligestilling som en særlig "dansk værdi" at distancere sig fra islam, det vil sige styrke antagonismen til de fremmede, frem for at kæmpe for kønslighed mellem de etniske danskere (Meret og Siim 2013; Mudde og Kaltwasser 2015, 28). Ligeledes konnoterer "indvandrere" i talen ikke indvandrere fra Japan, "bandekonflikter" og "æresrelateret vold" konnoterer ikke hvide rocker-grupperinger som Hells Angels, og "parallelsamfund" konnoterer ikke overklasse-miljøer i Nordsjælland. "Terror" peger næppe heller på den type terrorisme, som Anders Breivik udførte i 2011 eller massakren i Christchurch i 2019.

Det handler derimod om muslimske indvandrere; bander, der opfører sig, som de gør, *fordi* de er muslimer; muslimer, der begår terror *fordi* det er islams bud; samt parallelsamfund, der er parallelle *fordi* de styres af muslimer. Thulesen Dahl opsummerer dette kompleks ved ligesom Vermund at foretage en induktiv slutning: "jo flere med muslimsk baggrund, der kommer til Danmark, desto sværere bliver det at integrere dem, der allerede er her" og: "så snart der er mange troende muslimer i et land, så vil landets samfundsstruktur ændre sig, fordi hverdagen – helt ned til mindste detalje – er styret af islam og dens imamer" (2019a). Med andre ord betyder islam, at muslimer er en monolitisk gruppe, der på grund af sin ensartethed og forudsigelighed kan foretages induktive slutninger om, som Thulesen Dahl gør her. Således konstrueres islam ikke blot som værende i modsætning til kristendommen (altså en teologisk konflikt) men til samfundet,

sammenhængskraften og friheden, det vil sige folkets interesser, ve og vel. Muslimer og folket er antagonistiske.

Magtblokken

DF har i ringere grad end NB mulighed for at artikulere sig selv i modsætning til en elite, fordi de selv har haft en central placering i dansk politik siden 2001, hvilket nævnes i både Thulesen Dahls årsmødetale og i hans kronik. Det er svært at komme uden om, at de selv er relativt magtfulde. Derfor er italesættelsen af magtblokken mere ambivalent end hos NB.

Der sker dog en tydelig italesættelse af partiet i opposition til en herskende meningselite. Thulesen Dahls kronik indledes med ordene: "Jeg husker stadig, hvordan det var i starten af 00'erne, hvor DF blev udskammet for at påtale problemerne" (2019b). Bemærk, at der ikke bare har været tale om en politisk uenighed, men en decideret udskamning. Forudsætningen for en sådan er et ulige magtforhold, i hvilket DF er underhunden. En lignende figur findes i Thulesen Dahls årsmødetale, i hvilken han fortæller om, at de andre partier har "latterliggjort" et forslag fra DF om retskrav på plejehjem til ældre over 80 år (2019b). Igen er der ikke bare tale om en uenighed mellem en række ligeværdige politiske aktører men en fortælling om DF som det mobbede barn i skolegården.

Thulesen Dahl indleder sin årsmødetale med en personlig anekdote om en fest, hvor han klædte sig ud som indianer, som afsluttes med: "Godt, der ikke var iPhones dengang, og det hele blev filmet… ". Dette følges op af en anekdote om, at han til en fodboldkamp "kunne finde på at råbe: 'KOM SÅ, GUTTER!' til drengene på banen". De to anekdoter efterfølges af en opsummerende refleksion: "Tænk, hvor krænkende jeg har optrådt… lang tid før Københavns Universitet kom os til undsætning og forklarede, hvordan vi skal tale til hinanden" (2019b). Således påkaldes et *krænkelsesnarrativ,* som ifølge Marker og Hendricks (2019, 148ff) er "et dominerende narrativ om en gruppe af krænkede, stødte, særligt følsomme eller udsatte, der i stadig højere grad brokker sig offentligt over jævnt hen ubetydelige ting", og som retorisk kneb "reducerer al kritik og uenighed til et spørgsmål om individuelle følelser". Krænkelsesnarrativet er nært beslægtet med narrativet om *den politiske korrekthed,* der italesætter et politisk tanke- og sindelagspoliti, det vil sige en elite, der vil "rense sproget" for "krænkende ord" (ibid, 155ff).

Thulesen Dahl nævner henimod årsmødetalens slutning den svenske klimaaktivist Greta Thunberg. Han indleder med et retorisk spørgsmål om, hvorvidt den førte klimapolitik kun handler om "at pudse vores glorie", hvorefter han siger, at Thunberg "kræver at sejle over Atlanten for at skåne klimaet", selvom det havde været meget bedre for klimaet at flyve. Ifølge Thulesen Dahl "bør der lyde et ramaskrig" – med andre ord: folket bør sige fra over for klima-elitens hykleri – men: "i stedet bliver man forsøgt tiet ihjel, for svenske Greta er et klima-ikon, så hende må man ikke kritisere" (2019b). Thunberg

bliver således en signifiant for "de rigtige meninger" og igen påkaldes et elitært tankepoliti, der vil bestemme, hvad folket må og ikke må sige.

Påkaldelsen af krænkelsesnarrativet og modpositioneringen i forhold til Thunberg og hendes støtte placerer DF sammen med 'folket' i en underhunds- eller offerrolle som dem, den hykleriske og gloriepudsende meningselite bestemmer over. Selvom denne identifikation med folket er svagere artikuleret hos DF end hos NB, bliver det i disse passager tydeligt, at man skal forstå, at DF og folket er i samme båd.

Alt i alt er der i DF's diskurs modsat hos NB ikke tale om en *politisk* elite bestående af *politikerne*. DF vedkender sig om ikke andet implicit at være en del af denne gruppe. Til gengæld er der tale om en *kulturel* elite med "de rigtige holdninger", der angående identitets- og klimaspørgsmål udskammer og agerer tanke- og sprogpoliti over for folket og DF. Altså en elitediskurs, som 'folkets' diskurs står i et antagonistisk forhold til, og således stabiliserer den folkelige identitet.

Konklusion

Udtrykket populisme bruges hyppigt og ofte nedsættende i den danske offentlighed men defineres sjældent, hvilket skaber forvirring om hvem, der er populister og hvorfor. Heller ikke i forskningen er der enighed om, hvad populisme dækker over. Denne artikel definerer det i forlængelse af Laclau som en diskurs, der er artikuleret omkring 'folket' (eller en funktionel ækvivalent som 'danskerne') som nodalpunkt og ser dette som antagonistisk til eliten. Højrepopulismens specificitet består i at tilføje 'de fremmede' til ligningen på elitens side og gøre alliancen med de fremmede imod folket til elitens primære 'forbrydelse.'

Diskursanalysen af det indsamlede materiale fra NB og DF har vist, at de to partier benytter højrepopulistisk diskurs, da de artikulerer nodalpunktet 'danskerne' som et privilegeret centrum for den folkelige blok, som stabiliseres gennem modsætningen til en magtblok. Der er dog en væsentlig forskel på forholdet til magten: Hvor magtblokken for DF er en gruppe politisk korrekte personer, der synes at være en relativt lille gruppe, der til tider har held med at udskamme folket, er den for NB hele det politiske *establishment*. Samtidig inkluderer NB den offentlige sektor i magtblokken og italesætter denne som uproduktiv, mens dette ikke er at finde hos DF. Det hænger godt sammen med, at DF har en mere social profil på det økonomiske område, mens NB har en erklæret borgerlig-liberal økonomisk politik. For begge partier gælder det, at elitens store brøde er dens alliance med de fremmede. Årsagen til, at DF nedtoner kritikken af magteliten, er sandsynligvis, at de selv har spillet en central rolle i dansk politik siden 2001. Ikke desto placerer de sig selv i en offerrolle, hvilket er ganske typisk for populistiske partier. Müller skriver: "Flertal kan opføre sig som forfulgte mindretal, og repræsentanter for den type flertal, der har en indlysende interesse i at iscenesætte sig som ofre og dermed aflede opmærksomheden fra egne fejlslag, kan drage nytte af denne selvopfattelse" (2016, 70).

Den mest konsekvente og stabile karakteristik af folket på tværs af partierne kan opsummeres med *ikke muslimsk indvandrer og ikke en del af eliten*. Det er således denne del, som højrepopulismen hævder, er helheden af folket, selvom der også bor andre mennesker i landet. Ækvivalenskæden med nodalpunktet 'danskerne' stabiliseres af de identiteter, diskursen konstruerer og ekskluderer, herunder muslimske indvandrere og eliten. 'Danskere' bliver med en parafrasering af Laclau dén del, der antager helheden af fællesskabets funktion – eller som der står i DF's principprogram: Danmark er danskernes land.

Tekster om populisme tager ofte normativ stilling til, om populismen er skadelig for eller i modstrid med demokratiet (se fx Abts og Rummens 2007; A. D. Hansen 2017b; M. H. Hansen 2018; Libak 2018; Mény og Surel 2002; Müller 2016). Det ville føre for vidt her at have en sådan diskussion om DF og NB, og formålet med denne artikel er en analyse af den populistiske diskurs snarere end en domsfældelse over den. På den ene side kan det siges, at Laclau som nævnt kalder etnopopulismen (svarende til højrepopulismen) for uforenelig med pluralisme (se også Anastasiou 2019; Dyrberg 2001; Mouffe 2005; Mudde og Rovira Kaltwasser 2013). Det synes desuden oplagt, at højrepopulismen med sin ækvivalenslogiske 'dem og os'-opdeling af samfundet medvirker til at skabe fjendebilleder og øge polariseringen i samfundet, hvilket forskningen peger på er skadeligt for demokratiet (se fx Marker og Hendricks 2019; Sunstein 2011). På den anden side kan det argumenteres, som for eksempel Carlsen (2000; 2013) har gjort, at højrepopulismen kan give en stemme til grupper i befolkningen, der ikke normalt bliver hørt, hvilket alt andet lige har en positiv demokratisk effekt. Hvis dette er sandt, kan (højre)populismen fungere som et korrektiv til demokratiet. Hvilken effekt, der er stærkest i forbindelse med den aktuelle danske højrepopulisme, er et oplagt emne for videre forskning.

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ABSTRACTS

Abstracts

'Couture military' and a queer aesthetic curiosity: music video aesthetics, militarised fashion, and the embodied politics of stardom in Rihanna's 'Hard'

Catherine Baker

Music video is an underappreciated type of audiovisual artefact in studies of the aesthetics of world politics, which typically privilege linear narrative storytelling and struggle to communicate how sonic and embodied practices also constitute world politics as sensory experiences through which individuals make sense of the world. Yet the ways in which music video invites spectators' senses to work together, and to filter meaning through their knowledge of stars' own 'meta-narratives', expose an intimate and affective continuum between the politics of stardom and attachments to collective projects such as militarism. This paper explores that continuum through a study of Rihanna's video 'Hard' and the aesthetic strategies it used to visualise her performance of a 'female military masculinity' in a fantasised space employing signifiers of US desert war.

Music making politics: beyond lyrics

M.I. Franklin

In 2016, Bob Dylan was the first singer-songwriter awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature. In 2018 Kendrick Lamar became the first Rap artist to win the Pulitzer Prize for Music. Between these two mediatized moments of public recognition, across the race and genre divides of contemporary culture, lie many musico-political timelines, recording careers, playlists, and embodied musicalities. This article aims to show why theory and research into the relationship between (the study of) politics and music-making need to move beyond indicators of political relevance based on lyrics, an artist's public persona, or publicity. It explores how a song can become an act of resistance, politicized in ways beyond lyrical content. I argue that considering more closely how any sort of music is made, as sonic material and on whose terms, is integral to projects looking to conceptualize the music-politics nexus. The case in point is 'My Way', a seemingly apolitical song, as it becomes repurposed: transformed through modes of performance, radical musical

(re)arrangements, and performance contexts. The analysis reveals a deeper, underlying politics of music-making that needs unpacking: the race, gender, and class dichotomies permeating macro- and micro-level explorations into the links between music, society, and politics. Incorporating a socio-musicological analytical framework that pays attention to how this song works musically, alongside how it can be reshaped through radical performance and production practices, shows how artists in diverging contexts can "re-music" even the most hackneyed song as political engagement.

Music, mining and colonisation: Sámi contestations of Sweden's self-narrative

Annika Bergman Rosamond

Sweden's dominant self-narrative has tended to marginalise its historical colonisation of Sápmi. This aspect of Swedish history sits uncomfortably with prevalent understandings of that self-identity. Indeed, there has been little emphasis on the historical subordination of Sámi people in political science scholarship on Swedish exceptionalism and internationalism. This article problematises this absence by centring the analysis on Sámi musician Sofia Jannok's efforts to decolonise Sápmi through her music. The first part examines Sweden's colonisation of Sápmi and the tensions between Sámi reindeer herding communities, mining interests and the Swedish state. This is followed by an exploration of the constitutive relationship between music, politics and celebrity, as sites of political communication. A two-step analysis follows, investigating the broad themes in Sofia Jannok's personal narrative and the discursive markers defining her music and politics. The analysis shows how her narrative intersects with the discursive themes of her musical expression and other engagements.

"We come from the land of ice and snow": Decolonising superhero cinema through music

Dina AlAwadhi and Jason Dittmer

In this short intervention we examine the relationship between Led Zeppelin's Immigrant Song and the Marvel Cinematic Universe's Thor: Ragnarok. We do this to highlight the doubleness of both texts' meaning, which gives each an aura of postcolonial subversion. This relation is important because in this case Immigrant Song was central to the

production of Ragnarok, with director Taika Waititi allowing the song to suffuse the film from its inception. When we speak of music in film, we must also consider the deeper role of music in inspiring the tone of various filmic productions.

Of country and country: twang and trauma in Australian Indigenous popular music

Simon Philpott

Over the last half century, as part of a wider struggle for recognition, respect, reconciliation and justice, Indigenous Australians and others supporting their claims have increasingly been heard in popular music. Indigenous musicians are increasingly insistent that white Australia must change.

Musical theatre and politics

Dennis Altman

The musical is in some ways the most significant contribution of the United States to theatre. Musicals have long been a space for considerable political expression, which is often overlooked in the tendency to view them as no more than light popular entertainments.

Fairness and citizenship

Lasse Nielsen and Kristian Kriegbaum Jensen

The Danish requirements for citizenship are often grounded on an ideal about rewarding personal effort and responsibility. A similar ideal is known from luck egalitarianism, a widely known and accepted theory of justice. This article unfolds a luck egalitarian argument in defence of the Danish requirements and investigates, in light of this argument, whether the requirements relevantly reflect effort and responsibility. The article concludes dismissively and offers a number of ways of improving Danish citizenship policy in terms of fairness.

"Denmark belongs to the Danes": Right-wing populist discourse in Denmark

Silas L. Marker

This paper examines the phenomenon of right-wing populism in Denmark in the year of 2019 by applying qualitative discourse analysis to a sample of central public texts from the right-wing populist parties New Right and The Danish People's Party. Both parties utilize populist discourse by constructing a popular bloc ("the people") stabilized by its constitutive outside: The elite and the Muslim immigrants. However, the discourses of the two parties differ from each other insofar as New Right articulates the strongest antagonism between the people and the elite, while The Danish People's Party downplays this antagonism, most likely because the party has a central power position in Danish politics.