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TEMA:
POPULISME: KRITISKE REFLEKSIONER
OVER ET GLOBALT FÆNOMEN

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Formål

Politik er et tværfagligt samfundsvidenskabeligt tidsskrift, der bringer artikler om politik ud fra mangfoldige akademiske perspektiver. Redaktionen lægger vægt på *faglighed* sikret gennem anonym refereebedømmelse, *formidling*, som gør Politik tilgængelig uden for universitetets mure, og endelig *politisk relevans*.
Tidsskriftet Politik er en videreførelse af Politologiske Studier.

TEMA:

POPULISME: KRITISKE REFLEKSIONER OVER ET GLOBALT FÆNOMEN

Introduction: Populism in the 21st Century: Critical reflections on a global phenomenon

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Thus far, the 21st century has ushered in a period of high volatility in established political systems across the world. The current climate of political instability is, in many ways, the result of longer-term trends coming to a head. Rising social inequality, increased migration flows, and technological advancements in industrial production have driven a neo-liberal, globalized economy that has altered the power structures of advanced and developing countries alike (Kriesi 2013). Poverty and unemployment have risen, national populations are more diverse than ever before, and urban concentration threatens the prosperity and sustainability of rural regions. The changing social and political landscape, compounded by more recent developments like international terrorism and global financial crises, has proven a difficult terrain for national governments to effectively navigate when responding to popular grievances (Held 2006).

Filling the void, new challengers to the political arena have emerged. They chastise the failures of mainstream elites and offer alternative, controversial agendas. Taking the form of political parties but also social movements, these outsiders hail from across the political spectrum and claim to represent the sovereign will of the people. Today, the so-called 'populists' are garnering unprecedented media attention and electoral support in nearly every corner of the globe.

In Europe, the results of the 2014 European Parliament elections were largely interpreted as a populist backlash, giving rise to the success of Eurosceptic parties. At the domestic level, right-wing populist parties have garnered a parliamentary foothold – and in some cases governmental power – in countries across Western, Northern, and Eastern Europe. Typically, this right-wing variety of populism incorporates a cultural dimension that advocates restricting immigration and advances traditional, conservative values (Mudde 2013). Expressions of European right-wing populism include the Front National in France, Alternative für Deutschland in Germany, and the Danish People's Party in Denmark, but the phenomenon is far from limited to parliamentary politics. Social

movements like PEGIDA and the Soldiers of Odin are likewise regarded as representatives of right-wing populism. The left-wing variety of populism, meanwhile, is most prevalent in Southern Europe and is generally couched in economic terms, for example in rejection of EU austerity measures in response to the Eurozone crisis (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014). Here, the most notable examples include SYRIZA in Greece, Podemos in Spain, and to some extent also Alternativet in Denmark (Husted and Hansen 2017).

The populist phenomenon, however, is by no means limited to Europe. In the United States, both right- and left-wing populist manifestations can be observed in factions of the Republican and Democratic parties, respectively. The election of Donald Trump confirmed the appeal of a right-wing populist message to the American electorate, while the 'Economic Populism' of Democrats like Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren resonates with leftist voters concerned with social inequality (The Economist 2017). In Latin America, the history of left-wing populism is rich and spearheaded by leaders like Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Juan Perón in Argentina, and Evo Morales in Bolivia (Hawkins 2009). The populist label has also been applied to contemporary Asia-Pacific leaders like Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines, Shinzō Abe of Japan, Narendra Modi of India, and Pauline Hanson of Australia (Moffitt 2016; Chacko and Jayasuriya 2017).

The sheer diversity of contexts to which the term 'populism' has been applied begs the question: What is populism, exactly? The term was first used in the United States in connection with the People's Party: a short-lived, left-wing political party borne out of agrarian unrest in the American South at the end of the 19th century (Goodwyn 1976). However, populist manifestations extend much further back in time than the etymology of the term itself. In fact, we can trace populism as far back as the Ancient Greeks and the iron-fisted, Athenian general Cleon in 400BC. Cleon was the first common citizen to join the Athenian political class, and he regularly accused the political elite of putting rhetoric and sophistry ahead of fair judgment, which was better exercised by "ordinary men" (see, for example, The Mytilenean Debate in Thucydides, *History* 3.37). In the interim between then and now, several transformative political actors and events throughout history share elements of populism: Robespierre and the French Revolution, the American Federalists and the signing of the Declaration of Independence, Hitler and the Völkisch Movement underpinning the Weimar Republic. In each case, a socially constructed 'people' were placed in contrast with the existing ruling elite, and significant political transformations followed suit.

From the examples outlined above, populism is seemingly a truly global phenomenon and a recurring feature of history. However, just within the past decade the concept of populism has received a resurgence of attention in the academic literature, particularly – but not exclusively – among European scholars. To introduce readers of this volume to some of the existing understandings of populism, we outline four theoretical perspectives on the concept below (for a more exhaustive list, see Pappas 2016).

Table 1: Overview of the most prominent perspectives on populism.

Perspective	Main characteristics	Key theorists
Populism as an ideology	Populism is an ideology that considers society split into two homogeneous groups: the pure people vs. the corrupt elite. However, it is a *thin* ideology because it lacks political consistency and attaches itself to *thick* ideologies like liberalism or socialism.	Cas Mudde Christóbal Kaltwasser Margaret Canovan
Populism as a style	Populism is a style of political representation that includes the discursive content of what politicians say, as well as the performative elements that accompany discourse, for example: rhetorical devices, gestures, staging, attire, accents, and mannerisms. Populists appeal to 'the people', talk or act in unconventional ways, and conjure a sense of crisis through political performances.	Benjamin Moffitt Simon Tormey Michael Bossetta
Populism as a movement	Populism is an undemocratic movement that primarily exists on the right side of the political spectrum. It is characterized as anti-pluralist in the sense that its proponents see themselves as the only representatives of the 'true' people and excludes those who do not belong to this category. Populism should be fought with liberal democratic means.	Jan-Werner Müller Robert Jansen
Populism as a logic	Populism is a logic of articulation that unifies political identities in equivalential chains against a common adversary. The adversary is often known as 'the elite' or 'the establishment', but this is not a given. Populism is *not* a distinct trait of particular movements or parties, but an integral part of *all* political projects. As such, the end of populism coincides with the end of politics.	Ernesto Laclau Chantal Mouffe David Howarth

The preeminent view among academics is that populism is best conceptualized as an ideology (Canovan 2002; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013), although more recently scholars have argued that populism is better approached as a political style (Moffitt and Tormey 2014; Bossetta 2017), a political movement (Jansen 2011; Müller, 2016), or a logic of articulation (Laclau 2005; Mouffe 2005; Howarth 2007). In the table above, we have outlined the main characteristics of these four perspectives, in an effort to supply the reader with a – somewhat simplified – overview of the literature on populism before embarking on the forthcoming articles.

As this overview shows, the four perspectives share some similarities. For instance, all four hold that populism establishes some kind of antagonistic relationship between people and elite – or, at least between 'underdog' and 'topdog'. That said, there are also several major differences, revolving around questions like: Is populism limited to one side of the political spectrum? Are some ideological elements axiomatic to all expressions of populism? Is populism compatible with democracy? Should we try to eliminate populism, or is it an integral part of the democratic process? Such disagreements have led some observers to question the concept's usefulness, based on the grounds that populism lacks any kind of positive content (see Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013). While we acknowledge the need to specify populism in positive terms and refine the concept's analytical utility, we also posit that the diversity of populism theories provides fertile ground for developing innovative, comparative research designs that can yield empirical discovery. The plurality of approaches to the concept allows researchers to compare an array of different empirical cases, while also allowing for multiple views on the same phenomenon. And if that is not constitutive of healthy scientific and/or democratic debate, then what is?

Outline of the special issue

At the outset of this special issue, we asked the authors to engage critically with the concept of populism, and each of the contributions accomplishes this task. Through a variety of novel theoretical and empirical perspectives, the articles raise a number of provoking arguments that challenge longstanding assumptions about populism. While some articles, such as Allan Dreyer Hansen's piece on populism as an articulatory logic and the interview with Jan-Werner Müller (conducted by Niels Boel, Carsten Jensen, and André Sonnichsen), are driven by theoretical aspirations, they still draw on a range of empirical examples to support their claims. The other articles – Jørgen Bæk Simonsen's piece on Islamic populism, Kristoffer Holt and André Haller's piece on PEGIDA's relationship with mainstream media, and Lazaros Karavasilis' piece on right-wing populism in the Greek public sphere – analyze distinct empirical phenomena but still engage critically with the concept of populism. We hope that, through reading the diverse range of empirical cases, theoretical approaches, and research designs included in this issue, the reader will get a better sense of what populism actually *is* but

also – and perhaps more importantly – be inspired to pursue his or her own study of populism within other disciplines and in other empirical contexts. In the following, we will provide a brief description of each of the five articles:

Article 1 by **Allan Dreyer Hansen** (2017) revisits Laclau's seminal theory of populism as a political logic of articulation. From the outset, Hansen questions the notion that populism is necessarily undemocratic, which has been advanced most recently by Jan-Werner Müller (see interview in this issue). Hansen does so by conducting an illustrative analysis of the 1934 Danish Social Democrats' party program, 'Danmark for Folket' (Denmark for the People), which marked a corner stone in the history of the party. With this program, the Social Democrats went from being a class-party focused on the working class to becoming a mass-party focused on the people as a whole. The Social Democrats would remain Denmark's largest party for the rest of the century, thus playing a key role in the constitution of what is today known as the Nordic welfare state. It may seem surprising to use precisely this program as an illustration of populism in action, but Hansen's point is that populism should not be understood as a particular ideology or movement, but as the practice of unifying political identities in equivalential chains against a common adversary. This is done by organizing the chain of political identities around an 'empty signifier' (i.e. a signifier without a signified). In the case of the Social Democrats, the empty signifier is the notion of 'the people', which is positioned in an agonistic relationship with 'Capital'. All political projects, regardless of ideological affiliations, employ this practice to a greater or lesser extent. Hence, the more general point in Hansen's article is that populism is present in varying degrees in all kinds of politics (even in the most technocratic and institutionalized political projects), which is why it makes little sense to conceive of populism as undemocratic *par excellence.*

Article 2 by **Jørgen Bæk Simonsen** (2017) departs from the intriguing question: If populism is conceived as an anti-pluralist phenomenon emerging in reaction to 'the establishment', does it then only exist in pluralist and democratic societies, or is it possible to detect populist tendencies in less democratic contexts? In other words, does it make sense to speak of populism in more totalitarian societies? Simonsen's answer is clearly affirmative. To illustrate this point, Simonsen takes the reader on a historical journey through 20th century Egypt and Iran. In the case of Egypt, he shows that the success of *The Muslim Brotherhood* in the 1930's and 1940's was very much predicated on the persistent articulation of 'true' and 'authentic' Muslim values in opposition to the more secular values that dominated Egypt society in the wake of British colonialization. Similarly, in the case of Iran, the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini can likewise be interpreted as a successful attempt at splitting Iranian society into two antagonistic camps: Supporters of the secular Shah dynasty vs. supporters of Khomeini's Islamic program. While the former group was framed as traitors and Western lackeys, the latter was described as the 'authentic' people of Iran, thus providing Khomeini with a pretext for instigating the revolt against the Shah in 1979. These two examples serve to illustrate that, although

populism may be a relatively modern phenomenon, it does not require a democratic and pluralist set-up to flourish.

Article 3 by **Kristoffer Holt and André Haller** (2017) casts its empirical gaze on the social media communication of the PEGIDA movement and offers a comparative analysis of PEGIDA Facebook pages in four countries: Germany, Austria, Norway, and Sweden. In particular, Holt and Haller set out to investigate how these national PEGIDA chapters used Facebook to criticize the mainstream media as 'Lügenpresse' (the 'lying press') at the height of the refugee crisis in 2015. The authors find that in all four countries, the PEGIDA movement expresses a deep skepticism of the mainstream media. However, interestingly and going against their original hypothesis, the authors also find that PEGIDA references the media affirmatively. That is, PEGIDA will positively reference and disseminate mainstream media content on Facebook when it supports PEGIDA's own position on immigration or migrants. Holt and Haller's comparative analysis also detects significant differences in how the national chapters use social media to reference traditional media outlets. The Swedish Facebook page, for instance, differs from the other three in that it rarely contests the media but, when it does, tends to do so by linking indirectly to alternative media sites. In Germany, Austria, and Norway, PEGIDA Facebook pages tended to reference mainstream media more often and directly attack specific statements included in their articles. The analysis also uncovers differences in terms of PEGIDA's affirmative references to mainstream media online. PEGIDA's German and Austrian chapters were aimed at confirming their position or legitimizing the movement, whereas in Sweden and Norway the Facebook pages were more used to promote events or engage with supporters. The findings ultimately suggest that PEGIDA has a selective relationship with the mainstream media on Facebook, and not all references degrade the media as 'Lügenpresse'.

Article 4 by **Lazaros Karavasilis** (2017) centers on the interesting question: when emerging as a left-wing phenomenon, how is populism framed in right-wing, alternative media spaces online? Karavasilis explores the Greek discourse about populism through a study of the website 'Anti-news', which hosts opinions from anonymous contributors ranging from center- to extreme-right. Finding that references to populism on the site have dramatically increased from 2010-2016 in the wake of the European economic crisis, Karavasilis shows that that the right-wing in Greece has taken up an elitist position of 'anti-populism'. Running counter to most European conceptions of populism, the article argues that in Greece, the populism promoted by left-wing parties such as SYRIZA is interpreted by the right as non-progressive and subversive to 'common sense': pursuing a liberal economic development through closer ties with the European Union. Interestingly, Karavasilis argues that right-wing 'anti-populists' in Greece view left-wing populism as traditional and anachronistic. At the same time, anti-populists consider a return to ethnocentrism and state regulation the primary means to counteract populism and modernize Greece in the 21st century economy. The article raises provoking questions about whether nativism is a defining feature of populism or, if notions of national identity can be used by anti-populists to promote a progressive agenda.

Article 5 is based on an interview with **Jan-Werner Müller**, conducted by **Niels Boel, Carsten Jensen, and André Sonnichsen** in Vienna (Boel et al., 2017). Throughout the interview, Müller sustains his core argument that populism is an undemocratic and anti-pluralist movement spearheaded and personified by politicians like Donald Trump, Marine Le Pen, and Viktor Orbán. According to Müller, populism is exclusionary and, thus, anti-pluralist in at least two ways. First, it is exclusionary against the elites, because populists refuse to recognize the moral legitimacy of other political candidates, and because 'the elite' always serves as the number one scapegoat in populist rhetoric. Müller refers to this as the populist claim to a 'monopoly of representation'. Secondly, populism is exclusionary against common people who do not share the views of the populist. These people, Müller claims, risk having their status as part of 'the people' revoked by the populist – the most obvious example being Trump's verbal attacks on 'all other people' but the real people. At different points during the interview, Müller is asked to ponder the difference between right-wing and left-wing populism. While he maintains that populism is far more prevalent on the right, he does not deny the possibility of a left-wing populism, citing Chavez as the most prominent example. However, contrary to theorists like Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, he does not see left-wing populism as a vehicle for challenging the hegemony of neo-liberalism and revitalizing liberal democracy. As he puts it: "Populism is always detrimental to democracy".

Taken together, the five articles included here illustrate the level of diversity that currently characterizes the state of populism research. The works differ in their theoretical understanding of populism as well as the empirical cases studied: ranging from authoritarian Egypt in the 1900's to consolidated democracies in contemporary Europe. Some critics might argue that the range of perspectives and cases included in this issue serve to dilute the analytical utility of populism scholarship. As editors, we would argue the opposite: that a broad and inclusive understanding of populism yields exciting avenues for innovative, comparative research. As a grand theory of populism seems unlikely to emerge in the near future, and charges of populism as an empty signifier continue to mount, we wish to encourage scholars to embrace the void and engage openly (and critically) with the concept as a means to shed light on existing social, cultural, and political phenomena. Populism is but one lens that attempts to ascertain the complexity of modern day politics. It is neither a sufficient cause nor reducible effect of this complexity. Nevertheless, critical reflections regarding how populism can help make sense of political phenomena – or not – are useful to further our understanding of contemporary political processes in the 21st century.

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Folket eksisterer ikke
– derfor har vi populisme.
Om Laclaus populismeteori

Af Allan Dreyer Hansen, lektor, Institut for Samfundsvidenskab og Erhverv, Roskilde Universitet

Artiklen er en diskussion af Ernesto Laclaus populismeteori. I denne forstås populisme ikke som et velafgrænset fænomen, men derimod som et sæt af logikker, der primært indebærer en konstruktion af 'folket' i antagonistisk modsætning til 'eliten'. Laclaus teori diskuteres i forhold til Socialdemokratiets berømte program Danmark for Folket fra 1934 og kontrasteres med Jan-Werner Müllers teori om populisme. Artiklens konklusion er, at demokrati og populisme ikke har nødvendige relationer. Populisme kan med andre ord både være en styrkelse af og en trussel imod demokrati.

Populisme er på dagsordenen igen, og hovedindtrykket herhjemme såvel som i Nordeuropa generelt er, at populisme er en trussel. Eksempelvis har den tidligere formand for EU-kommissionen, José Manuel Barroso, udpeget populisme som sin alvorligste bekymring (Barroso 2013; Cendrowitz 2012), ligesom at den nuværende formand, Jean-Claude Juncker, i sin tale om Unionens tilstand snakkede om "populismens vinde som de europæiske demokratier ikke måtte bøje sig for" (Juncker 2016), og en radiovært på P1 Morgen talte om, hvordan de tre valg i hhv. Storbritannien (Brexit), Italien (om forfatningen) og præsidentvalget i Frankrig kunne være "dominobrikker der vælter på populismens alter" (P1 Morgen 2016). Dette er dog primært en (nord)europæisk tendens, og i både USA og Latinamerika og til dels også i Sydeuropa finder man mere positive vurderinger. Eksempelvis hævdede den tidligere præsident Obama, at han og ikke Trump er populist (CBSN 2016; generelt for denne forskel mellem kontinenterne, se Stavrakakis og Katsambekis 2014; Stavrakakis 2015). I akademiet er populismediskussionen også tilbage. Bortset fra at den normativt nedsættende vurdering også er dominerende her, er det centrale kendetegn for debatterne fraværet af enighed om, hvad det egentlig er, man diskuterer. Åbningen af akademiske analyser med påpegning af, at det er en kliche, at populisme er et fænomen, der undviger bestemmelse, er nærmest selv blevet en kliche.

I denne artikel vil jeg udfolde Laclaus populismeteori[1]. Som det vil fremgå, er Laclaus helt grundlæggende pointe, at vi skal tænke populisme som en politisk *logik*, der kan være til stede i større eller mindre grad, men som aldrig forsvinder helt. Populisme skal derfor ikke ses som et marginalt, afvigende fænomen, men som en basal del af al politisk praksis (Laclau 2005a; 2005b). Laclau er valgt, fordi hans bidrag stadig er det mest overbevisende. Jeg følger ham dog ikke hele vejen. For det første hævder han, at populisme har en onto-logisk kvalitet, hvilket er noget, jeg ikke mener (Hansen 2014).[2] Det har imidlertid kun begrænset konkret effekt i forhold til populismebegrebet som sådan. Derfor vil denne kritik ikke fylde meget. For det andet synes Laclau at hævde, at populisme er demokratisk positivt i sig selv (fx Laclau 2006; Clausen 2001).[3] Det, mener jeg, er problematisk. Jeg følger Laclau i, at der ikke er noget nødvendigt normativt negativt ved populisme som sådan. Folkets genkomst i politik kan være tegn på en tiltrængt demokratisering; men erfaringerne viser også, at populisme kan gives udemokratiske udtryk, og vi må derfor fastholde demokrati som en åben dimension, der må inddrages i vurderingen af konkrete tilfælde af populisme.

Artiklen er opbygget på den måde, at jeg efter en lidt bredere introduktion folder Laclaus relativt komplekse populismeteori ud i dens enkeltelementer. I forbindelse her-med vil jeg punktvist relatere Laclaus position til en alternativ populismeteori, nemlig Jan-Werner Müllers (2014; 2015; 2016b; 2016a). Når Müller er valgt, skyldes det primært hans udbredelse i den bredere offentlige debat ikke mindst herhjemme, og at der er et interview med ham i dette temanummer af *Politik*. Han er samtidig nok den p.t. mest rendyrkede fortaler for en normativ fordømmelse af populisme, hvilket netop er den po-sition, jeg ønsker at kritisere.[4] Meget kort fortalt hævder Müller, at populisme er karak-teriseret ved en moralsk påstand om, at "vi – og kun vi – repræsenterer det sande folk" (Müller 2015, 4; 2016b, 19). Fordi der abonneres på et sandt folk, er populisme antiplu-ralistisk og antidemokratisk. Populisme er, når en 'del af folket' fremstiller sig som hele folket i betydningen det sande og moralsk rene folk, og dermed ekskluderer den ikke-sande, umoralske del af folket. Hans gennemgående eksempler er folk som Trump, Orbán og Erdogan, der alle meget eksplicit udpeger bestemte befolkningsgrupper, som ikke hø-rer til. Müller er bestemt en mere udtømmende diskussion værd, men af pladshensyn må jeg begrænse mig til enkelte nedslag. Det drejer sig om selve hans populismedefinition,

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1 Laclau beskæftigede sig med populisme gennem hele sin karriere (Laclau 1977; 1980; 1985; 2005a; 2005b).

2 Laclau og Mouffe har argumenteret for, at det politiske har ontologisk primat. Med det mener de, at sociale forhold altid er *indstiftede* under konfliktuelle, i deres sprogbrug, *antagonistiske* betingelser. I sine analyser af populisme går Laclau yderligere et skridt videre og hævder, at populisme er ontologisk primært i forhold til politik. Populisme bliver på den måde ontologisk primært for alle sociale forhold. Da jeg afviser politikkens primat (Hansen 2014) er det klart, at jeg ikke accepterer populismens heller. Jeg accepterer ikke engang den begrænsede tese, at den er primær i forhold til politik. Der findes andre politikformer end po-pulistiske, omend Laclau har stærke argumenter for, at langt de fleste (moderne) former indeholder ele-menter af populistisk logik (jf. også Arditi 2010).

3 I en tidligere tekst var hans normative vurdering faktisk ikke helt så positiv; Laclau 1985, 40-42.

4 Teoretisk og empirisk er der andre bud på populismedefinitioner, der faktisk virker mere overbevisende end Müllers, fx Mudde og Kaltwasser (2012).

og ikke mindst hvad den *ikke* indfanger, nemlig venstrepopulistiske artikulationer. Dernæst drejer det sig om påstanden om den nødvendige moralske fordømmelse og sidst hans blindhed overfor nødvendigheden af grænsedragninger for *enhver* politisk bevægelse og orden. Jeg diskuterer disse punkter, hvor det passer bedst i artiklen, men min samlede konklusion er, at populisme ikke *som sådan* er demokratisk problematisk, hvilket jeg udfolder i konklusionen.

Jeg inddrager løbende Socialdemokratiets berømte partiprogram *Danmark for Folket* (fremover *DFF*) (Socialdemokratiet 2016 [1934]) som eksempel på de teoretiske pointer. Som det vil fremgå, er påstanden ikke, at *DFF* er udtryk for rendyrket populisme. Men eksemplet er valgt, både fordi det er et ganske centralt stykke dansk politisk historie, og fordi det faktisk er ganske eksemplarisk i forhold til Laclaus populismebegreb. Som det måske er bekendt, er programmet fra 1933 og førte sammen med den efterfølgende kampagne i forbindelse med folketingsvalget i 1935 til den største valgsejr i Socialdemokratiets historie. Flere kommentatorer har påpeget, hvordan programmet markerer overgangen i selvforståelsen i Socialdemokratiet(s top) fra et arbejderparti til et folkeparti (Korsgaard 2001, Bryld 1976). Den ændring er uden tvivl en betingelse for den senere udvikling af velfærdsstaten, men som Bryld (2004) har gjort opmærksom på, er der ikke nogen idé om en velfærdsstat, som vi kender den, i *DFF.* Langsigtet var målet stadig et brud med den nuværende kapitalistiske samfund og indførelsen af et socialistisk. Mange af de normative kritikere af populisme vil ganske givet finde det provokerende at hævde, at et afgørende partiprogram fra landets ledende kraft i opbygningen af velfærdsstaten var (overvejende) populistisk. Men refleksion over hvorfor det er provokerende at kalde det populistisk og ikke blot, som Korsgaard, udpege socialdemokratiet til at være "det virkelige folkeparti" (Korsgaard 2001, 422) er en væsentlig del af formålet med denne artikel. For god ordens skyld skal det påpeges, at jeg bruger programmet som eksempel. Der ikke er tale om en egentlig analyse af Socialdemokratiets projekt i denne periode. Det ville både kræve mere plads og ikke mindst inddragelse af meget andet materiale.

Populisme: Ideologi, bevægelse eller logik?

I forlængelse af Laclaus (og hans partner, Chantal Mouffes) generelle diskursteori (Laclau og Mouffe 1985; Laclau 1990; 2005a) hævder Laclau, at populisme er en logik, og dermed ikke et veldefineret fænomen eller velafgrænset objekt. Som han påpeger er det, på trods af begrebets centralitet, uklart, hvad der refereres til "when we call a movement (?), an ideology (?), a political practice (?), populist… [T]o call them populist would involve differentiating that attribute from other characterisations at the same defining level, such as 'fascist', 'liberal', 'communist', etc." (Laclau 2005a, 32). Men ifølge ham er det i sidste ende umuligt at finde "that ultimate redoubt where we would find 'pure' populism, irreducible to those other alternative characterisations" (Laclau 2005a, 32). Dette er ikke bare Laclaus påstand. Som det hedder i en klassisk antologi om populisme fra 1969:

"There … can be no doubt about the *importance* of populism. But no one is quite clear just what it *is*." (Ionescu og Gellner 1969, 1).

Overordnet kan man skelne mellem to typer af forsøg på at svare på spørgsmålet om populismens definerende attributter. Den ene starter empirisk og prøver at opliste alle de karakteristika, man kan finde, der beskriver populisme. Fx fremlagde P. Wiles 24 forskellige forhold, der angiveligt kendetegnede populisme. Men han måtte derefter selv indrømme af ingen af dem kunne siges at gå igen i alle populismer (Wiles 1969, 171f; se også Canovans (1982) første analyser af populismer og Laclaus (2005a, 5f) kritik).

Den modsatte strategi har været teoretisk at begrunde visse træk og definere populisme i forlængelse heraf. To eksempler viser problemerne med denne strategi. Det første er at knytte populisme til en særlig historisk problematik, typisk ved at hævde, at populisme opstår i overgangen fra et traditionelt til et moderne samfund (Pappas 2016, 4; Panizza 2005, 3). Men med populismens genkomst i USA og nylige udbredelse i Europa må den forklaring afvises (omend relationen mellem sociale opbrud og populisme er centralt, som vi skal se). Hvad der ikke kan fastholdes er, at populisme skulle være knyttet til "tilbagestående" samfund (Panizza 2005, 4f).

Et andet eksempel, som er centralt i denne sammenhæng, er en marxistisk tilgang. Ikke mindst fordi det er den tradition, Laclau og Mouffe selv kommer fra, og netop problemet med at lede politiske bevægelser tilbage til 'dybereliggende' klassepositioner, var det, der fik dem til at bevæge sig ud af marxismen. Men også fordi diskussionen af populismens eventuelle klassebasis altid har spillet og faktisk stadig spiller en central rolle i de generelle populismediskussioner (for en overraskende ny artikulation af denne position, se Koulinka og Fukuyama 2017). Som det er velkendt, er marxismen en teori om, at det er de økonomisk baserede klasser, der er de egentlige sociale aktører. De sociale klasser er objektive størrelser, givet på et ontologisk dybere niveau, og de eksisterer og virker derfor uanset, hvordan de sociale aktører selv forstår deres kampe og relationer. I forhold til populisme betyder det for det første, at den må have en klassebase. Den har ofte været tænkt som småborgerskabet, der er presset af den kapitalistiske udvikling (se fx Fryklund og Peterson 1981). Denne forklaringsmodel kan i et vist omfang bruges på de tidlige populistiske bevægelser i 1800-tallet og fx Fremskridtspartiet i Danmark i 1970'erne. Men den har store problemer i forhold til populismen i Latinamerika i midten af 1900-tallet, der i vid udstrækning var baseret på urbane arbejdere (Laclau 1977; Panizza 2005), ligesom der er mange arbejdere der støtter højrepopulistiske bevægelser i nutidens Europa og USA. Skal populisme derfor indfanges med et traditionelt marxistisk klassebegreb, må sådan en opbakning henføres til 'falsk bevidsthed', og den politiske vurdering af populisme er selvfølgelig entydigt negativ (fx Mouzelis 1985).[5]

Et tredje eksempel er Jan-Werner Müller, der som nævnt definerer populisme som en moralsk skelnen mellem en del af folket, der udpeges som det rigtige folk, og en del,

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5 For en nylig version af en marxistisk kritik se Zizek (2006), hvor han anklager populisme for at være 'kryptofascistisk'. Det skyldes primært, at lederen i populisme er ikke underlagt 'ideen' som tilfældet angiveligt skulle være i den kommunistiske bevægelse. Laclau har efter min mening leveret et ganske overbevisende svar til Zizek (Laclau 2006).

der ikke er det. Hans position er faktisk interessant, fordi han i udgangspunktet afviser en række tidligere, tvivlsomme, påstande om populisme, nemlig bestemte vælgere (fx små-borgere), socialpsykologiske profiler eller en vis 'politisk stil' (Müller 2016b, 76). Andetsteds uddyber han:

> "So how should we think about populism instead, then? Populism, I suggest, is a particular *moralistic imagination of politics*, a way of perceiving the political world which places in opposition a morally pure and fully unified people against small minorities, elites in particular, who are placed outside the authentic people… In other words, 'the people' is not really what it appears to be, prima facie, in its empirical entirety, or what might seem, on the basis of voting or other political procedures, to be the 'popular will'". (Müller 2015, 4)

Men der er et afgørende problem i Müllers definition. Ud over at han aldrig rigtigt viser, hvordan han når frem til definitionen, om den er empirisk eller teoretisk genereret, er det overordnede problem det, den *ikke* indfanger som populisme. Der er ingen tvivl om, at der kan findes populistiske bevægelser og ledere, der lever op til Müllers definition, ikke mindst de eksempler han selv giver. Problemet er, at det udelukker alle de bevægelser, der *ikke* baserer sig på en moralsk fordømmelse, fx Sanders i USA, Podemos i Spanien og Syriza i Grækenland, men også en lang række af historiske eksempler, inkl. *DFF*.

Spørgsmålet, der må stilles, er: Hvis de ikke er populister, hvad er de så? Her har Müller ikke noget svar. Begrænsningen i Müllers perspektiv viser sig bl.a. ved, at han – helt eksplicit – ikke skelner mellem højre- og venstrepopulisme (Müller 2015). Men hans generelle definition af populisme svarer fx til Judis' karakteristik af *højre*populisme (Judis 2016a; 2016b). Judis påpeger, at det, der kendetegner højrepopulisme, er, at den er triadisk. Det vil sige, at den ud over en antagonisme mellem folk og elite, under- og over-hund, også udpeger en del 'underhunde', som indtrængende, fremmedlegemer etc. De skylder som regel eliten deres tilstedeværelse (jf. fx Dansk Folkepartis kritik af 'Over-danmark' og 'EU-eliten'). Med andre ord begår Müller en klassisk definitorisk fejl og opløfter et kontingent karaktertræk fra visse (højre)populismer til det egentlige, fælles karakteristikum. Hermed er det heller ikke svært at forstå, hvorfor liberale- og vestrefløjs-tænkere gør populisme som sådan til genstand for normativ fordømmelse.

Før vi går videre bør det bemærkes, at der i den senere tid har bredt sig en opfattelse af, at der alligevel er etableret konsensus omkring en (minimal) definition af populisme som specifik 'tyndø ideologi (Mudde og Kaltwasser 2012, 8; Deiwiks 2009). Jeg er ikke overbevist, men kan desværre ikke forfølge diskussionen yderligere her.[6]

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6 Laclau har fået en overraskende støtte fra en helt anden – positivistisk, kvantitativ – lejr. Aslanidis (2016) argumenterer for, at populisme er en logik, der forekommer i grader, i modsætning til ideologier, der er kendetegnet ved enten-eller. Hans argumenter er i det store og hele sunde. Eneste problem i denne sammenhæng er, at hans teoretiske udgangspunkt, en social virkelighed der kan gøres til genstand for begrebslig tilegnelse gennem kvantitativ analyse, strider grundlæggende mod det verdensbillede, Laclaus teori er baseret på.

Laclaus teori om populisme

Som resten af Laclaus teoribygning er hans populismeteori (2005a; 2005b) kompleks og relativt svært tilgængelig. Jeg folder den derfor ud i 9 punkter og gennemgår dem i rækkefølge. Ifølge Laclau er populisme ikke et objekt eller 'fænomen', men derimod:

> 1) en form for politik, en artikulatorisk logik (forskellig fra en modsatrettet logik), og derfor
> 2) et gradsspørgsmål, der
> 3) i perioder med dybere kriser
> 4) konstruerer en folkelig pol, som
> 5) i antagonistisk modsætning til eliten/magtblokken, gør
> 6) en række forskellige krav og identiteter ækvivalente vis-a-vis magten, hvormed den skaber
> 7) en særlig politisk identitet (et identifikations-tilbud), som
> 8) lader sig repræsentere gennem et tendentielt tomt symbol (en "tom betegner"), som ofte er
> 9) navnet på lederen.

Lad os tage dem skridt for skridt.

En artikulatorisk logik

I stedet for at levere endnu en 'positiv' definition af populisme er Laclaus strategi at se populisme som en specifik form for politik, en 'diskursiv artikulatorisk logik' (Laclau 2005a, 106; 2005b: 33- 4). At der er tale om en diskursiv artikulation betyder ikke, at der er tale om et overfladefænomen, fx simpel retorik. At noget er diskursivt artikuleret betyder, at det får sin form af den sammenhæng, det indgår i, af de øvrige elementer, det kædes sammen med (Laclau og Mouffe 1985). Forskellen til marxismens klassebegreb er derfor tydelig. Arbejderklassen i marxismen er præcis ikke afhængig af de kontingente historiske relationer, den måtte indgå i. Den forbliver den samme, uanset om den faktisk indgår i bredere alliancer på et givet tidspunkt.

Som nævnt er Laclau og Mouffe via Gramsci nået frem til, at denne forestilling om sociale aktører ikke kan fastholdes. De relationer, som en given social kraft (der ikke behøver at have en klasseidentitet) indgår i, foregår ikke på et overbygningsniveau. De modificerer de involverede identiteter. Det var præcis den erkendelse, der fik Gramsci til at tale om 'kollektive viljer' snarere end klasser (Gramsci 1971). Laclau og Mouffe generaliserede den indsigt og påpegede, at der ikke er noget, der bare er (hvad det er). *Alt* er artikuleret og dermed modificeret af at indgå i visse relationer, snarere end andre, der også var mulige på et givet tidspunkt (Laclau og Mouffe 1985; for introduktioner se Hansen 2005; 2017). Det betyder ikke, at alt altid kan artikuleres med alt andet, men der er

ikke nogen principielle eller rettere mere basale ontologiske grænser for artikulation. Ingen forhold har en ikke-artikulerbar kerne eller essens.

Den artikulatoriske logik viser sig tydeligst, når de sociale forhold bliver 'rystede', når man ikke bare kan fortsætte, som man plejer. Laclaus begreb for sådanne rystelser er *dislokation* (Laclau 1990, 5f) Pointen er, at når et socialt forhold bliver 'rystet', dislokeret, opstår der behov for nye artikulationer, dvs. svar på hvordan sådanne dislokationer overkommes. Der vil som regel være flere bud på, hvad de bedste løsninger er, og derfor er der et konfliktuelt element involveret i artikulation helt op til, at selve den gamle orden, den, der er rystet eller dislokeret, er problemet og må erstattes af noget nyt. Som vi skal se, er populisme præcis et forsøg på en sådan radikal re-artikulering, der problematiserer den rystede orden.

To typer artikulatorisk logik

Debatten om populisme viser os tydeligt fraværet af essens. For Laclau er populisme det tydeligste eksempel på en specifik type af artikulatorisk logik, den såkaldt ækvivalente. Jeg folder det mere ud nedenfor, men overordnet er en ækvivalent logik en, der bidrager til, at forskelle udviskes. De enkelte elementer, der kædes sammen, bliver i højere grad ens, de kan skiftes ud for hinanden, i fælles modsætning til noget, de *ikke* er. Til forskel fra en ækvivalent logik har vi en såkaldt forskels- eller differentiel logik (Laclau og Mouffe 1985, 127f). Den er kendetegnet ved, at de enkelte størrelser kædes sammen side om side og bevarer deres særtræk. Laclau omtaler denne logik som institutionel, og i forhold til politik ses den i fx velfærdsstaten, hvor (logikken er) at der ikke er nogen krav eller politikker som ikke (i princippet) kan inkluderes og imødekommes. Men logikken kan også findes i fx klientelisme (Laclau 1997, 130; 2005a, 123).

Der er altså to væsentlige forskelle mellem en differentiel og ækvivalent logik, eller mellem populisme og institutionaliseret politik. Den første er, at i differenslogikken udpeges der ikke (eksplicit) en modstander, som per definition ikke kan inkluderes. Derimod er der ækvivalens mellem enkelte størrelser baseret på deres fælles (negative) relation til det, der truer dem alle. Som følge heraf er den anden, at de enkelte krav og politikker i institutionaliseret politik bevarer deres identitet. En ækvivalent relation er derimod udviskningen af særtræk, så det enkelte led kan skiftes ud for de andre. I institutionaliseret politik kan man behandle miljø- og kulturproblemer relativt adskilt; i en populistisk brudsituation vil alle de forskellige krav tendere mod at repræsentere den samme utilfredshed med den herskende orden.

I min læsning er *DFF* et paradigmatisk eksempel på en artikulatorisk logik, nemlig re-artikulationen af det centrale politiske subjekt for Socialdemokratiet. Hvor det tidligere havde været arbejderklassen, er *DFF* resultatet af en udvikling over imod *Folket* som den afgørende aktør. Det er selvfølgelig en proces, der forløb over en længere periode, men det er meget tydeligt i *DFF*: "Arbejderklassen naaede vidt frem i Kraft af Solidaritet og Sammenhold, men hele Folket bør være med". Vi vender tilbage til spørgsmålet, men det skal lige bemærkes, at selvom klassebegrebet aldrig har været uproblematisk, og de facto

altid selv har måttet artikuleres, er det klart, at de artikulatoriske logikker bliver meget mere åbenlyse, når det kommer til at dreje sig om at afgrænse, hvem der udgør *folket*.

Et gradsspørgsmål

Det er imidlertid vigtigt at huske på, at de to logikker aldrig vil kunne findes i ren form. Der er ikke nogen politisk orden, der kan opnå en fuldstændig institutionalisering eller universel inklusion. Der vil altid skulle trækkes grænser, og forskellige problemer og krav vil blive kædet sammen som repræsentationer for det samme. Omvendt vil selv den allermest åbne, revolutionære brudsituation bære visse relationer til et institutionelt kompleks. Det er præcis derfor, der er tale om logikker, som kan være mere eller mindre dominerende, men som altid vil eksistere i et blandingsforhold. Derfor er det rette spørgsmål ikke så meget, om denne eller hin leder, bevægelse etc. som sådan er populistisk. Spørgsmålet er mere i hvilken grad, det er tilfældet. Det gør sig også gældende i *DFF*. Som allerede nævnt er programmet ikke et ærkeeksempel på populisme. Men det er et eksempel på, at et parti, der i sit projekt tydeligt trak på en populistisk logik og blev succesfuld i forlængelse af den populistiske mobilisering – også senere i forhold til at institutionalisere en stærkt inkluderende orden, den skandinaviske velfærdsstat (Bryld 2004).

Kriser

Jeg har nævnt populistiske brud. Lidt mere præcist er Laclaus påstand, at populisme optræder i perioder med dybere kriser, dvs. dislokationer i forbindelse med institutioner, repræsentation og samfundet generelt. Det skyldes, at populisme snarere end at være bundet til en bestemt historisk fase – overgang fra traditionelle til moderne samfund – viser sig i brudsituationer, når en given hegemonisk orden er under pres. Diskursteorien henter inspirationen fra Gramscis begreb om organisk krise, med hvilket han refererer til voldsomme brudsituationer, som Weimar-republikkens sammenbrud. Ifølge Laclau har vi populisme, når en krise skaber en situation, hvor den herskende orden ikke kan levere svar på de frustrationer og krav, der findes i samfundet. Når den institutionaliserede (differentielle) orden ikke kan indoptage disse krav, skabes muligheden for, at de ikke længere eksisterer relativt adskilt hver for sig, men tværtimod gøres ækvivalente for hinanden. Som vi skal se er det igennem en sådan sidestilling af identiteter og krav (at de kan skiftes ud for hinanden), at folket konstrueres.

Der kan næppe være tvivl om, at *DFF* passer fint ind i denne bestemmelse. Programmet er lanceret i en krisetid i de tidlige 1930'ere med dyb økonomisk krise, nazisme i Tyskland, fascisme i Italien og kommunisme i Sovjetunionen. Der var tale om "en af Kapitalismen fremkaldt Krise", der "i Omfang og Varighed [er] endnu mere alvorlig og indgribende" og som hærger de udsattes hjem og familier. Socialdemokratiet er så den kraft, der kan overkomme denne krise: "Overfor denne Forvirring og politiske Haabløshed staar Socialdemokratiet som en Klippe i Tidens Brænding".

En folkelig pol

I sådanne situationer bliver det tydeligt, at politiske identiteter ikke er givet af basale kategorier og etableret på et mere primært ontologisk niveau som marxismens klassebegreb, men derimod er resultatet af artikulationsprocesser. Det vil sige, at de er resultatet af kontingente sammenkædninger af forhold, der ikke har en forudgående nødvendighed til hinanden. Med en let omskrivning af et berømt citat af Laclau og Mouffe kan man sige, at *folket ikke eksisterer*. I mere dagligdagstermer betyder det bare, at det folk, populismen artikulerer, ikke findes forud for den konkrete politiske proces. Canovan beskriver folket som et "promiskuøst begreb", med en spøgelsesagtig uhåndgribelighed (Canovan 2005, 140; se også Korsgaard 2001). Derfor ser vi artikulationsprocesser så tydeligt i populismens aktive konstruktion af folket.

Igen tjener *DFF* som et oplysende eksempel (Socialdemokratiet 2016). Programmet kan ses som udtryk for Socialdemokratiets bevægelse fra arbejder- og klasseparti til folkeparti (Korsgaard, 2004, 422 og 588). Det vigtige er imidlertid, at dette ikke er et simpelt skridt fra én objektivt eksisterende aktør (klassen) til en anden (folket). Der er tværtimod tale om en konstruktionsproces. Det folk, der adresseres, findes ikke blot og bart forud for de politiske processer. Så selv om programmet refererer til "det danske Folks Traditioner, Anskuelser og Vilje" i ental, er folket ikke et spontant fællesskab – det må skabes: "det er Tid til at skabe det Folke-Fællesskab, der vender sig imod Lovløsheden og sætter sig hele Samfundets Opbygning som Maal". Det kræver en aktiv indsats at samle folket, og det er ikke hele befolkningen, der adresseres. Programmets "Maal er at samle alle, der hører til den arbejdende og udbyttede Befolkning".

Antagonisme: Folk vs. elite

En skillelinje mellem folket og dets 'Andet', en opdeling af samfundet i to modsætningsfyldte poler, er kendetegnende for populisme. Den populistiske logik er en grænsedragnings-logik. Samfundet ses ikke som et hele, hvor alle kan tilgodeses. Tværtimod er der en illegitim elite der antagoniseres (Laclau 2005a; 2005b). Denne antagonisering er ifølge Laclau den eneste måde, der kan skabes enhed i en folkelig identitet. Da der ikke er en forudgående indre forbindelse mellem de elementer, der kommer til at indgå i en konstruktion af folket, må dets enhed skabes, artikuleres. Det sker gennem en aktiv eksklusion af det, som folket *ikke* er. I samme bevægelse som populisme udpeger folket, udpeger den også folkets modsætning: magten, eliten, oligarkiet etc. Alle de krav og identiteter, der udgør den folkelige pol, hænger kun sammen i den udstrækning, de forbindes gennem en antagonistisk modsætning til det ikke-folkelige.

Hermed kan vi tydeligt se kontingensen, den fraværende essens i 'folket'. Til forskel fra marxismens klasser, der også kun eksisterer i deres konfliktrelation til hinanden, men hvor både arbejderklasse og borgerskab er givet af de underliggende økonomiske strukturer, er hverken folket eller eliten givet på forhånd. Hvad og hvem, der faktisk bliver udpeget til at være en del af folket eller eliten, er et konkret historisk spørgsmål.

Antagonistisk eksklusion er faktisk også til stede i *DFF*. På trods af, at programmet prøver at inddrage stort set alle (erhvervs)grupper, er der en antagonisering af folkets modsætning. Programmet henvender sig til "alle, der er ramt af Kapitalmagtens Krig mod det produktive Arbejde". Det er en re-artikulering af den klassiske klassekamp, for det er bestemt ikke alle virksomhedsejere, der sættes udenfor. Men programmet trækker en bastant grænse overfor en magtblok, der anklages for at "føre krig". Selv om det ikke fylder meget, er det ikke kun den store kapitalmagt, der ekskluderes. Adelen nævnes også (som husmændenes og bøndernes fjende).

Müller: moralitet og grænsedragning

Her er det passende at se nærmere på to andre problemer i Müllers populismeteori, nemlig påstanden om at populisme per definition baserer sig på en moralsk skelnen mellem det rene folk og den korrumperede elite (Müller 2015, 4), og hans (liberale) blindhed overfor grænsedragningens nødvendighed. Som vi har set, er der ingen tvivl om, at populisme er antagonistisk, at populisme formulerer en konfliktuel relation mellem folket og eliten. Men der er ikke nogen nødvendighed i, at antagonismen formuleres i moralske termer, selv om det givetvis ofte er tilfældet. Man kan ikke hævde, at *DFFs* påstand om, at kapitalmagten fører krig mod det produktive arbejde eller konstateringen af, at "Bonden og Husmanden … i disse Aar har fået at føle, at deres Plads var nærmere ved Arbejderen end ved Lensgreven" er moralske fordømmelser. Det er helt klart antagonistiske artikulationer, men ikke moralske. Og selv i de tilfælde, hvor antagonismen faktisk gives en moralsk form, er det ikke *nødvendigvis* demokratisk problematisk. En moralsk fordømmelse af militærdiktaturer, apartheidregimet mv., er jo ikke i sig selv noget problem.

Dermed er vi ved det sidste problem ved Müllers tilgang, nemlig blindheden for grænsedragningens nødvendighed. Som god liberal ønsker Müller at værne om pluralismen. Det er svært at være uenig med ham, men det spørgsmål, som liberale sjældent stiller sig selv, er, om der skal trækkes grænser for pluralisme (og for demokrati som sådan). Ifølge Laclau og Mouffe er svaret på det spørgsmål: ja, det må der nødvendigvis (Jf. fx Mouffe 2005). Der er ikke nogen politisk orden, der ikke er nødt til at trække grænser til det, den *ikke* er. Pluralisme kan ikke være total, ligesom intet demokrati de facto kan være fuldstændigt inkluderende. Som Mouffe har vist, betyder det, at enhver politisk position – også pluralisme – må ekskludere. Det viser sig to steder hos Müller selv. Det ene er i hans kritik af, at en del af folket hævder at repræsentere hele folket (faktisk at være hele det *sande* folk). Problemet er den totalitet, han stiller i modsætning til populismens 'sande' del af folket. Hvilken type totalitet er 'hele folket'? Müller refererer konsekvent til 'det empiriske folk', nogle gange i dets 'helhed' ("the people in its empirical entirety") (Müller u.å, 11), men det er en illusion. Der findes ikke noget 'empirisk folk'. Er det statsborgere inden for en nationalstats grænser? I så fald, hvad med immigranter og flygtninge? Og hvad med tidligere tiders ekskluderede fra statsborgerskab? Problemet er selvfølgelig, at folket ikke bare er der, heller ikke 'empirisk'. Det må på den ene eller anden måde

afgrænses. Folket eksisterer ikke, det er en udflydende, skyggeagtig størrelse, og at henvise til (forestillingen om) en umiddelbar empirisk referent løser ikke det problem.

Det andet sted, vi ser det, er interessant nok i alle hans overvejelser om den eventuelle eksklusion af populister fra det gode selskab. Eksempelvis mener han, at EU burde have slået hårdere ned på Østrig, da Frihedspartiet kom til magten. Han har faktisk et helt kapitel, der diskuterer hvorledes man (liberale demokrater) bør omgås populister (Müller 2016a, kap 3). Uanset om konklusionen bliver eksklusion eller ej, viser selve hans diskussion af problemet grænsedragningens nødvendighed. Selv det mest pluralistiske og demokratiske folk er nødt til at trække en antagonistisk grænse for at konstituere sig selv.[7]

Ækvivalente krav og identiteter

Tilbage til Laclaus populismebegreb. Som vi har set, sættes en række specifikke krav og identiteter lig med hinanden gennem antagoniseringen af det ikke-folkelige, magten eller eliten. Det vil sige, at de kan skiftes ud med hinanden i deres fælles negative relation til eliten, til det ikke-folkelige. Der er tale om en *negativ* relation, fordi (påstanden er at) de enkelte elementer ikke deler en dybere 'positiv' kvalitet, der forudbestemmer dem til at indgå i en folkelig pol.[8] Om en given identitet kommer til det, er et åbent politisk spørgsmål, et resultat af konkrete historiske artikulationer.

Igen kan *DFF* tjene som eksempel. Programmet henvendte sig til "den arbejdende og udbyttede" befolkning. Når man ser nærmere på programmets præcisering af, hvem det så er, er der en udtalt ækvivalent logik på spil. Programmet henvender sig til "Industriens og Landbrugets Arbejdere, til Gaardmænd, Husmænd, Fiskere, Tjenestemænd og Næringsdrivende i Handel og Haandværk, til alle Haandens og Aandens Arbejdere". Det er "alle, som bygger deres Liv paa ærligt Arbejde." Det, Laclaus teori retter vort blik imod, er den manglende nødvendighed i sammenstillingen af disse identiteter. I modsætning til den tidligere klassekamps-diskurs er der både kommet 'småborgere' og egentlige (omend små-)kapitalister med i ækvivalens-kæden. De adresseres godt nok som de, der "bygger deres Liv paa ærligt Arbejde". Men det er ingen udpegning af en positiv essens. For hvor og hvordan trækkes grænsen mellem ærligt og uærligt arbejde? Det gøres præcis ved at udpege Storkapitalister og Adelen som det ikke-folkelige.

Her kunne man indvende, at denne opremsning ikke er et udtryk for ækvivalenslogik, tværtimod. Er det, vi ser, ikke konturerne af det modsatte, af en differentiel, inkluderende logik, hvor alle har deres legitime plads i (den kommende) velfærdsstat? Den logik er givetvis også til stede,[9] og det er (bl.a.) derfor, at *DFF* ikke er et ærketypisk populistisk manifest. Men det, som giver den ækvivalente logik sin fremtrædende rolle,

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7 Det behøver ikke at være en antagonisme til faktisk eksisterende fjender. Det kan være til et sæt af (udemokratiske) idéer eller til den styreform, demokratiet afløste. Pointen er, at enhver identitet er baseret på en negativ relation til det, den *ikke* er.

8 For en uddybning af det negatives status i diskursteori, se Hansen (2003).

9 Som Bryld (2004) påpeger, var forestillingen om en velfærdsstat, som vi kender den i dag, bestemt ikke særligt udviklet i Socialdemokratiet i begyndelsen af 1930'erne. På det tidspunkt var det stadig et nyt socialistisk samfund, der var endemålet. Vejen dertil var imidlertid blevet parlamentarisk demokratisk.

er, at programmet faktisk eksplicit trækker en grænse mellem den legitime folkelige pol og den illegitime elite; og at der ikke er nogen nødvendighed i, hvor grænsen præcist bliver trukket.

Lidt uddybende om krav

Jeg har nævnt hvilke identiteter, dvs. befolkningslag og erhvervsgrupper, programmet ækvivalerer i dets konstruktion af folket. Men et af elementerne i Laclaus teori, som jeg indtil videre ikke har præciseret, nemlig krav, kræver en nøjere betragtning. Det er et af de steder, jeg er uenig med ham. Laclau hævder, at mindsteenheden for analysen af populisme skal være krav, ikke grupper (Laclau 2005a, 72f; 2005b, 34f). Det skyldes, at han ønsker, at af-essentialisere 'gruppen'. Artikulation går hele vejen, og der er derfor ikke nogen grupper, der har nogen nødvendig status. Økonomiske klasser er ifølge denne logik også resultatet af konkrete artikulationer, hvilket arbejderbevægelsens historiske problemer med at skabe enhed jo indikerer. Hvis vi udstrækker overvejelserne til de såkaldte nye politiske identiteter, bliver det endnu mere tydeligt. Køn, seksuel orientering, handicap, race, religion, miljø, dyrevelfærd etc. er alt sammen identiteter, der ikke repræsenterer 'objektive' gruppetilhørsforhold, men er resultatet af konkrete artikulationer. Hvilken gruppe eller samfundsmæssig sektor, der kommer til at fungere som identitetsbærende, er ikke givet på forhånd.

Den anden teoretiske pointe er, at betegneren 'krav' har en indbygget dobbelthed, der bidrager til at indfange den brudsituation, populisme vokser frem i. Den engelske betegnelse er 'demand', og afstanden mellem efterspørgsel (eller anmodning) og krav svarer til afstanden mellem institutionaliseret politik og (begyndelsen) på et populistisk brud. I normale, relativt stabile perioder er det politiske system (i den traditionelle betydning) åben for behandling af 'efterspørgsler'. De forskellige problemer fører til efterspørgsel efter løsninger, der i et vist omfang kan mødes af den herskende orden: i forhold til infrastruktur, sygehuse etc. Men hvis disse efterspørgsler i stigende omfang skuffes og ikke kan imødekommes, ændrer efterspørgslen sig til krav. Hvis der er tilpas mange utilfredsstillede krav, kan der skabes ækvivalente relationer mellem dem, og vi får begyndelsen på dannelsen af en populistisk folkelig pol i modsætning til magten eller eliten, helt op til (muligheden for) et krav om et egentligt regime- eller systemskifte.

Jeg er helt enig i Laclaus bestræbelse på at undgå 'grupper' som ureflekterede essentielle kategorier (jf. hans læsning af gruppepsykologien i 2005a, 21-64). Vi indgår alle i utallige sammenhænge, subjektpositioner, som det hedder i teorien, og hvilke subjektpositioner, der bliver afgørende for identiteter (og ikke mindst politiske identiteter), afhænger af konkrete historiske situationer og artikulationer. Imidlertid mener jeg, at Laclau gør perspektivet for endimensionalt ved at hævde, at *kun* krav kan være mindsteenheden for populisme.

Umiddelbart passer krav godt ind i Laclaus bestræbelse på at bestemme populisme på et ontologisk niveau. Et krav formuleres, fordi der opleves en mangel, noget der ikke er, som det burde være. Det vil sige, at krav skaber en forbindelse til en dislokation, et

krav markerer en rystelse, en negativitet. Men jeg vil hævde, at krav ikke er (og ikke kan være) en ontologisk kategori. Det er kontingent, om oplevelsen af en mangel, om erfaringerne af dislokation, omsættes i krav eller fx parkeres som skæbne, som noget ingen kan gøre noget ved eller lignende. I forlængelse heraf er det også tydeligt, at krav, som Laclau selv påpeger, har en række positive specificiteter, der antyder, at det ikke kan ophæves til ontologisk kategori. Et krav er fx rettet mod noget, en autoritet, der forventes at kunne indfri det, eller hvis der er tale om en antagonisering, opleves som forhindringen for indfrielsen. Alt i alt er det min påstand, at krav ikke kan siges at være en ontologisk kategori.[10]

Hvis det er rigtigt, åbner det op for et spørgsmål, som Laclau ikke selv rejser, nemlig om ikke andre størrelser kunne tænkes at indgå i folket? I hans tidligere diskussioner (Laclau 1980; 1985) talte han om 'folkelige positionaliteter', altså ikke kun krav. Der er også tale om identiteter, det der også kaldes sociale sektorer eller grupper. Disse er selv resultatet af kontingente artikulationer og har ikke en dybere ontologisk nødvendighed indbygget, ligesom de modificeres af at blive artikuleret ind i en folkelig pol. Men de er virksomme som identiteter og spiller en væsentlig rolle i populistiske ækvivalenser. Empirisk er udpegningen af de identiteter, der udgør folket, da også en central del af populisme. Men også andre størrelser, ikke mindst lederen og symbolerne spiller en central rolle, uden at disse nødvendigvis artikuleres som krav.

Det ser vi også i *DFF*. De forskellige identiteter er så centrale i programmet, og de kan ikke udtømmende forstås som krav.[11] Men programmet søger faktisk også at artikulere en lang række egentlige krav, hvoraf nogle bestemt har karakter af brud med det bestående. Kravene går lige fra "Socialisering af Banker", "Kontrol med Aktieselskabers Udbytte og Prisdannelse", "en moderne Sociallovgivning" til hjælp til ejendomsbesiddere i landbruget. Men også til indførsel af egentlig parlamentarisme i form af et-kammersystem og ikke mindst "Kvindens Ligeberettigelse med Manden". Men uanset om konklusionen er, at den folkelige kæde består af mere end krav eller ej, er styrken ved Laclaus teori, at den retter vort blik imod den manglende nødvendighed i artikulationen af de forskellige størrelser, der indgår i den folkelige pol. Når man ikke længere kun er et klasseparti, men et folkeparti, bliver konstruktionen af projektet betydeligt mere vanskelig, og krav og identiteter, der ikke har et nødvendigt forhold til hinanden, skal aktivt kædes sammen.

En særlig politisk identitet (et identifikations-tilbud)

Laclau afviser, at grupper har en forud-given objektiv eksistens. Hvis 'folket ikke eksisterer', hvis der kun er det folk, der fremkommer som resultat af konkrete politiske artikulationer og kampe, hvad er det så, der faktisk binder det sammen – og i videre forstand,

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10 For en generel kritik af Laclau og Mouffes tese om det politiskes ontologiske primat, se Hansen (2014).
11 En dybere analyse ville givetvis vise, at ingen af disse erhvervsgrupper har egentlige identiteter, men at hvad en husmand, en arbejder osv. var, selv var resultatet af artikulationsprocesser. Men det er ikke det samme som at hævde, at det *kun* er krav, der konstituerer den folkelige pol.

afgør hvilken specifik konstruktion af identitet, der vinder opbakning og bliver hegemo-nisk, som det hedder? Det svar, som Laclau giver i sine senere skrifter, er *affekt*, en følel-sesmæssig binding til et projekt, som går ud over eller rettere fylder den afstand, opbak-ningen bag et populistisk (og et hvilket som helst andet politisk) projekt, har til en simpel rationel interesse (Laclau 2005, 101f). Den teoretiske pointe er, at fordi vi taler om krise og brudsituationer, opleves der mangel og afstand. Noget er ikke, som det burde være. Jo dybere krisen stikker, jo mere de forskellige identiteter er rystede (dislokerede), desto mindre vil opbakningen til et projekt, der præsenterer sig som løsningen på problemerne, være givet af 'rationel kalkule' og interesse-vurdering.[12]

      For Laclau er denne pointe generel. Der er ikke nogen identitet (faktisk ingen be-tydning overhovedet (Laclau 2014)), der ikke i et eller andet omfang involverer en 'af-fektiv investering'. Men vi ser det meget tydeligt i populisme, ikke mindst i de symboler og symbolikker, der bruges. Tænk fx på Socialdemokratiet anno 1933 og "Når jeg ser et rødt flag smælde" eller mere nutidigt Dannebrog for Dansk Folkeparti. Hvad betyder disse symboler mere generelt? Laclaus svar er, at de repræsenterer, hvad man kunne kalde for 'negationen af negationen', altså overkommelsen af løsningen på den situation, der opleves som forkert, som mangelfuld. Jo mere mangelfuld situationen er, jo dybere krisen stikker, desto mindre vil symbolet signalere noget konkret, og desto mere vil den affektive dimension dominere.

Den tomme betegner

Enheden i den folkelige pol skabes som nævnt gennem en fælles negativ afgrænsning af det ikke-folkelige. Men for at folket overhovedet skal kunne fremstå som en enhed, må der være noget, der repræsenterer ækvivalenskæden som helhed (Laclau 2002, 135-139). Spørgsmålet er, hvordan sådan en repræsentation kan finde sted. Hvis de forskellige krav med videre i ækvivalenskæden delte en fælles kerne ville der ikke være et repræsentati-onsproblem. Men fordi der ikke findes sådan et fælles element, må repræsentationen ske på anden vis. Det er et generelt problem, der gælder for alle identiteter. Det, der kommer til at betegne og dermed repræsentere en given helhed, er ikke bare essensen som sådan. Der er tale om en krystallisering af en helhed. Derfor må den repræsenterende betegner tømme sig selv for mening for at kunne repræsentere hele kæden.

      Det er igen noget, der viser sig tydeligt i populisme, fordi der kædes så mange heterogene elementer sammen. Populistiske symbolers karakteristiske tomhed er et sær-ligt tydeligt eksempel på en generel problematik. Fordi de forskellige elementer, der ind-går i en populistisk folkelig ækvivalenskæde, ikke har noget fælles element, må det sym-bol, der knytter dem sammen, blive stadigt mere tomt, jo længere kæden udstrækkes. Jo

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12 Om et givet projekt opleves som at tjene eller tværtimod være imod ens interesser er selvfølgelig selv resultatet af forudgående artikulationer: Objektive interesser findes simpelthen ikke. Denne logik er helt nødvendig for at forstå Rust-bæltets arbejderes opbakning til Trump og de mange tidligere kommunister i Frankrig, der nu støtter Front National.

mere dislokeret situationen er, jo længere den folkelige ækvivalenskæde udstrækkes, desto mere kommer den tomme betegner (det samlende symbol) til at betegne en forhåbning om noget hinsides den nuværende tilstand. Det centrale symbol må også tømmes, fordi det skal fungere som repræsentant for meget forskellige forhåbninger, dvs. affektive investeringer, til den nye tilstand der skal indstiftes.

Igen finder vi et godt eksempel på denne logik i *DFF*. Hvad er det, der giver enheden i projektet? Hvad træder ud af kæden, tømmer sig og repræsenterer helheden? Her er der faktisk to gode bud. Det første er selve sloganet "Danmark for folket". Det er faktisk et krav: nationen skal ikke være for de få, men for de mange. Det er tendentielt tomt, for ligeså lidt som folket er en simpel, entydig kategori, ligeså lidt er det tilfældet for nationen, "Danmark". Men der er faktisk også et andet og måske endnu stærkere bud, som ikke er med i programmet, men som knyttede det politiske projekt sammen i en stærk kampagne, det legendariske "Stauning eller Kaos". Men dermed er vi ovre i spørgsmålet om lederen i populismen.

Lederen

I populismedebatten indtager lederen en meget central plads (for et overblik, se fx Panizza 2005, 18). Et af Laclaus yndlingseksempler på en tom betegner er Peron i Argentina (Laclau 2005a, 214f), og der er ingen tvivl om, at lederen ofte er en endog meget central figur i populisme. Mange tager som Žižek (2006) udgangspunkt i dette til en normativ fordømmelse af populisme, og navne som Erdogan, Orbán og Trump er jo heller ikke repræsentanter for konstruktioner af folkelighed med stærk demokratisk appel. To ting bør dog understreges. For det første, at selvom lederen ofte kommer til at fungere som den tomme betegner, er det ikke nogen nødvendighed. Faktisk havde de to 'oprindelige' populistiske bevægelser, the Populist Party i USA og Narodnikerne i Rusland ingen stærk samlende lederfigur. Det andet er, at der ikke er nogen nødvendighed mellem en leder, der fungerer som 'tom betegner' og en autoritær udvikling. Laclau (2005a, 100) peger selv på Nelson Mandela som et oplagt eksempel, og Stauning i Socialdemokratiets kampagne omkring *DFF* er et andet.

Stauning eller Kaos: det kan det næsten ikke siges tydeligere. Alternativet til Socialdemokratiets projekt er 'kaos", generaliseret dislokation og negativitet. Hvem kan forhindre denne? Hvem kan samle folket i bevægelsen mod den 'fraværende fuldstændighed'? Det kan lederen, Stauning. Dermed bliver figuren Stauning en tom betegner, som kommer til at symbolisere projektets indhold, og som givetvis blev mål for udbredt affektiv investering. I hvert fald opnåede Socialdemokratiet 46,1% af stemmerne ved valget i 1935; et resultat, der ikke siden er overgået.

Som opsamling på denne diskussion må vi igen rejse spørgsmålet, om *DFF* og Socialdemokratiet anno 1933/1934 var rendyrket populisme? Nej, det var det ikke. Der er bestemt også mange elementer af institutionel politik, og programmet advarer eksplicit imod "fantastiske Eksperimenter og lovløse Handlinger ... Trusler og Forsøg paa at nedbryde et ordnet Samfund". Men programmet viser, at en populistisk logik tydeligt er til stede, selv i det parti, der mere end noget andet kom til at blive velfærdsstatens helt centrale opbygger. Det viser frugtbarheden i at forstå populisme som en logik, der kan være mere eller mindre til stede, og ikke et velafgrænset fænomen, der enten er der, eller ikke er der. Det viser også, at man ikke normativt bare kan afvise populisme som farligt og udemokratisk.

Konklusion: populisme og demokrati

Som konklusion på artiklen skal jeg derfor runde det normative spørgsmål vedrørende populisme. Der er en overvældende mængde af litteratur, der kritiserer populisme normativt. Som vi har set, hævder Müller, at populisme per definition er anti-liberalt og udemokratisk. Jeg har gennem artiklen argumenteret for, at det bestemt ikke er tilfældet, hvilket jeg også har søgt at give belæg for med inddragelse af Socialdemokratiets program "Danmark for Folket".

Men hvis populisme ikke som sådan er udemokratisk, kan vi så omvendt konkludere, at den som sådan er demokratisk? Det kan man nogle gange få indtryk af i Laclaus tekster (Laclau 2006; 2014, 267). Det er da også værd at understrege, at populisme ikke *som sådan* er demokratisk problematisk. Faktisk er der indslag af populisme i den demokratiske logik: folket som ultimativt referencepunkt, folkesuverænitet. En populistisk logik har også potentialet til en styrkelse af det folkelige element i demokrati, nemlig 'underhundens' påkaldelse af sin ret. Det er noget, jeg personligt bakker op om (givetvis mere end Müller). Men da populisme er en logik for artikulation, og som mange højrepopulistiske bevægelser tydeligt viser, kan man ikke drage den konklusion, at populisme i sig selv er demokratisk. Den ekskluderende grænselogik, der altid er tilstede i konstruktionen af folket accentueres med populisme, og denne kan åbenlyst godt ende i en autoritær position, hvor konkurrerende konstruktioner af folket bekæmpes med udemokratiske midler. Det gælder både for højre og venstre-populismer. Så spørgsmålet om demokrati er en tredje dimension, man må have med i analysen og vurderingen af konkrete populismer. Jeg har andetsteds (Hansen 2016) argumenteret for, at Leforts pointe om at holde magtens sted tomt, sammen med Mouffes begreb om agonistiske (modstander) relationer kunne være en sådan dimension. Så selv om populisme ikke som sådan kan afvises som udemokratisk, må konkrete populistiske bevægelser også vurderes på deres villighed til at acceptere en agonistisk respekt for magtens tomme sted.

Med Laclaus begrebsapparat får vi værktøjer til at forstå konkrete politiske bevægelser som mere eller mindre populistiske. Det er et klart fremskridt i forhold til definitioner, der som Müllers hævder at lave en skelnen mellem noget, der er populistisk, og noget andet, der ikke er populistisk. Samtidig får vi problematiseret den udbredte idé om,

at populisme som sådan er farligt og fortjener normativ fordømmelse. Tværtimod er der klare demokratiske elementer i populistisk logik, som henvisningen til folket som ultimativ reference, samt en hævdelse af underhundens, ikke-elitens, ret. Men det betyder omvendt ikke, at populisme som sådan er normativt (demokratisk) 'godt'. Konkrete populistiske bevægelser må også vurderes efter demokratiske standarder, ikke mindst villigheden til at holde magtens sted tomt. Men en sådan vurdering kan bestemt falde positivt ud.

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Er islamismen populistisk, eller er populismen i Mellemøsten blevet islamistisk?

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Artiklen diskuterer og sammenligner de forskellige former for populisme, der har præget den politiske udvikling i Mellemøsten siden begyndelsen af det 20. århundrede. Det konkluderes, at den ikke-militante islamisme har spillet en afgørende rolle og evnet at sikre sig bred folkelig opbakning. Det var også tilfældet i Iran, hvor kredsen omkring Khomeini målrettet italesatte opgøret med shahen i en shiitisk islamisme.

Hvad er populisme, og hvad vil artiklen?

Populisme som begreb og fænomen har præget den europæiske debat gennem de seneste årtier. I den akademiske verden har der været en omfattende debat, dels om hvorledes begrebet skal forstås, og dels om det overhovedet kan bruges analytisk med henvisning til, at begrebet er flydende og uden et klart defineret indhold. I *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies* fremhæver Mudde og Kaltwasser (2013), at populisme sjældent benyttes som en karakteristik af personer eller organisationer selv, men derimod er en betegnelse, der bruges om andre personer og grupperinger og ofte med en negativ undertone. På linje med den tyske politolog og idéhistoriker Jan-Werner Müller fastholder de imidlertid, at begrebet har sin selvfølgelige og anvendelige plads i den politiske analyse, fordi det er funderet på en række eksplicitte karakteristika, uanset hvilken ideologisk tendens det konkrete eksempel på populisme repræsenterer. De definerer derfor populisme som "a thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite'" (Mudde og Kaltwasser 2013, 498). Jan-Werner Müller fremhæver i forlængelse heraf, at populisme er udpræget antipluralistisk og tillige stærkt ekskluderende (Müller 2016 s. 134). Både Mudde og Kaltwasser samt Müller understreger, at den populisme, der gennem de seneste årtier har været så dominerende, er tæt forbundet med den forandring, Europa har gennemlevet de seneste årtier, hvor et voksende antal personer fra alle dele af den tredje verden har bosat sig og af mange opfattes som en trussel mod det kendte og det nationale.

Populisme er således et fænomen, der hører det moderne samfund til og trives godt både med og uden en institutionaliseret og demokratisk sanktioneret politisk medbestemmelse og er derfor *ikke* er et fænomen alene knyttet til et pluralistisk demokratisk system. Det har vi kunnet iagttage i Mellemøsten, hvor befolkningernes aktive deltagelse i det politiske liv i de fleste tilfælde og gennem lange perioder har været stærkt begrænset eller helt fraværende (Angrist 2013).

Målet med denne artikel er at påvise, at populisme har spillet en central rolle i det politiske liv i det moderne Mellemøsten. Ligesom resten af den tredje verden blev det meste af Mellemøsten underlagt europæiske kolonimagter og måtte derfor gennem en politisk kamp for at sikre sig politisk uafhængighed og status som selvstændige, suveræne nationalstater (Rogan 2009). I kampen for selvstændighed handlede de forskellige nationale grupperinger på vegne af folket, og de forskellige bevægelsers taler og deklarationer var formuleret i et sprog, der altid havde folket og dets fremtid som omdrejningspunkt. De nationale bevægelser var ofte xenofobiske og fastholdt, at de europæiske kolonimagter måtte ud af landet og overlade det til folket, der så kunne indrette sig som det fandt bedst. De nationale bevægelser i Mellemøsten formulerede sig alle i et populistisk sprog, hvor fremtiden fri af kolonimagterne ville blive indledningen til en gylden fremtid. Med empirisk udgangspunkt i Egypten og Iran vil artiklen illustrere, hvorledes islamisme defineret som en politisk, ideologisk brug af islam i forskellige formuleringer har italesat sig selv og udfordret andre populistiske ideologier i regionen.

Egypten og Det Muslimske Broderskab

Islam som reference blev kun sporadisk benyttet i den nationale kamp for selvstændighed, og ingen steder var det på tale, at den nationale kamp skulle sikre etableringen af et politisk system baseret på islam. Det blev kun tilfældet i Saudi Arabien, hvor den i 1932 etablerede saudiske stat blev funderet på et erklæret islamisk grundlag (Ayoob 2009). I alle andre tilfælde var målet etableringen af en nationalstat, hvor folket skulle have medbestemmelse og aktivt deltage i det politiske liv. Men den uafhængighed, Egypten sikrede sig i 1922/1923, blev tydeligvis ikke opfattet som tilstrækkelig, og mellemkrigstiden blev præget af en national kamp mod den fortsatte engelske tilstedeværelse i landet (Vatikiotis 1980). I 1928 tog en nyuddannet lærer ved navn Hassan al-Banna (1909-1949) initiativ til etablering af *Det Muslimske Broderskab.* Bevægelsen skulle gennemføre en omfattende og bredt anlagt oplysningskampagne og være med til at sikre, at den egyptiske befolkning – folket – fik den nødvendige viden om islams sande værdier. Den nyuddannede lærer erfarede kort tid efter sin ankomst til Ismailiyya ved Suez-kanalen, at mange fattige egyptere hverken havde den ønskede eller den fornødne viden om islam, og at de derfor var et let bytte for den sekulære tilgang til livet, som blev faldbudt af mange (Mitchell 1969).

Det skulle der sættes ind over for, og derfor skulle *Broderskabet* lancere en civil aktivisme, der konkret og praktisk kunne vise, at islam var andet og mere end tro i or-

dets snævre betydning. Tro var *også* at handle, og kun ved en sådan aktivistisk forståelse af islam ville det blive muligt at dokumentere, at islam var en reference af betydning for livet i alle dets mangfoldige facetter (al-Banna 1975). Det skal fremhæves, at al-Banna i flere af sine skrifter argumenterer for, at en sådan strategi ville bidrage til, at de sande og autentiske islamiske værdier, der tidligere i historien havde skabt den klassiske islamiske civilisation, igen kunne finde indpas og bidrage til en nødvendig kulturel renselse af det egyptiske folk af den forurening, det var blevet påført under den engelske tilstedeværelse. I flere af sine skrifter henvender han sig direkte til de mange egyptere, der ikke længere aktivt praktiserer islam i overensstemmelse med den forståelse han og *Broderskabet* gjorde gældende. Deres daglige liv og virke var i voksende omfang blevet præget af værdier og normer introduceret af den administration, England havde opbygget efter invasionen i 1882. De var derfor på vej væk fra gruppen af sande og autentiske egyptiske muslimer, og den bevægelse skulle bremses (se skriftet *Mod lyset* i al-Banna 1975).

At denne udprægede populistiske lancering af islam som et værn i forsvaret af det, *Broderskabet* forstår som sande muslimske værdier, havde en stærk folkelig gennemslagskraft kan aflæses af den næsten eksplosive vækst, bevægelsen oplevede gennem 1930´erne og 1940´erne. *Broderskabets* centrum blev snart flyttet fra Ismailiyya til hovedstaden Kairo, og herfra gennemførtes en målrettet organisering af bevægelsen i alle egne af Egypten og siden også i andre arabiske lande i regionen (Mitchell 1969; Lia 2006). Al-Banna fastholdt, at den forståelse af islam, han udviklede, *ikke* var politisk i ordets sædvanlige betydning, og af samme grund udviklede bevægelsen sig hverken under hans eller hans efterfølgere til et traditionelt politisk parti. Men uanset dette var *Broderskabet* i kraft af sin målrettede aktivisme med til på afgørende vis at påvirke den offentlige debat.

Broderskabet var centralistisk og hierarkisk organiseret. Al magt blev samlet hos lederen og den selvsupplerende kreds omkring ham og sigtede på ingen måde på at inddrage de menige medlemmers aktive deltagelse i formuleringen af bevægelsens program. *Broderskabets* mange aktive medlemmer virkede i deres respektive sociale sammenhænge som loyale repræsentanter, der gennem deres aktivistiske engagement skulle invitere andre til at tilslutte sig bevægelsen. Al-Banna taler i sine skrifter mere om *umma*-en – de rettroende muslimers samfund – end om folket, og af samme grund havde hverken han eller bevægelsen den kristne koptiske minoritet som mål for bevægelsens virke, selvom de oplysningskampagner, den gennemførte, forsøgte at konvertere kristne koptere til islam og dermed træde ind i *umma*-en. Kopterne udgjorde i denne periode omkring 15% af den egyptiske befolkning, medens den nu menes at udgøre 8-10%.

Nationalisme og islamisme i Egypten

Populisme som politisk strategi kan udmærket praktiseres i et politisk system, der er baseret på pluralistisk folkelig deltagelse gennem afholdelse af tilbagevendende valg, og

sådan var det politiske system i Egypten formelt organiseret i tiden mellem grundlovens lancering i 1923 og det militære kup i 1952. Perioden var domineret af modsætningsforholdet mellem skiftende nationalistiske regeringer på den ene side og kongen, der ifølge grundlovens bestemmelser havde meget store udøvende beføjelser, på den anden side. Kongen var derfor igen og igen i stand til at begrænse den politiske indflydelse, det nationalistiske *Wafd*-parti fik uanset det forhold, at partiet sejrede ved det ene valg efter det andet (Terry 1982). *Broderskabet* på sin side afstod fra at organisere sig som et politisk parti og fokuserede først og fremmest på at re-islamisere befolkningen og ved enhver mulig lejlighed at slå til lyd for, at islam var det sande egyptiske folks fundament. Derfor skal vi helt frem til slutningen af 1900-tallet før bevægelsen for alvor begyndte at overveje at etablere sig som et politisk parti, selvom det i forbifarten skal nævnes, at et voksende antal individuelle medlemmer fra midten af 1980´erne deltog i valg til det egyptiske parlament som kandidater for flere forskellige politiske partier (Rutherford 2013).

    Broderskabet blev efter et militært kup, gennemført af en gruppe unge officerer i juli 1952, politisk udmanøvreret. På vegne af det egyptiske folk lovede de nye nationalistiske militære magthavere anført af Nasser en ny og strålende fremtid for det egyptiske folk, dersom det ville støtte det program, de nye magthavere præsenterede. Det var baseret på opbygningen af et stærkt militær, der kunne forsvare nationen mod ydre fjender, og en sådan var blevet skabt, da den jødiske stat Israel så dagens lys i maj 1948. Sammen med andre arabiske stater havde Egypten erklæret den nye stat krig, men lidt et forsmædeligt nederlag (Rogan 2009).

    Derfor skulle der gøres op med det politiske, pluralistiske system, der var blevet skabt ved overgangen til den delvise selvstændighed i 1922-23. Landet havde i de nye militære magthaveres udlægning i virkeligheden været styret af udenlandske interesser og havde derfor ikke tjent folkets interesser – et klassisk populistisk argument, der ofte blev benyttet (se f.eks. Nasser 1952). Derfor forbød det nye regime alle politiske partier og etablerede i stedet et enhedsparti, der skulle sikre magthaverne en institutionel ramme gennem hvilket regimet kunne mobilisere befolkningens støtte til dets kamp for at gøre op med den koloniale fortid. Det løfte blev aldrig for alvor indfriet, og de tre forskellige enhedspartier, der blev skabt i Egypten gennem 1950´erne og 1960´erne, blev aldrig organiseret på et generelt princip om direkte indflydelse fra den brede befolknings side (Angrist 2013). De forskellige enhedspartiers propaganda var præget af en populisme, der gennem årene blev formuleret med lidt skiftende indhold, og det var først fra 1962 og med etableringen af *Den Arabiske Socialistiske Union,* at regimets populistiske propaganda blev panarabisk og socialistisk (Waterbury 1983). Men det skal fremhæves, at både Broderskabet og enhedspartierne ideologisk fastholdt nødvendigheden af, at landet kom fri af den økonomiske, politiske og kulturelle afhængighed, de vestlige kolonimagter havde påført ikke bare Egypten men også andre arabiske stater.

Radikal militant islamisme

Den centrale position, *Broderskabet* sikrede sig efter sin etablering, var et resultat af den dygtige og målrettede italesættelse, der prægede bevægelsens publikationer, hvad enten det var al-Bannas egne skrifter eller dens officielle tidsskrift, men den store gennemslagskraft, bevægelsen havde i den offentlige debat, blev som nævnt ikke omsat i egentlige målrettede og traditionelle politiske initiativer. I 1954 blev Nasser mål for et mislykket politisk attentat, hvilket resulterede i, at *Broderskabet* blev erklæret forbudt og efterfølgende gjort til genstand for en målrettet og særdeles hårdhændet undertrykkelse. Blandt de mange medlemmer, der blev fængslet, var Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), der fra begyndelsen af 1950´erne var blevet en af *Broderskabets* vigtigste penneførere (Bergesen 2008). Han blev i 1966 anklaget for meddelagtighed i planlægningen af et kup rettet mod Nassers regime, og under retssagen blev hans skrift *Ma´âlim fî-l-tarîq (Milestones)* brugt af anklagemyndigheden som dokumentation for hans bidrag til planlægningen af det postulerede kup. Det blev under retssagen ikke faktuelt dokumenteret, hvilket dog ikke forhindrede myndighederne i at henrette ham (Moussalli 1992).

De tanker og ideer, Qutb formulerede i sine skrifter forfattet under sit fængselsophold og smuglet ud for senere udgivelse, fik efterfølgende stor betydning for den militante radikalisering, flere islamistiske grupper gennem de følgende årtier kom til at repræsentere i Egypten (Toth 2013). *Det Muslimske Broderskabs* ledelse, anført af Hassan al-Hudaybi (1891-1973) og udpeget som ny leder af *Broderskabet* i 1951, forsøgte efter bedste evne at distancere sig fra de radikale synspunkter, Qutb formulerede i årene før sin henrettelse. I overensstemmelse med al-Bannas bærende ide om, at bevægelsen var en aktivistisk folkelig bevægelse, fastholdt den nye leder, at den skulle bibeholde sit fokus på at islamisere det egyptiske samfund gennem *da´wa* (invitation /mission/oplysning), *før* det ville blive muligt at skabe et nyt stærkt islamisk samfund og en islamisk stat (Zollner 2012). Qutb på sin side gjorde gældende, at selvom det egyptiske regime hævdede at være muslimsk, så var det det i virkeligheden ikke, fordi hverken staten eller lovgivningen var funderet på sande islamiske principper. Det egyptiske regime var udtryk for *jahiliya* – uvidenhed - og således illegitimt. Derfor skulle det fjernes, og Qutb udviklede i den forbindelse en ide om opbygning af en særlig gruppe af elitemedlemmer (*talî´a*), der kunne føre an i en væbnet militant kamp mod det illegitime politiske system, der styrede Egypten (Moussalli 1992; Toth 2013). Medens den islamisme, al-Banna havde argumenteret for, havde taget udgangspunkt i et behov for folkelig (ud)dannelse, (gen)opdragelse og retledning for ad den vej at forme muslimer, der fulgte og praktiserede den sande forståelse af islam, blev Qutbs ideer om en væbnet militant kamp som redskab til at skabe en sand islamisk stat fra begyndelsen af 1970´erne grundlaget for militante islamisters kamp mod først Sadat og siden Mubarak (Kepel 2003).

Da Nasser døde i 1970 blev Anwar al-Sadat ny præsident, men ingen troede for alvor på, at han ville kunne opretholde magten (Finklestone 1998). Den antagelse skulle snart vise sig at være forkert, og gennem de følgende år indledte han forhandlinger og

siden aftaler med fængslede ledere af *Det Muslimske Broderskab,* der takkede ja til et samarbejde med den nye præsident. *Broderskabet* fik som følge heraf mulighed for igen aktivt at virke mod utvetydigt at tilkendegive, at bevægelsen ikke ville deltage i forsøg på at vælte det eksisterende politiske system (Hirst 1981). Gennem 1970´erne lancerede Sadats regime i alle statslige medier – og dengang var der ikke andre - et billede af ham som *ra´îs al-mu´minîn - de troendes præsident,* ligesom det igen og igen blev understreget, at det politiske system, han stod i spidsen for, virkede i overensstemmelse med sande islamiske principper og traditioner. Tendensen til at italesætte regimet med brug af islamisk retorik viser Sadat-regimes klare forståelse af, at *Broderskabet* også under den hårde undertrykkelse, bevægelsen blev udsat for under Nasser-regimet, havde været i stand til at fastholde sin betydning og fortsat omtale sig selv i et sprog, der fandt genklang i den brede befolkning.

Den kamp, militante islamistiske grupper førte mod det egyptiske regime, skulle komme til at strække sig over flere årtier, men førte ikke til det ønskede resultat. Og medens *Broderskabet* fortsat arbejdede på at sikre sig bred folkelig opbakning, baserede militante grupperinger som *Jama´at al-Muslimîn* og *Jama´at al-Jihâd* deres indsats på skabelsen af en elitær fortrop, der kunne føre an i kampen mod regimet. Den militante gruppering *Jama´at al-Islamiyya* forsøgte som *Broderskabet* i oprør og gennem udgivelse af mindre skrifter og pamfletter at skaffe sig en bred folkelig opbakning men uden held. De militante gruppers italesættelse af militant islamisme fandt ikke genklang hos ret mange, men såvel de militante radikale grupperinger som *Det Muslimske Broderskab* var på hver sin måde med til at presse regimet til officielt at bekende sig til islam. Det kom formelt til udtryk ved ændringen af den egyptiske grundlov i 1980, hvor islamisk lov defineres som hovedkilden for landets lovgivning. I grundloven af 1973 var islamisk lov omtalt som "en af kilderne" og i landets første grundlov af 1923 hed det blot, at islam var statens officielle religion (Fegiery 2016).

Men Sadats muligheder for at opretholde billedet af sig selv som de troendes præsident og en oprigtig muslim blev gennem 1970´erne vanskeligere. Han sikrede sig ganske vist betydelig folkelig opbakning, da det i oktober 1973 lykkedes den egyptiske hær at krydse Suezkanalen og militært sætte sig fast flere steder på Sinai-halvøen, der var blevet erobret af Israel tilbage i 1967-krigen. Men den folkelige opbakning blev sat over styr, da præsidenten i 1977 efter tophemmelige forberedelser fløj til Israel og i en tale i det israelske parlament tilbød en fredsaftale. Den blev efterfølgende forhandlet på plads i Camp David under præsident Carters formelle ledelse og underskrevet på plænen ved Det Hvide Hus i Washington i marts 1979. Sadats initiativ blev stærkt kritiseret af et meget bredt udsnit af egyptere og udlagt som et knæfald for USA/Vesten og en kapitulation i forhold til Israel. Den øvrige arabiske verden reagerede også og organiserede en boykot af landet samt besluttede at flytte Den Arabiske Ligas hovedkontor til Tunis. De militante islamistiske grupperinger intensiverede deres kritik af regimet og en lille gruppe etableret i et samarbejde mellem *Jama´at al-Jihâd* og *Jama´at al-Islamiyya* gennemførte i oktober 1981 et attentat på Sadat. Gruppens medlemmer havde forud for kuppet studeret en lille pamflet skrevet af Abd al-Salam Faraj (1954-1982) med titlen

al-farîda al-ghâ´iba, den glemte forpligtelse, hvor forfatteren med tydelig inspiration fra Sayyid Qutb gjorde gældende, at Sadats regime var et eksempel på et muslimsk regime, der med overlæg forsøgte at skjule, at *jihâd* i virkeligheden var en af islams oprindelige religiøse pligter og derfor en pligt for alle muslimer (Jansen 1986). Men heller ikke i denne sammenhæng lykkedes det de militante islamister at formulere sig på en måde, der udløste folkelig støtte. Kritikken af Sadats politik var som nævnt bredt funderet, men at det skulle være en legitim begrundelse for et dødeligt attentat blev afvist. Den militante islamisme havde nok støtte hos enkelte, men fik aldrig held med at vinde ud- bredt folkelig støtte – heller ikke selv om de tog udgangspunkt i de samme populistiske begreber som både *Broderskabet* og skiftende nationalistiske grupperinger havde benyt- tet. Den brede ægyptiske befolkning kunne ganske enkelt ikke identificere sig med bud- skabet.

Shahstyrets fald – og islamistisk massemobilisering

Anderledes kom det til at gå i Iran, hvor Pahlavi-dynastiet i januar 1979 gik til grunde i et opgør med en alliance af indbyrdes meget forskellige ideologiske grupperinger. De enedes i oktober 1978 i Paris om et strategisk samarbejde, der i januar 1979 sluttelig tvang shahen i eksil (Bakhash 1986). Muhammad Reza (1919-1980) havde i begyndel- sen af 1960´erne sat et reformprojekt betegnet som *Den Hvide Revolution* i gang med det erklærede mål at gøre Iran til regionens førende stat i et tæt samarbejde med Vesten (Reza Pahlavi, 1971). De bærende ideer i shahens reformer blev stærkt kritiseret af reli- giøse grupperinger i Qum, men kritikken og demonstrationerne fik ikke nævneværdig støtte fra befolkningen. Ayatollah Khomeini (1902-1989) måtte som konsekvens heraf se sig selv sendt i eksil, og efter et kort ophold i Tyrkiet fik han asyl i Irak, hvor han slog sig ned i Najaf, der historisk var et af de førende shiamuslimske lærdomscentre i landet. Her holdt han i 1970 en række forelæsninger, der efterfølgende blev udgivet i bogform med titlen *Den Islamiske Regering* (oversat i Algar 1981). I forelæsningerne argumenterede han for nødvendigheden af at skabe et politisk system funderet på islam, fordi kun et sådant kunne sikre den sociale retfærdighed, Koranen foreskriver. Han gjorde sig i forelæsningerne også til talsmand for en ændring i den måde, de religiøse lærde arbejdede på og opfordrede direkte de yngre muslimske lærde til at være langt mere direkte, når de henvendte sig til den brede befolkning. Deres budskaber og konkre- te anvisninger skulle tilpasses den konkrete sociale, politiske og økonomiske situation, som karakteriserer det liv, befolkningen lever, og det råd må siges at være blevet taget eftertrykkeligt til efterretning af ganske mange religiøse lærde gennem de følgende årti- er.

   Khomeini selv evnede dette til fuldkommenhed, og hans mange forelæsninger og taler blev i Najaf optaget på kassettebånd og gennem 1970´erne smuglet ind i Iran for efterfølgende at blive delt ud til befolkningen i alle egne af landet. Iranernes sympati for shah-regimet blev mindre og mindre og udviklede sig sluttelig til en regelret util-

fredshed, udløst af voksende sociale spændinger for større og større dele af befolkningen, der slet ikke fik fordele af de stigende indtægter, Iran sikrede sig gennem 1970´erne som følge af de voldsomme stigninger i prisen på olie. Khomeini selv og mange andre religiøse lærde evnede at drage fordel af den voksende sociale polarisering i det iranske samfund (Algar (1981) giver adskillige eksempler på sådanne taler). Shahstyret blev beskyldt for at arbejde tæt sammen med udlandet navnlig USA, og den iranske overklasse blev skildret som landsforrædere, der som shahen selv misbrugte deres positioner til at berige sig og dermed fratage den brede iranske befolkning mulighed for at nyde godt af landets rigdomme. Khomeini-gruppens budskab blev således italesat på bedste populistiske vis.

En amerikansk antropolog ved navn Michael Fischer, der i efteråret 1978 var på feltarbejde i Iran, fulgte på nærmeste hold udviklingen i det endelige opgør med shahen og kunne dokumentere, hvorledes demonstrationerne gennem shahstyrets sidste måneder omhyggeligt blev orkestreret med inspiration fra imam Hussains martyrium ved Kerbala tilbage i 681 (Fischer 1980). Gennem efteråret 1978 blev det historiske drama ved Kerbala italesat i et populistisk narrativ, der tog udgangspunkt i den konkrete sociale og politiske situation, Iran befandt sig i. Den populistiske italesættelse, kredsen omkring Khomeini evnede at gøre brug af, var helt afgørende for den omfattende mobilisering, som oppositionen mod shahen satte i scene i det endelige opgør om magten i landet fra november 1978 til januar 1979.

Shahens endelige fald i januar 1979 udløste en voldsom intern borgerkrigslignende kamp mellem sekulære venstreorienterede grupper på den ene side og kredsen omkring Khomeini på den anden. Også i den sammenhæng lykkedes det Khomeini-gruppen at beskrive situationen i termer og billeder hentet fra den shiamuslimske tradition. De sekulære politiske grupperinger blev skildret som lakajer for udenlandske interesser og *ikke* som sande og autentiske iranere. Kredsen bag Khomeini fik ved en folkeafstemning i marts 1979 bred folkelig opbakning til etablering af en islamisk republik, og den nye grundlov sikrede, at centrale elementer af Khomeinis skrift om den islamiske regering blev lagt til grund for det nye politiske system, der efterfølgende blev etableret (Schirazi 1998). Og da Irak i september 1980 invaderede Iran og kortvarigt sikrede sig kontrol over Khuzistan-provinsen, lykkedes det endnu en gang det nye regime at italesætte situationen med brug af den shiitiske tradition. Borgerkrigen blev bragt til afslutning i løbet af sommeren 1982, hvor det lykkedes kredsen omkring Khomeini definitivt at nedkæmpe oppositionen og tvinge den i eksil (Arjomand 1988). Krigen mod Irak varede frem til en våbenhvile blev indgået i oktober 1988, men gennem hele krigen evnede det nye regime at fortolke krigen som et angreb på det sande iranske shiamuslimske folk (Johnson 2011).

Den populistiske ideologisering af islam var tidligere blevet sat på ord af den iranske sociolog Ali Shariati (1933-1977) og hans syntese mellem shia-islam og socialisme fik ganske bred tilslutning fra intellektuelle kredse, og det var denne tendens, der blev afgørende for, at det i januar 1979 lykkedes oppositionen at bringe shah-styret til fald, og dermed var islamismens potentiale for populistisk mobilisering til fulde doku-

menteret. Det skulle gennem 1980´erne gentage sig med etableringen først af *Hizballah* i Libanon og siden *Hamas* i Gaza (Alagha 2011; Gunning 2007). Begge grupper formulerede deres synspunkter med brug af en stærk anti-imperialistisk retorik, der også havde karakteriseret mobiliseringen i Iran. Tendensen fik yderligere fremdrift, da det i 1988 lykkedes en alliance mellem de afghanske talibanere og frivillige *mujâhidûn* fra forskellige lande rundt om i den muslimske verden at tvinge USSR ud af Afghanistan (Hamid og Farrall 2015). I løbet af et årti havde populistisk islamisme bidraget til at bringe to regimer til fald, der havde støtte fra de to eksisterende supermagter USA (der støttede shahstyret i Iran) og USSR (der støttede det kommunistiske styre i Afghanistan). Og dermed var fundamentet for den forskydning, som den militante islamisme oplevede fra begyndelsen af 1990´erne og frem, lagt. Militant islamisme blev transformeret fra at være et fænomen i den muslimske verden til at blive, hvad det har været siden: et internationalt sikkerhedsproblem. Militante islamister alene eller organiseret i mindre grupperinger har siden 2001 gennemført en stribe terrorangreb mod den vestlige verden. Angrebene og de islamistiske grupperinger udgør *ikke* en reel fare for den vestlige verden, dertil er de for få og for uorganiseret, men de kan ramme hvor som helst, når som helst og påføre uskyldige civile lidelser og smerte (Turner 2014). At også den internationalt funderede militante islamisme forsøger at udtrykke sig i populistiske termer og begreber er tydeligt, men lige så tydeligt er det, at deres populistiske italesættelser ikke har evnet at mobilisere folkelig opbakning. Det gjaldt Usama bin Ladins opfordring til *jihad* mod jøder og korsfarere fra 1998 (Ibrahim 2007), og det gjaldt Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, der 29. juni 2014 udråbte kalifatet (Lister 2015). Ingen af disse initiativer fik bred folkelig opbakning som tilfældet var det med *Det Muslimske Broderskab* i Egypten og kredsen omkring Khomeini i Iran.

Post-islamisme

Gennem hele det 20. århundrede har islamisme været en del af det politiske og kulturelle liv i Mellemøsten, og fra 1970´erne og frem slog islamisme også igennem i den tyrkiske republik, der var blevet etableret i 1923 på et klart formuleret sekulært grundlag (White 2002). Periodisk har den islamistiske bevægelse været under voldsomt pres, men hver gang er den dukket op igen og interessant nok ofte i nye former og med nye udtryk. Det blev synligt i Egypten gennem 1990´erne, hvor en ny individuel variant af islamisme slog igennem. Det blev erkendt af flere og flere militante grupperinger, at den stat, de gerne ville sikre sig kontrol over, var stærkere end som så og derfor ikke lod sig nedkæmpe. Når det lykkedes kredsen omkring Khomeini at etablere en islamisk republik i Iran var det derfor et udtryk for et sammenfald af særlige politiske og økonomiske omstændigheder. Resultatet blev, at flere militante grupperinger i Egypten opgav kampen og erklærede sig rede til forhandling med systemet, hvis deres fængslede medlemmer blev løsladt efter den model, som Sadat i midten af 1970´erne indgik med *Det Muslimske Broderskab.*

Dermed var den militante islamismes drøm om at sikre sig kontrollen med staten opgivet, men islamismen som fænomen var ikke gået i graven. Allerede i 1980´erne havde medlemmer af *Broderskabet* og andre med samme tilgang taget initiativ til at engagere sig i de eksisterende faglige og professionelle organisationer, og dermed påviste de, at der var mulighed for at præge udviklingen i landet uden om det traditionelle politiske system. Tendensen kunne også aflæses i et voksende individuelt engagement i et sandt flor af tilbud drevet af islamistiske aktivister af den type, der havde karakteriseret *Broderskabet*, men nu ofte sat i gang af personer, der nok var islamister men ikke nødvendigvis medlemmer (Ismail 2004; Saba 2005; Ismail 2006). Tendensen blev forstærket af den nye medievirkelighed, der slog igennem i den mellemøstlige verden fra midten af 1990´erne og frem. Private fik med ny teknologi adgang til TV (Galal 2009; Gräf og Skovgaard-Petersen 2009) og eksempelvis prædikanten Khaled Amr fik stor betydning for mange egyptere, fordi han fastholdt, at man som troende muslim udmærket kunne engagere sig i det private erhvervsliv. Et udbytterigt engagement var *ikke* i modstrid med den fortolkning af islam prædikanten formulerede i sine TV-udsendelser (Sætren 2006; Olsson 2013). Islam blev på den måde fra midten af 1990´erne og frem for mange et individuelt engagement, og en måde hvorpå den enkelte i praksis kunne synligøre islams relevans for det moderne liv ved udgangen af det 20. århundrede, og tendensen er blevet fortsat i begyndelsen af det 21. århundrede (Brown 2016).

Denne form for islamisme er af flere forskere betegnet som post-islamistisk. Islamisme er i denne forståelse ikke længere et politisk engagement om magt, og islam er ikke formuleret som en politisk ideologi, således som den blev det af en lang række radikale og militante islamistiske grupperinger i de foregående årtier. Islamisme blev nu transformeret til et individuelt engagement, der helt i overensstemmelse med moderniteten kan forbinde den enkelte troende til et utal af forskellige grupperinger af aktive medborgere med henblik på at støtte personer, som i en given sammenhæng har brug for hjælp og støtte af forskellig art: Gratis juridisk rådgivning i forhold til kommunale og/eller statslige institutioner; rådgivning i forbindelse med graviditet; støtte til lektielæsning; støtte til ældre med nedsat fysisk bevægelighed eller støtte til kvinder, der har været udsat for vold og/eller seksuelle overgreb (Bayat 2007; Bayat 2009). Når sådanne initiativer skal begrundes sker det igen med brug af populistiske referencer: Det skal modvirke den vestlige verdens indflydelse, og det skal genskabe sande værdier og sikre en udvikling, der tager rod i de traditioner og med de værdier, der nu lokalt gør sig gældende. Dermed har den populisme, som denne type islamisme præsenterer fundet nye veje at italesætte og håndhæve et aktivistisk engagement – og så længe islamisme evner at italesætte sig selv på den måde vil den forblive en dynamisk størrelse i Mellemøsten (Bayat 2007; Bayat 2009).

Konklusion

Det Muslimske Broderskab diskuterede helt tilbage i 1990´erne om tiden var inde til at bevægelsen etablerede sig som et regelret politisk parti. En række medlemmer var i 1996 med til at danne partiet *Wasat* – et ord der betegner 'midte' – men bevægelsens ledelse afviste initiativet. Først da Mubarak blev tvunget til at trække sig tilbage i februar 2011 og dermed satte en udvikling i gang mod skabelsen af et nyt politisk system i Egypten, besluttede *Broderskabet* at danne *Retfærdighedspartiet.* Ved valget til parlamentet i 2012 blev partiet det største parti, medens det salafistiske *al-Nur-parti* blev det næststørste parti i det nyvalgte parlament (Boserup 2016). Ved præsidentvalget samme år blev Muhammad Mursi (født 1951), der gennem mange år havde været medlem af *Broderskabet,* valgt til ny præsident ved det første frie præsidentvalg i Egyptens moderne historie. Men året efter måtte han se sig fjernet fra magten af sin forsvarsminister Abd al-Fatah al-Sisi (født 1954), der siden har siddet tungt på magten (Hokayem 2016). Det nye militære regime har igen forbudt *Broderskabet,* fængslet et meget stort antal medlemmer af bevægelsen og i skueprocesser dømt mange til døden eller til lange fængselsstraffe. At dømme efter den opbakning, *Broderskabet* fik ved valgene i 2012 taler intet for, at det vil lykkes al-Sisis regime at knække endsige tilintetgøre *Broderskabet,* men naturligvis nok at gøre betingelserne for dets fortsatte virke vanskeligt. Imens må individuelle personer opretholde den tolkning af islam som tilsyneladende fortsat har udbredt støtte i den brede befolkning. Et af midlerne hertil er en populistisk strategi med løbende tilkendegivelser af, hvorledes det sande muslimske Egypten skal forholde sig. Det har siden begyndelsen af etableringen af *Broderskabet* i 1928 kunnet dokumenteres, at islamisme er populistisk men også at den mellemøstlige populisme er blevet islamistisk som tilfældet med etableringen af Den Islamiske Republik Iran i 1979 har vist.

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What Does 'Lügenpresse' Mean? Expressions of Media Distrust on PEGIDA's Facebook Pages

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In this article, we analyze the protest movement PEGIDA's criticism of the press (i. e. 'Lügenpresse', the 'liar press') on Facebook. What are the main points of criticism of the press and what are the reasons expressed for this criticism, and how do they refer to traditional media in the postings? We conduct a qualitative content analysis of PEGIDA's Facebook pages in Germany, Austria, Sweden, and Norway. The study shows that there are two main types of references: affirmative references to prove one's own positions and contesting references which comprise media criticism.

Introduction

The liar press-shouts during the rallies of the right-wing populist movement PEGIDA (abbreviation for 'Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident) in Germany condense one of the most dominating discourses not only in Germany but also in other countries. The question if mainstream media reports accurately and does a full coverage including different standpoints, especially concerning political issues, is in the middle of this debate. Especially right-wing populist politicians and activists claim that established media lies in the coverage of migration politics. Journalists are seen as part of the elite, besides the political establishment or other elite persons and organizations like international bank houses, and are therefore defined as enemies in populist ideology. Populist communication tries to appeal to the 'pure people' and to separate them from 'the elite' and social outgroups such as migrants, long-time unemployed people and others (Jagers and Walgrave 2007). The aversion against journalism expresses itself not only in 'liar press' shouts of protesters but also in right-wing party

politics: Frauke Petry, a former politician of the German party *Alternative for Germany,* persistently calls established journalism 'Pinocchio press. Also, physical attacks on journalists are reported and condemned by professional organizations (BDZV 2016). In Sweden, the Sweden Democrats have for long been treated more negatively by journalists than other parties and have successfully been able to use the victimization by mainstream media as a rhetorical resource (Hellström and Lodenius 2016).

PEGIDA's allegations include critique on the trustworthiness of journalistic products as well as on an assumed limitation of political diversity in media coverage. Empirical research shows that established journalists are not always used as an enemy in populist discourse. In many cases, the populist movement even used mainstream media coverage to underline their own political positions (Holt and Haller 2016). However, media distrust remains a central category in populist right-wing discourse. But *how* exactly PEGIDA relates to mainstream media has not been investigated yet. This paper uses a qualitative content analysis of the PEGIDA Facebook pages of its outlets in Germany, Austria, Sweden, and Norway. We analyzed postings from June 1st until September 30, 2015 to identify the patterns of media criticism used in the online communication of the movement in order to answer our research question (RQ): *How are references to mainstream media used on the PEGIDA Facebook pages in Germany, Austria, Sweden, and Norway*?

Media distrust, populism, and alternative media

In recent years, Europe has seen the rise of populism as well as various alternative media that express anti-system, anti-establishment and anti-immigration sentiments (Aalberg, Esser, Reinemann, Stromback, and De Vreese 2016; Holt 2016). These media present alternative interpretations of political and social events and try to influence public opinion according to agendas that are mainly critical of immigration politics and the perception of an imminent threat of Islamization of European countries – although the main focus of criticism and level of 'anti-systemness' (Capoccia 2002) varies greatly among different outlets. Additionally, the intensity of criticism also varies greatly between them, making it difficult to talk about a specific and well-defined new type of alternative media. Nevertheless, as in the Swedish case, a number of alternative media outlets (especially online) with a specific focus on a) criticism of Swedish immigration policy and b) of how this issue is treated in mainstream media have become visible enough to attract much attention and cause intense debates within the mainstream media (Truedson 2016). These alternative media often accuse traditional media of: being biased against any immigration-critical perspective, covering up problems related to immigration, and ostracizing individuals who espouse political views deemed controversial (Holt 2016). What distinguishes these alternative media from other social or participatory media is their clear and outspoken aim to blame,

critique and sometimes even undermine trust in established media. These media outlets are not always purely ideological in a traditional sense, although there are many with outspoken sympathy for right-wing extremism. Their ideological focus is not, however, limited to far-right activism. Those active in these environments represent positions along a very wide spectrum – from neo-Nazis and fascists through right wing populists to moderates and social democrats (Holt 2016). As an alternative media channel, and given the fact that the PEGIDA movement expressly avoids contact with mainstream media, the movement's Facebook pages can be placed within this broader context of immigration critical alternative media.

Since there is a lack of research and knowledge specifically about these media, political as well as scholarly debates about such media channels can (and tend to) be somewhat crippled by indignation and polemics (Taguieff 2015), rather than based on facts and systematic observations. In order to understand why these media are appearing in Europe and seem to be successful in their communication, it is necessary to study the whole range of political expressions related to immigration-critical perspectives and media skepticism, especially in the context of the "new technological affordances epitomized by Web 2.0". (Alvares and Dahlgren 2015). The criticism from these alternative media regarding the way that mainstream media works cannot be brushed off as a minimal and peripheral phenomenon; they represent perspectives that echo across the European political scene as well the American, where President Donald Trump employs similar arguments (Trump 2016). Tsfati (2003, p. 67) defines media skepticism as a sense of "alienation and mistrust toward the mainstream media". It involves the "feeling that journalists are not fair or objective in their reports about society and that they do not always tell the whole story" and that mainstream journalists "will sacrifice accuracy and precision for personal and commercial gains" (Tsfati 2003, 67). A recent study shows support for the hypothesis that online news-consumption from alternative sources through social media negatively affects the level of satisfaction with democracy, and the authors refer to interaction with "anti-system" views as an explanation (Ceron and Memoli 2015). In this paper, our aim is to study and describe this criticism as it is visible through the way PEGIDA relates to mainstream media in their Facebook postings, in order to contribute to a better understanding of how media criticism is expressed by populist movements on social media.

Paradoxically, the relationship between populist players and alternative media on the one hand, and mainstream media on the other, is not entirely one of contestation and antagonism. Populist politicians need the mainstream media both as opposing poles in their rhetoric and as vehicles for their message. The connection between these movements and the established media is therefore more complex because any movement needs publicity (Mazzoleni 2014). Also, recent studies have shown that alternative media are highly dependent on mainstream media for material to write about and to comment on; in order for there to be an alternative, the original must be in place and active (Holt 2016).

Methodology

The strategic communication of the PEGIDA movement almost exclusively takes place via Facebook pages as the leaders refuse to talk to established media. For instance, PEGIDA Germany does not operate a genuine website. In the beginning of the movement, the URL www.pegida.de linked to the Facebook account @*pegidaevofficial,* which is the most important communication platform of the protesters. Since right-wing populist movements often express anti-mainstream media resentments that may lead to a non-use of traditional PR instruments such as press conferences or news releases, political communication research has to focus on optional communication channels such as social network sites.

Since there is less research on manifestations of media distrust and criticism of established media by populist social movements, an explorative approach is useful. In a recent study (Holt and Haller 2016), we found that PEGIDA pages in different countries often refer to news articles of established media in an affirmative fashion, for example by pointing out that a mainstream newspaper article states something that strengthens their own arguments. However, a closer qualitative research has not yet been made. Our approach in this study focuses on a qualitative content analysis of the postings on the official Facebook sites of the movement to find out how PEGIDA outlets substantiate the 'liar press' accusation. Media distrust can be expressed by different allegations. Some critiques argue that journalists hide facts that could be considered opportune to a right-wing populist agenda, such as hiding crime statistics of migrants. Other accusations claim that there is an exclusion of some political camps such as right-wing movements, parties or politicians. The most aggressive allegations are that mainstream media journalists intentionally lie in terms of presenting wrong information on topics, especially concerning migration. The qualitative content analysis focuses on the type of media distrust in the postings of the movement. The coding was conducted by using the qualitative research software MAXQDA. All posts containing references to traditional media, online and offline, were identified and part of the qualitative analysis. 'References' can be differentiated between explicit and implicit references:

1) An *explicit* mention of traditional media can be identified when media companies or journalists are explicitly named, for example: 'According to an article of *SPIEGEL Online*' or 'a journalist from the *ARD* TV show'. Hyperlinks to mainstream media products are also counted as explicit references.

2) An *implicit* mention occurs when traditional media outlets are not

named but addressed as a whole, for example as 'liar press', 'the mainstream media', 'Pinocchio press', 'established media' or 'journalistic elite'.

The four countries we have selected are examples of countries where the emergence of a movement like PEGIDA, and their brand of populism, constitutes a sharper contrast to the mainstream/elite attitude toward immigration (and Islam in particular) upheld in public discourse by influential parties than in many other European countries. This is most evident in Germany and Sweden – countries who have differed mostly from most European countries in this respect – but it also goes for Austria and Norway to a lesser degree (Berry, Garcia-Blanco, and Moore 2016). The self-appointed position as outsider, rebel and voice of marginalized opinions is highlighted in such settings and motivates the study of how they relate to mainstream media in these countries. Since there are also differences between the countries in these matters, a comparison is made between them.

Overall, the sample includes 892 postings (Germany: 351; Austria: 384; Sweden: 106; and Norway: 51). After identifying the posts with references to mainstream media the sample was reduced to 348 postings (Germany: 151; Austria: 151; Sweden: 25; and Norway 21). Converted to percentages, 43% of the German, 39% of the Austrian, 26% of the Swedish and 41% of the Norwegian sample contain at least one reference to mainstream media. After picking out relevant postings with references to traditional media and importing them to MAXQDA, we analyzed the objects. The research focus was on the actual use of the media references: We investigated how the references were used and whether the usage fulfilled a strategic function. It was assumed that the PEGIDA pages mainly criticized mainstream media as an opposing actor for political reasons.

Our sample contains all postings of the official PEGIDA Facebook pages from June 1st until September 30 in the most intense phase of the refugee crisis of 2015. The German sample must be seen as a special case for several reasons: PEGIDA emerged in Germany and was topic of international media coverage, especially in 2015 when the participant numbers rose up to 20.000-25.000 (Durchgezaehlt.org 2016).[1] Besides, the German PEGIDA page is by a large margin the most successful page in the sample in terms of 'likes'. In the empirical analysis and particularly in the interpretation of the findings it has to be noted that the Scandinavian pages do not have that range (the Swedish page had 1.325 'likes' and the Norwegian had 5.143). In July 2016 the German page had about 205.000 'likes'. A quite impressive number: Chancellor Merkel's CDU (Christian Democratic Union) had about 123.500 'likes' and the SPD (Social Democrats) 120.000 in December 2016. The German page was also in the center of a

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[1] Social movements are difficult to analyze as there is no registration process in the most cases. We also have different sources counting the numbers of protest marchers. The website Durchgezaehlt.org shows all trustworthy sources and statistics.

conflict between PEGIDA and Facebook. After complaints of users the original page was shut down in July 2016 (SZ-Online 2016) but was re-established as a new site.

Empirical Findings

In this chapter we will present the qualitative findings of the study. Each subchapter will first describe an overall theoretical consolidation. In a second step examples from each investigated country will illustrate the theoretical assumptions. Actually, the study identified the assumed 'liar press' accusation by the right-wing populists. Nevertheless, we found another communicative pattern regarding media references, namely affirmative ones. A third type of references was neutral or could not be coded unambiguously. For a better transparency and understanding, all selected posts in the following were translated into English by the authors.

<u>Affirmative References</u>

Contrary to the thesis of a dominance of media criticism or distrust, the qualitative analysis revealed an affirmative pattern. These types of references are used to 'prove' own political standpoints of the page producers. Some articles substantiated PEGIDA's positions, for example by showing statistics on migration or by citing politicians or experts who criticize migration policies.

Germany

The simplest type of affirmative references are articles to topics including crime caused by immigrants or terrorism. On June 26th the German PEGIDA page linked to breaking news of the magazine *Focus* about the Islamic terror attack on a tourist hotel in Tunisia. The producers of the page affirmed their fears with the words: "And it goes on, take care guys, the sleeper cells can be everywhere!" Another link to the newspaper *Die Welt* from September 3rd was about the Norwegian intelligence warning of ISIS and Al Nusra terrorists who could use refugee trails to enter Europe. Affirmative references were not only about crime but also contained critique on the refugee policy. There are illustrative examples for that: On September 3rd PEGIDA linked to *MDR*, a German public service TV station. It reported about the trade with Syrian passports in Germany. A second article underlined that political problem in the newspaper *Die Welt*. It reported about a Dutch journalist who bought a fake Syrian passport with the portrait and the personal information of the Prime Minister of the Netherlands, Mark Rutte. There are further references which were used to prove a failed immigration policy in other areas: A link to the local newspaper *SHZ* lead to an article about Denmark closing its borders

(September 9th). The post is accompanied by the text: "Denmark shuts down…it is colorful enough." In the German right-wing sector the word "colorful" (German: "bunt") is regularly used in a sarcastic way to make fun of (mainly left-wing) people demanding a high diversity of cultures in the country. PEGIDA's criticism also concerns concrete political areas, for instance labor market policy. An article of the weekly newspaper *Die Zeit* cited the German Employment Minister, Andrea Nahles with the words "The Syrian Doctor is not the usual case." (September 10th). In the lead of the posting the administrators of the page are agitating against asylum seekers. Like in many other posts of the German page there is also an insult against Sigmar Gabriel, former leader of the Social Democrats (SPD), who is named as "#FastSonderSchülerSigmar" in reference to Gabriel's statement that a former teacher wanted him to go to a special-needs school.

Austria

Like in the case study of Germany, we also found affirmative references on the Austrian page. One type of 'positive' references are posts of mainstream media articles citing politicians or experts with similar or same political positions to those of PEGIDA. An online text of the Austrian quality newspaper *Die Presse* was posted on July 9th: The text cited Heinz-Christian Strache, frontman of the right-wing populist Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ). The text is about the discussion on financial help for Greece. Strache demands a referendum of the Austrian people before the government would send money to the indebted country. The introductory text of the posting highlights Strache's quote and a part of the article. A second type of affirmative references concerns statistics that support PEGIDA's positions on migration. On September 10th the movement uploaded an article of *Heute*, a large giveaway newspaper in Austria. The article shows a statistic on financial family assistance for immigrants: "223 million euros flowed abroad in 2014". The post implicitly assumed that immigration costs Austria millions of euros.

Besides texts which are used to prove one's own position, we see another type of affirmative reference: One posting referred to the newspaper *Augsburger Allgemeine* and was about the plan of PEGIDA Germany to run in the 2016 state elections (regional elections) in Germany (July 8th). The article cited one of the most prominent leaders of PEGIDA, Lutz Bachmann. In a speech at a rally in the city of Leipzig, he said that PEGIDA would try to get direct mandates to overcome the five-percent threshold needed to gain seats in the state parliaments ('Landtage'). That posting shows that affirmative references are not only about certain political issues but also concern organizational aspects. The communicative purpose could be to show the Austrian supporters that the right-wing populist movement has a clear political strategy.

In three cases the Austrian page posted letters to the editor of mainstream media dealing with the asylum crisis (two letters) and the fear of terrorism. All texts were published in

the leading Austrian tabloid *Krone* in the column 'The Free Word' ('Das Freie Wort'). On June 29th a reader criticized the Austrian Minister of the Interior who said that terrorism in France and Tunisia would "have no connection to Austria". The writer complains about the wording of Islamic crimes which would be called 'psychotic' and not as terrorist attacks. The other letters made the asylum crisis a subject of discussion. On July 26th a reader wrote about asylum seekers which complained about the conditions in the Austrian refugee camp in Traiskirchen: "Therefore my question to all of those asylum seekers: Why are you here, more specifically why are you not going somewhere else if you do not like the care in Austria?". The third letter (August 9th) built up a conflict between the political class and the people in the asylum discussion: "What is happening right now is pure dictatorship and the bill will be presented in the end. Look at the opinion polls! Dear guys, you are ruling in the wrong direction against us Austrians!". The use of letters to the editor may be to produce a 'community feeling' in the right-wing sphere. By showing letters of normal media recipients creates the impression that PEGIDA's claims 'match up' with the political standpoints of the recipients. However, all three texts are similar to PEGIDA's claims in content and tone.

Sweden

As shown in a previous study, the Swedish page is more oriented towards communication directly with supporters than the other countries, for example with information about a planned rally or about the leadership of the movement or with direct calls for actions (for example 'share this post'). Sweden also stands out against the other three countries referring to traditional media less frequently (and to alternative media more frequently) than the other countries (Holt and Haller 2016). Here we have looked more specifically into the nature of the references to traditional media. When it comes to the affirmative references, we found that they fall into the same patterns as described above with the German and Austrian cases. On the 2 August, 2015, for example a posting contained a shared article from the Swedish Public Service TV broadcaster (*SVT*), with a debate article arguing against a proposal for introducing separate opening hours for men and women at certain public pools. In this case it is clear that the posting of this article is a statement of support for the debater who clearly opposed such Islamic influence on Swedish public life. Other postings contained articles from traditional media with statements or information that problematizes Islamic organizations or pointed to the threat of Islamic terrorism or Swedish unpreparedness for crime committed by Muslim immigrants. One post contained a link to an article by a local tabloid where the view on women and equality presented on various Muslim online resources in Sweden is criticized. Another example is a link to a morning newspaper with an article about the police inability to deal with crime in certain problematic areas where many immigrants live. One posting was a link to an article in a national tabloid *Expressen* about how ISIS is smuggling terrorists into

Sweden. The references to traditional media on the Swedish page were almost exclusively posted just as links - without any comments.

Norway

The Norwegian page contained many references with added comments from the one who posted. On the 18th of June, for example, the posting contained a reference to an article in the business newspaper *Finansavisen* and an article that compared the cost of accepting refugees from Syria into Norway with the cost of sending aid to the region. PEGIDA Norway comments: "The cost for one Syrian refugee is 7 million crowns!". Other affirmative postings of links to mainstream media mainly deal with news that are presented as support for a critical stance against Islam, like reports about the persecution of Christians in Islamic countries or negative effects of immigration for Norwegians (such as for example cut downs in the care for the elderly made in order to accommodate refugees).

Contesting References

Our first working hypothesis claimed that there will be mostly anti-media postings on all PEGIDA pages in the sample. Theoretical works suggest that media criticism is an integral part of an anti-elite strategy of populist communication. Actually, there are many contesting references which will be shown below.

Germany

Some contesting references in the German sample used mainstream media content as a basis to contest opposing positions. An online article of the private news channel *N-TV* featured an interview with the CEO of Daimler Benz, who said that "most of the refugees are young, well-educated and highly motivated. Precisely the type of people we are looking for." (September 6th). PEGIDA then called him a hypocrite as Daimler would not build any factories in Africa which would stop emigration from the continent. Another post linked to an article of the *Sächsische Zeitung* and was about rumors that asylum seekers would be allowed to steal in supermarkets. The producers of the Facebook page commented on that and claimed that the newspaper was owned by the Social Democratic Party: "Really a great and calming journalistic investigation" followed by laughing emoticons. It is obvious that PEGIDA questioned the trustworthiness of the report. This example shows that the right-wing group tries to build up a political-medial complex which can also be observed on a macro level (see below). A further disagreement with a professional can be seen on June 9th: After riots

by left-wing extremist in Leipzig a scientist said in the newspaper *Freie Presse* that more policemen could "heat up the atmosphere" at demonstrations. In that case PEGIDA also uses a sarcastic reply: "Consequently less police would mean that the SAntifa picks up little flowers, we understood Professor Pickel…". Like in other cases PEGIDA creates a compound word: 'SAntifa', which contains 'Antifa' as the abbreviation for anti-fascist movements and 'SA' which stands for the Sturmabteilung, a paramilitary group in the Third Reich. Once again, a separation into 'the people' and a social outgroup, the anti-fascists, is made including criticism of the elite personalized by a scientist was made.

In addition to attacks against specific media outlets there are posts expressing critique to established media in general. It is striking that the German page often uses the word 'liar press' to label mainstream media as untrustworthy information sources (for example on September 3rd, 4th, 11th, 14th, 16th or 18th). The liar press allegation is often accompanied by insults such as the word '#Journaille' which is a degrading German term for journalism. On September 19th PEGIDA wrote: "The following applies for every #journaille of that kind, you have to hit the #presstitutes where it hurts the most.". 'Presstitutes' is a compound word of 'press' and 'prostitutes' which indicates an assertion that journalists are corrupt. The German PEGIDA page often uses caricatures showing a right-wing world views. A cartoon from September 2nd shows journalists in training with an instructor saying: "You are writing 'left march'? Everyone who is neglecting the teaching content is fired!". There is also an attempt to create some kind of a counter-public in a posting on September 2nd when PEGIDA linked to a live video stream in Budapest to show live pictures of refugees in the Hungarian capital. In that posting the movement claimed that "the #presstitutes of the #journaille" deliberately choose images of children to manipulate the public.

Austria

Most cases of contesting posts concern dissent with the content of mainstream media articles, for example on July 22nd, August 17th, 18th or September 24th. The reference from July 22nd is an article to the German news magazine *Focus* on Islamic religious education in Germany. PEGIDA Austria criticizes that concept in a satirical way: "Seriously, with an alleged minority of 4.2 million Muslims in Germany this is absolutely unnecessary, or have we been lied to for decades?". The example from August 18th is an interview with a social scientist published in the Austrian newspaper *Der Standard*. In the text, the researcher claims that we witness the "most qualified immigration ever". PEGIDA opposes the statement and proposes a policy which takes care that people do not have to flee to Europe if their home countries would be more livable. A third example is a graphic of the Austrian Television which shows a quote of the chairwomen of the Green Party in Austria, Eva Glawischnig, who said that she wants to integrate the burka to the Austrian society. PEGIDA comments on that: "The

chairwomen of the Greens Eva Glawischnig integrates the burka into Austria. Or Austria into the burka. Only she knows precisely!". There is also direct criticism of specific media outlets. On September 4th a link to a TV interview aired on Austrian Television (*ORF*) was commented by PEGIDA: "The ORF did not expect that a Middle East expert gives answers to mass migration to Europe which the red broadcasting (in German the term "Rotfunk" indicates a left-leaning medium) has not expected!".

Besides contesting references, we also find postings showing an overall claim against mainstream media. These are postings which are not necessarily naming specific media institutions but which are displaying media criticism in general. Negative references of that type are sometimes made by posting wall charts claiming that media is an "agitator" (September 24th), "hides" (September 12th) information, or manipulates the coverage by only showing "dead children or women" (September 5th) as refugee victims. Some cases indicate that the Austrian producers try to build up the classical populist triad (Jagers and Walgrave 2007, p. 323) of 'the people' against 'the elites', consisting of politicians and the media, and against 'social outside groups' which are supposed as a threat to the 'heartland' (Mudde 2004, p. 543), mainly Muslim migrants (August 17th, 28th and September 10th). An example from September 24th summarizes all three social groups of populist discourse in a wall chart: "Big thanks to everybody who has the courage to speak about problems in our asylum policy. Thank you for resisting the agitation of the media, celebrities, the lefts, the greens and other do-gooders. Keep it up! You are not alone!". Like in the German sample, there are also allegations of an influence of the government on public broadcasting, for instance on August 22nd: The page links to an article of a right-wing alternative website blaming the Austrian Television not to reveal the origin of a band of robbers in Vienna. Another post from September 10th blames the *ORF* to be an institution of "state propaganda" and calls the public service broadcaster "state broadcaster" (in German: "Staatsfunk" in terms of an official propaganda channel of the ruling class).

Sweden

The contesting references on the Swedish PEGIDA page were rare. The examples we found mostly contained *indirect* contesting references where articles from immigration critical alternative media were cited and where mainstream media is criticized. One example is a link to a video from the American alternative site *Clashdaily.com*, telling the story of a young girl who was raped by Muslim immigrants. The highlighted preamble states: "This is exactly what the media does not want you to know.". Another posting consisted of a link to an article at *Pamelageller.com* with the title: "Media BLACKOUT on MASSIVE PROTEST Against Muslim Migrant Invasion of Europe.". There were no postings at all containing comments by PEGIDA Sweden.

Norway

The contesting references to mainstream media found on the Norwegian page were either arguments against statements and opinions presented in newspapers or contained critical remarks about the media per se. One post dealt with the fact that the PEGIDA movement is widely described as right-wing extremist in the mainstream media and countered by referring to humanist values. Another posting linked to an article in the daily newspaper *Dagbladet.no* with the title "A good investment for Norway" - pointing to immigration as an investment to counter the demographic trend of a decreasing population in Norway. PEGIDA Norway comments: "Is this irony?", and present statistics for the employment rate for immigrants from several Muslim countries. Another type of contesting reference deals with how the media work. In relation to an attempted rape case, where the suspects were described as North Africans in mainstream media, a debate followed about whether or not to disclose such information. PEGIDA Norway exclaims: "Enrichment! Attempted rape! Multiculture!", blaming Norwegian politicians and media paving the way for such behavior by being overly cautious in these matters.

Discussion

Overall, we identified two strategic patterns of PEGIDA's online communication: Firstly, affirmative references (references used in an affirmative way, as proof of own positions or support for stated opinions). Against our first working hypothesis, there were not only contesting references to established media which would have confirmed theories of populism assuming that populists are dependent on the antipode against elite institutions like media organizations (Mudde 2004; Jagers and Walgrave 2007). Secondly, we found contesting references criticizing mainstream media. Contesting references can be separated into two sub patterns: The first type comprises of 'liar press' allegations in general. As the qualitative analysis shows, criticism of 'the liar press', 'the state media' or 'the red broadcast' reveal a deep-rooted skepticism visible on the PEGIDA Facebook pages in all four countries. The second sub pattern contains opposing opinions to media information, for instance disagreement with statements of public figures speaking in the media. In this respect, Germany, Austria, and Norway follow a similar pattern, where comments accompany links to articles containing statements in mainstream media, while the Swedish page more passively posts links to content in other media.

The occurrence of affirmative references to mainstream media shows the complexity of populist communication as well as its relationship to established media organizations. On the one hand, an alternative media sphere was established in the last years with a high reach in some instances. If we look at Germany we see a wide range of right-wing alternative media projects like *Politically Incorrect* (*PI News*), *Compact* magazine, *Junge Freiheit* and the publishing house *Kopp*. These publishers are, because

of their wide reach, rather successful in the right-wing sector. In addition to that, the publishers mentioned above offer a broad spectrum of content, for example: articles, videos, books, or conferences. Consequently, Storz (2015, 7) believes there is "communicative full service" in the right-wing public sphere. Despite of the emergence of right-wing media, our findings show that populist communication depends on the supply of information by established media houses since right-wing alternative media do not have the financial and personnel resources for 'real' journalistic work. Besides, the use of mainstream media content may lead to a higher credibility among the public.

Restrictions of the study

This paper presented an exploratory study to discover possible relationships between populist social movements and established media. Therefore, a qualitative approach was used in order to focus on the content and the language of the PEGIDA postings. We tried to present our methodology and findings as transparent as possible. However, there are some restrictions of the study which have to be considered in the valuation of the findings. As in other online content analysis, we cannot guarantee that the content was not modified since we saved the material on a fixed date. Almost all online content is characterized by a high transitoriness and dynamicity. There is also a problem concerning the multimediality and multimodality of online content (Wünsch and Welker 2010, 497): Facebook posts do not only contain texts but also videos, images and other visual material such as emoticons, visual memes or gifs. Though we also tried to include ironic and sarcastic visual statements, our study mainly focused on the textual part of the material.

Furthermore, the methodological design of the study was based on theoretical assumptions of the relationship between populism and the media. After a first analysis, we decided to use a qualitative content analysis to determine main categories of populist references to mainstream media actors. Hence, the presented study must be seen as a preliminary study for a quantitative content analysis. Due to limited personnel resources the paper is limited to the Scandinavian, German and Austrian case studies. Hence, the study cannot claim to be applicable for other countries as well as for other types of populist web presences. Nevertheless, our theoretical classification is useful and can be used in further research projects on populist online communication.

Concluding remarks and outlook

This paper tries to answer the question of how right-wing populist movements relate to and criticize established media. We therefore analyzed the Facebook communication of the right-wing movement PEGIDA in Germany, Austria, Sweden, and Norway. As

stated above, there is an alternative media sphere being established in the populist sector. In the European case, these communicative services are not as powerful as mainstream media. However, we witness a higher recognition of political alternative media in the US. After the inauguration of President Donald Trump, some right-wing media received press credentials for the White House, for example the *Gateway Pundit* blog (Grynbaum 2017). Apart from smaller alternative media organizations, *Breitbart News Network* became one of the leading news sites for conservatives in the US. The use, spread and impact of such alternative media will be a major issue for media scholars and political scientists to study in the near future.

Further research should continue to analyze the relationship of populist alternative media and mainstream media to observe possible changes in the dependence of alternative media on content of established journalism. Furthermore, general and ongoing studies on the field positions of alternative media actors could be useful to identify powerful players in the alternative media field. A field-centered approach could be a reasonable basis to determine the power positions which arise from inequitable allocations of cultural, social, and economic capital (Bourdieu 1992, 58). Influential populist media outlets like *Breitbart* in the US, *Avpixlat* and *Fria Tider* in Sweden or *Kopp* in Germany could be ranked higher in the alternative media field whereas smaller blogs or individual websites are less powerful. An ongoing measurement of that field could give scholars the possibility to make predictions for the future communicative framework in democratic societies.

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Perceptions of 'Populism' and 'Anti-populism' in Greek Public Discourse during the Crisis: The case of the website 'Anti-news'

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The aim of this paper is to present how 'populism' is perceived in the website 'Anti-news' as a representative example of the Greek public discourse in the period between 2010-2016, when the economic crisis heavily affected Greece at a political and social level. The paper will also attempt to explain how populism is portrayed through this right-wing oriented media and how their audience perceives populism. Moreover, the paper offers an account of how 'anti-populism' is formulated within this medium and how it contributes to existing notions of anti-populism.

Introduction

After 2008, the global financial crisis affected almost every country in Europe and the Americas with an unprecedented impact on the political and social landscape of these countries. Greece was one of the countries that saw its economy collapse due to a staggering external debt, which led Prime Minster George Papandreou to request a bailout package from the EU, ECB, and IMF in 2010. The introduction of the bailout mechanism (which became known as 'Troika') in the lives of the Greek people signaled a major turning point in the country's history, which can only be compared with the fall of the dictatorship and the beginning of the Third Hellenic Republic in 1974. The severe austerity measures that were a prerequisite for the loan started to have substantial negative implications on the Greek society and led to the further degradation of the country's political order. From 2010 up until today, the public discourse was focused on the causality of the crisis and also on criticizing the previous period from 1974 to 2010, known as 'Metapolitefsi', as a period responsible for the country's misfortunes.

One of the media that is a representative example of the aforementioned criticism is the website 'Anti-news'[1], an alternative media site which hosts opinions from centre-rightists, liberals, to neoliberals, far-rightists and even fascists in some cases. The variety of the voices that are expressed through this website, along with that of its creator Failos Kranidiotis (a known far-right and nationalist lawyer and journalist), provide a comprehensive view of how an audience with right wing tendencies perceives a concept like populism. In addition, due to Kranidiotis' personal friendship with Antonis Samaras (leader of the conservative party New Democracy [ND] from 2009 to 2015), Anti-news has a close affiliation towards ND, which justifies the critique of populism that is presented on the website. The aforementioned factors have prompted the purpose of this study, which is to explore how populism is seen through a right-wing website and how the opinions and thoughts that are presented contribute to the existing notions of anti-populism. For that purpose, I tracked the frequency of articles related to populism from 2010 to 2016. This was achieved by a thorough examination of the website's archive through three keywords: 'Populism', 'Metapolitefsi' and 'PASOK'. These keywords were chosen to identify articles dealing with anti-populism and comprise the empirical corpus of this study.

As Table 1 shows, in the first two years, the articles referring to populism are relatively low: 11 for 2010 and 17 for 2011. However, after 2012 we see a significant increase in the frequency of those articles: 48 in 2012, 40 in 2013, 45 in 2014, 59 in 2015 and 97 in 2016. This clearly shows that populism is becoming a matter of concern for the contributors of the website, especially after the rise of populist parties in government (SYRIZA and Independent Greeks) in 2015.

Table 1. Frequency of articles referring to populism per year

Year	Articles Referring to Populism
2010	11
2011	17
2012	48
2013	40
2014	45
2015	59
2016	97

The paper is divided into three parts: First, I will present how populism is signified in the contemporary political landscape of Europe and the main theoretical approach for the case. At the same time, I will also explore the existing notions of anti-populism and

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[1] http://www.antinews.gr/

how these contribute to the research. Second, I will focus on the discourse that has been produced by Anti-news, which revolves around populism, anti-populism, and a critique of Metapolitefsi. The aim of the last part will be to interpret the website's views on populism as well as to analyze the particular form that anti-populism takes in Anti-news. Finally, I will conclude my analysis with a summary of the findings from the research.

Modernization Theory, Populism, and Anti-populism

The emergence of populist parties in the beginning of the 21st century in Europe (Mondon 2014; Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014; Tournier-Sol 2014; Kioupkiolis 2016) has refueled the academic interest delving into the causes, consequences, and aspects of the multi-layered phenomenon of populism (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012). According to Pappas there are at least seven major definitions of populism (2016) that represent the diversity of theoretical approaches to defining populism. However, despite all of these approaches there is neither a definitive theory on what populism exactly is nor a strict delineation of the specific characteristics that populism has. Instead, the different approaches of populism attempt to interpret the versatility of the phenomenon in accordance with parties that appear to be populist. This paper approaches populism and anti-populism using modernization theory. Based on the aforementioned theory, populism is regarded as an expression of social and economic anachronism, mostly associated with nationalism and statism that opposes economic progress. On the other hand, anti-populism is thought to be the solution to populism as it supports economic modernization through free markets, while embracing political liberalism. As I will analyze in the following paragraphs, these approaches will explain how Anti-news perceives populism and how that leads the site into developing an anti-populist stance.

It is of outmost importance for the paper's purposes to understand how populism is perceived within the discourse that is articulated in Anti-news. Modernization theory, its evolution across time, and how it came to define populism in a negative manner can provide the theoretical context for a satisfactory perception of populism. During the 1950's, Richard Hofstadter attempted to analyze the populist phenomenon and its contribution to the American political culture. In his work, Hofstadter (1955) examines populism in a negative manner. Based on the examples of the People's Party and McCarthyism, he claims that populism is heavily associated with nativism, nationalism, nostalgic traditionalism, and 'moral absolutism', while he describes populists as a movement that looks backwards (Stavrakakis 2017). However, populism seems to represent only one of two antagonistic political and cultural groups in Hofstadter's theory. According to Hofstadter (1955), the other group endorses the need for industrial capitalist modernization, whatever the cost may be, and promotes this modernization as the normal political and social evolution, that is against the anachronisms exhibited by pop-

ulism. The contribution of Hofstadter's perception of populism to the theory of modernization has made the latter the defining point of liberal thought, not only in the US but also to liberals on a global level (Gilman 2000; Latham 2000). At the same time, it has created a preliminary context for the development of anti-populism (Stavrakakis 2017).

The theory of modernization and its opposition towards populism has also been adjusted to the Greek political culture by academics who have adopted the theory of modernization in order to interpret populism. One of them is Diamandouros (2000), who introduced the theory of a dualistic Greece, according to which the Greek political culture has two different traditions. Each of these traditions has formed its own ideological system in order to interpret the Greek political and social reality, leading to a conflict between them. On the one hand, there is an 'underdog culture' which supports a state-oriented economy, a large public sector, and ethno-centrism – but not a free market and economic reforms. This culture has also become hegemonic through the use of populism as an ideological tool, which has become the defining element of this culture (Diamandouros 2000). The other culture that is present in Greece favors political and economic modernization. Therefore, its ideological influences are mostly drawn from political liberalism and at the same time characterized by a secular orientation towards the advanced industrial countries of Western Europe. This culture is in favor of the free market mechanism and believes in the state's regulatory role in making the Greek economy more competitive in a global level. That makes this culture more open towards reforms and technological innovation as well as more dedicated to liberal democracy and constitutionalism as the necessary political context to achieve economic and social modernization (Diamandouros 2000). To sum up, this dualistic scheme, which derives from the theory of modernization, manages to interpret populism in a negative manner. Populism is perceived as the main ideological orientation of social and political forces that oppose any form of progress and are more inclined towards a nativist and ethnocentric culture.

In light of this context, modernization theory has managed to characterize any alternative political and economic solution as populist and led to the creation of anti-populism (Gilman 2000) as the medium that can support and expand modernization thought. The forms that anti-populism has taken throughout the years vary from case to case, and, like populism, a widely accepted theory of anti-populism has yet to emerge. Therefore, there are several recent academic attempts to define anti-populism, examine its relation to populism and identify how populism is portrayed in political and media discourse. Even though these theories are extensive, I will focus on outlining the most important elements that each theory has to offer in order to understand the diversity of approaches used to define and interpret anti-populism.

Much of the work on anti-populism has focused on studying the concept through empirical analyses of the media. According to Mylonas (2014), who has examined anti-populism in the newspaper 'Kathimerini' (the most prominent printed newspaper in Greece), the anti-populist discourse is articulated mostly within a liberal and neoliberal

context. Specifically, Kathimerini as well as other mainstream Greek media have interpreted the Greek economic crisis in neoliberal terms, meaning that the pathologies of the Greek society are responsible for the crisis (Pleios 2013). According to their view, the backwardness of the Greek society and the way in which people 'lived above their abilities', along with an ideological hegemony of left wing populism, are the main reasons that Greece was led to a financial crisis and was unable to do the necessary structural reforms in its economy (Mylonas 2014). Most importantly, populism does not only obstruct Greece to reach a neoliberal restructuring of its economy; it also prevents the country from becoming more 'European' (Mylonas 2014). This perception is characteristic of liberal and neoliberal news media such as Kathimerini and is an example of how modernization theory has been adjusted to the recent economic crisis and the Greek case in particular. Moreover, the case of Kathimerini shows how anti-populism is articulated through media, which is of essential importance in order to analyze a similar discourse in Anti-news.

However, anti-populism has also been expressed from a political perspective, which in turn has ignited an alternative approach to the phenomenon. Medarov's account (2015) on liberal anti-populism in post-1989 Bulgaria offers important information on the main elements of political anti-populism and anti-populism more broadly. Through an examination of how liberal intellectuals in Bulgaria articulate anti-populist discourse, Medarov concludes that populism is presented as the opposite of liberalism and a "pre-given set of neoliberal practices, ideas and technologies of governance" (Medarov 2015, p. 8). Anti-populism achieves the aforementioned distinction by using 'populism' as an empty signifier, rendering it capable of multiple meanings, including: irresponsibility, demagogy, corruption, immorality, destruction, and irrationalism (Stavrakakis 2014). Attributing populism with the aforementioned characteristics is also representative of the anti-populist 'fear of the masses', which reflects a shift from political antagonism to post-political technocratic management as it negates any political opposition by characterizing it 'populist' and therefore reckless and irresponsible (Katsambekis 2014). Overall, Medarov's analysis is a comprehensive example of political anti-populism, its articulation and signification that progresses research on anti-populism and its various interpretations.

Both of these examples are a reconfirmation that modernization theory is in complete contrast with populism, even if the latter is politically progressive. The liberal and neoliberal orientation of modernization theory automatically renders populism as a phenomenon that opposes real economic and social development, since neoliberalism does not recognize any other political or economic alternative as a viable option. For that purpose, anti-populism has been developed as a discursive tool aimed at debunking positions that oppose neoliberalism as irrational and against economic progress. The variations that we have presented can provide us with a few preliminary elements that will lead us closer to an understanding of anti-populism and will be of outmost importance for analyzing the discourse in Anti-news:

- Anti-populism originates from modernization theory and has become the ideological tool of liberals and neoliberals in contemporary world.
- The purpose of anti-populism is to render populism as a phenomenon that obstructs economic development and defies neoliberal governance and therefore is outside of the common logic and sense.
- This allows anti-populism to be developed from both the media and the political world in order to defend and expand liberal and neoliberal values in economy, society, and politics.

Populism Governs This Country!: Perceptions of Populism and Anti-populism in Anti-news

Since 2010, Greece has seen its traditional party system collapse, its economy shrunk due to austerity measures and the living standard of many Greeks has further diminished. These events have triggered new narratives which attempt to explain the causes of the crisis and interpret them through the context of the crisis (Liakos and Kouki 2015). Among these new narratives is one created from the contributors of the site Anti-news, which attributes populism as the fundamental origin of the crisis in nearly every social, economic, and political aspect. In this section, I explore how this narrative is constructed, how Anti-news perceives populism in connection with the Greek crisis, and the form that anti-populism takes within the website.

According to the writers of Anti-news, after 1974 Greece saw an exceptional transition towards democracy due to Constantine Karamanlis' efforts to lead the country into the European Economic Community and to further democratization of Greece after the military dictatorship (Voulgaris 2001). However, when the first socialist government of PASOK (Eleftheriou and Tassis 2013)[2] came into power in 1981, it signaled the beginning of an economic decline that led to the current crisis. Specifically, the journalists and the commentators tend to characterize this period as "a period defined by corruption, venality, populism and the mugging of the state resources" (Mitralexis 2012). This period is also defined by the so-called "'PASOK system', which deceived the people with false symbols and false promises into extracting as many resources from the state as they could" (Anonymous 2012a)[3]. Therefore, Metapolitefsi was dominated by the "ideological sovereignty of the left, which was established by PASOK" (Anonymous 2012c)[4] and stigmatized by "lawless guild privileges, the distribution of promi-

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[2] PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement), was the most prominent socialist party in the period from 1974 to 2012 and has been intrinsically connected with the history of the country the last 40 years.
[3] All Anti-news users are listed as 'Anonymous', as they write under pseudonyms on the site. Links to their posts can be found below in the References.
[4] This narrative of the country after 1974 fully elaborates in characterizing the aforementioned ideological sovereignty as a "mentality and an ideology that encouraged despicable and distorted situations, the privileges of the public sector that led to an ungoverned country, an orgy of wasted money, the flee of private

nent governmental positions, which served to increase the power of the clientelistic state and by state-funded union workers who resisted any attempt at reform or modernization and they still govern the country" (Anonymous 2013a). However, these opinions seem to describe the 'symptoms' of a deeper cause that guided the political system of Greece after 1974 and led to the current crisis. The people who write to Anti-news seem to consider PASOK's left wing populism as responsible for all of the aforementioned characteristics that defined the period of Metapolitefsi. Populism is at the forefront of nearly every article concerning the crisis and is also recognized as being the root cause of the country's current situation. An article from Anti-news attempts to define populism as:

> "Demagogy that is exercised in the name of the people, but works only for the benefit of the demagogues who attempt to manipulate the people. It is a propaganda technique that deceives the 'people' and pits them on one side, and tarnishes everyone who is against them as 'enemy of the people', aiming at their isolation from the people. Populism does not suggest any solutions, but only yells slogans, completely aware that they are false and dangerous" (Anonymous 2011a).

Another article describes populism metaphorically as: "A shepherd, who feeds the masses of desperate and less strong citizens with unfulfilled promises, empty words and vague, sweet banalities" (Anonymous 2013b).

The clear connection between populism and Metapolitefsi tends to blame populism for the creation and enlargement of the clientelistic state, the degradation of the nation, and the "forging of a false 'popular unity' not for the political emancipation of the popular classes, but in order to manipulate them efficiently" (Anonymous 2011a). Populism is not only presented as the primary cause of the crisis but also as the constitutive ideological tool of PASOK that governed for more than 30 years and created an "economic model, dictating that the state can be the solution for every misfortune, a model which is historically bankrupt" (Anonymous 2012b). The association of populism with PASOK and how the latter used populism also shows that for Anti-news populism can only originate from the left, since there is an apparent lack of criticism towards right wing populism, throughout the discourse of Anti-news.

The connection between Metapolitefsi and populism extends in many articles to the inclusion of PASOK and SYRIZA in their discourse. Many contributors often believe that SYRIZA continues to promote left wing populism, following PASOK's legacy. At the same time and especially after SYRIZA saw a steady rising at the opinion polls (Katsambekis 2015)[5], almost every contributor of the site saw the aforementioned

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companies from Greece due to consecutive mobilizations from labor unions, the criminalization of entrepreneurship in Greece and the defense of the university's asylum to outlaws. In other words, the ideological sovereignty of the left encouraged and supported all of the "diseases" of the Greek society that consequently led to the crisis".

[5] SYRIZA (Coalition of the Radical Left) is a radical left party that was formed in 2004 and rose to power for the first time on 25th January 2015.

party as the reincarnation of Andreas Papandreou's PASOK. An example for this comparison is an entire article focused on proving exactly how SYRIZA is the "New PASOK" by stating that "the rigid clientelistic state and the so- called 'army of PASOK' are now moving towards SYRIZA. The latter also attempts to destroy PASOK and become the only party that represents the centre-left" (Anonymous 2012d). That belief creates a triple connection between PASOK, SYRIZA, and populism, with populism being the element that is dominant in both parties. In summary, Anti-news views populism as the definitive characteristic of Metapolitefsi, mostly expressed by PASOK and to a lesser extent by SYRIZA.

However, writers of Anti-news do not confine themselves to criticizing populism and its responsibility towards the crisis. Another important aspect that is also present is that of the alternative solution; one that will counteract the effects of populism in the Greek society as well as the economy. According to several contributions, Greece has to "be a nation-state again, have a competitive economy in a global level and a strong national identity" (Anonymous 2010a). This will only be achieved if Greece will "continue to have a European orientation" (Anonymous 2015), "restructure its national economy" (Anonymous 2011b) and "embrace again the ideas of patriotism and social liberalism" (Anonymous 2010b). According to the writers of Anti-news, the only one who can modify the above solutions into a political alternative to populism is Antonis Samaras and the party of New Democracy (Karavasilis 2015). Therefore, a connection is made between Anti-news and New Democracy, since the former sees the party and its leader as the only alternatives that will reverse the effects of populism in the country.

Anti-news's Attitude towards Populism: A Different Form of Anti-populism?

The examples above are representative of the public discourse produced in Anti-news and provide a clear picture of the perception of populism and anti-populism among the political right in Greece. Based on the analysis, I outline the characteristics of this populist and anti-populist discourse in Table 2 below.

As presented in Anti-news, the characteristics typically attributed to populism are interpreted as negative elements that 'infected' the Greek society and its politics (Nikisianis et al. 2016). Populism is signified as a force that threatens the country, the nation, and the society with a devastating collapse (Stavrakakis and Sevastakis 2012). From this anti-populist perspective, populism derives from a clientelistic state, a left wing political culture, social struggles and a negative attitude towards the EU that, taken together, are seen as responsible for the current crisis. On the other hand, the signification of anti-populism in Anti-news discourse harbors some familiar but also new features of anti-populism.

Table 2: Characteristics of Populism and Anti-populism in Anti-news

Populism	Anti-populism
Clientelistic State	State as a Regulator for Economy
State-centered Economy	Global Competitive Economy/Reforms
Left Wing Political Culture	Ethnocentrism/ Liberal Values
Social Struggles	Common Sense
Euroscepticism	Euro centrism

While the objection to a state-centered economy and support for free markets is a common feature of anti-populism, in Anti-news the exclusion of the state and its potential is not absolute. Instead, the anti-populist perspective argues that the state must regulate the free market and, through neoliberal reforms, overcome the clientelistic state and make the economy more competitive at a global level (Doxiadis 2016). The website's anti-populism also considers a corruptive left wing political culture, and the populism that has both produced and dominated the political life in Greece, as obstructing the country from reaching its true economic potential (Mylonas 2014). To counteract the effect of populism at the cultural level, there must be a newfound turn towards the importance of national identity and how 'we, the Greeks' as a homogenous entity can overcome the crisis that populism has implemented (Mylonas 2014).

Justified by the connection between Anti-news and Antonis Samaras, the writers also stress the importance of liberal values and how they can provide an alternative to the dominant culture of the left (Karavasilis 2015). In this case, anti-populism also deems every social struggle or reaction to the implementation of neoliberal reforms as something illogical that contradicts common sense, the common good, and even the homeland itself (Stavrakakis and Sevastakis 2012). Lastly, there is also the association of populism with Euroscepticism and how the former opposes the idea of Europe and consequently, the country's position in EU. At this point we see that the contradiction between 'populism' and 'Europe' (Doxiadis 2016) leads Anti-news' anti-populism to embrace a Eurocentric approach as the only way that will make Greece economically dynamic, entrepreneurial and more westernized in a European way (Mylonas 2014).

The distinction between populism and anti-populism in Anti-news can also be interpreted within the context of modernization theory. As the theory dictates, there is a linear path to progress in which societies who fail to modernize are so-called 'traditional', and those who do are deemed as 'developed' (Liakos and Kouki 2015). From this point of view, populism and all its characteristics are the definitive elements of a society that is traditional, anachronistic and therefore unwilling to adapt to the technological and economic progress that is suggested by modernization (Doxiadis 2016). Moreover, populism is perceived as responsible for creating an underdog culture which lies in complete contrast with a modernizing culture based on economic reforms, the universal adoption of liberal values in politics and society as well as a continuous attempt to westernize the country in compliance with European standards (Diamandouros 2000). Although the anti-populist discourse in Anti-news mostly represents a relationship between modernization theory and populism, the role of the nation and national identity in anti-populism is peculiar. While modernization theory rejects the importance of ethnocentrism altogether (Diamandouros 2000), the writers of Anti-news see the nation and the strengthening of national identity as tools that will modernize Greece and bring the country closer to the political and economic model of Western countries. The combination of a strong national identity and liberal/neoliberal values will provide the necessary framework for the country's exit from the crisis and, additionally, act as the only economic, social, and political solution to populism.

Conclusion

The website "Anti-news" can be described as a distinct case among the Greek media – print or otherwise. At the same time, the views that are expressed within the website provide a comprehensive account of how right-wing supporters perceive populism and how they articulate their anti-populist discourse. As presented in the analysis here, Anti-news holds populism responsible for shaping society, politics, and economy in Greece over the last 40 years and blamed for an unprecedented crisis. The suggested alternative to populism is an amalgamation between liberalism, neoliberalism, and ethnocentrism, and when combined with the proper political leadership (i.e. that of Antonis Samaras) will guarantee the modernization of Greece.

The discourse that is articulated in Anti-news is a clear example of how anti-populism in Greek media uses modernization theory to brand any alternative to neoliberalism as 'populist' and therefore 'irrational'. Within the same context, any attempt to prevent the implementation of neoliberal austerity measures is met with disbelief and branded as a contradiction to 'common sense'. Moreover, the peculiarity that makes this anti-populist discourse even more distinct is the role of the nation in Greece's road towards modernization. As presented above, the significance of ethnocentrism as the ideological and cultural orientation of the country is of the utmost importance for the writers

of the website, and its necessity is stressed in almost every article. This leads to the conclusion that the anti-populism presented in Anti-news, although featuring most of the elements found in similar media discourses, fails to reject the idea of the nation altogether; instead, the nation is seen as the cornerstone of progress. Not only that – this form of anti-populism argues that a return to ethnocentrism and the strengthening of national identity will be able to counteract the effects that populism has had on the economy, society and politics of Greece.

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Populism and the Claim to a Moral Monopoly: An Interview with Jan-Werner Müller

Conducted by Niels Boel, Political Scientist and Lecturer, Carsten Jensen, PhD and Political Scientist, and André Sonnichsen, PhD and Political Analyst.

Jan-Werner Müller's (born 1970) political analysis of contemporary populism reached way beyond an academic audience with the publication of his short and punchy essay Was ist Populismus? Ein Essay in 2016.[1] Perhaps because his work has been able to articulate the concerns of many liberal democrats, who see a real and present danger in the spectacular rise of various kinds of populism in Europe and the USA, Müller's arguments have been widely embraced, also here in Denmark. The debate initiated in the Danish media by Müller's visit to Copenhagen in October 2016 was the impetus behind the interview published below, which was conducted in Vienna in early 2017. Here, the group behind the interview pursues some of the trajectories that follow from Müller's arguments on populism. In the interview, Müller sustains his central idea that populism, in both its Left-wing and Right-wing versions, is a threat to representative democracy. Müller teaches politics at Princeton University and was, at the time of the interview, also a visiting fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences, Vienna.

"When I rule, the people rule"

Interviewers: In many ways, the label 'populist' is childless. Certainly, those who often are referred to as populists seldom call themselves populists. We would like, therefore, to start with the basics and ask you to define precisely what you understand by the term populism?

Jan-Werner Müller: Contrary to what we read and hear virtually every day, not everybody who criticizes elites – as the clichéd phrase goes – is a populist. Of course, when they are in opposition, populists criticize the government, but they also do something else: populists claim that they, and they alone, represent the people. That is the decisive

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[1] *Was ist Populismus? Ein Essay* (2016, Berlin: Suhrkamp). See also 'What is Populism?' (*The Utopian*, March 2011) and 'Parsing Populism. Who is and who is not a populist these days?' (*IPPR*, October 2015)

criterion. And it clearly is not about policy content. For example, if you tell me what you think about immigration or the European Union, I am not able to tell immediately if you are a populist or not. It is a particular claim concerning representation, not a specific position on a policy issue.

Populism is always detrimental to democracy in at least two ways. Firstly, it follows from its anti-pluralism that populists assert that all other contenders for power are essentially illegitimate. Again, this is never just a matter of disagreement about policy, which is of course perfectly normal in a democracy. No, the populist immediately claims that the issue at stake is entirely moral; and they make everything into a personal question: the others are bad characters, they are corrupt, they are crooked, they don't work for the people, they work for the multinationals, or the EU, or what have you.

Secondly, and perhaps less obviously, all those who do not share the views of the populist (and hence do not support the populists politically), can have their status as properly belonging to the people put into doubt. Thus, populists always perform two exclusions. One is at the level of the elites – that is, party politics, professional politicians, and so on. The other is at the level of the people themselves, if you like. That is, populists claim that some citizens are not really part of the people. Last year Donald Trump[2] said: "The most important thing is the unification of the people and all the other people do not mean anything". *That's* what I am talking about. All the others, even if they have an American passport, do not truly belong, or so the populist decrees. So, it is not just anti-pluralism at the level of elites; it's also anti-pluralism among the people themselves.

So, just to be clear, people who say they are against the establishment also make a claim that they have a monopoly of representing the people. In doing so, do they try to deny the rights of others to belong to the people?

Yes, for me the decisive criterion is that populists claim a distinctly moral monopoly of representation. Again, take Trump. I assume that his speechwriters did not try to contribute to a political theory textbook on populism when they wrote his inauguration speech – but had they done so, one must admit that they succeeded brilliantly. Remember what he said in essence: "Today, power is given back to the people." In other words: when Trump rules, the people rule. It is this equation that, to me, amounts to a claim to a monopoly of representation, which is peculiar to populists.

All the other things that people mention when describing populism – criticizing the elites, 'being against the establishment' and so on – are not in and of themselves dangerous for democracy. On the contrary: any old civics textbook would tell you that good democratic citizens should be critical of the powerful, keep a close watch on elites in politics, the economy, culture, etc.

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[2] Elected president of the USA on November 8, 2016 and assumed office on January 20, 2017.

What was the intellectual path that led you to work with the concept of populism? Who were the initial inspirations?

I think I was originally puzzled by the idea of Left-wing populism. Was it possible to develop such a thing and why exactly would it be desirable? I also wanted to think about a notion often put forward by populists themselves, namely the claim that they are the real defenders or even today's only authentic promoters of democracy. And some observers – who are not populists themselves – advance a conceptual split according to which the populists are illiberal democrats and maybe some of the elites are undemocratic liberals. But can democracy really benefit from populism?

I was intrigued by these kinds of questions, but contrary to what I read about myself sometimes now, I'm not an expert on populism. There are people who have been studying these parties and movements in great empirical detail – I cannot possibly offer what they can offer. I learned tremendously from people who really are experts like Cas Mudde and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser.[3] But I hope that my take on populism has been useful as a contribution to democratic theory and that, perhaps, it might also inspire further empirical research. At the same time, I generally have argued against the case for Left-wing populism that has been put forward by Ernesto Laclau[4] and Chantal Mouffe[5].

What was your aim in writing 'What is Populism?' Did you achieve the goal?

I think it's best to leave judgments like this to readers. Well, one aim was to offer some kind of understanding and, more particularly, a set of distinctions as well as an examination of the dynamics of populist regimes. In the European context, in the public debate, you often get the feeling that everybody is a populist and everything is populism. Many movements and leaders have been pigeonholed together – either because politicians, journalists, and academics are lazily following received opinion or because they actually have an ideological agenda and seek to discredit certain parties by grouping them with populists (given that, in Europe, populism, unlike in parts of US discourse, mostly has a bad name).

I was, for instance, struck by announcements from representatives of the European Union, who at one point said that there are populists on the Left and on the Right and that they are all dangerous and fundamentally anti-European. I thought it was important to hold on to some distinctions, to say, no, not every protest is populist, not every protest is a threat to the system, some protests can be healthy and productive. We do

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[3] Cas Mudde (1967), Dutch political scientist and populism expert who teaches at The School of Public and International Affairs, University of Georgia. Wrote *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, 2007.

[4] Ernesto Laclau (1935 - 2014), Argentinean political philosopher and political activist. He taught at the University of Essex, UK and is known for his work on hegemony and populism.

[5] Chantal Mouffe (1943), Belgian political theorist. Professor at the University of Westminster, London. She was originally inspired by Antonio Gramsci. Since the early 1990s, she has studied liberalism, neoliberalism, and populism.

not want to be in a situation where we say that we need to hold on to long-established parties in order to preserve our democracy – or else. Not all new parties or movements are threats to democracy.

It can be fateful to collapse distinctions and dismiss new parties and movements as populist, because you send a message to the supporters of what are sometimes democratically productive movements or parties that basically we don't accept anything new, there is no place in the system for them. It can give them the impression that the system is broken, and that you can't do anything differently in what critics sometimes call technocracy or post-democracy. They are quickly labelled as anti-European if they want a different Europe or just different policies. Some are even equated in that way with Marine Le Pen[6], who really *is* anti-European.

I also worry about the way certain descriptions of 'populism' are accepted as valid, neutral, or quasi-objective by journalists. Many of us now take it for granted that there is something like a homogeneous 'elite' or 'the establishment' and that everyone is fed up with them and are revolting against them and so on. This is already talking populist language; many populists do not represent 'the people,' but at best a third of the electorate. We should not buy into this simplistic narrative which populists themselves are suggesting, especially if the 'rise of populism' is presented as something absolutely inevitable.

Another example is the idea that populists always necessarily have simplistic policy proposals. Some people say this without any kind of neoliberal policy agenda, but some advance this claim because they want to discredit any other political options. It is easy to discredit somebody who criticizes you, if you say that they are populists, so they must be like Le Pen or Orbán[7] or Trump and therefore they must be dangerous.

So, these were some of my intentions. Again, I leave it to you to judge whether they were realized or not. On a self-critical note: The question I often find most difficult to answer is what do we do in response to populism? I stick to all the answers in the book, but I think that this is also the area in which I have been pushed to develop new answers since the book came out.

Populism and the liberal democratic order

I guess you would agree that the concept of 'the people' is operational in both democracy and populism. Nevertheless, you seem to suggest that populists misuse the concept of the people, but that the democrats don't. Can you elaborate?

Well, I would rephrase the question. First, I do not think that anybody should have a special privilege to say what the people really is and that other conceptions are wrong,

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[6] Marine Le Pen (1968), leader of Front national. Member of the French parliament. Daughter of Jean-Marie Le Pen.
[7] Viktor Orbán (1963), Prime Minister of Hungary.

or that somebody necessarily misuses the term 'the people.' The concept of the people is always up for grabs, and democracy is also about a permanent contestation of what democracy is, as the French theorist Claude Lefort (1924-2010) often pointed out.

Moreover, we all have a right to go to the streets and claim that we can represent interests and identities, which have as yet not been properly represented. But this is different from someone claiming that they and only they represent the people, or what populists often call 'the real people' (notice again the exclusionary implications – some people do not form part of the people, even though to the innocent observer it might seem so). Also, for populists the people are always homogenous. And this is empirically not true, obviously. As Habermas[8] once put it, the demos can only appear in the plural.

When a 'normal' democratic politician looks at society and says, 'this problem has not been addressed before', certain citizens' interests and identities have not been properly represented, the 'normal' politician treats those claims to representation as hypothetical, as essentially fallible. If it turns out that nobody is following their lead, they say, 'Ok, but we don't give up, we will reframe our appeal, we have just got to mobilize better' and so on. Whereas the populist, not always but typically, is going to say, 'Somebody has prevented the real people, the silent majority, from expressing itself.'

Again, the obvious example is Trump, who in effect said during the campaign, "If she wins, it was probably rigged". It is one thing if populist leaders say that. It's yet another thing if 70 percent of self-identified Republican citizens believe it – a bad sign for any democracy. In that sense, populists do something that 'normal' politicians do not do – they constantly erode the trust in democratic institutions.

I hasten to add that, of course, any of us can criticize our democratic institutions; they are not sacrosanct. There might be many good reasons to say that our election system is flawed, or that our system of party financing is problematic, or whatever it might be. But that is not what the populists say. The populist effectively says: 'If *I* don't win, the system is flawed.' *That* is not a democratic argument.

Would you agree, seeing that the notion of the people is common to both populists and democrats, that the danger of populism is inherent to the democratic order?

Yes, I would agree with that. Although, if you find anything plausible in my theory, it is specifically about representative democracy. In Athens, you could have had demagogues, you could have had rabble-rousers, but you would not have had populists as I describe them, because you would not have had the principle of representation at the core of the democratic order. So, in that sense, yes, it is a permanent danger, which also means that we can never get rid of it. As long as we have representative democracy somebody can make populist claims. It does not mean that they will be equally successful, but it is not something we can exclude for good. It is a further question why some populist claims resonate more at certain times than at others.

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[8] Jürgen Habermas (1929) is a German sociologist and philosopher.

In your book, you dismiss both what you call a political-sociological diagnosis and a social-psychological diagnosis of populism. The former refers to attempts to explain populism by reference to a threatened lower class and middle class and the latter to suggestions that populist anger is a simplistic response, which misunderstands its target, in the same way that August Bebel[9] once claimed that antisemitism is socialism for dummies. But, if you dismiss these explanations, how then would you account for the contemporary surge of populism?

I would say two things. First, I am struck by the fact of how easily we liberal democrats buy into the populists' own narrative. We are always saying that populists are not trustworthy, that their ideas are too simplistic, and so on. But when they offer us a one-line explanation as to why they are being successful – things like 'it's all about the losers of globalization' or 'the working class don't like foreigners anymore,' we often immediately buy into these stories. Why? Because we seem to want an easy life, too, and rest content with simplistic, one-dimensional explanations. That does not answer your question, but I wanted to mention it, because it is surprising that people who generally do not believe a word the populist say immediately think they are right on the reasons for their own success.

Also, we would never accept such simplistic explanations concerning other kinds of political parties. We do not think that voters of social democratic parties all have exactly the same interests and the same motivations, belong to precisely the same class or are exactly in the same psychological state. We would at least think from the start that we are dealing with a heterogeneous coalition of interests and identities and that the support for the party depended on how it presented itself, and so on. Trivial, I know, but with populists we all of a sudden forget such basics.

The second thing is that, from my theoretical point of view, in one sense populism is the same everywhere, because all populists make the same moral claim that they alone represent the people. But it doesn't follow from this that the *causes* of populism are the same everywhere. Again, we make it easy for ourselves if we say, oh, we have this populist phenomenon everywhere on the global level so it must be the same causes everywhere. But of course, this doesn't follow. I have not studied these cases in any great empirical depth, but it seems clear enough to me that national contexts matter a great deal. The reasons for the rise of Jörg Haider[10] are not the same as the reasons for the rise of Jean-Marie Le Pen[11], which are again not the same as the reasons behind the rise of Donald Trump.

In other words, the causes can be very heterogeneous. It seems to me naive to think that there is just one kind of populist voter and that if we magically could find his

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[9] August Ferdinand Bebel (1840-1913) was a German politician and labour leader. He was the first chairman of the Social Democractic Party of Germany.
[10] Jörg Haider (1950-2008) is the former leader of the Austrian Freedom Party.
[11] Jean-Marie Le Pen (1928) is the founder of the French extreme right-wing party Front National and father of its current leader, Marine Le Pen.

or her sorrows and grievances, then the whole sordid phenomenon of populism would just go away.

What this also implies – something a lot of people don't want to hear – is that we need to distinguish between particular policy content and populism as such. Racism and nationalism are not the same as populism. To be sure, Right-wing populists do draw on racism and ethnic nationalism, but analytically, it is possible to distinguish between content and form. In other words, it is at least theoretically possible for a populist, let's say far-Right party, to get rid of populism and still have the same views on racism and nationalism.

This brings up a difficult issue. I think that if we accept pluralism, it also means that we must engage with things we don't like morally and politically – fighting against them with the best arguments we can muster, but also accepting their place in a democratic system. For instance, within a democratic spectrum, there can be space for parties and politicians who advocate minimizing immigration and very conservative family policies. At least, as a democratic theorist, one must say that this can be part of legitimate pluralism, as long as these parties cease to be populist, that is to say, do not claim a moral monopoly of representing the people (and do not talk about immigration in a way that incites hatred of minorities).

The problem with this nice or not so nice story is that I can't think of any populist parties that have ceased being populist. The example I sometimes hear – you probably know much more about this – is the Norwegian Progress Party. From what I understand, it's not true they are not populist anymore. That they are in government does not mean that they are not populist.

So, we are talking about a possibility, but not necessarily a reality. It is easy to see why. For instance, if you were Marine Le Pen now, why should you cease to be a populist at this moment? Things are going extremely well [this was said before the French presidential elections, ed.], and you know that if you change your politics and conceded the fundamental legitimacy of the other parties, then that would probably cause a bit of cognitive dissonance.

I guess what we are trying to hang on to is an explanation for the preference for populism, which would have the same theoretical status as the psychological and social explanations, which you seem to dismiss in your book. Beyond a reference to a contextual description, is there a way of theoretically accounting for why a given voter chooses populism?

I'm not saying that we can't learn from these approaches. What I am saying is that we have to be very careful with such psychological generalizations, because we open a door through which all the clichés of 19th century mass psychology re-enter; according to these, the irrational masses are always waiting to be seduced by some great demagogue.

Again, we make it too easy for ourselves, if we just assume that people are all angry and resentful and then stop with that supposed fact. We should have known from Aristotle onwards that people are not just angry for no reason. Very often it has to do with feelings of righteousness, of unfairness, and injustice. If we stop with facile mass psychologizing, we never get to the point of asking why people are, in fact, angry. Their answers might not be convincing, but we should at the very least hear what they are.

Still, you are right to say that we need to discuss more general explanations and not just say that it is all entirely contextual – though, to be sure, in all likelihood we have a complicated combination of various factors; it is not just one cause that explains everything. So, context is not a meaningless answer.

But you are going to press me again and rightly so. So here is what I can come up with as a theoretical answer, which is present also in the book, but not very much developed there: I think that our time is characterized by an increasing conflict between those who want more openness (which takes the clichéd versions of economic and cultural globalization, but can also mean the recognition of ethnic, sexual, and religious minorities in one's own country – in other words, it doesn't have to be something to do with the international) and those who want more closure. In this conflict, the populists appear as actors who have answers ready; after all, they always do identity politics and they have an account of who the real people are, about who belongs and who doesn't. It does not mean that they are right, but this is an issue where they can say something.

If our central problems were different – if we were talking much more about bioethics or if we actually took global warming seriously – I don't think populists would have much of a prominent role. In those debates, they can try to discredit and delegitimise the experts, but beyond that, they probably would not have much of substance to say. But, concerning the conflict around globalization, openness or closure, which I think is now as real as the conflict between capital and labour, between the countryside and the city, they have something to say. It provides them with an opening in a way that other conflicts do not.

Would you allow for the possibility that a populist party or movement could, in fact, internally display a very high degree of pluralism? In other words, that a party or a movement might have an anti-pluralist approach to the existing order and a very antagonistic relationship to it, while at the same time, internally, it might display a very high degree of pluralism? Do you think it is possible, under certain circumstances, that what we call a populist force might, in fact, be a pluralist society in waiting?

It is a very good question and I have two remarks in response. Firstly, there is no law that says that populist parties can't have internal pluralism. But, if you follow my approach, it is very unlikely because the starting point for populists is always that there is a singular authentic popular will based on the idea of a homogeneous people. So, populists would generally say: 'What's there to debate? We know what the real will of the real people is and, in fact, it should be obvious to everyone.' They always know that

authentic will in advance, because it is deduced from their symbolic construction of the real people – which, by the way, is a purely theoretical exercise, no actual input from the people is needed. It is very unlikely that we will have a vibrant internal debate, where at a party conference they will debate endlessly about what the single authentic will really is. We do not see the Orbáns or the Erdogans[12] of this world having a pluralistic, democratic internal life in their parties. But, I would not say that it is, by definition, totally impossible.

My second remark would be in response to critics saying: 'Look at Podemos and Syriza, they have a lot of internal democracy, they are pro-refugee, they are pro-LGBT, and this shows that they can't possibly be populist.' That for me would be insufficient. The question basically is whether they make that central claim of a moral monopoly of representation or not? If they say that only they represent the true people, then it does not really matter, because the question is how you position yourself vis-à-vis other contenders to power and vis-à-vis citizens that happen not to agree with you.

We need to ask about the difference between Left-wing and Right-wing populism.

The difference has to with the actual political content, the material from which a claim to a moral monopoly of representation can be derived. Contrary to what I sometimes hear, it is not by definition impossible to have Left-wing populism. There are some who say that this cannot happen, because the populists are the bad guys and the Left are, by definition, the good guys. But no, it is possible. Chávez[13] is the obvious example of an actual Left-wing populist – there came a point at which it was simply illegitimate, per definition, to disagree with Chávez. You immediately became a traitor to the real Venezuela, to the project of twenty-first century socialism etc.

We would like to discuss the liberal democratic order that the populists claim to be up against. Do you think there is any merit to the argument made by many contemporary populists that the liberal democracies have not delivered?

Forgive me again for giving a very boring answer, but the only honest answer is: It depends! Again, we want easy answers and this kind of economic reductionism provides an easy answer. If it were true that populism is all about economic inequality and stagnation, then Geert Wilders[14] would not be where he is now. Then we would see an explosion of populism in Ireland or Portugal, both of whom suffered tremendously during the Euro Crisis – but we just don't see those things. So, there is no easy account that says that economic crisis results immediately in populism.

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[12] Recep Tayyip Erdogan (1954), president of Turkey since 2014 and leader of the populist and Islamist AKP party. Former prime minister.

[13] Hugo Chávez Frías (1954 – 2013), President of Venezuela from 1999 to 2013. Often labeled left populist by friends and foes alike.

[14] Geert Wilders (1963), Dutch opposition politician and member of the parliament since 1998. He is leader of the Right-wing Partij voor de Vriheid.

Let me go back to something I touched upon at the beginning. Whether you can make a case against the elites in an economic crisis is very contextual; and I don't think that we can use a simplistic model along the lines of, 'It's the economy, stupid,' or more or less politely say that 'populism is socialism for idiots.'

We should also not forget that some populists, like Hugo Chávez, in the beginning made very plausible claims about people's exclusion from a particular political and economic system. It would be crazy to claim that, for instance, Turkey was a wonderfully open and pluralistic society and then the mad Erdogan came and destroyed it all. The same with Chávez: of course, there were social exclusions and tremendous injustices in Venezuela. There are reasons why people end up like populists in certain times. There are times where people don't start out as populists, but become radicalized. It partly depends on the responses they get from other actors – such as existing powerful parties, judges, etc. We can't say from the beginning how things will end up. Maybe Chávez would have become a populist under any circumstances and maybe he would not.

A final theoretical question before we move onto the next focus area: Would you be prepared to inscribe populism as a stage in process of political change, so that one could say, for example, that populism emerges at certain 'stages' of democratic development, or that certain 'historical conjunctures' make it more likely than others?

I am sceptical of those kinds of theories, at least in relation to populism. That does not mean that populism is a random or mysterious phenomenon. There are some factors that play a role. I mentioned the role of the cleavage vis-à-vis globalization. If this is correct we should not be surprised to see a certain type of identity politics coming out in the open now.

But this is very different from saying that there are patterns over time so that you can tell the same story for all countries. In the US, for instance, it is fair to say that Trump would not have happened without the extreme partisanship of the Republican Party over the past 25 years. What explains his success is not some inevitable 'wave' of populism everywhere. It is that 90 percent of self-identified Republicans voted for Trump. If he had not been the Republican candidate, but a third party candidate, let's say leading a new grassroots movement of angry white workers, he would not be president today. Plenty of Republican voters seem to have said to themselves: 'Yes, he's a little crazy, but I can't possibly vote for the other side.' That kind of partisanship did not come out of nowhere. So yes, there is a story, but this story cannot be generalized.

Neo-Liberalism and the Populist Challenge

One of your main criticisms of populism is its anti-pluralism. Could we apply the same criticism to neoliberalism, especially as it has been expressed in recent years through the macro-economic policies of the EU under the label 'austerity'? Some critics have

claimed that these policies defend themselves simply by saying that "there is no alter-
native" (TINA). Is this not also an example of anti-pluralism?[15]

As I say in the book, one of the problems with technocracy is that they make it easier for populists to say, 'Look, where are the people in all this?' Technocrats in effect claim that there is only one rational solution and we, as citizens, just have to consent to it. If you don't agree, you are irrational; debate is unnecessary; no other solutions are available. That kind of discourse makes it easy for populists to say, 'I thought we had democracy, which means having choices.' But the twist of the argument is, as you rightly observe, that even if they seem to be extremes opposed to each other, technocracy and populism also have something in common: The technocrats say: 'there is only one rational solution,' while the populists say: 'there is only one authentic, popular will (and only we know it).' Everything between the two extremes disappears - and everything in between is, at least in my understanding, democracy: debate, persuasion, a chance to have a real choice.

That also makes it plausible to say, contrary to what we hear now about an omnipresent crisis of representation, that there are counter-examples where this in-between space, democracy has become strengthened. And as a result, more people seem again to be willing to accept existing democratic institutions. There is no break here. For example, whatever you personally think of Syriza and Podemos, their success makes it more plausible for people to say to themselves, yes, there are really options. There is a choice. And because they have the option to make their option as strong as possible, citizens are also more willing to say, 'OK, we lost, Podemos is still not in power, but we can try again and are prepared to live with the outcome until the next elections.' But, if I feel that it is post-democracy all the way down and that there is no alternative I can vote for, it is much more likely that I will turn away from the political system altogether.

I think some of these outcomes have been far from obvious. It was far from obvious, for instance, that young people in these countries left the squares and said, 'Okay, we are going to build parties instead, based on our experiences.' It would have been perfectly understandable if they had said, 'Okay, if this is the system, I give up on it entirely. We will stay in the squares and give up on party politics completely.' Or, another option that one could have easily imagined in light of European history, would have been something like armed struggle – just think back to what some young people did in the 1970s. And instead they formed parties, which help to reflect the actual conflicts and cleavages in society. So, it's hardly a homogeneous crisis of representation everywhere.

Of course, you could reply to me: 'I can vote for Tsipras[16] ten more times, and nothing ever changes (in fact, it gets worse).' True – but it is important to distinguish between some national systems, where things actually have changed, and the EU level,

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[15] The phrase is attributed to Margaret Thatcher, who typically claimed that "There Is No Alternative", a statement which became known as TINA.
[16] Alexis Tsipras (1974-) is leader of Syriza and Greek Premier Minister since January 26, 2015.

where the conflict – for shorthand – between austerity and anti-austerity is not being reflected and up for any kind of sustained democratic contestation. It can be reflected in Greece and Spain, but it cannot be properly reflected in the EU as a whole. In other words, we have to be precise about where the crisis is, instead of having a lazy approach, which says, 'Same crisis everywhere.' We should not subsume everything under the same concept and, for instance, say that protest parties are all dangerous. No, protest parties that accept the rules of the democratic system – which means not least: 'we accept it when we lose' – are good news.

Would you accept the argument that a certain dose of populism is healthy because it points to problems with democracy and that these problems can be made visible and thus corrected as part of an adaption to populism?

No, not in the general way that this argument is usually presented. The standard variety of it would say, 'Oh, yes, we don't like their style, and it might be dangerous what they do, but we recognize that they have identified people's real concerns and real sorrows.' The reason I would reject this is that it is based on a misunderstanding of how democratic representation works. It is not true that populists ultimately reveal the truth about what is happening deep down in society (even though again, in a strange way, it's a real comforting story for us to say, 'Yes, *now* we know what's going on, because they have told us'). No, they have not. Because democratic representation is not some mechanical reproduction of given objective interests and identities out there, which parties merely transmit into parliaments.

Instead, it is a dynamic process, where different offerings of representation and identification by politicians and parties can make a huge difference to how people perceive themselves. An obvious example is that it is a big mistake to say, 'Oh, Donald Trump has shown us that millions and millions of people in the USA are racists. Well, maybe we did not realize it before, but he has now told us the truth about American society.' Now, of course it's true that there are plenty of racists in the US and that he has managed to convince a lot of people – though not everybody who voted for him – to see themselves as *de facto* members of something like a white identity movement. But that was not inevitable. This is not the ultimate, objective truth about American society.

So it's a dynamic process. I'm not saying that anything goes, that anything can gain traction with voters; there must be *something* there on the basis of which populists are able to mobilize. But to jump from this to the statement that they have discovered the truth about people's real problems, and that we should accept what they tell us at face value, is a serious mistake.

Sorry to return again to the issue of anti-pluralism, but we would like to press the point, seeing it is at the core of your conception of populism. For example, some would currently assert that there is a neoliberal hegemony, which prevents welfare

*states from being preserved. On the basis of this claim, could you say that the popu-
lists are right to say that the system itself is anti-pluralist?*

It's true that the EU makes it more difficult to preserve welfare states; the goal of realiz-
ing a certain economic vision is indeed built into treaties. But I would not go so far as to
say 'the system itself.' I think that too often the constraints placed by the EU on national
systems are exaggerated. Let's not forget that politicians themselves often have an in-
centive to present their ideas in a much more technocratic way than they merit. It makes
it easier for them. Rather than saying, 'I'm responsible for this decision or that deci-
sion,' it's much easier for them to say, 'I can't do anything, Brussels told me to do it.'
For a politician, it's much more tempting than to fight for more room of manoeuvre or
to accept responsibility for actual choices.

Again, there is a curious symmetry, when you think about it. The populist also
say, 'Look, I'm not responsible, I'm just implementing the people's authentic will.'
Both the technocrat and the populist deny actual personal responsibility. If things go
wrong they can always say, 'Sorry that we have a terrible recession. Brussels made me
do it'; and failing populists can say, 'I was about to implement the will of the people,
but this judge prevented me from doing it' or 'The international financial elites prevent-
ed it from happening.'

*In some of the media commentary about the rise of contemporary populism, some
very serious concerns have been raised and some very dramatic scenarios painted. For
example, Robert Kagan[17] and others have used the word fascism in relation to Trumps
campaign. What is your assessment of the current conjuncture? In your opinion, is the
situation dangerous?*

First of all, I would very much argue against the cliché that we are facing an irreversible
process, a wave or even a "tsunami", as Nigel Farage[18] put it, that is, "washing away the
elites" (or, a variation of the same theme: Marine Le Pen's domino theory). Nigel Far-
age didn't bring Brexit about all by himself. He needed his very established British con-
servative collaborators like British Foreign Minister Boris Johnson[19] and Michael
Cove[20]. In the same way, Trump did not win the election as the leader of a third, insur-
gent, anti-establishment, populist party. He was the candidate of a very established par-
ty. Just as much as Farage needed his Boris Johnson, Trump needed his Christie[21] and

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[17] Robert Kagan (1958), American historian and columnist.
[18] Nigel Farage (1964), former chairman of the UKIP (United Kingdom Independence Party) and member
of the European Parliament.
[19] Boris Johnson (1964), foreign secretary of the UK.
[20] Michael Cove (1967), member of the cabinet of Theresa May since 2017. He is a well-known Euro-
sceptic.
[21] Chris Christie (1962), governor of New Jersey, has been an early supporter of Donald Trump.

Rudy Giuliani[22] and, interestingly, his Newt Gingrich[23] who is an intellectual by the standards of the American conservative movement.

Long story short: nowhere in Europe or Northern America has a far-Right populist come to power on his own. Austria would have been the first if Hofer[24] had won the presidential election in 2016, but he didn't. Every single case where these parties have had some success, Trump's victory, Brexit – and Brexit is not a threat to the British political system like Trump is to the American political system – they had the support of their collaborators, and I use this word including its historical resonances, in the form of conservative elites.

Therefore, it is a mistake these days to be fixated on the populists in isolation. There is a larger dynamic. We should keep a very close eye on conservatives in particular. I still find it hard to believe that, if conservatives in The Netherlands and France refuse to collaborate with these people that they will have great triumphs in the coming elections, let alone that Frauke Petry[25] will be the chancellor in Germany.

Nevertheless, let's take a look at the worst possible scenarios. Is liberal democracy able to defend itself against 'the populist surge'? Under these circumstances, which measures would you be prepared to endorse in the defence of liberal democracy?

If you look at the American situation now, some of the liberals are extremely naive. Populists want conflict. They want confrontation. Ironically, they always talk about unification, but it is unification on their terms – if you do not unify according to their ideas, you are in for trouble.

But democracy is not about unification. Democracy is about legitimately contained conflict. It is a typical, clichéd American way of talking when US politicians say that the country is 'so divided' and that leaders, after all elections, have to heal the wounds of the nation. In a way, unification is way out of line in terms of a Madisonian understanding of democracy, which is not about unifying at all. It is precisely about enabling and maintaining conflict. As long as everybody acknowledges each other as legitimate opponents, democracy is in OK shape.

It's naive to think that as long as there is significant protest, Trump is failing. No. As long as he can portray protesters as a minority of people who are failing to defend our homeland, there is trouble. Around 40 percent of Trump's voters get their news from FOX, followed by much smaller proportions that get their news from CNN and Facebook. The Washington Post and The New York Times are not even in the top ten for Trump supporters. So how these media see the protests is essentially irrelevant for Trump's constituency.

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[22] Rudy Giuliani (1944), Republican mayor of New York from 1994 to 2001.
[23] Newt Gingrich (1943) is considered to be one of the leading ideologues of Donald Trump.
[24] Norbert Hofer (1971) is an Austrian politician who narrowly lost the Austrian presidential elections in 2016.
[25] Frauke Petry (1975) is the leader of the German Party *Alternative für Deutschland*.

Of course, it does not follow from this that we should not protest because we might see that protest incorporated into a Trumpist narrative. We should protest, but we should not be so naive as to think that it will translate immediately into something politically effective.

There are two things I would add. In an EU context, there are actually mechanisms available in the EU treaties. It is a tragedy and a shame that they have not been used. There are concrete things that could be done in the cases of Hungary and Poland – and, again, in the case of Hungary, it matters a great deal that supposedly mainstream conservatives have been covering for Orbán, who in effect is a far-Right populist.

The tougher question is about the possibility, which exists in some countries, to prohibit parties altogether. I would say, although these populist parties are dangerous to democracy, this is not enough to legitimate party bans. But it puts even more of a burden on politicians to respond to them in a way that makes it clear how populists undermine democracy, and that they are simply not like other contenders for power.

BØGER

Populisme hitter – både blandt vælgere og politologer

En kommenterende anmeldelse af Jan-Werner Müller, Cas Mudde og Christobal Kaltwasser samt Ernesto Laclau

Populismen har ryddet forsider i de senere år. Med valget af Donald Trump, en anti-elitistisk, men autoritær populist som USA's præsident nåede den sit foreløbige højdepunkt i 2016. UKIP's succes med at få briterne til at stemme gang i en udmeldelsesproces i forhold til EU var også med til at sikre fremdrift. På den anden side talte dog, at Marine le Pen overbevisende tabte det franske præsidentvalg og siden meldte ud, at de franske vælgere havde overbevist hende om, at vejen frem for franskmændene *ikke* går uden om EU.

De tre sæt af begivenheder har hver på deres måde været med til at gøre populismen til et populært valg som medietema og til at vise, at populister kan sætte dagsordner – også for eksperterne. Der er samtidig begyndt at komme mange bøger om net-

op populisme. Her er valgt tre, der hver på deres måde er karakteristiske for nogle bredere strømninger i politologisk, politisk og idéhistorisk litteratur. Ernesto Laclau skrev siden begyndelsen af 1970'erne om populisme og dens konflikter med liberalisme, Cas Mudde har mange år på bagen som en af de mest anerkendte politologiske populisme-forskere, mens Jan-Werner Müller, der primært har været kendt for sine bøger om demokratiet og dets udfordringer i et ideologiteoretisk perspektiv, er relativt nytilkommen på populismescenen. Tilsammen giver de et bredt billede af populismens politiske, empiriske og teoretiske udfordringer til politologer samt eksempler på, hvordan man kan møde dem.

Bøgernes særtræk

Set fra et strikt statskundskabsperspektiv er Cas Muddes og Cristobal Rovira Kaltwassers lille bog *Populism. A very Short Introduction* den mest centrale af de her valgte tekster. Den former sig som en relativt nøgtern indføring i emnet, der ikke i første omgang bjergtages af emnets aktualitet, men i stedet giver en bred oversigt over populismens udvikling. Forfatterne inkluderer dels den populistiske realitet fra det 19. århundredes russiske folkevenner til vores dages europæiske højrepopulister samt latinamerikanske venstrepopulister, og dels de tilgange, der har været med til at uddybe kendskabet til dem.

   Populism giver desuden en oversigt over nogle af de større debatter, der er blevet fremprovokeret af populismens succes. Der er kapitler om populistisk lederskab, populisme og demokrati, årsagerne til populisme og endelig spørgsmålet om, hvad man kan og skal gøre ved den. Hvad angår det sidste, mener Mudde og Kaltwasser, at populismen i de aktuelle former har været med til at sætte reelle politiske og sociale udfordringer på dagsordenen. Blandt de emner, hvor man bør lytte til populisterne, er 'det demokratiske underskud i EU' og ulighed i Latinamerika. De hævder, at det bedste værn mod populister på sigt er at fjerne årsagerne til 'den populistiske efterspørgsel'. Det vil f.eks. sige at demokratisere EU og afbøde de værste uligheder.

   Jan-Werner Müllers *Hvad er populisme?* er på sin vis 'nøgtern' nok, men den er først og fremmest et meget passioneret debatindlæg *mod* populisme. Hvor Mudde og Kaltwasser anerkender, at 'populisme' kan være nyttig i nogle sammenhænge, som for eksempel når autoritære samfund skal demokratiseres, går Müller *all in* i angrebet på populister. I hans optik er populisme ganske enkelt 'anti-pluralistisk' og tendentielt antidemokratisk. *Hvad er populisme?* former sig da også som en kritisk diskussion af aktuel populisme i tre dele: En diskussion af teorier om populisme, en diskussion af den reelt eksisterende populisme, især i Europa i det nye årtusinde samt en diskussion af, hvad man kan gøre ved den.

   Hvor Mudde og Kaltwasser går overvejende politologisk til værks er Müllers tilgang mere idéhistorisk, og han fokuserer især på de direkte politiske effekter af populisme. Det betyder bestemt ikke, at han mangler sans for realiteter og detaljer, men blot at den politiske hensigt om at komme frem til, hvordan man bekæmper populisme i det

hele taget, øjensynligt har fyldt mere i tilvejebringelsen af bogen og dens disposition, end den har gjort for de førstnævnte. Også for Müller er svaret på populismens udfordring dog mere demokrati. Populismen skal bekæmpes med demokratiske midler, og liberale demokrater skal utrætteligt indgå i dialog med populisterne.

Mens de to nævnte bøger bevidst er skrevet som enkle oversigter over emnet er Ernesto Laclaus bidrag mere subtilt. Det er på sin vis ligeså repræsentativt for en strømning - diskursteori og tilgrænsende tilgange, men det er ikke så tilgængeligt og heller ikke skrevet så direkte formidlende. I stedet findes Laclaus 'seneste populismebog' skjult inden i det udvalg af repræsentative tekster fra hans hånd, som David Howarth redigerede for forlaget Routledge i 2014. Samlet set udgør fire af kapitlerne, skrevet fra 1977 til 2007, en tekstmasse af samme omfang som de øvrige nævnte bøger, der behandler populismen.

Ernesto Laclau publicerede sin første tekst om populisme på engelsk i 1970. Her blev 'populisme' set som den politiske form, som modstanderne af Argentinas (hans hjemlands) oligarkier påtog sig i kampen mod, at landets økonomiske politik blev underlagt krav fra verdensmarkedet i stedet for dets indbyggeres behov. Laclau formulerede sig dengang inden for marxismens rammer, men forlod denne tankegang i begyndelsen af 1980'erne. Hans oprindelige tilgang til populismen blev dog udviklet som en tilføjelse til marxistisk politik- og ideologiteori og offentliggjort som en del af hans ph.d.-afhandling fra Oxford i 1977. De tekster om populismen, der er samlet af Howarth, dækker både den marxistisk og den post-marxistiske periode, og de giver således en bred indføring. Også Laclau har naturligvis drøftet, om man skal støtte eller modarbejde populismen. Som Mudde, og i stærk modsætning til Müller, ser han nærmest populismen som sådan som en politisk neutral form, men tilslutter sig selv eksplicit et venstrepopulistisk synspunkt.

Det klassiske spørgsmål: Hvad er populisme?

De valgte bøger har til en vis grad hver deres svar på problemet angående populismens egenart, men er mere enige om mange af dens karakteristikker, end man umiddelbart skulle tro.

Cas Mudde har kaldt sin tilgang ideologisk orienteret, til forskel fra tilgange, der ser populisme som politisk stil, et rationelt valg for landbrugere i overgangen til industrisamfund eller simpelthen en ultrahøjre-bevægelse.[1] Mudde og Kaltwasser (s. 6) definerer populisme som en "thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic camps, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volunté generale* (general will) of the people."

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[1] De kalder deres tilgang til populisme "an 'ideational' approach", concieving it as a discourse, an ideology, or a world-view." (s. 5).

Denne definition ligger snublende tæt på Ernesto Laclaus (s. 132)[2] forsøg fra 1977, som er genoptrykt i Howarths udvalg: "Our thesis is that populism consists in the presentation of popular-democratic interpellations as a synthetic-antagonistic complex with respect to the dominant ideology."

Hovedelementerne i de to tilgange er fuldt ud forenelige omkring forestillingerne om 1) en dikotom samfundsopfattelse, 2) et over- og et undersamfund og 3) en kollektiv vilje, der modsætter sig *status quo* under påberåbelse af at repræsentere folket mod eliten. Til denne enighed kommer, at Jan-Werner Müller (s. 42-43) også anerkender formuleringerne i grove træk, om end dog kun som sekundær karakteristik, ikke som definition: "Populisme er efter min tese en ganske bestemt forestilling om politik, hvor det moralsk rene og homogene folk altid står overfor umoralske, korrupte og parasitære eliter – hvoraf følger at denne type eliter i virkeligheden slet ikke hører til folket".

Til forskel fra den 'ideologiske' opfattelse af populisme, som karakteriserer de to førstnævnte tilgange, skal det fremhæves, at Jan-Werner Müllers grundidé om populisme adskiller sig. Müller vil udvikle en 'idealtype', der entydigt kan placere politiske ideer og især politikere inden for 'populisme-kategorien'. Müller (s. 25-26; 19) finder sit kriterium i ideen om, at nogle ikke accepterer pluralisme i en demokratisk kontekst, men hævder at have en privilegeret adgang til/et moralsk monopol på at repræsentere 'folket': "Det jeg gerne vil betegne som alle populisters kernepåstand, lyder omtrent sådan: 'Vi – og kun vi – repræsenterer det sande folk.'". Det formuleres også sådan: "Populister påstår 'Vi er folket'. De mener imidlertid – og det er altid et moralsk og ikke et empirisk udsagn (…)' Vi - og kun vi – repræsenterer folket'."

Hermed følger også en anden af Müllers sekundære påstande om populismen, nemlig at den er anti-pluralistisk, fordi den ikke anerkender andres krav på også at repræsentere folket, eller i det mindste dele heraf, og dermed også bliver tendentielt udemokratisk, fordi populister ønsker selv at regere uden bindinger til de demokratiske spilleregler i øvrigt.

Som det fremgår, er de to typer definitioner gensidigt udelukkende. De medfører da også to forskellige former for politisk vurdering. Mudde og Laclau ser populisme som en i princippet 'neutral' politisk form, der altid vil blive indholdsudfyldt (til højre eller venstre), mens Müller ser den som direkte partisk, anti-pluralistisk og tendentielt anti-demokratisk.

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[2] I en anden tekst fra samme år skriver Laclau om den populistiske konflikt: "Through this antagonism, the dominated sectors would … identify themselves .. as 'the other', 'the counterposed' to the dominant powerbloc, as the *underdog*." - svarende til det Mudde og Kaltwasser beskriver som '*"the pure people" versus "the corrupt elite"'*. Ensartetheden i formuleringerne er om end ikke ord for ord, så dog indholdsmæssigt helt parallel. Hvis man dertil lægger Muddes og Kaltwassers formulering om 'volunté generale' og sammenligner den med Laclaus optagethed af 'collective will', som del af udformningen af hegemoniske projekter for henholdsvis magtblok og underhunde, er det strengt taget svært at se forskel på de to tilgange. Citatet er fra Ernesto Laclau (1977) *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory*. Verso, London, Verso, s. 107.

Er problemet så 'højre' eller 'populisme'?

Laclau har siden 1977 udviklet sin populismeopfattelse i den retning, at al politik i demokratiske samfund har populistiske elementer i sig. Der vil altid være en vis mængde påkaldelse af at 'repræsentere folkelige kræfter' i demokratisk politik, uanset hvordan dette så måtte blive formuleret i praksis, og hvad enten det er fra højre eller venstre. Denne antagelse modsiger naturligvis tilgange som Müllers, mens Mudde og Kaltwasser i langt højere grad er villige til at drøfte populismens eventuelle dyder (se følgende). Mere specifikt føjer Laclau også en slags idealtype til sin tilgang, nemlig den tanke, at den typiske populisme opstår i heterogene samfund, skaber en enhed af krav fra neden, skaber symboler for denne enhed og som regel frembringer en leder, der kan fortolke kravene for 'folket'. Jo flere træk af denne beskrivelse en given politisk bevægelse har, jo mere rendyrket populistisk er den. Der er imidlertid ikke noget i typen, der i sig selv skulle pege på en særlig højre- eller venstredimension.

Hvad Laclau angår, har hans store interesse dybest set altid været venstrepopulisme, eller måske snarere mulighedsbetingelserne for, at venstrepopulistiske bevægelser kunne udvikles og trives. I den forstand er problemet entydigt højre-egenskaben ved visse bevægelser – ikke deres eventuelle populisme. I en lille spansksproget tekst fra 2005 drøftede han da også det, han så som de vigtigste partier i udviklingen af et alternativ til neoliberalismen, nemlig de latinamerikanske 'centrum-venstre' populister, hvortil han regnede et så bredt felt som Kirchner-parret i Argentina og Hugo Chavez i Venezuela. Imidlertid lå han helt på linje med Mudde og Müller, når de ser højrepopulismen som den henholdsvis empirisk og principielt set største politiske udfordring af de to varianter.

Mudde og Kaltwasser bruger 17 linjer og en illustration ud af *Populisms* 130 sider på den aktuelle europæiske venstrepopulisme, Syriza og Podemos. Det er bestemt ikke her, de ser den store udfordring – hverken til det liberale demokrati eller til politologien. Den egentlige udfordring i USA og Europa kommer i deres optik fra højrepopulismen. Ofte er det da også sådan, at populisme og højrepopulisme bruges som synonymer. Det gælder for eksempel for Jan-Werner Müller, der nærmest skal til Latinamerika for at finde en virkelig venstrepopulisme, den venezuelanske chavisme, mens han egentlig ikke ser Syriza og de selverklærede venstrepopulistiske ledere af Podemos (Pablo Iglesias og Enigo Errejón) som populister i hans forstand.

I praksis definerer Mudde og Kaltwasser (s. 34) højrepopulisme som en kombination af populisme samt autoritære og nationalistiske politiske ideologier. Hvad angår den autoritære dimension peger de på "'law and order' issues" og med hensyn til den nationalistiske dimension på den forestilling at "states should be inhabited exclussively by members of the native group ("the nation") and that non-natives ("alien") elements are fundamentaly threatening to the homogenous nation-state." De opfatter tilsvarende Jean-Marie Le Pens parti Front National fra 1972 som prototypen på denne politiske form. I praksis mener de (s. 34) dog, at højrepopulisme først blev en relevant politisk kraft i Europa i 1990erne. Man kunne tilføje: Altså efter Murens Fald og i takt med at

den nye verdensordens globalisering i stigende grad blev mærkbar. Som dansker kan man godt føle sig lidt overset, når de svinger den brede pensel. Fremskridtspartiet var trods alt blandt de store stemmeslugere i 1970'erne.

Sammenligninger, styrker og svagheder

I de tre valgte udgivelser former vurderingerne af populisme sig i et ret komplekst mønster. Som det er fremgået, er der i udgangspunktet store ligheder mellem definitioner fra Muddes og Kaltwassers samt Laclaus side. Müller kan også tilslutte sig indholdet i definitionerne, men kun som underordnet beskrivelse, idet han selv foreslår en definition i en helt anden dimension.

Også med hensyn til vurderingen af forholdet mellem populisme og den klassiske politiske kløft i økonomisk interessebaseret politik synes Laclau samt Mudde og Kaltwasser at være enige: Populisme kan være både være højre- og venstreorienteret. Denne opfattelse udfordrer i praksis Müllers formuleringer, der synes at se populismen som tendentielt højreorienteret.

Endelig står Müller også lidt alene med ideen om, at populismen af natur er 'anti-pluralistisk' og tendentielt anti-demokratisk. Mudde skriver derimod nuanceret og meget eksplicit, at populisme kan være en løftestang for demokratisering af autoritære samfund, men at den som regel trækker i den modsatte retning i udviklede, liberale demokratier. Den er en illiberal demokratisk bevægelse, der ofte er rettet mod udemokratisk liberalisme. Hermed kunne man uden at gøre vold på forfatterne sige, at i forhold til 'det demokratiske underskud' i EU, er det måske meget sundt for demokratiet med noget populisme og elite-kritik. At lade andre stemmer end ministerråd og teknokrater blive hørt i EU debatten er ikke 'anti-pluralisme', selvom disse stemmer skulle påkalde sig at være 'folkets røst'.

Til slut en opsummerende forbrugeroplysning. Muddes og Kaltwassers bog bør roses for det bredeste udsyn, det største overblik og det bedste udvalg af tekster, der anbefales til videre læsning. Nogle steder er der dog nok valgt en lidt for bred pensel i fremstillingen, men den giver klart det bedste afsæt for videre empiriske studier.

Ernesto Laclaus tekster bør roses for at opsummere den længste erfaring og for at være de mest originale. Hans tekster præges dog nogle gange af indforståethed og for meget fokus på 'fikse ideer'. Laclau er i denne sammenhæng tyk på filosofi og teori, men noget tynd på empiri.

Jan-Werner Müllers bog er i særklasse bedst skrevet, men der er lidt for meget namedropping og politisering end systematisk empiriske henvisninger (selvom der er mange *eksemplificerende* henvisninger til populistiske synspunkter, bevægelser og partier) - hvor sympatiske hans liberalt-demokratiske synspunkter end er.

Man kan ikke på den baggrund pege på en tekst frem for de andre. Men hvis man zoomer ind på enkelte aspekter, kan man sige, at fra et teoretisk synspunkt vinder Laclau for sin grundighed, fra et empirisk vinder Mudde og Kaltwasser for deres solide

greb om den reelt eksisterende populisme. Praktisk politisk vinder Müller for hans gen-
nemtænkte liberaldemokratiske argumenter mod (især højre-)populisme.

Alt i alt er der i hvert fald masser af stof i de tre bøger til fortløbende debat og
oplæg til videre arbejde i alle dimensioner (teoretiske, empiriske og politisk-
ideologiske). Syntese er nok umulig endnu, men det er efter alle tre forfatteres mere
eller mindre eksplicitte værdigrundlag sikkert meget sundt. Et vist mål af uenighed, så
længe der også er et vist mål af fælles grund, er nyttigt i den demokratiske debat og vi-
densudvikling – også med hensyn til populismen.

Borgerløn – eksistensgrundlag eller cafépenge?

Anmeldt af Jørgen Lindgaard Pedersen, lektor emeritus ved Danmarks Tekniske Universitet (DTU), Management Engineering

Erik Christensen, der netop har udgivet bogen 'På vej til borgerløn', er tidligere lektor ved Aalborg Universitet. Nu er han som pensionist en særdeles aktiv debattør og forfatter især omkring borgerlønstanken. Siden år 2000 har han udgivet en fem-seks bøger om borgerløn alene samt om borgerløn og bæredygtig udvikling. Hertil kommer et større antal artikler heraf nogle er udkommet i samarbejde med andre forskere og samfundsdebattører.

Hvad er borgerløn og hvorfor borgerløn?

Der findes mange forskellige definitioner af, hvad borgerløn er. Forfatteren tilslutter sig den definition, det internationale borgerlønsnetværk BIEN (<u>B</u>asic <u>I</u>ncome <u>E</u>arth <u>N</u>etwork) anvender (s. 9):

> 1) Den er universel
> 2) Den er individuel
> 3) Den er ubetinget
> 4) Den skal være tilstrækkelig
> 5) Den udbetales løbende, ikke som et engangsbeløb

Endvidere peger forfatteren på, at der eksisterer tre argumentationstyper eller fortællinger om borgerløn (s. 26-28):

1) En teknisk borgerlønsfortælling
2) En politisk borgerlønsfortælling
3) En utopisk borgerlønsfortælling

I den tekniske borgerlønsfortælling ses der på de muligheder, der åbnes ved at slå for-skellige tilskudsformer sammen og gøre det offentlige mere brugervenligt og måske billigere. Altså et rationaliseringsprojekt.

Den politiske borgerlønsfortælling går ud på, at der sker en udvikling, hvor der skabes større frihed for den enkelte borger til at påtage sig uformelt arbejde. Dette vil indebære større autonomi i forhold til staten, arbejdsmarkedet og det civile samfund. En videreudvikling af et økonomisk medborgerskab i den universelle velfærdsstat som vi har i de nordiske lande.

Sluttelig har vi den utopiske borgerlønsfortælling, hvor borgerlønnen sættes ind i en langsigtet vision om skabelsen af et nyt bæredygtigt samfund, hvor det økologiske, det sociale og det økonomiske er forbundet og går op i en højere enhed.

Selv om det måske ikke siges helt eksplicit, så er det Christensens mål at bidrage til, at det enkelte individ opnår større frihed og større tryghed. De tre fortællinger nævnt oven for er de samfundsmæssige forudsætninger eller rammebetingelser, som kan bi-drage til det egentlige måls opfyldelse. Forfatteren synes at tilslutte sig et miks af alle tre fortællinger. Først og fremmest for at udvide den sociale basis for tilslutningen til borgerlønsprojektet.

En praktisk reform med indførelse af borgerløn

I bestræbelsen på at få indført borgerløn i praksis med specielt henblik på Danmark har Christensen nogle mere kontroversielle forslag. Han afviser, at betalingen for borger-lønnen skal komme fra indkomstbeskatning (s. 82). Derimod opererer han med en sam-fundsmæssig fond bestående af vores fælles ejede viden. Denne fond skal hvert år tilfø-res tilsammen omkring 10 % af bruttonationalproduktet (BNP) fra patentindkomster, copyrightindkomster, andre intellektuelle indkomstarter, kapital- og formuebeskatning samt skat fra jord- og anden naturressourcerente (s. 82).

Forfatteren knytter ovenstående beskatningsforslag sammen med to andre re-formforslag. For det første går han ind for, at de private bankers pengeskabelse skal fjernes og overføres til Nationalbanken (s. 86). For det andet vil han beskatte de højt-lønnede og beskæftigelsessikrede lønmodtagere af deres indkomst fra arbejdsmarkedet (s. 88-89).

Hvem er kombattanterne omkring borgerløn og hvilke ressourcer har de?

Men hvem skal kæmpe en borgerløn igennem og hvem er modstanderne? Her kommer det for tiden meget omtalte prekariat ind i billedet. Prekariatet er, hvad vi kan kalde samfundets løsarbejdere. Christensen gør ikke noget videre ud af at behandle denne

gruppe. Det gør Guy Standing derimod. Standing, der er forfatter til bogen *Prekariatet*, er professor i økonomi ved School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) i London. Han har en lang karriere i blandt andet ILO bag sig.

Prekariatet er ikke en ensartet klasse som arbejderklassen, men derimod en blanding af mennesker i mange forskellige sektorer som typisk kun har indkomst, når der er en kortvarig efterspørgsel efter dem. Det kan være inden for butiksområdet, fremstillingserhvervene eller transporterhvervene. Det kan også være undervisere i skoler eller på universiteter. Der kan være folk på vej ned, eller folk på vej op. Og endelig er der folk, der lever hele deres liv i prekariatet. Standing tager uden argumentation afstand fra det marxistiske begreb lumpenproletariatet, som indbefatter mere permanent arbejdsløse ud over grupperne i prekariatet (s. 26).

Standing kommer med nogle tal for størrelsen af prekariatet. I Japan skal det udgøre omkring 1/3 af arbejdsstyrken (tallene er fra 2010, hvor den engelske version af bogen som nævnt oven for blev udgivet). I Sydkorea skal over halvdelen af landets arbejdere være i midlertidige ikke-faste jobs (s. 36-37).

Hovedpointen i Standings værk er at prekariatets livsforhold er kendetegnet ved en fundamental usikkerhed. Det er indlysende, at dette betyder, at det er svært at kunne binde sig økonomisk til f.eks. en ejerbolig, hvor der jo løbende skal betales væsentlige ydelser. Men i det hele taget udgør usikkerheden et fundamentalt utryghedsskabende livsvilkår. Der er således tale om en skævvridning af samfundet.

Det er påfaldende, at såvel Christensen som Standing gør en del ud af at analysere viljestyrke og ressourcer hos prekariatet til at indføre borgerløn. Men spørgsmålet om der findes en tilsvarende viljestyrke og ressourceudrustning hos andre grupper i samfundet med hensyn til borgerlønsprojektet stilles knap nok eksplicit. Det ville ellers være nærliggende at se nærmere på det egentlige borgerskab, som må formodes at besidde såvel fast ejendom som opnå monopolgevinster via deres jobs og formue. De vil få beløb svarende til cafépenge, men sandsynligt komme til at betale mærkbare beløb. I betragtning af, at 2/3 af den danske befolkning er ejere af fast ejendom, må der her være en solid modstandskraft mod at betale øgede ejendomsskatter selv om den betegnes som værende grundskyld. Christensen prøver at overbevise sig selv og andre om, at arbejderne vil kunne vinde ved at tilslutte sig borgerlønskampen. Det er dog mindre klart om de samme arbejderes fagforeninger på samme måde vil kunne vinde på borgerlønnens indførelse. Blandt andet vil incitamentet til at melde sig ind i arbejdsløshedskasser formindskes. Med a-kassernes betydning som rekrutteringssluse til fagforeningerne kan dette naturligvis blive særdeles alvorligt for disse (s. 60-84).

En kritik af borgerlønnen på dens egne præmisser

Finansieringen af borgerlønnen er i bedste fald uklart beskrevet. Dels størrelsesmæssigt, dels kildemæssigt. Dvs. hvorledes kan der opkræves beløb af en størrelsesorden, der blot tilnærmelsesmæssigt kan betale for gildet? Og fordi indkomstskatten på forhånd opgives som kilde, hvilket forekommer realistisk med det generelt høje skatteniveau vi

har i Europa, så er der ingen dybdegående analyser, der viser, at husejerne, 2/3 af den danske befolkning, skulle være indstillet på at øge ejendomsbeskatningen, herunder jordbeskatningen (grundskyldsbeskatningen). Hvis det kun er den del af befolkningen, som ikke ejer deres bolig, der går ind for finansieringsmodellen, så har den på ingen måde et politisk flertal bag sig.

Det hjælper heller ikke, hvis de moderne virksomheder, der besidder stor intellektuel kapital, som i dag er beskyttet af forskellige former for intellektuelle ejendomsrettigheder (patenter, ophavsrettigheder, forædlerrettigheder m.v.) skal have beskattet en stor del af afkastet herfra. Effekten heraf ender på den ene eller anden måde hos private aktionærer fra den velstillede del af befolkningen eller hos pensionskasser, som den brede befolkning jo også skal leve af afkastet fra.

Når Christensen mener, at borgerlønsprojektet har en vis mulighed for at blive realiseret synes det blandt andet at være begrundet i en analyse af, at den aktuelle indførelse af robotter og ikke mindst denne udviklings formodede vækst i de kommende år vil samle støtte fra såvel jobtruede lønmodtagere samt fremsynede arbejdsgivere. Så vidt jeg kan se er Standing ikke uenig i denne analyse.

En kritik af borgerlønnen og dens præmisser

Selv om jeg kan ha' sympati for dele af borgerlønsprojektet, så har jeg meget svært ved at forstå, hvorfor Christensen og Standing og vistnok alle andre borgerlønstilhængere i den grad forsvarer, at den skal være universel. Dvs. tildeles alle voksne statsborgere (vistnok fra 15 år og derover) samt mennesker med gyldig opholdstilladelse i landet. Og vel at mærke uden hensyntagen til deres indkomst. Forfatterne fremfører blot synspunktet uden nogen videre argumentation. Det forekommer meget ejendommeligt, eftersom det er et centralt kritikpunkt fra skeptikere og modstandere. Naturligvis efter skepsissen omkring effekten på arbejdsudbuddet. Derfor må interesserede samfundsborgere selv forsøge at finde mulige argumenter. Et første muligt argument kan være, at det kan være en måde at frigøre også økonomisk bedrestillede borgere fra det evige pres for at opretholde indtjeningen. Et andet mere gustent argument kan være, at den bedrestillede del af befolkningen via borgerlønnens universelle karakter kan bestikkes til at støtte den. Det er en parallel til Socialdemokratiets argument for universalisme i velfærdsydelserne i det danske velfærdssystem – når middelklassen også får ydelserne, så vil de være vanskeligere at rulle tilbage.

Hvorfor ikke modernisere og forbedre velfærdsstaten uden borgerløn?

Som nævnt er det ikke helt klart hvad tilhængerne af borgerløn egentlig betragter som hovedformålet med borgerlønnen. Men lad os blot se på tre målsætninger, der fremføres af Christensen og Standing:

1) Øget frihed eller autonomi for den enkelte borger
2) Øget tryghed i livet
3) Større lighed i fordelingen af samfundsgoderne

Der er ingen tvivl om at der under finanskrisen og den efterfølgende økonomiske krise og stagnation fra 2007-08 og fremefter er sket en kraftig opstramning af kontrollen med modtagere af offentlige ydelser i Danmark såvel som internationalt. Først på det seneste har kritikken af denne overdrevne kontrol vundet gehør i den offentlige debat. Men der er ingen grund til at tro, at denne kontrolsyge ville være anderledes i et samfund med borgerløn.

Behovet for tryghed i den basale økonomi er meget fundamentalt, fordi tryghed med hensyn til en vis mindsteindkomst afgør om folk kan anskaffe sig en ejerbolig og andre større forbrugsgoder som bil. Men argumentet er det samme her, nemlig at borgerlønnens størrelse og permanens afhænger af det politiske livs omskiftelighed.

Lighedsmålsætningen opnås ved progressiv beskatning, genindførelse af formuebeskatning samt tilbagerulning af lettelserne i arvebeskatning. Her er det pjat at postulere, at borgerløn kan hjælpe mærkbart.

Bøgernes kvalitet og svagheder

Erik Christensens bog er såvel velskrevet som letlæst med sine 128 små sider. Den er baseret på forfatterens blog på den nu nedlagte portal Modkraft. Forfatteren har gjort sig den umage at bortredigere gentagelserne fra bloggen. Tak for det!

Guy Standings værk på 350 sider er også såvel velskrevet som letlæst. Den har masser af konkrete eksempler på vigtige pointer. Men på mig virker det som spild af læserens tid at skulle have præsenteret disse myriader af eksempler. I stedet burde forfatteren have bragt nogle modeksempler på sine hovedpåstande eller resultater. I så fald ville jeg have haft større tillid til hans hovedsynspunkter.

Men uanset disse kritikpunkter så kommer der forhåbentlig flere skarpe analytiske bidrag i debatten. Der findes allerede nogle fra såvel tilhængere og modstandere som folk, der kan tænke selvstændigt.

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ABSTRACTS

Abstracts

The People Does Not Exist - That Is Why We Have Populism. On Laclau's Theory of Populism

Allan Dreyer Hansen

The article discusses Ernesto Laclau's theory of populism. In Laclau, populism is not understood as a demarcated empirical phenomenon pertaining to certain political actors. It is a set of logics which mainly involve the construction of 'the people' in an antagonistic relation vis-a-vis 'the elite'. Laclau's theory is used in interpreting the Danish Social Democracy's famous 1934 political program, Denmark for The People, and contrasted with Jan-Werner Müller's conception of populism. The article's main conclusion is that there are no necessary relations between democracy and populism. In other words, populism can represent both a strengthening as well as a threat to democracy.

Is Islamism Populist, or Have Middle Eastern Populism Become Islamist?

Jørgen Bek Simonsen

The article discusses and compares different types of populism that have characterized certain political developments in the Middle East since the beginning of the 20th Century. It is concluded that non-militant Islamism has played a crucial part in this development and secured widespread public support. This has been the case in Iran where the circle around Khomeini specifically articulated the struggle against the Shah in relation to Shi-itic Islamism.

What does 'Lügenpresse' mean? Expressions of media distrust on PEGIDA's Facebook pages

Kristoffer Holt & André Haller

The recent rise to prominence of populist politicians and movements throughout the West is often explained with reference to popular dissatisfaction with "the elite" (Mudde 2004), r. e. politicians estranged from the people they represent or journalists representing the establishment rather than acting as watchdogs of those in power. Lacking in such explanations is often a substantial account for the reasons behind popular dissatisfaction. In this article, we analyze the protest movement PEGIDA's criticism of the press (i. e. "Lügenpresse", the "liar press") on Facebook. What are the main points of criticism of the press and what are the reasons expressed for this criticism, and how do they refer to traditional media in the postings? We conduct a qualitative content analysis of PEGIDA's Facebook pages in Germany, Austria, Sweden and Norway. The focus lies on postings referring to mainstream media. The study shows that there are two main types of references: affirmative references to prove one's own positions and contesting references which comprise media criticism.

Perceptions of 'Populism' and 'Anti-populism' in Greek Public Discourse during the Crisis: The case of the website 'Anti-news'

Lazaros Karavasilis

The aim of this paper is to present how "populism" is perceived in the website "Anti-news" as a representative example of the Greek public discourse in the period between 2010-2016, when the economic crisis heavily affected Greece at a political and social level. The paper will also attempt to explain how populism is portrayed through this right-wing oriented media and how their audience perceives populism. Moreover, the paper offers an account of how "anti-populism" is formulated within this medium and how it contributes to existing notions of anti-populism.