THEME: ARCTIC INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN A WIDENED SECURITY PERSPECTIVE

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Ansvarshavende redaktør

Professor MSO, ph.d. Christian F. Rostbøll,
Institut for Statskundskab,
Københavns Universitet

Øster Farimagsgade 5, Postboks 2099
1014 København K
Mail: cr@ifs.ku.dk
Tlf. 35323428
Bøger til anmeldelse sendes til samme adresse, att. Tobias Liebetrau.

Redaktion

Ph.d.-stipendiat Anne Mette Møller, Institut for Statskundskab, KU
Ph.d.-stipendiat Anne Sofie Bang Lindegaard, DIIS og Institut for Statskundskab, KU
Ph.d.-stipendiat Benjamin Ask Popp-Madsen, Institut for Statskundskab, KU
Ph.d.-stipendiat Ditte Maria Brasso Sørensen, Institut for Statskundskab, KU
Ph.d.-stipendiat Emil Husted, Institut for Organisation, CBS
Ph.d.-stipendiat Hjalte Meilvang, Institut for Statskundskab, KU
Ph.d.-stipendiat Kristoffer Kjærgaard Christensen, Institut for Statskundskab, KU
Ph.d.-stipendiat Marc Jacobsen, Institut for Statskundskab, KU
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Post.doc Malte Frøslee Ibsen, Institut for Statskundskab, KU
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Lektor, ph.d. Tore Vincents Olsen, Institut for Statskundskab, Aarhus Universitet
Professor MSO, Mark Blach-Ørsten, Institut for Kommunikation og Humanistisk Videnskab, RUC
Cand.scient.pol. Simon Gravers Jacobsen
Stud.scient.pol Lise Lerche Paulsen

Redaktør for boganmeldelser

Ph.d.-stipendiat Tobias Liebetrau, Institut for Statskundskab, KU
Mail: politik@ifs.ku.dk

Formål

Politik er et tværfagligt samfundsvidenskabeligt tidsskrift, der bringer artikler om politik ud fra mangfoldige akademiske perspektiver. Redaktionen lægger vægt på *faglighed* sikret gennem anonym refereebedømmelse, *formidling*, som gør Politik tilgængelig uden for universitetets mure, og endelig *politisk relevans*.
Tidsskriftet Politik er en videreførelse af Politologiske Studier.

THEME: ARCTIC INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN A WIDENED SECURITY PERSPECTIVE

Introduction: Arctic International Relations in a Widened Security Perspective

Marc Jacobsen, PhD Candidate, Centre for Advanced Security Theory, Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen

Victoria Herrmann, PhD Candidate, Scott Polar Research Institute, University of Cambridge

"If there is a Third World War, it's strategic center will be the north pole."
- US General Harp Arnold (1946)

Since the militarization of the circumpolar north during the Cold War, the Arctic has been imagined and analyzed as a space of (in)security. The relic stations of the Distant Early Warning System and the still active Russian and American polar nuclear submarine fleets hold testament to the 20th Century construction of not only a physical polar security space, but rhetorical spaces that came to construct an imagined North that informed southern publics and politicians whom would never travel above 66 degrees North. Today, one of the dominant narratives of and valuation metrics for the Arctic in public discourse is still one of security. It has been over two decades since the Cold War thawed into amiable relations between the Western powers and the Soviet Union. And yet, as the ice at the top of the world melts, there has been a stark increase in the focus of scholarship, journalism, and discourse on a race for resources and remilitarization in what has been termed the "new cold war". With this increasing securitization, the rhetoric that once divided the globe has been revived through narrow views of an Arctic security framework (Herrmann 2015). There are reports on how to avoid a new Cold War complete with photographs of tanks (Cohen et al. 2008); news articles on Russia preparing for an 'ice-cold war' (Scarborough, 2017); and interviews that suggest America is falling behind on the new Cold War over Arctic oil (Johnson and De Lucem 2016). As neither most politicians nor the citizens they represent will travel to the northernmost region, the warnings of chilled relations in the 21st Century that loom in text and titles of scholarship and print media are integral in shaping perceptions of not only circumpolar security, but also opportunities to cooperate in mitigating those security threats.

There are many scholars of International Relations that focus on security studies beyond the militarization of the North Pole, particularly those of energy security, as vanishing sea ice makes offshore petroleum exploration feasible, and on the security of all humanity, as a warming Arctic raises sea levels and produces more volatile weather patterns for the rest of the globe. However, such scholarship fails to engage the complexity and multidimensional aspects of Arctic security that might foster a deeper understanding of the region, and in turn more nuanced cooperation and exchange of expertise between security actors. Much of the current Arctic security discourse focuses analyses on singular, linear dimensions – most notably military and energy. In such a rapidly changing Arctic, there is a need to engage in a comprehensive investigation into what Arctic security means in the 21st Century. Climate change, globalization, urbanization, and demographic shifts are transforming the cultures, landscapes, economies, and socio-political structures of the circumpolar region. This special issue of Politik aims to widen the debate on Arctic security relations through a more comprehensive dialogue inclusive of the many different types of security, their interactions, and their challenges by using the theoretical approach of the Copenhagen School. A better understanding of security dynamics in the circumpolar North today demands a critical analysis of those changes through a multidisciplinary and multi-modal lens. Each chapter in this special issue provides one layer of that multimodal lens of Arctic security that, together, weave a complex web of change. This special issue therefore continues to move the discourse of polar security beyond – but not excluding – the conventional debates of military capabilities and state sovereignty towards a more comprehensive definition of security, including its interacting environmental, economic, political, health and cultural dimensions.

Though broken down here into separate dimensions, taken together the special issue highlights the interactions between these dimensions and the importance of looking at topics comprehensively. Security in one dimension inevitably have a cascading effect on others that need to be approached holistically to find the most effective solutions. The insecurities of climate change, arguably the biggest transformative force in the Arctic, is just one example. The Arctic is warming at a rate of almost twice as much as the global average, making the effects of climate change in the circumpolar North far more intense and rapid than most of ecosystems on the globe. Insecurities that come with such rapid warming are found in all the dimensions that the authors of the special issue explore.

The Copenhagen School and widened Arctic security studies

The widened security perspective emerged in the immediate post-Cold War period by challenging the dominant IR approaches of Realism and Liberalism through formulating a discursive take on and by broadening the understanding of security (Buzan and Hansen 2009, 187-191). As part of this constructivist turn, the Copenhagen School developed as an amalgamation of diverse elements: Barry Buzan (1983) organized and expanded a range of phenomena relevant for security into distinct economic, environmental, societal,

political, and military sectors. Ole Wæver (1995)[1] conceptualized security as the result of a specific type of speech acts (securitizations), and sectors became the name for 'second order observations' (Wæver 1999) of distinct 'dialects' of securitization (Wæver 1997, 356). In 1998, Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde tied these ideas together in their momentous book *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. With this theoretical legacy in mind, the present issue is organized to reflect the varied sectoral security issues with particular focus on the communication defining whether something is constructed as being threatened within the Arctic. Five articles use Wæver's securitization approach to unpack five different cases of security within the circumpolar region. The final article, by Heather Exner-Pirot and Robert Murray, uses the English School of security studies which Barry Buzan is also a part of. In this light, we find it appropriate to explain the most basic ideas of Wæver's theory here, while further nuances, possible points of critique and various ways of using the theoretical tools will be explained and demonstrated in the individual chapters.

According to Wæver, security is intersubjective and discursively constructed (Wæver 1995, 55) in a self-referential and contingent process constantly open for restructuration (Buzan et al. 1998, 204). A securitization act happens when a *securitizing actor* with a significant ethos declares a valued *referent object* to be existentially threatened (Buzan et al. 1998, 36). In the sectors relevant to the chapters in this issue – the military, the societal and the environmental – the referent objects are the sovereignty of the state, large-scale collective identities, humankind, and other species that may be externally threatened by e.g. other states, migration, and climate changes (Buzan et al. 1998, 22-23). Whether the securitization act is successful or remains a mere attempt depends on the reception by a relevant *audience* – often agenda setting politicians, bureaucrats, media, and academics – who accepts or rejects the securitization act, hence deciding if *exceptional measures* should be allowed to protect the threatened referent object (Buzan et al. 1998, 23-26). In this way, the audience is both decisive (Wæver 2003, 11) and passive as it is only if the audience explicitly denies the securitization act that it can be concluded that it was just an unsuccessful attempt (Buzan et al. 1998, 26). A successful securitization act may, on the other hand, involve suspension of civil and liberal rights that otherwise would have been respected if the referent object had remained on the lower discursive level of normal politics (Buzan et al. 1998, 23-24). The decision to label something a security problem does not, however, reflect whether the relevant object is threatened per se, instead it is a political, and usually elitist, decision taken with the purpose of legitimizing specific and often state-centered solutions (Wæver, 1995, 57; 65). The opposite of security is not, as one might think, insecurity, as insecurity is when a security issue is present when a means to avert the threat either does not exist or has not been implemented (Wæver, 1995, 56). Instead, the binary opposition to security is *de*security, which happens when a securitized issue is discursively removed from the sphere of security. Contrary to

[1] The early stages of the concept are explained in a 1989 working paper entitled *Security, the Speech Act, Analysing the Politics of a Word* which, however, does not mention the securitization concept by its name.

securitization, the process of desecuritization follows democratic rules and procedures of transparency and accountability when it occurs within a system where normal procedures are democratic. It is, thus, found on the lower discursive level of normal politics (Wæver 1995, 56-57).

In the 1980's and early 1990's, the IR literature about the Arctic was largely descriptive (Jensen 2016, 4) with most of the few theoretically inspired contributions situated in the institutionalist camp with Oran R. Young (1994, 1999) as the most prominent name. After some delay, poststructuralism has, however, also got a hold of circumpolar IR studies with thanks to the informed authorships of i.a. Iver B. Neumann (1994), Geir Hønneland (1998) and Carina Keskitalo (2004) who have scrutinized the discursive region-building and identity formation in the Arctic. More recently, the securitization approach has also slowly become a still more popular analytical lens. It has i.a. been used to show how the Cold War as a macrosecuritization frame hierarchized multiple other security issues in the Canadian Arctic, enabling securitizing actors to portray threats within one sector as threatening to a referent object in another sector as well, resulting in a securitizing dilemma (Watson 2013); how Mikhail Gorbachev's famous Murmansk speech was an act of desecuritization paving the way for normal politics (Åtland 2008); how the Elektron incident (Åtland 2009) and Greenpeace's attempt to board Gazprom's Prirazlomnaya oil rig in the Pechora Sea (Palosaari and Tynkkynen 2015) were sought securitized by some Russian actors; how the effects of climate change prompted difference reactions by the Canadian Inuit and the Sámi in Norway (Greaves 2016); how the concept of security is omnipresent in the Norwegian High North discourse (Jensen 2013); how Greenland has managed to get a foreign policy more autonomous from Denmark by referring to a threatened national identity (Jacobsen 2015); how the Greenlandic uranium debate activates securitization talks in relation to both the political, environmental, and economic sector in what is basically a debate about what kind of country Greenland should strive to be (Kristensen and Rahbek-Clemmensen 2017); and finally how the number of securitization attempts and successful securitization acts in the Arctic correlates with the increased number of Arctic strategies and geopolitical demarcation (Albert 2015). It is in line with these inspiring contributions that the articles within this issue aim to take this scholarship further by showing how securitization can be used as a fruitful analytical tool to gain new perspectives on the complexities of Arctic international relations.

Marc Jacobsen and **Jeppe Strandsbjerg**'s article '**Desecuritization as Displacement of Controversy: geopolitics, law and sovereign rights in the Arctic' demonstrates how the Ilulissat Declaration was a pre-emptive desecuritization act in reaction to the growing concern for military conflict in the wake of the Russian flag planting. It happened through agreeing that science and international law shall determine the delineation of the Arctic Ocean, but while it was successful in silencing securitization attempts this shift to other government techniques simultaneously generated new dilemmas and controversies: within international law there has been controversy over its ontological foun-

dations and within science we have seen controversy over specific standards, hence challenging the notion of 'normal politics'. While minimizing the horizontal conflict potential between states, this development has simultaneously given way for vertical disputes between the signatory states on the one hand and the Indigenous peoples of the Arctic on the other.

Wilfrid Greaves and **Daniel Pomerants** investigate in their article ''Soft Securitization': Unconventional Security Issues and the Arctic Council' if the Arctic Council has sought to discursively construct particular security issues via its declarations and other official outputs. Through a textual analysis of the publicly available documents, they examine the Council's use of security language to assess whether such rhetoric is mobilized to identify specific threat-referent relationships or in an 'adjectival' sense that does *not* construct particular issues as existentially threatening. They, moreover, reflect on the analytical usefulness of the securitization theory, and the dynamics of constructing unconventional and contested security threats in a multilateral intergovernmental forum.

Heather Exner-Pirot and **Robert Murray** use the theoretical approach of the English School in their article 'Regional Order in the Arctic: Negotiated Exceptionalism' to explain the current state of affairs in the Arctic which continues to be marked by cooperation and stability. The reason for this is that states with involvement in the region have worked to negotiate an order and balance of power predicated on norms such as cooperation and multilateralism. The establishment of an Arctic international society has seen great powers and smaller powers come together to form an order aimed at promoting norms and institutions not seen elsewhere in the world. An Arctic international society has, thus, been deliberately negotiated in a way that promotes cooperation between Arctic states. However, this order can be disrupted if Arctic international society does not take conscious steps to maintain a strong institutional framework that protects Arctic internationalism.

Victoria Herrmann explores the gap between Arctic societal security discourse and tangible climate change commitments to Arctic Indigenous peoples in UN climate negotiations in 'Arctic Indigenous Societal Security at COP21: The Divergence of Security Discourse and Instruments in Climate Negotiations'. The article argues that the space for and use of Arctic societal security discourses at COP21 are not matched with climate commitments. Thus, the resulting global policy initiatives to support adaptation and mitigation in the North do not adequately support the security of current cultural practices and heritage in the Arctic. Empowering native culture of the North as a reason for acting on climate, but not empowering its security through tangible financial, legal, or technical commitments creates a post-colonial inequality in power in cultural security discourses and commitments.

Rasmus K. Rasmussen and **Henrik Merkelsen**'s article **'**Post-colonial governance through securitization? A narratological analysis of a securitization controversy in contemporary Danish and Greenlandic uranium policy' combines the securitization approach with theory of risk and narratological methodology in their analysis of the Danish-Greenlandic government debates about potential uranium exploitation. They conclude

that the securitization controversy visible at the surface level of policy documents reflects an identity struggle at the deeper narrative level closely related to the understanding of national identity politics. These underlying stakes are brought to the fore when securitization is used as a governance technique.

Ulrik Pram Gad's article entitled 'What kind of nation state will Greenland be? Securitization theory as a strategy for analyzing identity politics' modifies the analytical strategy prescribed by Copenhagen School Securitization Theory to produce a nuanced picture of national identity politics, the tensions involved, and scenarios for the future. An analysis of the 2002 and 2016 debates on language supplements the received image of what constitutes Greenlandic identity, centered on language and iconic material cultural practices, with conspicuously modern elements like democracy and welfare. Advancing formally from 'home rule' to 'self-government' has shifted the debate towards material challenges – prompting a more prominent role for the English language, in turn pointing Greenland towards new alliances in Arctic geopolitics.

Ole Wæver's afterword reflects on three aspects of this special issue: First, what kind of total picture emerges from the analyses, i.e. how does the special issue add up to an understanding of 'Arctic international relations' and 'Arctic security'. And what are the main implications hereof? Second, he points out how some of the theoretical observations and innovations made by the contributors deserve to be identified and evaluated for their potential general relevance beyond an Arctic setting. Third, he suggests how the Copenhagen School's third leg 'regional security complexes – in addition to securitization and sectors – could also play a role in this special issue and in other similar analyses of Arctic security developments.

It is the hope that all these articles will spur scholars from across the globe to consider and debate the complex and comprehensive security challenges and opportunities presented in the circumpolar north. Today more than ever before, the northernmost reaches of the world are integrated into the international system. Although the North has always been connected to the rest of the world through trade networks and migratory routes, globalization, and climate change have created unprecedented connectivity through communication systems, global markets, and environmental cooperation. Such linkages have made the northern environment and its peoples very much a part of, and influenced by, the international economic, political, and cultural security developments of today. So too have these connections brought important non-Arctic emerging powers like China, India, and South Korea into Arctic governance and investment decisions, shifting alliances and multilateral cooperation within and below the Arctic Circle on international affairs. With increasing economic, military, and environmental interest in the Arctic region, it is vital to understand both the challenges and opportunities of evolving insecurities to ensure that publics and politicians alike are provided with a balanced, comprehensive understanding of the region. As you embark on this special issue, we leave you with this: the significance of understanding circumpolar security dynamics is global in impact. As you consider each chapter and the securitization concepts therein, we encourage you to consider how the approach of the Copenhagen School can open up, or

perhaps reorient, your own work to include widened security perspectives and issues – whether in the Arctic or beyond, through trade networks, energy production, and climate change that stretch southwards.

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[2] All reviews have been 'double blinded'. Though the names of all involved are hereby made public (after previous consent) it is still, however, secret who the reviewer for each individual article is. We have chosen to make reviewers' names public in order to show our sincere gratitude and to guide readers' attention towards their authorships in case one finds the widened security approach fruitful in the study of Arctic international relations.

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Desecuritization as Displacement of Controversy: geopolitics, law and sovereign rights in the Arctic

Marc Jacobsen, PhD Candidate, Centre for Advanced Security Theory, Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen

Jeppe Strandsbjerg, Associate Professor, Department of Business and Politics, Copenhagen Business School

This article suggests that the Ilulissat Declaration of 2008 can be perceived as a preemptive desecuritization act in reaction to the growing concern for military conflict in the wake of the Russian flag planting on the North Pole in 2007. The declaration confirmed that science and international law shall determine the delineation of the Arctic Ocean. However, while it was successful in silencing securitization attempts, the shift from security to science and law generated new dilemmas and controversies: within international law there has been controversy over its ontological foundations and within science we have seen controversy over specific standards, hence challenging the notion of 'normal politics'. While minimizing the horizontal conflict potential between states, this development has simultaneously given way for vertical disputes between the signatory states on the one hand and the Indigenous peoples of the Arctic on the other.

Introduction[1]

In May 2008, the five states adjacent to the Arctic Ocean, the so-called Arctic Five (A5), signed the Ilulissat Declaration. In the Declaration, they declared their shared intention to cooperate and settle the allocation of sovereign rights in the Arctic Ocean on the basis of international law and scientifically valid geodata. The declaration was, as we will explain, a reaction to a growing concern among scholars and politicians reacting

[1] We would like to thank our fellow colleagues whose critique, suggestions, and encouragements have been invaluable in the development of this paper. The theoretical argument benefitted greatly from a work-in-progress seminar hosted by *Centre for Advanced Security Studies*, while the empirical details were enhanced following an Arctic Politics Research Seminar at University of Copenhagen. Ulrik Pram Gad, Michael Byers and the anonymous reviewer deserve special thanks for their thorough and thoughtful comments which were decisive in the final stages of writing.

in particular to media reports on the potential for conflict and an increasing militarization of the Arctic region. More specifically, the concern arose over the distribution of sovereign rights to what is called the Outer Continental Shelf in the Arctic Ocean. As such, we suggest, the Ilulissat Declaration was an act of pre-emptive desecuritization initiated by state elites to prevent a securitized Arctic scenario. To the extent that the Ilulissat Declaration became a standard reference in subsequent scholarly and political conversations, including academic publishing, about the legal status of the Arctic, the declaration has been effective because it has become a powerful argument for why Arctic geopolitics is not about to become securitized. However, in this article we are not only concerned with Arctic geopolitics but, more specifically, we aim to show how the Ilulissat Declaration, as an act of pre-emptive desecuritization, can teach us something about how desecuritization also works. We suggest that desecuritization is not necessarily about moving a policy issue from security back to normal politics but, rather, desecuritization works by shifting a policy issue from one technique of government to another. This shift, we argue, entails a displacement of a controversy, meaning that the shift generates new controversies arising from the issue being desecuritized.

In its original formulation by scholars associated with what has come to be known as the Copenhagen School, desecuritization was referred to as an opposite process of securitization; i.e. attempts to prevent a policy issue from being securitized or attempts to move issues from the realm of security and back to normal politics (Wæver 1995, 57-58). The initial writings were about how desecuritization could be achieved (Huysmans 1995; Wæver 2000), as it was perceived to represent a positive move reclaiming an issue from the exceptional realm of security back to the normal realm of politics. Later, this view of desecuritization became criticized for avoiding politics (Aradau 2004) and for not being morally superior to securitization (Floyd 2011). Others have sought to recover and highlight the political richness of the concept through examining its ontological and practical levels (Hansen 2012). Analyses of desecuritization have subsequently followed three strands of questions: (1) what counts as desecuritization; (2) why desecuritization should take place; and (3) how it may be achieved (Balzacq, Depauw, and Léonard 2015 cf. Bourbeau and Vuori 2015, 254). The issue of migration has been a particularly popular case in these studies (Roe 2004; Huysmans 1998; Huysmans 2006). Usually, desecuritization has been analyzed as a post hoc process taking place when something has already been securitized, but as Philippe Bourbeau and Juha A. Vuori (2015) argue – as they take up the cue from some of the earliest studies of desecuritization (Wæver 1989; 1995; 2000) – desecuritization may be a pre-emptive act made in order to prevent the securitization of a particular referent object.

Analyzing the Ilulissat Declaration as a pre-emptive desecuritization act is interesting for a number of reasons. First, the Ilulissat Declaration was largely driven by state elites with the aim of avoiding a security scenario articulated by members of a broader public. Conventionally, analyses of desecuritization posit state elites as those who securitize, and public voices – for lack of a better term – as those who seek to desecuritize. Second, and this is the most significant for this article, the success of the

Ilulissat Declaration was built on its ability to shift the question of sovereign rights from a potentially securitized domain to another, very particular legal-technical regime codified by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The point here is that while avoiding the spectre of security, such a shift from security to law and science is not necessarily a return to a more democratic and open political domain but rather another institutional domain governed by its own rules and logics. We label these domains as different techniques of government.

The main purpose of this article is to show how such acts of desecuritization through shifting techniques of government may generate new lines of controversy. While this shift has, indeed, been successful in minimizing the risk of horizontal conflict between states, it has simultaneously given way for vertical disputes between the signatory states on the one hand and the Indigenous peoples of the Arctic on the other who question the very ontological foundation of the sovereignty concept and the legitimacy behind the alleged right to delineate the Arctic. If peaceful status quo persists, such voices will probably continue to be audible, but if the involved states are not satisfied with the resolution of their overlapping claims, hardened interstate rhetoric and securitization attempts may resurface. As such, desecuritization is contingent. In what follows, we will briefly present the theoretical notion of desecuritization, followed by an outline of the historical geo-strategic concerns in the Arctic. This again is followed by an analysis of the Ilulissat Declaration as a case of desecuritization, while finally laying out the displacement of controversy.

Desecuritization and techniques of government

The question of what makes something a security issue has traditionally been dealt with in objective terms, in the sense that we could objectively analyze the world to say whether a given phenomenon should be considered a risk. As such the study of security would be concerned with how actors (politicians, bureaucrats, and strategists) would or could best respond to a threat. As a central part of the constructivist turn in International Relations, the Copenhagen School formulated a discursive take on security, famously coining the term securitization (Wæver 1995; Buzan et al. 1998). In contrast to conventional realist (as philosophical realism) understandings of threats being objective facts, the most radical claim by the Copenhagen School is that something becomes a security issue not by virtue of its inherent nature but through discursive statements. Drawing on language theory, Ole Wæver posits security as a speech act where it is the utterance, designating something as a security issue in itself, that is of interest rather than the referent of that utterance (Wæver 1995, 55). This in turn transfers the security focus of studies from the objective needs and threats surrounding a state/society to the realm of political discourse.

The next important step is that security and insecurity do not represent a binary opposition. Rather, the opposite of security is desecurity, with desecurity meaning normal politics. An agenda of minimizing security cannot move forward by criticizing se-

curity, rather, it must understand the language-game that security is (Wæver 1995, 56). Rejecting the binary nature of in/security, Wæver removes the positive connotations surrounding the concept of security. By insisting that the counter to security is normal politics, it follows that a democratic ethos would pursue an agenda of desecuritization in order to deal with politics through normal procedures. The logic behind this is that because security as a concept signifies existential threats to a particular state or political order, then issues of security are dealt with through emergency laws and exceptional measures not encompassed by normal democratic rules of transparency and accountability. As a language game, security "is articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites" (Wæver 1995, 57). Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde operate with a continuum ranging from non-politicized (meaning something is not an issue for public policy) over (normal) politicized to securitized (exceptional measures) (Buzan et al. 1998, 23-24).

The most obvious way to desecuritize is to not talk about issues in terms of security, but to ignore securitization and insist that an issue is non-politics or normal politics. In cases where something is already securitized, this is not a viable strategy. It is then necessary to put things back into normal politics (Huysmans 1995, 65; Roe 2004, 284). The second way is to actively downgrade the issue by redefining it as not being a threat towards a valued referent object (Buzan and Wæver 2003, 489). Third, and most common, is the indirect discursive process of redirecting the security discourse towards other more compelling issues that are securitized at the expense of the first issue that, more or less unnoticed, is reduced to the discursive level of politics (Buzan and Wæver 2003, 489). These ways can follow objectivist, constructivist, or deconstructivist routes to desecuritization (Huysmans 1995, 65-67). As we will discuss, the kind of desecuritization in the Arctic today is an elite-driven, pre-emptive desecuritization following the second logic. We see state representatives continuously arguing that there is little tension, plenty of cooperation, and little to worry about in Arctic interstate relations.

There is an on-going sentiment in the writings dealt with here that to desecuritize is to render issues more democratic and accountable because they avoid the emergency rules associated with security: "to *de*securitize surely implies exactly that – to take security out of security, to *move it back* to normal politics" (Roe 2004, 285). In that sense, normal politics is better than security. The aim to return to normal politics posits a challenge to the more conventional view that security is good because it avoids insecurity. However, it has also led to a debate of the definition of normal politics. Is it democratic? What are normal rules and procedures? From a Foucauldian perspective, it is obvious to question the notion of normality. In the Arctic context, the debate of what 'normal' politics is should also remain an open question. Within this larger debate, the aim of this article is to demonstrate how normalization meant shifting the issue of sovereign rights delineation into other socio-political domains or techniques of government. In its wording, the Ilulissat Declaration shifted questions of sovereignty into a combined legal and scientific-technical domain by pointing to an existing legal framework and

diplomatic practice for dealing with such issues and not to a general field of 'normal politics'.

The following analysis suggests that desecuritization in this case is not a question of stepping back from security into an arena of normal politics. Rather, it is meant to shift a policy issue into another technique of government. As such, successful desecuritization might require the existence of alternative institutional frameworks capable of handling this issue. These other frameworks will embody different kinds of controversies compared to those of security. And while a desecuritization act obviously aims to move an issue out of the emergency, the move will not remove but rather displace controversies. The next part briefly outlines the historic Arctic security discourse from a securitization point of view. This will be followed by the analysis of the Ilulissat Declaration as a desecuritizing act through replacement of one policy issue to other government techniques.

Geostrategic concerns in the Arctic: the spectre of security in a historic perspective

During the Cold War, the Arctic was home to significant US and USSR armament in which Thule Air Base and the Kola Peninsula became key strategic military locations. Even though an argument could be made that it was also the theatre of 'normalized' security routines and East West cooperative initiatives, like the A5's Polar Bear Treaty of 1973 (cf. Byers 2013, 173), the then global macrosecuritization[2] of a possible nuclear war between the Warsaw Pact countries and NATO (Buzan and Wæver 2009) dominated the security discourse in the Arctic region. It was often subject to securitization attempts in relation to the military sector, well exemplified by then U.S. Air Force General Harp Arnold who in 1946 stated that "[i]f there is a third world war […] its strategic center will be the North Pole" (Murphy 1947, 61 cf. Hough 2013, 25). In response to the antagonistic military rhetoric and the significant military build-up, a couple of unsuccessful desecuritization attempts were made. In 1980, Norway's then Prime Minister Oddvar Nordli proposed a nuclear weapon free-zone in the Arctic (Apple 1980, 17), and six years later, Secretary-General Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President Ronald Reagan met in Reykjavik to discuss the possibilities of warming up bilateral relations. None of the initiatives led to the intended result, but they were considerable steps in the desired direction, culminating with Gorbachev's famous Murmansk speech in 1987, in which he stated that "[t]he militarization of this part of the world is assuming threatening dimensions" (Gorbachev 1987, 4) and made clear that "[t]he Soviet Union is in favor of a radical lowering of the level of military confrontation in the region.

[2] Securitization theory has mainly focused on the middle level of world politics, so in their aim of applying the concept to what happens above the middle level, Buzan and Wæver introduced the concept of macrosecuritization. In their influential article, the Cold War is highlighted as the *example par excellence* of an over-arching conflict that "[…] incorporate, align and rank the more parochial securitizations beneath it" (2009, 253).

Let the North of the globe, the Arctic, become a zone of peace. Let the North Pole be a pole of peace" (Gorbachev 1987, 4). As Kristian Åtland has rightly shown, this speech served as an desecuritization act, paving the way for normal politics in an Arctic previously characterized by geostrategic concerns (Åtland 2008).

Following the end of the Cold war, the Soviet/Russian Northern Fleet declined, as did security concerns more generally in the region. Disputes over sovereignty were generally contained or localized and not subject to securitization attempts. Over the past fifteen years, global interest in the region has, however, increased for one of three reasons. Overall, climate change is increasing accessibility to the region and, thus, is (1) opening new shipping lanes; (2) catalyzing economic exploitation of hydrocarbon and mineral resources; and (3) highlighting continental shelf claims by Arctic states. Accompanying these developments, Arctic states have redefined and developed Arctic strategies, and several countries have revamped their military capabilities as clear signals that they are ready to defend their interests. As a result, the Arctic has re-emerged as a geostrategic space attracting an increasing amount of political and public attention and resurrected the spectre of geopolitics. Two more or less consecutive events especially fueled the global Arctic interest and drew significant headlines. First, the (in)famous planting of the Russian flag on the geographical North Pole, 4,261 meters below sea level, on August 2nd, 2007. Second, the publishing of US Geological Survey's (USGS) estimate of undiscovered oil and gas north of the Arctic Circle suggesting that the "extensive Arctic continental shelves may constitute the geographically largest unexplored prospective area for petroleum remaining on Earth" (USGS 2008, 1). With the incipient financial crisis and historical high oil prices that reached $100 per barrel in the beginning of 2008 (Krauss 2008) and peaked in July 2008 with a price of $147 a barrel (Hopkins 2008), the publication gained worldwide attention.

It was the combination of the imagination of hitherto unknown riches with the absence of settled sovereignty in the Arctic that paved the way for a variety of conflict scenarios, accelerated by the Russian flag planting organized by leading members of the Putin-loyal party *United Russia* (Dodds 2015, 380f). The spectacle mirrored, it was thought, European colonial practices of claiming land through symbolic acts in previous centuries and it was, thus, met by unambiguous negative replies from the other Arctic states. Canada's then Foreign Minister Peter MacKay noted "[y]ou can't go around the world these days dropping a flag somewhere. This isn't the 14th or 15th century" (thestar.com 2007). Spokesman of the U.S. Department of State Tom Casey said "I'm not sure whether they've, you know, put a metal flag, a rubber flag, or a bed sheet on the ocean floor. Either way, it doesn't have any legal standing or effect on this claim" (Casey 2007). Russian explorer and Duma member, Arthur Chilingarov, retorted: "I don't give a damn what all these foreign politicians they are saying about this […] Russia must win. Russia has what it takes to win. The Arctic has always been Russian" (Associated Press 2007).

The event, indeed, caused a hardened rhetoric between the Arctic states, but actual securitization attempts were not made from official state level. Some commentators

and academics, on the other hand, were quick to point out the dangers of this development, painting a public image of sovereign states participating in an anarchic race for riches and new territory in one of the world's last remaining *terra nullius*. Headlines such as 'The Arctic Cold War' (Chung 2007), 'Scramble for the Arctic' (Financial Times 2007) and 'Arctic Meltdown' (Borgerson 2008) in non-tabloid media like *Toronto Star*, *Financial Times*, and *Foreign Affairs*, framed an impression of a region riddled with conflict, insecurity, and military threats. In his influential essay, Borgerson warned against 'the coming Arctic anarchy' and argued that "[…] the situation is especially dangerous because there are currently no overarching political or legal structures that can provide for the orderly development of the region or mediate political disagreements over Arctic resources or sea-lanes" (Borgerson 2008, 71), and "[u]ntil such a solution is found, Arctic countries are likely to unilaterally grab as much territory as possible and exert sovereign control over opening sea-lanes wherever they can" (Borgerson 2008, 73-74). In this climate, it took little imagination to picture a scenario where the A5 were racing to secure and defend sovereign rights over assets through flags and guns.

Desecuritization of sovereignty disputes through science and international law

Denmark's then Foreign Minister, Per Stig Møller, took initiative to invite high-level representatives of the so-called A5 to a meeting in Ilulissat, Greenland, in direct response to this hardened interstate rhetoric and the growing mass of news reports outlining potential conflict scenarios in the Arctic. In his own words, he woke up one morning "soaked in perspiration with the head full of Russian submarines" (Breum 2013, 28) and realized that something had to be done. On May 28th, 2008, the A5 representatives declared that "the law of the sea provides for important rights and obligations concerning the delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf, the protection of the marine environment, including ice-covered areas, freedom of navigation, marine scientific research, and other uses of the sea. We remain committed to this legal framework and to the orderly settlement of any possible overlapping claims" (Ilulissat Declaration 2008). The rationale behind the declaration was to de-escalate security concerns and signal to a wider audience that the five states were not about to engage in an Arctic arms race but able to, and did indeed, cooperate on relevant areas. Explicitly referring to the attempts to securitize the Arctic in military terms, Møller concluded the meeting by stating "[…] we have hopefully, once and for all, killed all the myths of 'a race to the North Pole'. The rules are in place. And the five states have now declared that they will abide by them" (Byers 2009, 89).

With that, the A5 also refuted the common perception of the Arctic Ocean as *terra nullius,* or a legal vacuum, while refusing alternative solutions e.g. following the logic of the *Antarctic Treaty* that does not recognize any sovereignty claims (Article 4) and bans military activity with non-scientific purposes (Article 1) (ATS.aq). Those, who had previously argued for the security scenario now widely acknowledged the new de-

velopment. This is well exemplified by Borgerson's *Foreign Affairs* essay five years later, in which he admitted: "[…] a funny thing happened on the way to Arctic anarchy. Rather than harden positions, the possibility of increased tensions has spurred the countries concerned to work out their differences peacefully. A shared interest in profit has trumped the instinct to compete over territory. Proving the pessimists wrong, the Arctic countries have given up on saber rattling and engaged in various impressive feats of cooperation" (Borgerson 2013, 79). Hence, the declaration was a successful pre-emptive desecuritization act that signaled to the world that no Cold War ghosts were about to resurface in the Arctic, and that the A5 would deal with issues of sovereignty and maritime safety through normal political procedures.

But what are normal political procedures? Much of Arctic sovereignty concerns arose because UNCLOS, concluded in 1982 and adopted in 1994[3], allows states to claim two types of extended zones beyond their territorial sea of maximum 12 nautical miles (NM) from shore: The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) giving rights to the water column and the Continental Shelf (CS), giving rights to the seabed. Both are defined as 200 NM zones ranging from the juridical coastline, and as such the EEZ and the CS are juridical constructs. In cases where the geological continental shelf exceeds beyond the 200 NM, states can, moreover, claim an *extended* Continental Shelf Zone. This claim must be supported by scientifically valid geodata of the seabed in order to prove to the Commission on the Limits on the Continental Shelf (CLCS), established under the auspices of UNCLOS, that the continental shelf extends beyond the 200 NM. By turning the question of extending sovereign rights into a question of scientific surveying, the law, in effect, renders normal politics a matter of technology and science.

It is common practice in international law to refer to geographical features when defining limits to sovereignty. The logic of the law assumes that 'nature' provides a unified presence and science represents this with a consensual voice. And yet, science is, in this process, politicized, and science never speaks with an unambiguous voice. This is recognized within international law as well (cf. Shaw 2003, 534). Yet, in response to this politicization of their *oeuvre*, geo-science holds on to the virtues of truth and objectivity. Responding directly to this question, the leader of the Greenland part of the Continental Shelf Project of the Kingdom of Denmark, Christian Marcussen, stated that scientists will seek to interpret the data in a way that is as beneficial as possible for Extended Continental Shelf claims while staying within what is scientifically credible (Strandsbjerg 2010). Emphasizing the scientific ethos, an editorial in *Nature Geoscience* stated that "[o]nly if the science that underlies its recommendations stands the test of time will the shelves' outer limits established under UNCLOS be globally respected as

[3] The U.S. is the only of the A5 who has not signed and ratified the UNCLOS. Despite a significant internal pressure for a U.S. signature, it has so far been rejected by a group of senators who fear that the same laws could be used against the U.S. in other instances and more generally because they are "[…] fearful of ceding too much sovereignty to a supranational organization […]" (Ebinger and Zambetakis 2009, 1224). In the 2009 U.S. Arctic Region Policy it is however, mentioned that "The Senate should act favourably on U.S. accession to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea promptly, to protect and advance U.S. interests, including with respect to the Arctic" (Bush 2009, 3).

the one and only valid demarcation line" (Nature Geoscience 2009, 309); i.e. the route to better boundaries is better science.

As an act of desecuritization it, first, came from the political elite to pre-emptively de-escalate conflict scenarios and, second, it appears that this was done by actively shifting the issue by using other techniques of government, namely law and geo-science. To the extent that desecuritization has been successful, it is because alternative mechanisms existed that could deal with delineation of the continental shelves. It is, of course, difficult to speculate about the conditions in cases where such a framework had not existed. But, in its absence, there would have been no procedures and standards for how to deal with the issue. In effect, it would have been harder for those involved to persuade each other as well as the public that there was no need to worry. As discussed above, the return of an issue to normal politics should be a progressive move leading to a more democratic and transparent handling of security issues. However, the shift from securitization as a technique of government to law and geo-science as new distributive logics are in place. Rather than democracy, the issue is now decided by right and measurement. This might be preferable to a question of survival, but it is not necessarily more democratic. Instead, a return to normal politics might be a question of shifting between different techniques of government – shifts that displace controversies.

Displacement of controversy

> "Sovereignty" is a term that has often been used to refer to the absolute and independent authority of a community or nation both internally and externally. Sovereignty is a contested concept, however, and does not have a fixed meaning. Old ideas of sovereignty are breaking down as different governance models, such as the European Union, evolve. Sovereignties overlap and are frequently divided within federations in creative ways to recognize the right of peoples. For Inuit living within the states of Russia, Canada, the USA and Denmark/Greenland, issues of sovereignty and sovereign rights must be examined and assessed in the context of our long history of struggle to gain recognition and respect as an Arctic indigenous people having the right to exercise self-determination over our lives, territories, cultures and languages." (ICC, 2009: sect. 2.1).

In response to the Ilulissat initiative, the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) issued *A Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic*, from which the above quote is taken. They reacted against the A5 settling sovereign demarcation without including the concerns of the Inuit, who constitute a well-organized Indigenous group of people in the Arctic. Apart from not being involved in the drafting of the Ilulissat Declaration, the ICC tried – at least rhetorically – to challenge the foundations of international law. As part of the scholarship on a changing understanding of sovereignty, they detach sover-

eignty from the state and, in effect, made the case for sovereignty referring to a much looser community that may exist across state boundaries (Shadian 2010; Gerhardt 2011). In a similar way, the leader of the Greenlandic party *Inuit Ataqatigiit*, Sara Olsvig, suggested that Hans Island, or *Tartupaluk* as it is called in Greenlandic, should be declared 'Inuit Land' as it has been used for hunting by the Inuit since the 14th Century (Inuit Ataqatigiit 2015). Olsvig's suggestion came as a reply to Professor Michael Byers' and Associate Professor Michael Böss' proposal that Hans Island should be turned into a condominium, equally shared and co-managed by Denmark and Canada (Weber 2015). Instead, Olsvig argued, this should be in the hands of Nunavut and Greenland.

We start to see here the contours of a displacement of controversy. By settling the security concerns over sovereign rights among the A5, the Ilulissat process has opened another controversy with the ICC challenging a conventional statist understanding of sovereignty and norms of international control and ownership. As has been discussed in more detail elsewhere, the Inuit claimed a different conceptualization, use, and practice of space than that underwriting law (Strandsbjerg 2011; Strandsbjerg 2012). In spatial terms, international law operates with land and sea as two distinct categories. In this schema, ice counts as water (in hard form) and, thus, as a maritime space. However, for the Inuit ice constitutes a material space used for travel and hunting, and it appears to play a somewhat hybrid role in between the dogmatic distinction between land and maritime space (Joyner 1991). That is, the pre-emptive desecuritization through law has displaced the controversy to one concerning the ontological foundations of international law.

If we turn to the other dimension in the legal-scientific nexus dealing with the continental shelf, there is an obvious immanent controversy arising over the quality of science. This has already been alluded to in the previous section discussing how science deals with their role in distributing sovereignty. CLCS has published guidelines for the validity of data and surveys required in order to make claims to an extended continental shelf zone, but uncertainty remains as to what exactly constitutes good enough data (Macnab 2008). Scientist and cartographic technocrats always play a key role in International Court of Justice (ICJ) cases dealing with the delimitation of maritime boundaries. And while they have to fulfil some scientific standards that can generate an agreement between all involved partners, ambiguity remains as to what constitutes adequate data. This signals another line of controversy built into the settlement of UNCLOS: scientific controversies over good enough data and their relation to law.

Finally, clauses in UNCLOS dealing with the continental shelf do not prescribe how to deal with overlapping claims between states. The CLCS are only mandated to deal with the individual submissions and refers to the ICJ and other principles in such cases (article 83; un.org 1982, 56). While geo-science still plays a central role in court disputes, diplomatic controversy could re-enter the settlement more clearly. Denmark, Russia, and Canada have significant overlapping claims in the area, so if all three submissions are to be deemed scientifically valid and hence approved by CLCS, another

controversy may surface in the shape of a more traditional maritime delimitation issue. It could, however, also lead to a bi- or trilateral settlement following the same template as the Russian-Norwegian *Barents Sea Agreement*, which, in the words of then President Medvedev stands as a "[…] constructive model of how rival Arctic nations should settle their differences" (Harding 2010).

The Ilulissat Declaration remains the *modus vivendi* for securing peace between the Arctic states. However, it is also clear from our discussion that the way in which the declaration worked as an act of pre-emptive desecuritization by shifting the issue of sovereign rights to a legal-scientific realm generates new controversies. While it successfully minimizes the risk of horizontal conflict between states, it simultaneously gives way for vertical disputes between the signatory states and the Indigenous peoples of the Arctic, who question the legitimacy behind the alleged right to delineate the Arctic Ocean. Furthermore, the legal-scientific framework embraced by UNCLOS generates its own new controversies. This speaks to a broader concern within desecuritization studies about the nature of normal politics in International Relations. While providing little in terms of a concrete answer, this article has aimed to present an empirical case of how a pre-emptive desecuritization displaces controversy from security to other areas.

Conclusion

Throughout the Cold War, the Arctic was securitized by the military sector as part of a possible US and USSR military conflict, which would in turn threaten most of the world. While several attempts to de-escalate East-West tension in the Arctic were made, it was not until Gorbachev's speech in 1987 that a desecuritization act was widely acknowledged, paving the way for cooperation. Two decades went with only sparse interest from external actors beyond the region, but a cocktail of climate change, emerging economic opportunities, and geopolitical uncertainty elevated the Arctic on the global political agenda and fueled the A5's expectations of territorial expansion and economic gain. Hardened interstate rhetoric and securitizing attempts by some journalists and academics followed in the wake of Russia's 2007 flag planting on the geographic North Pole. Nine months later, the Ilulissat Declaration was born in direct response to concerns about regional interstate conflict and to downplay securitization attempts, leaving some of the most hawkish observers convinced that an 'Arctic anarchy' was, indeed, called off. In this way, the Ilulissat Declaration pre-emptively desecuritized the issue of sovereign rights in the Arctic Ocean by actively downgrading it, which is the second possible strategy described by Buzan and Wæver (2003, 489).

As a case for desecuritization, the Arctic, however, challenges some established conventions within securitization theory. It is state elites that initiate desecuritization and they do so not only through discursive strategies, but also by shifting issues in danger of being securitized to institutional frameworks. If securitization can be seen as a technique of government, then, this is a question of shifting issues from one to other

techniques of government. Contrary to the democratic ethos of the theory, these shifts in government techniques do not necessarily represent more democratic procedures. Instead, each of these techniques are populated by their own experts and technocrats operating according to logics of right (law) and accuracy (science) that never speak with ambiguous voices, challenging the notion of what normal politics are.

While shifting techniques of government might diminish the danger of securitized relations between states, the shift generates what we defined as a displacement of controversy. Within international law, we have seen controversy over its ontological foundations. Within science, we have seen controversy over standards of science. Each of these are amplified and become more political significant when an issue is securitized via relocation to another technique. While the Ilulissat Declaration has been successful in minimizing the horizontal conflict potential between states, it has simultaneously given way for vertical disputes between the signatory states on the one hand and the Indigenous peoples of the Arctic on the other who question the very understanding of the sovereignty concept and the legitimacy behind the alleged right to delineate territory and claim sovereign rights in the far North. In times with good interstate relations, these voices are easier heard in the regional security discourse. Until CLCS has made the final assessments, such voices may gain even more volume, but if overlapping claims are deemed valid by the CLCS, the final decision will be made by International Court of Justice or via bi-/trilateral agreements, hardened interstate rhetoric, and securitization attempts may resurface to a dominant position on the Arctic security discourse.

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'Soft Securitization': Unconventional Security Issues and the Arctic Council

Wilfrid Greaves, Assistant Professor, International Relations, University of Victoria

Daniel Pomerants, PhD Student, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto

This article investigates whether the Arctic Council has sought to discursively construct particular security issues via its declarations and other official outputs. Through a textual analysis of its publicly available documents, the authors examine the Council's use of security language to assess whether such rhetoric is mobilized to identify specific threat-referent relationships or in an 'adjectival' sense that does not construct particular issues as existentially threatening. They, moreover, reflect on the analytical usefulness of securitization theory, and the dynamics of constructing unconventional and contested security threats in a multilateral intergovernmental forum.

Introduction

The Arctic Council is the principal institution for Arctic regional governance, and it is involved in numerous activities in the Arctic region. Although its mandate explicitly excludes matters related to military security, some scholars have argued that the Council nonetheless contributes to Arctic security governance through its coordinating and policy-shaping role on a variety of topics essential for the interests of states and human well-being in the region (Charron 2012; Chater 2014; Chater and Greaves 2014; Greaves 2013; Wilson 2016). In this sense, the Arctic Council can be viewed as an unconventional security actor that contributes to framing different policy areas in 'security' terms. However, there has been limited empirical analysis of which issues the Arctic Council frames as security-relevant through its declarations and other official outputs, and what the specific security implications of those issues are understood to be.

This article contributes to understanding the Arctic Council's role as a security actor in the context of a rapidly changing circumpolar region, and provides a starting point for assessing securitizing moves by a regional international governmental organization. As such, it asks: Does the Arctic Council use security language to depict particular

issues as relevant to Arctic security? How does the Arctic Council understand the 'security-ness' of those issues? Methodologically, the article undertakes textual analysis of the Council's publicly available online documents, including multilateral agreements and declarations, policy papers, working group reports, public statements, and other related sources. It examines the Council's use of security language to assess whether such rhetoric is mobilized to identify specific threat-referent relationships or whether such rhetoric is mobilized in an 'adjectival' sense that does *not* construct particular issues as existentially threatening.

The article proceeds in three sections. First, it outlines securitization theory as a framework for understanding the social construction of security issues. Second, it outlines the Arctic Council, and discusses the emerging role it has played in the governance of regional security issues, particularly 'soft', unconventional security issues that are not prohibited under its mandate. Third, it examines which issues the Council has articulated as security-relevant for the circumpolar region. We find there is some evidence to suggest that the Arctic Council depicts certain issues as relevant to security in the Arctic, but that most instances of its use of security language conform to adjectival uses of security rather than securitizing moves that identify specific threats. The concluding section offers some reflections on the Arctic Council and the construction of Arctic security issues, as well as theoretical reflections on the analytical usefulness of securitization theory, and the dynamics of constructing unconventional and contested security threats in a multilateral intergovernmental forum.

Securitization Theory

Although 'security' is often associated with the use of military force to defend the national interests of sovereign states, it is an essentially contested concept that has no fixed or inherent meaning (Smith 2005). Rather, security is contextual and a result of specific configurations of social relations within a given political context. What security means is, in short, socially constructed. Security is defined by how powerful or influential political actors articulate its meaning and the specific security threats they identify, and whether their security claims become widely accepted and enacted into public policy.

One approach for explaining the process through which security issues are socially constructed is securitization theory, a "radically constructivist" account developed to explain the changing nature of security threats after the end of the Cold War (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998). The core contribution of securitization theory is to provide a convincing framework for understanding how language and discourse interact with systems of power to (re)produce particular meanings of security that inform the ideas and practices of political actors (Balzacq 2011). Specifically, 'securitization' refers to the process through which political issues are transformed into security issues, and thus elevated above the realm of 'normal' politics by legitimizing extraordinary measures to address them. Thus, "to 'securitize' an issue [is] to challenge society to promote it higher in its scales of values and to commit greater resources to solving the related problems"

(Sheehan 2005, 52), by claiming a privileged place for that issue within the associated realm of public policy.

The process of securitization involves two basic steps. First, a social actor, called the securitizing actor, makes a *securitizing move* that identifies a relationship between a valued object and a phenomenon that threatens its survival or wellbeing. However, for a securitizing move to become successfully constructed as a security issue or threat, it must be accepted by an *authoritative audience* within a given political context, often though not exclusively a sovereign state. The second step in the securitization process is thus the adjudication of securitizing moves by an audience with the power to mobilize exceptional measures in defense of the threatened object (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998). Once accepted, securitizing moves transform something into a security issue, legitimating action corresponding with the urgency of being designated security-relevant. It is through this intersubjective process of making and accepting security claims that security issues and specific security threats are socially constructed, from which point they are often institutionalized and reproduced through the structures and routine practices used to manage security issues.

Securitizing moves were originally conceived as speech acts, but they can also be written, visual, or semiotic representations of threat-referent relationships (Williams 2003). In theory, anyone can be a securitizing actor and anything identified as a referent object in need of protection, but in practice not all actors or objects are equally positioned for successful securitization, nor can all phenomena be considered threatening (Greaves 2016). But the basic logic that underpins securitizing moves is one of danger, emergency, and imminent crisis. Securitizing moves use language such as, but not limited to, 'security', 'insecurity', 'threat', 'survival', and 'danger' to invoke an existential threat to a specified referent object with the goal of mobilizing an urgent political response. The discursive construction of something as threatened is more important than the specific language used.

In this respect, 'security' and related terms can be used in ways that have distinct meanings and political implications. Bill McSweeney (1999) notes that security has both 'nominative' and 'adjectival' forms that connote different things. The nominative form of security implies 'protection from', in the sense of security being a property of being free from threat or danger. Implicitly or explicitly, nominative uses of security invoke the need to protect a valued object from a threat to its survival or fundamental wellbeing. This encompasses the standard usage of security within international relations, whereby what is typically implied is the security of a sovereign state from the threats of military defeat or political subjugation. By contrast, adjectival forms of security connote an 'ability to', a positive attribute or aspiration in terms of the ability of people, states, or societies to satisfy particular needs and desires (McSweeney 1999, 14). Adjectival uses of security – such as food security, energy security, health security, etc. – do not necessarily specify threat-referent relationships, and do not conform to the discursive logic of securitization

insofar as they do not attempt to legitimate emergency measures in response to an existential threat to objects of social value. Rather, they describe aspirational conditions of satisfying particular social needs in various policy areas.

The likely success of a securitizing move is structured by three 'facilitating conditions': use of securitizing language, the authority and social capital of the securitizing actor, and the features of the threat (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998, 33). These conditions shape whether securitizing moves invoke an existential threat, whether actors are heard, and which phenomena can be credibly securitized. Typically, state actors have been understood to possess privileged access to securitizing processes, but there is no given reason why state institutions alone should be able to make securitizing moves. Indeed, some analyses depart from a strict focus on the state (Greaves 2013, 2016; Vuori 2010), but conform to Ole Wæver's (1995, 57) expectation that "security is articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites," even if those elites are transnational or non-state in nature. The remainder of this article examines the Arctic Council as an example of a non-state institutional actor that uses security language, but assesses its use of security language to determine whether it appears consistent with nominative or adjectival uses of security. When the Arctic Council 'speaks security', does it seem designed to identify threat-referent relationships in order to mobilize a political response from its member-states, or is it employed in an adjectival way to describe desirable conditions in different policy domains?

Methodologically, securitization "aims to gain an increasingly precise understanding of who securitizes, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what results, and, not least, under what conditions (i.e., what explains when securitization is successful)" (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998, 32). They note that "securitization can be studied directly; it does not need indicators. The way to study securitization is to study discourse and political constellations" (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998, 25). For this article, data on which issues the Arctic Council has identified as security-relevant were collected through textual and discourse analysis of the Council's publicly available online documents during the 20-year period from 1996-2016, including declarations and agreements, policy papers, working group reports, public statements, and other related sources. These provide a representative sample of the Arctic Council's outputs and thus reflect which issues it understands to be relevant to security in the Arctic region.

Governance and the Arctic Council

The Arctic Council was established in 1996 through intergovernmental agreement as a successor to the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS). It has a unique structure consisting of all eight Arctic states as Members, six Permanent Participants (PPs) representing Indigenous peoples from across the circumpolar region, and various non-voting state and non-state Observers. The Council has a broad mandate to promote cooperation on environmental protection and sustainable development, as well as facilitating

and promoting the participation of Indigenous peoples in Arctic governance. Given the relative underdevelopment of a multilateral architecture in the circumpolar region during the Cold War, since the 1990s the Arctic Council has emerged as the premier forum for regional cooperation and governance, and is built on a consensus-based model of decision-making that affords all member-states and PPs the opportunity to influence the agenda and shape the Council's outputs (English 2013). The reports and studies of the Arctic Council and its Working Groups – most prominently the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, the Arctic Human Development Report, and the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment – have become "touchstone documents" that are widely employed by policy-makers, activists, and scholars (Charron 2012, 771).

Building on the AEPS, the Arctic Council has principally focused its activities on issues related to environmental monitoring and conservation, sustainable economic development, and emergency preparedness and response. Indeed, five of its six Working Groups focus exclusively on environmental issues, and the sixth is mandated to work for sustainable economic development.[1] The Working Groups' findings have been influential, inspiring high-level policy change and international agreements, such as the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (Fenge 2012, 64). More recently, all eight Arctic states have signed two multilateral treaties under the auspices of the Arctic Council that enhance cooperation in areas related to public safety. In 2011, members signed the *Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic*, the first legally binding instrument established under the auspices of the Arctic Council, followed in 2013 by the *Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic*. The main features of these treaties are commitments to collaborate in case of a search and rescue or oil spill emergency, which includes information sharing and cooperation between Arctic militaries, coast guards, and other agencies. This demonstrated a significant expansion of the Council's activities into important new policy areas, including those which, as discussed below, necessitate the deployment of military and paramilitary assets.

Although it has some noteworthy achievements, the Arctic Council has particular limitations. It was established through a multilateral executive agreement rather than a formal treaty, and thus lacks international legal personality (Bloom 1999). The Council only established a permanent secretariat in 2013, and continues to experience challenges related to its capacity and the resources necessary to fulfil research and its other mandated activities. It is also specifically limited in its ability to address security issues. Indeed, the very first article of the *Ottawa Declaration* (Arctic Council 1996) that established the Council includes a caveat specifying that it "should not deal with matters related to military security." This provision was included in the text at the Council's founding because

[1] The Arctic Council's Working Groups are: Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP), Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), Emergency Prevention, Preparedness, and Response (EPPR), Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME), and the Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG).

the United States insisted that extending the mandate to include military security could interfere with America's global security and defense interests (Bloom 1999, 714; Nord 2006, 301). As a result, the Arctic Council has focused its activities on 'soft' policy areas pertaining to the environment, economic development, and political representation for the region's Indigenous peoples.

Military security cooperation among most Arctic states has thus principally occurred through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The significant exception to this is Russia, as NATO was founded to deter the Soviet Union and protect its members – of which five possess Arctic territory – against the prospect of Soviet/Russian aggression. After the Cold War ended, there was considerable cooperation in the Arctic region between post-Soviet Russia and its Arctic neighbors, notably Norway, on a range of military issues, including decommissioning Soviet nuclear materiel and limiting the flow of conventional armaments (Eriksson 1995). More recently, there has been growing regional military coordination outside of NATO. In June 2013, Greenland hosted the first meeting to include the defense chiefs from all eight Arctic countries. This summit strengthened cooperation in the areas of marine surveillance, search and rescue (SAR), and expanded joint military exercises, and built upon the SAR agreement reached in 2011. The meeting specifically addressed military security issues excluded from the Arctic Council's mandate, and built upon other progress in security cooperation among the member-states pertaining to search and rescue. It also signified important military cooperation between Russia and the other seven Arctic states, five of which were its foes during the Cold War. Such cooperation was brief, however, as regional relations have been strained by new tensions related to the illegal Russian annexation of Crimea in spring 2014, its on-going support for armed separatist proxy militias in eastern Ukraine, and Western sanctions imposed as a result.

The expansion of the Arctic Council's work into areas like search and rescue and emergency preparedness and response has situated it at the center of emergent areas of Arctic policymaking. In the process, its activities have effectively broadened to include new areas linked to a range of regional security issues, including the management and deployment of military assets (Chater 2014; Chater and Greaves 2014; Greaves 2013). This has led analysts to discuss whether the Council may be assuming a greater role in regional security cooperation. Charron (2012, 774) notes: "One area that was thought to be *verboten* was that of matters related to military security. However, given that the [SAR Agreement] necessitates the coordination of the states' military, coast guard, police, and transport services for rescue purposes, hard security may be entering into the agenda by stealth." Wilson (2016, 63) also observes that, "over time, such practices in the 'soft security' sphere may help to erode the practical effect of the Ottawa Declaration's prohibition of 'hard security' discussions from the Council." While still developing, the expanding scope of the Council's activities into areas involving military assets has raised new questions about the Council's role in governing regional security.

The argument that the Arctic Council may, in fact, be involved in managing military security issues is more controversial than the claim that it has been actively involved

in making policy around a number of issues that affect human and the environmental security in the region (Chater and Greaves 2014; Greaves 2013; Hoogensen Gjørv et al. 2014; Wilson 2016). True, the Council remains fairly weak in terms of its ability to affect substantive outcomes in the region, providing a forum for interstate negotiation rather than an autonomous actor for Arctic governance. However, its very establishment fostered important changes in the nature of Arctic politics, particularly with respect to environmental protection, human security, and Indigenous peoples. Indeed, the Arctic Council has contributed to the changed post-Cold War regional security context in which understandings of Arctic security have been widened to include a greater range of issues. At the same time at the Arctic Council's establishment, "the very meaning of security was also being extended beyond traditional concerns with 'military' threats to focus on environmental and societal problems such as health, cultural survival, freedom of expression and security of communication" (AHDR 2004, 219). In this light, it is appropriate to investigate how the Arctic Council has used security language and whether and how it has articulated the nature of security issues within the region.

Security Issues and the Arctic Council

The structure and nature of the Arctic Council raise a number of relevant questions for securitization, with the most important being: which entities does the actor-audience relationship necessary for successful securitization operate between? International governmental organizations (IGOs) pose a number of theoretical and empirical challenges for securitization in this regard, particularly the question of whether they are best understood as fora for state actors to make security claims to other states (in which case the authoritative audience would be the organization's executive body, such as the United Nations Security Council, or the plenary comprising all the organization's members) or whether they can operate as securitizing actors or audiences in their own right (Hanrieder and Kreuder-Sonnen 2014; McInnes and Rushton 2011). The answers will vary depending upon such factors as the IGO's mandate and organizational structure, institutional autonomy and legitimacy, whether it possesses an independent legal personality, and how its decision-making mechanisms operate. Some IGOs may be able to effectively advocate for particular issues to be understood as security-relevant while others will not, just as some may possess sufficient capabilities, resources, and independence from their members to operate as an audience for the acceptance of securitizing moves made before it.

For the Arctic Council, there are several possibilities as to how the relationship between securitizing actors and audiences might operate. Theoretically, the Council could be an audience for securitizing moves brought by its Member States or Permanent Participants; or the Council, particularly through its Working Groups, could play the role of securitizing actor identifying issues of concern for the Arctic region and communicating these to the Member States and Permanent Participants for their acceptance. If one were to disaggregate the work of the Council's Working Groups from its biannual ministerial

meetings, it is also possible that the working groups could frame security issues for the consideration of the Council's decision-making body.

However, we argue here that the Council's lack of a founding treaty providing it with legal personality, the formal exclusion of security issues from its mandate, its consensus-based decision-making, and its lack of independent monetary or other policy resources make it less persuasive to view it as an audience for securitization. Rather, it seems more appropriate to view the organs of the Arctic Council as articulating unconventional security issues for consideration by its members and, perhaps, other authoritative audiences beyond the Arctic region such as other IGOs. This is particularly so given that the Council operates on the basis of consensus, whereby all of its decisions and outputs require the approval of all members and, de facto, of the Permanent Participants, as well (Koivurova and Heinämäki 2006). Since each of its members is able to exercise a veto, the Council as a whole cannot be conceived as an audience with particular agency independent of the states and Indigenous peoples that comprise it. Each member acts as an audience of one that must be convinced for the Council as a whole to support a decision. As a result, the Arctic Council is *not* best understood as an audience for the adjudication of securitizing moves, but rather as consisting of sub-components (members, Indigenous peoples, and working groups) positioned to make security claims for the consideration of other audiences (including Arctic Council Member States) with the authority and capacity to effectively respond.

The data in this section are drawn from textual and discourse analysis of publicly available documents from 1996-2016 archived online by the Arctic Council, such as Declarations and Senior Arctic Officials meetings reports, Legally-Binding Agreements, Observer States Reports, and Working Group documents.[2] These provide a broad, representative sample of the Arctic Council's policy outputs, and can be reasonably expected to include instances of how it articulates security issues in the region. As of January 2017, there were 1678 documents archived in the Arctic Council's database. Of these, 1299 were produced after 2006, indicating a substantial increase over time in the number of policy documents produced by the Council and its Working Groups. Keywords such as 'security', 'insecurity', 'threat', and 'danger' were employed to search for uses of security language that might indicate threats being depicted to Arctic referent objects. This produced 55 documents that also included variations like 'securities' and 'insecurities'. These documents were then examined to assess whether their use of security language suggested the construction of a threat-referent relationship or was 'adjectival' in nature.

Upon analysis, there is evidence to suggest that the Arctic Council depicts certain issues as relevant to security in the Arctic. However, most of the Council's instances of security language conform to adjectival uses of security rather than securitizing moves that identify specific threats in the region. Through its use of security language, the Council generally describes policy areas in which current conditions could be improved such

[2] Arctic Council Archive Home. 2017. "Arctic Council Repository." Available from: <https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/>.

that conditions of human life in the region might be made better or more resilient. Overall, it appears that the Council does not employ such terms to construct issues as existentially threatening and requiring an urgent response from its members.

For instance, of the 11 major Arctic Council declarations issued from 1996-2015[3], seven contained references to 'security', but the first such reference is the footnote to the *Ottawa Declaration* that prohibits the Arctic Council from dealing with military security, which is clearly not a securitizing move. Other uses of security in the declarations refer to "human security" (Notes from the Second Ministerial Meeting 2000, 15), "energy security" (Ninth Ministerial Meeting, 'Information for Press', 2015, 20), and most of all, "food security" (*Barrow Declaration* 2000, 4; Notes from the Second Ministerial Meeting 2000, 5 and 12; Report of Senior Arctic Officials to Arctic Council Ministers, Barrow 2000, 13; *Nuuk Declaration* 2011, 6; *Iqaluit Declaration* 2015, 7). Some of this language appears to be borrowed directly from the Arctic foreign policies of member-states, as with the reference in the *Notes from the Second Ministerial Meeting* appended to the *Barrow Declaration* that discussed "enhancing the security and prosperity of Canadians, especially northerners and aboriginal peoples" (2000, 15). This phrasing directly echoes the human security discourse that briefly influenced Canada's Arctic policy in the early 2000s (Greaves 2012). However, none of these uses of security language construct a threat-referent relationship, but rather describe or develop plans to address the various human, energy, and food security challenges faced by Arctic inhabitants.

Similarly, 13 documents from Arctic Council ministerial meetings from 2000 to 2015 mention 'security' or 'insecurity' in relation to a variety of non-military issues. These issues are often mutually constitutive and interrelated such that one is seen to affect or produce others in related but distinct policy areas. For instance, the 2002 Senior Arctic Officials (SAO) Report to Ministers discusses security in reference to food security and persistent toxic substances in the Russian North (14). The 2004 SAO Report discussed the potential for cooperation on data gathering and information exchange in the Arctic similar to the Global Monitoring for Environment and Security network that exists elsewhere (15), the importance of the RAIPON/AMAP food security initiative (18), and a statement from the European Commission's Joint Research Centre on its assessment of the importance of the Arctic for the security and reliability of European energy supplies (45). The 2006 SAO Report discusses an AMAP report on food security in relation to Indigenous peoples in the Russian North (12) and a number of projects related to environmental protection and security (47). The 2011 SAO Report discussed the intent of the incoming Swedish chairmanship to focus on food and water security and safety (27), while the 2013 SAO Report refers to SDWG projects on food and water security (5).

Although beyond the core scope of this article, a similar assessment can be made of recent documents from Arctic Council Observers, which provide descriptive accounts

[3] There are 11 declarations, but for our purposes three other documents associated with these declarations were also analysed: a page of "Notes" and a "Report of Senior Arctic Officials (SAO) to Arctic Council Ministers", both presented during the Barrow Declaration, and a document containing 'Information for Press' associated with the Iqaluit Declaration.

of security-related issues including: space satellites and maritime rules-based governance and security (European Commission 2016, 12-14), environmental protection and security (Observer Report: Spain 2016, 5; Observer Report: China 2016, 5), and human security (The University of the Arctic 2016, 3; The International Union for Circumpolar Health 2016, 3). Arctic Council members, Permanent Participants, and Observers discussed possible security issues related to these areas, but did so without constructing specific threat-referent relationships or invoking the survival of the object in question. Specifically, the European Union (European Commission 2016) is primarily concerned with space technology and the role of satellites in contributing to environmental, safety, and security needs (2016, 4; 2016, 12), maritime security threats and maritime rules-based governance dialogue with Arctic stakeholders (European Commission 2016, 13; European Commission 2016, 14), as well as continued research in security matters (European Commission 2016, 17). Spain (Observer Report: Spain 2016) had similar concerns, as their observer report suggested a preference for fostering peacekeeping, environmental protection, and security (Observer Report: Spain 2016, 5), but they were the only two that echoed such sentiments in their documents. The rest of the Observers were much more focused on human security matters related to food security (University of the Arctic 2016, 3) and environmental security (Observer Report: China 2016, 5). Noticeably absent from any of this discussion is the World Wildlife Fund, Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (SCPAR).

The generally adjectival nature of these uses of security language can be contrasted with the securitizing potential of the terms 'food security' and 'food insecurity', which are the most common uses of security language by the Arctic Council. For instance, the *Arctic Resilience Interim Report* (2013) includes many more references to 'security' than any other document because it contains a chapter devoted to food security, understood as a condition where people are able to access and afford the nutrition necessary for their wellbeing. The *Arctic Resilience Interim Report* discusses food insecurity as a subset of welfare-related discussions around poverty and welfare support within Inuit communities (2013, 117). However, in the context of social and ecological changes occurring at both local and regional scales across the Arctic, references to 'food insecurity' may actually depict a more acute emerging threat to the survival of Arctic peoples facing inadequate access to reliable food supplies. The 2011 *Food-based Dietary Guidelines in Circumpolar Regions* (Jeppesen, Bjerregaard, and Young 2011, 30) outlines a framework for dealing with food insecurity among the Inuit population in Nunavut. The *Arctic Human Health Initiative* (Parkinson 2013, 24) and the *AMAP Assessment of Human Health in the Arctic* (AMAP 2009, 21, 46, 203; AMAP 2015, 42) also include specific references to diet and food insecurity among Indigenous populations, suggesting a threat-referent relationship whereby 'food insecurity' poses dire threats to continued health and survival of Indigenous populations in the region. In some contexts, 'food insecurity' may thus invoke quite direct threats confronting specific Arctic populations.

Recently, the discourse has shifted further towards the human security dimension of Arctic governance. The 2015 SAO Report notes that security has been discussed in terms of gender equality with explicit reference to human security and the material and cultural well-being of northern residents (39), interest by multiple Working Groups in food and water security (52-73), and energy security in remote Arctic communities (74). However, as with most other uses of security language by the Arctic Council, references to human security typically do not provide clear or explicit threat-referent relationships. For example, the above studies of food and health security provide explicit and detailed reference to communities in danger, what those dangers are (such as specific chemical pollutants), and proposes solutions about how to deal with those. By contrast, the 2015 SAO Report that discusses gender equality with explicit reference to human security and the material and cultural wellbeing of northern residents is more vague about who is threatened and why, providing a more descriptive account of the dangers involved (2015, 39). Such a description is also found in the *Gender Equality in the Arctic* report (Hoogensen Gjørv 2014, 59), which refers to the way in which states might actually contribute to the production of insecurity for some actors while seeking security for itself. The *Arctic Social Indicators* report similarly provides a descriptive account of insecurities associated with social and cultural life whereby their absence can "predict life satisfaction" (Larsen and Schweitzer 2013, 294).

The adjectival nature of the Arctic Council's use of security language is supported by the fact that while uses of 'security abound there is little discussion of 'insecurity' or 'danger' in the same documents. In fact, there is no mention of 'insecurity' or 'danger' in any of the Arctic Council's declarations. Documents from the ministerial meetings refer to insecurity sparingly along the same themes discussed above, while the *Arctic Resilience Interim Report* (2013) refers to 'danger' in discussions around endangered species preservation (80), dangerous travel conditions (83), and the Endangered Species Act (104). There are no references to insecurity in the Observer States reports either, though there is some mention of 'danger' in the Ministerial Meetings documents that variously either echo the necessity of protecting threatened or endangered species (SAO Report 2006, 17), and understanding that education is lacking in relation to the dangers of certain human behaviors, especially the ability of communities to educate expectant mothers of the dangers of certain behaviors (The Future of Children and Youth in the Arctic 2000, 17), and the protection of endangered Indigenous languages (The Arctic Council Secretariat, Keeping Our Traditions Alive 2015, 28). Further reference to 'danger' in these documents involve the dangers associated with shipping and natural resources exploitation and oil spill preparedness response (SAO Report 2011, 6), and Iceland's national responsibility as codified by domestic legislation to protect the country from actions that endanger human health, resources, or ecosystems (Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic 2011).

Overall, this analysis suggests that particular uses of security language in the documents produced by the Arctic Council indicate, at most, the construction of a specific threat-referent relationship in which the survival of certain Arctic populations, mostly

Indigenous, is threatened by lack of access to food. More commonly, however, the use of security language in the Council's documents is adjectival, and does not connote the context of crisis or emergency suggested by a securitizing move.

Conclusion

Drawing on the evidence from the Arctic Council's repository of documents from 1996-2016, three preliminary conclusions can be made about the role of the Council in the social construction of regional security issues. First, by producing these documents, the Arctic Council has contributed only modestly, and perhaps indirectly, to the social construction of unconventional issues as relevant to security in the Arctic. The research of the Council's Working Groups provides useful data that may be used by other regional actors in various ways, including to articulate their own security claims. But overall, it does not appear that the Arctic Council itself attempts to construct issues as security relevant. In short, the Arctic Council does not particularly function as a securitizing actor attempting to construct issues as existentially threatening. While there are various possible explanations for this, a likely one is that international institutions that lack robust organizational structures, legal personality, or policy-making autonomy are unlikely to be in a position to articulate security claims independent of their member states. This is even more likely when decisions are made on the basis of consensus, whereby the Council's outputs must reflect the positions of all eight of its members and the Permanent Participants.

Second, although the Arctic Council does not function as a securitizing actor per securitization theory, it does make considerable use of adjectival forms of security language to describe preferred or improved conditions for Arctic peoples, societies, and ecosystems. Many issues ranging from human- to state-centric concerns are described as being security-relevant. In this respect, the adjectival use of security by the Council reflects the considerable challenges posed by the pace and scale of regional changes associated with phenomena such as environmental change and economic modernization, and the numerous ways in which the conditions of existence in the Arctic region can be improved. The key distinction is that whereas these adjectival uses of security identify aspirational conditions that can be worked towards through changes in practices and policies, they generally decline to identify specific relationships of existential danger to specific referent objects.

Finally, while the Arctic Council may not function particularly as a securitizing actor, a different question is raised by the analysis in this article: namely, whether the Council has been an audience for the securitizing moves of other actors, and thus whether its extensive use of adjectival security language to describe an array of Arctic issues reflects its acceptance of other actors' security concerns. Though this requires further research to fully answer, the fact that Permanent Participants and environmental organizations with observer status at the Arctic Council have made extensive use of securitizing

language to refer to issues of gravest concern to them – and to mobilize an effective political response to phenomena such as climate change and loss of Indigenous cultures and languages – suggests one possible avenue for future study. This article thus provides an analytical starting point to examine whether a more appropriate way to perceive the Arctic Council is not as an actor advancing security claims of its own, but as a forum in which others might make securitizing moves with a chance to be heard and enacted by a group of powerful states with considerable capabilities to respond to the many challenging issues in the circumpolar region.

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Regional Order in the Arctic: Negotiated Exceptionalism

Heather Exner-Pirot, PhD, Strategist for Outreach and Indigenous Engagement at the University of Saskatchewan

Robert W. Murray, Managing Director at Dentons Canada LLP's Government Affairs and Public Policy Practice Group, Senior Fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, and Research Fellow at the Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary, Canada

This article offers a theoretical explanation for what has been described as Arctic 'exceptionalism' - the successful effort to maintain cooperation in the region despite internal competition for resources and territory, and to compartmentalize Arctic relations from external geopolitical tensions. By using an English School approach to understand the Arctic, the authors describe how Arctic international society has been deliberately negotiated in a way that promotes cooperation between Arctic states, and that a rules- and norms- based order exists that serves all parties' interests well.

> "The fate of each state depends on its responses to what other states do. The possibility that conflict will be conducted by force leads to competition in the arts and the instruments of force. Competition produced a tendency toward the sameness of the competitors… Contending states imitate the military innovations contrived by the country of greatest capability and ingenuity. And so the weapons of major contenders, and even their strategies, begin to look much the same all over the world." (Waltz 1979, 127)

In his writing on the nature of international politics, Kenneth Waltz was correct to note that states are motivated by a desire to survive and that the international balance of power was especially important in understanding and explaining how conflict could arise between states or blocs of states. Throughout the history of the state system, there has been a preoccupation with rivalry, competition, and how states perceive each other, with the majority of commentary on international politics pointing out the ever-present dangers of conflict. What is equally important to note about international politics is that states have consciously and willingly negotiated various types of international and re-

gional order in an effort to mitigate the impact of an anarchic international system and have aligned themselves with either informal or formal organizational structures designed specifically to promote cooperation between states.

While it is true that the international system is anarchic in its structure and that states tend to behave as self-interested actors, the history of international politics has seen examples of internationalism, cooperation, and multilateralism, often characterized by states seeking opportunities to combine resources and work towards ensuring their survival through means other than conflict or coercion. Further, it is imperative to differentiate between the establishment and functioning of international order and various regional orders that have emerged at various times in world history, as regional orders tend to reflect the specific interests of like-minded states in a more concentrated way. Studies in regional order often focus on the European historical example, but more recently, regional order has been the subject of more intense scholarly study and how these regional orders relate to the larger international or world order (see Fawcett and Hurrell 1996). Much of this increased focus on regionalism and regional order comes as a result of the growth in regional cooperation and initiatives focused either on security or economic issues, such as NATO, NAFTA, the European Union, ASEAN, OAS, and others.[1]

The region that has received far more attention since the end of the Cold War has been the Arctic. Although the Arctic states are at odds in other parts of the world, notably over Russia's annexation of Crimea and its sponsorship of ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine, there has been a sense that the Arctic is somehow a 'unique' or 'exceptional' region in international affairs. There has been very minimal spillover to date in regional political relations; indeed, there have been advancements in formal cooperation in the past three years. The question has been asked: can Arctic politics be explained through the traditional lenses used to understand and explain international affairs?

This paper argues that the Arctic regional order is exceptional insofar as Arctic states and those states with involvement in the regional have worked to negotiate an order and balance of power predicated on norms such as cooperation and multilateralism. The establishment of an Arctic international society has seen great powers and smaller powers come together to form an order aimed at promoting norms and institutions not seen elsewhere in the world, though this paper notes that the Arctic is not immune from the possibility of war and conflict. By using an English School approach to understand the Arctic, we contend that Arctic international society was deliberately negotiated in a way that promotes cooperation between Arctic states, but that this order can be disrupted if Arctic international society does not take conscious steps to maintain a strong institutional framework that protects Arctic internationalism.

[1] Respectively, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; North American Free Trade Agreement; Association of Southeast Asian Nations; and Organization of American States.

Negotiating Regional Order

One of the lasting impacts of Arctic romanticism has been a tendency of international relations scholars to apply theoretical schools of thought from the field to current Arctic politics. Oran Young summarizes this trend by arguing:

> "There is a pronounced streak of romanticism in the thinking of many who take an interest in the Arctic, an attitude that encourages those affected by it to focus on the exotic and even unique properties of the physical, biological, and human systems of the region…Understandable as the resultant Arctic exceptionalism may be, it has the effect of obscuring our vision of a range of issues that are both critical to various constituencies in the Circumpolar North and of great interest to social scientists as exemplars of concerns that are generic in the sense that they arise in every corner in the world." (Young 1992, 13-14)

In examining the way scholars have approached Arctic international relations in recent years, much of the focus has been placed on aspects of traditional security studies or on the human security aspects of debates, but few approaches have made significant progress in trying to understand why international politics in the Arctic region are insulated from trends elsewhere in the world, particularly given the states involved in Arctic affairs, notably the United States and Russia.

The English School of international relations emphasizes the role of international society as a middle way of theorizing international affairs between the traditional realist conceptualizations of international politics, such as that presented by Waltz, and liberal or critical theoretical approaches that look at domestic-level or critical variables to understand global affairs. For the English School, the society of states is key to explaining state behavior, especially how states interact with one another; and more, the motives behind how and why states at times in history have willingly taken part in robust multilateral and cooperative regimes, and at others have worked together in a minimalist fashion. Robert Jackson summarizes the importance of international society as a conceptual tool for international relations by stating:

> "The conceptual key to international society is the manner in which sovereign states associate and relate: the character and modus operandi of their association and relations. It is formal in a significant way: it involves procedural standards of conduct, an essential normative basis of which is international law. However, it is also substantive in an equally significant way as it involves the pragmatic encounters of the separate national interests of those same independent states which, although subject to international

> law, are still free to lay down their own foreign policies." (2000, 102)

According to the English School, states seek to ensure their survival and mitigate the effects of an anarchic international system by consenting to partake in a society of states. These societies differ in their normative frameworks and character based on a number of variables, including the great powers dominating the international system at a given time in history. The main motivator for states consenting to sacrifice elements of their independence and autonomy is their quest for survival, and according to English School theory, the ideal way for states to do this is to use international society as a means for establishing and maintaining order.

One of the most important theoretical variables in identifying the degree to which states will work together in international society and the normative or institutional framework of a given society of states is the role of great powers. It is ultimately great powers that have the most influence in negotiating, implementing and enforcing order within international society, and the relations of these powers in various systemic structures, such as bipolar, multipolar, or unipolar, determines how strong and enduring order within a society of states will be. According to Hedley Bull, great powers face a series of options available to them in their considerations of order:

> "Great powers manage their relations with one another in the interests of international order by (i) preserving the general balance of power, (ii) seeking to avoid or control crises in their relations with one another, and (iii) seeking to limit or contain wars among one another. They exploit their preponderance in relation to the rest of international society by (iv) unilaterally exploiting their local preponderance, (v) agreeing to respect one another's sphere of influence, and (vi) joint action." (Bull 202, 200)

Following Bull's logic, great powers have the option to cooperate in a minimalist fashion or a more robust fashion, should they choose to do so, in the interest of maintaining order among states. An important point to highlight is that international societies are not strictly global in character, and the decisions of states, especially great powers, regarding establishing order via negotiation and the normative framework of a society of states also have consequences at the sub-global level.

In recent years, English School scholars have given more attention to the distinction between an overarching 'global' international society and 'sub-global' or 'regional' international societies. According to Yannis Stivachtis:

> "Opening the regional level of analysis might have serious implications for understanding institutions and norms like sovereignty, diplomacy, balance of power and others which exist and are per-

> formed at both global and regional level as, in many cases, regions form their own sub-global (regional) international societies which co-exist with global international society." (2015, 69)

It is therefore noteworthy to point out that, at any given time, there is both a global international society as well as a series of regional international societies, themselves consciously negotiated sub-global orders intended to better coordinate the relations between states and mitigate the effects of both anarchy, and possible global conflicts. Further, the institutions that form the normative framework of a regional international society need not be entirely consistent with those of global international society. Consequently, the relations between states at the global level may differ between those same states in regional interactions.

With eight states, multiple Indigenous groups, multilateral institutions and an emerging governance regime, and vast interest from a number of states and institutions, the Arctic is most certainly an emerging example of a regional international society (see Weinert 2014). Stivachtis furthers this claim by stating:

> "Arctic international relations are a complex of political, economic, development and militaristic dimensions. Throughout the Cold War, the Arctic was a region of symbolic military competition between the United States and Soviet Union. However, post-Cold War conditions in conjunction with climate change have transformed the Arctic into an important world region in the sense that states began to assert their claims of national sovereignty over areas previously considered inaccessible. This has had important implications for the Arctic regional order." (2015, 78)

The case for discussing Arctic exceptionalism traditionally hinges more on arguments about the Arctic being insulated from other geopolitical and international issues, particularly involving conflict, than being seen as a unique zone of cooperation. While it may be true that no region can be totally insulated from other international or global trends, it can be the case that the Arctic is 'exceptional' to the extent that the states that comprise Arctic international society have intentionally negotiated a regional order predicated on a more cooperative framework than they pursue with each other elsewhere, and have endeavored, implicitly, to compartmentalize relations there. The following section will explain in greater detail the normative composition of Arctic international society and the reasons state behavior in the region might look different, or exceptional.

An Arctic International Society Emerges

The establishment of an Arctic international society emerged, like many phenomena in contemporary international relations, at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The negotiation of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) in 1991, and subsequently the establishment of the Arctic Council in 1996, are often pointed to as the beginning of regional state relations. However, its true origins are more closely tied to a 1987 speech in Murmansk by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, to which the AEPS and Arctic Council, and many other foundational institutions of Arctic international society, were a response. It included six points:

1. A nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe.
2. Restricting naval activity in the Baltic, Northern, Norwegian and Greenland Seas, and extending confidence-building measures in these areas.
3. Peaceful cooperation in developing the resources of the North, including knowledge exchange, with specific mention of "oil and gas deposits of the shelf of our northern seas".
4. The development of scientific cooperation in the Arctic, including "questions bearing on the interests of the indigenous population of the North…and the development of cultural ties between northern peoples".
5. Cooperation in environmental protection.
6. The development of the Northern Sea Route.

Re-examining the speech, which further called for the Arctic to become a "zone of peace", there is evidence of significant continuity in regional state interests and goals over the past thirty years. Although the international system has evolved, state interests in the Arctic have remained largely intact and have led to normative institutions predicated on cooperation and multilateralism. These include: (1) efforts to maintain peace and stability in the region, echoed more contemporarily in the confidence-building efforts attempted through the Arctic Chiefs of Defense Staff meetings (though suspended after only two gatherings in 2014 after the Crimea intervention); (2) the establishment in 2015 and continuing efforts of an Arctic Coast Guard Forum; and (3) a premium placed on cooperation with regards to economic, scientific and environmentalist endeavors, manifested in the work of the Arctic Council, various scientific organizations, fishery regulations, the establishment of mandatory polar shipping guidelines, and the large number of other Arctic conferences and forums on a variety of topics. These interests have all been reiterated in the strategic objectives of the Arctic states as described in regional and national policies and speeches since 2008 (Heininen 2012), and clearly demonstrate a set of primary institutions within Arctic international society that are unique to the region and its particular political dynamics.

The institutionalized, stable, and rules-based Arctic society of states has also successfully integrated world society variables, such as NGOs, indigenous groups, and global civil society. Arctic-based organizations founded in the early 1990s include the Northern Forum, the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC), the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (now Council), the Barents Euro Arctic Council, and the University of the Arctic, alongside others. The AEPS, a Finnish initiative that included all eight states

with Arctic territory, also made, in retrospect, a transformational move by including Indigenous groups formally within the institution, a trend that was then replicated in the Arctic Council.

If Russia and the Murmansk speech provided space for the development of an Arctic international society, it is Finland and Canada, both middle powers that are generally attributed with leading its formalization, at least in the 1990s (Huebert 1998; Keskitalo 2004; English 2013). This is consistent with Martin Wight's view of the role middle powers play in the formation and conduct of societies of states (1978). It is notable that the United States played a limited role in the establishment of the Arctic Council, other than to circumscribe its mandate, such as the proscription on discussions of a military nature and defined financial contributions to the forum, at a time when the United States was trying to taper the proliferation and scope of international multilateral institutions (English 2013). Individual Americans, however, played key roles in regionalization processes. U.S. government participation in the Arctic Council was very much a concession to Canadian appeals, and was contingent on the Council not dealing with matters of military security or demanding defined contributions, and the adoption of a consensus based decision-making structure (English 2013; Bloom 1999). The U.S. also conceded the inclusion of Indigenous organizations as Permanent Participants, and the mandate for sustainable development, although there was concern and skepticism about its implementation in practice.

How can we explain the limited role assumed by the United States as an Arctic society emerged? The shared interests of Arctic states typically revolve around the soft security and low politics issues of the environment, science, and Indigenous and northern peoples' well-being. Environmental cooperation is not viewed by states through a lens of competition for relative gains; in fact, states are perceived to benefit from whatever efforts their neighbors make to protect their own environments, or contribute to scientific understanding, irrespective of their own efforts. Because environmental and scientific cooperation in the Arctic has taken shape largely through guidelines rather than binding agreements, there have been no economic or political costs imposed involuntarily. Within these circumstances, the United States has played a more muted role in Arctic politics than is the case in regions where territorial and economic competition is more fierce.

Competition or Conflict

Of course, many have argued that the Arctic is a theatre of fierce territorial and economic competition. A narrative of competition has dogged the Arctic region in the popular media, with suggestions that the Arctic states, and especially the Arctic Five littoral states (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the United States) have been 'racing' to claim large swathes of extended continental shelf and exploit the large deposits of hydrocarbon and mineral resources. Where viewed as a zero-sum competition, claims of Arctic exceptionalism are exposed to significant skepticism. Theory, and history, sug-

gest that states, especially great powers such as the United States and Russia, will attempt to maximize their strategic and economic advantages when the opportunity presents itself, but will not make decisions that significantly increase the risk of conflict unless their survival is threatened. In the Arctic, where interests are largely compatible, this has meant developing a robust international society negotiated to uphold Arctic states' interests based on a set of primary and secondary institutions that foster collaboration and information sharing, while establishing a unique Arctic balance of power. When viewed through a lens of absolute gains, the five littoral Arctic states all stand to benefit from a stable, peaceful, and accessible ocean, whereas instability would threaten their economic and strategic advantages.

The Arctic Ocean is best described, not as a newly opened 'Wild West' up for grabs, but as an ocean. Like the others, it is subject to the terms of the 1982 United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea.[2] One of the most pertinent provision with regards to Arctic governance has to do with submission of claims to the outer limit of continental shelf beyond the 200-nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone. There is an unusually far extension of geologic shelf throughout the Arctic basin (Antrim 2017), meaning lots of shelf to claim for the Arctic states through the processes identified in UNCLOS, e.g. through the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.

Following media reports of a scramble for the Arctic following the Russian planting of a titanium flag on the sea bed at the geographical North Pole in August 2007, the 'Arctic Five' states[3] held a meeting in Ilulissat, Greenland, on 28 May 28, 2008, to reassert their commitment to the existing "legal framework and to the orderly settlement of any possible overlapping claims" (Ilulissat Declaration 2008). Rather than the setting for a great power showdown, the Ilulissat Declaration demonstrated that the Arctic region had become exclusive, a club unto itself, in which the five littoral states stand to gain tremendously and seek to preserve their collective sovereignty and jurisdiction over the region, vis à vis other stakeholders. (see Jacobsen and Strandsbjerg's article in this issue which analyses the Ilulissat Declaration as a desecuritization act).

Forming a group or society of states concomitantly requires an identification of those who are not part of the club. China has previously called for the Arctic Ocean to be considered a "common heritage of mankind" (Zhuo 2010), and the EU Parliament called for an Antarctic-like Treaty to govern the region in 2008, to the dismay of the Arctic Five. Subsequently, criteria for Observership in the Arctic Council – a role with no inherent power – was devised to assess the extent to which "the applicant recognizes Arctic States' sovereignty, sovereign rights" and understands that "an extensive legal framework applies to the Arctic Ocean including, notably, the Law of the Sea, and that this framework provides a solid foundation for responsible management of this ocean" (Arctic Council 2013). China, India, South Korea, Singapore, Japan and Italy, and with

[2] Although the United States is not a signatory to UINCLOS, it accepts most of the Law of the Sea, including parts pertinent to the Arctic, as customary international law.

[3] The states with EEZs extending in to the Arctic Ocean: Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and Unites States.

some caveats the European Union[4], met these provisions to the satisfaction of the Arctic states and were finally admitted as Observers in 2013. But the Arctic Council retains a strong dynamic of those who are in and those who are out. The most recent, May 2017, *Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation* was ultimately negotiated between just the eight Arctic states despite the strong scientific interests and contributions in the region by other states and their nationals (see Greaves and Pomerants article in this issue about 'soft' securitization and the Arctic Council).

It is not only non-Arctic states who have been cast as outsiders of regional Arctic society. There have been tensions with other members of the Arctic Council, namely Iceland, Finland, and Sweden, as well as some Indigenous Permanent Participants, when the Arctic Five have endeavored to meet, beginning but not ending with Ilulissat. More recently, the Arctic Five states issued a Declaration to Prevent Unregulated Fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean, on July 16, 2015. Because the Central Arctic Ocean is High Seas, the Arctic Five do not have any authority to prevent others from fishing there, and did not assume any. However, Iceland called the move "unacceptable" (Quinn 2015) and summoned the respective Ambassadors to explain why Iceland had been left out. (Talks have since expanded to include Iceland, as well as China, the European Union, Japan, and South Korea and negotiations will likely conclude in 2017.)

What is most notable of this is the demonstration that in many Arctic affairs, Russia is a normal and even preeminent member of regional society, part of the upper tier, and not an outcast as is often described or would be expected based on its relationship with the Western Arctic states elsewhere.

The Manifestation of Exceptionalism

Recent history affirms that the Arctic is exceptional, inasmuch as narratives of conflict or at least spillover, based on the confluence of antagonistic actors, an underdeveloped resource base, strategic location, and rapid change, have failed to be realized.

Russia's 2014 incursion into Crimea, and before that Georgia in 2008, has tested the Arctic states' resolve to maintain cooperative relations in the region whilst pursuing sanctions elsewhere. Regional cooperation has proven resistant however. Rather than a dissolution of Arctic society, there has been ongoing investment into the development of shared norms, rules and institutions in the past five years. These include:

- The conclusion of three binding agreements negotiated under the auspices of the Arctic Council, including the 2011 Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical

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[4] The European Union is a special case. In 2013, the Arctic Council "receive[d] the application of the EU for Observer status affirmatively", but deferred a final decision, due to Canada's concern over its seal products ban. Although this particular issue was resolved by the 2015 Ministerial, Russia then blocked full acceptance due to tensions related to sanctions in the Arctic region over Crimea. In practice, the EU enjoys all of the minimal benefits Observer status offers, as an ad hoc Observer.

and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic; the 2013 Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution, Preparedness and Response in the Arctic; and the 2017 Agreement on Enhancing Arctic Scientific Cooperation.

- The establishment of a Permanent Secretariat for the Arctic Council in Tromsø, Norway in 2013, which together with the two binding agreements marked a progression in the institutionalization and authority of the Council vis à vis the Arctic states.

- The adoption of a mandatory Polar Code, or International Code for Ships Operation in Polar Waters, under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in 2014.

- The establishment of an eight-party Arctic Coast Guard Forum in 2015 to cooperate at an operational level in the maritime Arctic.

- A Declaration by the five littoral Arctic states Concerning the Prevention of Unregulated high Seas Fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean in July 2015, with negotiations underway to extend an agreement to China, Japan, South Korea, Iceland, and the EU in 2017.

The decision to compartmentalize relations within the Arctic from external events and factors has been a conscious one. Statements by various Arctic diplomats summarize the thinking: Canadian Senior Arctic Official Alison Leclaire asserted in October 2016 that "Canada and Russia have interests in the Arctic, including shared interests, hence the importance of engaging in interstate dialogue… despite differences on some issues, communication channels between Russia and Canada should remain open" (as quoted in TASS 2016). Norwegian Foreign Minister Børge Brende articulated in March 2017 that

> "Northern regions and cooperation in the Arctic is of high priority for Norway. Russia is an important partner and player in the Arctic, and [the Arctic Dialogue conference in Arkhangelsk] provides a good frame for continuing the political dialogue with Russia regarding questions of common interests" (as quoted in Nilsen 2017).

Similarly, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated in March 2017 that "It is essential to preserve the Arctic as a territory of constructive dialogue, creation and cooperation on an equal basis…Russia sees no potential for conflicts in the Arctic Region" and international norms "serve as a firm basis for joint solutions of any problems" (as quoted in TASS 2017).

Location, Location, Location

The exceptionalism of Arctic society - the conscious effort to compartmentalize relations in the region - is less about idealism and more about shared interests. Events and phenomena that have proven destabilizing in other regions have not had the same effect on Arctic relations. This can be explained by fundamental differences in the Arctic region's geography and demography, and the society that has evolved within it.

Marine and Environmental Interests

Perhaps most importantly from an international relations point of view is the fact that the Arctic region is oceans-based, as opposed to land-based. This, combined with other features of the Arctic including remoteness, sparseness, and extreme weather conditions, has drastically reduced the flow of trade, people, and conflict – the issues that dominate regional relations in other parts of the world. It is no surprise, then, that formal regional cooperation – the 'procedural standards of conduct' – have occurred primarily around marine issues.[5]

Marine matters are particularly well suited for and benefit from regional cooperation, because water boundaries are much more fluid, literally and figuratively. Environmental matters are similar: political borders have little influence on the traversing of air, water, flora and fauna, or pollutants. The ocean-based Arctic region thus offers many benefits for cooperation to states.

Epistemic Community

Another unique characteristic of Arctic international society is the influence and composition of its epistemic community. There is an unusual amount of political space for non-state actors, particularly Indigenous organizations, scientists/academics, and environmental NGOs, perhaps because the state itself has generally had less of a presence in the Arctic.

This uniqueness is perhaps best demonstrated in the structure of the Arctic Council, which in addition to its eight state members includes six Indigenous Permanent Participants, "created to provide for active participation and full consultation" (Arctic Council 2013). Permanent Participants are fully included in the Council's executive meetings, Ministerials, Working Groups, and Task Forces. They do not have a vote per se, but as the Arctic Council is a consensus based organization, this has not had much significance. NGOs, scientists, and scientific organizations have also played a central

[5] Shipping, e.g. the 2015 Polar Code; SAR, e.g. 2011 Agreement on Aeronautical and Mari-time Search and Rescue in the Arctic; marine environment, e.g. 2013 Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution, Preparedness and Response; Coast Guards, e.g. 2015 Arc-tic Coast Guard Forum; fisheries, e.g. 2015 Oslo Declaration Concerning Prevention Un-regulated High Seas Fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean; and marine wildlife, e.g. 1973 Agreement on Conservation of Polar Bears.

role in the work of the Arctic Council, e.g. in the production of its reports, assessments, and guidelines.

It can be argued that this diverse network of actors has played a stabilizing influence in regional society; there is strong path dependency towards the continuation of scientific, environmental, and Indigenous cooperation at various other levels, irrespective of the political ebbs and flows in state relations.

Likelihood of Military Conflict

The Arctic's history and geography also reduce the likelihood of conventional military conflict in the region. On the first point, the relative sparsity of the Arctic population, and the late settlement by ethnic Europeans, means that there isn't a recent history of territorial loss and boundary change across the region, at least on the part of nation-states (for Indigenous peoples the view is quite different). This is in sharp contrast to the context of Russian aggression in Crimea and South Ossetia, which were both formerly part of the Soviet Union, host large ethnic Russian populations, and maintained close relations with Moscow following its collapse in 1991 and their absorption into Ukraine and Georgia, respectively. These are narrow, specific and predictable circumstances. Based on this pattern, the Baltic states have reasonable cause to fear a Russian incursion but not the Scandinavian countries, and certainly not North America.

Other concerns about a conflict over newly accessible Arctic resources are similarly unlikely given the region's geography and geology. Over 90% of the estimated offshore hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic fall within the Arctic states' own, undisputed, Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), with Russia, Norway, and Alaska possessing the lion's share. There will be no case in the foreseeable future of Russia or any other country running out of Arctic hydrocarbons to extract, and so looking to annex other regions. Rather, the vast majority of Arctic offshore oil remains untapped because it is difficult and expensive to access, and thus unprofitable. Furthermore, Canada and the United States announced their intentions on December 20, 2016 to designate their respective Arctic offshores off limits for oil and gas development.

The idea of taking Arctic resources by force also defies logic. Those large-scale Arctic developments that have been realized are typically multi-billion-dollar capital investments which require decades-long lifespans to reap returns. Investors do not and will not fund billion dollar Arctic projects under conditions of significant geopolitical uncertainty, for example where territory is under dispute. It is therefore in everyone's economic interest to maintain a peaceful and stable Arctic region which is rules-based and predictable.

It is also difficult to imagine a scenario in which military tactics would serve any states' Arctic interests. The vast majority of the region is inhospitable, dangerous, and generally inaccessible. Some kind of large-scale land-based acquisition is thus inconceivable, as for the most part there is nothing to take and nowhere to occupy. As former Canadian Chief of Defense Staff, General Walt Natynczyk, articulated in 2009,

"If someone were to invade the Canadian Arctic, my first task would be to rescue them" (as quoted in Byers 2014, 9).

Norwegian General Sverre Diesen identified the most likely scenarios for actual military conflict in the Arctic at a conference in 2008. While maintaining that "we see no threat, in the conventional military meaning of the word" of military force in the region, in theory such an event would most likely be an "air- or sea-launched raid, possibly against an objective of military or economic value, but with extraction of force as soon as desired effect had been achieved". Diesen also assessed sustained military presence in the region as more "a visible expression of national interests and claims than as a traditional military deterrent" (as quoted in Skogrand 2008, 90-94).

Russia's Interests

The case for exceptionality of Arctic society rests primarily on the close and resilient cooperation between Russia and the other seven Arctic states, despite clashes in interests elsewhere. How do we account for that?

Russia's foremost strategic interest in the Arctic is to develop its resources. Resource development has propelled the Russian Arctic to contribute as much as 20% of Russian GDP (Medvedev 2008) when oil prices are high, and over 70% of the Arctic region's GRP (Glomsrød et al 2017, 28); Russia's Arctic produced 70% of the country's oil and 90% of its gas in 2012 (Glomsrød et al 2017, 62). This is in sharp contrast to Canada, Denmark, and the United States' respective 'Arctics' (defined as Canada's three territories; Greenland and Alaska), which represent < 1% of national GDP. This makes the Arctic much more important to Russia than to its potential competitors, and also makes Russia the most invested in a stable and prosperous Arctic. Russia needs foreign investment, expertise, and markets to profit from its Arctic resources, particularly with offshore oil drilling. The sanctions imposed by Western countries over Crimea have been harmful to these efforts. Outright conflict would be paralyzing.

According to Valery Konyshev and Alexander Sergunin (2014, 2), it would not make sense for Russia to "pursue a revisionist policy in the Arctic" because it is "a status quo power" in the region. Although much has been written and speculated about Russian investments in their Arctic military capabilities, they are often described as 'modernization programs' designed to retrieve some of its capabilities in the Soviet era. Konyshev and Sergunin argue (2014, 2) that these "programs are quite modest and aim at upgrading the Russian armed forces in the High North rather than providing them with additional offensive capabilities or provoking a regional arms race".

This is not to say that conflict in the Arctic with Russia is impossible, even as it is unlikely. However, Russia's militarization of the region appears to be more focused on domestic political interests than being outwardly aggressive. There have been no overt violations of existing agreements, no military skirmishes, and no posturing that would appear to indicate Russia, or any other Arctic state, is on the verge of initiating conflict. Rather than fearing Russia's behavior in the Arctic, it is incumbent on other

Arctic states to engage with Russia and use the Arctic as an avenue for dialogue and cooperation, rather than to engage in arms racing behavior or escalation tactics that would erode the existing diplomatic normative character of Arctic international society.

Great Powers, English School, and Arctic Exceptionalism

Returning to Hedley Bull and the English School (Bull 2002, 200), how can we best understand persistence of peace and stability in Arctic society? The key to understanding how an international society functions, is found, as noted above, in the institutions negotiated by the states involved in a society of states, indicating their normative preferences and structure for a society at a given time in history. By examining the primary institutions of Arctic international society, the exceptional trends of the region become clearer:

1. *An Arctic Balance of Power*: Despite the media hype around new military investments in the Arctic, it is generally agreed that they have not fundamentally altered the regional balance power, or as George Soroka describes it, "the other regional states have not yet seen a need to balance against Moscow" (as quoted in Exner-Pirot 2017). Indeed, the United States has let much of its Arctic capabilities diminish, especially in terms of ice-breaking power. While Moscow appears to be investing more heavily, as described above it is not aimed at providing Russia with provoking a regional arms race or establishing Russia as a regional hegemon. Other Arctic states have responded by investing in their own capabilities, but not to the extent that the Arctic balance of power is predicated on balancing against Russian power in the region.

2. *Arctic Diplomacy*: Even though there have been difficult moments, all of the Arctic states, including the United States and Russia, have been very deliberate in articulating that the Arctic is a region of cooperation and that this must not change, which has been reinforced by their actions. In spite of economic sanctions, Arctic-specific collaboration including fisheries, shipping, scientific cooperation and SAR, has been ongoing since the annexation of Crimea, and the work of the Arctic Council has not been affected in any explicit way. Much emphasis is placed on 'dialogue' and a regional commitment to multilateralism and cooperation.

3. *Emphasis on International Law*: Though the Arctic Council does not discuss military matters, and the ad hoc meetings of the Arctic Chiefs of Staff were suspended after March 2014, confidence building measures such as the establishment and activities of the Arctic Coast Guard Forum have continued. Russia has been actively settling its boundary disputes, and the threat they pose to stability, with its successful delimitation of its Barents Sea maritime boundary with Nor-

way in 2010, and through the orderly delimitation of its extended continental shelf via the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). In fact, Russia has restricted its submission to the CLCS to the shelf largely to the eastern hemisphere, with its claim to the Lomonosov Ridge ending close to the North Pole (Russian Federation 2015). Denmark's submission, by contrast, goes deep in to the Eastern, or Russian, side (Kingdom of Denmark 2014).

4. *Role of Arctic States*: States remain the primary actors and decision-makers in Arctic international society, but they have consciously chosen to allow elements of world society to significantly influence decisions and multilateral bodies that are key components of the way the Arctic works. NGOs, Indigenous groups, and civil society are important actors in explaining how decisions in the Arctic are made by states, which has helped to influence the cooperative structure of the Arctic society of states.

5. *War*: While it is the case that narratives around Arctic conflict, competition and a 'race' for the region are exaggerated, it is important to note that the Arctic is not immune from states acting to assert or protect their interests, and that ongoing militarization of the region can affect how willing states are to maintain an institutional framework for Arctic international society based on cooperation. War has been used historically by international societies as a means of establishing and protecting order and the balance of power, and as Arctic international society continues to evolve, great power management must have the option as a means of deterring states from disrupting the institutional structure of the region and enforcing the interests of Arctic states.

Conclusions

Arctic international society has been framed as a unique, or even exceptional, region in that it has exhibited resilience to the clashing of interests that have pervaded Russia's relations with the West elsewhere during the post-Cold War period. For international relations theorists in the realist camp, this state of affairs is seen as highly tenuous, with competition and conflict stemming from unsettled boundaries, large and newly accessible reserves of oil and other resources, strategic location, and the presence of both a superpower in the United States and a revisionist great power in Russia, overdue to impact Arctic relations. This paper has argued that the English School of international relations better explains the current state of affairs in the Arctic, which continues to be marked by cooperation and stability.

The Arctic states have negotiated a rules- and norms- based order that serves all parties' interests well. A regional international society has been founded on environmental protection and marine cooperation, both issues where states seek absolute, not relative gains. It is marked by extensive non-state actor cooperation, particularly

amongst Indigenous peoples, scientists, and NGOs, which has served to moderate the impact of fluctuations in state relations elsewhere. Russia in particular, with its economic dependence on hydrocarbon and mineral exports from its Arctic region, is vested in a stable and predictable regional order. There are no obvious strategic goals that could be accomplished through military means in the Arctic.

The establishment over the past thirty years of a robust Arctic international society has not made the region immune to inter-state competition and conflict. It is incumbent upon the Arctic states to continue to be proactive in maintaining and strengthening the values, norms and institutional framework that have made it exceptional in contemporary international relations. But there is a recognition amongst all stakeholders that the nature of regional Arctic relations is worthy of protection; as a model of international society, it is also worthy of emulation.

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Arctic Indigenous Societal Security at COP21: The Divergence of Security Discourse and Instruments in Climate Negotiations

Victoria Herrmann, PhD Candidate, Scott Polar Research Institute, University of Cambridge

This article explores the gap between Arctic societal security discourse and tangible climate change commitments to Arctic Indigenous peoples in UN climate negotiations. The author argues that the space for and use of Arctic societal security discourses at COP21 are not matched with climate commitments. Thus, the resulting global policy initiatives to support adaptation and mitigation in the North do not adequately support the security of current cultural practices and heritage in the Arctic. Empowering native culture of the North as a reason for acting on climate, but not empowering its security through tangible financial, legal, or technical commitments creates a post-colonial inequality in power in cultural security discourses and commitments.

On December 8th, 2015 seven women from Alaska and Greenland mounted a stage in the Indigenous Pavilion of the 21st UN Climate Change Summit (COP21) to share songs, dances, and culture of their homeland (Kaljur 2015). They were in Paris, amongst a crowd of 40,000 people, to advocate for strong global action on climate change to save the Arctic from some of its most dramatic impacts (O'Rouke 2015). December 8th had been named *Arctic Day* at the Conference – a day where space and time were dedicated to Saami and Inuit leaders to celebrate the cultures of the Arctic and caution delegates about the needs for preserving it in a rapidly warming world. Throughout the day, representatives from across the region shared the cultural heritage at risk from climate change. Sami singer Sofia Jannok performed and spoke of climate change against a backdrop that read "WE ARE STILL HERE," followed by a traditional dance performance by the Uummannaq Children. Later that evening, Elle Márjá Eira, an artist, filmmaker, singer, and reindeer herder from Finnmark, sung *We Speak Earth.* Altogether, the aim of *Arctic Day* at COP21 was clear: to show the world the rich heritage of the circumpolar north that stands to be lost

if nothing is done to reduce global warming. “This is not a textbook for us,” Cathy Towtongie, President of Nunavut Tunngavik warns the crowd. “This is our way of life” (Kaljur 2015).

Four days later, the world listened. The Paris Agreement, the product of two decades of work by members of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, set countries on a path to hold the increase in global average temperature to well below 2 degrees Celsius, and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 degrees, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change (UNFCCC 2015). To accomplish this, Paris created the foundation for a consistent flow of finances to help developing and least developed countries lower greenhouse gas emissions while simultaneously growing their economies. Beyond mitigation, the Agreement also envisioned a world where ample financial and technical resources would be made available to increase resiliency and augment adaptation efforts on the front lines of climate change. But while this global target to reduce greenhouse gas emissions ensures a reduction in the severity of future climate impacts in the Arctic, the Agreement makes no mention of the region directly, nor of the consequences happening today that can no longer be avoided. “[The agreement] was historic, yes,” said Okalik Eegeesiak, Chair of the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) to Radio Canada International in the days after returning from Paris. “[But] Inuit and Saami peoples wanted to have more recognition and respect for Arctic peoples,” she said in a phone interview. “There is some mention of indigenous peoples and our rights and our role in climate change [issues] but there isn’t much commitment to work with us” (Quinn 2015).

In UN climate change conferences, there exists a disconnect between the space for and use of Arctic cultural heritage as a catalyst for action and parallel international legal and financial support for climate adaptation and mitigation in the North. This article aims to unpack the gap between creating a space for societal security discourse and producing tangible climate commitments to Arctic Indigenous peoples in UN climate negotiations. After a brief introduction to its foundational scholarship, the article first surveys and explores visual and textual narratives pertaining to Arctic heritage at COP21 focusing on regional Indigenous political organizations and representatives. The narrative analysed emerges at the nexus of climate and culture, and contends both that societal security is to maintain Arctic indigenous culture in its traditional state and that societal security is to protect indigenous culture from harm or destruction while allowing it to live, change and develop in its own accord to assist with climate mitigation and adaptation actions. The article then turns to the resulting Paris Agreement and Paris Road Map to survey specific legal, financial, and policy support mechanisms for Arctic Indigenous peoples. The article will argue that the space for and use of Arctic Indigenous societal security discourses at COP21 are uneven with the resulting global policy initiatives, and do not adequately support the security of current cultural practices and heritage in the Arctic. It contends that empowering native culture of the North as a reason for acting on climate, but not empowering its security through tangible financial, legal, or technical commitments creates a

post-colonial inequality in power in societal security discourses and commitments. Overall, the article aims to fill a gap in current scholarship on the nexus of security, Arctic identity, and climate change in order to better understand the interaction of societal security and scales of identity at UN climate change negotiations.

Conceptual Framework of Societal Security and The Arctic Citizen

Of all the dimensions of the recent model of 'comprehensive' security, societal security is perhaps the softest and most elusive of its iterations. In the Copenhagen School which Wæver founded and wherein the concpept of societal security finds its origin, security is not a static concept but rather a changing phenomenon influenced by international developments in conflict, economy, identity, and politics, among others. Societal security is no exception to this. It is complex and ambiguous, in no small part because it is dynamic and depends on so many factors. Societal security is "the defence of an identity against a perceived threat, or more precisely, the defence of a community against a perceived threat to its identity" (Wæver 2008, 581). Here, the identity of the community, rather than the sovereignty of the state, is the value, or referent object, that is being protected. This deepening and complementation of the idea of security to include issues of identity, and in turn culture and heritage, necessitates a brief unfolding of the concept of identity, how it relates to security, and what the nexus of identity and security means in the multi-state and multi-national space of the Arctic. Identity can be understood in relation to Benedict Anderson's seminal works on imagined communities and nations, where nations are a socially constructed community imagined by the people who perceive themselves as part of that group (Anderson 1991). Here, the community and its shared identity is imagined because "members of the nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion" (Anderson 1991, 49). Individuals construct a stretchable net of kinship that allows for, and is built upon, a shared identity, history, and culture. As Gellner argues, "Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it *invents* nations where they do not exist" (Gellner 2008).[1]

It is within this space of nation, of constructed shared identities, that the conceptualization of the 'Arctic Citizen' is born in the global climate change science and risk discourse. In Marybeth Long Martello's *Global Change Science and the Arctic Citizen,* she proposes that climate change has given birth to the development of a new type of

[1] Societal security and the use of identity, as opposed to state sovereignty, as the referent object does have its opponents. Early on, scholar Bill McSweeney (1998, 137) argued that identity does not have an empirical base upon which to lean, and is either an act, whereupon identity relates to the ability of individuals to uphold the narrative about them as a collective self, or a structure, wherein identity relates to the story from which the individuals attempt to build an identity. In this reading, identity is understood as a process and not as an object to be secured. In response, Wæver and Buzan (reference is lacking) have attempted to demonstrate that social communities defined in terms of identity can become a reference object in some events of securitization in which the value that is being protected is not the sovereignty of state but rather the identity of community.

political, identity-based actor in the North (Martello 2004). Martello proposes that by weaving together generational knowledge and social agenda setting across tribes, Indigenous groups have constructed and adopted a new imagined identity, and in turn empowered this identity as an emerging regional policy community. This type of identity can be seen as a combination of the nation (an imagined community) as defined by possessing compact, well-defined territories at their homeland, a land that acts as a repository of historic memories and associations, the place where 'our' sages and heroes lived and fought, and nation as predominately defined by ethnicity. Adopting the Societal Security approach of the Copenhagen School, Arctic Indigenous organizations and community representatives can come to define their own identity independent of (and at times in opposition to) the political state within which they are located (Wæver 1993, 23). Indeed, the legitimacy of the state is neither exclusively nor necessarily founded on social identity, but Arctic Indigenous actors can create currency in the international arena through establishing an independent social identity. Closely linked to constructivism and developed around Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver's conceptualization of security, societal security is "about the large, self-sustaining identity groups" of the collective identities of societies which share a common "we-feeling" (Buzan et al. 1998, 119). Here, the state is not the focal action in the international security framework, but instead a group of people who share a common identity. As Buzan explains, "Society is about identity, the self-conception of communities and of individuals identifying themselves as members of a community. These identities are distinct from, although often entangled with, the explicitly political organizations concerned with government" (Buzan et al. 1998, 119). Here, the Arctic Citizen, the imagined community of the North and its shared identity, are built on the idea that the circumpolar north has been their homeland since time immemorial, where legendary heroes like Kiviuq, an eternal Inuit wanderer, lived and travelled. Their identity, and in turn societal security, is not tied to the Western concept of a state with hard borders and a sovereignty to be secured. Rather, the Arctic Citizen's identity is tied to the landscapes of the Arctic, indigenousness, and the ethnic distinction they possess as being direct descendants from the original inhabitants of the North. In the societal security framework, this identity is the referent object that is being secured, not any one Arctic state.

As climate science regionalizes the Arctic, it has simultaneously underwritten an Arctic identity centred on the notion that its peoples comprise an at-risk community. Science, and in turn the policy community, treat the Arctic as a single unit under pressure from a variety of global forces. In analysing how native peoples construct their own political agency through different strategies to further their own political interests in the Arctic, Monica Tennberg furthers Martello's work to find that Indigenous political agency is based on multiple forms of power and activist leaders' ability to change the structure of power relations to create space for their own political agency (Tennberg 2010). Through the emergence of a regional identity, the voice of this new citizen has been recognized as an important part of knowledge creation of socio-ecological changes

of the region's systems, providing a certain level of agency on the part of the Arctic Citizen that allows their voice to be heard through regional Indigenous organizations. Rather than people being passive victims, as they had been before, the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) depicts them as adaptive beings and holders of knowledge, so that they come to embody a dual identity of victim and expert. This has resulted in changing approaches to knowledge formation, mapmaking, and the quantification of climate change, including ACIA successfully privileging the Indigenous experience in the north by including new approaches to knowledge production, detailed accounts of Indigenous communities, provision of heightened public visibility, and, consequently, strengthened their agency in climate change issues. (Martello 2008).

Societal security in the Arctic relates to the capabilities of the "Arctic Citizen" to "preserve its essential characteristics in the face of variable circumstances and despite the potential or actual threat" (Hough 2004, 106). Societal insecurity, then, exists when communities of any kind identify a threat to their survival as a community (Wæver 2008, 582). In societal security theoretical scholarship, threats are either horizontal competition, such as migrations, or vertical competitions, such as integrations and secessions (Wæver 2008, 583). The vast majority of societal security scholarship focuses on these two types of threats in ethnic conflicts, minority rights, immigration, regionalism, separatism, and anti-Western nationalism and rhetoric. Significantly less developed is the notion that climate change poses a threat to societal security. When climate change is addressed in the Copenhagen School, it is almost entirely within the environmental security strand. But environmental threats to societies can occur, especially when identity is tied to a particular territory and culture is adapted to a way of life that is strongly conditioned by its natural surroundings. Threats to the environment, whether they be deforestation, pollution, or climate change, can endanger the existence of that culture, and in turn the society to which it belongs (Roe 2010, 220). Of course, these dimensions cannot adequately address the issues of security separately; each of the sectors Wæver and Buzan lay out affect each other in real life, and climate change, like many threats, involve a combination of them. If we are to understand climate change as a threat, or at least a threat multiplier, to other strands – economic, ecological, political, and military – then we must also untangle climate change as a threat to societal security.

A subsidence-based way of life that is close to traditional land is central to Northern Indigenous groups' cultural identities. Arctic society's identity focuses on an intimate dependence on traditional methods for hunting and fishing, housing, sharing of food, and travel on snow and ice, among many others. This provides a long-established spiritual and cultural communal existence through an intimate relationship with their surroundings. Even the development of northern indigenous languages is intimately connected with ice, land, sky, and wildlife. But as climate and geophysical changes occur with warmer temperatures, performing basic tasks vital for both food and cultural development, like hunting trips, are becoming not only challenging, but also dangerous with thinner, less stable ice. Some traditional travel routes to camp sites, neighbouring communities, and hunting and fishing areas have become unreachable. A

changing climate also has implications for the passage of traditional knowledge from one generation to the next, particularly their weather predicting skills. Their weather and climate-related knowledge of hunting conditions from cloud and wind pattern observations do not fit with today's changing climate. Many villages across the North are heavily reliant on subsidence lifestyle activities based around Arctic waters, including the Chukchi Sea, Baffin Bay, and the Northwest Passage. However, the massive thinning of ice sheets and glaciers have negatively impacted the abundance and distribution of Arctic wildlife species, including the ringed seal, salmon, walruses, and caribou, many of which will be pushed to extinction by 2070–2090 (Watt-Cloutier 2004). In addition to less access to wildlife and flora like berries for collection, changes in see ice thickness and distribution, permafrost conditions, and extreme weather events also increase risks for personal injury. Food storage is also being undermined by climate change. Traditionally, outdoor meat caches were used to keep community food fresh and preserved in the cold. Today, these traditional storage methods are no longer viable, as higher temperatures spoil communal preserves. There is also the potential that climate change could increase human exposure to contaminants like organic pollutants, heavy metals, and radionuclides through shifting air and water currents.

Across the Arctic region, Indigenous communities have effectively bolstered their capacity to conserve native languages, diets, and traditions in spite of many changing conditions. But melting sea ice, shoreline erosion, and forest fires are endangering societal security by threatening the continuation of a culture that has survived and thrived for millennia. If a society loses its unique identity, it cannot survive as a society. There are many actors involved in securing Indigenous cultural heritage in the face of a changing climate, including the United Nations, national governments, and non-governmental organizations. The most vocal and effective of these actors are Arctic Indigenous organizations and Arctic communities themselves. The section to follow uses Arctic Day at COP21 as a case study to examine the types of narratives constructed by and about the Arctic Citizen at UN climate negotiations. It then turns to a textual analysis of the Paris Agreement and auxiliary texts to survey how and to what extent the Arctic Citizen is included in the resulting documents. The article finally returns to the conceptual framework laid out here to analyse how the Paris Agreement addresses, or does not address, societal security of the Arctic Citizen.

The Arctic Citizen at COP21

The use of Arctic visuals as the iconic imagery and symbolism of climate change has been well documented (Manzo 2010). Surveys show that circumpolar visual imagery like polar bears and retreating ice act as emotional anchors or referents to an otherwise abstract phenomenon, and as such are widely circulated and reproduced. In the words of Vidal, "It's the age of the melt… when the stranded polar bear becomes the symbol of the times." (Vidal 2008). The symbolism of the Arctic at COP21 was no exception to this. 'Ice Watch' at the Place de la Republique invited visitors to walk around blocks of ice from

Greenland, watching as the natural sculptures melted before their very eyes. The installation, by Greenlandic geologist Minik Rosing and Icelandic-Danish artist Olafur Eliasson, was meant to "make the climate change we are facing tangible" and 'inspire shared commitment to take climate action" (Walker 2015). Further down the road, Greenpeace's three-tone mechanical polar bear, Aurora, marched towards Le Bourget Conference Center. While these more recognizable visual narratives that exhibited the power of the polar bear icon to represent climate change in the minds of the public were present, a parallel narrative – one that was both complementary to and in contention with the polar bear narrative – was also employed in Paris.

In effect, the intent of COP21 Arctic Day was to provide an alternative visual narrative of the Arctic in a rapidly changing climate – a narrative defined not by polar bears and ice but by the richness of the human experience in the circumpolar north. In the words of Inuit Circumpolar Chair Okalik Eegeesiak as she presented in the Indigenous Pavilion on December 8th, "Stop using the polar bear as an icon for climate change. This does not help us address the very real human dimension. Same with the seals" (Kaljur 2015). But beyond the reorienting of narratives from mega fauna to humans, if considered within the comprehensive security framework provided by the Copenhagen School, COP21's Arctic Day's intent and rhetoric were rooted in notions of societal security. As defined by Buzan and Wæver, society itself is "about identity, the self-conception of communities and of individuals identifying themselves as members of a community" (Buzan et al. 1998, 119). In a full day of programming, Arctic Indigenous representatives at COP21 presented themselves as a single, pan-regional society through cultural performances and informational presentations. The structure of the event was built upon a two-fold societal security foundation: (1) that the Arctic Citizen and Arctic society has a resilient ability to persist in its essential character in the face of political, economic, and colonial/post-colonial threats; and (2) that the Arctic Citizen and Arctic society is unable to persist in its essential character under changing ecological conditions and threats of a rapidly changing homeland that are exacerbated by land rights and imperialist policies.

Arctic Day was the production of both a visual and oral narratives of a culture at risk as a means to construct an imagined community, as seen through its schedule:

11.00-12.05	Film Screening: "Last Yoik of the Saami Forest"
12.10-14.10	Film Screening: "Inuk"
14.15-15.45	Film Forum by Saami Film Institute: 7 Saami Stories & Stoerre Vaerie
14.15-15.45	Joiking Workshop – We speak Earth by Áslat Holmberg
15.45-15.50	Dance performance by Uummannaq Children
16.00-16.15	Ted X talk on Climate Change by Sofia Jannok
16.15-17.45	Panel Session: Climate Knowledge and Solutions from Arctic Voices With Okalik Eegeesiak, Aili Keskitalo, Cathy Towtongie, Reggie Joule and Maatalii Okalik
17.45-18.45	Saami concert by Elle Márjá Eira

Notably, Arctic Day's narrative is an evolution of external threats to Arctic Indigenous identity and culture that begins with state discrimination and post-colonial legacies that are then woven into current insecurities of a changing climate for Arctic society. The opening film, "Last Yoik of the Saami Forest," chronicles the logging damage that has taken place in the forests of Finnish Lapland over the past 50 years (Documentary Educational Resources). The Northern old growth forests therein are essential to Saami reindeer herding and their traditional way of life, but have been severely deforested by the state-owned logging company Metsahalltus. The consequence put forth in the film is the Saami fears that it will not be able to live as itself with its distinctive characteristics and dynamics once its landscapes are changed. While this threat to societal security is not one put forth by Buzan in his work – migration, horizontal competition, or vertical competition to a society's culture and cohesion[2] changing the landscapes provides the same threat to cultural heritage and identity. The focus on environmental degradation and its effects on identity offers a transition to climate change as a threat to the survival of the Arctic community as a cohesive unit. The film *Inuk* then acts as the bridge between environmental and climatic threats to identity. *Inuk* is a coming-of-age story of 16-year old Gaaba Petersen, who was raised in Nuuk and sent to Uummannaq Orphanage, a foster home in the North, after his parents are unable to care for him due to alcoholism (*Inuk* 2014). While in the North, Gaaba is sent to a bear hunter to learn the wisdom of his people, and in this journey into manhood where seal hunts replace video games, he encounters the effects of global warming.

For the remainder of the day, the cultural richness of the Arctic Citizen's identity and climate change as a threat to that societal security are interlaced through dance performances by Uummannaq Children, talks on climate change in the North, vocal performances that 'speak for the earth,' and conversations about climate knowledge and solutions to a rapidly changing landscape. Arctic Day buttressed two concepts. First, that societal security in the Arctic, as theorized generally by Wæver, is not tied to a state territory. Rather, the large-scale collective identity of Indigenous peoples to the circumpolar north function independent of the state. Together, Inuit leaders from across the region drafted and presented a joint declaration on climate change in the Arctic — "to send a united message to the world, to recognize and support the special challenges that climate change poses for Arctic peoples and the right to development in the Arctic," noted then Minister of Labor, Finance, Ministerial Resources, and Foreign Affairs Vittus Qujaukitsoq on December 8th. "Our joint Inuit voice and our traditional know-how from across the Arctic should be heard and included in international policy-making. Most importantly, Arctic indigenous peoples have to be ensured equal access to the right to development. Indigenous peoples' rights and interests must be included in the COP21 outcome document" (Walker 2015; Governments of Nunavut and Greenland, and Inuit Circumpolar Council 2015).

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[2] To be sure, Arctic Indigenous communities have faced these external threats to their identity and culture. As described by Inuit Circumpolar Council Chair Okalik Eegeesiak at COP21 "Despite all odds, we are still here."

Perhaps the societal insecurity brought about by a changing climate is captured in an interview that lle Márjá Eira, the final performer of Arctic Day, did with Snowriders International while at COP21. On camera and in her performance on the evening of December 8th, she spoke of how a warmer world is impacting her and her family's identity in the small Saami village.

> "My family works with reindeers and climate changes is affecting us personally because if the snow disappears then our way of living disappears. It's our tradition, and we're gonna have a lot of problems herding the reindeer, and the reindeers will also struggle. And I'm afraid that if the snow disappears then will the Saami people also disappear, our traditions and our language? That's why I'm here using my voice, by showing my films, talking to people, and also through music. It's important to use your voice and tell about us, even when we are not invited to the grand conference" (Snowriders International 2015).

lle Márjá Eira presents her and her family's identity as a part of the collective Arctic societal identity on a lower scale. Identities are inherently multi-layered based on an individual's lived and inherited experiences. Gender, economic class, marital status, and religion are just a few of the many layers an individual can perform within their identity, while scales, from the identity of a resident of a specific village to Arctic Citizen to Indigenous, all the way up to a member of humankind, add yet another layer to identity. Each of these different scales of identity are multiple, overlapping, and at time in contention with one another (Tsing 2000). The identity narratives and societal insecurities presented here are no different. The Arctic Citizen identity was the primary identity proposed, but it was inevitably combined with other scales of identity that were being practiced, and evaded. Saami, Inuit, Canadian, Greenlandic, American, Alaska, European, Indigenous, and the list goes on. Arctic Day at COP21 transcended these multiple and contested scales of identities, to present a singular, shared narrative of a threatened, culturally-unique in a full day of dance, film screenings, songs, and speakers on at-risk cultural heritage and social safety nets.

Nonetheless, the space for Arctic Indigenous actors to present societal insecurity at COP21 did not translate into textual legal and financial commitments to security for the Arctic Citizen. This is not to say that there have not been other significant advances in the recognition of Arctic Indigenous agency and voices. The Permanent Participants of the Arctic Council and scientific research reports like the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment hold testament to this. However, the final text of the Paris Agreement does not make mention of the Arctic region or their insecurities nor do other parallel documents like the Adaptation Fund or the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage from the Effects of Climate Change. While the Arctic Citizen was present and active discursively in Paris, they were not represented in its result.

The Gap between Physical and Textual Spaces at COP21

Paris was a high-level negotiation that established broad strategies for mitigating greenhouse gas emissions and adapting to the consequences, historic emissions have generated through the Paris Agreement. The development of the Paris Agreement since 2015 has focused on creating a practical plan for climate action by answering the question of how to actually limit temperatures to "well below" two degrees; how governments of developed countries will concretely help those on the front lines of a rapidly changing environment; and what breakthrough innovations are needed to transform the global economy to be resilient, equitable, and carbon neutral. While the rules for the Paris Agreement's implementation are set to be finalized by 2018, with the next big climate policy milestone in 2020 when each country will put forward an enhanced national climate plan, the Paris Agreement itself and the roadmap to the rulebook provide a number of mechanisms to address societal security (Darby et al. 2016). These include climate finance, the adaptation fund, and the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage.

Why are the narratives and space for discourses of Arctic Indigenous culture and identity at COP21 not paralleled in the resulting agreement? While there exists an acknowledgement and empowerment of Indigenous actors as knowledge-holders and contributors, current scholarship stops short of analysing the lack of legal and political instruments that might be employed to achieve the societal security advocated specifically by the 'Arctic Citizen.' Current scholarship offers two possibilities for the lack of tangible instruments to support Arctic Indigenous cultures in a changing climate. The first is the "slipperiness" or "softness" of the concept of culture itself, and therefore an inability to effectively secure something as dynamic and amorphous as culture (Forrest 2004). As noted by Scott Forrest at the Northern Research Forum in Yellowknife in 2004:

> "The boundaries of culture are of course permeable and dynamic, which exacerbates the difficulty of "securing" them, particularly through legal protection. Once you define and prescribe what you want to protect, you create artificial permanence and inhibit the natural change that defines a living culture. Living cultures are at once persistent in that the course of the river is relatively unwavering, but at the same time the water moving through it is always in motion. The inherent tension between permanence and dynamic change lies at the heart of placing culture within the framework of security."

Because of this difficulty to articulate the concept of identity into a form where it can be effectively 'secured' through political and legal means, the pursuit of indigenous societal security has often been advanced under the guise of biodiversity, sustainability, and en-

vironmental security. This has occurred by borrowing similar justifications and arguments from the biodiversity discourse, by promoting idealized images of indigenous peoples resource managers, and through strategic alliances between indigenous peoples and environmental NGOs. This grafting of science narratives onto cultural identity to foster political agency is a concept picked up by Michael Bravo in *Voices from the Sea Ice*. As Bravo explores how climate change narratives have shaped notions of Arctic Citizenship, he finds that the vocabulary of ecological risk, which enjoys widespread currency in political discussion about climate change, has constructed an Arctic Citizen that is visible but voiceless (Bravo 2009). He concludes that northern communities have largely embraced this new notion of citizenship in order to monopolize on the agency imbued in regional victims, but that these voices are often masked by the southern produced narratives themselves.

However, when these arguments are graphed onto the proceedings of the UNFCCC and COP21, they fall short of explaining why Arctic society is left insecure. Non-economic assets of society – the shared historic sites and cultural heritage that buttress identity and societal cohesion – are secured in UNFCCC frameworks. For example, UNESCO, the UN organization responsible for coordinating international cooperation in education, science, culture, and communication, serves on the Adaptation Fund Board as a Multilateral Implementing Entity. The Adaptation Fund was created in 2001 (the last time the Conference of the Parties was in Marrakesh) to support adaptation projects in developing countries. It was originally tied to the soon-to-expire Kyoto Protocol, the last big international agreement linked to the UNFCCC that committed parties to binding emission reduction targets. Since its establishment, the Fund has financed $358 million of mostly small-scale projects to help communities' adaptation to the effects of climate change we can no longer avoid (World Bank Ground 2016). Developing countries have largely applauded the Fund as a success, and in particular its direct access structure that allows accredited countries to manage their own projects. Such a structure allows developing countries to have a sense of ownership as the majority share of the Fund's governing board seats. The Adaptation Fund sought $80 million to finance projects already in place ahead of the meeting in Marrakesh, which was fulfilled by European commitments. As a Multilateral Implementing Entity, the culture-based organization is able to serve "vulnerable countries by directly working with them to address their requests and needs, while collaborating and mobilizing the necessary resources and partners for effective local implementation on the ground" (UNESCO 2016).

In addition to UNESCO's participation in the Adaptation Fund, the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage, associated with Climate Change Impacts' work on noneconomic loss and damage, also challenges the slippery argument of culture. In 2013, Parties of the Conference established the Warsaw Mechanism to promote the implementation of approaches to address loss and damage, including the non-economic losses like historic sites, cultural heritage, tradition, and identity (United Nations 2017). In its first two years, the Warsaw Mechanism established a number of expert groups, like that on non-economic losses, that are working to enhance data on and

knowledge of losses associated with the adverse effects of climate change, and identify ways forward for reducing the risk of addressing losses with specific focus on potential impacts within regions. One of the most concrete actions to come out of COP22 in Marrakesh was the approval of a five-year work plan on loss and damage, to begin in 2017 under the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism. Moving forward, this work plan will guide countries in formally addressing topics like slow-onset impacts of climate change, climate-induced migration, and non-economic losses and damage – including culture, historic sites, traditions, and identity (United Nations 2016).

However, none of these internationally-based climate change instruments can be used by Arctic Citizens. While other sub-societal identities are acknowledged within the Paris Agreement and auxiliary documents like the Warsaw International Mechanism, developed and developing societies based on the economic status of their state is the privileged identity scale at UNFCCC negotiations. The term 'Arctic' does not appear in the text of the Paris Agreement, and Indigenous peoples are only acknowledged twice for their particular vulnerabilities, knowledges, and rights, in its preamble and in Article 7.5.[3] Neither of these references come with particular actions; rather, they are merely *acknowledgements.* By contrast, there are 49 references to developing and least developed countries with stronger language. For example, in Article 5, "Support shall be provided to developing country Parties for the implementation of this Article, in accordance with Articles 9, 10 and 11, recognizing that enhanced support for developing country Parties will allow for higher ambition in their actions."

The elusiveness of identity and culture as the foundational concepts upon which societal security rests are general difficulties when addressing insecurities; however, it is clear that non-economic assets and non-tangible losses have been considered in the UNFCCC and while drafting the Paris Agreement. A third explanation may illuminate an important addition to the framework of understanding Arctic societal security at COP21, namely, an explanation based on privileged scales of identity in UNFCCC negotiations and decision-making. The two examples of societal security, and specifically non-economic assets associated with societal identity, use the identity scale of the sovereign state to provide assistance. The Paris Agreement and the UNFCC generally divide the world

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[3]"*Acknowledging* that climate change is a common concern of humankind, Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well as gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity."

"Article 7.5. Parties acknowledge that adaptation action should follow a country-driven, gender-responsive, participatory and fully transparent approach, taking into consideration vulnerable groups, communities and ecosystems, and should be based on and guided by the best available science and, as appropriate, traditional knowledge, knowledge of indigenous peoples and local knowledge systems, with a view to integrating adaptation into relevant socioeconomic and environmental policies and actions, where appropriate."

into developed and developing countries, wherein developed countries provide financial, technical, and political assistance in mitigation, adaptation, and damage efforts in developing states. There is a disadvantage to understanding climate change policy in this way for the societal insecurities of the Arctic Citizens, as it makes invisible the developing communities within developed states, those who are both on the front lines of rapid climate change and are at the periphery of both the political and financial geographies of their countries. Although the effects of climate change know no borders, international climate negotiations have long held an established, inelastic geopolitical map. Since the founding days of the Conference of the Parties, the world cartography of climate policy has been drawn into three blocs: the developed, the developing, and the least developed worlds. The founding document of the COPs, the UNFCCC, proposed at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit and ratified by 194 parties in 1994, called for "common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities" to reduce country emissions" (United Nations 2016). Until COP21 in 2015, developing countries led by China argued that they should not be held to the same limits on emissions as developed countries because of historical emissions by developed countries and their own development needs. Because of historic inequalities and the persistence of extreme poverty in many developing countries, climate justice became tied to allowing developing economies to make a slower transition away from carbon-intensive, cheaper fuels while requiring developed countries to make deeper emission cuts first.

Arctic Societal Security as a Missed Scale

As the Paris Agreement and tangential meetings and negotiations focus on global transformations and vulnerabilities and finances support needs of developing countries, ecologically, socio-economically, and politically vulnerable communities in developed countries like the Arctic become obscured. But the Arctic is warming twice as fast as the rest of the globe from a process known as polar or Arctic amplification (ACIA 2005). And this amplified warming at the pole means that limiting global warming to 2 degrees Celsius will result in a 4 degree increase in the circumpolar north (Mooney and Samenow 2016). Arctic leaders at COP21 were aware of this privileging of developed/developing identity over the Arctic's regional or Indigenous societal identity within the texts. "We keep reminding our respective governments that Inuit, Saami and northern indigenous Peoples should be considered underdeveloped communities," Eegeesiak noted at Arctic Day. "We will be going after the funds that were announced as well" (Kaljur 2015). Nonetheless, in spite of statements like these, the text of the Paris Agreement still makes no tangible guarantees to the Arctic Citizen as a community entirely within developed states. Revisiting the definition of societal security, "the capacity of a society to conserve its specific character in spite of changing conditions and real or virtual threats" (Forrest 2004, 1), the Paris Agreement and UN programs related to COP21 do not provide Arctic society with the financial or technical resources to fulfil this capacity. The opportunities offered by the Adaptation Fund, the Warsaw International

Mechanism, or the Paris Agreement deliver the financial means for societies in developing and least developed countries to preserve their essential characteristics in the face of climate change. The Arctic Citizen, however, is left a space to voice their needs for international agreements and programs to address Arctic societal security, but not any means to address their insecurities.

In the shadow of the US Presidential Election, the 22nd Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) took place in November 2016. More commonly known as COP22, the conference brought country delegations from around the world to Marrakesh, Morocco, in an effort to move humanity forward in curbing global warming. Like COP21, COP22 failed to translate the discourse around Arctic societal insecurities into tangible commitments. There were two Arctic Days at COP22, one held at the Nordic Pavilion on November 12th, and one held at the US Pavilion titled *The Melting Arctic – a glimpse into the future of global climate change*, held as part of their Arctic Council 2015-2017 Chairmanship on November 11th. Both of these events highlighted the challenges of living in a rapidly changing North, though, importantly, neither featured Indigenous representation and neither focused on identity as the organizing concept. Each Arctic Day spoke to the threats global climate change brings to traditional Arctic cultures, historic livelihoods, and safety, with a focus on the physical impacts of climate change on communities. Scientists, policymakers, and researchers spoke about the insecurities climate change is bringing to Arctic communities. And yet, Marrakesh followed in COP21's footsteps in its privileging of state scales of identity over sub-national societies. With no specific legal, financial, or technical assistance from the UN, Arctic Citizens as a sub-national identity still face threats to their survival as a community as the region warms (Wæver 2008, 582).

Providing a space for Arctic Citizens to voice these security threats to society is important, but does not reify Arctic Indigenous society as an independent social agent endowed with the agency to have their sub-state identity as Arctic Citizens, within developed countries, to be acknowledged and protected in the negotiations themselves. This in turn, as argued by this article, leaves the Arctic Citizen unable to 'defend' their identity in the face of climate change through any of the available international climate policy or finance mechanisms. The UN Conference of the Parties Process will continue onward from COP22 long into the future. Delegates from Parties of the Paris Agreement will work to limit future greenhouse gas emissions and to safeguard the least abled amongst humanity to adapt to the already locked-in effects of a warming world. This article provides a foundation for understanding the interactions of societal security and scales of identity at UN climate change negotiations by examining what societal security is for the Arctic Citizen, where the Arctic fits into UN climate change negations, and what the ultimate texts reveal about the Arctic's inclusion in global action on climate change adaptation, mitigation, and loss and damage work. But this survey should serve as just that – an exploration upon which future research can build to understand, analyse, and

ultimately address the gap between societal security rhetoric and climate action at the top of the world.

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Post-colonial governance through securitization?

A narratological analysis of a securitization controversy in contemporary Danish and Greenlandic uranium policy

Rasmus Kjærgaard Rasmussen, Associate Professor, Department of Communication and Arts, Roskilde University

Henrik Merkelsen, Associate Professor, Department of Strategic Communication, Lund University

This article combines the securitization approach with theory of risk and narratological methodology in the analysis of the Danish-Greenlandic government debates about potential uranium exploitation. The authors conclude that the securitization controversy visible at the surface level of policy documents reflects an identity struggle at the deeper narrative level closely related to the understanding of national identity politics. These underlying stakes are brought to the fore when securitization is used as a governance technique.

Introduction

In the last decade, the Arctic region has become an arena for renewed geopolitical and economic interests and activities. Climate change and the prospect of permanently passable Northwest Passage and Northeast Passage have contributed to a renewed interest in the region. This interest has been accentuated by the recent continental shelf controversy among Arctic states, so much so that some scholars talk of a securitization of the Arctic region (cf. Jacobsen and Strandsbjerg this issue; see also Borgerson 2008; 2013). The renewed interest in the Arctic has also been discernible in recent Danish foreign policy strategy (Danish Government 2016a, 2) wherein The Kingdom of Denmark's role as a "major arctic power" is emphasized. However, the revitalized role of the Arctic has simultaneously contributed to new disputes over sovereignty between Denmark and Greenland, not least due to new complexities in shared and independent responsibilities between the Greenlandic and the Danish governments that resulted from the 2009 Self-Government Act (Gad 2014). This new division of jurisdiction implies that while Den-

mark still controls security, defense, and foreign policy[1] (see also Jacobsen and Gad 2017), Greenland's government has taken control over many areas of domestic policy. The most profound change among these authority alterations are those over natural resources, including the power to issue exploration rights and extraction licenses.

In Greenland, future extraction of hydrocarbon and valuable minerals such as rare earth elements (REE) and uranium is envisioned as one of the most feasible paths towards economic growth and independence from Denmark (Naalakkersuisut 2008a; 2010; 2014b, see also Bjørst 2016; Kristensen and Rahbek-Clemmensen 2017). Therefore, lifting the ban on uranium mining and export became especially imperative for the political elite in the years preceding the Self-Government Act, and after intense and protracted public debates, the ban was abolished in 2013. Greenland's newly acquired control of its natural resources and the accentuated potential of uranium mining have created a delicate situation between the two countries where juridical, security, and identity agendas intersect. This is epitomized by the dual-use property of uranium: as a mineral, it pertains to the field of raw materials, which falls under Greenland's jurisdiction; and as an explosive material, it pertains to the field of security and foreign policy, which falls under Denmark's jurisdiction.

The policy positions related to uranium are at the core of what we term a 'securitization controversy' between the two governments. We term the political and legal exchanges between Nuuk and Copenhagen related to uranium a 'controversy' in order to delineate these from the process of securitization proper which by definition ends all negotiations on a given issue. In contrast, the securitization controversy between Denmark and Greenland came to a provisional closure when a formal arrangement between the two countries was reached in 2016 with the *Agreement on security issues pertaining to uranium extraction and export* (Danish Government and Naalakkersuisut 2016). This agreement acknowledges Greenland's full legal right to the uranium as a mineral, while concurrently recognizing the necessity of Denmark's continued authority over the practical implementation of international treaties related to uranium security and non-proliferation. The agreement also stipulates that Greenland's Ministry of Industry, Labour, and Trade must "be heard" in all matters regarding uranium (see Søndergaard 2016).

This article aims to unpack the policy narratives pertinent to extraction and export of uranium articulated by the Danish and the Greenlandic Governments in official documents from the 2008 transition period to Self-Government to the Agreement in 2016. By doing so, the study seeks to explain how the underlying narrative structures in the documents reveal profound conflicts of interests between the two countries. Through the analysis, we argue that the securitization controversy is the manifestation

[1] However, according to §13.2 in The Self-Government Act (2009), Greenland can have foreign affairs responsibility in certain cases: "In matters which exclusively concern Greenland, the Government may authorize Naalakkersuisut to conduct the negotiations, with the cooperation of the [Danish] Foreign Service". See Jacobsen 2015 for a discussion.

of a latent post-colonial identity struggle. The analytical strategy of this article establishes a conceptual framework whereby the Copenhagen School's securitization theory is integrated with a relational theory of risk and the concept of risk games. Methodologically, we connect this framework with a narratological approach. In the analysis, we identify how Danish and Greenlandic Governments establish different types of risks that appear disconnected from each other, but through a deep narratological analysis are connected and constitute a profound conflict involving fundamental aspects of identity and sovereignty. In a concluding section, we discuss the implications of the securitization controversy in terms of the future of Denmark, Greenland, and the relationship between the two.

Analytical strategy

During the past decade, the theory of securitization has opened up new avenues for studying security in International Relations. The theory has been applied in a wide array of empirical contexts, including the renewed geopolitical interest in the Arctic region that has followed the post-Cold War de-securitization of the region (cf. Watson 2013). According to the Copenhagen School, securitization is a speech act that can move certain societal issues away from the normal democratic institutions of political control and into a state of emergency with limited democratic control (Wæver 1995). Being successful with a 'securitization move' depends on a 'securitizing actor' linking an 'existential threat' to a 'referent object' and that this move is accepted as such by an audience (Buzan et al. 1998). Conversely, issues can be subject to 'de-securitization', which according to the Copenhagen School, is the preferred state of affairs insofar as the state of emergency carries with it fundamental challenges to political legitimacy. When de-securitized, the security issue will enter traditional societal arenas and institutions like politics, science, market etc. These arenas open up for debating the issue according to the prevailing institutional logics thereby providing more transparency (Buzan et al. 1998, 206).

The constructivist approach of securitization theory highlights the contingent nature of which issues qualify for being accepted as existential threats (see e.g. Hansen 2011). While some 'facilitating conditions' regarding the speech act, the securitizing actor, and the existential threat are important for a successful securitization, it has been stressed that success ultimately relies on the acceptance by the audience (Buzan et al. 1998). Securitization faces similar audience perception as risk management does. Both rest on a well-known distinction between real risks and perceived risks. Successful management of national security and societal risks depends on the threats in question being understood, or at least accepted, by the public or important constituents (Slovic 1992). In this respect, securitization is nothing but a special case of riskification (see Petersen 2017 for a recent review).

Similar to the Copenhagen School, social theories of risk have pointed to the relational and constructivist nature of risk. According to Hilgartner (1992, 42), "the pro-

cess of constructing a risk object consists of defining an object and linking it to harm. This task is a rhetorical process, performed in texts that are displayed in specialized organisations or in public arenas, and it usually involves building networks of risk objects". In its simplest form, risk involves two objects. Boholm and Corvellec (2011) term the first object the 'object at risk,' which can refer to whatever physical or symbolic entity that represents a value to some actors. In securitization theory, the equivalent concept is the 'referent object'. The second object is termed 'risk object,' and refers to whatever physical or symbolic entity that represents a threat to the object at risk. In securitization theory, this is known as the 'existential threat'.

The main exception to this striking similarity between a relational theory of risk and securitization theory is that securitization involves only a certain kind of risks that can justify governing through extraordinary means. A key difference between securitization and riskification is that in the latter, "audience" is not conceived of as a homogeneous entity. What is an object at risk for one actor may or may not be a risk object for another (Boholm 2009). Such risk controversies are manifold in the everyday practice of risk management and societal regulation. In a security context, they have been observed on the level of macro-securitization (cf. Buzan and Wæver 2009). For instance, in alliances between states where changes in hierarchical ordering of security claims in order to "secure a 'monolithic identity' may be presented as a threat to some other aspect of the group's identity or to a sub-group subsumed under the group" (Watson 2013, 266). The tensions between actors in such relations is what we term a securitization controversy. A securitization controversy is a risk game (Slovic 2001) where the stakes for one or more actors can potentially be elevated to the level of national security. At the level of national security, a risk game resembles what has been termed a 'sovereignty game' (cf. Adler-Nissen and Gammeltoft 2008) insofar that a securitization move always (at least implicitly) involves a sovereignty claim. A securitization controversy is a process that installs a hierarchy of risk agendas of which some have the potential for becoming securitized. Other risk agendas may not have that potential but are nevertheless important to the extent that they can serve to strengthen a securitization move or the opposite, for instance through de-securitization.

Structural narratology: a methodological alternative to discourse analysis

In pointing to securitization controversies as a process that precedes securitization or de-securitization as a final outcome in cases where audiences do no constitute a monolithic identity, we contend that a simple discourse analysis, as proposed by Wæver (1998, 176-78), is the most suitable method. When a monolithic identity cannot be presupposed, it becomes relevant to address how identities are relationally constructed in discourses and which role such constructions have in the controversy. In order to account for the complex nature of what we have termed securitization controversies, we argue that structural narratology offers viable alternative to discourse analysis: First, structural narratology emphasizes the oppositional nature of narrative meaning by as-

suming that conflicts and antagonistic relations are fundamental to signification; second, by presenting a rigorous methodology, structural narratology enhances the possibility for comparison and replication, therefore increasing its overall validity; and third, its focus on relations between specific actantial functions makes it analytically compatible with both securitization theory and relational risk theory.

According to the structuralist tradition on which modern narratology is based, a central distinction is made between surface and deep structure of society understood as semiotic sign systems (cf. Levi-Strauss 1955). This means that all narratives consist of two levels: the syntagmatic relations between signs at the level of discourse and what is said/in which order. By contrast, the deep narratological structure is paradigmatic and constitutes the level at which meaning is generated. Greimas' actantial model (1966) explains how deep narratological structures are central in generating meaning at the surface level of discourse (fig. 1). The model consists of three axes. The first horizontal axis describes the internal level of communication within the narrative whereby a 'sender' (or 'giver') makes an 'object' available to a 'receiver'. For instance, in the traditional fairy tale, the king is the 'sender' that sends the protagonist on a quest to rescue the princess. This is the communication axis. In most narratives, the protagonist is a 'subject' that has a desire for an 'object' (i.e. the protagonist's desire for the princess). This second vertical axis is the desire axis. To complicate matters and for the purpose of creating dramaturgical tension and narrative energy, the third horizontal conflict axis describes how the 'helper' and the 'opponent' relate to the 'subject'. In a fairy tale, the classic villain can take many forms and also so in modern policy narratives which often invoke a greater evil – e.g. globalization or terror – to justify action (see Rasmussen 2017).



Figure 1. Greimas' actantial model (1966)

As the example of classic and modern villains illustrate, the meaning of the narrative depends on the underlying function and not on whether the actual discourse contains a dragon, a wizard, climate change, or terrorism. The purpose of conducting an actantial analysis is to bring the underlying structure of the story to the foreground in order to explain how identities at the surface level are constructed. It is important to stress that the actantial analysis pertains to how meaning is generated within and between texts in intertextual meta-narratives. It refrains from making speculations about an author's intentions, audience reception, and other conditions beyond the narrative. Thus, the ques-

tion of audience becomes an intra-textual part of the narrative in the form of an 'implied' or 'model' reader (Eco 1979). This does not render the empirical audiences irrelevant; rather, it simply points to how these extra-textual audiences are already institutionalized into certain forms of representations, e.g. other policy documents or media accounts that constitute overarching societal narratives.

While initially drawing on a distinction between manifest and latent (cf. Greimas 1971), the ontological foundation of structuralism and structuralist narratology have been subject to profound criticism (e.g. Derrida 1966). In post-structuralist epistemology, the notion of (objectivistic) deep structures has been abandoned. We agree with much of the post-structuralist criticism. Yet, we argue that it is possible to employ the structuralist methodology with the purpose of explicating the transformational process whereby human actors and objects are constructed in narratives without making inferences concerning the contested ontological status of underlying structures. Thus, we employ this methodology in terms of its ability to explain phenomena that are not immediately observable in a way similar to how psychological constructs are used. Thus, the key benefit of structural narratology is its ability to provide explanations at a general level through a simple and replicable methodology.

Operationalization: using the policy narratives as sources of securitization

Methodologically our study is based on a combination of the relational model of risk and the actantial model. Empirically we analyze policy documents. Policy documents exhibit clear narrative traits (Stone 2002) and within the broad field of policy analysis a narratological approach has gradually evolved (Jones and McBeth 2010). Following the 'linguistic turn' in security studies, (Payne 2014) narrative analyses of foreign policy-making have become more common (e.g. Krebs 2015; Kubiak 2014). We have chosen policy documents over other types of texts because of their status as 'authoritative' or 'programmatic' texts (Kuhn 2008, Clarke 2005, Clegg et al. 2006). In a political context this means that they serve to bind actors and other texts to a degree that exceeds the performativity of other types of speech acts. Following this, we understand the practice of politics as being exclusively dependent upon documents (Latour 1988; Shore and Wright 1997; Riles 2006; Law and Singleton 2014).

Our initial analysis of the policy documents, listed below, is purely descriptive and operates on the surface (discourse) level. We use the relational model of risk to identify the main conflicts between the securitization vis-à-vis de-securitization moves employed by the Danish and Greenlandic governments. When applying the model to a security context it is possible to situate the object at risk (or the referent object) as the desired *object* in the actantial model. Conversely, the risk object (or existential threat) has its equivalent in the *opponent*. Thus, in the second step of our analysis, we identify narratives and counter-narratives, which together account for the opposing value preferences that underlie the controversy.

Our empirical material consists of a large compendium of policy documents and strategies from 2008 through 2016 published by the Danish and the Greenlandic governments where we have sampled 10 specific documents for the analysis. Here, our inclusion criteria have been the policy documents and strategies that explicitly deal with Denmark's and Greenland's future foreign policy and/or raw materials, specifically uranium (and REE). In addition, we have included statements on independence and/or uranium made by Danish and Greenlandic politicians in the press during the period. We have also traced the issues back to parliamentary debates and drawn on written material in the form of 'Questions for a Cabinet Minister' – so-called 'Section 20 questions' (see Bibliography Section B).

Analysis

In the policy documents, we observe how the status of the so-called zero-tolerance policy on uranium exploitation plays an important role. There has been a commonly shared understanding in both countries that a ban on uranium exploitation exists, a ban that allegedly originates from a Danish parliamentary decision in the late 1980s (see Vestergaard and Thomasen 2015). In the following section, we show how the Government of Greenland articulates this ban as a de-securitization move that at the deep narrative level draws on a latent identity conflict involving the two countries' post-colonial status.

The securitizing controversy over uranium: conflicts at the surface level of discourse

The Greenlandic Perspective: uranium as the object at risk

The importance of uranium in the Greenlandic narrative about its future cannot be underestimated. In 2008, two years before the responsibility over raw materials and minerals was officially transferred, the Home Rule of Greenland commissioned the *Uranium Report vol. 1* (Naalakkersuisut 2008) on the potentials – and risks – related to uranium exploitation. The report paints a rosy picture of uranium as a prerequisite of economic growth; it is based on a high world market price on uranium. Rhetorically, it projects a scenario for "a uranium industry in Greenland" by drawing on the existing successful uranium industry in Saskatchewan, Canada. This is done in order to "set potential uranium extraction in relation to the Home Rule's mineral strategy and the described goals for the development of the raw material sector to a viable business which can contribute to economic development and employment" (Naalakkersuisut, 2008, 5-6). In other words: uranium is enacted as *the* future of Greenland (Michael 2016). The linkage between welfare and uranium is also present in a later report by the Tax and Welfare Commission of 2010 which emphasizes future revenues (Naalakkersuisut 2010). However, the 2008-report also tells another more complex story of the history of the Realm's preceding governance of uranium, focusing on how the so-called zero-tolerance policy was engendered by the Danish State. This led the authors of the report

to the conclusion that "[i]t will not be possible to begin uranium exploration or extraction before a new political decision is made" (Naalakkersuisut 2008, 3). This decision was made in 2013, when the zero-tolerance policy was lifted by the Inatsisartut.

While Danish reports and policy papers in this period tend to downplay, or even silence, the significance of the uranium issue, Greenlandic policy papers and strategies articulate the conflict very clearly. The conflict is most visible in an advisory opinion report (a so-called 'responsum') commissioned by the Home Rule and written by former professor of International Law Ole Spiermann (Spiermann 2014).[2] In this report, the juridical implications of the transference of jurisdiction concerning raw materials are outlined. While emphasizing the Greenlandic perspective, the report offers an analysis of the focal points of conflicts by referring to the Danish interests. As such the report serves as an important repertoire of legal arguments which are to be found in the ensuing policy documents from the Greenlandic government. One of the key documents in this period is the 120-page report titled, *Greenland's Oil and Mineral Strategy 2014-2018* (Naalakkersuisut 2014a; 2014c). To stress its societal importance, this report was also published and distributed in a short, popularized version to a wider audience (Naalakkersuisut 2014b). Here, the benefits of mineral extraction are presented under headlines like "Raw materials create wealth" and "Raw materials contribute to our society with (…) tax revenues (…) salaries to workers (…) company profits" (Naalakkersuisut 2014b, 8). It concludes that mining is "For the benefit of Greenland" – which incidentally is also the title of an independent report on sustainable development in Greenland (see Ilisimatusarfik, Københavns Universitet 2014).

Uranium mining is presented as a safe and unproblematic solution to independent economic development. In order to counter the popular narrative of the dangers of mining, Canada and Australia are enrolled as archetypical examples of a safe uranium export industry. The report does, however, point to a potential conflict when stating that "Greenland has the right to give exploration and utilization licenses, but if export is of a kind which can have consequences for foreign, defense and security policy, Denmark must be involved" (Naalakkersuisut 2014b, 14). The structure of this argument follows Spiermann's strong emphasis on Greenland's full *legal* right to the authority over its natural resources (Spiermann 2014).

By applying the relational risk theory, we can extract a simple figuration that captures the essence of how the Greenlandic government establishes its risk narrative concerning uranium at the surface level:

economic growth	zero-tolerance policy
object-at-risk	risk-object

[2] Apart from being visible in policy papers the same patterns of conflict are present in contemporary Danish and Greenlandic parliamentary debates as pointed out by a recently published master's thesis – see Hansen 2016.

While it has been observed that the so-called zero-tolerance policy never actually existed (Vestergaard and Thomasen 2015), by treating it as a policy, the Greenlandic government has the advantage of being able to change the policy in accordance with its aspirations of becoming economically self-sustaining. As a total ban on uranium renders an explicit security policy pertaining to its dual use superfluous, lifting the ban has no security implications per se. Thus, it can take place within the domain of 'normal' politics. Accordingly, the 2013 bill emphasizes that future uranium extraction should take into account public health, nature, and the environment. It also stresses that "extraction and export of uranium can be done in full compliance with international rules and with a country's overall foreign and security policy interests" (Naalakkersuisut 2013). Thus, the passing of the bill is a strong de-securitization move from the Greenlandic government. Although the 2014 strategy states that Denmark must be involved *if* export can have consequences for foreign, defense, and security policy, the bill argues that this is not a problem. By this move, the Greenlandic government successfully replaces the zero-tolerance policy as a risk-object with the potential national security aspects that are presented as a simple matter of complying with international regulations.

The Danish Perspective: uranium as the risk object

The Uranium Report Vol. 1-document is so successful in establishing the zero-tolerance narrative and the idea of the need of a new political decision that uranium is acknowledged as a common policy issue by shifting Greenlandic and Danish administrations. This is evidenced by the Realm's 2011 joint *Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020* in the section on the potential exploitation of "Critical metals and rare earth elements and deposits in Greenland" where it is stated that "Greenland currently has zero-tolerance policy on uranium and thorium." (Governments of Denmark, Greenland and the Faeroe Islands 2011, 28). But most pertinent, the successful establishment of uranium as a policy field in need of a new decision happens in 2012 when this debate is institutionalized in a joint Danish-Greenlandic intra-governmental working group on "the consequences of lifting the zero-tolerance policy" and their subsequent report from 2013 (Danish Government Naalakkersuisut 2013). The political and governmental complexities governing uranium's dual use is aptly captured in its summary: "The need for a clarification [of the zero-tolerance policy] is due to the fact that Greenland's self-government took over responsibility of the raw material field as of 1st of January 2010 and thus has the legislative and executive power over this field and that export of uranium has foreign, defense and security political implications" (ibid., 5).

The report confirms the narrative of the zero-tolerance policy as a historical fact. It also establishes a central policy problem in that the zero-tolerance policy becomes a key element in a sovereignty game. In a post-colonial context, this means the 'hierarchization' of "three priorities: legal self-government, economic self-sufficiency and aboriginal cultural identity" (Gad 2014, 7). The report emphasizes the completion between the two first priorities: who has the final word in controlling the riches of the underground, and thus the territory, of Greenland? By de-securitizing uranium as a

peaceful energy source (and potential source of welfare), Greenland seeks to minimize Danish influence. By pointing to the security implications of its dual use, Denmark rebuffs Greenland's de-securitization move. However, at the same time Denmark is keen on not going in the opposite direction since a successful securitization move would end the game. Such a move would stand in stark contrast to the newly transfer of sovereignty to the self-government of Greenland. This non-confrontational stance is stressed by statements made in January 2014 by then Danish Prime Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt: "It is clear that uranium is a special material, and therefore we should have a cooperation agreement in this area" (Ritzau 2014). However, a securitization-like move emerged when the Danish Parliament adopted the Great Scale Act ('storskalaloven'). Here the Ministry of Justice stated that rare earth materials "can potentially raise questions related to foreign-, defense- and security policy" (Ministry of Justice 2014) in response to a parliamentary question from Greenlandic MP Sara Olsvig (Olsvig 2014).

From 2014 to 2016, the security issue of uranium was tackled at the bureaucratic level by the Danish Government. For instance, the 2016 security trend analysis published by the Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS) stated that "[towards 2030] China will still be interested in extraction of raw materials in the Arctic, including Greenland" (DDIS, 2016, 10). This echoes a general securitization narrative of the Arctic (e.g. Bamford 2015), specifically the supply security of REE materials and uranium narrative prevalent around 2010-2014 (e.g. Boersma and Foley 2014). At the higher governmental levels pertaining to Denmark's foreign policy, the issue of uranium is absent. This is the case in the comprehensive foreign policy review published by the Danish Government – the so-called Taksøe Report (Danish Government 2016a; 2016b). While the issue of uranium may be deemed an unimportant detail in Denmark's grand strategy for its foreign relations, the Arctic is given weight as part of The Kingdom's security priorities. And The Kingdom's status as an Arctic great power is emphasized when the report states "we must take advantage of our position as a major Arctic power" (Danish Government 2016b, 13). To give muscle to Denmark as a heavy-weight champion in international politics, 'The Kingdom' gives Denmark the opportunity to present the state as among the world's 12th largest territories and the 3rd largest within NATO, after the US and Canada (Danish Government 2016a, 2).[3] In this way, the report uses 'The Kingdom' when this is opportune to promote *Denmark's* foreign political ambitions.

By applying the relational risk theory, we can extract a hierarchy between two simple figurations that capture the essence of how the Danish government establishes its risk narrative. At the highest institutional level, the narrative silences the uranium in favor of emphasizing the importance of the Arctic region in general:

[3] Such interpretation is corroborated by statements made by the former Danish foreign minister in an interview given in 2011. Here Martin Lidegaard stated that "We have a greater presence in Beijing and Washington and Berlin because of Greenland. That's what makes Danish foreign policy unique" (Breum 2015, 344).

Arctic Great Power	Competing Arctic Great Powers
object-at-risk	risk-object

It is only at the lower institutional levels in the Danish administration that the securitization controversy is played out. Here, the Danish Government is careful not to counter the Greenlandic de-securitization move with a decision that overrules the Greenlandic annulment of the zero-tolerance policy. Yet, it is clear that the annulment is perceived as a problem and that in the Danish narrative uranium is treated as a risk-object:

National security	Uranium as dual-use material
Object-at-risk	risk-object

It is interesting to observe how the two risk figurations, while clearly connected in a hierarchical order, thematically remain disconnected. Denmark's status as an Arctic great power appears not to be threatened by the rather insignificant securitization controversy concerning uranium.

The identity struggle: latent conflicts in Greenland's and Denmark's post-colonial narratives

The analysis of the narratives thus far reflects what can be achieved through a simple discourse analysis (cf. Wæver 1998). At surface level, the narrative shows the basic configuration of the securitization controversy. It provides answers to questions such as: which are the competing risk constructions, and what is the hierarchy between them? The analysis also points to some peculiar moves in the struggle that are difficult to analyze at the surface level of the narratives. New questions arise: what exactly is the thematic relation between the two risk figurations in Denmark's narrative? What is the function of uranium in the two countries' narratives, and why does it become a point of controversy? In order to answer these questions, the analysis must take into account the deep structure of the narrative at the level of the latent actants and functions.

The Greenlandic deep narrative: Denmark as a colonial power

From a securitization perspective, Greenland's government is the first actor to make a clear de-securitization move. At the backdrop of the 2010 transfer of jurisdiction over raw materials in the Greenlandic underground, the Nalakkersuisut presented a simple narrative with a happy ending: In the Greenlandic interpretation of this jurisdictional transfer, Denmark as an actant has been erased from the story[4]. The story simply consists of a *subject* (Greenland) and a desired object (full control over uranium extraction) without any obstructing *opponent*.

[4] Gad (2014, 17) makes a similar observation when pointing to how "communicating with the EU, Greenland also envisions sovereign equality by photo-shopping Denmark out of the picture".



Figure 2. The simple Greenlandic story: Denmark erased from the narrative

This contrasts with the pre-self-government narrative imposed by Denmark. In this, Denmark was an ambiguous actant in the sense of relieving Greenland from the economic and bureaucratic burdens of being an independent state while at the same time imposing limitations on its sovereignty. That is, at the deep narrative level, Denmark has been the *sender* (or giver), a *helper* and an *opponent*. As a *giver,* Denmark has generously supported Greenland's fragile economy. As a *helper,* Denmark has assisted Greenland with overcoming the dangers mainly stemming from self-inflicted problems, which in this (Danish) narrative makes Greenland its own worst enemy. As *opponent,* Denmark has taken the role of the responsible parent that imposes some restrictions on the freedom of a disorderly child in order to protect it from its own failures. This grand narrative, we argue, bears all the traits of the form of power inflicted by a colonial ideology (cf. Osterhammel 1997. See also Rud 2016 for a discussion on the positions on Denmark as colonial power in Greenland). While Denmark is careful not to reproduce this paternalism in official documents, it is articulated in many statements made by Danish People's Party's spokesman for foreign and Greenlandic affairs, Søren Espersen. His proclamations like "[r]ather than ranting and raving, it would be better if Greenland took care of its own problems" (Kristiansen 2016) are emblematic of the colonial narrative of the "ungrateful child". In this paternalistic role, Denmark has been an antagonistic actant which has prevented Greenland from realizing its desired object of independence (Breum 2011; Gad 2016). A central aspect of legitimizing this role has been how the grand narrative about the Danish-Greenlandic relationship has installed Greenland as the key *opponent* in its own 'tragic' story.

In this respect, the post-self-government narrative established by the Greenlandic government is a successful counter-narrative. It is possible to write Denmark as an *opponent* out of the narrative. And even if this narrative may appear naïve and too optimistic, it places Denmark in a serious dilemma. By accepting Greenland's new narrative move, the Danish government loses influence as an Arctic great power; by rejecting the narrative, Denmark makes a clear signal that despite the transfer of authority to the Greenlandic Government, the Danish Government as the old colonial power still pulls the strings. The Greenlandic narrative clearly presents uranium as the solution to achieving economic independence. By blocking this road to independence, the Danish Government faces the risk of being perceived as a colonial power that is desperately seeking to maintain its colony in a relationship of dependency and subordination. At the deep narrative level, the Greenlandic counter-narrative cannot erase the Danish gov-

ernment entirely from the story, but it effectively exposes the hypocrisy of the colonial master plot in the Danish pre-self-government narrative. Thus, if the Danish Government should seek to re-enter the story by securitizing the extraction of uranium, the only actantial role available will be that of the *opponent*. The era of being an ambiguous actant is over.

This overreaching counter-narrative is not explicit in the policy documents themselves, but it is abundantly present in the socio-cultural formation of statements given by Greenlandic politicians in the press. Here, the connection between independence and uranium in the Greenlandic contemporary discourse was articulated by former Greenlandic Premier Aleqa Hammond before the election in the autumn of 2013, stating her goal as independence "within my lifetime" (see Breum 2015, 24) preceded shortly after by Naalakkersuisut lifting the ban on uranium mining the 24th of October. Less than year later in early 2014, Hammond's symbolic statement was followed by the establishment of the commission to investigate Greenland's colonial past.

The Danish deep narrative: Greenland as a means for geopolitical power

In our analysis, we observed how Greenland is absent from the contemporary Danish narrative and its grand strategy for foreign policy. This absence is clear in the 2016 strategy whitepaper on *Danish Diplomacy and Defence in Times of Change. A Review of Denmark's Foreign and Security Policy,* also known as the Taksøe-report. Here it is stated that "The Kingdom of Denmark is a major Arctic power as well as a small European nation" (Danish Government 2016b, 5), while effectively toning down the fact that the only reason the Kingdom is an Arctic power is because of Greenland and that Greenland with its recent status of self-governance is the actual power.

It is noticeable that while the Arctic is mentioned more than 50 times in the report, Greenland is only mentioned 32 times. It is also worth drawing attention to the context in which Greenland is mentioned. Most references to Greenland specifically mention "the *people* of Greenland" (our italics). When referring to the territory, the report is keen on making an explicit connection to 'The Kingdom' rather than to Greenland. Thus, the report (2016b, 13) states that: "[w]e must take advantage of our position as a major Arctic power to influence developments in the Arctic to the benefit of the Kingdom of Denmark, the region and the peoples of Greenland and the Faroe Islands". The story presents Denmark as a *subject* which is almost synonymous with 'The Kingdom' in its relation to the position as an Arctic great power (the desired object). In this narrative, Greenland and its aspirations for the future is both silenced and subordinated to the Danish master plot. In this narrative, the old colonial possessions are important only to the extent that they can provide Denmark with geopolitical influence.



Figure 3. The Danish aspiration as a great Arctic power

While the two Danish risk narratives remain thematically detached at the surface level of the policy documents, a report from the Danish security and intelligence service makes an explicit link to "China" and "mining" as a potential threat to Danish interests in the Arctic region: "Due to close ties between Chinese raw materials companies and the Chinese political system, major investments in Greenland face a certain level of risks as large-scale investments impact significantly on small economies such as the one in Greenland. Therefore, investments in strategic resources are potentially prone to political interference and pressure" (DDIS 2015, 34).

But how does China become a threat to Danish foreign policy goals? We argue that the key to this riddle lies in the experience Denmark has with "major investments in Greenland" and the benefits of its "impact" in terms of "political interference and pressure". By replacing "China" with "Denmark" in the quote, it becomes clear that the threat is China's potential for assuming the *giver* and the *helper* role in the Greenlandic narrative. This would effectively write Denmark out of the narrative, and in turn the status of being an Arctic great power.



Figure 4. Reversing the post-colonial roles: from helper to opponent

The deep narrative structure in the intelligence report reflects how the foundation for the securitization controversy is to be found in the conflict between the Greenlandic and the Danish narratives. China is an *opponent* in the Danish narrative because it is a potential *helper* in the Greenlandic narrative. The way the grand narrative from colonial Denmark

represents Greenland as its own worst enemy may serve to legitimize (at least domestically) the paternalism that is implicit in the intelligence report. However, we argue that the grand narrative creates a blind spot concerning the obvious hypocrisy manifested in the report. It is obvious that China is a threat to Denmark's position as an Arctic great power, but it is less obvious that this is a threat to Greenland's aspirations for future independence.

Discussion and conclusion

The final official resolution of the uranium struggle was reached in 2016 by the joint adoption of the *Agreement between the Danish Government and Naalakkersuisut regarding the foreign and security political issues pertaining to extraction and export of uranium and other radioactive materials in Greenland* (Danish Government Naalakkersuisut 2016). In this agreement, Greenland reiterated its sovereignty in regard to issuing licensees; but, Copenhagen retains the responsibility for controlling export vis-á-vis international uranium safeguard regimes. While this agreement marks a provisional closure, it cannot be seen as the end of the securitization controversy. It appears to be a pragmatic, albeit temporary, solution to a fundamental conflict of interests. By not making an ultimate decision, both parties can benefit from working together even though they don't share the same long-term goals. Denmark can benefit from Greenland as a means to realize its foreign policy ambitions and Greenland can benefit from Denmark as a means to realizing its ambitions of independence. The question that now remains is whether Denmark is actually helping Greenland.

Our analysis shows that the aspiration of becoming an Arctic great power is an important part of Danish foreign policy. But it is also an aspiration that shares many traits with the traditional mindset of a colonial power. Our analysis of the specific securitization controversy concerning uranium is just one of many examples of how the colonial mindset collides with Greenland's aspirations for independence. By repeatedly pointing to a potential securitizing move, the Danish government establishes a legitimate platform for maintaining some control in Greenland. Yet, when making this latent threat, Denmark is balancing on a knife-edge since it threatens to hollow out the self-governance in Greenland and unleashes a public out-cry amongst political elite in Greenland. This was visible in the mishaps of late 2016 regarding the abandoned military base, Grønnedal. Here, Chinese company General Nice Industries Ltd. made a bid to take over the base, approved by Naalakkersuisut. In the last minute, the Danish Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen rejected the Chinese bid and let Denmark's defense take over responsibility for "reopening" the closed base at a low maintenance level. No explanation was given as to why the Chinese company was rejected, but speculations were made by a leading observer that strategic national interests were at the heart of the decision (Breum 2016).

Securitization is a tempting solution to the paradox faced by Denmark in its relationship with Greenland. In the long run, both countries cannot assist each other in

their conflicting ambitions. Paving the way for Greenland's future independence will be the end of Denmark's status as an Arctic great power. Yet, as Gad (2016) has argued, to avoid a hasty Greenlandic exit of the Danish Realm, Denmark must do anything in its power to accommodate Nuuk's wishes, including more formal moves towards independence and a revision of the Danish Constitution. We argue that securitization is a problematic solution for maintaining Danish control over a joint Danish-Greenlandic foreign policy as it bears the risk of being de-masked as a new face of colonialism. In the securitization controversy of uranium, Denmark cleverly avoided showing this face, gently assisted by Greenland's initial desecuritization move. When Denmark shows this face, however, it nurtures Greenland's ambitions for independence.

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What kind of nation state will Greenland be? Securitization theory as a strategy for analyzing identity politics

Ulrik Pram Gad,[1] Associate Professor of Arctic Culture and Politics, Aalborg University, Denmark

Arctic geopolitics is a moving target - and Greenland, determined to emerge as a sovereign nation state, is a particularly dynamic case. The choices currently made in language policy about how to prioritize the Greenlandic, Danish, and English languages will put Greenland on very different routes towards and beyond independence. The article modifies the analytical strategy prescribed by Copenhagen School Securitization Theory to produce a nuanced picture of national identity politics, the tensions involved, and scenarios for the future.

Greenland might be an enormous island, but it is also a people of only 56,000 persons. As such, it will be in need of partners and allies in most of the fields in which a modern nation state and welfare society engages: goods ranging from foodstuff to industrial machines, services ranging from education to military alliances, and human resources in most specialized trades. Given the way in which current global upheavals in both climate, power, and commerce change Greenland's position on the globe, a sovereign Greenlandic state will not be acting in a vacuum when choosing where to shift its dependencies. Nevertheless, a prognosis of Greenland's future maneuvering in Arctic and international politics must take as its point of departure the way in which Greenland envisions its core identity. Independence, according to Greenlandic identity discourse, is meant to allow the

[1] I am grateful for comments on an early version of this paper from Iben Bjørnsson, Martin Breum, Danita Burke, Naja Graugaard, Victoria Hermann, Marc Jacobsen, Uffe Jakobsen, Lars Jensen, Jon Rahbek-Clemmensen, and an anonymous reviewer for *Politik*. The basic arguments of this article - both concerning analytical strategy and Greenlandic national identity - hark back to my master's thesis analysing the 2002 Greenlandic debates on language, available as Gad (2005). The central conclusions of that part of the empirical analysis were published in English in (Gad 2009a), and the acknowledgments extended in Gad (2005, fn. 1) still apply. A more detailed version of the 2016 empirical analysis presented in this paper is available in Danish in Gad (forthcoming).

unfolding of Greenland's true self, free from colonial domination. However, what can this self-identity tell us about the course of a future Greenlandic state?

Decades of philosophical, historical, sociological, and anthropological research into nationalism has taught us that even if cultural and political similarities and differences might be coalescing, national *identity* does not exist (Fink 1991). Only national *identification* exists (Brubaker and Cooper 2000, 14ff; Hall 1996, 2) as a re-iterative, Janus-faced process: 'We' identify with characteristics and ideals which each of 'Us' believe our compatriots to share - while defining ourselves in contrast to traits and ideals we believe characterize 'Them'; others, who are not 'Us'. However, rarely do we agree on the specifics of our identity nor on what differentiates ‘Us’ from ‘Them’. Even if ethnographers, scholarly and lay, have produced detailed accounts of 'Eskimo culture' and 'Greenlandic political culture' with no consensus, the future course of Greenland is determined by a political negotiation of 'who we are' and how to realize the ideal. Current debates about language policy are, at the core, about 'whom we should be.’ The choices made in these negotiations about how to prioritize the Greenlandic, Danish, and English languages will put Greenland on very different routes towards and beyond independence.

Empirically, this article shows how a future sovereign Greenlandic state will set out to be a democratic welfare state. But it also shows how it will face internal struggles over the character of its democracy and society: whether it will be a linguistically exclusive community risking its character as a Nordic welfare society, or if it will be an inclusive community reneging its cultural identity. In providing this analysis, the article demonstrates how one may appropriate the analytical strategy prescribed by Copenhagen School Securitization Theory (hereafter CSST) to produce a nuanced picture of national identity politics. The focus of the analysis is on public and political debates on language policy, since both Greenlanders and scholars agree that the command of *kalaallisut* [the Greenlandic language] has for more than a century been core to discussions about what constitutes Greenlandic identity (Thomsen 1996, 270; Sørensen 1994, 108; Sejersen 1999, 126ff; Langgård 2002, 77). After introducing a few basic elements of how nation, state, language, and identity relate - in theory and in Greenland - the article offers an approach to modify the CSST apparatus for analyzing identity politics. The article then moves on to analyze three pairs of threat narratives present in the Greenlandic debate on language: Two threats to democracy; two threats of exclusion, continuing to take aim at the overall evolution of Greenlandic society; and, finally, two radically different ways of articulating the English language in order to escape the dilemmas and tensions produced in the bilateral relation between Greenland/Denmark. The article concludes by formulating three scenarios for how a potential sovereign Greenlandic nation state could constitute itself linguistically - prioritizing Greenlandic, Danish, or English - and how the linguistic constitution would influence the international relations in the Arctic region.

Nation, state, language, and identity in theory and in Greenland

In the Arctic, both the modern state and the concept of nation arrived rather late - and white colonizers imported both (Dahl 2016; Thuesen 1988). In Greenland, the notion of sharing an identity, whether national or ethnic, as Greenlanders was the result of meeting *qallunaat* [white people]. Since Denmark gradually became capable of enforcing the monopoly it granted itself on trading in Greenland, Danes became *the* qallunaat in relation to whom Greenlanders defined their identity (Sørensen 1994, 109; Dorais 1996, 29). As self-appointed *naalagaat* [those who decide over others], Danes came to take up the position of the radical other of Greenland: the other which at once constituted and compromised Greenlandic identity (cf. Žižek 1992, 197; Wæver 1994, 18). Upon their arrival, the Danes decided that vis-à-vis Greenlanders, difference needed to be upheld. Greenlanders would be best off by sticking to hunting seal (and the Danish fur trade would benefit too). Meanwhile, the nation building process, which took place during the 19th Century in a number of European countries, was copy-pasted in Greenland with surprisingly little delay, and with an important linguistic twist compared to other colonial societies. According to Danish theologian N.F S. Grundtvig, national elevation (the only true way to relate to God) demanded the education of the common man in his own language. In Greenland, this meant the education of Greenlanders as catechists, capable of receiving education via the Danish language, in order to teach both the gospel and general enlightenment in Greenlandic to their compatriots along the coast. This new class of hybrids became parties to the early 1900 *kalaaliussuseq*-debate [on what constituted Greenlandic identity] conducted in the Greenlandic newspapers. Here, the traditional elite of *piniartorsuit* [great hunters] argued (agreeing with the Danes) that being expert sealers was what distinguished Greenlanders. In the end, however, the new intellectual class (the catechists) was included in national identity; fluency in the language of the land became accepted as a central criterion for being Greenlandic.[2] A century later, command of the two languages is still central "in this ethno-political universe [where] Greenlandicness and Danishness are experienced and used as each other's negation" (Sørensen 1991, 48; my translation.).

Identity does not pre-exist by itself. Rather it has to be produced and reproduced in an ongoing negotiation. Each idea of someone being identical is the result of a contingent process in which some traits are prioritized over others; i.e., a political process. In the politics of identity production, two mechanisms work in tandem: reification and securitization. You point out something as threatened and thereby affirm and solidify the existence of this something in the first place (Wæver 1994; Buzan et al. 1998, ch. 6). The basic story told in Greenlandic identity discourse is one that takes its point of departure in noting how Danes caused the decline of original Inuit culture. Even if a Greenlandic elite cheered,[3] 'development' and 'modernization' are essentially apprehended as 'Danish'. Hence, in scholarly analyses as well as in public debates in both Greenland and Denmark,

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[2] For the details and effect of the *kalaaliussuseq* debate, cf. Petterson (2014); Langgård (2003).

[3] Like elites elsewhere in the later stages of colonial projects, cf. Manniche (2003).

the relation between modernization and Greenlandization is often presented as a dichotomous choice: Either you do the one, or you do the other. This conclusion is apparent if one focuses on language. Part of integration into the Danish state in 1953 was the prioritization of the Danish to secure modernization. Integral to the introduction of home rule in 1979 was giving priority to Greenlandic.

In effect, the result was a dual track primary education system, presenting parents and teachers at particularly urban schools with the choice of putting children in Greenlandic or Danish classes. Often teachers and parents, Greenlandic or mixed Danish/Greenlandic couples, prioritized the Danish language with a view to securing their children the best options for further education. In smaller settlements, the language of instruction depended on what teachers were available. In the 50's and 60's, teachers mainly consisted of Danes; currently, teachers are mostly Greenlanders. No reliable statistics exist on the language capabilities of the Greenlandic population, but, roughly speaking, the majority of the population (particularly outside the capital, Nuuk) is by now functionally monolingual Greenlandic speakers, with a large minority more or less bilingual and a rather small, but mostly well-educated minority speaking Danish but not Greenlandic (Arbejdsgruppen 2002, 30; Gad 2005). English competencies more or less follow Danish competencies and the general level of education.

This predicament sits uneasy with the ideal, imported from Denmark, that the best way to be part of the world involves having your own culturally homogenous nation state (Gad 2016). The point of departure to demand Greenlandization remains the decline of an original Inuit culture faced with Danish colonization. But no one wants to return to pre-colonial hunting culture. Rather, Greenlandic national identity discourse involves the standard nationalist idea that resurrecting the fallen, golden past in the future can only conclude in the form of a nation state, and this involves development and modernization. The Greenlandization narrative needs to articulate symbolic elements of Inuit culture - particularly language - to elements of modernity: formalized education, outboard motors, and the internet. Greenlandization means modernization performed in Greenlandic rather than in Danish. However, picking the right elements of tradition and modernization is fraught with dilemmas and tensions. Particularly after securing Danish acceptance of the formal right to secession in 2009, political debates in Greenland have turned to ways of finding alternative sources of revenue to escape dependence on the annual 'block grant' from Denmark. After the hype of a mining adventure was academically debunked (Rosing et al. 2014), whether politically accepted in Nuuk or not, an oil bonanza is left as the only credible shortcut to a self-supporting economy. However, the intensified ambition to shift Greenlandic identity politics away from focusing solely on the bilateral relation to Denmark has involved a re-articulation of some of the dilemmas and tensions. When analyzing both the shift and the underlying dilemmas and tensions, Copenhagen School securitization theory offers valuable tools.

Reading identity politics as threats and defense

The authoritative Copenhagen School definition of a securitization (Wæver 1995; Buzan et al. 1998; cf. Jacobsen and Herrmann this issue) involves the participation of two distinct actors. A securitizing agent performs a 'securitizing move,' a statement rhetorically constructing an existential threat to a valued referent-object while advocating an extraordinary measure to avert the threat. And a relevant audience accepts that this extraordinary measure may be adopted. If both elements, move and accept, are present, a successful 'textbook' securitization has occurred and the social situation of the issue at hand has changed from a politicized or even a non-politicized to a securitized one. However, the basic proposition of this article is that focusing only on successful securitizations is an extravagance we should not allow ourselves. Of course, the Copenhagen School is correct in stating that 'security' constitutes a realm both exclusive and explosive, hence, it is important to know how any specific subject has indeed come to be securitized. We can learn more from studying unsuccessful or partial securitizations. First, less-than-successful securitizing moves provide important information about how to avoid full securitization, not least because even less-than-successful securitizations may spark security dynamics (Wæver 2009b). Second, the close relation between security and identity (Wæver 1994; Buzan et al. 1998, ch. 6) means that the rhetorical figure at the core of a securitizing move may serve as a valuable lens for studying political identity negotiations. If done in a structured way, this may feed into analyses of not just security dynamics but also the dynamics and results coming out of identity politics - i.e., the political construction of identities. In other words: by listening to what is pointed out as threats to what, we may learn what is important to an identity in question. By looking at how threats and measures to their aversion are constructed in relation to valued referent-objects, we can learn about how identities evolve.

In contrast to an 'orthodox' implementation of Copenhagen School analytical strategy, this article makes three amendments. First, we relax the demand that threats need to be existential and measures extraordinary. Both thresholds, extraordinary and existential, are conceptually challenging to define and have proven problematic to establish in empirical analyses.[4] Second, we observe the sequences of measures-threats-referent-objects as narratives. In a formal sense, measures have the same relation to threats as threats

[4] The distinction between existential and 'non-existential' threats very much depends on the definition of the referent-object: Any threat can be taken as existential in relation to a referent-object specified in the 'right' way. A malaria mosquito may credibly be pointed out as an existential threat to the life of a human being. A regular mosquito could be posed as an existential threat to the wellbeing of a human being. A swarm of mosquitos may pose an existential threat to the possibility of enjoying spectacular Greenlandic nature - and to the tourism business. And because of the paradoxical character of identity, it is impossible to dismiss up front that any potential diacriticon will be pointed out as essential to the identity at hand. For instance, the Greenlandic language lacks its own name for numbers from 13 and up. A politician explicitly points out the fact that Greenlandic speakers use Danish numbers as a threat to Greenlandic identity (Inatsisartut 2002.04.19, 60). In theory, only the audience can decide whether it accepts this threat as existential for the referent-object in question (Buzan et al. 1998, 31). In parallel, the operationalization of the limit between 'normal' and 'extraordinary' "remains insufficient" for application by analysts, wherefore "[i]n

have to referent-objects. When pointing out a threat, you prognosticate a negative effect of something on a referent-object. When suggesting a means to avert a threat, you prognosticate or promise that the means will have a negative effect on the threat. Moreover, the measure will have an indirect, positive effect on the survival of the referent-object. Hence, the analytics employed in this article read CSST's rhetorical figure of 'measures-threats-objects' as a narrative chain of causes and effects that, in the end, point out a valued referent-object. When an argument advocates measures against threats (or just points out threats), it only works rhetorically with an audience because the referent-object is valued because who 'we' are is important. In a final step, we tend to the reaction of the audience. However, contrary to a basic securitization analysis, we are not (only) interested in whether an audience confirms or completes the process of securitization by accepting the possible use of extraordinary means.[5] Rather, like in a more advanced CSST analysis

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the application on concrete cases, quite hopeless debates often emerge on whether something is 'ordinary' or 'extra-ordinary'." (Wæver 2003, 26; cf. Werner 1998). However, as we will see below, the delimitation of the ordinary is not just a technical problem for the analyst; often the question of whether a proposed means is ordinary or extreme is core to the empirical politics. E.g., a denial of voting rights to people who only speak Danish constitutes an extraordinary suppression of basic democratic rights, provided that one brings to the table a concept of democracy based on individual rights. But the same denial constitutes a natural and ordinary way of respecting and upholding the cultural specificity of a people - if the point of departure is a concept of democracy based on the rights of an ethnically defined community.

[5] This amendment relates to critical discussions of CSST, however, the position taken in this article is only feasible because the object of study is *not* security *per se*, but identity politics. CSST advocates a focus on the *illocutionary* force of the speech act: a securitizing speech act is complete and successful if an audience is compelled to accept a hypothetical implementation of extraordinary means. Hence, the audience is at once decisive (Wæver 2003, 11) and passive: only if a relevant audience explicitly *denies* accept, the analyst may safely conclude that the securitizing move was *not* successful (Buzan et al. 1998, 26; cf. Derrida 1982, 8; Austin 1997, 65). Moreover, more than one audience may show itself to be relevant by denying accept of a proposed extraordinary means (cf. Wæver 2003, 26; Roe 2008). If the Greenlandic parliament adopts an extraordinary measure - e.g., prohibiting members from speaking Danish in parliament - the electorate may show itself to be a relevant audience denying accept at the next general elections. Or the Danish state may, in the form of the Danish High Court denying the constitutionality of the decision. Or an international body like the European Court of Human Rights. The present article escapes these complications by focusing on the *perlocutionary* consequences of the construction of threats and defensive means; i.e., the explicit responses to such claims. One strand of critique takes the CSST focus on the illocutionary force of a securitizing speech act to deny the relevance of the audience (cf. Gad and Petersen 2011). It claims that Wæver's concept of security equals Schmitt's concept of politics, and warns that both involve the idea that agency is concentrated in one authority able to assert its will top-down: A powerful actor installs security by declaration. As an alternative to this (skewed) rendition of CSST, critics advocate and produce analyses accounting for all the little acts of small agents or for the underlying structures, which co-produce a given securitization (Gad and Petersen 2011). Such self-proclaimed 'sociological' securitization analyses, of course, are valuable in directing attention towards minor agents to hold accountable for unjust distribution of insecurity and towards structures to change to escape surveillance and mal-governance. However, applying securitization theory - whether in the 'sociological' version or à la Wæver - as a checklist for successful securitization misses one important point: unsuccessful and *partially* successful securitizing moves and outright misfires also provide valuable information for understanding security dynamics (Wæver 1995). Moreover, it allows us to understand important dynamics of broader identity politics. First, because interactive dynamics may arise from less-than-successful securitizations. Second, less-than-perfect securitizing moves may tell us about the limits of identity discourses and how they are negotiated. In combination, interactive dynamics and discursive limits provide the foundation for building prognoses of future politics. Recent ST writings by Wæver seem to be bifurcated. Either an article is more or less explicitly engaged in an exchange with the 'sociological version' of ST defending an illocutionary version of speech acts of securitization and a

of dynamics of securitizations, the 'audience' is relevant also when suggesting alternative narratives of cause-and-effect, pointing out other threats, means and/or referent-objects (whether or not this amounts to formal counter-securitizations by posing alternative *existential* threats and *extraordinary* means). The point is, that alternative narratives of cause and effect point out alternative referent-objects as valued, indicating alternative identity constructions.

Scholarly consensus insists that the Greenlandic language is 'alive and well', particularly when compared with other indigenous languages.[6] Nevertheless, securitizing moves that point to Danish language as a threat is a recurrent feature of Greenlandic politics. This observation confirms the image of Denmark as Greenland's threatening other. However, casting the analytical net just a little bit broader and reading the debate on language policy and threats comprehensively point to other referent-objects that make for a much more nuanced image. This provides us with more information to use when trying to understand just what a future Greenland might aspire to be. The remainder of this article analyses the 2002 and 2016 debates on language in the Greenlandic parliament (*Inatsisartut)* and newspapers (*Sermitsiaq* and *A/G*) through the CSST lenses as modified above.[7] On the one hand, the years 2002 and 2016 are not special. Language policy is a recurrent issue in debates on how to realize the best kind of Greenland. On the other hand, the formal change of status for the Greenlandic autonomy arrangement in 2009 involved a formal change of status for the Greenlandic language: Whereas the 1978 Home Rule Act declared that, "Greenlandic shall be the principal language. Danish must be thoroughly taught. Either language may be used for official purposes." (section 9), the 2009 Self-Government Act declares Greenlandic to be "the official language in Greenland" without mentioning the Danish language. Moreover, *Inatsisartut* in 2010 adopted a long-debated Act on language policy aiming primarily to "secure the Greenlandic language as a language, complete and supporting the society" (section 1) by prescribing that all public agencies and private enterprises employing more than 10 persons formulate a language policy (section 4) and by awarding every resident in Greenland the "right to learn Greenlandic and Danish as well as a language of international reach".[8] However, the shift of focus for the overall debate on the next steps towards independence, from formal recognition and self-government to substantial self-support in terms of economy and human resources, appears to have made more of a difference to the way weights have shifted between the threats pointed out, the means suggested, and the definitions of Greenlandic identity promoted. Below, a few central threat constructions will be explicitly dissected

collective interpretation of Austin's account of illocution (Wæver 2011; 2015). Alternatively, it employs securitization theory in analyses of security dynamics playing out as series of speech acts from different securitizing agents (Buzan and Wæver 2009; Wæver 2009a; Wæver 2009b; Wæver and Sheikh 2012).

[6] Arbejdsgruppen (2002, 36); Langgård (2003, 215); A/G (2016.12.07, 2); Langgård in A/G (2016.12.07, 4).

[7] Gad (2005, ch. 3.3.1) discusses the delimitation, drawbacks and benefits of selecting this archive for analysis.

[8] The 2010 Act does retain the 1978 formula that "The Danish language may be used for public purposes." (section 3), however, contrary to 2009, the possible reform of this status is a purely internal matter for Greenland.

according to the reading strategy developed above; but most of the analytical work will be presented in a synthesized form. [9]

Pointing out threats in Greenlandic debates on language

As part of 2016 *Inatsisartut* deliberations on the import of foreign workers, MP Hans Enoksen put forward the ambitious "final demand" that, "you have to be able to speak Greenlandic to have a job in the public sector. This will strengthen our identity. ... In this way, we will create a proud people working for its own country. In this way, we can establish the state of Greenland."[10] Even if Enoksen did not name it explicitly, in the context of decades of debate it is clear that a threat comes from the Danish language. Interventions in parliamentary and media debate frequently point out the position of the Danish language in most formal institutions in Greenland as a threat to the interests of individual Greenlandic speaking monolinguals. It is difficult or impossible to get jobs in the public and private sector or to get an education if you only speak Greenlandic because 'the system' speaks Danish. However, as Enoksen makes clear, the referent-object of the threat goes beyond the individual. The way in which Danish language has pushed aside Greenlandic threatens both national pride and the ability of Greenlanders to work for the realization of their national ambition. Enoksen's demand may be comparatively ambitious, but it resonates with well-established narratives about threats, valuables, and defensive means.

Nevertheless, almost a decade of 'Self-Government' focusing on economic diversification and limiting economic dependency to prepare for formal independence have re-configured the Greenlandic debates on language. Even if most narratives of threats and defense remain recognizable from earlier years, Enoksen's position is indicative of the way in which the weight seems to have shifted in the debate. In 2002, Enoksen was the newly elected chair of the ruling social democratic *Siumut* party, and the campaign before the general elections in December that year was dominated by his low-voiced support for the principle, long pushed mainly by the left-wing nationalist *Inuit Ataqatigiit* party, that the *Inatsisartut* rostrum should be reserved for the Greenlandic language. In 2016, he was leading *Partii Naleraq*, a small but vocal opposition party, pushing an ambitious demand concerning most of the Greenlandic labor market. Meanwhile, the language debate preoccupying both parliament and press concerns whether and how to introduce English as the second language instead of Danish. In what follows, the article presents three close-ups of three configurations of threat constructions:

- the threats conjured up to delimit the Greenlandic nation eligible to take part in democratically determining its own future;

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[9] Detailed empirical references documenting the 2002 and 2016 analyses respectively are available in Gad (2005) and (forthcoming).
[10] Enoksen in A/G (2016.10.19, 12); Inatsisartut (2016.10.12, 49)

- the threats posed from linguistic (in)competencies towards the dual processes of Greenlandization and modernization, both necessary to realize a future Greenlandic nation state;
- and the recently promoted switch to English as a way of escaping the latter dilemma.

Greenland – ethnic or civic democracy

From the arguments put forward during the 2002 electoral campaign in support of the demand that the *Inatsiartut* rostrum should be reserved for the Greenlandic language, one can read an idea of democracy as tightly connected to an ethno-cultural community. The members of such a community have the right to decide its own future without outside interference. The regular use of the Danish language is presented as a threat to both important qualities of Greenlandic identity and to the Greenlandic people's hard-won ability to protect them, "we have now [acquired] home rule, because we …. wanted to take care of our culture and language ourselves, and to strengthen them" (Heinrich in Sermitsiaq 2002.11.15, 22). However, the demand sparked a storm of reactions. Opponents described the exclusion as a threat to both democratic values and to the quality of democratic debate. Primarily, the demand was described as a threat to individual rights to be heard by and take part in a democratic, political process. Namely, "our democracy" will be threatened if "Danish speakers are denied their fundamental right to express themselves" (A/G 2002.11.05, 2).

These two narratives, about Danish language as a threat to ethno-cultural democracy and about the prohibition of the Danish language as a threat to individual democratic rights, feed into each other. Any articulation of one narrative challenged the foundation of the other and vice versa. The realization of ethno-cultural democracy threatens the democratic rights of Danish speaking monolingual individuals. If the rights of Danish speakers are accommodated, the ethno-cultural ideal of democracy is compromised. On the one hand, the civic and the ethno-cultural narratives agree that democracy and democratic debate is a referent-object so valuable that it needs to be defended. In that sense, being a democracy is part of Greenlandic national identity: No-one imagines a future Greenland that is not democratic. On the other hand, the two narratives clearly disagree about what constitutes democracy, or rather, about how to delimit the community which must be democratic. Is the future Greenlandic democracy for everyone who live in Greenland, or is it for those who fulfil certain linguistic or ethnic criteria making them legitimate Greenlanders? This disagreement installs a tension in Greenlandic identity discourse between the universally accepted 'democracy' and the traditional diachriticon 'Greenlandic language'.

National welfare - Greenlandization and/or modernization

Pointing out Danish language as a threat to individual Greenlandic speakers opens two solutions, an individual and a collective. First, the threat may be interpreted in such a way that it is not 'the Danish speaking system' which constitutes the threat, but rather the fact

that the individual in question is monolingual, the societal solution to which is then to teach individuals Danish in more efficient ways. However, the Danish language is pointed out as a threat to more heavily loaded referent-objects than individuals. At its most basic level, Danish language is presented as a threat to the Greenlandic language as such: The presence of Danish impedes the development of Greenlandic to *function* in certain sectors of society. Such 'domain losses' contribute to the threat against the formal *position* of Greenlandic, and this in turn is a threat to the *dignity* of the Greenlandic language. Particularly, its dignity is threatened when Danish migrants and Danish speaking Greenlanders "couldn't be bothered" (Poulsen in Sermitsiaq (2002.02.15, 28); Matthiassen in Sermitsiaq (2002.05.03, 26); Heilmann in Sermitsiaq (2002.11.28, 38). Learning to speak Greenlandic. As "the Greenlandic language is our soul" (Olsen in Sermitsiaq 2002.11.22, 41); cf. Sørensen (1994, 109)., the threat to the function, position and status of the Greenlandic language really take aim at the identity, equal worth, and dignity of the Greenlandic people. Indeed, a Greenlander has the *right* to be able to live a life with the language of the land only. The Greenlandic and Danish languages need to have equal status, not on Greenlandic territory, but equal in being superior in each their territory. The conclusion to this narrative, describing the second, collective solution to the threat coming from lack of Danish competencies vis-à-vis a Danish speaking 'system', is a total linguistic Greenlandization of education, administration, and businesses.

However, the narrative of Greenlandization clashes with a narrative of modernization. At the basis of this narrative is the impression that the Danish language is a precondition for knowledge and vision in general and for education in particular. Next, vision and education is presented as a precondition for employment at an individual scale and for enterprise at a societal scale. The narrative reached its climax when the lack of capabilities in the Danish language was pointed out as a threat to Greenland's development towards emerging as an independent welfare state. Specifically, the narrative of exclusion of Danish speaking monolinguals voiced in opposition to the reservation of the *Inatsisartut* rostrum continued along this line, since their exclusion would mean that individuals migrate to Denmark or do not repatriate after studying abroad. Even without brain drain, exclusion may threaten the quality of democratic deliberation. Further, low quality deliberation means low quality solutions to a host of specific societal problems, and consequently less development and less welfare. Like democracy, welfare is a referent-object worth defending. Welfare is an indispensable element in Greenlandic identity (cf. Langgård 2003, 250; Larsen 1992, 223).

Modernizing without the Danish language

So, on the one hand, renouncing on being a modern welfare state would contradict Greenland's basic vision of itself. On the other hand, the main medium both for abstract modernization and for concrete manning of the welfare state, the Danish language is, constitutively per definition, a threat to Greenlandic identity. No surprise, then, that a classic

(Engell 1982, 168f) discussion within the overall Greenlandic debate on language concerns the possibility of accessing the joys of modernization via English rather than Danish. No consensus exists on the subject, however. In 2002, the English language was routinely mentioned as a road to modernity along the Danish one, and at times as an occasional add-on to Danish when mentioning the need to facilitate openness to secondary and tertiary education. However, in 2016, a new turn of the narrative had moved the Danish language to the role so far reserved for the Greenlandic, namely that of a provincial language threatening to limit Greenland's access to global modernity. Correspondingly, the English language ascended to the role of primary means to mend that threat. The coalition agreement claimed that, "we as a nation will be in a stronger position by having a world language as second language. Such a change will bring us closer to the goal that Greenland should have more options to choose from globally and in commerce" (Olsen in Sermitsiaq 2002.11.22, 41); cf. Sørensen (1994, 109). A couple of young Siumut members explained the connection between Danish and English, "The Danish language is dominating too much in Greenland and it is directly impeding when it comes to communicating with the rest of the world ... [T]he Danish language is directly the cause for many Greenlanders having difficulties in learning English".[11] Hence, a Siumut MP proposed that English should substitute Danish as primary foreign language, arguing that, "The children and the young ones are our future. Therefore, it is only natural, that we open their world out towards the gates of the great outer world, since this is the only way we can harvest a better and updated knowledge in the future."[12] A Siumut spokesman laid out the proportions, "[T]he Danish language is a language for six million Danes. But a billion people around the world understands the English language" (Langgård in A/G 2016.12.07, 4).

A host of words of caution were issued in opposition in both parliament and press. Added to threats of exclusion of Danish speakers were warnings about Greenland losing access to free education in Denmark, and that neither the teachers nor schoolbooks were anything near ready. More radically, English was presented as a threat to Greenlandic language and identity more powerful and severe than Danish:

> "English is already washing over the society as a flood. At worst, the dikes may break and flood the Greenlandic language ... If a central decision to decisively embrace English is taken, one just need to know that one will be nourishing a snake in one's bosom. I do not know a single minority language in the world that has survived alongside the English". (Langgård in A/G 2016.12.07, 4)

[11] Johansen & Sandgreen in *sermitziaq.ag* (2016.03.16). Accessible at: http://sermitsiaq.ag/siumut-ungdom-danske-sprog-haemmer [Accessed 3 July 2017].

[12] Motzfeldt in Inatsisartut (2016.04.21/38) (clash of metaphors in org.)

Nevertheless, an ensuing *Inatsisartut* debate concluded that English could be introduced in the first year of primary school alongside Danish. The Minister for Education, representing the moderate *Demokraatit* party which was briefly a coalition partner, even suggested that the point of departure for her follow-up on the debate would be to implement the change within two years.

Conclusion and perspectives: Kuwait, Luxembourg, or Iceland?

Greenlandic identity revolves not only around 'Greenlandic culture.' It *also* includes democracy, sovereignty, and, in particular, welfare. Greenlandic identity politics is all about *how* to combine *which* symbolic elements of a 'native' Greenlandic culture with these elements of modernization. A future sovereign Greenlandic state will set out to be a democratic welfare state. But the use of Danish language is seen as a threat to the dignity and integrity of a Greenlandic nation imagining its true incarnation to be culturally homogenous and, thus, speaking Greenlandic. Greenland is facing tough struggles with itself over the character of its democracy and society. The attempts to combine indigeneity and modernity create important tensions that then appear in the discourse. Particularly, when the demand for prioritizing Greenlandic language is put forward in absolute ways, tensions arise in relation to welfare and independence. One option is that Greenland insists on being an ethnically defined nation. This would imply that it risks its welfare character by pushing away people who only speak Danish, including immigrants from the former colonial power and even more problematically Danish speakers who consider themselves Greenlanders. Another option would be fully to convert itself into a civic conception of nationhood, including all citizens on equal terms regardless of linguistic competence. This would mean putting at risk the cultural identity legitimizing and spurring the quest for independence in the first place.

The article specified this fundamental dilemma by applying a strategy for analyzing identity political negotiations, developed by modifying CSST, on Greenlandic debates on language, a core element in Greenlandic identity discourse. On the one hand, this analysis *alone* cannot form the basis of predictions for how the future of a Greenlandic state will be. First, because it has dealt only with the self-perception and ideals of Greenland without taking into account the perceptions and ideals of neighbors and more distant relations. No nations form their future in a vacuum or unilaterally re-casts the globe in their own image (even if one could get that impression from listening to national political debates). On the other hand, no scenarios of a future Arctic would be valid without taking into account the specific aspirations and ideals of Greenland. Second, the analysis presented has limited itself to one topic: language policy. This is only one of a series of discussions decisive for the future course of Greenland, but it is indeed a fundamental question. Both because it represents deeply sedimented parts of the self-image of Greenland and implicates almost all sectors of society. Moreover, the choice and priority of languages have severe consequences for what kind of society may materialize, and how it will engage the international as part of a new Arctic.

To build scenarios, parallel cases may serve as a guide. Parallels are never perfect because every case is unique. However, it appears particularly difficult to find a relevant 'peer group' of which to make Greenland a case. A population similar in size to the smallest sovereign islands, typically scattered in tropical seas, only Greenlanders inhabit stretches of the coast of an Arctic island almost the size of India (home to a billion people) or the Caribbean Sea ('home' to 13 sovereign states and 15 more or less self-governing dependencies). Nevertheless, for the sake of opening up our imaginations (Øverland and Neumann 2004; Gad 2009b), rather than comparative analysis, three countries could serve as 'end points' for three narratives continuing from where the Greenlandic debates on language is at present. All three continuations work on the (fragile) condition that Greenland finds ways to both finance welfare (i.e., strikes oil) and develops human resources. In real life, of course, these conditions intertwine intimately with the question of language, but to focus attention on one important choice (that of language), we bracket everything else.

Default must always be a status quo scenario. In this case, default means prioritizing the teaching of and in Greenlandic while paying lip service to the importance of a second language. If Greenland continues the linguistic policies of the last three decades and suddenly hits a major oil deposit, Greenland will be the Kuwait of the Arctic. Greenlandic welfare will be secured; all Greenlanders will be at leisure. Formally, Greenlanders will be in charge, but substantially expat experts will run the country, probably most of them on relatively short contracts. Possibly, there will be a quite high level of corruption and slack, but no one cares. There is enough for all Greenlanders, and the expats do not need to commit as they are looking to move on. Below, a huge proletariat of disenfranchised foreign menial workers not socially integrated. In terms of geopolitics, such a linguistic and ethno-political strategy would make Greenland like most third world countries dependent on one or a few natural resources, as free to switch allegiance from one super power to another as the constellation of superpowers of the day allow.

If Greenland adds fluency in Danish to Greenlandic, Greenland will be an Arctic equivalent of Luxembourg. Attractive to Scandinavian and Icelandic immigrants and ambitious in integrating them. On the one hand, such a multicultural elite will be in charge of the country in a more solid way. Like in Luxembourg, the elite might combine its dual-integration (abroad and in Greenland) and the sovereignty of Greenland to siphon resources from the neighbors into the country. On the other hand, the elite will be less distinct and deeper integrated with neighbor countries (in Greenland's case the Nordic countries). The foreign proletariat will probably also exist in this scenario, but it might be a little bit less isolated as some of it may come in via Scandinavia, fluent in a language usable also in Greenland. Geopolitically speaking, such a Greenland would continue to be oriented towards Europe (possibly even better integrated informally) and likely to be less left as much alone by other power centers as today (i.e., within a US sphere of interest with or without a Danish buffer).

Finally, if Greenland succeeds in substituting English for Danish as a second language, and does so in a sufficiently solid way that most Greenlanders are functionally bilingual, Greenland will be like Iceland. Greenlanders will be open for business with

most of the world without intermediaries and, thereby, directly in control, as far as its educational resources take it. It will be necessary to recruit the most specialized human resources on a global labor market, but it will be easier to do so because the imports will not need to integrate fully linguistically. Hence, Greenland will still be an ethnically distinct 'members only club', as outsiders will not really be able to know what is going on behind the linguistic doors. Again, supplemented with a foreign proletariat, easier to integrate (more or less) in select individual cases via English, but also easier to segregate *en masse*. This Greenland is likely to be drawn into Anglo-Saxon North America, particularly as it gradually unravels its special ties to Denmark and, thereby, Scandinavia and Europe, while forgetting the Danish language.

In 2016, a parliamentarian majority in Greenland seem to prefer prioritizing English. However, replicating the Icelandic success appears a daunting task, taking into consideration the radically different points of departure for the two countries. The then Minister of Education of Iceland in 2014 explained how the switch to English was really just a formalization of a practical process more or less completed:

> "It was not until 1999 that English switched places with Danish to become the first foreign language taught in the Icelandic school system. Long before that, however, English had become the foreign language that received the greatest attention in the educational system and held a unique position when it came to stimulation and pupils' motivation. For years now, children have been strongly motivated to learn English by their surroundings." (Minister of Education 2014).

Contrast this to a recent evaluation of the Greenlandic primary school, reporting how, "a teacher and a superintendent from two small towns say: Danish and English are hard, because they [the pupils] do not meet [those languages] in their everyday life." (EVA 2015, 44).

However, the broad acceptance of the idea suggests that a narrative has been established which would allow Greenlandic identity to unfold in the form of a modern, national welfare state without negating itself by being dependent on the Danish other. As such, the narrative will come back to haunt the politicians every time an evaluation tells them that their latest school reform did not make it either. Making the human resources meet the ambitions remains the toughest challenge on Greenland's road to independence.

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Afterword: The Arctic Security Constellation

Ole Wæver, Professor of International Relations and Director of Centre for Resolution of International Conflicts, Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen.

The Arctic carries some peculiar paradoxes. As a space, it invokes an unusual degree of concreteness with its momentous geographical features and the relatively minor human presence compared to most other parts of the globe. And yet, at the same time, it is so obviously overloaded with cultural and mythological interpretations. On most maps it is the ultimate anchor at the top of the globe – and often what the map captures with least claim to correctness. Traditional security used to be about the states at the top of the hierarchy of stateness with superpower strategies colliding during the Cold War. Today the most important decisions are made in places like Nuuk, the capital of something that is sometimes a state, and sometimes prefer not to be one (Wæver 2004; Adler-Nissen and Gad 2012). When expanding the security perspective beyond states, the two new forms of security that pop up most often in relation to the Arctic are possibly those at opposite ends of a time spectrum. One is the most 'traditional' in the form of defending Indigenous cultures and other forms of life, and the other the most future-oriented one, climate change. Finally, the usefulness of the Arctic for testing and developing theory seems limited because it is surely not 'typical' in any normal sense, and thus hard to generalize from. Yet it is potentially productive for that same reason: an extreme case can be a demanding and sometimes creative challenge to the theory used.

I am grateful to the authors and especially the editors first for taking the effort to explore the potential value of securitization theory for understanding Arctic international relations, and secondly for allowing me the opportunity to read, learn from, and comment on these interesting articles.

In this brief postscript, I would like to reflect on three questions. First, what kind of total picture emerges from the analyses, i.e. how does it add up to an understanding of 'Arctic international relations' and 'Arctic security'. And what are the main implications hereof?

Second, some of the theoretical observations and innovations made by the contributors along the way deserve to be identified and evaluated for their potential general relevance beyond an Arctic setting.

Third, although this special issue focuses on two of the three constitute elements of the 'Copenhagen School', securitization and sectors, the third leg – regional security complexes – could play a role.[1]

Arctic International *Politics*

The articles in this special issue sum up to a rounded and relevant picture of Arctic International Politics to an unusual degree. This is impressive given that they do not have survey character and are not mandated to cover each a part of the landscape. Each constitutes a research article with its own clearly delineated case and a particular angle aiming to push theoretical and methodological innovation. Nevertheless, they manage to cover most of the important dimensions and complement each other in interesting ways.

Standing on the shoulders of the contributors, I therefore feel enabled to offer a kind of integrative take on Arctic International Politics as seen through the lens of securitization (theory). Naturally, they are not to be blamed for my re-appropriation of their analyses, but here comes:

Security dynamics were, for a while (say: half a century, from the birth of 'national security' as a key concept around 1940 to the end of the Cold War in 1990), centered on the military security of states. So at least as a matter of conventional courtesy it seems reasonable to start the mapping from this sub-set of securitizations and then add the other ones. Does the Arctic have a driving dynamic of military security concerns and mutual moves of a military nature? No, at most they operate at two ghostly levels: one is the underlying frame of a Cold War past that cannot be put fully to rest because it continues to be a structural underlying speculative reality. The point here is that the whole nuclear deterrence 'reality' was always a strangely hyper-real one of scenarios that nevertheless became incredible material and real. Because weapon-systems were installed partly on the basis of these theories, decision-makers had to – and have to! – react to game-theoretical social facts relatively independent of the political relationship (Kahn 1960; Tunander 1989; Baudrillard 1995; Wæver and Buzan 2010). Given that these nuclear systems still have some of their important touch points in the Arctic, the strange, ongoing simulations of nuclear scenarios unfold as a constant rumbling beneath the military security landscape of the Arctic. Not least the Russian reasonable worry that the US missile defense could overturn the basic nuclear constellation is relevant in an Arctic setting due to the continued centrality of radars at Thule Air Base and Russia's increasing reliance on submarines in Arctic waters for its nuclear deterrence.

The other military security spectre is future oriented and takes the form of speculative security in a world where climate change has melted much ice, opened new sea

[1] Regional security complexes have been discussed elsewhere more than a few times in reference to the how to fit the Arctic into the global map of security complexes (or not). (Åtland 2007; Lanteigne 2016; Burke and Rahbek-Clemmensen 2017; Kluth and Lynggaard 2017; Padrtová 2017).

lanes, and possibly transformed the economics of various mineral and carbo-hydrate resources. As reported by several of the articles in this special issue, most of the sober analyses of this issue point to the conclusion that we are not heading for a 'Scramble for the North Pole' or some similar semi-colonial race for the last 'white spots' on the map. However, in our current media reality of fake news and cyber capitalism, it is far from inconceivable that the self-confirming reward system on telling the most interesting stories will turn the militarization of the Arctic into a sufficiently real virtuality.

Still, as argued most systematically in the article by Exner-Pirot and Murray, the conditions for military competition are weak in the region – an interpretation which is reinforced by the desecuritization story by Jacobsen and Strandsbjerg. In sum: a film is played in the background about military security in the Arctic, and it matters. Everybody has an eye on it now and then, but it is not the driving dynamic in the region. It is more of a passive resonance that could be mobilized. Interestingly, as demonstrated by several articles here, this scenario of military rivalry has served to elevate many other issues, sometimes simply because the military scenarios have contributed to the general validation of Arctic 'importance' in an age of attention competition, sometimes more directly by justifying other agendas as a way to re-focus attention. On to other securitizations that need to be positioned in relation to this part of the puzzle.

The next layer should be 'new security' issues (or 'non-traditional security' if you want pre-emptively to adapt terminologically to the near-future where we follow Asian leads). What security threats in the environmental, societal, economic, or political sectors are mobilized in a situation where military security does not exhaust the imagination? Here, it is useful to take a transnational perspective. The fact that 'climate security' is generally elevated in the global hierarchy of security issues has implications in a local setting where it is not a given that 'climate change' would have a similar prominence if looking only at the local power structure. (This need to bring in the transnational factor is not about the objective severity of threats because climate change *does* hit harder in the Arctic than most other places. However, if balanced out politically on the local arena, it is not given that a securitization of climate change could be mobilized. Probably, it is due to the global circulation of the climate issue, that the issue figures high on the Arctic agenda as well.) The effects on the regional constellation of climate securitization are complicated and contradictory. As argued by Victoria Hermann and others in this issue, it empowers Indigenous organizations to speak more strongly on the international arena, while at the same time it acts as a driver on the shadow securitization of state-to-state rivalry as well. So far, the securitization of climate change has mostly impacted relationships between regional actors and extra-regional ones, i.e. Indigenous actors have mobilized on the global scene but also the states of the region have become more central in global climate politics by the Arctic gaining symbolic standing worldwide. However, some of the internal tensions in the region that are identified by several authors also run down through the climate issue. Especially Nunavut and Greenland as the two most state-like Inuit polities *benefit* both from climate change itself (Barkham 2016) and from climate concerns (eg. through climate tourism), and are able to make at least a case for

exemption from emission reductions (for reasons similar to developing countries) – while also called upon to defend vulnerable communities against it.

Here, we see strongly the interaction with the other very powerful security issue of a non-traditional nature, what the Copenhagen School calls 'societal security', i.e. groups that defend their identity. Even if it is concretely the same people who are defended, they will appear as a different kind of referent object for security policy if approached in state terms or non-state, i.e. as a polity or as an identity community, defended in the realm of sovereignty and states or in the world of groups and identities . Often it will be possible for Arctic actors to coordinate those two layers in relation to the climate, because when pointing to threats to culture, identity, and traditional modes of sustenance, the most important human addressees for climate change culpability are naturally the biggest emitters (as when the ICC sued the US at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights for its climate inaction), not their own states, but the tension is likely to grow more evident as both climate change and statehood strengthen.

The fulcrum of the general constellation seems to be what Jacobsen and Strandsbjerg discuss in terms of a displacement from horizontal to vertical controversies; interstate rivalry has become less threatening due to amongst other things the Ilulissat desecuritization, but this has intensified disputes between the signatory states to that declaration and the Indigenous peoples (as well, we might add, some states struggling to achieve high enough degrees of arcticness to be involved in political processes).

Thus, when mapping the constellation of securitizations, it is important to be attentive to the simultaneous role of referent objects of many kinds that are often partly invisible to the security gaze of each other. When states articulate security, this typically has 'sovereignty' as defining standard and tends to privilege as (rhetorically admissible) threats from other states or domestic political forces, while actors relevant to the sectors of societal security and environmental security will not count here. Nevertheless, these different securitizations are causally connected so that security relations among states can be impacted by security actions taken by other kinds of units, eg. societal defenders of identity such as transnational religious movements or even environmental groups. Vice-versa it is very often the case that those who strive to secure 'non-traditional' forms of security will have to be attentive to the possibility that they trigger security concerns by states. Greenpeace's #SaveTheArctic campaign is an example of a political project that on the surface (!) is a relationship between 'people' and Shell and Climate Change, but it invariably will affect the interests of states like the US and Greenland (Gerhard et al forthcoming). [2]

Concretely in the Arctic, some of the main interconnected securitizations that are not easily translated into each other but nevertheless impact each other are the two layers of military security – US-Russia nuclear security and potential escalation over territorial delineations as well as new patrolling needs – and the politics of climate change as such (as a politics over climate actions), plus the spin-off securitization of societal

[2] Thanks to Marc Jacobsen for pointing my attention to this example.

survival for Indigenous communities and settlements and not least the complex political security of polities of inbetweenness. The central position in the region of political units that are on the move sovereignty-wise makes for very peculiar security dynamics.

It is far from unique that the referent object is not a 'status' or 'being' but a process. This is in various ways also the case for the EU defending 'integration', countries defining themselves as 'developing' and maybe most intriguingly revolutions/revolutionary states (Holbraad and Pedersen 2012). However, what is particularly challenging in cases like Greenland is that not only Greenland itself has a security referent object that is a process, a movement, a direction of change, ever closer to full statehood – this is also accepted by the most important other actors including 'Copenhagen' (cf. Gad as well as Kjærgaard Rasmussen and Merkelsen in this issue; (Adler-Nissen and Gad 2012)). Route, speed and destination are unknown, but the direction is not. This means that any calculation of an overall equilibrium of stability of the security constellation has to be a mobile one, a stability of instabilities, and balance of imbalances.

As Kjærgaard Rasmussen and Merkelsen show, the politics on sensitive issues (as in their case: uranium) is often shaped by *latent* securitizations. This is an observation that comes naturally when taking a securitization perspective (even if it has not been exploited analytically as much in securitization studies as it could have been). Given that securitization constitutes a breaking out of limitations, a setting-oneself-free to do what one deems necessary for survival – an act that often triggers chain-reactions of escalation – it is often in the interest of one actor to avoid that another one does so. A given political order – not least an international order – will therefore often rest on the main parties assessing the 'red line' of the other actors in order to avoid pushing them across to actual securitization (Wæver 1995a; Wæver 1995b; Wæver 2018) – much like the classical art of diplomacy and the Kissingerian concept of 'a legitimate order' (Kissinger 1957). Therefore, in a constellation that is generally characterized by cooperation and mutual adjustment, securitization will often play a role as potentiality, as a move that matters also when not made – it matters because it could be made and therefore all parties have to consider the what-if of securitization. These mutual considerations of where other actors might play the securitization card is part of the overall constellation.

This all amounts to a *security constellation*, where the different securitizations are interlocking and form a dynamic, structuration-like context for further securitizations. (Buzan et al 1998: 166-171, 201; Buzan & Wæver 1997, 2003) The concept of 'security constellation' is much wider than regional security complexes – the most known 'relational' concept from the Copenhagen School. Regional Security Complexes are units who have their securitizations inter-mingled to such a degree that they can't be handled separately, and where this happens in a territorially coherent manner. However, it is possible that a number of securitizations interact and condition each other in a way where general transnational processes or movements become involved, global issues like climate change become part of the constellation, and actors who have their main regional anchorage elsewhere get interlinked in a constellation that is in this instance 'Arctic'.

All of the articles do more than make use of (Copenhagen School style) securitization theory; they all contribute to it as well.

In the introduction, *the editors* talk of 'cascading effects' among the different securitizations.[3] It is not a point that is developed systematically later on in either the introduction or any of the chapters, but actually many illustrations can be found in the articles. The point that securitization by one actor in one sector often triggers securitizations by other actors in other sectors is an observation that is made surprisingly rarely (given how widespread it is and how straightforward it is to observe it with the help of securitization theory). Probably, the infrequency follows from a polarized attitude by many securitization scholars to the concept of sectors (military, economic, etc): Either you don't like sectors and organize your work around actors, issues or events, and then the cross-cutting dynamics remain unobserved (because you don't care for those sectoral lines they are crossing). Or you emphasize sectors and do a study confined to a particular sector, e.g. environmental security or economic security, and then the cross-cutting dynamics do not show up clearly either. However, most of the contributors to this special issue strike a healthy balance of taking sectors sufficiently serious that they designate issues, yet keep the wider perspective.

This is in my view close to the original impulse behind the concept of sectors. It was not meant to support a view of security dynamics being compartmentalized in separate sectors – it served to highlight characteristic dynamics peculiar to security of the different kinds, i.e. securitization on identity issues (societal security) had particular physiognomies and privileged actors that differ from what you meet when looking at say economic security. Therefore, it would very often be most relevant to study political struggles or processes cross-sectorally but based on an understanding of the 'form shaping' effects of the different sectors. Cascading was thus to be expected, but demonstrations and illustrations haven't been as common as expected. This special issue offers quite a few. The most consistently illustrated case is probably the one of climate change that impacts all kinds of other security concerns relating to societal security, food security, potential geopolitical rivalry and the politics of gradating sovereignty. But the issue also presents a link between food security and societal security, as observed by Greaves and Pomerants, and between societal security (language policy), economic security and international positioning in the analysis by Gad.

Jacobsen and Strandsbjerg organize their analysis around the two interlinked conceptual innovations of pre-emptive desecuritization and desecuritization as a shift of technique of government. The first is quite straight-forward and hard to meet with anything but acceptance and appreciation. There is an almost structural built-in bias to the

[3] The concept of 'cascade' has been used in securitization debates before, probably most ambitiously by Thierry Balzacq (Balzacq 2010) who refers to the phenomenon that people react to securitization the same way as their friends. Jacobsen and Herrmann seem to use it in a more sense of securitization in one setting and one sector triggers securitization by others in other places and often in other sectors.

concept of 'de-securitization' that it sounds like something that comes *after* securitization. The easy image is one where something has become securitized, and the challenge is then what can then be done to shift it out of the security realm and into one that relieves us of those particular dangers and drawbacks associated with securitiness, such as undemocratic urgency and exceptionalism? However, it is clearly possible that perceptive politicians sometimes manage to see a securitization spectre arising as did Danish foreign minister Per Stig Møller and others in 2007-8 leading to the Ilulissat Declaration, the consolidation of an A5 format and mutual reassurance that the way to deal with territorial rights was through international law and geoscience. Pre-emptive desecuritization? Yes, indeed.

While this is the part of their argument that is politically and practically of most far-reaching implications, in academic circles, it is probably more controversial and with more wide-ranging implications when they add the argument that the alternative to securitization was not in this case 'normal politics', but rather another 'technique of government' that was not necessarily closer to ideal politics (law and geo-science). This speaks into a long debate; one where - the authors are right and the original formulation of the theory unfortunate. Passages in the 'Framework book' and elsewhere can certainly be read as equating de-securitization and re-politicization. This should not be held as an automatic or one-to-one relationship. What de-securitization implies by necessity is only that minimum which is implied in the definition: that something is then not dealt with in security mode (Wæver 2011). This removes the particular mechanisms that securitization trigger including the potentially positive one of focused attention and the negative ones of over-writing debate by necessity and installing a relationship of protector-protected.

What form it then takes instead is an open and separate question. In the literature, this has most aggressively (and first) been argued by Claudia Aradau (Aradau 2001) as the likelihood that security issues will often instead become dealt with in the modus of 'risk' which entails its own – different but potentially equally strong – shaping effects on politics, typically an economistic logic of cost-benefit optimization through expertise. But many other forms are certainly possible. Other parts of the Framework book, especially the 'sector chapters,' point to a set-up where securitization competes with a sector-specific rationality (market in economics, environmentalism in the environmental sector, faith in relation to religion, etc). The book is in tension with itself (or some specifications need to be introduced): Securitization competes both with (normal? ideal?) politics in general and with sector-specific rationalities. The reason why securitization is contrasted to 'normal politics' is that one of the effects of securitization is to reduce the possibility of politics, because questions of survival can easily be insulated from contestation through rhetorics of urgency, loyalty and cohesion. When de-securitization is achieved, one particular barrier to politicization has been removed. This does not mean that all such have, and the very route of de-securitization can involve the instalment of other mechanisms that are equally strong in hindering politicization, such as logics of expertise, privacy, efficiency or proprietorship. The analysis by Jacobsen and Strandsbjerg in terms of displacement of controversies and techniques of government is a helpful step towards correcting this part of the theory. Not least their point that pre-existing formats into which

the issue can be shifted probably make de-securitization easier while simultaneously making 'normal politics' more difficult. This shows the necessity to specify more clearly the different types of politics involved 1) in the very event of issues moving to or from security status, 2) the processes leading into these events, and 3) the ongoing politics 'inside' situations that are securitized, technisized or riskified, politics that is then always formed by that particular speech act but still political (Wæver 2011).

Greaves and Pomerants contrast 'adjectival' use of security language to more explicit designation of threat-referent object constellations (cf. McSweeney 1999). It is a helpful way to handle what probably confuses many students: we are allegedly looking at what people do with 'security' and then we have all these domains of 'food security' and 'drug security' that don't look really securitized. In this context, it is important to bring that powerful McSweeney observation back in view that often these 'adjectival security' discourses are really less about existential threats (i.e. the ever-metastazing use of that original 'national security' move on new fields) and more about domain-specific security discourses and – according to McSweeney – basically about the more positive aspiration to satisfy needs in this domain (cf. the more recent debate on 'positive security').

However, it is also worth reminding that what is 'technically speaking' adjectival always deserves closer analysis as to whether it is strict securitization in the sense of threat-to-a-referent-object or it is a domain of needs to be satisfied, because in many cases what is grammatically speaking adjectival will be a confusing meeting point for the two kinds, as seen for instance in the cases of energy security and cyber security. Much of the literature on energy security is quite confusing because it mixes up 'security' in an issue specific sense (typically security of supply) with one that links to security in the more general sense, i.e. when energy issues arrive on the 'security agenda'. Similarly, 'cyber security' has been notoriously confused because the field of computers and networks have had its own 'security' concerns since the beginning, and until recently the dominant meaning was simple integrity and system stability. Over the last decades, more and more usages of the term have used security in the sense derived from 'national security' through the process of widening, and thus in this field too, much of the conceptual literature has been about sorting out the interwoven meanings that with some simplification can be seen as originating from the two main sources of the field-specific terminology and the general security logic. Whereas conceptual analysis can try to clarify these differences, political actors naturally utilize the ambivalences and continuities along a sliding scale.

Clearly, it is possible for a statement to be made in adjectival form and still be clear-cut securitization as in the case of the original five sectors from the 'Framework book', e.g. 'military security' or 'economic security'. The Greaves and Pomerants article has found a good way to handle this by checking in each instance whether there is a clear threat-defense logic invoked and that should in most cases work. However, my argument here about the duality of adjectival security introduces a distinct possibility that one does not find the explicit securitization, exactly due to the inherent duality in much of this adjectival security. Because of the slidings between the two basis origins of each of these, securitization can be done by connotations and vague implications.

This could be an ironic effect of the 'excessive success' of security talk as well as of increased reflexivity where there is a growing awareness among practitioners that one does something by using security language - not only an implicit, 'practical' and 'tacit' knowledge of how to do it, but increasingly a reflexive, conscious understanding of these dynamics. This makes it increasingly viable to get an issue half-way securitized with the advantage of not having to spell it out. Similar dynamics can be observed in the US with the various instances of a 'war on …' drugs, poverty, etc.

This creates a methodological problem for securitization studies. Concretely, in relation to the case study, it means that the findings of Greaves and Pomerants especially regarding 'food security' as close to actual securitization probably can be strengthened one notch. There is more 'security' connotations involved than if one had talked 'food security' 20 years ago, simply because the general idea of widened security has made it more likely that the terminology triggers speculation about those threat-defense sequences that are maybe less clearly spelled out than they would have had to be in the past. Possibly, the concept of 'human security' that they observe in the documents could also be explored further with an angle like this.

Hermann's article is the one that most clearly zooms in on societal security. In this case, it is particularly about the defense of the collective identity of Indigenous peoples in relation to climate change, and an important element here is how both the categories of the threat but also the identity of the referent object and its agency are partly constituted through climate research and risk communication. This opens up for an interesting meeting between two otherwise quite separate if not opposed strands of debate in security/securitization theory. On the one hand the 'soft' societal security focus on identities and on the other hand the 'harder' interest associated with new materialism and Actor-Network Theory in objects and artefacts (Amicelle et al. 2015). While the article also involves a meeting between the environmental and the societal sectors, it is a more theoretically challenging cross-over to see science and scientific objects in such a central role in relation to identity processes.

Another theoretical point made in this article is that the exact form of societal security in this case is neither horizontal competition between two parallel identities, nor vertical competition as in conflicts over integration or seccession, but rather about threats to the reproduction of identities that work through the demolition of the infrastructural 'basis' for the reproduction of a form of life. This route was mentioned and discussed both in the original main book that launched the concept of societal security in the Copenhagen School (Wæver et al. 1993) and in the societal chapter in the framework book, but it did not make 'top 3' in the standard model and has consequently been overlooked. It is therefore positive to see this form of societal security dynamic re-analysed with such a clear illustration.

Also *Kjærgaard Rasmussen and Merkelsen* make (as did Hermann) interesting links between security studies and risk theory. It is both correct and potentially misleading when they say that "securitization is nothing but a special case of riskification" and that the main difference is that "securitization involves only a certain kind of risks that can

justify governing through extraordinary means". Especially the 'nothing but' and 'only' phrasing tends to draw attention mostly to the similarity, not the distinctiveness. Where exactly is the specialness – what certain kind of risk is securitization? Naturally, it cannot be the threat in itself that has special features; it is a structural property of the narrative.[4] It is an instance of securitization when referent object, securitizing actor, threat etc are form a particular pattern that is structured in time with a characteristic rhythm.

It is a great idea to re-introduce structural narratology (which played a key role in the original paper presenting securitization (Wæver 1989), but it invites some complicated theoretical discussions. Greimas' style semiotics obviously pulls the theory in a more structuralist direction, and this seems to be in tension with the other move in the article of presenting risk theory as being more sophisticated than securitization theory because the former has a differentiated (not monolithic) view of audience. They make the point about 'social theories of risk' that "what is an object of risk for one actor may or may not be a risk object for another" – which they contrast with the allegedly monolithic view of the audience in securitization theory. However, the issue is not whether the audience is monolithic or not, because the audience does not pre-exist the situation, what matters is the audience-in-the-situation; and it is not to be decomposed into individuals, because focus is the political event of securitization and the audience is those who make a crucial difference as to whether the securitizing actor manages to shift the boundary of possibility based on a security argument. The audience is exactly a structural position in a Greimas-like manner.

Probably, the ambivalences in the article on this point has to do with the widespread misconception that securitization theory is about communication and perceptions – about a securitizing actor making a threat argument to convince an audience. However, this sender-receiver model of communication is problematic and the original Austin version of speech act theory aims to analyze social acts and events – that which happens in and to the modal competencies in a relationship through a speech act. Therefore, the audience is not those listening to a speech – it is the co-producing actor that is necessary in order to bring about a transformation of a social situation (in casu a securitization). (Wæver 2011; Wæver 2015)

As the reader has probably already noticed, I have entered more into debate with the authors here than in relation to the other articles, and this is a sign that they have made a particularly important theoretical move that in my view is important to get more than half-right. Much can be gained by deepening securitization theory with the help of the structural narratology (and structural semiotics) of Greimas. However, then it is important to avoid a step backwards on the concept of audience; backwards both in relation to the sophistication achieved in the evolution of Copenhagen School Securitization Theory and

[4] In their empirical case study, it is not clear that the use of 'object-at-risk' and 'risk-object' terminology is helpful compared to normal securitization terminology. Actually, there is a risk that it unsharpens the clear sense of the criteria for securitization. Here their own argument about risk of a special kind seems to turn into risk without any special kind; and consequently what is gained as a clearer picture of relationality is lost in relation to threshold clarity. Nothing seems to prevent that future analyses optimize on both accounts.

paradoxically in relation to the structuralism and formalism of Greimas. Actually, there seems to be a very promising correspondence between the relational construction of roles according to Greimas and the attention to constitution of relational rights and duties in illocutionary speech acts according to Austin's original version of speech act theory (especially as re-read by Marina Sbisa; (Sbisà 2007; Wæver 2015)). The defining event in a securitization is exactly the rights and duties exchanged between defender and defended.

Furthermore, Kjærgaard Rasmussen's and Merkelsen's idea of 'securitization controversies' is promising as a way to encapsulate that process that leads to more definite outcomes as to both whether and exactly in what form something becomes securitized. The term 'controversy' will send some scholarly minds off in the direction of ANT and 'controversy mapping', and that is probably an added benefit (Venturini 2009; Venturini et al. 2015).

Gad is in the final article of this issue as always incredibly precise both in his own arguments and in his attention to exactly where he deviates from the standard version of the theory. He shows convincingly how a securitization analysis of debates over language policy in Greenland can generate a more general map of the principled pathways for Greenland. Some of the mechanisms in the analysis have striking similarities to the one suggested by Kjærgaard Rasmussen and Merkelsen, because it is the relational constellation of identities that organized the insights. The meta-analytical strategy of explicating very precisely what principles and assumptions of the theory are relaxed and for what purposes is a generally exemplary observation because it opens for a transparent follow up process of loosening and tightening these assumptions and thereby observe what they entail. It is fitting for a special issue where the mobilization of a theory has proven so productive for development of the theory, that it ends with an article that even develops general principles for one way to do such theory development.

An Arctic Regional Security Complex?

The primary Copenhagen School concept for looking at regions is that of 'regional security complex', and therefore it could have been expected that the special issue would include such an analysis. Fortunately, it doesn't because ultimately the Arctic is not a regional security complex. Nevertheless, it might be useful to reflect a little on the ways it comes close to and why it is not, and what that means, because this can actually help deepen the analysis in this special issue of the regional order, the article by Exner-Pirot and Murray that makes use of English School concepts of regional international society as primary lens.

In the original Copenhagen School presentation of the theory as well as the global map of regional security complexes (Buzan and Wæver 2003), the Arctic is not one of the security complexes. Recently, this has been challenged by several scholars who see it as either a mistake already back then or overtaken now by events. (Lanteigne 2016; Kluth and Lynggaard 2017) At first, the analyses presented in this special issue would seem to support this claim because indeed we find a lot of securitizations in the region

and they are interconnected, so this does look like a RSC, "a set of units whose major processes of securisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another" (ibid: 491). However, for theory internal and theory building reasons, Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) works with the premise that the RSCs are exclusive, i.e. not overlapping. It is a way to carve up the world into a map of regions. Thus, the question is whether the Arctic is the primary context for the dominant security problems of especially the major powers in the region, or it is secondary to their over-arching security dynamics. Here, the dominant RSC for Russia remains the post-Soviet one in combination with their participation in global level security. Similarly, the US is nested in North America and very active in global security. Seen from eg. Copenhagen, the main RSC is Europe. Thus, the Arctic should not be placed as a RSC. For the states mentioned, it is relatively easy to see how the Arctic can be treated as an additional arena where they interact with various actors from the same and different RSCs, much like inter-regional dynamics. However, the Arctic does raise some additional challenges to RSCT that can't be solved in the brief space here, not least due to the complications that emerge as especially Greenland becomes more and more of a state, and its primary security context is the Arctic. Also, the involvement of states from several RSCs means that it cannot be analyzed as a sub-complex in one RSC (Åtland 2007). As a temporary solution until this has been worked out, let us just notice 1) that the Arctic is not a RSC, and 2) the main players can all be placed on the global map in relation to both their own RSC and their relationship to other regions as well as the global level.

Exner-Pirot & Murray present an analysis of the Arctic through the classical English School concept of international society, and more specifically the more recent concept of regional international societies. A regional international society can differ from the simultaneous global one to the point where the same global powers have different relations to each other in the regional context than they have elsewhere. This is most helpful, especially given that the Arctic can't be analyzed as a RSC. However, some open questions in their analysis might be resolved through linking it to the RSC analysis.

What is ultimately the mechanisms in the regional international society that enables it to keep relationships among especially the great powers from fluctuating with general developments? Can this be achieved purely by normative/institutional means or does it demand also a channeling of power political impulses? The English School after all is different from American institutionalism both in its more thick constructivist and historicist elements but also in the opposite direction by including more realism and power politics (Wæver 2017). One element of how this is achieved involves a key role for region-specific actors in orchestrating. Possibly, this has some similarities to what was called the Nordic Balance during the Cold War. This was not a balance of power between either the local states or the superpower, it was a configuration of unexploited possible escalation (increased entry into the region), that the Nordic countries across their alliance divide could orchestrate to keep both super powers at a relative distance and thus preserve the Nordic sub-region as a low-tension area despite the fact that it was a part of a European

region with a higher level of tension. Similarly, the more local Arctic states need to be conscious about the challenge that stems from the great powers regularly having impulses that point towards militarization. Exner-Pirot & Murray offer a very helpful list of reasons why even the great powers actually have strong interests in cooperation and weak in rivalry in the region. However, it is a classical IR insight why such situations often turn sour nevertheless; joint absolute gains are often derailed by relative gains logic, even if not rational according to a conventional cost-benefit calculation. So, it is important to manage quite actively the potential spill-down from global dynamics.

Enter RSCT. To manage this downward pressure, one needs an analysis of the global system and the main regional-global interactions (Wæver 2017). Therefore, even if the Arctic is not one of the RSCs; it is important to know those regional and global dynamics that drive the main powers. Especially, it is useful to see how the balance has shifted from global to regional, and the global structure that has emerged in recent years has relatively weak global competitive dynamics, and have the main tensions located at the intersection of especially the post-Soviet region and the global level and between East Asia and global. This probably explains much of the restraint by great powers in the Arctic, but it is important for Arctic actors to keep up to date with this global analysis to be able to channel Great power impulses in the future as well.

A further premise for a regional international society to work is that the regional identity is sufficiently strong. Especially the introductory article by the editors places the Arctic in the context of the problematique of region building. As explained in *Regions and Powers* (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 48) Regional Security Complex Analysis is complementary to analyses of region-building, the two are not rivalling attempts to do the same. Studies of region-building explore how a regional identity gets established and consolidated. With some characteristic similarities and differences to nation-building, the imagined community of a region gets a social standing that in turn makes it more 'natural' to do all kinds of concrete things along those lines (Wæver 1993; Wæver 1997). Arguments about culture, history, geography etc. get articulated into a relative strengthening of this regional format compared to other affinities. This is complementary to RSCs (and security constellations), because they are about the actual interdependences among securitizations and actors might prefer to see their own region as different from the one that is practiced through security interactions, eg. Arab states preferring to see an Arab region (and/or an Islamic transnational community), instead of a Middle Eastern region that includes Israel and Iran, but when mapping interlocking securitizations, one ends up with the Middle East. Various region-building projects interact with the RSCs but one is not the key to the other; to one it is crucial how actors self-identify, to the other not. A regional international society will most likely depend on a regional identity.

Finally, as I surmised above, the concept from the Copenhagen School vocabulary that might be most productive in this context is the underused one of 'security constellation' (Buzan et al. 1998: 201-3; Buzan and Wæver 2003: 51f; Buzan and Wæver

2009). It is the network of securitizations and desecuritizations, interlinked both 'internally', when one enters the other ("It is a hostile act that they depict us as a threat") and when they interact in a more external, causal manner.

Four perspectives then supplement each other: region-building, regional international society, regional security complex and security constellation. They support each other primarily through the following links: region-building explores the extent to which regional identity takes shape. This in turn is an important pre-condition for managing a regional international society, especially when it is out of synch with Regional Security Complexes and therefore unable to develop strong security institutions and/or anchor stability in the general security outlook of the powers. The regional international society is the repository of norms and institutions that limit security rivalry and escalation, but again given that main actors are anchored outside the region, a particular task falls upon the regional actors in orchestrating figurations that make mutual restraint viable among powers that have at times a more tense relationship due to developments in other parts of the world. The RSC analysis offers a tool to grasp the drivers of powerful external actors that need to be orchestrated for the region to remain orderly and cooperative.

This special issue has demonstrated many ways that securitization analysis of the Arctic helps to capture regional security dynamics, but the analysis has also provided a productive arctification of securitization theory – a number of innovations that deserve to be applied to other parts of the world.

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ARTIKLER UDEN FOR TEMA

Hvordan skabes et alternativ? Om det radikale demokratis mulighedsbetingelser

Jannick Schou, ph.d.-stipendiat, Institut for Business IT, IT-Universitetet i København

Den belgiske politiske filosof Chantal Mouffe har over flere årtier udarbejdet en model for såkaldt radikalt demokrati. Hendes demokratiske model lægger vægt på konflikt, affekt og konstruktionen af kollektive identiteter som bærende elementer i et levende demokrati, og fungerer derved som et korrektiv til den eksisterende neoliberale orden. I denne artikel foretages en kritisk læsning af denne model ved at trække på begreber hentet fra den argentinske filosof Ernesto Laclaus del af diskursteorien. Derigennem problematiseres de underliggende mulighedsbetingelser som Mouffe baserer sin model på, hvilket fremadrettet kan danne grobund for yderligere radikaliseringer af det radikale demokrati.

Introduktion

Er der et alternativ til det nuværende neoliberale demokrati? Kan demokratiet styrkes, gøres mere inkluderende og mindre teknokratisk? Disse spørgsmål har til stadighed udgjort nogle af de grundlæggende problemkomplekser inden for politisk filosofi. Særligt venstrefløjen har tematiseret disse som et led i en kritik af det kapitalistiske system, blandt andet i form af Jürgen Habermas' (2009 [1962]) model for *deliberativt demokrati* samt Chantal Mouffes (2005; 2013) post-Marxistiske model for *radikalt demokrati* (Khan 2013; Karppinen, Moe og Svensson 2008; Kapoor 2002). Denne artikel foretager en analyse og diskussion af den sidstnævnte teori, nemlig Mouffes 'radikale og pluralistiske demokrati', også kaldet *agonistisk pluralisme*. Ved at trække på centrale begreber fra den argentinske filosof (og Mouffes mangeårige partner) Ernesto Laclau (1990; 1996) vil jeg foretage en teoretisk problematisering af det radikale demokratis *mulighedsbetingelser*. Mens Mouffes teoridannelse gradvist har vundet forskningsmæssigt indpas over de sidste tyve år (Tambakaki 2010; Dahlberg og Siapera 2007), har der ofte manglet en mere teoretisk diskussion af disse mulighedsbetingelser. Forskningen har alt for ofte ledt efter empiriske manifestationer af radikalt demokrati, i stedet for at spørge ind til Mouffes teoretiske og politiske fundament. Dette er problematisk af flere grunde. Først og fremmest fordi Mouffes eget værk netop tager udgangspunkt i en teoretisk dia-

log og dekonstruktion af andre modeller for demokrati. For det andet fordi realiseringen af et radikalt demokrati nødvendigvis må bygge på en refleksion over dets aktualiseringsmuligheder. Hvordan kan et alternativ skabes? Hvad er betingelserne for dette?

Ved at anvende diskursteorien på Mouffe selv bliver det delvist muligt at komme disse problemer i møde. Mouffe er af både biografiske og værkmæssige årsager tæt forbundet med Laclau. Udover at være gift var de også begge forfattere til bogen *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* fra 1985. Dette værk har sidenhen dannet grundlaget for ikke blot idéen om radikalt demokrati, men også post-Marxistisk diskursteori i bredere forstand (Howarth 2000; Smith 1998; Torfing 1999). Formålet med denne artikel er dog ikke at overføre Laclaus argumenter eller politiske ontologi til Mouffe. Ej heller at foretage en systematisk sammenligning af disse forfatterskaber (se eksempelvis Wenman 2003). Tilgangen består derimod i at bruge Laclaus koncepter som en form for sensibiliseringsværktøj, der kan hjælpe til at udbygge og viderearbejde Mouffes model. Det er et kritisk konstruktivt snarere end evaluerende eller dekonstruerende projekt, denne artikel er ude i. Jeg vil sætte fokus på de grundlæggende forudsætninger, som Mouffe lægger til grund for sin model, og herigennem spørge, om hendes teoretisering går langt nok.

Artiklens argument er, at det radikale demokrati beror på to mulighedsbetingelser: (1) en fælles konfliktuel konsensus om 'liberty' og 'equality' som tomme universalier, samt (2) en fælles tillid til demokratiets bærende institutioner. I denne artikel vil jeg forsøge at vise, hvordan disse to betingelser dog også fremstår delvist uafklarede i Mouffes forfatterskab. Artiklens argument er således, at Mouffe har en tendens til at underkende disse betingelsers indbyggede politiske implikationer. Hverken Mouffes tomme universalier eller demokratiets eksisterende institutioner er neutrale størrelser. De er derimod – formuleret med Laclaus diskursteoriske begreber – udtryk for sedimenterede og delvist neutraliserede diskurser. Som sådan må de betragtes som dybt *politiske* størrelser med deres egen indbyggede historik og eget normative grundlag. Mouffe overser eller afskriver for mig at se alt for ofte disse strukturelle betingelser. På denne måde risikerer radikalt demokrati at blive en affirmativ model, der ikke så meget indvarsler en transformation af de nuværende diskurser som deres reproduktion. Artiklens argument er, at Laclaus værk tillader os at se disse uklarheder og derved arbejde mod en fremadrettet radikalisering af det radikale demokrati. Artiklen bidrager til den voksende forskning om alternativ politisk deltagelse (Dahlberg og Siapera 2007; Howarth, Norval og Stavrakakis 2000; Norval 2007; Smith 1998; Husted 2015) og diskursteorien som politisk filosofi (Marchart 2007; Critchley og Marchart 2004; Schou 2016; Dahlberg 2014). Ved at undersøge det radikale demokratis mulighedsbetingelser giver artiklen en større klarhed over, hvad Mouffes model indeholder og ekskluderer. Det bliver derved muligt at viderebygge og radikalisere hendes politiske projekt fremadrettet.

Radikalt demokrati som politisk projekt

Mouffes model for demokrati blev for alvor lanceret i 1985 med *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* skrevet i fællesskab med Laclau. På dette tidspunkt blev betegnelsen radikalt demokrati ('radical democracy') brugt til at rammesætte hendes projekt. I en række senere publikationer, såsom *The Return of the Political* (1993)*, The Democratic Paradox* (2005a [2000]), *On the Political* (2005b) og *Agonistics* (2013) er det dog navnlig betegnelserne 'agonistic pluralism' eller en 'agonistic model of democracy', der bliver anvendt. På trods af disse semantiske forskydninger er grundidéen dog forblevet relativt stabil over tid. Der er ifølge Mouffe tale om et korrektiv til den 'liberale tradition' (personificeret ved Habermas og Rawls), en intervention i den neoliberale orden (Mouffe 2005) og et forsøg på at bryde med de stadigt mere deterministiske modeller, som den Marxistiske tradition tog udgangspunkt i mod slutningen af 1960'erne og 1970'erne. I modsætning til den ortodokse Marxistiske opfattelse af social transformation – der ser dette som et udtryk for et tiltagende antagonistisk forhold mellem forskellige klasser – tager Mouffe udgangspunkt i en radikalisering og udbygning af det *eksisterende* demokrati. Overgangen til et mere inkluderende demokrati sker ikke automatisk, og det kræver ikke en fuldstændig omvæltning af samfundets strukturer. Hvorfor der specifikt er tale om et opgør med neoliberalismen, vil jeg vende tilbage til senere. Først vil jeg dog gennemgå hovedtrækkene i Mouffes teori.

Grundlaget for Mouffes arbejde er en udvidet forståelse af det politiske. Hun indfører derfor en sondring mellem 'politics' og 'the political'. I denne distinktion refererer 'politics' til den helhed af diskurser, praksisser og institutioner, der til daglig forbindes med det institutionaliserede politiske system: "the ensemble of practices, discourses and institutions, which seek to establish a certain order and organize human coexistence" (Mouffe 2005, 101). Over for dette defineres 'the political' som et ontologisk grundvilkår: "By 'the political' I refer to the dimension of antagonism that is inherent in human relations" (Mouffe 2005, 101). Mens 'politics' altså udgør et regionalt fænomen – en afgrænset historisk helhed af institutioner og praksisformer – er 'the political' et kvasi-transcendent vilkår. Der er indbygget et vist antagonistisk konfliktpotentiale i alle menneskelige relationer og i al konstruktion af mening.

Mouffe opfatter grundlæggende demokratiet som et kollektivt anliggende, der handler om at skabe fælles former for identifikation. Demokratiet kan ikke reduceres til et rent individuelt projekt eller en aggregering af individuelle interesser: "democratic logics always entail drawing a frontier between 'us' and 'them', those who belong to the 'demos' and those who are outside it. This is the condition for the very exercise of democratic rights" (Mouffe 2005, 4). Dette argument bygger dels på Carl Schmitts (2007 [1932]) forståelse af det politiske som en grænsedragning mellem et 'os' (ven) og et 'dem' (fjende). Men det tager samtidig også sit udgangspunkt i Jacques Derrida og dekonstruktionen. Hvis konstruktionen af en identitet altid er defineret ud fra dens relation til noget *uden for* denne, vil der altid være et "konstituerende ydre" (Mouffe 2013, 4-6). At skabe kollektive identiteter indebærer derfor nødvendigvis et forhold mellem et indre ('vi') og et ydre ('dem'). Både det indre og det ydre kan kun eksistere i kraft af deres relation til hinanden. Derfor begår den liberale tradition ifølge Mouffe en fejl, når den

reducerer demokratiet til individet som en autonom størrelse, eller blot summerer individuelle interesser. Det kollektive kan ikke reduceres til en aggregering af enheder: det er derimod en relation og en grænsedragning.

Demokrati er samtidig grundlæggende *konfliktfyldt* for Mouffe. Der er aldrig blot tale om en teknisk afvejning af fordele og ulemper ved en given politisk problemstilling. Derimod er politiske spørgsmål udtryk for et valg imellem forskellige, internt modstridende forestillinger om det politiske fællesskab: "Proper political questions always involve decisions that require making a choice between conflicting alternatives" (Mouffe 2013, 3). For Mouffe er det netop dette konfliktpotentiale, som den liberale tænkning ikke kan indeholde og derved prøver at undertrykke. Ifølge den handler politisk praksis om at nå konsensus og enighed ud fra fastlagte procedurer. Derved bliver konflikt afmonteret og ekskluderet fra starten.

Den liberale tradition har samtidig også undertrykt følelser, affekt og passion som legitime og nødvendige dele af demokratiet. Ifølge Mouffe tager hverken Habermas eller Rawls højde for disse elementer i deres teoridannelse. Hvis der skal bygges en ny model for demokratiet – en måde, der kan gøre den demokratiske dialog dybere, øge deltagelse og mindske undertrykkelsen af forskelle – er det derfor nødvendigt at indarbejde *affekt* som et grundlæggende vilkår i demokratisk deltagelse. Konflikter mobiliserer affekt, og et levende demokrati har brug for mobiliseringen af det affektive. Ellers er der ifølge Mouffe en risiko for, at det ender i en ren teknokratisk situation, hvor folket får en apatisk holdning til det politiske system.

Spørgsmålet er nu, ud fra disse kritikpunkter af alle de elementer der traditionelt set ikke kan indeholdes i demokratiet, hvordan der kan etableres en model, der på en og samme tid tager hensyn til *antagonisme* og *konflikt* fremfor konsensus og orden, *affekt* og *passioner* fremfor rendyrket fornuft samt *pluralisme* og *kollektivisme* fremfor aggregeret individualisme. Det er ifølge Mouffe klart, at eksempelvis Habermas' procedurale forståelse af deliberativt demokrati ikke kan indeholde disse elementer. Så hvordan kan disse *genindsættes* som ikke blot supplementære dele af demokratiet, men derimod som en del af dets grundlæggende konstitution? Det, der særligt gør dette spørgsmål vanskeligt, er forholdet mellem det antagonistiske og det pluralistiske: Mens antagonisme 'forenkler' det sociale (se Laclau og Mouffe 2014, 117) ved at splitte det op i lejre, handler pluralisme grundlæggende om at kunne rumme mangfoldighed. Hvordan kan kompleksitet bevares i et system, der som grundvilkår søger at reducere dette?

Mouffes svar er en agonistisk model for demokrati. Ifølge Mouffe anerkender en sådan model først og fremmest, at magt og magtrelationer spiller en afgørende rolle for demokratiet. Det betyder først og fremmest, at eksisterende magtrelationer skal omformes, så subjekter, der historisk set ikke har haft adgang til den offentlige sfære og demokratisk deltagelse, får øget indflydelse (Mouffe 2005, 99). Men magtrelationer skal samtidig ikke ses som noget, der kan afskaffes eller fjernes. Som Mouffe (2005, 22) skriver: "To acknowledge the existence of relations of power and the need to transform them, while renouncing the illusion that we could free ourselves completely from power – this is what is specific to the project that we have called 'radical and plural democra-

cy'." Radikalt demokrati handler dermed ikke om at stoppe eller forhindre magtrelationer, men derimod om at skabe institutionelle rum, hvori konflikt kan indeholdes. Dette leder Mouffe til at skitsere sin model for agonistisk pluralisme på følgende vis:

> "the aim of democratic politics is to construct the 'them' in such a way that it is no longer perceived as an enemy to be destroyed, but as an 'adversary', that is, somebody whose ideas we combat but whose right to defend those ideas we do not put into question. (…) An adversary is an enemy, but a legitimate enemy, one with whom we have some common ground because we have a shared adhesion to the ethico-political principles of liberal democracy: liberty and equality." (Mouffe 2013, 102)

Denne 'adversary' er det, der definer *agonisme.* Mens antagonisme er en kamp mellem fjender, er agonisme en kamp mellem 'adversaries'. Formålet med det radikale demokrati er derfor at omforme antagonisme til agonisme. I stedet for at udrydde konflikt skal den anvendes produktivt som selve motoren for demokratiet. Ved at give plads til agonisme – som et centralt led i demokratiets konstitution – kan Mouffe samtidig også give plads til affekt, passioner og konflikt. Demokratiet bliver et rum, hvor der er mulighed for kontinuerlige kampe, hvis formål er at forhandle eller reproducere bestemte hegemoniske ordner. På denne måde er demokratiet aldrig givet på forhånd, men skabes derimod i agonistiske møder mellem kollektive identiteter, der har et fælles grundlag, men er uenige om udformningen af partikulære politiske spørgsmål. Det er netop disse *fælles mulighedsbetingelser* som jeg undersøger nærmere i det følgende. Hvilke konditioner opstiller Mouffe egentlig for implementeringen af agonisme og radikalt demokrati? Hvad skal der til for at skabe dette alternativ?

Det radikale demokratis mulighedsbetingelser

Før vi nærmer os disse spørgsmål, bør vi dog først undersøge, hvorfor det netop er det *neo*liberale, som Mouffe spiller op imod. Er der noget specifikt ved denne "hegemoniske diskurs", der gør den særligt problematisk i forhold til Mouffes politiske projekt? Mouffe går sjældent ind i en reel beskrivelse af, hvad hun egentlig forstår ved neoliberalisme som politisk og økonomisk projekt. I *The Democratic Paradox* fra 2000 beskrives det neoliberale dog på følgende vis:

> "From the political standpoint what guides me is the conviction that the unchallenged hegemony of neo-liberalism represents a threat for democratic institutions. Neo-liberal dogmas about the unviolable [*sic*] rights of property, the all-encompassing virtues of the market and the dangers of interfering with its logics constitute nowadays the 'com-

> mon sense' in liberal-democratic societies and they are having a profound impact on the left, as many left parties are moving to the right and euphemistically redefining themselves as 'centre-left'." (Mouffe 2000, 6)

Neoliberalisme bliver altså her karakteriseret af Mouffe som værende en form for 'common sense', der sætter markedets logikker og privat ejendomsret over alle andre principper. Der er tale om, hvad særligt den foucauldianske forskning inden for neoliberalisme har kaldt for et normativt system eller en bestemt form for rationalitet (se Brown 2015; Dardot og Laval 2013). Som 'common sense' udvisker neoliberalismen sin egen kontingens, og kommer til at fremstå som om "there is no alternative to the existing order" (Mouffe 2005, 31). Samtidig understreger Mouffe også, at denne orden udgør en trussel mod de demokratiske institutioner. Dette skyldes ifølge Mouffe to grundlæggende træk ved det neoliberale system.

For det første vægter neoliberalismen *den liberale tradition* over den *demokratiske*. Ifølge Mouffe (2013, 123) har det liberale demokrati historisk set været en forening af to (delvist modsatrettede) traditioner: En *liberal,* der har lagt vægt på frihed og pluralisme, og en *demokratisk,* som fokuserer på lighed og folkelig suverænitet. Disse to traditioner har ifølge Mouffe eksisteret i et kontinuerligt modsætningsforhold, hvor særligt frihed og lighed har stået over for hinanden. Det neoliberale hegemoni har dog forskudt denne balance, så den demokratiske tradition i stigende grad er blevet udfaset:

> "What has happened under neo-liberal hegemony is that the liberal component has become so dominant that democratic values have been eviscerated. Several previous democratic advances have been dismantled, and under the motto of 'modernization', core democratic values have been dismissed as 'archaic'. (…) [I]t is clear that the situation has drastically worsened under neo-liberal hegemony" (Mouffe 2013, 124).

For det andet er neoliberalismen også en trussel for demokratiet, fordi det implicerer en gradvis *neutralisering* af politisk konflikt og forskellighed. Det neoliberale hegemoni ekskluderer og delegitimerer politisk opposition: "[t]he status quo has become naturalized and made into the way 'things really are'" (Mouffe 2000, 5). Der er tale om en "post-political trend […] [that] deprives democratic citizens of an agonistic debate where they can make their voices heard and choose between real alternatives" (2013, 119). På denne måde går Mouffes kritik altså *specifikt* på det neoliberale: dels fordi det *prioriterer* den liberale tradition fremfor den demokratiske, og dels fordi det annullerer politisk konflikt. Agonistisk pluralisme, der netop ser konflikt, affekt og deltagelse som grundsten i et velfungerende demokrati, bliver på denne måde et korrektiv til den neoliberale afmontering og neutralisering af politisk kamp.

Spørgsmålet er imidlertid: Hvordan kan det eksisterende demokrati transformeres? Hvad er mulighedsbetingelserne for radikalt demokrati? I den ovenstående tekst fremhævede jeg, hvordan Mouffe forstår bevægelsen fra antagonisme til agonisme. Mens den *antagonistiske* relation er konstrueret rundt om 'den anden' som en fjende, der skal udslettes, drejer den *agonistiske* sig om at se den anden som en legitim modstander ('the adversary'). Det er en medspiller, der opererer inden for samme demokratiske spilleplade. Denne sidste del er vigtig. Mouffe fremhæver netop, at agonisme kræver visse fælles mulighedsbetingelser: "while in conflict, they [adversaries] see themselves as belonging to the *same political association, as sharing a common symbolic space within which the conflict takes place*" (2005, 20, min fremhævning). Det betyder, at politisk konflikt altid skal virke inden for "conditions regulated by a set of democratic procedures accepted by the adversaries" (2005, 21). Mouffe fremhæver i denne forbindelse særligt to træk, der udgør de grundlæggende mulighedsbetingelser for hendes demokratiske model: "Consensus is needed on the institutions that are constitutive of liberal democracy and on the ethico-political values that should inform political association" (2013, 8). Enhver mulighed for realiseringen af det radikale demokrati beror altså på en fælles konsensus om de demokratiske institutioner og en række etisk-politiske værdier.

Disse etisk-politiske værdier bliver andre steder specificeret: "liberty and equality constitute the political principles of a liberal democratic regime and should be at the core of a theory of justice in modern democracy" (Mouffe 1993, 52); "consensus is needed on (…) liberty and equality for all" (2005, 31) samt "[a] democratic society requires the allegiance of its citizens to a set of shared ethico-political principles […] and it cannot allow the coexistence of conflicting principles of legitimacy in the midst" (2005, 122). 'Liberty' og 'equality' skal altså ifølge Mouffe udgøre de etisk-politiske grundværdier for det radikale demokrati. Dette betyder dog ikke nødvendigvis, at deres betydning eller indhold skal være fastlagt på forhånd. Det skal derimod være muligt at mobilisere konfliktfyldte fortolkninger af, hvad disse begreber indeholder. 'Liberty' og 'equality' bliver derved en form for tomme universalier. Konsensus om disse skal være en konfliktuel konsensus. De er således på en gang *uden for konflikt* og *genstanden for konflikt.* En fælles forpligtelse til disse to begreber udgør det radikale demokratis første mulighedsbetingelse.

Den anden mulighedsbetingelse omhandler de demokratiske institutioner. Omformningen af det nuværende demokrati sker ikke automatisk. Det kræver aktive handlinger, politisk engagement og udformningen af kollektive identiteter. I denne forbindelse er det for Mouffe centralt, at dette sker *igennem* de nuværende politiske institutioner. Mouffe udbygger dette i en mere direkte kritik af Michael Hardt og Antonio Negris (2004) forestilling om 'Multituden'. Hun anser deres model for at være en 'tilbagetrækningsstrategi': "In contrast to this strategy of 'withdrawal', I want to offer a different conception of radical politics envisaged in terms of 'engagement' with institutions, with the aim of bringing about a different hegemony" (Mouffe 2013, 71). Dette engagement leder til en form for reformering igennem institutionerne:

> “The exodus approach denies the possibility of a counter-hegemonic struggle within the institutions that disarticulates the constitutive elements of neo-liberal hegemony. It perceives all institutions as monolithic representatives of the forces to be destroyed, and every attempt to transform them is dismissed as reformist illusion. The strategy advocated is one of ’desertion’ and of the creation of new social relations outside the existing institutional framework. What is foreclosed is an immanent critique of institutions, whose objective is to transform them into a terrain for contesting the hegemonic order.” (Mouffe 2013, 100)

For Mouffe handler det altså om at skabe en immanent kritik gennem institutionerne. Demokratiets parlamentariske institutioner er for hende en grundlæggende præmis for etableringen af agonisme og radikalt demokrati. I et forsøg på at underbygge dette argument skriver Mouffe (2013, 23), at det parlamentariske systems sammenbrud i nazi-Tyskland var stærkt medvirkende til, at jøderne blev artikuleret som en antagonistisk ’Anden’ der skulle udryddes: ”This, I think, is something worth meditating on for left-wing opponents of parliamentary democracy!” Mouffe anser derfor den egentlige kritik af det eksisterende regime som ”a call for a radicalization of liberal democratic institutions, not for their rejection” (2013, 119-120). Det betyder også, at ”the real task (…) is to foster allegiance to our democratic institutions” (Mouffe 1993, 151). Mulighedsbetingelse nummer to er altså en grundlæggende tillid til det demokratiske systems institutioner.

Ernesto Laclaus politiske ontologi

Efter at have redegjort for Mouffes position i det ovenstående vil jeg i dette afsnit vende mig mod Ernesto Laclau. Jeg vil argumentere for, at en række centrale begreber fra den laclauianske del af diskursteorien gør det muligt at udbygge og viderearbejde dele af Mouffes teoridannelse. Udgangspunktet for dette er i første omgang en behandling af Laclaus differentiering mellem ’the political’ og ’the social’. Denne distinktion minder til dels om Mouffes, og hendes begrebspar er faktisk til tider blevet anvendt til at beskrive Laclaus værk (herom, se Marchart 2007). I *New Reflections on The Revolution of Our Times* fra 1990 udfolder Laclau dog forskellen mellem ’the political’ og ’the social’ på en måde, der fremstår væsentligt forskelligt fra Mouffe.

For Laclau såvel som Mouffe har ’the political’ primat. Deres fælles sociale ontologi er derved grundlæggende en *politisk* ontologi (Laclau og Mouffe 2014; Laclau 1990; Marchart 2007). Men mens ’the political’ for Mouffe udgør en altid potentiel antagonisme, der er til stede i alle sociale relationer, peger Laclaus brug i en lidt anden retning. Han beskriver således ’the political’ som “[t]he moment of antagonism where

the undecidable nature of the alternatives and their resolution through power relations becomes fully visible" (Laclau 1990, 35); "the moment of original institution of the social [which] is the point at which its contingency is *revealed,* since the institution (…) is only possible through the repression of options that were equally open" (Laclau 1990, 34, oprindelig fremhævning) og "the original act of institution" (Laclau 1990, 35). 'The political' udgør det øjeblik, hvor en beslutning bliver truffet mellem forskellige mulige valg. I det øjeblik beslutningen bliver truffet, fremstår verden kontingent og principielt set åben. Den kunne være anderledes. Hvis produktionen af mening aldrig kan spores tilbage til 'fast' grund, men derimod er en historisk konstruktion, udgør 'the political' et helt grundlæggende moment i Laclaus politiske ontologi. Det er øjeblikket, hvor bestemte meningssystemer bliver indstiftet. Det politiskes "essens" er ifølge Laclau netop denne indstiftende beslutning, hvor der sondres mellem det inkluderede og det ekskluderede (Laclau 1990, 160).

I hverdagen fremstår verden dog ikke nødvendigvis politisk, åben og kontingent (Laclau 2005, 154). Den er derimod udgjort af mere eller mindre 'objektive' strukturer, der virker neutrale og de-politiserede. For Laclau dækker 'the social' netop over dette: "the sedimented forms of 'objectivity' make up the field of what we will call the 'social'" (Laclau 1990, 35). Sedimentering er et begreb, Laclau henter fra Edmund Husserl, og det dækker over en forglemmelse eller neutralisering af de indstiftende operationer: "the routinization and forgetting of the origins" (Laclau 1990, 34). Bevægelsen fra 'the political' til 'the social' kan ses som en sedimenteringsproces, der får det kontingente til at fremstå naturligt eller nødvendigt. I denne proces glemmes det, at alle strukturer er blevet produceret og konstrueret. På denne måde skjules alle de bagvedliggende magtkampe, der har været impliceret i produktionen af mening over tid.

Laclau understreger vigtigheden af distinktionen mellem 'the political' og 'the social'. Der er ikke blot tale om et historisk eller regionalt fænomen, men om *ontologiske* grundvilkår, der dækker for al mening og alle sociale relationer: "social relations are constituted by the very distinction between the social and the political. (…) The distinction between the social and the political is thus ontologically constitutive of social relations" (Laclau 1990, 35).

Det er i denne forbindelse vigtigt at påpege *forskellen* mellem Laclau og Mouffes begrebspar. Selvom deres respektive distinktioner udspringer af en lang række fælles forudsætninger, så *betoner* de forskellige perspektiver. Hos Laclau er både 'the political' og 'the social' ontologiske størrelser. Verden er på en gang og til alle tider givet i spændet mellem disse to. Hos Mouffe er antagonismen derimod altid potentiel. Selvom al form for mening er baseret på eksklusion og et 'konstituerende ydre', så er der ikke nødvendigvis tale om en antagonistisk relation. 'The political' bliver for hende en altid potentiel antagonisme i sociale relationer. Laclaus konceptualisering af samme begreb forekommer i denne forbindelse ret anderledes: det er det diskursives (af)grund eller indstiftende øjeblik. I modsætning til Laclaus 'the social' omhandler Mouffes forståelse af 'politics' derudover ikke et ontologisk niveau. Det er derimod en samlebetegnelse for en række bestemte praksisser, diskurser og institutioner. Der kan altså godt være en ver-

den uden 'politics', men ikke en verden uden 'the social'. Og omvendt kan 'politics' godt være en del af 'the social' (hvilket det på mange måder ofte vil være), men den sidstnævnte betegnelse kan også dække over en lang række andre praksisfelter. Tabel 1 illustrerer disse forskelle. I det følgende vil jeg genbesøge mulighedsbetingelserne for Mouffes model for radikalt demokrati igennem dette laclauianske begrebspar. Den subtile forskydning, der åbner sig imellem Laclau og Mouffes respektive distinktioner, gør det muligt at se det radikale demokratis mulighedsbetingelser fra en anden vinkel.

Mouffe	**The Political** Altid potentiel antagonisme i sociale relationer *Ontologisk*	**Politics** Det system af praksisser og institutioner, der historisk set er blevet forbundet med politik *Ontisk*
Laclau	**The Political** Det øjeblik, hvor der sondres mellem inde og ude, inklusion og eksklusion *Ontologisk*	**The Social** En neutralisering, forglemmelse og institutionalisering af 'the political' *Ontologisk*

Tabel 1: Forskel mellem Mouffe og Laclau

Det radikale demokratis mulighedsbetingelser og deres tærskel

I den ovenstående gennemgang af Mouffes model for radikalt demokrati viste jeg, hvordan hun særligt insisterer på to mulighedsbetingelser. For det første at der til grund for konflikt i et radikalt demokrati skal være konfliktuel konsensus om demokratiets grundlæggende etisk-politiske værdier: 'liberty' og 'equality'. For det andet at transformationen af det neoliberale demokrati bør ske gennem demokratiets eksisterende institutioner. Mouffes kontinuerlige forpligtelse på disse to mulighedsbetingelser kan på mange måder ses som et forsøg på at forene 'the political' og 'politics'. Hvordan kan den altid potentielle antagonisme i sociale relationer håndteres inden for det demokrati-

ske system på en produktiv måde? Mouffes svar: ved at omforme antagonisme til agonisme ud fra nogle fælles demokratiske mulighedsbetingelser. Spørgsmålet er imidlertid, hvordan disse betingelser tager sig ud, hvis de bliver set igennem Laclaus politiske ontologi.

Som beskrevet i ovenstående udgør 'liberty' og 'equality' en form for 'tomme universalier' hos Mouffe. Ifølge hende bør de danne fælles ramme om det radikale demokrati. Men hvor kommer disse begreber egentlig fra? Og hvorfor er det netop disse og ikke andre, der bør danne fundamentet for radikalt demokrati? Her peger Mouffe på *traditionens rolle* (Mouffe 1993, 15-18). Traditionen implicerer for Mouffe en historisering af samtidens begreber. Vi er på en gang formet og indsat i historien ifølge Mouffe. På denne måde bliver 'liberty' og 'equality' historiske størrelser, der over tid har konstitueret hjørnestenen i det liberale demokrati. Begreberne kommer altså fra den politiske filosofis historie. Samtidig understreger hun også, at betydningen af disse begreber ikke er fastlåst. Der *bør* netop være plads til forskellige fortolkninger og forståelser af dette begrebspar. Derfor bliver disse universalier tømt for iboende og essentielt indhold. Men indeholder ikke også den neoliberale diskurs i høj grad en fortolkning af 'liberty' og 'equality'? Selvom Mouffe har en tendens til at argumentere for, at det neoliberale system opsplitter og ødelægger disse to begreber, så er spørgsmålet, om sagen er helt så lige til. Bygger neoliberalismen virkelig på en total afmontering af 'liberty' og 'equality'? Eller er der i højere grad tale om, at Mouffe ikke er enig i dette systems artikulation af disse begreber, og *derfor* affejer det neoliberale projekt? Med andre ord og mere substantielt: Hvor går grænsen egentlig for, hvad disse begreber kan betyde? Hvis *meningen* af 'liberty' og 'equality' principielt set er kontingent og åben, så betyder det også at fortolkningen og forståelsen af disse kan variere enormt. Men hvor stor en elasticitet har disse begreber, når det kommer til stykket? Hvor langt kan de trækkes fra 'traditionens' opfattelse af disse, før de ikke længere kan kategoriseres som 'værende' disse betegnere? For mig at se er problemet her, at Mouffe på den ene side understreger elasticiteten i begreberne 'liberty' og 'equality'. Men på den anden side påpeger Mouffe dog netop også traditionen og disse begrebers historik. Disse begreber er altså både *uden for* det konfliktuelle – idet de skal danne et fælles grundlag – men de er også en *del af* det konfliktuelle, idet de er åbne for forskellige perspektiver. Som 'tomme universalier' skal begreberne sættes i en form for historisk parentes. Vi skal glemme deres tradition for derigennem at gøre dem åbne for divergerende fortolkninger. Men grunden til at disse begreber er vigtige, er netop på grund af deres historiske betydning. 'Liberty' og 'equality' er altså på én og samme tid *inden for* og *uden for* aksen mellem 'the political' og 'the social': de er indlejret i traditionens sedimenterede strukturer, men konceptualiseres samtidig også, som om de er åbne, kontingente og elastiske.

Mouffes anden mulighedsbetingelse indbefatter de demokratiske institutioners rolle. Som tidligere beskrevet anser Mouffe demokratiets institutioner som en fuldstændig bærende del af hendes projekt. For Mouffe handler det om at omforme det politiske system *gennem* institutionerne. Hun har dog en ret konsistent tendens til at tilsidesætte disse politiske institutioners normative og sedimenterede strukturer i hendes beskrivel-

ser af det radikale demokrati. Men hvis vi skal følge Laclaus begrebsbrug, så bør det nuværende demokratis politiske institutioner netop ses som en del af 'the social', idet de er et kerneelement i reproduktionen af det neoliberale demokratis grundlæggende normative strukturer. Institutionerne – og de logikker og praksisser, som de fordrer, – er produktet af bestemte magtkampe, der har fundet sted over tid. De er lige så diskursive som tekst og sprog. Og de indeholder derfor bestemte måder at indrette og forme praksisser, der er gjort 'usynlige', 'neutrale' og 'objektive' over tid. Fælles forpligtelse på de demokratiske institutioner bliver derved også en implicit forpligtelse på de sedimenterede strukturer, som disse udgør.

Mouffe er ikke blind over for dette. I *On the Political* – hvor hun rent faktisk eksplicit trækker på Laclaus distinktion mellem 'the political' og 'the social' (Mouffe 2005, 17-18) – påpeger hun, hvorledes "society is always politically instituted", hvorfor vi ikke må glemme, at "the terrain in which hegemonic interventions take place is always the outcome of previous hegemonic practices and that it is never a neutral one" (Mouffe 2005, 34). Mouffe er altså langt hen ad vejen enig i, at de politiske institutioner ikke blot er neutrale, men derimod udtryk for bestemte diskurser, der er blevet sedimenteret over tid. På trods af dette har hun en tendens til at identificere det radikale demokrati med, hvad vi kan kalde for politisk *praksis* i snæver forstand. I sidste ende synes Mouffe nemlig mest interesseret i konfrontationen mellem forskellige forståelser og meningssystemer. Det er den åbne, affektive og konfliktfyldte kamp mellem diskursive projekter, hun lægger vægt på:

> "Instead of trying to design the institutions which, through supposedly 'impartial' procedures, would reconcile all conflicting interests and values, the task for democratic theorists and politicians should be to envision the creation of a vibrant 'agonistic' public sphere of contestation where different hegemonic political projects can be confronted. This is, in my view, the *sine qua non* for an effective exercise of democracy." (Mouffe 2005, 3, oprindelig fremhævning)

Ordet 'exercise' er vigtigt i denne passage: Demokrati er *noget der gøres* i mødet mellem hegemoniske projekter. Det handler om "the [...] practices of democratic politics" (Mouffe 2005, 9) og såkaldte "democratic 'language-games' " (Mouffe 2005, 33). Institutionerne skal derved omformes gennem "the discourses, the practices, the 'language games' that produce democratic 'subject positions'." (Mouffe 1993, 151). Mouffe er altså ikke blind over for institutionernes rolle, men hendes teoretisering synes alligevel ikke at dække disse. Det er som om, de konstant glider i baggrunden. Hun nævner dem ofte *en passant* og går herefter videre til at beskrive den demokratiske konfrontation som et sprogspil eller praksis. Men hvordan, kan man spørge, rammesætter bestemte sedimenterede institutioner egentlig mulighederne for politisk praksis? Hvad er forholdet mellem nye former for radikaliserede politiske praksisser og de eksisterende institutionelle rammer? Er det eksempelvis muligt at forestille sig nye måder at skabe politisk

konfrontation, *uden* at de politiske institutioner ændres? Og endnu mere substantielt: Nødvendiggør det radikale demokrati et opgør med den neoliberale orden, eller er Mouffes model mulig inden for dette systems eksisterende institutionelle rammer? For mig at se anderkender Mouffe således, hvordan institutionerne indgår som en del af 'the social'. Men samtidig har hun dog også en tendens til at afskrive betydningen af dette i hendes konkrete beskrivelser af politisk praksis. Ved at gøre f.eks. Hardt og Negri til repræsentanter for en tilbagetrækningsstrategi – der ser på hele det institutionelle apparat som et monolitisk og uforanderligt maskineri – er Mouffe også med til at undgå disse mere komplicerede spørgsmål. Er der vitterligt ikke en tredje vej imellem fuldstændig tilbagetrækning og institutionel neutralisering?

Konklusion: Hvordan skabes et alternativ?

Denne artikel har forsøgt at foretage en relativt afgrænset manøvre. Den har problematiseret mulighedsbetingelserne for den politiske filosof Chantal Mouffes model for radikalt demokrati igennem begreber lånt fra Ernesto Laclaus del af diskursteorien. Selvom deres individuelle forfatterskaber udspringer af en række fælles forudsætninger og argumenter, så har de alligevel udviklet sig i forskellige retninger. Gennem en relativt fintmasket gennemgang af Mouffes model for radikalt demokrati har jeg vist og diskuteret de mulighedsbetingelser, der ligger til grund for hendes politiske projekt. Jeg har derudover demonstreret, hvordan Laclaus distinktion mellem 'the political' og 'the social' kan virke som en løftestang til en problematisering af disse betingelser. Så hvad er denne artikels implikationer?

Først og fremmest peger den på en grundlæggende spænding, der både kan findes hos Mouffe og Laclau: nemlig forholdet mellem anti-essentialisme og normativitet. På den ene side betoner de begge, hvorledes mening aldrig kan forankres i en fast og ahistorisk grund, men derimod altid er produktet af historiske interventioner og forsøg på at etablere hegemoniske projekter. Der er altså tale om en kritik af universalier og tilsyneladende objektive diskurser. Men samtidig holder de også fast i, at venstrefløjen skal og bør være i stand til at udarbejde nye normative politiske projekter. Problemet ved dette er, at sådanne normative projekter netop har brug for fast grund under fødderne. Forestillingen om 'traditionen' som Mouffe trækker på – og som i øvrigt også kan findes hos Laclau (1990) – udgør et forsøg på at koble det anti-essentialistiske og det normative. Men det kræver også en yderligere eksplicitering. Hvornår kan venstrefløjen ikke længere stå inde for den måde, hvorpå traditionen approprieres af eksempelvis neoliberale kræfter? Hvor går grænsen for, hvad traditionens begreber kan indeholde? Og hvem trækker disse grænser? Selvom vi ikke skal lade os fange i absolutte krav om eksempelvis Fornuft som eneste legitime princip (se Howarth 2000), så er traditionens rolle stadig ambivalent i Mouffes politiske projekt. Er venstrefløjen og den liberale traditions grundlæggende værdier overhovedet så sammenfaldende, som de ofte fremstår hos Mouffe?

Dernæst så peger artiklen på en spænding mellem institutionel forandring og konservering. Dette forhold er ikke kun aktuelt i forhold til en rent intern læsning af Mouffes værk. Spørgsmålet går derimod igen i store dele af den kritiske venstrefløjs politiske filosofi. Er det muligt at bevare grundinstitutionerne i det eksisterende demokrati og samtidig forandre måden, hvorpå det praktiseres? Kan disse aspekter overhovedet skilles ad? Den slovenske filosof Slavoj Žižek (2000a, b) har af flere omgange kritiseret Mouffe (og Laclau) for at glemme den egentlige kritik af det kapitalistiske system og økonomien. Ved at fokusere på politiske forskelle og diskursive kampe neutraliseres kritikken af den politiske økonomi ifølge Žižek. Demokratisk konflikt og deliberation er sådan set fint, men hvordan er dette med til at forandre institutionelt forankrede forhold i den politiske økonomi? Andre forfattere på venstrefløjen, såsom Dardot og Laval (2013), har også kritiseret forestillinger om 'participatory' og radikalt demokrati for simpelthen ikke at gå langt nok i opgøret med det neoliberale systems hegemoni. Et forsvar for det liberale demokrati kan ikke være venstrefløjens sidste bastion ifølge disse forfattere. Der er brug for andre former for intervention. Andre politiske værktøjer, der genopfinder demokratiet.

Denne artikels pointe er mindre bombastisk. Gennem en læsning af Mouffe *med* Laclau står Mouffes fokus på politisk *praksis* snarere end institutionel transformation tydeligere frem. Selvom Mouffe ikke er blind over for hverken institutioner eller sedimenteringen af politiske magtkampe, så har hun alligevel en tendens til at gøre det radikale demokrati til et diskursivt sprogspil. Det fremstår derfor ofte som om, at det radikale demokrati skal indføres i en institutionel verden, der uden videre lader sig transformere. Denne artikel handler ikke om, hvorvidt Mouffe har ret eller ej. Det ville være banalt blot at afvise hendes model, fordi hun tager et reformistisk-institutionelt perspektiv. Problemstillingen er snarere, at Mouffe for mig at se underkender de måder, hvorpå det eksisterende system fungerer ved at institutionalisere og neutralisere magt over tid. Idet Mouffe lægger reproduktionen af bestemte institutionelle og etisk-politiske rammer til grund for hendes model, opretholder hun også delvist en række af de normative strukturer, hun søger at udfordre. Det liberale demokrati bliver på en gang det, der skal transformeres, men det bliver også midlet til denne transformation. Radikalt demokrati risikerer på denne måde at blive en *affirmativ* model snarere end et kritisk eller interventionistisk alternativ til eksisterende magtstrukturer. Den laclauianske pointe må netop være, at konstitutionen af de eksisterende politiske institutioner er udtryk for specifikke normative idealer, der er blevet neutraliserede, pakket sammen og glemt over tid. Det (neo)liberale demokrati er derfor fuldstændig indviklet og indgraveret i disse institutioner. For mig at se kan en læsning af Mouffe gennem Laclau være med til at synliggøre disse problemstillinger. På den måde kan vi begynde at videreføre og udvikle Mouffes model. Vi kan fortsætte med at radikalisere det radikale demokratis kritik af den neoliberale hegemoni og derigennem komme tættere på en ny politisk orden.

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BØGER

Hvis vi måler det gode liv kan vi handle på det

Ian Bache og Louise Reardon
The Politics and Policy of Wellbeing - Understanding the Rise and Significance of a New Agenda
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Anmeldt af Hjalte Meilvang, ph.d.-studerende ved Institut for Statskundskab, Københavns Universitet

Danskerne er kendt som verdens lykkeligste folk. I 2009 fik vi derfor besøg af Oprah Winfrey, og i 2016 blev 'hygge' genstand for en række bøger, der udforskede, hvorfor livet er så godt i Danmark. Dansk livskvalitet er på mode. Men udover at være et kulturelt fænomen bliver lykke, tilfredshed og livkvalitet i stigende grad betragtet som politiske målsætninger. For er det ikke det, politikerne dybeste set bør sikre borgerne: muligheden for at leve et godt liv? Er det ultimative politiske succeskriterium ikke snarere, at borgerne er lykkelige, end at BNP vokser?

Sådanne spørgsmål er i stigende grad på dagsordenen hos internationale organisationer og i en række af vores nabolande. Det er denne 'wellbeing agenda' som Ian Bache og Louise Reardon via et dokumentstudie og interviews med diverse interessenter udforsker i borgen *The Politics and Policy of Wellbeing*. De stiller grundlæggende to spørgsmål: 1) hvorfor er wellbeing kommer på dagsordenen netop i disse år, og 2) og hvilken politisk betydning har det? (s. 4)?

Det teoretiske udgangspunkt er John Kingdons teori om dagsordensfastsættelse, hvor bestemte ideer kommer på dagsordenen, når de tre strømme af *policies* (de konkrete politikker, løsninger og handlemuligheder), *politics* (det strategiske politiske spil om den offentlige mening, politiske magtbalance etc.) og *problems* (kriser eller opsigtsvækkende tendenser og begivenheder) flyder sammen på en for ideen gunstig måde. Policy entreprenører, der ønsker at fremme bestemte løsninger, forsøger at koble strømmene ved at udnytte 'policy vinduer', der f.eks. kan opstå, når et regeringsskifte giver muligheder for at implementere løsningen (et vindue i *policy*strømmen) eller et problem skriger på en løsning (et vindue i *problem*strømmen).

Vi har været her før: To bølger af wellbeing

Bache og Reardon betragter det nutidige fokus på wellbeing som en 'anden bølge', der følger efter tidligere forsøg på at forstå samfundsudviklingen i bredere termer end de økonomiske. Den første bølge begyndte i 1960'erne med Robert Kennedys kritik af BNP for at måle alt "except that which makes life worthwhile". Med dette udgangspunkt advokerede den såkaldte *Social Indicators*-bevægelse for bredere målinger af samfundsmæssig succes, der inkluderede bl.a. uddannelse, bolig og sociale forhold. Denne første bølge løb imidlertid tør for energi midt i 70'erne, da økonomisk krise medførte fornyet opmærksomhed på klassiske politiske emner som beskæftigelse og vækst. Derudover blev indikatorerne, der kunne opfattes som et venstreorienteret projekt, også sat under pres af ideologiske forandringer på regeringsplan med Ronald Reagan i det Det Hvide Hus og Margarat Thatcher på Downing Street.

Anden bølge tog ligeledes udgangspunkt i begrænsninger i BNP men tilføjede desuden bekymringer over miljø og 'selvoplevet livskvalitet'. Fra 1970'erne miljøbevægelse over Brundtland-rapporten i 1987 til FN's 'Earth Summit' i Rio de Janeiro i 1992 blev kvaliteten af det miljø, vi lever i, gradvist accepteret som en nødvendig faktor i definitionen af et gode liv. Og med bl.a. Richard Easterlin's studier af den manglede korrelation mellem et lands BNP og borgerens selvrapporterede lykke ('Easterlin paradokset') i 1970'erne samt 1990'erne 'positive psykologi' kom nødvendigheden af at spørge folk, hvordan de selv vurderer deres liv, gradvis på dagsordenen. Finanskrisen og en gryende international klimagenda åbnede et policyvindue for den anden bølge, der for alvor brød igennem med den såkaldte Stiglitz-kommission i 2008-2009, der på opdrag af den franske præsident Sarkozy udforskede BNP's begrænsninger med fokus på livskvalitet og bæredygtighed. Særligt OECD har siden båret faklen videre med sit *Better Life* projekt, der har medført talrige casestudier og internationale sammenlignelige livskvalitetsdata samt inspireret mange nationale projekter.

Den anden bølge i detaljer: Storbritannien og EU

Den anden bølge udforskes nærmere i to cases: Storbritannien og EU. I Storbritannien observerer forfatterne et skift i *politics*-strømmen, da David Camerons koalitionsregering tiltræder i 2010, og premierministeren støtter op om det nationale statistikkontors initiativ *Measuring National Well-being*. I *policy*-strømmen er fokus på wellbeing blevet båret frem af en række akademikere, der arbejder i grænselandet mellem forskning og politikformulering – ofte i tæt samarbejde med udenlandske kollegaer. *Problem*-strømmen har siden 1990'erne været karakteriseret af klimabevidsthed, mens lykkeforskeren Richard Layard i midt 00'erne bruger Tony Blairs ønske om evidensbaseret politik til at præsentere en 'bussiness case' for intensive kognitive terapiforløb i det britiske sundhedsvæsen som en omkostningseffektiv måde at øge livskvalitet.

I *politics*-strømmen har EU siden Maastricht-traktaten søgt at være en internationalt førende aktør på sociale og klimamæssige spørgsmål. I 2007 afholdt man en kon-

ference under sloganet *Beyond GDP*, der to år efter blev til en officiel udmelding fra Kommissionen under det mindre udfordrende *GDP and Beyond*. *Policy*-strømmen har især været karakteriset af søgen efter en ny 'vækstmodel', hvor særligt miljømæssige forhold har været centrale, mens subjektiv livskvalitet først kom på dagsordenen relativt sent under indflydelse fra OECD. *Problem*-strømmen handlede som i Storbritannien oprindeligt meget om miljø og klima, men store problemer i mange medlemslande efter finanskrisen har sat også sociale forhold på dagsordenen.

Livskvalitetspolitik i Storbritannien

Men hvilken – om nogen – betydning har måling af livkvalitet faktisk fået? Ser vi faktisk en ændring i den førte politik og de valgte løsninger på samfundsmæssige problemer? Dette spørgsmål undersøges primært i Storbritannien. For at svare på det inddrager forfatterne Peter Halls klassiske tanker om 'social læring og paradigmer' (Hall 1993) for at disaggregere policy-begrebet. Paradigmeskift er karakteriseret ved såkaldte tredje ordens ændringer, hvor grundlæggende samfundsmæssige prioriteter forandres. Andenordens ændringer er udskiftning af instrumenterne til at nå disse mål, mens førsteordens ændringer er kalibreringer af den måde, givne instrumenter fungerer på. De fleste konsekvenser af livskvalitetsdagsordenen er 'førsteordens', hvor allerede anvendte politikker tilpasses, f.eks. ved at tilføje livskvalitetshensyn til politikevaluering (s. 109-11). Det britiske sundhedsvæsens omfavnelse af kognitiv terapi ses derimod som en andenordens ændring, idet folks mentale velvære ikke tidligere har været på dagsordenen. Bache og Reardon finder ingen tegn på ændringer af samfundets grundlæggende prioriteter: "quality of life only resonated when it was considered to be a useful device for achieving economic growth" (s. 120). Få betydende aktører har for alvor været interesseret i at komme udover BNP. Med et total fravær af tredjeordensændringer, ser det altså ikke ud til, at den nye dagsorden har medført grundlæggende forandringer.

Overordnet finder forfatteren derfor, at selvom der er en voksende konsensus mellem internationale organisationer, forskere og nationale statistikbureauer om, hvordan livskvalitet skal måles, er det stadig ret uafklaret, hvordan (og om) livskvalitetsmålinger skal inkluderes i praktisk politikudførelse. En eventuelt 'tredje bølge', hvor befolkningens livskvalitet bliver accepteret som et generelt succeskriterium på linje med BNP er derfor ikke lige om hjørnet. Som den anerkendte BNP-ekspert Diane Coyle for nyligt skrev i et arbejdspapir, så vil skift i samfundsmæssigt væsentlig statistik forventeligt ske drypvis (Coyle 2016). Bache og Reardon slutter tilsvarende af med at konkludere, at yderligere forandringer skal komme gennem "gradual accumulation of knowledge and experience relating to the well-being policy relationship" (s. 159).

Vurdering af deres argument/resultater

Bogen skal særligt læses for den velformidlede og grundige empiriske afdækning af fremkomsten af livskvalitet som politisk målsætning. Teori skal simplificere virkelighe-

den, så den kan undersøges, og en kombination af Halls og Kingdons teorier fremstår som en velvalgt ramme for denne afdækning. Denne forfatter er hverken politisk økonom eller ekspert i offentlig politik, men konklusioner om, at Kingdon gav for lidt opmærksomhed til transnationale aspekter ved mødet mellem de tre strømme, og at Hall mangler at se muligheder for inkrementelle paradigmeskift, virker ikke som banebrydende teoretiske bidrag– hvad forfatterne da heller ikke påstår: det er den empiriske undersøgelse, der er i højsædet. I den optik kan det relative fravær af opmærksomhed på, at de faktisk undersøger en 'målingsagenda", undre.

Forfatterne tager udgangspunkt i, at det er "politics and not economic that will ultimately determine the destiny of this agenda" (s. 3), hvorfor analysen skrider frem som en afdækning af forskydninger i de tre strømme. På det empiriske plan ignoreres det ikke, at meget af det, der foregår, handler om udviklingen af nye måder at måle livskvalitet, men det teoretiske fokus på politiske variable ("Politics… will determine" i citatet ovenfor) bevirker, at behandlingen af tekniske og videnskabelige udviklinger til tider behandles stedmoderligt. Debatter om, hvordan et multidimensionalt begreb som livskvalitet skal indfanges i målingen – via aggregering til et overordnet indeks eller ved at afrapportere separate indikatorer – bliver f.eks. nævnt som en del af policy-strømmen, men fokus på dagsordenssættelse og beslutningstagning bevirker, at det ikke sker systematisk. Litteraturen om betydningen af at sætte tal på noget, der de seneste årtier er vokset frem indenfor bl.a. videnskabssociologi og evalueringsstudier, kunne have været inddraget i højere grad (f.eks. Dahler-Larsen 2011; Desrosières 1998; Espeland & Stevens 2008).

Betydningen af livskvalitet som politisk målsætning bliver primært undersøgt som et spørgsmål om, hvorvidt livskvalitetsmålinger faktisk anvendes i praksis, og man savner et lidt bredere perspektiv på betydning. Hvad er f.eks. de demokratiske implikationer af, at folks tilfredshed bliver et politiskevalueringskriterium? Som en af the-grand-old-men i skandinavisk velfærdsforskning Robert Erikson har skrevet:

> "People's opinions and preferences should influence societal planning through their activities as citizens in the democratic political process, not through survey questions and opinion polls." (Erikson 1993, 78)

Den britiske sociolog Will Davies ser tilsvarende 'Det Gode Liv' som et spørgsmål med mange svar, der ikke bør pakkes ned i et tals enkle konklusioner, hvor borgerne risikerer at blive mere objekter end subjekter for politik (Davies 2012). I en dansk optik har Gitte Meyer kritiseret den besnærende logik i at måle nye ting (livskvalitet, miljø etc.) for derved at øge deres betydning i forhold til økonomiske prioriteter – en udvikling hun ikke ser som udtryk for større rumlighed og bredde i samfundsmæssige prioriteter, men som, at en indsnævrende (tællende) logik bredes ud til stadig nye områder (Meyer 2016). Som en udforskning af livskvalitetsdagsordenes opståen er Bache og Reardons bog et glimrende sted at starte – men for dens potentielle betydning skal man kigge bredere.

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ABSTRACTS

Abstracts

Desecuritization as Displacement of Controversy: geopolitics, law and sovereign rights in the Arctic

Marc Jacobsen & Jeppe Strandsbjerg

By signing the Ilulissat Declaration of May 2008, the five littoral states of the Arctic Ocean pre-emptively desecuritized potential geopolitical controversies in the Arctic Ocean by confirming that international law and geo-science are the defining factors underlying the future delimitation. This happened in response to a rising securitization discourse fueled by commentators and the media in the wake of the 2007 Russian flag planting on the geographical North Pole seabed, which also triggered harder interstate rhetoric and dramatic headlines. This case, however, challenges some established conventions within securitization theory. It was state elites that initiated desecuritization and they did so by shifting issues in danger of being securitized from security to other techniques of government. Contrary to the democratic ethos of the theory, these shifts do not necessarily represent more democratic procedures. Instead, each of these techniques are populated by their own experts and technocrats operating according to logics of right (law) and accuracy (science). While shifting techniques of government might diminish the danger of securitized relations between states, the shift generates a displacement of controversy. Within international law we have seen controversy over its ontological foundations and within science we have seen controversy over standards of science. Each of these are amplified and take a particularly political significance when an issue is securitized via relocation to another technique. While the Ilulissat Declaration has been successful in minimizing the horizontal conflict potential between states it has simultaneously given way for vertical disputes between the signatory states on the one hand and the Indigenous peoples of the Arctic on the other.

'Soft Securitization': Unconventional Security Issues and the Arctic Council

Wilfrid Greaves & Daniel Pomerants

This article assesses the Arctic Council's role as a security actor in the context of a rapidly changing circumpolar region. It investigates how the Arctic Council uses security language, and which issues it depicts as relevant to Arctic security. The article does this by undertaking textual analysis of 'securitizing moves' represented in the Council's publicly available online documents, including declarations and agreements, policy papers, working group reports, public statements, and other related sources. The findings offer empirical insights into the Arctic Council and the construction of Arctic security issues, as well as theoretical reflections on the analytical usefulness of securitization theory, and the dynamics of constructing unconventional security issues in a multilateral intergovernmental forum.

Regional Order in the Arctic: Negotiated Exceptionalism

Heather Exner-Pirot & Robert W. Murray

Traditional theories of International Relations have thus far failed to explain the unusual degree of cooperation seen in the Arctic between Russia on the one hand, and the seven Western Arctic states led by the United States on the other. Rather than witnessing a devolution into competition and conflict over strategic shipping routes and hydrocarbon resources, regional Arctic institutions have continued to grow in strength and number in the past several years, and transnational ties have deepened. This has prompted some observers to describe the Arctic as 'exceptional' – somehow immune to or isolated from global political competition.

This paper argues that the Arctic regional order is exceptional insofar as Arctic states and those states with involvement in the region have worked to negotiate an order and balance of power predicated on norms such as cooperation and multilateralism. The establishment of an Arctic international society has seen great powers and smaller powers come together to form an order aimed at promoting norms and institutions not seen elsewhere in the world. By using an English School approach to understand the Arctic, we contend that Arctic international society has been deliberately negotiated in a way that promotes cooperation between Arctic states. However this order can be disrupted if Arctic international society does not take conscious steps to maintain a strong institutional framework that protects Arctic internationalism.

Arctic Indigenous Societal Security at COP21: The Divergence of Security Discourse and Instruments in Climate Negotiations

Victoria Herrmann

In UN climate change conferences, there exists a disconnect between the space for and use of Arctic cultural heritage as a catalyst for action and parallel international legal and financial support for climate adaptation and mitigation in the North. This article aims to unpack this divergence of creating a space for societal security discourse and producing tangible climate commitments to Arctic Indigenous peoples in UN climate negotiations. The article surveys and explores visual and textual narratives pertaining to Arctic heritage at COP21 focusing on regional Indigenous political organizations and representatives. It contends both that societal security is to maintain Arctic indigenous culture in its traditional state from changes in the climate and that societal security is to protect indigenous culture from harm or destruction while allowing it to live, change and develop in its own accord to assist with climate mitigation and adaptation actions. The article then turns to the resulting Paris Agreement and Paris Road Map to survey specific legal, financial, and policy support mechanisms for Arctic Indigenous peoples. The article argues that the space for and use of Arctic Indigenous societal security discourses at COP21 are uneven with the resulting global policy initiatives, and do not adequately support the security of current cultural practices and heritage in the Arctic.

Post-colonial governance through securitization? A narratological analysis of a securitization controversy in contemporary Danish and Greenlandic uranium policy

Rasmus K. Rasmussen & Henrik Merkelsen

The complex constitutional relationship between Greenland and Denmark has had no clearer manifestation than the last decade's juridical and political wranglings over the control for uranium. In the article, we argue that the quarrel between Nuuk and Copenhagen found in their diverging uranium policies can be seen as what we term a 'securitization controversy'. That is, a form of negotiating process which delicately postpones securitization proper due to the entangled role of the uranium issue in the independence debate. Through narrative analysis of contemporary Danish and Greenlandic government

policy documents (2008-2016) we thus demonstrate how Greenlandic documents attempt to desecuritize risks pertinent to extraction of uranium and REE while Danish government papers seek to risikfy uranium in order to keep the issue open to future securitization. In the analysis, we further show how certain risks in the policy papers are connected and constitute a narrative conflict involving identity and sovereignty. We argue, that the controversy found at policy level in turn is the result of the underlying 'sovereignty game' in the constitutional relationship between the two countries. The article introduces a methodological framework for studying such securitization controversies drawing on risk analysis and narratology. We argue that in order to account for the entangled and narrative nature of the discursive movements in the policy texts, structural narratology can be a viable methodological alternative to the Copenhagen School's preferred method of discourse analysis.

What kind of nation state will Greenland be? Securitization theory as a strategy for analyzing identity politics

Ulrik Pram Gad

Arctic geopolitics is a moving target - and Greenland, determined to emerge as a sovereign nation state, is a particularly dynamic quantity. The choices currently made in language policy about how to prioritize the Greenlandic, Danish, and English languages will be putting Greenland on very different routes towards and beyond independence. The article modifies the analytical strategy prescribed by Copenhagen School Securitization Theory to produce a nuanced picture of national identity politics, the tensions involved, and scenarios for the future. Analysis of the 2002 and 2016 debates on language supplements the received image of what constitutes Greenlandic identity, centered on language and iconic material cultural practices, with conspicuously modern elements like democracy and welfare. Advancing formally from 'home rule' to 'self-government' has shifted the debate towards material challenges - prompting a more prominent role for the English language, in turn pointing Greenland towards new alliances in Arctic geopolitics.

Hvordan skabes et alternativ? Om det radikale demokratis mulighedsbetingelser

Jannick Schou

How can an alternative to liberal democracy and neoliberalism be developed? This question has occupied a number of political theorists from the Left, including Chantal Mouffe. This paper provides a discussion of Mouffe's notion of radical democracy by drawing on concepts from Ernesto Laclau's discourse theory. The paper starts out by providing a detailed description of Mouffe's model with a focus on its underlying conditions of possibility. Here, two factors are highlighted: an allegiance to 'liberty' and 'equality' and a common trust in democratic institutions. By reading these conditions through the work of Laclau, the paper argues for an increased attentiveness towards the ways in which discourses become sedimented and neutralized over time. The paper argues that Mouffe tends to downplay the role of normativity and institutions in favor of democratic practices. Highlighting these areas, this article argues, is a call for a further radicalization of radical democracy going forward.