

Politik

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TEMA

TÆNKETANKE I DE NORDISKE LANDE

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Formål

Politik er et tværfagligt samfundsvidenskabeligt tidsskrift, der bringer artikler om politik ud fra mangfoldige akademiske perspektiver.

Redaktionen lægger vægt på *faglighed* sikret gennem anonym referebedømmelse, *formidling*, som gør Politik tilgængelig uden for universitetets mure, og endelig *politisk relevans*.

Tidsskriftet Politik er en videreførelse af Politologiske Studier.

Introduktion: Tænketanke i de nordiske lande

Mark Blach-Ørsten & Nete Nørgaard Kristensen

Dette temanummer sætter fokus på tænketanke i de nordiske lande. Internationalt, især i USA, har forskningen længe interesseret sig for tænketanke og deres forsøg på at opnå indflydelse ved at påvirke den politiske og offentlige debat, mens europæisk forskning på området stadig er begrænset. Inden for de seneste ti år har der imidlertid været en vækst i antallet af tænketanke i Europa – en udvikling, der også kendetegner de nordiske lande, hvor Sverige har det højeste antal tænketanke, mens antallet i Danmark, Finland og Norge er mindre, men stigende. Forskningen i tænketanke i de nordiske er dog stort set fraværende (fx Bjerke 2015). Disse forhold – på den ene side et stigende antal tænketanke i Norden og på den anden side en manglende nordisk forskningsinteresse for fænomenet – har motiveret dette særnummer.

Selvom tænketanke kan variere i type, størrelse og formål, har de fleste tænketanke i stigende grad fokus på at opnå indflydelse på politiske og offentlige dagsordner via synlighed i nyhedsmedier. Det peger på en tredje årsag til, at det nordiske perspektiv kan være særlig interessant. Internationalt betragtes de nordiske lande nemlig både politisk og mediesystemisk som mere lig hinanden end forskellige i lyset af forankringen i den nordiske velfærdsmodel (fx Edling et al. 2006, Pettersen 2011) og den demokratisk korporative mediemodel (fx Hallin & Mancini 2004, Syversen et al. 2014). Studier peger dog også på forskelle *inden for* de nordiske lande, fx i deres politiske kommunikation (Allern & Ørsten 2011; Strömbäck et al. 2008). Netop derfor er det relevant at undersøge, hvilke ligheder og forskelle der er i tænketankenes indtog i de nordiske lande, herunder deres størrelse, antal og gennemslagskraft i medierne.

Fire af de fem artikler i dette nummer udspringer således også af et fælles nordisk forskningsnetværk, som i perioden 2012 til 2015 har sat fokus på tænketanke og deres synlighed i nordiske nyhedsmedier. Baseret på teorier om medialisering af politik samt de-korporatisering af det politiske system, argumenterer de fire artikler på forskellig vis for, at der er sket forandringer i de institutionelle rammer for produktionen af politiske ideer på tværs af og inden for de enkelte nordiske lande, og at disse forandringer er nogle af årsagerne til den seneste stigning i antallet af tænketanke. Artiklernes analyser baserer sig derfor, overordnet set, også på det samme empiriske design i form af kvantitative indholdsanalyser, baseret på en fælles kodebog, med fokus på årene 2006 og 2013 og repræsentationen af centrale nationale tænketanke af forskellig politisk observans i

dagsordensættende aviser i Danmark, Sverige, Norge og Finland. Artiklernes analyser betoner dog forskellige dimensioner af denne medierepræsentation og er først og fremmest nationalt fokuseret. Netop på grund af fraværet af empirisk forskning på området i Norden, har målet været at etablere nationale baseline-studier, mens det komparative perspektiv manifesteres på tværs af artiklerne.

Fordi tænketanke er et inklusivt begreb, der kan dække over mange, forholdsvis forskelligt organiserede aktører, adresserer alle artiklerne mere eller mindre detaljeret, hvordan tænketanke kan defineres – og hvordan disse definitioner operationaliseres i de enkelte artiklers studier. Temanummerets første artikel, af Jesper Dahl Kelstrup, som er skrevet uden for det nordiske forskningsnetværk om tænketanke, har fx et overordnet fokus på at diskutere, definere og afgrænse, hvad en tænketank er. Kelstrup foreslår at se tænketanke som ”permanente organisationer, der hævder en grad af uafhængighed og søger politisk indflydelse ved at mobilisere ekspertviden.” Udover interessen for teoretisk at definere, hvad en tænketank er i både USA og Danmark, giver Kelstrups artikel et overordnet billede af den kamp om nyhedsmediernes opmærksomhed, der ud kæmpes mellem tænketanke som nye politiske aktører i den politiske debat og traditionelle korporative aktører, navnlig interesseorganisationer.

Den næste artikel, af Mark Blach-Ørsten & Nete Nørgaard Kristensen, ser på medialiseringen af tænketanke i syv danske aviser og på tænketankenes netværksrelationer i de korporative netværk, som kan ses som den klassiske vej til politisk indflydelse i det danske samfund. Baseret på de danske data fra den nordiske indholdsanalyse, peger artiklen på stigende synlighed af tænketanke i medieoffentligheden samt en klar tendens til at lade tænketanke optræde som uvildige eksperter frem for som partskilder. Den supplerende netværksanalyse viser dog samtidig, at de korporative netværk langt fra er smuldret væk. Hvor den liberale tænketank CEPOS har den største andel af mediedækningen, er den socialdemokratisk forbundne tænketank AE-Rådet tættest repræsenteret i forskellige netværk uden for medierne.

Paul Bjerkes artikel ser på tænketanke i Norge baseret på såvel indholdsanalyse som interview med relevante aktører. Artiklen konkluderer blandt andet, at de undersøgte tænketanke er forholdsvis små organisationer med relativt få ansatte, men også organisationer, der har en stærk gennemslagskraft i de norske nyhedsmedier. Her opnår de gerne en positiv omtale, men typisk uden en tydelig marketing af deres ideologiske ståsted. Det peger, ifølge artiklen, på de gensidige interesser, nyhedsmedier og tænketanke har i henholdsvis professionelt kommentarstof af nyhedsværdi og en offentlig arena til fremsættelse af ideer, udspil og argumenter.

Den fjerde artikel, skrevet af Sigurd Allern og Ester Pollack, fokuserer især på Sveriges ældste og mest kendte tænketank, den neolibérale tænketank Timbro, der blev grundlagt i 1978. Som reaktion på Timbros succes har Sverige i de senere år set en vækst i tænketanke, både nogle med et neoliberalt udgangspunkt og tænketanke, der udspringer fra andre dele af den politiske højre-venstre skala. På trods af væksten i antallet af tænketanke viser indholdsanalysen dog, at Timbro har den stærkeste gennemslagskraft i de svenske nyhedsmedier.

Temanummerets sidste artikel, af Lotta Lounasmeri, fokuserer på tænketanke i Finland. Her ser både det politiske landskab, nyhedsmedierne og antallet af tænketanke lidt anderledes ud sammenlignet med de andre nordiske lande. Artiklen fokuserer således på de særlige finske forhold og konkluderer blandt andet, at tænketanke ikke er slået igennem i den finske offentlighed på samme måde, som det ser ud til at være tilfældet i de øvrige nordiske lande. Kun en tænketank af betydning, EVA, er for alvor synlig i de finske medier.

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Tænketankes brug af dagbladene som et marked for politiske idéer i Danmark

Jesper Dahl Kelstrup

Indledning

Tænketanke er i de seneste ti år blevet en etableret bestanddel af den politiske debat i Danmark. Den stigende tendens til at tænketanke tilkæmper sig spalteplass har bl.a. manifesteret sig ved at Dagbladet Børsen i december 2014, for tredje år i træk, kårede Mads Lundby fra den borgerligt-liberale tænketank Cepos, som den mest citerede økonom i Danmark (Henriksen, 2014). Denne artikel spørger, hvordan danske tænketankes synlighed i landsdækkende dagblade har udviklet sig sammenlignet med interesseorganisationer i de sidste ti år og hvad der kan forklare denne udvikling? Artiklen falder i to dele. I første del defineres tænketanke som ”permanente organisationer, der hævder en grad af uafhængighed og søger politisk indflydelse ved at mobilisere ekspertviden” (Kelstrup, 2014, 21). Som baggrund for definitionen skitseres tænketankes etablering i efterkrigstidens USA, herunder den forestilling om uafhængighed, der har været med til at legitimere tænketankes ekspertviden. Desuden fremstilles den kritik som tænketanke i stigende grad fra 1990'erne har været udsat for. Særligt er tænketankes sammenblanding af ekspertise og politiske interesser blevet kritiseret (Rich, 2004).

I anden del uddybes det, hvad der kan forklare, at tænketanke har vundet indpas i danske dagblade i det seneste årti på trods af den stigende kritik af disse organisationer i den internationale litteratur og det aftagende antal af nye tænketanke globalt. Der tegnes et analytisk billede af det relative styrkeforhold imellem gruppen af de mest citerede tænketanke og interesseorganisationer i perioden fra 1. januar 2006 til 31. december 2015. For at forstå fremvæksten af tænketanke ansues dagbladene som et marked, hvor tænketanke kan bruge deres (påståede) uafhængighed til at præsentere og at få anerkendt idéer, som andre aktører efterspørger. Forestillingen knytter an til teorier om *agenda-setting* og *blame avoidance*. Desuden undersøges udviklingen i citationer for hver af de ti mest aktive tænketanke i dagbladene med henblik på at anskueliggøre forskelle i forskellige tænketankes synlighed. Analysen indikerer, at tænketanke med tydelige idépolitiske udgangspunkter får mere omtale i de landsdækkende dagblade end tænketanke, der er mere fokuseret på bestemte policy-områder eller temaer. Det konkluderes, at den øgede synlighed af tænketanke i landsdækkende

dagblade er et vigtigt udgangspunkt for at belyse årsager til og konsekvenser af deres fremvækst i Danmark, herunder hvad fremvæksten af et øget antal tænketanke betyder for disse organisationers rolle i fremtiden.

Tænketankes fremvækst i USA og etablering i Danmark

Forståelsen og definitioner af tænketanke afspejler, at tænketanksbegrebet stammer fra USA. Tænketanke er her vokset ud af en liberal tradition for pluralisme, vægt på filantropi og billigelse af privatfinansierede aktørers rolle i den politiske proces (Abelson, 2006, 43; Dickson, 1972). Nedenfor defineres tænketanksbegrebet, og det uddybes hvordan forståelsen af tænketanke har udviklet sig og siden mødt kritik i den amerikanske kontekst.

Hvad er en tænketanke?

En vigtig udfordring i definitionen af tænketanke er at balancere imellem, hvad der er nødvendige og tilstrækkelige betingelser for at bruge begrebet (Sartori, 1970, 1044). Det er på den ene side nødvendigt med en præcis definition, der adskiller tænketanke fra beslægtede organisationer som universiteter, interesseorganisationer og konsulentvirksomheder, hvis tænketanke skal etableres som et selvstændigt begreb og ikke blot ses som en undertype af fx interesseorganisationer. På den anden side må definitionen, i hvert fald hvis den skal anvendes komparativt, være bred nok til at omfatte tænketanke fra forskellige politiske systemer. I en dansk og kontinental-europæisk kontekst, hvor der er tradition for offentlig finansiering af tænketanke, er den amerikanske forståelse af tænketanke som private organisationer for snæver. For også at inkludere offentligt finansierede tænketanke, defineres tænketanke her bredt som ”permanente organisationer, der hævder en grad af uafhængighed og søger politisk indflydelse ved at mobilisere ekspertviden” (Kelstrup, 2014, 21).

Der er tre nøglebegreber i denne definition. For det første anses tænketanke for at være permanente. Dermed er projektgrupper og kommissioner, der bliver nedsat som ”tænketanke” til at løse et konkret politisk problem undtaget fra definitionen. For det andet hævder tænketanke en grad af uafhængighed. Som vi vender tilbage til i diskussionen af tænketankes historik nedenfor, er tænketankes uafhængighed et omdiskuteret, men ikke desto mindre et nødvendigt kriterium, fordi en vigtig kilde til tænketankes legitimitet ligger i deres afstand til etablerede interesser. For det tredje søger tænketanke politisk indflydelse ved at mobilisere ekspertviden. Selvom tænketanke kan udføre meget

forskellige funktioner bl.a. knyttet til politisk uddannelse af meningsdannere eller konferencer med erhvervslivet, er det nødvendigt for alle tænketanke at orientere sig imod politisk indflydelse, dvs. i retning af politikere og centrale meningsdannere, der er medbestemmende for hvordan politik aftales og reguleres. Medierne, herunder landsdækkende dagblade, er som det fremgår nedenfor en vigtig arena for denne mobilisering af ekspertviden.

Tænketankes styrke ligger således i at mobilisere ekspertviden, der ofte bygger på et evidensgrundlag. Hensigten er, at tænketankes påståede uafhængighed i kombination med deres ekspertise kan bidrage til, at deres analyser og idéer bliver anerkendt i en politisk offentlighed (Arnoldi, 2005). Definitionen kræver ikke, at tænketankes analyser (som universiteternes forskning) lever op til videnskabelige konventioner ved fx at publicere deres viden i fagfællebedømte tidsskrifter. For tænketanke er formålet netop, til forskel fra universiteter, at få analyser og idéer anerkendt i en politisk frem for en videnskabelig offentlighed. Tænketanke er heller ikke interesseorganisationer, der er blevet defineret som: "... sammenslutninger af medlemmer eller andre støtter, der arbejder for politisk indflydelse" (Grant et al, 2004. I: Binderkrantz et al. 2014, 19). Det skyldes for det første, at tænketanke ikke nødvendigvis har medlemmer. Selvom nogle tænketanke giver borgere mulighed for at deltage i organisationens arbejde, jf. fx tænketanken Concitos "klimaambassadører", Cepos' "Akademi" eller Mandag Morgens "MM Academy", så findes der også tænketanke som ikke gør, fx AE-rådet eller offentligt finansierede tænketanke som Det Nationale Center for Velfærd (SFI) eller Dansk Institut for International Studier (DIIS).

Endelig udfører tænketanke i modsætning til fx konsulentfirmaer ikke konkrete analyser på bestilling, fordi det sætter spørgsmålstegn ved deres uafhængighed. Samlet set er tænketanke altså organisationer, der kombinerer uafhængighed og ekspertise til at øve politisk indflydelse ofte igennem offentliggørelse af deres analyser i medierne. Tænketanke er samtidig en organisationsform, der har ændret og tilpasset sig skiftende samfundsmæssige og politiske dagsordener over tid og udbredt sig fra USA til resten af verden.

Tænk tankes amerikanske rødder

Tænk tankesbegrebet blev gradvist udbredt i den offentlige diskurs i USA fra 1960erne bl.a. ud fra behovet for at inddæmme truslen fra Sovjetunionen og for at opbygge et nationalt sundhedsvæsen (Kelstrup, 2007) og på baggrund af en tiltro til, at videnskabelige fremskridt kunne bidrage til at løse strategiske samfundsudfordringer (Medvetz, 2012). Troen på tænketankes potentialer til at udfordre bureaukratisk vantetænkning blev stærk etableret i amerikansk politologi efter Anden Verdenskrig. Et centralt element var politologen Harold Lasswell's forestilling om en '*policy scientist for democracy*', altså en samfundsvidenskabelig videnskabsmand, der stillede sit intellekt i demokratiets tjeneste (Lasswell, 1971, 27ff). Troen på tænketankes demokratiske potentiale var i denne periode stærk. Aaron Wildavsky brugte de amerikanske tænketanke som spydspids til at kritisere fraværet af uafhængig policy-rådgivning i Europa:

"It is exactly the intolerance for independent advice that has inhibited schools of public policy from starting in Europe. If you have hierarchical societies, if you have legitimated the idea of a bureaucracy having a monopoly over expertise in policy areas, you will not look too favourably on the idea of think tanks" (Wildavsky, 1979, xxvii).

Wildavsky's kritik ramte plet for så vidt, at private tænketanke i 1970erne ikke spillede nogen rolle i dansk politik. I Danmark var policy-viden bl.a. informeret af de offentligt støttede sektorforskningsinstitutter som fx Socialforskningsinstituttet (SFI), der i 1962 blev oprettet til at rådgive den voksende velfærdsstat på socialområdet. Desuden bidrog det korporative system til at rådgivning, inddragelse og implementering blev foretaget i et samspil med interesseorganisationer, som på nogle områder også overtog implementeringen af lovgivning og aftaler (Christiansen & Nørgaard, 2003). Interesseorganisationers repræsentation af forskellige grupper var i forlængelse heraf med til at sikre, at de blev legitime og udbredte civilsamfundsaktører i Danmark (Binderkrantz et al, 2014, 13; Fisker, 2015, 46). Selvom den amerikanske model også havde stærk offentlig finansiering på fx forsvars- og sundhedsområderne, bar den danske institutionalisering af anvendt forskning præg af langt stærkere offentlig styring end i den amerikanske kontekst, som tænketanke udsprang af.

Kritikken af advocacy-tænketaanke i USA

Selvom Aaron Wildavsky priste tænketankenes uafhængige ekspertrolle, blev der allerede fra starten af 1970'erne, måske som et resultat af en svækkelse af offentlige bevillinger og af troen på videnskabens evne til at løse centrale samfundsproblemer, oprettet flere, mindre og mere ideologisk farvede tænketanke i USA. De førte bl.a. kampagne for politikere eller understøttede ideologiske dagsordener (Abelson, 2006). Fremvæksten af privatfinansierede tænketanke i USA skyldes også muligheden for at modtage skattefri støtte fra private donorer under amerikansk lovgivning (§ 501 (c) i 'The Internal Revenue Code') (Rich, 2004). Udviklingen af mindre og mere ideologiske tænketanke medførte et stigende fokus på tænketankes rolle som *advocacy*-organisationer, der strategisk er gearret til at agitere offentligt for bestemte politiske standpunkter. Mest ikonisk udgav den konservative amerikanske tænketank The Heritage Foundation i begyndelsen af Ronald Reagans præsidentperiode i 1981 første version af 'Mandate for Leadership' – en bog med omkring 2000 forslag til konservativ politik, hvoraf mange blev implementeret (Edwards, 1997). Væksten i privatfinansierede *advocacy*-tænketanke i USA fortsatte og gav fra 1990'erne anledning til stigende kritik fra flere sider. For det første begyndte amerikanske grundbøger i politisk interessevaretagelse, pga. tænketankenes mere advokerende rolle i politik, at forstå dem som en ny type interesseorganisation (Berry, 1997; Cigler & Loomis, 1998; Rich, 2004, 10). For det andet blev forestillingen om et skarpt skel imellem uafhængig ekspertise og værdibaseret politik at blive udsat for kritik:

”The firewall is gone, and the change in the role and behavior of experts in recent decades suggests need for a fundamental revision in how scholars treat them in accounts of policy making” (Rich, 2004, 209).

I forlængelse af denne kritik udtrykte forskeren James McGann, der ellers havde markeret sig som tilhænger af tænketankes bidrag til demokratiet, bekymring for at sund konkurrence imellem tænketanke, fordi den stigende polarisering i amerikansk politik var ved at blive til en uciviliseret idékrig (McGann, 2005). Nyere forskning i tænketanke har understøttet denne bekymring ved at pege på, at tænketanke i flere tilfælde bruges som legitimering af allerede etablerede interesser i det politiske system, og at de altså ikke blot kan fungere som interessevaretagere, men også som ekspertgrundlag for holdninger, der allerede deles af politiske eliter (Medvetz, 2012, 179; Parmar, 2013; Stone, 2004, 14).

Den ovenstående kritik af tænketanke udfordrer forestillingen om, at tænketanke løser forhåndsdefinerede samfundsproblemer. Kritikerne påpeger, at tænketanke i højere grad bidrager til at opretholde og udvikle eksisterende interesser og idéer i politik ved at give dem evidensbaseret opbakning i den offentlige debat. Denne kritik udfordrer dog ikke, at offentligheden kan bruges som en markedsplads for idéer. Selvom efterspørgslen af tænketankes idéer kan være forhåndsdefineret, kan denne efterspørgsel forstås som en ramme, der udfyldes af tænketanke. Det sker fx når politiske partier efterspørger nye forslag til at udvikle deres politik på en måde, der vil stille dem fordelagtigt i den offentlige debat. For tænketanke, der som nævnt i definitionen ovenfor må hævde uafhængighed fra etablerede interesser, er det ikke legitimt at foretage vedvarende idéudveksling direkte med bestemte beslutningstagere. Det sætter nemlig spørgsmålstegn ved, om tænketanke spiller en kritisk og demokratiserende rolle som alternativer til staten, sådan som Wildavsky forestillede sig det i 1979. I modsætning til direkte interessevaretagelse giver medierne mulighed for at foretage en offentlig og indirekte idéudveksling. Det må forventes at gøre landsdækkende dagblade til velegnede arenaer for tænketanke, idet både tænketankes *stakeholders* og målgrupper har en gensidig interesse i få deres idéer anerkendt i den offentlige debat for derved at gøre dem mere genkendelige og legitime for politiske aktører. Fremvæksten af tænketanke forventes på den baggrund at give sig til udtryk i en styrket evne til at skabe opmærksomhed omkring idéer i den offentlige debat. Forventningen om at danske tænketanke har fået øget synlighed i landsdækkende dagblade undersøges nedenfor for perioden 2006-2015. Desuden undersøges variationen i forskellige tænketankes synlighed i dagbladene i samme periode.


2. Øget synlighed for tænketanke i dagbladene?

Selvom tænketankes betydning i dansk politik endnu ikke er fyldigt belyst, er der enighed om, at der specielt efter oprettelsen af den borgerligt-liberale tænketank Cepos i 2004 er kommet flere tænketanke i Danmark (Kelstrup, 2014; McGann et al., 2014). Det kan forekomme paradoksalt og anakronistisk, at tænketanksbegrebet begyndte at fænge an i Danmark netop i samme periode som kritikken af tænketankes rolle i USA tog til og efter at den globale vækst i antallet af nye tænketanke faldt (McGann et al., 2013, 17). For bedre at kunne forklare fremvæksten af tænketankes rolle i Danmark, tester dette afsnit om tænketanke, som forventet, har opnået øget synlighed i dagbladene.

Mere synlige tænketanke i dagbladene i perioden 2006-2015

Det bør nævnes, at uenigheden om hvordan tænketanke skal defineres, betyder, at der er usikkerhed om, hvor mange tænketanke der eksisterer generelt og i Danmark. Fx angiver en amerikansk rangering, at der var 34 tænketanke i Danmark i 2014 (McGann, 2015, 55). Frem for at opgøre hele populationen af danske tænketanke, er hensigten her at give et overblik over udviklingen i de mest medieaktive tænketanke med henblik på at sammenligne dem med de mest medieaktive interesseorganisationer. Dermed kan det illustreres, hvor meget tænketanke fylder og hvordan dagbladenes referencer til dem har udviklet sig i sammenligning med en gruppe af organisationer, der historisk har været indflydelsesrig i dansk politik. Nedenfor sammenlignes de ti hyppigst refererede tænketanke med en gruppe på ti interesseorganisationer, der er blevet identificeret som 'sværvægtene' (Binderkrantz et al, 2014). Metodisk er de mest aktive tænketanke identificeret ved at søge på en større gruppe tænketankes navne i Infomedia i ni landsdækkende dagblade i perioden fra 1. januar 2006 til 31. december 2015. De ti tænketanke med det højeste antal samlede referencer i perioden er inkluderet i figur 1 nedenfor. Tænketanke der tidligt eller sent i perioden har været hyppigt refererede, men hvis synlighed enten er ophørt eller påbegyndt sent i perioden, fremgår således ikke nødvendigvis af figuren.

Figur 1: Udviklingen i summen af referencer i landsdækkende dagblade til de ti mest nævnte interesseorganisationer og tænketanke fra 1. januar 2006- 31. december 2015.



Mens der ikke har været nogen signifikant ændring i antallet af referencer til interesseorganisationerne over perioden, er udviklingen i referencerne til tænketankene udtryk for en

signifikant stigning ($P < 0,001$) i antallet af gange top-ti tænketankene optræder i dagbladene. I perioden 1. januar 2006 til 31. december 2010 repræsenterede tænketanke i gennemsnit 22,4 % af det samlede antal citationer for de to grupper. I perioden 1. januar 2011 til 31. december 2015 var samme gennemsnit 31,4 %. I perioden 2006 til 2015 er tænketanke altså ikke alene blevet refereret hyppigere i de landsdækkende dagblade; de har også i stigende grad kunnet konkurrere med sværvægterne iblandt danske interesseorganisationer. Fra 2012-2015 er der dog sket et mindre fald i antallet af referencer til både interesseorganisationer og tænketanke.

Tænketankes uafhængighed som en komparativ fordel i dagbladene

Hvorfor har de mest medieaktive tænketanke i de sidste ti år haft en komparativ fremgang sammenlignet med indflydelsesrige interesseorganisationer? Som indikeret ovenfor har interesseorganisationer en udbredt og legitim position i dansk politik, bl.a. fordi de historisk har varetaget en væsentlig del af den løbende folkelige repræsentation og været med til at forhandle og implementere politik (Binderkrantz et al, 2014; Christiansen & Nørgaard, 2003). Det er derfor bemærkelsesværdigt, at tænketanke er blevet mere refereret af de landsdækkende dagblade igennem perioden. Forestillingen om at medierne fungerer som et marked for politiske idéer, kan bruges til at forstå tænketankes fremvækst i forhold til udbud og efterspørgsel af deres idéer. Et sådant perspektiv betyder, at tænketankes synlighed kan studeres ud fra færre dynamikker end de, der er knyttet til forandringer i teknologi, finansiering, lovgrundlag, politiske institutioner og uddannet arbejdskraft, som tidligere har været set som vigtige baggrundsfaktorer for deres udvikling (McGann & Weaver, 2000, 13ff).

På udbudssiden tager markedsforestillingen udgangspunkt i, at politiske beslutninger er stabile. Det reflekterer en vigtig pointe i litteraturen om *agenda-setting*, nemlig at nye idéer eller policy-forslag møder modstand fra etablerede aktører, men at disse idéer alligevel, hvis de får fortsat opmærksomhed, kan få pludselig og uventet effekt (Kingdon, 2003). Interesseorganisationer kan i dette perspektiv blive underlagt det dilemma, at de enten kan vælge at blive en del af stabile beslutninger og dermed blive systembevarende, eller at de må stille sig uden for indflydelse i de perioder, hvor det politiske system ikke er lydhor overfor deres interesser (Jones & Baumgartner, 1993). Tænketanke kan imidlertid indtage friere positioner i den politiske offentlighed, både fordi de ikke er medlemsbaserede og fordi de ikke er underlagt krav om kortsigtet indflydelse. Martin Ågerup,

der er direktør for Cepos, fremhæver i et interview i 2011 betydningen af ikke at skulle tænke strategisk hverken i forhold til vælgere eller politikere (Ågerup, 2011, [05:58]). Cepos' idéer bliver ifølge Ågerup ikke forhandlet til indflydelse. Derimod er brugen af idéerne afhængig af at de over tid er på mediernes dagsorden.

”Vi forventer ikke, at vores idéer bliver brugt ved gradvis overtalelse. Der opstår en situation, hvor der skal handles. Og hvis der så ligger en idé derude, som er blevet luftet, og som ikke er blevet skudt ned, så kan den anvendes. Det er sådan det ofte sker. Det kommer pludseligt, at politikere tager idéer til sig” (Ågerup, 2011: [23:11]).

Pressechefen Janus Brecht fra Arbejdsbevægelsens Erhvervsråd (AE-Rådet) fremhævede ligeledes i et interview i 2011 det langsigtede perspektiv, som AE-Rådet arbejder med, herunder at dagsordener skal skubbes kontinuerligt over tid. Brecht nævner fx, at AE's idé om 13 års uddannelsespligt er blevet forsøgt sat på den offentlige dagsorden i 12-15 år (Brecht, 2011, [39:05]). Disse interviewudtalelser indikerer, at både Cepos og AE-Rådet aktivt og over tid arbejder for at sætte offentlige dagsordener, hvilket kan fungere som en udbudsorienteret indikation på deres øgede synlighed i dagbladene. Tænketankene arbejder begge med flere målgrupper, der kan spænde fra den brede offentlighed over politiske meningsdannere til en snæver kreds af politiske beslutningstagere (Brecht, 2011; Ågerup, 2011). Omkring kernegruppen af politiske beslutningstagere, spiller det ind, at idéer skal kunne bruges strategisk.


I forhold til efterspørgslen af tænketankes idéer, skal regeringssøgende partier og beslutningstagere tage hensyn til det strukturelle pres på de offentlige budgetter (Strøm, 1990). Skiftende regeringer må foretage nedskæringer af de offentlige budgetter og for at bevare regeringsmagten må de udvikle strategier for ikke at blive straffet for det af vælgerne, når der er valg (Pierson, 1996). Det fører bl.a. til, at politikere er mere optaget af at undgå dårlig omtale (*blame avoidance*) end at tage æren for deres politik, fordi vælgerne er mere sensitive overfor negative end positive forandringer (Weaver, 1986). I sparetider er forhandlingsløsninger med interesseorganisationer ikke altid attraktive, fordi det er sandsynligt, at organisationers medlemmerne vil udtrykke deres utilfredshed offentligt. Mens denne dynamik er svært undgåelig fx i forbindelse med overenskomstforhandlinger imellem offentlige arbejdsgivere og faglige organisationer, kan den minimeres på andre områder ved at nedtone involveringen af interesseorganisationer i reformer. Tænketanke har den fordel at de via analyser i medierne indirekte kan imødekomme behovet for nye idéer i situationer, hvor regeringer

skal gennemføre upopulære reformer. Mens partiernes efterspørgsel efter idéer ikke påvirker tænketankes plads i medierne direkte, kan politikere indirekte påvirke tænketankes synlighed, ved at omtale dem som relevante aktører eller ved at henvise til deres idéer. Det gør det mere sandsynligt, at journalister ser tænketanke som politiske relevante aktører og refererer til dem og deres analyser. Det er ligeledes sandsynligt, at kritiske aktører offentligt tager afstand fra tænketankenes idéer og den reformdagsorden, de relaterer sig til, hvilket forstærker tænketankenes synlighed i medierne. På den måde kan beslutningstageres og politiske partiers behov for nye idéer bidrage til at flytte politiske debatter fra lukkede forhandlingssituationer og ud i det offentlige rum og skabe øget relevans for de tænketanke, hvis idéer betragtes som politisk relevante. På den baggrund kan tænketanke bruge medierne og specielt dagbladene til at lancere deres idéer. Tænketanke har på dette idémarked den fordel, at deres idéer ikke repræsenterer medlemsinteresser, men ofte betragtes som uafhængige og som om de ikke kommer noget sted fra (Shaw et al, 2015). Derfor er tænketanke ikke bundet op på et institutionaliseret forhandlingsforhold og deres idéer kan anvendes fleksibelt. Nedenfor uddybes det, hvordan referencer til forskellige tænketanke har udviklet sig i de landsdækkende dagblade med henblik på at indikere forskellige tænketankes synlighed.

Den varierede udvikling i tænketankes synlighed i dagbladene

Udviklingen af de ti mest citerede tænketanke i perioden 2006-2015 er illustreret i figur 2 nedenfor.

Figur 2: Udvikling i referencer i landsdækkende dagblade for de ti mest nævnte tænketanke fra 1. januar 2006- 31. december 2015.



Figuren viser variation i tænketankes synlighed. Cepos og AE-Rådet har gennemgående været de mest refererede tænketanke i dagbladene i perioden. Den udbredte synlighed af disse to tænketanke i dagbladenes dækning er interessant, fordi begge tænketanke i offentligheden er kendt som hhv. en liberal og en centrum-venstre tænketank. Den relativt høje synlighed af disse tænketanke peger i samme retning som den tendens i USA, der blev refereret og kritiseret ovenfor. Også i Danmark ser det ud til, at tænketanke der har et let identificerbart politisk budskab har bedre adgang til dagbladene end andre tænketanke, som beskæftiger sig med mere afgrænsede *issues* som fx SFI, DIIS, klima- og miljøpolitik (Concito), erhvervs- og uddannelsespolitik (Dea), dansk europapolitik (Tænketanken Europa) eller vækst og innovation (Kraka). Det er sandsynligt, at politisk strategisk relevans er en af faktorerne i fremvæksten af Cepos og AE-rådet i dagbladene efter 2006. Et amerikansk studie har i tråd med denne forklaring fundet, at tænketanke i USA også har fået en stærkere position i takt med, at øget politisk polarisering har øget efterspørgslen efter politisk relevant viden i den amerikanske kongres (Bertelli & Wenger, 2009). Dog har De Økonomiske Råd også en forholdsvis synlig placering i dagbladene, hvilket indikerer, at offentlige og mere konsensusøgende tænketanke også kan opnå synlighed i det omfang deres analyser betragtes som nyhedsværdige af dagbladene.

Figur 2 og den generelle udvikling af nye tænketanke, indikerer udviklinger i danske tænketankes rolle, som kræver mere præcise undersøgelser (se artiklen af Blach-Ørsten & Kristensen i dette nummer). Som det fremgår af figuren, er der i perioden 2006-2015 oprettet flere nye tænketanke inklusive Cevea (2008), Concito (2008) og Kraka (2011), der alle haft succes med at etablere sig i top ti af tænketanke med højest antal referencer i dagbladene i løbet af perioden uden dog at komme helt op i toppen. Der bliver altså gradvist udbudt mere ekspertviden fra flere forskellige tænketanke over perioden. Det øgede antal tænketanke og den øgede konkurrence om synlighed i medierne kan være medvirkende til at forklare det generelle fald i omtalen for organisationerne efter 2012. Ligesom en aftagende interesse for tænketanke som nyt fænomen også kan spille en rolle.

Det er vigtigt at undersøge mere præcist, hvad den øgede konkurrence om adgang til offentlig synlighed betyder, for at uddybe den forestilling om tænketankes brug af medierne, der blev skitseret ovenfor. Ligeledes har de fleste tænketanke ved siden af deres medierettede strategier, direkte relationer til politikere og andre *stakeholders*. Medieeksponering er altså ikke det eneste succeskriterium for tænketanke. Eksempelvis har Martin Ågerup fra Cepos i 2015 indikeret, at tænketanken er begyndt at prioritere alternative kanaler til indflydelse højere end medieadgang (Løppenthin, 2015). Men hvordan påvirker tænketankes prioritering imellem direkte og indirekte

indflydelse deres synlighed i medierne? Har etablerede tænketanke spill-over fra den ene kanal til den anden, ligesom det er blevet indikeret for interesseorganisationer (Binderkrantz et al, 2014)?

I forhold til efterspørgslen efter tænketankes idéer, tyder Cepas og AE-rådets høje grad af synlighed på, at dagbladene vægter tænketankes politiske relevans og aktualitet højt. Men hvordan hænger individuelle tænketankes relevans for medierne sammen med efterspørgslen af deres viden på Christiansborg?

Forestillingen om udviklingen af et marked for udveksling af idéer har peget på, at tænketanke er vokset frem i Danmark pga. af øget efterspørgsel efter politiske relevante idéer igennem medierne. Samtidig stiller forestillingen nye spørgsmål omkring udviklingen og indholdet i tænketankes analyser, den politiske efterspørgsel efter deres idéer og konsekvenserne af flere tænketanke i dansk politik. Hertil er der også behov for at svare på mere grundlæggende spørgsmål om tænketanke, herunder om deres analyser fungerer som alternativer til den ekspertise, der findes i den offentlige administration, sådan som Aaron Wildavsky forestillede sig det.

Konklusion

Artiklen har påvist, at tænketanke er blevet mere synlige i landsdækkende danske dagblade i perioden 2006-2015. Der er desuden blevet argumenteret for, at udviklingen i danske tænketankes medieadgang i de dagsordenssættende dagblade overordnet kan forstås ud fra deres evne til at bruge dagbladene som et marked for udveksling af politiske idéer. En sådan forestilling åbner vigtige overvejelser omkring tænketankes udbud og efterspørgsel af evidensbaseret viden i den offentlige debat. Artiklen har dermed både bidraget med en påvisning af tænketankes øgede synlighed i dagbladene og med en forestilling om, hvordan de bruger medierne til at opnå synlighed i den danske offentlighed.

Mere præcist har artiklen for det første argumenteret for, at tænketanke analytisk kan defineres som ”permanente organisationer, der hævder en grad af uafhængighed og søger politisk indflydelse ved at mobilisere ekspertviden” (Kelstrup, 2014, 21). Der er ud fra tænketankes amerikanske rødder blevet argumenteret for, at de er i konkurrence med interesseorganisationer, men på basis af ekspertviden frem for medlemsbaseret legitimitet. For det andet er der blevet givet et billede af det relative styrkeforhold imellem gruppen af de mest citerede tænketanke og interesseorganisationer i de seneste 10 år. Det er blevet vist, at de ti største tænketanke i perioden 2006-2015 har oplevet en signifikant

stigning i det antal gange, de bliver citeret i landsdækkende dagblade. I forhold til konkurrencen med sværvægterne blandt interesseorganisationerne har stigningen betydet, at tænketankes andel af de to gruppers mediecitationer er steget fra et gennemsnit på 22,4 % af det samlede antal citationer for de to grupper i perioden 2006-2010 til et gennemsnit på 31,4 % i perioden 2010-2015. Tænketanke bruger dagblade til at få anerkendt deres analyser offentligt, fordi de både ud fra teorien om *agenda-setting* og udvalgte tænketankspraktikers udsagn har en interesse i at udbyde ekspertbaseret viden i medierne. Tænketankes idéer efterspørges af beslutningstagere der, jf. teorien om *blame avoidance*, efterspørger evidensbaseret viden, som kan anvendes uden at der skal forhandles med udbyderne af denne viden. Artiklen har vist, at tænketankene Cepos og AE-rådet, som leverer viden ud fra tydelige idépolitiske ståsteder, i perioden 2006-2015 har været mere refererede i dagbladene end andre tænketanke. Fremtiden for danske tænketanke er nu endnu mere interessant at undersøge, end den var for blot et par år siden. Ændringer i form af øget konkurrence imellem et større antal tænketanke, forholdet imellem direkte og indirekte strategier og variationer i den politiske efterspørgsel er vigtige temaer for den fremadrettede forskning i tænketanke, der forhåbentligt kan gøre os klogere på årsager til og konsekvenser af tænketankes rolle i danske medier og politik.

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Think tanks in Denmark – Media visibility and Network Relations

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Introduction¹

Special interest think tanks have a long history in countries such as the US, Great Britain and Germany but they have only recently entered the public and political arena in Denmark. This entry is closely associated with the weakening of societal corporatism in Denmark since the 1980's and 1990's, which have necessitated that actors seeking to influence political decision making have had to find new ways of trying to shape policy making (Rommetvedt et al., 2012). Studies of special interest groups in Denmark have pointed towards three important arenas of influence for organized interest: the Parliament, the administration and the news media (Binderkrantz, 2012). However, such studies have until now not included think tanks. In this article we analyze the two most prominent advocacy think tanks in Denmark, the liberal think tank CEPOS and the social democratic think tank Economic Council of the Labor Movement (ECLM), and their influence on two of the three arenas: The media arena and the administrative arena.

Theoretically, we draw on de-corporatisation (Rommetvedt et al., 2012) and mediatization (Hjarvard, 2013; Strömbäck & Esser, 2014), and argue that media visibility and attention have become increasingly important for political actors seeking to influence decision makers, but that corporatist networks and access to the administrative sphere continue to be important arenas of influence (Binderkrantz, 2012). The empirical study of the media arena analyses the coverage of selected think tanks in 2006 and 2013 in seven Danish newspapers, including three of the largest broadsheet newspapers, since especially national broadsheets continue to play an important role as agenda-setters in Denmark (e.g., Lund, Willig & Blach-Ørsten, 2009). The study of the administrative arena is based on a database containing the members of all (by January 2014 active), nationally relevant boards of top corporations, state committees and councils, nationally represented interest group, and several formal and informal networks.

¹ This article is the product of close collaboration between the two authors, and we are equally responsible for the content. Our names are listed alphabetically.

De-corporatization and the new terrain for political actors

Think tanks are a new phenomenon in a Danish political context. Although well-known both internationally and in Sweden and Norway, Denmark's first think tank was established in the early 2000s. Currently the number of think tanks, depending on their definition, may be as high as 34.² That think tanks are now playing an increasingly important role in the Danish public and political debate (Kelstrup, 2014) is no coincidence. The traditional corporatist structure, i.e. that of integrating employers' associations, trade unions, and other interest groups in the policy making process, is in decline throughout Scandinavia. As a consequence political actors seeking to influence political decision making have had to find new and alternative ways of gaining public and political influence (Tyllström, 2013, Binderkrantz et al., 2015). In a study on corporatism in Denmark and Norway from 1980 to 2005 Rommetvedt et al. (2012: 46) conclude that: "Interest group participation in policy preparing committees has declined dramatically since the early 1980s, and today political decisions are rarely prepared in corporatist committees." Along the same lines, Tyllström shows (2013; 21) that: "(...) the Swedish political system (...) has undergone a significant de-corporatization since the 1990s in which corporatist institutions have lost their influence". Thus, evidence suggests that the so-called 'Scandinavian Corporatist Model' is changing fundamentally.

The process of de-corporatization has led to several important changes in political influence and decision-making. First of all, de-corporatization has occasioned what Rommetvedt et al. (2012) name 'the revival of Parliament'. This means that the national Parliaments have become more active, influential, and competitive, but also that the outcome of decision making processes has become more uncertain since the political opposition, in many instances, has succeeded in changing or amending government policy in ways that the government did not foresee or intend (Rommetvedt et al., 2012: 477). As a consequence of the revival of Parliament, civil servants in the ministries have increasingly become part of the policy preparing process. Thus, for political actors outside of government, the parliament and the ministries' de-corporatization has led to increasing uncertainty as to the outcome of parliamentary decision-making. As a consequence a new strategic terrain for seeking influence on political decision-making has emerged (Rommetvedt et al., 2012).

One part of this new terrain consists of the rise of lobbying and PR. Since Parliament and civil servants have become more powerful, it has also become more important for organized interests to

² See <http://gotothinktank.com/dev1/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/GoToReport2013.pdf>, p. 22 (last retrieved 19. January 2015).

seek to influence public policy making via these channels. Thus, increased political lobbying directed at civil servants, government and parliament has been observed in all Scandinavian countries (Tyllström, 2013; Rommetvedt et al., 2012).

Another consequence is the increased focus by political actors on strategic political advocacy through the news media (Binderkrantz & Christensen, 2014; Tyllström, 2013). Advocacy can here be understood as the building of public opinion around an issue through the news media (Tyllström, 2013). This kind of advocacy includes preparing press releases and talking to journalist both off and on the record. Media advocacy is, however, often complemented with other activities, such as the direct lobbying of politicians, civil servants, etc.

A third aspect is the rise of think tanks. Both Tyllström (2013) and Kelstrup (2014) point out that Europe has seen “an explosion in think tanks” in recent years (Tyllström, 2013: 21), and the news media are one important arena for think tanks to practice political advocacy. But whereas news media advocacy by special interest groups (e.g., business groups, unions, organizations of public institutions, etc.) and, to some extent their lobbying, have already been the focus of some Danish research (e.g., Binderkrantz, 2012, Binderkrantz et al. 2015), the rise of the *think tank* in the Danish political and public debate has so far been the subject of less scholarly attention, among other things due to the only recent introduction of thinks tanks in Denmark.

Visibility, political influence and the news media

The abovementioned studies as well as studies on visibility (Thompson, 1995, 2005) and the mediatization of politics (Ørsten, 2004; Hjarvard, 2013; Strömbäck & Esser; 2014) show that with the decline of corporatism the news media as an arena of political influence has become increasingly important. Addressing the changes in the Danish corporatist structure in the late 1980s, Pedersen (1989) stated that the bargaining and decision making process that used to take place behind the closed doors of corporatist committees increasingly took place in the news media (Ørsten, 2005). Indeed, Thompson (1995, 2005) has argued that the growing visibility of public life is to be understood as one of the most important structural changes in modern society.

More specifically, Thompson (1995, 2005) outlines a general theory of mediated visibility and how the development in communication media has transformed public life from face-to-face interaction to mediated quasi-interaction, arguing that “mediated visibility is not just a vehicle through which aspects of social and political life are brought to the attention of others: it has become the principal means by which social and political struggles are articulated and carried out” (Thompson, 2005: 49).

In much the same way the mediatization of politics thesis argues that Western societies to “an increasing degree is submitted to, or becomes dependent on, the media and their logic” (Hjarvard, 2008: 14). In fact Hjarvard (2013) argues that despite the decline of the party press in the Nordic countries during the 20th century, a re-politicization of the news media in recent years have turned the news media into an opinion industry, meaning that “the media’s contribution to the formation of public opinion becomes institutionalized as a permanent feature of modern politics, and the media no longer solely reflect politics, but become intimately involved in the very production of politics” (Hjarvard, 2013: 52).

In this new environment, political actors – politicians, spin doctors, but also trade unions, special interest groups, NGO’s, business corporations, public bureaucracies, etc. – therefore center much of their activities on the news media. Binderkrantz et al. (2015), for instance, argue that special interest groups can, in theory, be active in three arenas of political influence: The administrative arena, the parliamentary arena and the media arena, but they also argue that “Politics has become increasingly mediatized leading all political actors to focus more on making a presence in the media” (Binderkrantz et. al. 2012: 121). In another study they further state that: “A prominent media presence provides an opportunity to effect or even shape the political agenda and influence the content of ongoing debates as well as political decisions.” (Binderkrantz & Christiansen, 2013: 183).

On the subject of *think tanks*’ access to the media arena and their media visibility, Rich & Weaver (2000: 81) state that: “Media visibility has become an especially important priority for nongovernmental research organizations whose principal mission is to produce and promote their expertise among policymaker (...)”. But that special interest groups and think tanks are successful in gaining media attention is not only due to the structural changes in political decision making. Special interest groups and thinks tanks also possess a number of more general attributes that interact favorably with the way in which the news media as an institution (Cook, 1998; Ørsten, 2005) understands its role in society and organizes its work (Binderkrantz & Christiansen, 2014; Rich & Weaver, 2000).

The news media in Denmark, as in the rest of Scandinavia, act as the orchestrator and interpreter of the public and political debate (Allern & Blach-Ørsten, 2011). A clear political priority given to public service television as well as direct and in-direct state subsidies for the press have made the news media in Scandinavia less vulnerable to technological and economic changes compared to, for instance, US news media (Blach-Ørsten, 2014). Thus, the news media maintain a high focus on

national politics and national political actors as part of their political and democratic obligation to further public debate (Esmark & Ørsten, 2006). As a consequence the news media actively compete for the 'best' political stories, a fact that many types of increasingly professionalized news sources have exploited in recent years (Allern, 2001; Kristensen, 2004; Blach-Ørsten, 2014).

It is the special interest groups' and think tanks' ability to assume this role of professional news sources that both national and international studies point to as one of the reasons why both kinds of political actors have been so successful in gaining media attention (Rich & Weaver, 2000; Binderkrantz & Christiansen, 2014). Evidence suggest that think tanks and special interest groups 'simply' represent new sources of information or new voices in the public debate to the news media, and thus may contribute to a more varied, informed political debate. Pautz (2011: 426), for example, argues that: "Think-tank analysts are best defined as part of the network of 'organic intellectuals' (...) among whom civil servants, technicians, policy experts or legal experts can also be found." From a news media perspective think tanks can thus be seen as a new category of 'expert sources' to the already heterogeneous group of experts and pundits characterizing contemporary journalism (e.g., Hopmann & Strömbäck, 2010). Schlesinger supports this (2009: 3-4) when arguing that: "the connections between think tanks and news media (as well as the political system) are key because some key-think tank players are also 'media intellectuals'. The practice of think tankery is above all about the mediation of ideas (...)".

However, not all special interest groups or think tanks receive the same amount of media attention, since resources play an important role in the quest for media access and visibility (Binderkrantz & Christiansen, 2014; Rich & Weaver, 2000). Furthermore, the ideology or political dispositions of news media may influence the distribution of attention to various think tanks. Rich & Weaver (2000) find some correlation between American newspapers' ideological standpoint and the think tanks they favor. Binderkrantz & Christiansen (2014) also find that despite the death of the party press in Denmark, left leaning and right leaning newspapers favor different interest groups, with the left leaning newspapers favoring unions and right leaning newspapers favoring business groups. This exemplifies Hjarvard's (2013) argument of the re-politicization of the Danish news media.

Thus, changing political circumstances ('*intra*-political') and changing relations between politics and media ('*extra*-political') have paved the way for the emergence of think tanks in a Danish context. However, these same circumstances potentially entail that the political access and media access, gained by different think tanks, may vary considerably.

The Danish study: Think tank typology, research design and research questions

Typology of Danish think tanks, and the think tanks included in this study

‘Think tank’ is a heterogeneous concept, because a variety of special interest groups, NGOs and grassroots all proclaim themselves as such. Indeed defining what a think tank is, and drawing the line between think tanks and other types of institutions and actors, are at the centre of existing literature (Kelstrup, 2014). While much of this literature concerns the US and is therefore biased towards the American debate and conceptualization of the subject, Kelstrup (2014: 21), writing on think tanks in an European context, suggests that think tanks can be identified as follows: 1) “Think tanks are organisations with a physical headquarter (sic).” 2) “Think tanks claim some degree of autonomy.” 3) “Think tanks attempt to exert influence on public policy, understood broadly as courses of action adopted and pursued by political decisions-makers.” 4) “Think tanks are active in mobilizing research with relevance for public policy by displaying a certain level of activity whether by conducting events, publishing or wielding media impact.” In more detail, McGann & Sabatini (2011: 4) argue that the functions of think tanks include:

“mediating between government and public; identifying, articulating and evaluating current or emerging issues, problems, or proposals; transforming ideas and problems into policy issues; serving as an informed and independent voice in policy debates; and providing a constructive forum for exchange of ideas and information between key stakeholders in the policy formulation process”.

Among the organizations that may, according to these characteristics, be acknowledged as think tanks, there are typically three types:³ Advocacy think tanks, universities without students, and party-affiliated think tanks. Whereas universities without students are the oldest type of think tanks internationally, the advocacy think tank is a newcomer (Stone, 1991,1996; Kelstrup, 2014: 37).

In Denmark, most think tanks are relatively new and can be defined as advocacy think tanks – for instance CEPOS, CEVEA, and KRAKA, which are all included in this study. More specifically, *Center for Political Studies/CEPOS*, founded in 2004/2005 by business people, cultural personalities, and politicians, frames itself as an independent liberal think tank (<http://cepos.dk/content/about-cepos>

³ Kelstrup (2014) proposes a fourth type of think tank, ‘the policy think tank’. This category is not found in the international literature, and differs, it seems, only slightly from the well-known category of advocacy think tank.

, last retrieved January 19 2015). This American inspired think tank has popularised the term in a Danish context and, more importantly, made way for competing or opposing, left-wing think tanks such as CEVEA and KRAKA. *CEVEA* was founded in 2008 as an independent center-left think tank (<http://cevea.dk/english>, last retrieved January 19 2015), while *KRAKA*, founded in 2011, also as an independent think tank, aims to “securing the future Danish Welfare state” (http://kraka.dk/om_kraka, our translation, last retrieved January 19 2015). In Kelstrup’s (2014) definition the *Economic Council of the Labor Movement* (ECLM) started out as a party-affiliated organization, founded in 1936 with close ties to the Danish Trade Unions. However, since such organizations enjoy little credibility in the Danish public, it has moved towards being an advocacy-think tank with a clear focus on professional media strategies (<http://www.ae.dk/english>, last retrieved January 19 2015).

Thus, these four think tanks are included in this study, because all of them may be considered advocacy think tanks – the most dominating type of think tanks in Denmark, and because two of them (ECLM and CEPOS) have existed in the full period of our study (2006-2013), while the other two (CEVEA and KRAKA) are new-comers, exemplifying the recent emergence and growth of advocacy think tanks in a Danish context.

Arenas of influence and samples

In line with Binderkrantz & Christiansen’s (2014) argument of special interest groups acting in three arenas of political influence (the administrative, the parliamentary and the media arena), we analyze the influence of think tanks in two of these arenas: The media arena and the administrative arena. Since special interest groups are still invited to participate in the legislative process in the parliamentary arena, this arena is of continuous importance to the study of special interest groups. However, think tanks are not recognized in this way and are not a formal part of legislative processes. Thus, if think tanks want to influence politics, they have to go through the other two arenas.

In the empirical study of the media arena, we analyse the full yearly coverage of the four think tanks in 2006 and in 2013, covering a time-period characterised by, as mentioned, a considerable increase in think tank efforts in Denmark (Kelstrup, 2014). We include the coverage in seven Danish national newspapers – broadsheet, tabloid and niche (print-version only) (n = 2279 news items and opinion pieces) – since especially national broadsheets continue to play an important role as agenda-setters in Denmark (e.g., Lund et al., 2009). The newspapers are listed in table 1.

Table 1: Newspapers included in the study

Newspaper type	Title	Political leaning	Daily readers (Winter 2013)
Broadsheet	<i>Berlingske Tidende</i>	Right-wing conservative	200.000
Broadsheet	<i>Jyllands-Posten</i>	Right-wing liberal	290.000
Broadsheet	<i>Politiken</i>	Centre-left	329.000
Tabloid	<i>B.T.</i>	Center- right	177.000
Tabloid	<i>Ekstra Bladet</i>	Center-left	182.000
Niche	<i>Information</i>	Left-leaning	99.000
Niche	<i>Kristligt Dagblad</i>	Christian-based	104.000

The codebook was developed as part of a larger comparative study of think tanks in the Nordic countries and a trained coder conducted the coding. Based on our theoretical framework, the empirical design was developed in order to answer the following research questions:

RQ 1: *How (much) are the different think tanks represented in different printed newspapers?*

This question concerns the general visibility in the newspapers of the four think tanks, and whether the visibility of the individual think tank can be linked to the political leaning of the newspapers.

RQ 2: *What kind of source role(s) do think tanks play in the news articles?* This question is

linked to the general debate on the media-sources relationship. Do the think tanks in question appear as ‘neutral’ expert sources, or are they clearly identified as sources with special interests.

For the study of the administrative arena we have used a database containing the members of all (by January 2014 active), nationally relevant boards. More specifically, the boards of all Danish top corporations, all state committees and councils, all boards and subcommittees of nationally represented interest group and several formal and informal networks. The unit of analysis is the appearance of a member of the board or advisory board of the selected think tanks in any of these nationally relevant boards. The database is collected by Ellersgaard & Larsen (2014: 14) for their study of power elites in Denmark. The selection is based on ‘the inclusion principle’, meaning:

“(…) if a registered gathering of some sort, be it a corporation board, a social club, a royal ball, within the limits of our sociological imagination can be conceived as potentially either powerful in its own right or serve as a vehicle for social integration between elite individual, it is included (…).”

The database contains 5.332 organizations and 62.841 positions, but cannot be considered ‘big data’

according to its collectors. Instead it is middle range data, since the database is deliberately focused on Danish society (Ellersgaard & Larsen, 2014). But in this sort of analysis relationships that could potentially influence network relations are overlooked, for example informal relationships such as friendship and kin, or relations created in the past, e.g., between actors from the same education/university (Ellersgaard & Larsen, 2014: 18).

The aim of the network analysis is to answer the following research question:

RQ 3: *How are the different think tanks connected to the administrative arena?* This question concerns the fact that even though corporatism is in decline, the administrative arena is still an important arena of influence.

Results: Media visibility

The empirical data shows that *all* the newspapers most frequently refer to the liberal think tank CEPOS (RQ1), indicating that CEPOS has been very successful in gaining media visibility. This is especially the case in newspapers of a similar political leaning, since CEPOS is more frequently mentioned in the right-wing conservative newspaper *Berlingske Tidende* and the right-wing liberal newspaper *Jyllands-Posten*, the centre right tabloid *B.T.*, the Christian niche newspaper *Kristeligt Dagblad* and the centre-left tabloid *Ekstra Bladet*. Only the centre-left-leaning broadsheet *Politiken* seems less favourable to CEPOS in terms of visibility in news items (see figure 1). Instead *Politiken* to a greater extent includes the left-leaning think tanks ECLM and KRAKA in the coverage compared to the other broadsheets *Berlingske Tidende* and *Jyllands-Posten*, but also compared to the other left-leaning newspapers *Ekstra Bladet* and *Information*. *Politiken* also favours the think tank *Kraka*. Thus, these findings imply a tendency of political parallelism of, especially, Danish broadsheets and ideologically or politically toned social agents.

That the liberal think tank CEPOS is by far the most visible of all the analysed think tanks is in line with international findings suggesting that liberal/conservative parties are often more successful at influencing and entering the news media. Rich & Weaver (2000: 98-99), for example, conclude that American think tanks within the ‘conservative cluster’ talk with a larger collective voice than those in the ‘liberal cluster’. Hopmann & Strömbäck (2010: 955) found that in media coverage of elections “media pundits more often than not have a right-wing rather than a left-wing background”. This Danish study of think tanks supports this, because even though two new left-wing think tanks

(KRAKA and CEVEA) have entered the media arena in the analysed period (2006-2013), CEPOS continues to be the most frequently mentioned think tank in all seven newspapers in 2013, no matter their political leaning.

Figure 1: The think tank the most in focus in the analyzed newspapers

		Name of newspaper							Total
		Berlingske	Jyllands-Posten	Politiken	BT	Ekstra Bladet	Infor-mation	Kristeligt Dagblad	
CEPOS	Count	348	270	206	56	39	164	57	1140
	% within Name of newspaper	53,5%	51,9%	39,2%	54,4%	52,0%	50,9%	68,7%	50,0%
ECLM	Count	198	181	198	22	23	91	20	733
	% within Name of newspaper	30,5%	34,8%	37,6%	21,4%	30,7%	28,3%	24,1%	32,2%
KRAKA	Count	52	46	97	11	10	17	1	234
	% within Name of newspaper	8,0%	8,8%	18,4%	10,7%	13,3%	5,3%	1,2%	10,3%
CEVEA	Count	52	23	25	14	3	50	5	172
	% within Name of newspaper	8,0%	4,4%	4,8%	13,6%	4,0%	15,5%	6,0%	7,5%
Total	Count	650	520	526	103	75	322	83	2279
	% within Name of newspaper	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

* This figure includes news stories and opinion pieces (n = 2279).

The successful media work of think tanks, of any political persuasion, is supported by the use of think tanks as sources and by the source role(s) attributed to them (RQ2). First and foremost, there has been a significant increase in the use of think tank representatives as sources in the news coverage (see figure 2): While approximately six in ten news articles in 2006 included a think tank representative as a source, this number had by 2013 increased to almost eight in ten (table not shown).⁴ In addition, think tanks are frequently used as the *main* source and increasingly so – approximately every one in three *main* sources, quoted or referred to by the analysed newspapers, are think tank representatives (table not shown).⁵

⁴ When coded for 'Is any think tank representative a source?', the answer was 'yes' in 58,4% of the 2006-sample (272 of 466 articles) and in 76,7% of the 2013-sample (689 of 898 articles). Only *news* articles were coded for this (n = 1364).

⁵ When coded for 'Main source quoted, referred to' this was a 'think tank representative' in 30,3% of the 2006-sample (141 of 466 articles) and 37,9% of the 2013-sample (340 of 898 articles). Only *news* articles were coded for this (n = 1364).

Figure 2: If a think tank appears a source, in what source role does the think tank appear?

		Name of newspaper						Total	
		Berling-ske	Jyllands-Posten	Politi-ken	BT	Ekstra Bladet	Informa-tion		Kristeligt Dagblad
	Count	210	182	155	24	10	81	25	687
	% within Name of newspaper	53,4%	53,2%	53,1%	47,1%	23,3%	44,5%	41,0%	50,4%
"Special interest" source	Count	91	67	60	8	6	54	15	301
	% within Name of newspaper	23,2%	19,6%	20,5%	15,7%	14,0%	29,7%	24,6%	22,1%
Peripheral reference	Count	71	81	70	19	27	47	21	336
	% within Name of newspaper	18,1%	23,7%	24,0%	37,3%	62,8%	25,8%	34,4%	24,6%
Other	Count	21	12	7	0	0	0	0	40
	% within Name of newspaper	5,3%	3,5%	2,4%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	2,9%
Total	Count	393	342	292	51	43	182	61	1364
	% within Name of newspaper	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

* This figure includes only news stories (news articles, news notes and feature articles), but not news analysis, editorials, op-ed/debate articles, etc. n = 1364.

Furthermore, the think tanks are in every second case cast as (autonomous) experts and not explicitly affiliated with specific political agendas or interests (see figure 2). This is especially the case in the broadsheets, while less dominating in the niche newspapers. The broadsheets as well as the tabloids much less frequently – approximately in one in five cases – frame the think tanks as ‘special interest’ sources, promoting specific viewpoints. This confirms the theoretical arguments on think tanks being successful in orchestrating themselves as part of the increasingly large network of ‘organic intellectuals’ or ‘media intellectuals’ characterising contemporary media culture (e.g., Jacobs & Townsley, 2011; Schlesinger, 2009). This dominating casting of think tanks as ‘neutral’ experts is confirmed by the fact that all the analysed newspapers are most often either positive or neutral to a

proposal or initiative by the think tanks when included in a *news story*. In less than one in thirty cases, the newspapers apply a negative approach to the proposals or ideas presented by the think tanks (see figure 3). For example, the conservative broadsheet *Berlingske* has 198 news items in which the liberal think tank CEPOS (the think tank most often featured in this newspaper) is mentioned (table not shown). 38,4 % (76 news items) are positive to CEPOS, while 31,8 % (63 news items) are neutral. Regarding ECLM, the second most mentioned think tank in *Berlingske*, 153 news items in total make reference to this think tank of which 44,4 % (69 news items) are positive to the think tank and 32,7 % (50 news items) neutral. Also *Jylland-Posten* features mostly positive mention of CEPOS and ECLM, which are also the most featured think tanks in this newspaper. CEPOS has a 46 % (69 news items) positive mention in the newspaper, whereas ECLM has a 43,2 % positive mention (64 news items). However, in the more left leaning media, *Politiken*, *Ekstra Bladet* og *Information*, CEPOS receives the least amount of positive mention of all the think tanks covered by these newspapers. In *Politiken* and *Information* ECLM gets the most positive mention, whereas Kraka gets most positive mention in *Ekstra Bladet*.

Figure 3: News angle tendency

		Name of newspaper							Total
		Berlingske	Jyllands-Posten	Politiken	BT	Ekstra Bladet	Information	Kristeligt Dagblad	
Positive to a proposal/initiative from the think tank most in focus	Count % within Name of newspaper	165 42,0%	151 44,2%	123 42,1%	25 49,0%	14 32,6%	77 42,3%	25 41,0%	580 42,5%
Negative to a proposal/initiative from the think tank most in focus	Count % within Name of newspaper	7 1,8%	10 2,9%	10 3,4%	1 2,0%	3 7,0%	5 2,7%	1 1,6%	37 2,7%
Neutral to a proposal/initiative from the think tank in focus	Count % within Name of newspaper	123 31,3%	140 40,9%	106 36,3%	15 29,4%	17 39,5%	76 41,8%	27 44,3%	504 37,0%
Irrelevant/not possible to decide	Count % within Name of newspaper	98 24,9%	41 12,0%	53 18,2%	10 19,6%	9 20,9%	24 13,2%	8 13,1%	243 17,8%
Total	Count % within Name of newspaper	393 100,0%	342 100,0%	292 100,0%	51 100,0%	43 100,0%	182 100,0%	61 100,0%	1364 100,0%

* This figure includes only news stories (news articles, news notes and feature articles), but not news analysis, editorials, op-ed/debate articles, etc. $n = 1364$.

So, while the newspapers generally cover the think tanks positively, the newspapers tend to favour different think tanks even more according to their political leanings. This points to a re-politization of the news media with regard to the use of think tanks as sources. Thus, as is the case with most sources performing or cast as expert sources, the think tanks are only on rare occasions met by a critical framing by the analysed newspapers. The think tanks seem to have more or less unhindered access to supply the news media and the public with tailored information and agendas.

This picture is, to some extent, confirmed in the *commentary articles* – i.e., articles often produced by the think tanks themselves. Not surprisingly this entails an even larger share of articles, compared to the news articles, with a positive stance towards the idea or argument proposed by the think tank (see figure 4). This is especially the case in the broadsheets and in one of the tabloids, since six in ten (or more) opinion pieces in these newspapers provide a positive view towards a proposal or initiative provided by the think tanks most in focus in these newspapers. This positive favouring is, however, much less present in the niche newspapers, especially in *Information*. Among the opinion pieces in this newspaper we find more critical attitudes towards the think tank initiatives – that is, viewpoints most likely presented by opponents of the think tank most in focus, its proposals or ideological standpoint.

Figure 4: Commentary tendency

		Name of newspaper						Total	
		Berlingske	Jyllands-Posten	Politiken	BT	Ekstra Bladet	Information		Kristeligt Dagblad
Positive to a proposal/initiative from the think tank most in focus	Count	156	119	140	39	4	53	6	517
	% within Name of newspaper	60,7%	66,9%	59,8%	75,0%	12,5%	37,9%	27,3%	56,5%
Negative to a proposal/initiative from the think tank most in focus	Count	48	34	54	5	20	57	5	223
	% within Name of newspaper	18,7%	19,1%	23,1%	9,6%	62,5%	40,7%	22,7%	24,4%
Neutral to a proposal/initiative from the think tank in focus	Count	20	20	28	7	6	16	8	105
	% within Name of newspaper	7,8%	11,2%	12,0%	13,5%	18,8%	11,4%	36,4%	11,5%
Irrelevant/not possible to decide	Count	33	5	12	1	2	14	3	70
	% within Name of newspaper	12,8%	2,8%	5,1%	1,9%	6,3%	10,0%	13,6%	7,7%
Total	Count	257	178	234	52	32	140	22	915
	% within Name of newspaper	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

* This figure includes only opinion articles (editorials, op-ed/debate articles, etc.) but not news (news articles, news notes and feature articles), n = 915.

Thus, if looking for critical approaches to think tanks in the newspapers one must turn to the op-ed pages and opinionated genres rather than to the news. But, we must, more specifically, turn to the niche newspapers rather than the broadsheets for these critical voices, since especially the left-wing niche newspaper *Information* provides an almost equal share of positive and critical commentaries, while the broadsheets provide a more skewed picture in favour of the think tanks they give most attention. Standing apart from the rest of the sample, the tabloid, *Ekstra Bladet*, has the most negative comments of all newspapers. This newspaper, and especially its op-ed section, is more generally known for its often loud and negative commenting on a range of issues.

Results: Network analysis

Think tanks do not act alone in setting an agenda (Stone, 2007). But not only the news media is an important ‘partner’ for most think tanks. Also network relationships to donor-groups, government, organizations, corporations, etc., may assist think tanks in being recognized and gaining status as authoritative experts in society.

Turning to the analysis of the network affiliations of ECLM and CEPOS, we need to keep in mind that the unit of analysis is the appearance of a member of the board or advisory board of the selected think tank in any of the nationally relevant boards that have been included in the database.

ECLM has a high density of network relations (see figure 5), of which most include affiliations with the state, organizations, corporations, and the Danish Parliament (see figure 6). ECLM has no fewer than 106 relations in total.

The density of ECLM’s relations is linked to this think tank’s continuous close connections to the Danish Workers’ Union and many of their members. Furthermore, the Danish Workers’ Union still have a strong relationship with the Social Democratic party, which was, at the time of this analysis, leading the Danish coalition government that came into power in 2011, and which, in turn, lead to many connections between ECLM and the Danish state. However, the many network relations also show that the corporatist state, in many ways, remains. Though the same network analysis cannot be conducted at the time when the corporatist state was in its heydays, this study does suggest that the notion of de-corporatization should be considered an ongoing process, and that many of the corporatist networks remain firmly in place.

Figure 5: ECLM's network affiliation



Figure 6: ECLM's most prominent network affiliations

	Percentage	Number of relations
Parliament	13 %	14
Foundations	8 %	9
Commissions	5 %	5
Organizations	26 %	28
State	32 %	34
Corporations	15 %	16

Turning to CEPOS, it is evident that the network relations of this think tank are fewer and also, to some extent, different from those of ECLM (see figure 7 and 8). With a total of 27 network relations CEPOS is connected to a much smaller, national network than ECLM. Furthermore, CEPOS is to a much lesser extent linked to State and Parliament and has most relations to organizations and corporations. This, on the one hand, emphasises its profile as a neoliberal, market-oriented think tank. On the other hand, this also implies that successful media management and extensive visibility in the media arena does not necessarily reflect dense network relations *outside* the media. Indeed, it might be the other way around. CEPOS, being a newly formed liberal think tank, does not have a strong, historically based network among the actors of the Danish corporatist state but 'compensates' for this lack of network relations by focusing its resources on media relations instead.

Figure 7: CEPOS' network relations



Figure 8: CEPOS' network affiliations

	Percentage	No. of relations
Foundations	15 %	4
Commissions	4 %	1
Organizations	37 %	10
State	15 %	4
Corporations	22 %	6
VL-Networks	7 %	2

Conclusion

Our analysis shows that advocacy think tanks have come to play an increasingly important role *within* and *outside* the Danish news media during the past decade. Especially, the two oldest and largest Danish think tanks, CEPOS and ECLM, seem to have caught the news media's attention as topics and sources of interest and importance. They receive almost the same amount of media coverage, yet the liberal think tank CEPOS receives more positive attention by the liberal media, while the social democratic think tank ECLM receives more positive attention by the centre left media. This confirms the tendency towards re-politization of the news media in Denmark that others have also pointed to (Binderkrantz & Christiansen, 2014; Esmark & Ørsten, 2006; Hjarvard & Kristensen, 2014), and similar conclusions have been reached in a US context (Rich & Weaver, 2000).

Furthermore, the media study shows that advocacy think tanks most often appear as 'independent' expert sources, and increasingly so, in news items rather than as 'special interest sources', despite their *raison d'être* of promoting particular ideologies and causes. This reflects the news media's more general tendency to prioritize a very heterogeneous flock of expert sources (e.g., Albæk, 2011), legitimised by quite varying forms of knowledge and authority (Kristensen & From, 2015), but it also indicates that Danish think tanks have efficiently and quickly succeeded in promoting themselves publicly as providers of ('objective') expert knowledge.

The network analysis shows that both dominating think tanks are well connected but, largely, to different spheres of society. CEPOS is mostly connected to media and private business, whereas ECLM has a much larger and broader network that links them to the state/government, private business, the unions, etc.

We can therefore conclude that think tanks are very active in Denmark, have a high media visibility and are successful in casting themselves in the news media as expert sources rather than being affiliated with specific political interests. But we can also conclude that media visibility is only one part of the equation and that the social network of the think tanks must also be taken into consideration. Thus, even though the debate on de-corporatization would suggest that the news media as an arena of influence has become the most important one, our analysis show that some of the corporatist structures are still intact and thus continues to warrant both focus and analysis.

Keywords

Denmark, mediatization, media visibility, news sources, de-corporatization, re-politicization, special interest groups, think tanks

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Norske tankesmier i mediene: En suksesshistorie

Paul Bjerke

I løpet av 2000-tallet har en ny type aktører etablert seg i det norske politiske systemet. De kaller seg gjerne *tankesmier* eller tenketanker. Fenomenet vokste fram i USA tidlig i forrige århundre, og deres suksess blir ofte forklart med særtrekk ved det amerikanske politiske systemet, blant annet svake og lite ideologiske partier (Rich, 2005, Abelson, 2009). Men i vår tid har de spredd seg til store deler av verden (Stone & Denham, 2008). Nå er de også kommet til Norge. En av tankesmienes viktigste målsettinger er synlighet i offentligheten. Denne artikkelen kartlegger derfor omfang og karakter av omtalen av tankesmier i de sju største norske papiravisene i 2013. Tankesmier er ifølge McGann & Weaver (2000) «non-governmental, not-for-profit, research organisations with substantial organizational autonomy from government and from societal interest such as firms, interest groups and political parties». Det er en ganske vid definisjon. Hva er det så disse mangslungne organisasjonene har felles – og hva skiller dem fra forskningsinstitusjoner, politiske partier, konsulentselskaper og gravende journalister som også samler, syntetiser og skaper informasjonsprodukter, «often directed towards a political or bureaucratic audience», men “also for the benefit of the media, interest groups, business and the general public» (Stone & al 1998, 2). For det første må de være «relativt uavhengige» av myndigheter, politiske partier og pressgrupper. Tenketankenes virksomhet må videre ha et klart element av forskning og/eller analyse. Men norske fordi mange tankesmier driver lite egen forskning, det er derfor tilstrekkelig at de «lener seg på forskning» (Johnsen, 2006). Endelig skal tankesmiens virksomhet være innrettet på å påvirke politiske beslutninger og/eller på opinionen. Stone & al (1998) mener organisasjonene også må ha et *ønske* om å påvirke politiske beslutningsprosesser for å kunne omtale som tankesmier.

I forskningslitteraturen er think tanks ofte blitt delt i ulike grupper, der de tre hovedformene, etter R. Kent Weaver (Weaver, 1989, McCann & Weaver, 2000), er:

- «**university without students**» (universiteter uten studenter) som legger hovedvekten på langsiktig akademisk arbeid og er finansiert av myndigheter, filantropiske fond, selskaper og individer. Deres viktigste output har tradisjonelt vært *bøker*.

- «**contract research organisations**», (oppdragsforskningsinstitutter) som har prosjekter på kort- og mellomlang sikt. De publiserer gjerne *rapporter*, og de får i all hovedsak sine inntekter fra offentlige og private oppdragsgivere.
- «**advocacy think tanks**» (opinionsdannende tenketanker) som også arbeider på kort og mellomlang sikt. De har en tydelig ideologisk målsetting og plattform. Slike tankesmier produserer gjerne en *mix* av bøker, artikler, tidsskrifter og kortrapporter og arrangerer møter/konferanser. Slike opinionsdannende tankesmier er normalt ikke finansiert av myndigheter, men av det sivile samfunn.

Det norske bildet

Det finnes knapt norsk forskning på tankesmier. Det er skrevet to hovedoppgaver om fenomenet (Johnsen, 2006, Ursin, 2007a) og noen masteroppgaver om Civitas betydning i enkeltsaker (Aanensen, 2006, Jensen, 2010). Jeg har tidligere (Bjerke 2015) kartlagt omfanget av tankesmiene i Norge. Her vil jeg i tillegg peke på et nasjonalt særtrekk: I Norge eksisterer det få eller ingen «universiteter uten studenter». Derimot finnes en stor sektor med samfunnsvitenskapelige forskningsinstitutter som i hovedsak lever av oppdragsforskning, gjerne for ulike offentlige myndigheter. Johnsen (2006) konkluderer at både Forskningsstiftelsen Fafo,⁶ Nova⁷ og Civita⁸ «i mer eller mindre grad matcher» hans definatoriske kriterier. Det betyr i praksis at *alle* de samfunnsvitenskapelige forskningsinstituttene også vil matche kriteriene. Det samme sier Lars Holger Ursin i en artikkel:

”Instituttsektoren er så omfattende og innflytelsesrik i Norge at den ofte omtales som et særnorsk fenomen - men det er bare delvis riktig. Det er nemlig sterke likhetstrekk mellom den norske instituttsektoren og amerikanske tankesmier, i alle fall den undertypen som primært driver oppdragsforskning” (Ursin, 2007b).

I en amerikansk rangering over tenketanker (Go To Think Tank)⁹ er Norsk utenrikspolitisk institutt (Nupi) og Peace Research Institute of Oslo (Prio) rangert blant verdens ledende innenfor området internasjonal politikk. Og i en japansk oppstilling (NIRA¹⁰) er Norsk Institutt for oppvekst,

⁶ Fafo ble startet i 1982 som «Fagbevegelsens senter for forskning, utredning og dokumentasjon» og hadde i starten en svært tydelig karakter av opinionsdannende tankesmie. Senere er Fafo omorganisert til et ordinært oppdragsforskningsinstitutt.

⁷ Norsk institutt for forskning oppvekst, velferd og aldring

⁸ En liberal tankesmie startet i 2003, se videre nedenfor.

⁹ <http://gotothinktank.com/>

¹⁰ <http://www.nira.or.jp/past/ice/> (fra 2005)

velferd og aldring (Nova) registrert som en «think tank». Men i norsk sammenheng er det svært uvanlig å omtale disse instituttene som tenketanker, fordi de ikke har en tydelig ideologisk agenda. I Norge brukes nemlig begrepet «tankesmie» tilnærmet synonymt med «*advocacy think tanks*». En talende illustrasjon finnes i en artikkel i Ukeavisen Ledelse der professor Frank Aarebrot omtaler Fafø som en tankesmie fordi den er en «premissleverandør» for politikk. Fafø svarer at de ikke er en tankesmie, men en forskningsorganisasjon: «Civita skiller seg fra Fafø ved å være en tankesmie, og har, som tankesmier bør ha, et ideologisk definert utgangspunkt.»¹¹ Gulbrandsen & al (2013) har kartlagt den norske instituttsektoren. Gjennomgangen viste at det fantes 26 samfunnsvitenskapelige forskningsinstitutter i 2013, med en samlet omsetning på over en milliard kroner. Svært mye av virksomheten er kartlegging, analyse og policyutforming for offentlig sektor. Denne sektorens posisjon og betydning for norsk politikk og politisk kommunikasjon er åpenbart et interessant tema.¹² Det kan blant annet diskuteres i hvilken grad instituttene er «uavhengige av myndighetene».¹³ Jeg vil her avgrense temaet til de *opinionsdannende tenketankenes* gjennomslag i mediene. Slike tankesmier har politisk påvirkning og innflytelse som mål og mediesynlighet som en av hovedmetodene i dette arbeidet.

Teoretisk forståelse av opinionsdannende tankesmier

Den internasjonale litteraturen om «*advocacy think tanks*» er voksende. Tilnærmingen er ofte tverrfaglig, og det kan etter mitt syn utskilles i alle fall to hovedsynspunkter. En statsvitenskapelig forståelse ser opinionsdannende tankesmier som en forholdsvis «nøytral» eller «tom» organisasjonsform som ulike typer interesser (politiske, økonomiske, sivile osv.) kan bruke til å fremme sine interesser på det politiske «market of ideas» (Barana & Sciotino, 2011, se også Pautz, 2011, Stone & Denham, 2008). Denne forståelsen knytter an til pluralistiske teorier eller eliteteorier som begge studerer tankesmier som en del av kampen om politisk innflytelse mellom

¹¹ Ukeavisen Ledelse, 9.8.2013

¹² Et eksempel som illustrerer problemstillingen er evalueringen av sexkjøpsforbudet, som regjeringen satte ut på anbud i 2013. Da lot Fafø være søke og begrunnet det med at rammene for evalueringen var slik at de mente det var faglig uforsvarlig å gjennomføre oppdraget (Aftenposten 10.1.14). I stedet ble evalueringen foretatt av konsultentselskapet Vista Analyse som konkluderte med at loven hadde virket etter hensikten. Konklusjonen fikk stor politisk betydning – og Fafø polemiserer deretter mot funnene i offentligheten.

¹³ I den siste norske forskningsmeldingen drøftes dette overhodet ikke. Argumentasjonen i meldingen for ikke å gripe inn med mer politisk styring var at det ikke er nødvendig, ikke at det ikke bør gjøres.

interessegrupper, organisasjoner, partier osv. Det gjøres f.eks. nettverksstudier som legger vekt på at tankesmier arbeider for å påvirke dagsorden utenfor de vanlige kanalene for beslutningstaking ved hjelp av «economy of connections», der kontakter er den harde valutaen (Garsten, 2013, 151).

Opinionsdannende tenketanker er også beskrevet som del av “*an institutional field for corporate-political interaction*” (Barley, 2010), et nettverk der bevilgende bedrifter, interesseorganisasjoner eller andre bruker tenketanker, ad hoc-grupper, PR-firmaer, konsulenter og advokatfirmaer til å øve innflytelse på sine primærmål, som er regjering og lovgivere. Media er her altså ikke hovedmålet for virksomheten, men et *middel* (Barley 2010). En skandinavisk variant av denne forståelsen er å legge vekten på at tankesmier vokser fram som et resultat av at samfunnet avkorporativiseres og medialiseres. Da skapes et økende behov for «uavhengig ekspertise» som både kan påvirke opinionen gjennom mediene og beslutningstakere direkte (se også artikkelen af Blach-Ørsten & Kristensen), og for aktører som ved hjelp av mobilisering, dagsordensetting og overtalelse kan utøve «soft power» (Garsten, 2013:143).

Den andre hovedtilnærmingen er historisk-sosiologisk og ser tankesmier som en *spesiell form for organisering* som neoliberale interesser med hell har benyttet de siste femti årene og som så – med noe mindre hell – blir kopiert av andre grupperinger og interesser (McKewon, 2012, Jaques & al., 2008, Djelic, 2015). Franske Marie Louise Djelic oppfatter f.eks. de neoliberale tankesmiene som en *institusjonalisert oppfinnelse* i den hensikt å spre ideer for å forandre verden (Djelic, 2015). I denne prosessen spiller såkalte transnasjonale fellesskap (Djelic & Quack, 2010, Plehwe, 2010) en helt sentral rolle. Djelic beskriver hvordan aktører som Anthony Fisher, direkte og personlig inspirert av markedsliberalismens ledende teoretiker Friedrich Hayek, systematisk bygde opp markedsliberale tankesmier over hele verden: «When there were only a couple of neoliberal think tanks thirty years ago, today there are close to four hundred in more than 70 nations across the world» (Djelic, 2015). Jeg har andre steder beskrevet (Bjerke, 2015) hvordan den norske liberale tankesmien Civita ble etablert etter påvirkning og mønster fra Fishers Institute of Economic Affairs og svenske Timbro. Denne forståelsen har sine aner i neomarxistiske tradisjoner, særlig en retning som trekker veksler på Antonio Gramscis begreper om *hegemoni* og *organiske intellektuelle* (Stone & Denham, 2008), som er knyttet til «interessepartier» i vid forstand. Det hevdes at samfunnsvitenskapelig ekspertise i tenketanker og transnasjonale nettverk “omformer interesser og fordelingskonflikter til ideologiske konflikter” (Rudloff, 2004, sitert i Pautz, 2012). Eller som Plehwe skriver: “Specific and particular interests can attain the status of general interests only if they are well understood, expressed and advocated as well as effectively legitimized” (Plehwe, 2010:306). Fellestrekket i begge

tilnærmingene er at de ser tankesmier som ledd i kampen om innflytelse og opinion, altså som genuint politiske aktører – selv om de iblant driver nettverksbygging i det skjulte – i stor grad er innrettet på åpen ideologisk strid. De «trivs best i öppna landskap», som den svenske sangeren Ulf Lundell sier. Opinionsdannende tankesmier har følgelig *synlighet* og *medieomtale* som et mål. De opinionsdannende tankesmiene er følgelig organisert for opinionsdanning, dels gjennom egne publikasjoner og skoleringstilbud, dels gjennom «agendasetting» (McCombs and Shaw, 1972) og «framing» (Entman, 1993) i mediene. Internasjonale studier viser videre at slike organisasjoner normalt har som *hovedstrategi* å benytte etablerte og tradisjonelle massemedia i dette arbeidet (Weaver, 1989, Rich & Weaver, 2000, Feldman, 2007, McKewon, 2012, Clark & Roodman, 2013, Blach-Ørsten & Kristensen, 2016). De legger altså normalt mindre vekt på egne publikasjoner, og sosiale medier brukes først og fremst til å spre artikler som er publisert i de tradisjonelle mediene. De ansatte i tenketanker skriver leserinnlegg og kronikker, de konstruerer «pseudobegivenheter» (Boorstin, 1961) av typen pressefrokoster, pressekonferanser og bokutgivelser (ofte på strategiske tidspunkter, med sikte på journalistisk dekning i sentrale nyhetsmedier (McKewon, 2012)). Ansatte i opinionsdannende tenketanker er dessuten ofte populære intervjuobjekter i et bredt utvalg av saker. McKewon skriver at «the primary role of neoliberal think tanks is to access the media in order to influence public opinion and advocate policies that are consistent with the interests of their organisational sponsors» (McKewon, 2012). Det har ifølge ham, lykkes. Disse tenketankene er nemlig «among the most influential news sources in USA and Australia». Mens Jaques & al. (2008) viser at 92 prosent av 151 kartlagte klimaskeptiske bøker er finansiert av konservative tenketanker og at “the successful use of this tactic (“scepticism”) has contributed to the weakening of US commitment to environmental protection.” (Jaques & al., 2008, 349). Opinionsdannende tankesmier er derfor styrt av en annen etikk og logikk enn de andre think tanks-typene. Det avspeiles også i rekrutteringspolitikken, der opinionsdannende tenketanker gjerne rekrutterer ansatte på et (allmenn)politisk grunnlag: «A staff of academics is almost certainly inappropriate for an ‘advocacy think tank’», skriver Weaver (1989). Kvalitative intervjuer med tankesmiene i Bjerke (2015) bekrefter at norske tankesmier også har mediesynlighet som et viktig mål i sitt arbeid. Har de lykkes?

Metodiske merknader

For å besvare dette forskningsspørsmålet har jeg gjennomført en studie av i hvor stor grad og på hvilken måte ledende norske papiraviser omtaler tankesmier. I tråd med Weaver (1989) har jeg først operasjonalisert «opinionsdannende tankesmie» som uavhengig, forskningsbasert, policyorientert og

ikke-kommersiell kommersielle organisasjoner og med et åpent ideologisk og/eller politisk ståsted som den ønsker å fremme.

Kartleggingen av tankesmier er deretter foretatt på basis av søk på begrepene «tankesmie» og «tenketank» i søkemotoren Google. Jeg forutsatte at denne typen tankesmier har en viss synlighet på Internett.¹⁴ Gjennom søket ble det funnet en rekke mulige organisasjoner, som så ble gjenstand for en nærmere analyse for å se om disse kriteriene ble oppfylt.¹⁵ Det var ingen av de aktuelle tankesmier som ble fravalgt i denne prosessen. To av dem er diskutabile. Mandag Morgen var en blanding av nett-publikasjon med faste utgivelser og tankesmie; mens Kristendemokratisk Forum er svært tett knyttet til Kristelig Folkeparti. Men begge har såpass tydelige trekk av tankesmier at jeg valgte å ta dem med. Resultatet av kartleggingen er gjengitt i Tabell 1.

Som det framgår av tabellen, har jeg funnet 13 organisasjoner som oppfyller mine kriterier for å bli kategorisert som («opinionsdannende tankesmier») og som var aktive i 2013. Heretter i kapitlet blir de omtalt bare som «tankesmier» eller «tenketanker». Alle er små organisasjoner. Den største, Civita, hadde i 2013 ni årsverk og et budsjett for året på rundt 12 millioner kroner. Agenda, som ble operativ våren 2014, har i dag en liknende størrelse. Manifest og Res Publica har 4-5 ansatte, mens Human Rights Service, Skaperkraft og Minotenk i praksis er 1-2 mannsbedrifter. Alle disse tankesmiene har, men i varierende grad, prosjektmedarbeidere, stipendiater, studenter og forfattere tilknyttet virksomheten. De øvrige tankesmiene på lista sysselsetter mindre enn ett årsverk. I alt engasjerte norske tankesmier i 2013 bare rundt 20 årsverk. Det har i dag steget til rundt 30 årsverk og en samlet årsomsetning på 30-40 millioner. Sammenliknet med sysselsettingen i liknende felt som samfunnsvitenskapelig oppdragsforskning, journalistikk, politiske partier og informasjon/PR, er omfanget bagatellmessig.

¹⁴ En mulig feilkilde er at organisasjoner som ikke kaller seg «tankesmier» eller «tenketanker», men likevel oppfyller kriteriene, på denne måten faller utenfor kartleggingen. Men når oppdragsforskningsinstituttene i utgangspunktet er definert ut, er dette neppe noe problem. Jeg har presentert funnene i flere relevante sammenhenger og ingen har etterlyst noen organisasjoner som burde vært tatt med, men ikke er det.

¹⁵ Jeg har også gått gjennom noen av de aktuelle NACE-kodene (statistiske næringskoder) på nettstedet proff.no, men det viser seg at de fem mest kjente tankesmiene har registrert seg på fem ulike koder, slik at gjennomgangen var lite nyttig for mitt formål. I NACE-registret finnes det en rekke enkeltmannsforetak som etter en slik definisjon kunne vært registrert som tankesmier, men slike er holdt utenfor kartleggingen.

Tabell 1 Norske tankesmier i 2013

Navn	Ansatte	Ideologisk grunnlag (tredelt)
Civita	9	Høyre
Agenda	- ¹⁶	Venstre
Manifest analyse	4	Venstre
Human Rights Services	2	Høyre
Res Publica	5	Venstre
Minotenk	3	Sentrum
Skaperkraft	2	Sentrum
Kristendemokratisk forum	-	Sentrum
Sosialliberalt verksted	-	Sentrum
Kristen og Progressiv	-	Venstre
Føniks - ruspolitisk tenketank	-	Sentrum
Ludwig von Mises-instituttet i Norge	-	Høyre
Mandag Morgen ¹⁷	-	Høyre

Pressedekning av tankesmier

Jeg har deretter *tallfestet* den offentlige interessen for tankesmier gjennom å studere pressedekningen, definert som omtale i landets sju største papiraviser, basert på opplagstall fra Mediebedriftenes Landsforbund:

Tabell 2. Aviser i studien. Faglig og ideologisk profil. Opplag 2013

Aftenposten	Broadsheet	Høyre	216000
Dagens Næringsliv	Business	Høyre	80000
Dagbladet	Tabloid	Sentrum	80000
VG	Tabloid	Høyre	164000
Stavanger Aftenblad	Regional	Sentrum	59000
Adresseavisen	Regional (Trondheim)	Høyre	67000
Bergens Tidende	Regional	Høyre	73000

¹⁶ Etablert i løpet av 2013. Vokst til ca. ti ansatte i 2014.

¹⁷ Mandag Morgen ble nedlagt i løpet av 2013.

Papiraviser er valgt fordi det fortsatt er disse som i stor grad setter dagsorden for den politiske debatten. Studier, både i Norge (Erdal, 2010) og internasjonalt (Pew Research Center, 2011, Lund & al, 2009¹⁸), viser at det er de «gamle» avisredaksjonene som produserer nesten alle nyheter, og det er avisenes kronikk- og debattsider som ofte er utgangspunkt for etermedienes debattprogrammer. Innsamlingen av relevante artikler ble gjort ved hjelp av søkemotoren på avisdatabasen Retriever. Søkeord var navnet på tankesmien. Samtlige artikler der en tenketanks navn var nevnt, er tatt med i analysen. Tabell 3 viser den samlede omtale av tankesmier i de sju avisene i 2013

Tabell 3 Antall artikler i de sju største avisene der en tankesmie er nevnt. Etter tankesmie. Antall¹⁹

Tankesmie	2013
Civita	369
Manifest	52
Agenda	48
Human Rights service	33
Res Publica	21
Progressiv	15
Skaperkraft	13
Minotenk	11
Mandag morgen	3
Totalsum	565

Tabellen viser at de sju avisene i 2013 totalt hadde 565 artikler der tankesmiene på noe vis var omtalt. Den (markeds)liberale tenketanken Civita var suverent mest omtalt,²⁰ klart mer enn alle de andre tankesmiene til sammen. Om dette totalt sett er mye eller lite omtale, er naturligvis et skjønnsspørsmål. Men en opptelling på Retriever av omtalen av tankesmier og noen andre politiske aktører og forskningsinstitusjoner i 2013 viser følgende:

¹⁸ Den danske nyhetsundersøkelsen er gjentatt i 2012 og foreløpige, ikke-publiserte resultater viser at mønstret fortsatt er det samme.

¹⁹ I samband med en fellesnordisk studie ble det også gjort en opptelling på samme måte i 2006. Resultatet var 200 artikler. Det betyr en klar økning fra 2006 til 2013. Det har to årsaker, dels er det blitt flere tankesmier, dels er de tankesmiene som eksisterte både i 2006 og i 2013 i hovedsak omtalt i større omfang.

²⁰ Civita var også klart mest omtalt i 2006.

Tabell 4. Antall artikler i Norges sju største aviser som inneholder omtale av henholdsvis tankesmier Nupi, ISF, Fagforbundet, Fellesforbundet og Universitetet i Oslo. 2013

Emne	Omtale
Tankesmier	565
NUPI (Norsk utenrikspolitisk institutt)	201
ISF (Institutt for samfunnsforskning)	145
Fagforbundet (Kommuneansatte)	443
Fellesforbundet (Industriansatte)	164
Universitetet i Oslo	1800

Tabell 4 viser at tankesmiene er vesentlig mer omtalt enn mer etablerte og langt større «contract research organisations» som Nupi (Norsk utenrikspolitisk institutt), og Institutt for samfunnsforskning. Nupi har 60 ansatte. ISF 56. De ganske små tenketankene er omtalt like mye som Norges to største fagforbund, Fagforbundet og Fellesforbundet, til sammen. De to fagforbundene har totalt rundt en halv million medlemmer. Det er også interessant at Norges største universitet, Universitet i Oslo, bare er omtalt tre ganger så ofte som de små tankesmiene.

Veier til mediedekning

De norske tenketankene forsøker å skaffe seg innflytelse gjennom tre hovedstrategier: Utgivelse av bøker/rapporter, direkte mediekontakt og nettverksbygging. Mediesynlighet bygger de både med bokutgivelsene og den direkte kontakten (Bjerke 2015). Tankesmiene utgir både dagsaktuelle, politiske og mer allmenngyldige, faglige bøker. Bokutgivelsene er nært knyttet til tankesmiens formål. I 2013 utga f.eks. den sosialdemokratiske Res Publica boka *Blåkopi* av Wegard Harsvik (Harsvik, 2013). Den var direkte innrettet på å støtte Arbeiderpartiet og deres allierte i den norske valgkampen. Middelet var en kritisk gjennomgang av det svenske høyrepartiets politikk og det norske Høyres angivelige kopi av denne. Den andre boka var derimot en utfordring også til de rødgrønne, en ny norsk oversettelse av Torstein Veblens sosiologiske klassiker *The Leisure Class (Den uproduktive klassen)* (Veblen, 2013). Utgivelsene får ofte omtale i dagspressen og i etermedienes

aktualitetsendinger og debattprogrammer. Avisomtalen legges normalt ut som linker på tankesmiens egen hjemmeside. I løpet av den første måneden hadde f.eks. Res Publica lagt ut 20 slike lenker om *Blåkopi*. Civita utga i 2013 seks bøker, alle med en klar liberal profil: Mest direkte innrettet på den aktuelle politiske situasjonen i Norge var Mathilde Fasting *Valgfrihet* (Fasting, 2013a) og en utgivelse om den første borgerlige samlingsregjeringen i Norge etter annen verdenskrig. Begge bøkene ble presentert som faglige utgivelser (en idehistorisk og en historisk). Men de ble (også) oppfattet som innspill i den aktuelle politiske debatten før stortingsvalget i 2013.

Tankesmiene produserer også kortrapporter. I 2013 hadde Civita mediesuksess med Fastings notat om *Arbeidstidsreglene i offentlig sektor* (Fasting, 2013b). Res Publica utga boligforskeren Arild Holt-Jensens rapport om norsk boligpolitikk (Holt-Jensen 2013), mens Manifest fikk en viss medieomtale rundt sin rapport om OPS (Offentlig-privat samarbeid) i helsesektoren (Pollock, 2013). Fellestrekket i disse rapportene er at de samler og syntetiserer kunnskap på et aktuelt felt, både fra forskning og fra konsulentrapporter og medieoppslag. Rapportenes innhold formidles gjennom journalistiske medier på to måter, som iblant kombineres. Dels skriver forfatterne kronikker med sine hovedfunn/påstander, dels tilbyr de innholdet (gjerne eksklusivt) til en redaksjon som da kan lage et nyhetsoppslag, basert på innholdet i rapporten. Poenget er at medieoppslaget helst ikke skal handle om rapporten, men om *innholdet* i den. Da Manifest laget en rapport om offentlig-privat samarbeid (OPS), var det VG som ble tilbudt saken, og som laget et oppslag²¹ om OPS med følgende ingress: «Investorene jubler over Høyres veipolitikk: Lav risiko og god avkastning kan skape et nytt marked for pengeplassering». Dermed fikk Manifest sitt politiske poeng fram gjennom en nyhetsartikkel i den største og mest innflytelsesrike av de norske tabloidavisene. Noe av det samme oppnådde Civita da Mathilde Fasting framsto som *ekspertkilde* i en større nyhetsartikkel knyttet til oppstarten av forhandlingene mellom KS og lærerne om arbeidstid høsten 2013.²² Fasting hadde da nettopp ferdigstilt rapporten om teamet og ble benyttet av businessavisa Dagens Næringsliv til å analysere forhandlingene.

Synlighet i avisartikler

Den andre måten å skaffe seg mediesynlighet på er ved å produsere debattinnlegg og kronikker. Tankesmiene oppfatter at det er forholdsvis enkelt å komme på trykk (Bjerke 2015). Dataene fra

²¹ VG, 28.7.2013, s. 15.

²² Dagens Næringsliv 18.11.2013, s. 6.

denne innholdsanalysen peker i samme retning. 18 prosent av avisartiklene der en tankesmie er nevnt, er kronikker eller debattinnlegg fra tankesmiene selv. Det går fram av Tabell 5:

Tabell 5 Fordeling av artikler etter sjanger og forfatter

<i>Sjanger</i>	<i>Antall</i>	<i>Prosent</i>
Nyhet	156	28
Kommentar	119	21
Kronikk		
Tankesmie	101	18
Andre	105	19
Notiser	84	15
Totalsum	565	101

Vi ser at 101 artikler (18 prosent) av alle artiklene der tankesmier er nevnt, er debatt- og kronikkinnlegg som er skrevet av deres egne representanter. Gjennom slike kronikker og leserinnlegg kan man lansere rapporter, debatter, ideer - og nye tolkninger og innramninger av aktuelle problemstillinger. Tallene viser tydelig at tankesmiene lykkes i å skape debatt om sine forslag. Redaksjonene (og andre innsendere) tar opp, roser og kritiserer innspillene. Det blir gjort på et bredt spekter av områder. Det går fram av tabellen under:

Tabell 6. Artikler der tankesmier er nevnt. Etter hovedtema.

Tema	2013
Ideologi	87
Tankesmien selv	67
Kultur og media	50
Velferd og helse	39
Økonomi	36
Innvandring	31
Arbeid	30
Utenriks	27
Utdanning	25
Skatt	22
Privatisering	15
Menneskerettigheter	13
Annet	123
Sum	565

Vi ser at tankesmiene opptrer i artikler med et svært bredt spekter av tema; fra ideologi og historie via skole, medier og samferdsel til skatt og makroøkonomi.

Hvordan blir så tankesmiene presentert i avisene? Blir deres utspill og/eller organisasjonen selv framstilt positivt eller negativt. I tabellen under er det brukt en grov inndeling av tankesmier i høyre/venstre-orientert (jf. Tabell 1²³) og en inndeling i «tendens» i omtalen, der «positiv» betyr at tankesmien er framstilt i et positivt lys og/eller tankesmiens utspill er positivt vurdert, mens «negativ» innebærer negativ vurdering eller omtale. «Nøytral» betyr at artikkelen ikke har noen tydelig tendens.

Tabell 7. Tendens i omtalen av tankesmier i leder/kommentar etter tankesmiens og avisens ideologiske plassering. Prosent. (N=119)²⁴

Avis	Sentrum		Høyre	
	Venstre	Høyre	Venstre	Høyre
Positiv	83	28	45	58
Negativ	0	36	36	25
Nøytral	17	36	18	17
Sum	100	100	99	100
N=	13	28	23	55

Som vi ser av tabellen, er et klart flertall av kommentarene i begge tuper aviser positive eller nøytrale til begge kategorier tankesmier. Men vi ser også en tydelig effekt av avisas grunnsyn: Sentrumsorienterte aviser er klart mer positive til venstreorienterte tankesmier og mer negative til de høyreorienterte enn høyreorienterte aviser er. Den velvillige holdningen vises også i hvordan tankesmiene blir presentert i nyhetssakene. Blir de omtalt som partskilder eller som nøytrale «eksperter»:

²³ Sentrums-tankesmiene i tabell 1 er her fordelt slik: Minotenk er «venstre», mens Skaperkraft er «høyre». De andre sentrums-tankene er ikke representert i denne tabellen.

²⁴ Merk at N er lav i denne tabellen, særlig for sentrumsorienterte aviser. Jeg har derfor gjort samme beregning med materialet fra 2006, og det viser samme tendens.

Tabell 8. Tankesmiens kilderolle i nyhetssakene. (N=156)

Kilderolle	Totalsum
Ekspert	54
Partskilde	27
Annet	19
Totalsum	100
N=	156

Tabellen viser at i et flertall av nyhetssakene der tankesmiene opptrer som synlige kilder, har de karakter av «nøytrale eksperter», ikke partskilde. Det betyr at tenketankene er presentert uten en ordmarkør som f.eks. «liberal» eller «venstreorientert». Dette gjelder for de fleste tankesmiene.²⁵ Tankesmiens målgruppe er ikke først og fremst «befolkningen». Det er heller ikke den sittende regjering. Tankesmiens virksomhet handler mye om å påvirke tenkningen til ledende intellektuelle sjikt – på lengre sikt (Djelic, 2015, Bjerke, 2015). Dette kan illustreres av hvor de velger å publisere og hvilke typer aviser som er interesserte i deres utspill og innspill:

Tabell 8. Omtale av tankesmier i avisene. Etter avistittel. Prosent

Aviser	2013
Adresseavisen (Trondheim)	3
Aftenposten (Oslo)	25
Bergens Tidende	19
Dagbladet (Oslo)	19
Dagens Næringsliv (Oslo)	16
Stavanger Aftenblad	8
VG	10
Totalsum	100
N=	565

Av tabellen ser vi at tankesmiene er mest omtalt i Osloavisene, særlig lav er interessen i Stavanger og Trondheim. Populæravisen VG skriver også mindre om tankesmiene enn Aftenposten og

²⁵ Men for mange av de mindre tankesmiene er det her snakk om svært små tall.

næringslivsorganet DN. Denne fordelingen gjelder også tekster som tankesmiene skriver selv. 44 av Civitas 78 innlegg og kronikker i 2013 har vært på trykk i Aftenposten og DN, bare fem i VG. Spissformulert kan man si at tankesmiene prioriterer og blir prioritert av Osloaviser med høystatus lesergrupper.²⁶

Diskusjon

Vi ser altså at tankesmiene omtales bredt og positivt, og vi ser at den liberale Civita blir klart mest (og i all hovedsak positivt) omtalt. Det står i sterk motsetning til det som skjedde med den liberale tankesmiens forløper. Civita ble nemlig dannet av LiFo, restene av organisasjonen Libertas som ble stiftet rett etter annen verdenskrig og som i hovedsak skulle samle inn penger til de borgerlige partiene. Men den hadde forsøkt å etablere seg i hemmelighet, noe som viste seg ødeleggende da det ble kjent (Riksaasen, 1973). Etter at dette ble avslørt i Arbeiderbladet i 1947, ble Libertas finansiert av redernes og næringslivets organisasjoner og konsentrerte seg i stedet om ideologisk arbeid, blant annet produksjon og utgivelse av bøker og pamfletter og kursvirksomhet på Elingaard gods i Østfold. Libertas tilfredsstillte de aller fleste kjennetegn på en opinionsdannende tankesmie, men dette begrepet ble aldri brukt om den. Organisasjonens formål var erklært liberalt: «arbeide for næringsfrihet, åndsfrihet og politisk frihet som grunnlag for en fullverdig livsstandard for alle». Libertas ble – i motsetning til Civita – aldri «stuerene» i norsk politikk. Spørsmålet er derfor hvorfor situasjonen er en helt annen i dag.

En viktig årsak er naturligvis endringer i det ideologiske klimaet: Markedsliberalismen var en marginalisert politisk-økonomisk retning fra 1945 fram til de økonomiske krisene i Vesten på 1970-tallet. Libertas kunne (med hell) avvises som en «reaksjonær» «propagandasentral» av Arbeiderpartiets ideologer (Brunvand, 1960). Da Civita ble etablert, med de samme økonomiske bidragsytere og det samme politiske programmet rundt årtusenskiftet, var denne typen argumentasjon virkningsløs og ble bare benyttet av ytre venstre-krefter. Den senere lederen for Manifest, Magnus Marsdal, skrev i 2004 at «Er det ikke relativt åpenbart hvilke konklusjoner en tankesmie for samfunnets rike og mektige vil komme fram til?»²⁷ (Marsdal, 2004).

Men, som vi ser av tabell 8; Civitas, Manifests og de andres ideologiske plassering blir i de fleste tilfeller *ikke* gjort kjent for leserne. Tankesmiens representanter presenteres heller som

²⁶ Dette illustreres også av at et søk på Civita i Morgenbladet, en ukeavis innrettet på høyt utdannede, gir hele 40 treff i 2013.

²⁷ Klassekampen 23.4.2004.

«nøytrale eksperter». Ettersom dekningen ellers i all hovedsak er positiv eller nøytral og 34 prosent av nyhetsartikler og notiser har utgangspunkt i innspill, utspill eller pseudobegivenheter fra tankesmien selv, tyder funnene på at tankesmiene – *helt uavhengig av ideologisk plassering* - lykkes i å skape positiv oppmerksomhet i mediene rundt sine utspill. Dette peker i retning av også *andre* årsaker enn politisk klimaskifte for å forstå tankesmiens gjennomslag i vår tid. Tankesmier har lenge vært knyttet til USA. Og noe av forklaringen har vært at det amerikanske partisystemet mer er kampanjeorganisasjoner for personer enn politiske «verksteder». Når de norske partiene er blitt svekket som arenaer for politikkutvikling gjennom de siste 25 årene, når tallet på partimedlemmer er raskt synkende og når det dessuten blir stadig færre folkevalgte, oppstår et behov for andre organisasjoner som kan «tenke langsiktig».

Et tilliggende moment er at USAs partipressesystem ble avviklet på 1800-tallet. USA hadde altså ingen partipresse da tankesmiene vokste fram i det tjuende århundret. En mulig medvirkende årsak til at tankesmier kom sent i Norge, er derfor partipressens fall. Mediehistoriker Henrik Bastiansen skriver:

”Det DNA-dominerte statsapparatet som ble bygd ut i Einar Gerhardsens regjeringstid var i stor utstrekning basert på at arbeiderpressen drev systematisk meningsdanning for å sikre den nødvendige velgeroppslutning som skulle til” (Bastiansen, 2009:41).

Sentrum i denne meningsdanningen på venstresiden var Arbeidernes Pressekontor i Oslo, som allerede i 1949 hadde mer enn ti ansatte og som ved siden av ordinær nyhetsformidling hadde som formål «å sørge for den best mulige politiske orientering gjennom fortrolige informasjon og politiske artikler» (Bastiansen, 2009, 41). Partipressesystemet sto under partikontroll og var slik sett ikke tankesmier i dagens forstand, men det kan neppe være tvil om at det foregikk omfattende politikkutvikling i disse organisasjonene og i nettverket mellom avisenes redaktører og politiske journalister. Bastiansen peker f.eks. på at Senterpressen, som i motsetning til AP knapt hadde sentralt ansatte, var navet i en «sirkulasjon av meninger mellom Senterpartiet, Senterpartiets pressekontor og Senterpressen som rent ideologisk skilte seg nokså sterkt fra både A-pressen. Høyrepressen og Venstrepressen. Det var organisasjoner som talte «bygdefolkets sak». Slik ble Senterpressen et bygdepolitisk oppdemmingssystem, en agrar motkraft» (Bastiansen, 2009). I løpet av 1990-tallet ble partipressen erstattet av konserndannelser, der redaktørene ble bedriftsledere (Roppen, 1996), og der (parti)politisk uavhengighet ble en dyd for alle journalister. Mange har hevdet partipressen var servil. Det er bare halvveis riktig. Avisene var lojale (og servile) mot *sine* partier. Men de var skarpt kritiske

mot de konkurrerende partiene. De sørget derfor for omfattende politisk debatt og politikktutvikling i offentligheten. De mer markedstilpassede og politisk forsiktige konsernstyrte avisene påtok seg ikke en slik oppgave. Dermed oppsto det på den ene siden et rom for opinionsdannende tankesmier, og Civita kunne starte opp.

På den andre siden fikk den fristilte pressa (som måtte tone ned sine politiske standpunkter) et behov for «profesjonalisert» kommentar og debattstoff, et behov som nå skjerpes av nedgangen i partipressas inntekter. Noe av forklaringen på tankesmienes suksess ligger dermed i de samme forholdene som forklarer PR-bransjens innpass i mediene (Allern, 1997, Cappelen, 2013): Det er et resultat av at tankesmiene og media har en felles interesse i denne typen publisering. Tankesmiene er opprettet for å påvirke opinionen, mens media har behov for spissede forskningsresultater, utspill, ideer og tanker som har nyhetsverdi og kan skape konflikt og debatt.

Konklusjon

Undersøkelsen har vist at norske tankesmier har hatt betydelig gjennomslag i de sju største norske papiravisene og at deknningen i all hovedsak er velvillig og positiv. Artikkelen har lansert to forklaringer på dette: en er knyttet til endringer i det politiske klimaet, den andre er knyttet til avviklingen av partipressesystemet. Den første forklaringen på de norske tankesmienes mediesuksess trekker på innsikter fra den historisk-sosiologiske analysen av tankesmienes framvekst som tett sammenvevd med den markedsliberale ideologiens suksess. Den andre forklaringen gir mer støtte til den statsvitenskapelige analysen av tankesmiers mediesuksess: de fyller et behov i et av-korporativisert og medialisert samfunn.

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Swedish Advocacy Think Tanks as News Sources and Agenda-Setters

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A heterogeneous concept

‘Think tank’ is a heterogeneous concept, and is used to characterize ‘a remarkably diverse group of organizations’ (Stone & Garnett, 1998). As Stone (2004, p. 2) remarks:

Think tanks vary considerably in size, structure, policy ambit and significance. As a consequence of this diversity, alongside cultural variations in comprehending the role of these organisations, there are considerable difficulties in defining ‘think tank’.

Some think tanks present themselves as independent research organizations without any ideological or political agenda—‘universities without students’ (Weaver, 1989, p. 564). Others pose as policy experts and function as contract research institutions. Many publicly-known think tanks, however, have a more partisan role and are heavily engaged in political advocacy and the marketing of ideas (Schlesinger, 2009; McKewon, 2012).

A characteristic feature of think tanks is that they ‘work to influence agendas outside the regular decision making channels’ (Garsten, 2013, p. 142). Think tanks trade in ideas, influence public opinion, and develop ties with political elites. However, they do so without any formal role in the polity. Their funding base may vary, but donations and contributions from corporations, foundations, and organisations seem to be typical. In the USA, the organisation scholar Stephen Barley (2010) has shown that corporations in the 1970’s and 1980’s extended their contributions to think tanks, as part of an attempt to increase their influence on federal government decisions. Together with political spending, contributions to lobby organisations, and hired PR firms, corporations were able to build ‘an institutional field’ to mould the political environment (Barley, p. 794).

Advocacy think tanks, which are the subject of our media study, exist to influence public opinion, public policy, and political debates with a more long-term, strategic scope than day-to-day politics, that is, ‘they help to provide the conceptual language, the ruling paradigms, the empirical examples that become the accepted assumptions for those in charge of making policy’ (Stone, 1996, p. 110).

Such think tanks see themselves primarily ‘as advocates for specific solutions to public policy problems or for their own political worldview’ (Thunert, 2004, p. 77). Business groups or corporations usually fund market-liberal advocacy think tanks. Other advocacy think tanks are linked to political parties, while others are sponsored by trade unions and interest organizations.

One of the strategic aims of advocacy think tanks is to influence political opinion, both through mediated communication, and through more direct contact and dialogue with policymakers. Think tanks publish books, new reports, and commentaries, arrange debates and seminars, and are more than willing to function as media sources on a broad range of topics (Bjerke, 2015; McKewon, 2012; Stål & Tillegård, 2005).

In the past few decades, think tanks have appeared in a large number of countries, including in Scandinavia and other parts of Europe. Of particular interest here is the large number of neoliberal think tanks that espouse a market- and business-friendly ideology (Djelic, 2014). Furthermore, think tanks have been active across Europe, and there has been an especially strong evolution of partisan and advocacy think tanks (Weaver, 1989). This development has also stimulated the establishment of transnational think tank networks (Plewe, 2007), one of the early examples being the London-based, neoliberal Stockholm Network (Miller and Dinan, 2008).

The Swedish think tank landscape

Several institutions in Sweden may be grouped into the diverse ‘think tank’ categories mentioned in the introduction above, including some academic and research institutes, and those think tanks primarily engaged in conferences and publishing. However, most institutions in Sweden that actively use the term ‘think tank’ to describe themselves and their societal role have an outspoken ideological and political platform. A report on Swedish think tanks in 2012 (Lindström, 2012) lists as many as 26 think tanks, including institutions and groups of quite different natures and public activities. Several of these are market-friendly organizations financed by the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise, including the most well-known and politically-outspoken neoliberal think tank, Timbro. We will describe Timbro and other advocacy think tanks in more detail below. However, it is important to note that the Swedish think tank landscape also includes several liberal research organisations without an outspoken partisan and advocacy profile.

One of the research-based think tanks sponsored by the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise is *Ratio*, which is formally defined as “the research institute of business” and declared to be an

independent institution.²⁸ Its research projects are financed by contributions from different sources, including both private and public foundations. Another organisation of the same type is *Institutet för näringslivsforskning* (the Institute for Business Research), a non-profit foundation established by Swedish employers and industrialists in 1939. A third market-friendly research institution is *SNS* (the Centre for Business and Policy Studies), which defines itself as a network for leading decision makers in business, politics and public administration, sponsored by a broad range of Swedish corporations and organisations.²⁹ Its main activities are linked to publishing, research, and the organisation of seminars. Originally, *SNS* was founded by Swedish business interests, but its platform was later broadened, and today its leadership includes some academics and public officials.

Another relatively large think tank that differs from typical ideological advocacy think tanks, is *Global utmaning* (Global Challenge), which is not a market-liberal organisation, but an independent institution that focuses on economic and environmental issues relating to globalization processes.

The different publishing and conference activities sponsored by *Axess*, a foundation controlled by a wealthy Swedish industrialist family, the Ax:son Johnson family, is another example of a think tank with activities that lie outside the role of typical advocacy think tanks. The family and their foundation clearly have a strategic liberal agenda. However, they do not engage directly in public debates and policymaking, as do Timbro and other advocacy think tanks.³⁰ As our primary interest is think tanks with a clear political worldview and an outspoken ideological agenda, we chose to include the following 13 advocacy think tanks in the media study: Timbro, Frivärld (Free World Forum), Den nya välfärden (The New Welfare), Fores,³¹ Captus, Eudoxa, Civitas and Bertil Ohlininstitutet, Arena Idé (named Agora in 2006), Arbetarrörelsens tankesmedja (the Think Tank of the Labour Movement),³² Cogito, Seglora, and Katalys. As the media analysis will show, some of these think tanks are nearly invisible, both as news sources and public commentators, and therefore we will concentrate the presentation and discussion below on think tanks with a more active public role.

²⁸ Source: <http://ratio.se/>

²⁹ Source: <http://www.sns.se/artikel/om-sns>

³⁰ The Ax:son Johnson family finance the liberal magazine *Axess*, sponsor the weekly *Fokus* magazine, own the *Axess* TV channel, and finance the international-oriented *Axess Programme on Journalism and Democracy*.

³¹ The full name is Fores – Forum för reformer och entreprenörskap (Forum for Reforms and Entrepreneurship).

³² In 2014, the Labour Movement Think Tank changed its name to Tankesmedjan Tiden and, among other activities, published a magazine called *Tiden* (*The Time*).

The liberal advocacy think tanks

The oldest of the nine selected advocacy think tanks is *Timbro*, which was founded in 1978. It has a neoliberal—some would say *libertarian*—ideological profile, and is fully funded by a foundation established by the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise: the *Foundation For Free Enterprise*.³³ Timbro also runs both the Timbro Media Institute and Stureakademin, the latter being an academy for the theoretical and ideological education and training of young politicians and public intellectuals, not to mention future editorial commentators. In 2013, a former chairman of the Centre Party, Olof Johansson, accused some of the Centre Party's liberalist politicians in Stockholm of being strongly influenced by Timbro.³⁴

Timbro is financially and organizationally independent of political parties, but many of its leaders and spokespersons have been members of the Swedish conservative party, the Moderates. Timbro also has had strong, informal links to the leading conservative morning paper, *Svenska Dagbladet*. However, the political background of Karin Svanborg-Sjövall, the present CEO of Timbro, is as a member of the Liberals.

For many decades, Timbro has been an active publisher, and its book list includes translated libertarian and neoliberal classics (written by Ayn Rand, Robert Nozick, Friedrich von Hayek, and Milton Friedman), and reports about current affairs. Timbro has played an active international role and has long cooperated with leading liberalist think tanks in the US (such as the Cato Institute, the Heritage Foundation, and the Atlas Network) and in the UK (such as the Institute of Economic Affairs). Karin Svanborg-Sjövall, CEO of Timbro, states that many of the ideas Timbro propagated in the last part of the 1970's 'are quite mainstream now'. However, in her opinion, the worldview of young people on the liberal and conservative side of the political spectrum today is a challenge for Timbro:

Young liberal politicians are quite uninterested in economic questions, of economic freedom, which are our core questions. The dominating tendency today is linked to problems concerning identity, gender, hbqt³⁵—in short pop politics—and from my political perspective this situation gives me an uneasy feeling. During the last years,

³³ In Swedish: Stiftelsen Fritt Näringsliv.

³⁴ Interview in *Flamman* January 16, 2013.

³⁵ Hbqt: Referring to homosexuals, bisexuals, queer, and trans persons.

it has become more difficult to convince young liberal politicians that government interference is a real problem.³⁶

The *2014 Global Go To Think Tank Index* ranks Timbro number 88 out of more than 6,500 think tanks worldwide.³⁷ In 1997, Timbro was one of the initiators of the London-based Stockholm Network, a European cooperation of free-market think tanks (Miller & Dinan, 2008, p. 167; Dinan & Miller, 2007). Much more important for Timbro these days is the newly-founded European Policy Information Center (EPiCenter), run cooperatively by Timbro and five other libertarian think tanks from across the EU (from the UK, Italy, France, Spain, and Lithuania), all of which are privately founded and working to support ‘the principles of a free society’.³⁸ Timbro’s staff consists (according to their homepage www.timbro.se) of 15 people, supported by short-term employees working on different projects.

During the last decade, Timbro’s growth and political influence have led to the establishment of several other Swedish think tanks, a few of which are on the right-wing, liberal side, and others of which have a centre-left or social democratic profile.

Frivärld (Stockholm Free World Forum), because of its financier, location, and history, has been characterized as ‘an offshoot from Timbro’ (Lindström, 2012, p. 3), but this think tank, which champions ‘individual liberty’, specializes in foreign policy and defence questions.³⁹ It was founded in 2011 and is, just like Timbro, fully financed by the Foundation For Free Enterprise. The Stockholm Free World Forum is also located on the same premises as Timbro. The staff consists of one manager, a part-time board leader, and one intern. The think tank has three associated research fellows.

Fores (Forum for Reforms and Entrepreneurship) was founded in 2008 and uses two labels to characterize its activities: green and liberal. The founders are the Bertil Ohlin Institute, the Centre Party, and an adult education association.⁴⁰ Its work concentrates on four program areas: climate and the environment, migration and integration, entrepreneurship and economic reforms, and the digital society. Mattias Goldmann, the CEO since 2013, says that Fores ‘fills a gap, being a think tank that takes the two big challenges of our own time, climate change and migration, seriously enough and at

³⁶ Personal interview with Karin Svanborg-Sjövall, June 15, 2015.

³⁷ www.gotothinktank.com. The Think Tank and Civil Societies Program at the Lauder Institute, University of Pennsylvania, set up the list.

³⁸ Source: www.epicenternetnetwork.eu.

³⁹ Source: www.frivarld.se.

⁴⁰ Studieförbundet Vuxenskolan.

the same time being willing to use market economic solutions'.⁴¹ The Centre Party, which today has a liberal political platform, is still the largest of approximately 60 financial sponsors.⁴² The regular staff consists of 10 people, but depending on projects and needs, additional people are employed on a short-term basis. Goldmann describes the main target group as policymakers inside Fores' prioritized areas. Policymakers include both civil servants and academics; these categories are seen as more important than political decision-makers. In this strategy, 'the media is not regarded as a target group; we use the media to reach the target group'.⁴³

In terms of international relations, Fores is part of the European Liberal Foundation, which includes likeminded think tanks in the EU, the European Economic Area (EEA), and even some outside this area. In the Nordic region, Fores cooperates with Zero, a green foundation in Norway, the Danish think tank Concito, and the Finnish think tank Demos.

Den Nya Välfärden (The New Welfare Foundation) is a liberal think tank engaged in opinion-building relating to 'entrepreneurship' and 'free competition', and was established in 1988. The think tank claims that it is financially supported by 18,000 business owners.⁴⁴ It is a member of the European Small Business Association. The staff consists of seven people. This think tanks has, in the past few years, communicated its policy more through paid advertisements in the press than through news initiatives and commentary articles.

In addition to the above-mentioned advocacy think tanks are four small, liberal think tanks with more limited activities. *Stiftelsen Bertil Ohlin-institutet* (The Foundation Bertil Ohlin Institute) was established in 1993 with the aim of stimulating scientific research and liberal ideas, and their application to societal issues. The foundation is financed through contributions from liberal press foundations. The relatively limited activity of this think tank, compared with the leading advocacy think tanks, seems to be concentrated on seminar debates and lectures, more than public agenda-setting. As mentioned above, the Foundation Bertil Ohlin Institute has supported the think tank Fores financially.

Idéinstitutet Civitas (the Idea Institute Civitas) is a think tank based on 'Christian and humanistic ideas'. It claims to be independent, but on the personal level, maintains relations with the Christian

⁴¹ Personal interview with Mattias Goldmann, October 27, 2015.

⁴² According to Mattias Goldmann, the Centre Party was responsible for nearly half of Fores' yearly income in 2015. Personal interview, October 27, 2015.

⁴³ Personal interview with Mattias Goldmann, October 27, 2015.

⁴⁴ www.dnv.se.

democratic party. The activities of this think tank seem mostly to be concentrated around the publication of ideological books and booklets.

Eudoxa is a liberal think tank founded in 2000 and organised as a limited company. The think tank profiles itself as a representative of 'transhumanism', independent of both political parties and religious interest groups. Debates on emerging technology and challenges related to the environment are given priority. The 2014 *Global Go To Think Tank Index Report* listed Eudoxa as a 'science and technology' think tank.

Captus, established in 2005, is a market-liberal think tank that demands lower taxes and less regulation for corporations. The activities of this think tank are mostly related to the publication of reports and booklets. Internationally, Captus has cooperated with New Direction – The Foundation for European Reform, a right-wing think tank based in Brussels, Belgium.

The red/green advocacy think tanks

The advocacy think tanks on the left and centre-left side of the ideological and political spectrum were all founded in the first decades of the new millennium.

Arena Idé (Arena Idea) is today the largest of the left-oriented think tanks, and is part of the Arena Group, which also includes a magazine (*Arena*), an online newspaper (*Dagens Arena*), and two publishing houses, Atlas and Premiss. The think tank was founded in 2000, but until 2006, it was called Agora. The Arena Group is organizationally independent of political parties, and defines itself as radical and progressive. The present leader, Boa Ruthström, characterizes its ideological platform as 'social democratic, with a liberal vein'.⁴⁵ In the period 2000–2013, Arena Idé was, according to Ruthström, a rather small organization with one employee and limited public activity. The think tank was later refinanced via support from some of Sweden's large trade unions, and today has, according to Ruthström, a yearly income of approximately 900,000 euros. Currently (2015), Arena Idé has five full-time employees, including a research leader and a chief economist. Timbro and Arena Idé have sometimes cooperated in terms of arranging political seminars and debates, and seem to look upon each other as 'favoured opponents' in the Swedish advocacy think tank sector. The most important target group is opinion leaders. 'Our strategy', says Ruthström, 'is long-term opinion formation, building on a wage earner and citizen perspective'.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Personal interview with Boa Ruthström, June 9, 2015.

⁴⁶ Personal interview with Boa Ruthström, June 9, 2015.

Regarding international relations, Arena Idé has developed contacts with think tanks such as Cevea in Denmark, Agenda and Res Publica in Norway, the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) and Policy Network in the UK, and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in Germany, a social democratic think tank that has established its own office in Stockholm.

Katalys is a radical, independent think tank founded at the end of 2012 by five trade unions, and is led by Daniel Suhonen and Victor Bernhardt, both with backgrounds as journalists and public intellectuals. Suhonen is also active in the left wing of the Swedish Social Democratic Party. The main aim of *Katalys* is to develop ideas and influence policy decisions in areas of interest and importance for the trade union movement, especially those concerning welfare, social economics, the labour market, and distributive issues. Suhonen describes the ideologically-conscious activists of the trade union movement as the main target group of *Katalys*: ‘People who are able to organize a strike, that’s the people we want to influence and give arguments’.⁴⁷

One of *Katalys*’ prioritized issues in the public eye relates to the possibilities for risk capitalists to harvest big profits through investments and ownership in the health, education, and kindergarten sectors. *Katalys* was shortlisted for *Prospect* magazine’s Think Tank of the Year for the EU area for its ability to ‘take on the policy establishment and push through new ideas’.⁴⁸ *Katalys* has two full-time employees. According to Suhonen,⁴⁹ the yearly income from trade union support is approximately 200,000 euros. The board consists of five representatives from the founding trade unions. In terms of relationships outside Sweden, *Katalys* has regular contact with the radical Norwegian think tank Manifest.⁵⁰

Arbetarrörelsens tankesmedja (the Think Tank of the Labour Movement) was founded in spring 2006 by the Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions, the Swedish Social Democratic Party, and other organizations in the labour movement. In 2014, it was renamed Tankesmedjan Tiden (the Time Think Tank). Its main aim is to stimulate debate about challenges faced by the labour movement. It publishes the magazine *Tiden* (Time) and reports about current affairs. The main activity of this think tank seems to be directed more towards the inner circles of the labour movement than towards the general public.

⁴⁷ Personal interview with Daniel Suhonen, June 10, 2015.

⁴⁸ *Prospect*, August 2015, p. 33.

⁴⁹ Personal interview with Daniel Suhonen, June 10, 2015.

⁵⁰ The full name is *Manifest senter for samfunnsanalyse* (Manifest Centre for Societal Analysis).

Cogito is a green foundation and think tank established in 2005 and financed by the Green Party⁵¹, but it formally declares itself to be independent when it comes to party politics. Their main aim is to stimulate debates concerning green politics, ecological questions, and global justice. *Cogito* is led by a board of six and has a large senior advisory board. However, none of these members seem to work for *Cogito* on a full-time basis. Besides support from the Green Party, *Cogito* also obtains some of its income from private donations.

Seglora smedja (the Think Tank Seglora) is a small, Christian institution. It was established in 2008 by two priests in the Evangelical-Lutheran Church of Sweden, Ewa Lindqvist Hotz and Helle Klein, the latter being the former political chief editor of the tabloid *Aftonbladet*.⁵² The think tank looks upon itself as an independent, critical voice inside the Swedish Church. One of its main aims is to organize opinion-building and raise the general level of education ‘in the intersection between the societal and the existential’.⁵³ Dialogue among religions and cultures is one of Seglora’s strategic aims, and the think tank’s anti-racist profile has led to attacks by supporters of the Swedish Democrats, an anti-immigration party. Seglora runs an online paper (dagensseglora.se) and arranges seminars, symposiums, and dialogues. It is based on the cooperation and support of the Stockholm diocese and donations from individual friends of Seglora.

Data and methods

Seven leading Swedish print newspapers with a paid circulation⁵⁴ were selected for a content analysis. The newspapers also have separate online editions. The print newspapers are, however, still important agenda-setters in terms of political news and commentaries, and opinion leaders normally give high priority to launching initiatives through these channels. Government ministers, opposition politicians, public relations consultants, and academics, for example, often use *Dagens Nyheter*’s prestigious debate page (DN Debatt) to launch initiatives and present results from new books and reports. The seven newspapers are *Aftonbladet* and *Expressen* (both popular tabloids), *Dagens Nyheter* and *Svenska Dagbladet* (both Stockholm-based morning papers), and two regional newspapers, *Sydsvenska Dagbladet* (Malmö) and *Göteborgsposten* (Gothenburg), plus *Dagens Industri*, a financial morning paper, published in Stockholm.

⁵¹ The Swedish name is Miljöpartiet de Gröna. After the national elections in 2014, the Greens are, together with the Social Democrats, part of the government led by Stefan Löfvén.

⁵² Klein is now the chief editor of the trade union magazine and online news site *Dagens Arbete*.

⁵³ www.seglorasmedja.se.

⁵⁴ Excluding the free newspaper *Metro*.

The popular tabloid *Aftonbladet* is owned by the Norwegian media corporation Schibsted, a publicly-listed company. *Aftonbladet* was once a social democratic newspaper owned by the labour movement. The Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions still owns a minority of the shares, and according to the owner agreement, the editorial commentary page should be written from a social democratic perspective. For the last decade, Schibsted has also owned the conservative morning paper *Svenska Dagbladet*.⁵⁵ *Dagens Nyheter*, *Expressen*, and *Sydsvenska Dagbladet* are all liberal newspapers owned by Sweden's largest media corporation, Bonnier, which is a family-controlled company. Bonnier also owns the financial newspaper *Dagens Industri*. The liberal newspaper *Göteborgsposten* is owned by Stampen, a company controlled by the local Hjärne family. The epithet 'liberal' in the Swedish case means that the newspaper's editorial pages are market-friendly, pro-EU, anti-socialist, generally support liberal immigration policies, want Sweden to join NATO, and favour governments supported by a coalition of liberals and conservatives.

Unfortunately, official, audited circulation figures are unavailable for two of the largest newspapers, *Dagens Nyheter* and *Aftonbladet*, but according to their own figures, their 2013 circulation was 283,000 and 199,000, respectively.⁵⁶ The audited circulation figures on weekdays for the other newspapers in the study were as follows: *Expressen* (183,000⁵⁷), *Göteborgsposten* (190,700), *Svenska Dagbladet* (159,000), *Sydsvenska Dagbladet* (99,800) and *Dagens Industri* (89,100).⁵⁸

To collect relevant articles from the two selected years (2006 and 2013), we employed the electronic news archive Retriever. The names of the selected nine think tanks were used as search words, and every article in the selected papers mentioning or referring to these think tanks in 2006 and 2013 were copied and evaluated according to their relevance. Irrelevant 'hits' (for example, referring to an arena and not Arena Idé, or to the church Seglora, not the think tank with the same name) were excluded from the coding. The codebook included 20 variables. A few of the most interesting variables and results will be presented and discussed here.

⁵⁵ Traditionally, *Svenska Dagbladet* has been linked to the Swedish Conservatives; however, some would say that the present editorial line concerning commentaries might more correctly be characterized as neoliberal. However, in May 2015, it was announced that in the future, *Svenska Dagbladet* will be part of a newly-founded media corporation founded by the Swedish Mittmedia Foundation and Schibsted, with the Norwegian corporation as a minority partner.

⁵⁶ Source: http://www.dagspress.se/images/stories/Svenska_Mediehus_2014_2015.pdf.

⁵⁷ *Expressen*'s circulation includes separate editions in Malmö (*Kvällsposten*) and Gothenborg (GT). Source: TS-statistik.

⁵⁸ For *Dagens Industri* the circulation numbers are from 2014 and include digital publication of 5,200. Source: TS-statistik.

Advocacy think tanks in the press

In 2006, nine of the thirteen advocacy think tanks listed above existed: Timbro, The New Welfare Foundation, Eudoxa, the Foundation Bertil Ohlin Institute, Captus, Civita, Arena Idé, the Think Tank of the Labour Movement, and Cogito. For 2006, there were, all in all, 267 references to the nine think tanks in the seven largest Swedish newspapers (Table 1). Seven years later, in 2013, four new think tanks could be added to the list: Free World Forum, Fores, Seglora, and Katalys. In 2013 the thirteen think tanks were referenced 307 times. The limited increase was a result of the establishment of the four newcomers. In both years, references in the conservative morning paper *Svenska Dagbladet* were most frequent, and least frequent were references in the financial newspaper *Dagens Industri*. However in 2013, the references in the liberal popular tabloid *Expressen* increased and became close to the level of *Svenska Dagbladet*. The differences between the visibility of advocacy think tanks in the other newspapers were, however, marginal.

Table 1. References to one or more advocacy think tanks in seven leading Swedish newspapers during 2006 and 2013 (per cent).

Newspaper	2006	2013	Both years
Svenska Dagbladet	21	27	24
Expressen	12	24	18
Dagens Nyheter	14	13	14
Aftonbladet	12	14	13
Sydsvenskan	16	10	13
Göteborgsposten	15	8	11
Dagens Industri	9	4	7
Total	99	100	100
(N)	(267)	(307)	(574)

Regarding *genres*, less than one third of the articles mentioning at least one of the advocacy think tanks belonged to news genres (such as news reports, news interviews, news notes, etc.), while 71 per cent were commentaries and other types of opinion articles (op-ed articles, debate articles, and letters to the editor). Around half of the opinion articles were written by people *outside* the editorial staff, and nearly two thirds of them were signed by representatives of the think tanks themselves. The high priority of opinion material is also a general tendency in today's Swedish press (Nord & Stür, 2009). The leader of Katalys, Daniel Suhonen, says that his think tank often informs the leader of a prioritized media source, such as *Dagens Nyheter*'s debate editor, several months in advance about a planned report, and coordinates it with a planned 'news event' to make it more interesting. When the

report is nearly finished, they attempt to reach agreement about the publication date for a prioritized debate article.⁵⁹

Nearly half of the news stories were initiated by a think tank, most often based on a new report offered as an information subsidy (Gandy, 1982) to a favoured news organization. However, a think tank may also become news for other reasons. In October 2006, Timbro was mentioned extraordinarily frequently in the press as a result of a political scandal involving several ministers in Reinfeldt's new government. One of these ministers was the Minister for Culture, Cecilia Stegö Chilo, a former CEO of Timbro and member of the Conservatives. The main norm violation in her case was that she, for ideological reasons, failed to pay the public broadcasting license fee, and thereby broke the law. She was portrayed in the press as an aggressive, neoliberal hawk who was undermining the Swedish public broadcasting system, and she was forced to leave her position after a short, heated media debate (Pollack, 2009).

Table 2. References to nine market-liberal and red/green advocacy think tanks in seven leading Swedish newspapers during 2006 and 2013 (per cent).

Name of think tank	2006	2013	Total
Timbro	70	53	61
Frivärld	--	11	6
Den nya välfärden	13	1	7
Fores	--	10	5
Other liberal advocacy think tanks ⁶⁰	7	1	4
Sum market-liberal think tanks	90	76	83
Katalys	--	15	8
Arena Idé/Agora	8	2	5
Other red/green advocacy think tanks ⁶¹	2	6	4
Sum red/green think tanks	10	24	17
ALL	99	99	100
(N)	267	307	574

⁵⁹ Personal interview with Daniel Suhonen, June 10, 2015.

⁶⁰ These liberal think tanks included Captus, Eudoxa, Civitas, and Bertil Ohlininstitutet.

⁶¹ These red/green think tanks included the Think Tank of the Labour movement, Cogito, and in 2013, also Seglora.

As Table 2 shows, Timbro was by far the think tank with the most references in both years examined. In 2006, the dominance of Timbro was especially notable (70 per cent of all mentions), and the visibility of the red/green think tanks was correspondingly small (10 per cent). The picture was essentially the same in 2013, but was not as one-sided. The main reason was the establishment of Katalys, the most radical of the think tanks, which despite possessing fewer resources than most of the other advocacy think tanks, showed a strong ability both to launch news initiatives and participate actively in public debates. With 15 per cent of the references, Katalys also had a stronger presence in the media than the four other red/green think tanks combined. In the case of Arena Idé, one contributing factor seems to be that it was undergoing restructuring in 2013, and therefore its external activity was limited.⁶²

An analysis of the news angle tendencies (positive, negative, or neutral) shows that 19 per cent of the articles about all the selected think tanks were coded as positive, and 11 per cent were coded as negative. A majority of the news stories were either ‘straight news’ without any clear bias, or short news items where the question of tendency was irrelevant.⁶³ However, Timbro was not only mentioned the most, but was also ‘in the lead’ in terms of news stories with a negative angle (one third of the articles). This is not surprising given Timbro’s history and profile. ‘We were created to be at the outer edge of the debate. A high level of conflict has been one of Timbro’s characteristics’, says Karin Svanborg-Sjövall.⁶⁴

Concerning opinion material, half of the articles ‘favoured’ the think tank and its initiative, while only 20 per cent were negative, and the rest were neutral or the question irrelevant. Timbro was the most controversial, and was commented upon much more actively than other think tanks; one third of these commentaries had a negative angle. Advocacy think tanks with less influence do not arouse the same interest and debate. Most positive editorial commentaries on think tank initiatives were found in Svenska Dagbladet, Sydsvenskan, and Expressen.

Reports and other initiatives from advocacy think tanks create both news and public debates. However, the news stories in very few cases carry headlines referring to the name of the involved

⁶² Information from Boa Ruthström in a personal interview, June 9, 2015.

⁶³ The coding of news angles was based on an evaluation of a news report’s title and its lead, and differentiated between positive, negative, or neutral angles. To be coded as ‘positive’, the headline/lead had to signalize sympathy with or support for the think tank mentioned. To be coded as ‘negative’, the headline/lead had to signalize criticism of/opposition to the think tank mentioned. Straight news reports, balanced news reports, and all cases without any clear positive or negative bias were coded as neutral. A fourth category was reserved for news articles (mostly very short news items) where the question of tendency was irrelevant.

⁶⁴ Personal interview with Karin Svanborg-Sjövall, June 15, 2015.

think tank. An interesting issue relates to the think tank representatives' roles as *sources* in the news. Are they presented as representing special interests and 'marked' with an ideological label (like neoliberal, market-liberal, green, radical, left, or socialist)? Or are they presented as *experts* on different areas? The Norwegian study (Bjerke, 2015) in this special issue shows that in approximately two thirds of the news stories, the Norwegian advocacy think tanks act in an expert role. The same tendency is found in the Danish study in this special issue (Blach-Ørsten & Kristensen, 2016). In Sweden, we found the same tendency, however less clear: Around half of Swedish think tank sources were, first and foremost, presented as expert sources, a slightly smaller share (45 per cent) as special interest sources, and the rest in peripheral references without any clear tendency. The think tank sources presented as experts often were academics engaged as think tank representatives or report authors.

However, concerning advocacy think tank representation in the media, opinion material (views) seem to be more important than news initiatives. Not surprisingly, representatives from Timbro are in the lead, even though Katalys leader Daniel Suhonen and the board leader of Free World Forum, Mats Johansson, also had an active role as media commentators.⁶⁵

Conclusion

Our first research question was: How often are Swedish advocacy think tanks referred to in the news? The answer is that media visibility varies a great deal among the studied think tanks. A few, like Timbro and Katalys in 2013, are referred to relatively often, but several think tanks are rather invisible in the news. Referring to our second research question, think tanks are active and important as debaters and opinion-makers. Commentary is their main genre, and the production of opinion material seems to be the easiest way to get into the newspaper columns. In answer to the third research question of how think tanks are presented as sources in the news: They play both an expert role and a 'special interest' role, but the first is a slightly more important one in the Swedish media.

Regarding the fourth research question related to the relative strength of market-liberal and right-wing think tanks versus red/green think tanks in terms of media representation and agenda-setting, the answer is not surprising. The four market-liberal advocacy think tanks in Sweden, with Timbro

⁶⁵ In 2006-2014 Mats Johansson was a member of Riksdagen, the Swedish parliament, for the Conservatives (Moderaterna), and his columns were mostly written in this double role as a think tank representative and a politician. Daniel Suhonen, Katalys, also combined the role of think tank leader with a role as activist on the left side of the Swedish Labour Party.

as the oldest and most established, have more resources, a larger staff, and were by far the most dominant in terms of media visibility and influence in earlier years. However, during the past few years, Fores seems to have made a breakthrough as an important source in the public debates about both climate change and migration. The activities of Katalys, which was established in 2013, indicate that a small, active, and radical think tank can be an agenda-setter. The restructuring of Arena Idé may also increase the relative strength of the red/green think tanks in the years to come.

As in the other Scandinavian countries, think tanks in Sweden are growing in number, and a few of them also in influence and political importance. However, only some of them have high media visibility. In addition, think tanks represent centres of influence in direct contact with policymakers. Swedish advocacy think tanks mostly depend on economic support from corporations or organized interest groups. They may be influential in strategic politics, but are at the same time a force outside mainstream political institutions. Think tanks are not, like the political parties and their youth organizations, based on membership and time-consuming membership activities. For this reason, they are often quick and efficient in terms of producing political arguments, and are free to take initiatives in different policy areas, but are also without any responsibility for further processes and outcomes. In the long run, the most interesting question is whether this development will stimulate democratic institutions and democratic processes, or whether it will reduce the development of political ideas to a specialized business for small, sponsored elites.

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Think tank scene in Finland: Nothing spectacular?

Lotta Lounasmeri

Think tanks spreading to the Nordic countries – what about Finland?

In the last two decades of the 20th century, think tanks proliferated dramatically, and the industry has experienced major growth globally (Hart & Vromen 2008, 137; Stone 2007, 264). Countries where think tanks were already present, such as the United States (US), Britain, Sweden, Canada, Japan, Austria and Germany, have experienced additional growth. In the long run, the global political and economic environments have gone through substantial changes along with technological developments, such as digitalization and the spread of the Internet. Together, these phenomena have generated a demand for ‘usable knowledge’ concerning new policy challenges and opportunities in societies. (Stone 2007.)

The term ‘think tank’ has become popular worldwide, and Stone (2007, 262) sees the fact that so many organizations globally call themselves ‘think tanks’ as symbolic of the effectiveness of the label. It has also been applied to hybrid organizations and ones that are not independent of the state, corporate or other interests (Stone 2007, 265). The US still represents the forerunner of the think tank scene (McGann & Johnson 2005). The United Kingdom (UK) and Germany have the most populous think tank landscapes and probably the most active think tank culture in Europe (Braml 2004). Thunert (2004), for example, counted 130 think tanks in Germany and about 100 in the UK.

In broad terms, think tanks can be defined as institutes devoted to producing research-based policy arguments and offering them in the policy-making process (Hart & Vromen 2008, 135). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) definition of think tanks (UNDP 2003, 6) is presented by Stone (2007), who categorize them as organizations engaged in research and advocacy on any matter related to public policy. Thus, think tanks advocate ideas, maintain and develop policy networks and provide expertise to policy-makers (Stone 2000). Keohane and Nye (1998, 136) see ‘think tank’ as an informal brand name for organizations able to ‘reliably edit and credibly validate information.’

Political party–affiliated think tanks are almost nonexistent in the United States, but they are the dominant model in Europe (McGann 2007, 12). According to Stone, the dominance of Anglo-American perspectives of what a think tank is obscures the diversity and hybrid forms of think tanks that have emerged recently. As Stone sees it, in any particular country, the historical circumstances,

political culture and legal traditions, along with the character of the regime in power, determine think tank development (Stone 2007, 261).

In the Nordic countries, the large-scale phenomenon of a growing think tank scene occurred in the 2000s. The underlying reasons presented for this emergence of think tanks include the weakening of the corporatist system as well as the growing influence of the media (*mediatization*) and the rise of promotional logic in these societies (Allern 2011; Blach-Ørsten & Kristensen 2016; Rommetvedt et al. 2012; Tyllström 2013; see also Cottle 2003; Davis 2007). The Nordic phenomenon seems to be limited to the rise of policy advocacy think tanks and think tanks associated with political parties, as they represent ideologically-driven, financially and/or organizationally connected institutes, which often devote at least as much attention to disseminating ideas as to producing them (see Braml 2006; McGann & Weaver 2000, 6-12). Apart from the Finnish business-funded EVA founded in 1974, advocacy think tanks in Finland are a recent phenomenon. Think tanks associated with political parties were first launched as recently as 2005, as government funding for this type of activity was initiated. The leftist Kalevi Sorsa Foundation and the Left Forum were founded then. Naturally, research organizations have been funded by different interest groups in Finnish society, such as trade unions or employers' organizations, but these organizations have not taken a particularly active public role. They include Pellervo Economic Research (Pellervon taloustutkimus, PTT), associated with the Central Union of Agricultural Producers and Forest Owners (Maa- ja metsätaloustuottajain Keskusliitto MTK) and the Centre Party; the Labor Institute for Economic Research (Palkansaajien tutkimuslaitos PT), associated with the Central Organization of Finnish Trade Unions (Suomen Ammattiliittojen Keskusjärjestö SAK) and the Social Democratic Party; and the Research Institute of the Finnish Economy (Elinkeinoelämän tutkimuslaitos ETLA), funded mainly by Finnish employer organizations. Each organization prepares evaluations and forecasts concerning the national economy. In contrast to the three other Nordic countries, in Finland de-corporatization and mediatization have also occurred, but possibly with different magnitudes and timescales. Moreover, the consensual political system and close relations between media and political actors might still be strong explanatory factors in the Finnish case. After presenting the results of the empirical analysis of Finnish think tanks' visibility in the media, I will discuss the specific political communication environment and culture in Finland. The aim is to see more closely why the think tanks have not appeared much in the media and why even a stalwart such as EVA makes only a modest appearance. The Finnish think tanks associated with political parties include the leftist tanks Kalevi Sorsa Foundation associated with the Social Democratic Party (SDP); the Left Forum associated with the

Left Alliance; Suomen Toivo (Finland's Hope), associated with the National Coalition Party; e2 associated with the Center party; Visio associated with the Green Party; and Suomen Perusta (Foundation of Finland) associated with the Finns Party. Other recently founded think tanks include Magma, which is financed by Swedish-Finnish foundations, and the right-wing, neoliberal Libera, which is financed by corporate money. In addition to these advocacy think tanks, Demos Helsinki was founded in 2005, as a non-aligned think tank that finances research on 'future society' with project funding.

EVA was established in 1974 as a policy and pro-market think tank, but started calling itself or officially became a think tank only when think tanks became a trend in Finland in the 2000s. EVA describes its mission as follows: 'EVA's aim is to identify and evaluate trends that are important for Finnish companies and for the long-term success of the society as a whole. EVA publishes reports and organizes events and discussions' (<http://www.eva.fi/en/eva/>). As for the think tanks associated with leftist political parties included in the analysis, the Kalevi Sorsa Foundation profiles itself as a social democratic think tank: 'describing and contributing to the conversation on what kind of social democratic policies combine freedom and justice with equality, also in the long term' (<http://sorsafoundation.fi/en/>). The Left Forum, established in 2006, says that it is 'building a collaborative network sharing a leftist set of values and extending from political parties to universities, research institutions and expert organizations'⁶⁶

Think tanks' role as public agenda-setters

In contrast to a classical view of think tanks, Hart and Vromen (2008) see that think tanks' activity is no longer about producing but about locating research and no longer about getting 'leverage' for one's own ideas but about effective 'brokerage.' This refers to discursively connecting suppliers (interest groups and organizations) and consumers (politicians and office holders) in the market for policy ideas. Stone (2007, 274), along with other researchers (Cook 1998; Rich & Weaver 2000; Osborne 2004) refers to the theory of agenda setting in connection with think tanks. Media visibility has become an important priority for nongovernment research organizations, whose principal mission is to produce and promote their expertise among policy makers (Rich & Weaver 2000, 81). Rich and

⁶⁶ (<http://www.vasemmistofoorumi.fi/en/leftforum/>).

Weaver (2000, 100) conclude that media visibility is one of several ways through which think tanks may affect the policy-making process. As Cook (1998, 10) illustrates, policymakers are influenced by and to pay attention to issues and ideas covered by the news media. Stone (2007, 274) sees that the management of expert discourse instead of research empowers think tanks in setting agendas. The success of the new style of think tanks is measured by their ability to produce frames and narratives that begin to pervade elite rhetoric and policy proposals circulating in the policy system (Osborne 2004, 138).

Bentham (2006) sees the role of think tanks in the British context in policy agenda-setting as significant. According to him, they have a key role in constructing frameworks within which public policy problems are understood. Bentham describes how the British Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) and Demos, a cross-party think tank, have created coalitions, networked with the media as well as acted as independent experts that mediate between the politics of government and political parties. In addition, Stone sees that think tanks are very effective organizations for translating ideas or abstract theory into 'sound bites' for the media and understandable 'blueprints' for decision makers and the public. The constant repetition of the policy message via different formats—seminars, conferences, workshops, policy briefs, web sites, books—broadcasts and amplifies policy research (Stone 2007, 272). This has also been EVA's strategy in Finland, as the organization produces a substantial number of reports, attitude surveys and the like, as well as organizes events such as seminars and discussion forums.

Think tank media visibility: empirical analysis of Finnish newspapers

The following presents the Finnish empirical results from a comparative Nordic media analysis, in which the activity and relevance of think tanks through their agenda-setting function and media visibility were examined (see also Blach-Ørsten & Kristensen 2016). The Finnish empirical material includes quantitative analysis of stories that appeared in the seven biggest Finnish newspapers in 2006 and 2013. As for the selection of think tanks, for all the Nordic countries, the minimum was the most important right wing (conservative/liberal advocacy think tank) and the most important left-wing advocacy think tank, if such a think tank exists. In the Finnish case, EVA was the most important, in terms of political judgment (the most influential) and the most referred to in the media. The social democratic Kalevi Sorsa Foundation and the Left Forum, associated with the Left Alliance, represent left-wing advocacy think tanks.

In the empirical analysis, the seven highest-circulation newspapers in Finland were examined for their coverage of the specified think tanks. These newspapers included Helsingin Sanomat, Aamulehti, Turun Sanomat, Iltalehti, Maaseudun Tulevaisuus, Ilta-Sanomat and Kaleva. Articles in printed newspapers (independent of size and genre) that cited or mentioned specific advocacy think tanks were included. A code book for the Nordic comparative research was developed in co-operation with Danish, Norwegian and Swedish partners, and quantitative analysis based on this common code book was carried out in each country. A total of 44 variables were established, of which the most important are presented in this article.

A research assistant coded the material in close cooperation with the author. The coder used a logbook and wrote references to or comments on coding decisions that were initially problematic. These points were discussed with the author and, when necessary, with the other Nordic partners. This quantitative approach represents the starting point and the first analysis of the appearance of think tanks in the Finnish media. However, to understand more thoroughly how think tanks influence the public agenda and their relationship with the media, one should also conduct more in-depth qualitative analyses. The research questions addressed in this article were as follows:

- 1) How much and what kind of coverage do the selected think tanks receive in the selected newspapers?
- 2) As sources, how do the selected think tanks figure in the selected papers?

To answer these questions, the following variables were used to cover the points in the selected newspaper articles:

- 1) Number of stories in 2006 and 2013 per think tank
- 2) Percentage of news and commentary stories
- 3) Percentage of the coverage per think tank
- 4) Main topics covered in the stories
- 5) Role of think tanks as sources
- 6) Whether a story was based on a think tank's initiative
- 7) Tendency detected in the news and commentary stories

The seven largest Finnish newspapers included in the sample are introduced briefly here. The largest and only nationwide newspaper is Helsingin Sanomat (HS), with a circulation of 313.062 (2013), which is still quite substantial in a country of 5.5 million people. Owned by Sanoma Corporation, this

newspaper is by far the biggest and most influential paper in the country, even if the circulation numbers have been dropping for years, consistent with the overall development of the newspaper market. The second largest newspaper is Ilta-Sanomat, with a circulation of 118.358 (2013). It is the biggest tabloid newspaper and is also owned by Sanoma Corporation. The third is Aamulehti, a daily published in Tampere, covering the Pirkanmaa region. Aamulehti has a circulation of 113.066 (2013) and is owned by Almedia Corporation, the second largest media conglomerate in Finland. The fourth is Turun Sanomat, a daily covering the Turku region (southwest Finland). It has a circulation of 94.185 (2013), and it is owned by TS-concern. The fifth biggest paper is a paper for the rural region, Maaseudun Tulevaisuus. With a circulation of 80.750, the paper is published by Viestilehdet Oy, which is owned by the Central Union of Agricultural Producers and Forest Owners. The sixth biggest paper is the other popular tabloid newspaper Iltalehti. It has a circulation of 77.345, and it is part of the Almedia Corporation. The last newspaper included in the sample is Kaleva, which has a circulation of 69.540. It is a daily published in Oulu, covering northern Finland, and it is owned by Kaleva Oy.

All the newspapers declare themselves politically non-aligned, but most have historical roots with political ties. Helsingin Sanomat disengaged from partisanship early on, in the 1930s. The newspaper had been close to the liberal National Progressive Party. The tabloid Ilta-Sanomat (est. 1932) is owned by the same concern and was originally published as an afternoon edition of HS. Iltalehti was originally established as an afternoon edition of the liberal Uusi Suomi, once a competitor of HS with a background as a supporter of the right-wing National Coalition Party. The same concern owns Aamulehti and the business paper Kauppalehti. In addition, Aamulehti was an organ of the right-wing National Coalition party (until 1992). Turun Sanomat (until 1962) and Kaleva (until 1953), in turn, were supporters of the liberal National Progressive Party, later the People's Party of Finland. Maaseudun Tulevaisuus, however, which is owned by the Central Union of Agricultural Producers and Forest Owners, declares itself politically non-aligned.

Still a modest presence

Compared to the other Nordic countries, especially Denmark, the size of the Finnish data, or coverage of think tanks in the press, is small. As stated, the phenomenon only recently appeared in Finland, and the media visibility of the recently founded think tanks is not very extensive. Think tanks as a phenomenon have not (yet) captured a significant part of the public arena. EVA, the organization that

has a longer history and has started calling itself a think tank, gets most of the visibility in the studied material. In this respect, EVA seems to be a special case.

The total number of stories for the two years 2006 and 2013 was a mere 273: 138 (50.5%) and 135 (49.5%), respectively. Thus, no significant increase in volume was detected. The stories were evenly divided into news and commentary pieces, 50.5% and 49.5%, respectively. The biggest dailies published most of the stories, with Helsingin Sanomat the leader. The complete figures are presented in Table 1.

Table 1: Number of stories published in the selected newspapers in 2006 and 2013

Helsingin Sanomat	89	32.6%
Aamulehti	64	23.4%
Turun Sanomat	43	15.8%
Iltalehti	23	8.4%
Maaseudun Tulevaisuus	21	7.7%
Ilta-Sanomat	20	7.3%
Kaleva	13	4.8%
Newspaper	Total amount	Percentage

Most of the stories mention EVA or use it as a source. It seems that other think tanks have not yet established themselves as credible public debaters, at least not when looking at mainstream newspapers. Stories mentioning EVA total 244, which represents 89% of the whole sample. Kalevi Sorsa Foundation was mentioned in 14 stories, representing 5%, and the Left Forum 11 stories, representing 4%. As the results show, the left-leaning think tanks have not yet received substantial media attention. Several other think tanks, those associated with political parties and others, were also founded in Finland in the 2000s, but they have not been very visible, either. The non-aligned Demos Helsinki, established in 2005, for example, was mentioned five stories in 2006 as well as in 2013 in the biggest paper Helsingin Sanomat.

Topics and genres: EVA as an all-round expert

The stories with the mention of one or more think tanks covered a wide range of topics and genres. The key topic, as outlined in the codebook, was defined by the title and the introductory section of the article. If this proved ambiguous or difficult to decide, the first topic mentioned was coded for.

Secondary topics were also coded but are not presented in this article. In the Finnish data, labor market issues appeared as the most frequently discussed topic. The topics of taxes and tax regulation, social welfare and health, as well as economic and financial policy, which ranked at the top of the list, follow a similar logic as in the other Nordic countries (Allern & Pollack 2015; Bjerke 2015; Blach-Orsten & Kristensen 2016). A unique element in the Finnish data, however, was the ranking of foreign policy and international questions as second among the themes discussed as key topics. Table 2 presents the topics discussed according to the coding categories.

The category other topics covers a surprisingly high portion of the stories, 23% (64 pieces). Among these stories, the subjects of meta news on politics or the political game totaled 16 stories. News about public figures or persons, especially the death of the former EVA leader and prominent Finnish figure Max Jakobson, totaled 21 stories.

As most of the stories involved EVA, one can conclude that EVA has promoted itself, with its prominent leader and public figure Matti Apunen (since 2010), as an expert in several societal issues, not only economic policies.

Table 2: Key topics discussed in the selected newspapers

1. Labor market	40	14.7%
2. Foreign policy, international questions	35	12.8%
3. Taxes and tax regulation	33	12.1%
4. Social welfare and health	25	9.2%
5. Economic and financial policy	25	9.2%
6. Culture/popular culture/arts	23	8.4%
7. The think tank itself	16	5.9%
8. Marketization/privatization	4	1.5%
9. Human rights	4	1.5%
10. Education and/or research	2	0.7%
11. Immigration and integration questions	1	0.4%
12. Other ideological questions	1	0.4%
13. Other topics	64	23.4%
Topic	Total amount	Percentage

Think tanks as expert sources

Think tanks as sources were categorized either as expert sources, ‘special interest’ sources, peripheral references or other. According to the data, newspapers often treat think tanks, especially EVA, as neutral information providers or sources, since think tanks figure as expert sources in 74% of the stories. Only in 6% of the stories did think tanks figure as special interest sources and in 13% as peripheral references. Often, a news story was based on the think tank’s initiative (51%), and in 35% of the stories, the think tank was the main source. Other sources used as main sources in the selected news stories are presented in Table 3.

Table 3: Main sources used in the stories

Think tank representative	35 %
Other sources	15.3%
Politician/political party	13.9%
Independent, academic expert source	10.2%
Industry, banking, business, trade associations	9.5%
Trade union, interest organization, NGOs	4.4%
Civil servant	4.4%
Media source	3.6%
‘Ordinary citizen’/not institutional source	3.6%
Source	Percentage

(N=138)

In the news and commentary stories, EVA receives a substantial amount of positive or affirming publicity. According to the data, EVA is a credible public discussant. The others do not have such reputation yet, as their appearance in the data is minimal. Positive tendency toward the initiatives presented by the think tanks, or tendency toward the think tanks themselves in the stories, was defined in this study as affirmative, non-critical, a major source ‘getting the floor.’ Of the news stories, 21% were positive, and of the commentaries, 24%. Not much negative coverage was found. Instead, most of the material could be categorized as neutral, 48% of the news stories and 54% of the commentary stories, or irrelevant, in which case no particular initiative or idea was discussed in the story. The data is found in Table 4.

Table 4: News angle and commentary tendencies in the selected newspapers

News angle tendency (N=137):

Positive about a proposal/initiative	29	21.2%
Negative about a proposal/initiative	5	3.6%
Neutral about a proposal/initiative	66	48.2%
Irrelevant/not possible to decide	37	27 %
Tendency	Total amount	Percentage

Commentary tendency (N=135):

Positive about a proposal/initiative	33	24.3%
Negative about a proposal/initiative	12	8.8%
Neutral about a proposal/initiative	74	54.4%
Irrelevant/not possible to decide	17	12.5%
Tendency	Total amount	Percentage

In the following section, I discuss the background and possible explanations for the Finnish data, the rather limited overall amount of coverage of think tanks, as well as the overwhelming dominance of EVA in the coverage.

EVA: an established organization and a credible public actor

Of the three think tanks studied, EVA is clearly the forerunner in media visibility in Finnish newspapers. EVA has promoted itself, with the prominent spokesperson Matti Apunen, as an expert on several areas of societal issues, not only economic policies.

EVA has a long history, and it has built a position as a legitimate organization in Finnish society that explains EVA's role in the Finnish data, and perhaps the no longer pressing need to achieve mass publicity. As Bentham puts it, think tanks are not static institutions; they also have an historical ideational and institutional background (Bentham 2006, 168). Here it is necessary to discuss EVA's background to shed more light on its position. The organization's history starts in heavily politicized 1970s Finland. When EVA was founded, there was an effort to balance the political climate, counter leftist tendencies and try to build consensus to enhance more market-oriented and corporate-friendly policies. According to the official history of EVA, originally the organization's most important mission was to enhance and prepare for societal change, as the industrial circles were seeing a mental

shift in society (Tarkka 2002, 99, 410). The first chairman, Max Jakobson (1974–1985), shocked Finnish society by talking about ‘a dangerous neighbor’, not referring to the Soviet Union, but to Sweden, and the stiffening effect of democratic socialism on Swedish society. His point was that Finland should avoid such a situation (Tarkka 2002, 113).

In the early years, EVA developed a specific strategy for media visibility and communication. Communication activities were planned in order to improve cooperation among the industrial organizations, steady article production for the press was to be established and publication activities were developed. As for the leadership of private companies, their ability and preparedness for societal discussion were enhanced by arranging meetings with politicians. The objective was also to teach chief executive officers (CEOs) and other executives to argue and state their case ‘against accusations made by the press’ (Tarkka 2002, 114, 127-8).

As the EVA founders noticed that the public’s attitudes and ways of thinking could not be influenced by traditional public affairs, PR activities or lobbying, EVA concluded that they could be influenced by ‘absolute publicity,’ even if the (initial) attention was negative. EVA was able to present in public the most important aspects of its program, and did so in a very visible way, even though initially the presentation did not have much effect. EVA events and reports received major publicity at the time. Tarkka establishes that the comments in the media were initially belittling and negative, but the ideas EVA presented were publicized and ‘planted a seed’ (Tarkka 2002, 410-11). For example, EVA’s attitude surveys of Finns have over many decades earned it the label of a credible information provider. In addition to media attention, EVA has other outlets and forums in which to spread the organization’s ideas more effectively and exert influence. Today, EVA is tightly woven in the other power structures of Finnish society and has a strong position in the public that gives the organization some leverage. The chairman and spokesperson of EVA since 2010, Matti Apunen, as a former editor-in-chief of Aamulehti and a columnist of Helsingin Sanomat, has a clear spot in the public light when necessary.

An all-round networked organization

Apart from media attention, having solid networks in Finnish society makes it easier to reach a large ground when advocating a policy idea. EVA is directly associated with the interests of economic life and Finnish employers’ organizations, and is obviously well funded. EVA is closely affiliated with the research organization ETLA and the employers’ organization EK. In the 1970s, at the time of EVA’s founding, Tarkka sees that ETLA’s public commentary and appearances, as they were

scientific and thus were presented as objective, did not carry far in public debate, which was highly political and subjective at the time (Tarkka 2002). In addition, ETLA did not react as quickly as day-to-day debate required. ETLA's role was not to be polemic or confrontational, but the organization could nevertheless be clearly pro-business. When EVA came along, ETLA's role next to EVA would be to concentrate on topical societal issues, but ETLA's main task would be conducting economic research alongside EVA – in the same way that the employers' organizations performed economic policy lobbying (Tarkka 2002, 101-2).

One of EVA's objectives from the start was follow-up and analysis of the political situation and landscape, and through that creating working relationships with political parties, their leadership, as well as their background forces (Tarkka 2002, 112). In addition, the aim of the socio-political activities of EVA was to stay informed by creating contacts with the government and the parliament and thus improve opportunities to influence policy. EVA created close connections to the Social Democratic party, and there was a clear change in the party's economic policy in the 1970s (Tarkka 2002, 413). EVA's most important channel of influence went through the party (Tarkka 2002, 413), and in 1977, the effort to form a consensus on economic policy issues between the most important political actors in society resulted in the Korpilampi conference. Close cooperation between EVA and the more right-leaning Social Democrats was paramount for the consensus that was formed, in order to agree on tax cuts for corporations and a moratorium on pay raises for employees in the name of national competitiveness (Saari 2010, 475; Lounasmeri & Ylä-Anttila 2014). Since then, EVA has used experts from different political backgrounds to conduct research reports, for example, Osmo Soininvaara, a former Green minister. In addition, internationally, EVA has developed a large network. During the period of Finland's gradual economic and political opening up and structural reform, Jakobson was followed by Kauko Sipponen as chairman (1984–1990). He started creating connections to organizations parallel to EVA. In 1987, EVA joined the European League for Economic Cooperation (Tarkka 2002, 331). Since Jaakko Itoniemi started as chairman for EVA in 1990, EVA has developed networks abroad and in Finland. EVA has sister organizations around the world and has established fellow programs to connect with senior and younger experts and decision makers in Finnish society.

After Finland joined the European Union (EU) in 1995, there was a quieter phase in EVA's activities, as many of EVA's objectives had been fulfilled. A new rise came in the 2000s. The new chairman Risto E.J. Penttilä (2002–2010) tried to engage in public discussion in a dynamic and provocative way, but did, in the end, not have enough credibility as a public figure. It also seemed he

had a profile as too right-wing or ultraliberal to appear convincing. In the current atmosphere, the former editor-in-chief of Aamulehti, Matti Apunen, seems to be the right kind of personality to attract the masses with his pragmatic, down-to-earth and no-nonsense attitude. His style is often provocative, and he also gets involved in subjects of daily life such as day care, which also have to do with value questions. With Matti Apunen, EVA has raised its profile and visibility considerably, even if the overall coverage is not large.

The lack of public attention for think tanks in the big picture

As stated, EVA is a special case among the Finnish think tank scene, and it is worthwhile to ponder why the other organizations, which are mostly advocacy think tanks or think tanks associated with political parties, have not received much public attention.

Fundamentally, the characteristics of the Finnish political culture and system as still consensual and corporatist, influence the relations between media and politics. The Finnish political system and landscape can be described as still very consensus-oriented (for example, Pfetsch et al 2014; Herkman 2011; Kantola 2011). The political consensus tradition in Finland has been and still seems to be particularly strong compared to the other Nordic countries. In the Finnish parliamentary system, governments have been frequently formed over the left-right border instead of alternating dominance of either the left or right. Thus, there is no tradition of block politics. This has meant that the three big parties—until the parliamentary elections of 2011 when the Finns Party reached big party status—the Centre Party, the National Coalition Party and the Social Democratic Party—have had to cooperate with the other two, if they want to form a government (Moring 2008, 46; Pfetsch et al 2014, 38). In addition, the Finnish welfare state was formed under the influence of various parties in coalition governments, together with a strong influence of corporatist interests, instead of being a construction of the leftist parties (Moring 2008, 46).

This decision-making culture entails a multitude of political actors relevant to political communication. One can also refer to network corporatism as a typical feature of the Nordic countries, where societal actors on a large scale gather to participate in policy processes (though in Finland the official parliamentary committee system has been dismantled). This could be hypothesized to lead to greater perceived autonomy of journalists, since the number of political actors who serve as a reference group to journalists is higher than in Southern European countries, such as France and Spain, or German-speaking countries, such as Germany and Switzerland (Pfetsch et al 2014). In Finland, the connections between media and political actors are still seemingly direct.

Political journalists generally have direct access to the political leaders, including the prime minister. There has been a gradual weakening of political parallelism since the 1980s, as journalists have distanced themselves from the political elite (Aula 1992, Pitkänen 2009). Newspapers gradually downplayed their political affiliations, and today, the political party press is quite marginalized (Tommila & Salokangas 1998). In 2008, Moring described the Finnish media landscape as still traditional in accordance with the democratic-corporatist model, even though there has been a clear development toward commercialization. He described the position of newspaper subscriptions, as well as public service radio and television, as still strong among the public. As for commercial television, it has not introduced a radically different news agenda despite its growing role since the 1990s (Moring 2008, 56). Thus, despite the weakening of ties, the media has not developed a markedly independent agenda, even if it has tried to take significant steps to distance itself from political power, as witnessed in connection with recent political scandals. This might, however, represent a generational question as younger journalists have taken up a more critical and challenging attitude toward politicians (Kantola 2011). In addition, reporting scandals might represent a rupture in normal day-to-day news work where connections and ties are in place.

One must also take up the point of the relevance and significance of public debate and media attention in policy processes in the Finnish case. Other forums might be more important when it comes to decision making in the Finnish polity. Being able to influence the actual political decision-making processes is still a very different matter, as they are often performed away from the public eye in elite circles (see for example Kunelius et al 2009). When talking about the relevance of the media presence of think tanks and of their expert role in the public sphere, Rich (2004, 139) has shown that the think tanks that are most widely cited in the mass media in the U.S. context are not seen by policy-makers themselves as particularly influential. According to him, 'it is easy to confuse high visibility in public arenas with high impact in the real corridors of power, where different laws of demand and supply and different concepts of utility from those prevailing in the mass media arena apply' (Rich 2004, 139). In a book on European political communication cultures, Pfetsch et al (2014, 95) conclude that Finland represents countries where there is a strong reliance on backstage agenda-setting strategies.

As for the think tanks themselves, for a large part, they are directly linked to certain political parties, possibly making them mouthpieces for a particular apparatus in the eyes of the media and the public. When bringing up ideas in political discussions, if the think tanks seem to be linked to the respective parties, they do not necessarily receive more popular support. In 2012, the leading national

newspaper Helsingin Sanomat wrote in an editorial that, thus far, think tanks had not been able to meet the expectations placed on them (*HS* 4.6.2012). They had not become engines for societal debate. Even if their publications and events sometimes made it into the news and aroused more general interest, they still primarily spoke to their own party activists. Moreover, the resources of these think tanks are not enormous, and they have limited staff. As this research focused on the offline versions of the analyzed newspapers, the social media activities of think tanks were not accounted for. These organizations use social media channels in their publicity work, but this has not amounted to receiving much attention in the mainstream media—at least not thus far. Overall, the breakthrough of Finnish think tanks into the mainstream media is still waiting to happen.

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Delegation af lovgivningsmagt: Risiko for ringere regulering?

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Indledning

Delegation af lovgivningsmagt er et emne, der har fyldt meget i litteraturen både inden for jura, statskundskab og økonomi. Således har både delegationens omfang og natur været genstand for debat i forskellige sammenhænge (se f.eks. de meget forskelligartede tilgange til emnet hos CEPOS 2009; Jakobsen & Mortensen 2014; Majone 1996). En ofte fremført tese i denne forbindelse er bevægelsen i retningen af en ”regulerende stat”, dvs. bort fra både en liberal minimalstat og en keynesiansk stat med fokus på omfordeling (Majone 1996, 54–55; 1999). Denne bevægelse betyder, at en stadig større del af samfundsøkonomien reguleres teknisk på baggrund af delegerede beføjelser frem for som resultatet af politisk deliberation. Det bærende argument for udviklingen er, at reguleringen ganske enkelt bliver af højere kvalitet, idet ekspertbåren regulering udgør en ’definitiv forbedring over for hidtidige praksisser’ (Majone 1996, 11). Udviklingen fører til to spørgsmål, som søges adresseret i denne artikel: Hvorledes manifesterer bevægelsen mod den regulerende stat sig – hvordan ser delegation ud i Danmark, og hvilket omfang tager den? Og kan det sandsynliggøres, at denne danske variant af den regulerende stat kan levere den kvalitet og effektivitet og dermed legitimitet, som anføres som argumentet for denne udvikling? At svare på dette spørgsmål om delegationens form og modus fordrer et tværdisciplinært udgangspunkt med brug af begrebsapparater fra både statskundskaben og juraen.

Artiklen falder i to dele. Den først del søger at diskutere begreberne legitimitet og delegation i en dansk kontekst. Derfor redegøres kort for de både deskriptive og normative aspekter af begrebet ”den regulerende stat”, og de gængse argumenter for delegation (De Mesquita & Stephenson 2007, 605), der eksempelvis fremdrages af Majone (1996) nuanceres og kontekstualiseres. Den danske udgave af den regulerende stat benytter sig nemlig ikke af agenturer som forudsat af Majone, men derimod af delegation direkte til ministre. Dermed opnås ikke den politiske uafhængighed og fokus på kvalitet og effektivitet, som delegationen ellers skal sikre; dette øger betydningen af andre – særligt juridiske – mekanismer til at sikre denne kvalitet og output-legitimitet. Disse mekanismer vil derfor også være

genstand for diskussion i et særskilt afsnit. Ydermere betyder den særlige danske måde at delegere lovgivningsmagt på, at også mere traditionelle kilder til input-legitimitet kort bør drøftes, hvis vi fyldestgørende skal kunne diskutere begreberne legitimitet og delegation. Konklusionen på disse teoretiske overvejelser er, at både output- og input-legitimiteten af brugen af delegation i Danmark i al fald teoretisk afhænger af, hvor meget delegation anvendes.

I artiklens anden del undersøges derfor brugen delegation i Danmark. Fokus er særligt på erhvervsområdet, da dette som udgangspunkt er den regulerende stats genstandsfelt. I lighed med andre studier (Jakobsen & Mortensen 2014) konkluderes, at brugen af delegation i almindelighed har været stigende, men dette studium supplerer diskussionen ved at foretage en dybere kvalitativt-juridisk undersøgelse og diskussion af måden, hvorpå vi griber delegation an i Danmark.

Hvad er "den regulerende stat", og hvordan ser den ud i Danmark?

"Reguleringsstaten" er et begreb, der er anvendt til at beskrive den stadig mere teknisk-rationelle tilgang til regulering af samfundsøkonomien. Begrebet søger altså at beskrive en statsform, hvor regulering sker teknisk-rationelt gennem delegation til eksperter og ikke som følge af mere flygtige politiske vinde. Begrebet kan forstås både deskriptivt og normativt, og italieneren Giandomenico Majone, der stod fadder til begrebet, repræsenterer begge (Majone 1994; 1996; 1998). Dette afsnit dvæler ved den første og deskriptive anvendelse af begrebet, idet denne i et ikke ubetydeligt omfang dikterer indholdet og holdbarheden af det normative argument.

Majone beskriver en udvikling med etablering af institutioner, hvortil delegeres lovgivningsmagt på et bestemt område – etableringen af agenturer. Udgangspunkt er således, at delegationen har tre karakteristika: Den er defineret i politisk-økonomisk termer, den har en politisk uafhængig institution som mål, og den er varig. I en dansk sammenhæng har der ikke været tradition for at anvende agenturer med selvstændige reguleringsbeføjelser. Nationalbanken og på enkelte punkter også Konkurrence- og Forbrugerstyrelsen er undtagelserne. Da delegation i Danmark således tager en anden form end forudsat af Majone, må vi kort undersøge denne form; de formelle rammer er jo en forudsætning for det normative argument for øget delegation.

I Danmark antager delegation en ganske særlig juridisk form, nemlig anordningens eller bekendtgørelsens. Denne type delegation adskiller sig fra delegation til et agentur på alle de tre karakteristika nævnt før: *For det første* sker udstedelse af anordninger og bekendtgørelser diskretionært. Dette betyder, at delegationen er knyttet til et konkret og specifikt regulatorisk tiltag frem for af mere almen karakter. Dermed opstår en diskrepans mellem den danske måde at håndtere

delegation på og så den måde, der fremdrages af Majone. Hvor den af Majone forudsatte delegation er af politisk-økonomisk karakter – dvs. at der delegeres bemyndigelse til at regulere et bestemt politisk-økonomisk område af samfundet – så er delegation i Danmark ofte af mere snæver, juridisk karakter. *For det andet* sker delegation som oftest ved en bemyndigelse af en minister. Hvor den regulerende stat har politisk uafhængige institutioner som mål for delegationen, foretages delegation i Danmark fra en politisk instans (Folketinget) til en anden politisk instans (en minister) frem for til en instans af teknisk-regulativ karakter. *For det tredje* sker delegationen i forbindelse med den almindelige lovudstedelse; der er ikke tale om en generel og endegyldig delegation, og dermed bliver de danske ministres myndighed til at udstede bekendtgørelser direkte afhængige af skiftende flertal i Folketinget – modsat f.eks. Nationalbankens myndighed over den danske pengepolitik.

Det normative grundlag for den regulerende stat er kort og godt et ønske om samfundsøkonomisk efficiens, og Majones argumenter for delegation kan ses som et forsøg på at vise, hvorledes dette ønske i højere grad kan indfries. Samtidig understreger Majone, at da delegation sker for at gøre reguleringen mere effektiv, bør netop reguleringens effektivitet også være den legitimitetsstandard, vi opsætter, når delegationen som sådan skal vurderes (Majone 1998). Andre og mere klassiske legitimitetskriterier – eksempelvis repræsentation – kan sagtens gøre sig gældende, men udgangspunktet er output-legitimiteten, om man vil (Beetham & Lord 1998; Scharpf 2009).

Spørgsmålet er nu, om dette normative argument for øget delegation også er holdbart i en dansk sammenhæng, hvor delegationen – som vist – antager en ganske anden modus end forudsat af Majone? Hvordan skal vi anskue gyldigheden af Majones argument om, at delegation er ønskværdigt, da det medfører en mere afpolitiseret og teknisk tilgang til reguleringen, når delegationen sker på en helt anden måde end til de agenturer, hans argument støtter? Eller sagt mere direkte: Kan vi forvente, at delegation ”på dansk” vil kunne opnå samme output-legitimitet som delegation til agenturer?

Med udgangspunkt i Majones argument om kvalitet og effektivitet som legitimitetskilde, må vi derfor undersøge, hvordan netop kvaliteten og effektiviteten af reguleringen sikres, når den nu ikke sikres ved at leve op til de tre forudsætninger for delegation, som Majone opstiller. Dette munder ud i en kort diskussion af begrebet regulatorisk kvalitet efterfulgt af en undersøgelse af de processuelle tiltag, der skal sikre denne kvalitet som forudsætning for effektiv virkning og dermed i sidste ende output-legitimiteten. Dernæst må det bemærkes, at forskellen mellem Majones udgangspunkt og de danske realiteter nødvendiggør, at spørgsmålet om input kort må berøres. Konklusionen på baggrund af disse to nedenstående afsnit er, at omfanget af delegationen i Danmark er altafgørende for en

vurdering af delegation som begreb. Dette fordrer naturligvis en viden om netop omfanget af delegationen i Danmark, hvilket efterfølgende søges klarlagt.

Begrebet kvalitet – forudsætningen for Majones normative argument

Majones (1996; 1998; 1999) tese er, at delegation af reguleringsbeføjelser vil sikre, at reguleringen er mere effektiv og efficient, hvilket i sig selv forlener den med legitimitet. Det kan dog være vanskeligt, grænsende til det umulige, at afgøre en retsakts samfundsøkonomiske efficiens, idet denne afhænger af så utrolig mange faktorer. Én faktor, der dog med en vis vægt kan siges at have tværgående relevans, er den regulatoriske kvalitet af de regler, der gælder. Et underliggende aspekt af Majones argument er således, at den regulerende stat medfører en højere kvalitet i reguleringen – ikke mindst på grund af uafhængigheden af de agenturer, der er genstand for delegeret lovgivningsmagt. Denne tese er senere også taget op af f.eks. Radaelli & de Francesco (2007, 28), der benævner kvalitet det ”kognitive anker” i diskussionerne om bedre regulering.

Begrebet ”kvalitet” er imidlertid sjældent undersøgt nærmere i den politologiske litteratur, der i stedet har fokuseret på metaregulering. Denne forskning er bl.a. præget af Radaellis arbejder, og disse studier har blandt andet kastet lys på begrebet metaregulering (Hansen & Pedersen 2006; Radaelli & Meuwese 2009), på konsekvensvurderinger af kommende regulering og kontekstafhængigheden af metaregulatoriske tiltags virkning (Radaelli 2004, 2005; Stern & Holder 1999; Wiener 2006). Perspektiverne varierer selvsagt, men det ses, at kvalitet sjældent har været behandlet i egen ret (Pedersen 2015). I stedet er regulatorisk kvalitet et begreb, der enten bruges som variabel i mere økonomisk orienterede studier af sammenhængen mellem regulatorisk kvalitet og økonomisk formåen og udvikling (Djankov, McLiesh & Ramalho 2006; Haidar 2012; Huynh & Jacho-Chávez 2009; Jalilian, Kirkpatrick & Parker 2007; Rodrik 2005; Stern & Cubbin 2005), eller et begreb, som defineres i juridiske termer (se f.eks. Bormann, Bülow, & Østrup 2002; Müller & Uhlmann, 2013; Painter, 2009).

Det juridiske fokus har mindst to væsentlige styrker: Den ene er, at det tillader os at definere regulatorisk kvalitet som en egenskab ved et konkret stykke lovgivning; dermed fås et veldefineret analyseobjekt. Den anden styrke er, at det tillader os at adskille begrebet regulatorisk kvalitet fra mere normative vurderinger af en retsakts formål (Fliedner 2001). Denne juridiske tilgang er naturligvis inspireret af en bestemt juridisk skole, nemlig en retsdogmatisk (Wegener 2000, 51–60) eller ”law-as-rules”-tilgang (velbeskrevet i Van Hoecke & Warrington 1998, der dog argumenterer for en

brede tilgang) kombineret med inspiration fra retspositivisme (Kelsen 1928). Denne snævre, juridiske tilgang er dog hæmmet af, at den alene ser på det juridiske landskab. Hvis fokus er på potentialet for reglernes effektive virkning, må den juridiske tilgang kombineres med en erkendelse af det ikke-juridiske landskabs betydning: Giver reglerne faktisk mening i den virkelighed, de skal virke i – er de reelt applicerbare? At den regulatoriske kvalitet således forstået har betydning, er ikke alene et spekulativt argument, men har empirisk resonans. Reregulering – og ikke blot afskaffelse af regler i form af deregulering – har været det centrale omdrejningspunkt for megen politisk og administrativ indsats under overskriften ”bedre regulering” (Pedersen & Pasquali 2009, 70), ligesom også nyere tiltag som f.eks. Virksomhedsforum bl.a. arbejder ud fra denne bagvedliggende forståelse af reglernes kvalitet som udgangspunkt for deres effektive virkning og dermed for deres betydning for den samfundsøkonomiske efficiens af reguleringen som sådan.

Denne regulatoriske kvalitet – f.eks. om reglerne er modstridende, eller om de indeholder juridiske begreber, der ikke er veldefinerede, og om de er reelt applicerbare – kan man god ret argumentere for, har relevans i alle regulatoriske sammenhænge, herunder ikke mindst om reguleringen vil være i stand til at opnå sit mål (Bálan 2011; Bormann et al. 2002, 13–16; Kaeding 2008). Bemærk dog venligst, at der her tales om relevans – ikke kausalitet. Som et af meget få aspekter af sikringen af den samfundsøkonomiske efficiens af regulering har kvalitet med andre ord bred betydning for reglernes effektive virkning og dermed for deres output-legitimitet. Samtidig står det klart, at netop den regulatoriske kvalitet i den regulerende stat søges sikret ved, at reguleringen foretages af et afpolitiseret agentur. I Danmark bruges ikke slige agenturer, så derfor må vi undersøge virkningen af eventuelle andre metoder til at sikre denne regulatoriske kvalitet.

Hvordan sikres den regulatoriske kvalitet i Danmark?

Metoderne til at sikre regulatoriske kvalitet er afhængig af den juridiske form, og særligt love og bekendtgørelser er her relevante at dissekere yderligere. For det første er de meget ens forstået, da der i begge tilfælde er tale om autoritativ udstedelse af regler – ikke fortolkninger af eksisterende regler som ved domsafsigelser eller vejledninger (Germer 2007, 14, 111–112). Desuden retter de sig begge mod borgere og virksomheder, hvor f.eks. cirkulærer retter sig mod interne forhold den offentlige sektor alene (Germer 2007, 112; Sørensen 1999, 42).

Helt grundlæggende vedtages love, mens bekendtgørelser udstedes. Sprogligt kan forskellen virke subtil, men reelt er den ganske stor. Før en lov kan vedtages, fordrer det nemlig ikke blot et simpelt flertal blandt Folketingets medlemmerne; der er også en række proceskrav, hvis formål bl.a.

er at sikre netop den regulatoriske kvalitet. I Danmark findes fem sådanne kontrolmekanismer, der skal sikre en grundig behandling af lovforslag:

- 1) Kravet om tre behandlinger i Folketinget, der følger af Grundlovens § 41.
- 2) En række krav til bestemte tidsfrister f.eks. mellem de tre folketingsbehandlinger. Disse krav følger af både Grundloven og Folketingets forretningsorden (Danmarks Riges Grundlov 1953; Folketinget 2013, §§ 10–15).
- 3) Brugen af (stående) udvalg til at bearbejde forslag mellem de tre folketingsbehandlinger; brugen af disse følger af Folketingets forretningsorden (Folketinget 2013, §§ 7–9).
- 4) Brugen af høringer til at oplyse det lovforberedende arbejde og Folketingets udvalgsarbejde som beskrevet i Justitsministeriets vejledning i lov kvalitet (Justitsministeriet 2005, 55–58).
- 5) Kravet om konsekvensvurderinger som fastsat i et statsministerielt cirkulære (Statsministeriet 1998) og yderligere beskrevet i Finansministeriets vejledning til udarbejdelse af konsekvensvurderinger (Finansministeriet 2005).

Disse fem kontrolmekanismer og ikke mindst samspillet mellem dem skal medvirke til at sikre den regulatoriske kvalitet.

Som udgangspunkt er delegeret lovgivning i Danmark, anordninger og bekendtgørelser, ikke underlagt nogen kontrolmekanismer, idet ”Forslag til samme ikke i Rigsdagen undergives den for Lovforslag foreskrevne Behandlingsmaade” (Matzen 1900, 23). Det kan dog indvendes, at visse af de fem kontrolmekanismer er relevante alligevel. For det første fordi bekendtgørelser er underlagt formelle krav om kontrasignatur og ministeransvar (Germer 2007, 118). Dette har dog ingen betydning for indholdet og dermed ej heller for dens regulatoriske kvalitet. For det andet følger det af det almindelige legalitetsprincip (Germer 2007, 99–100), at udstedelse af en bekendtgørelse kræver lovhjemmel, og den bagvedliggende bemyndigelses- eller fuldmagtslov vil jo have gennemgået ovenstående kontroller før vedtagelse. At fuldmagtsloven er underlagt disse kontrolmekanismer til at sikre den nødvendige grundighed i lovgivningsprocessen, betyder dog ikke, at de delegerede retsakter er det. Medmindre det ekspliciteres ganske nøje i selve forslaget, hvad de delegerede retsakter vil indeholde, kan eksempelvis konsekvensvurderingerne ikke tage højde for bekendtgørelser, der udstedes med hjemmel i den vedtagne lov. Selvom der til brugen af delegation generelt stilles krav om mere omfattende lovbemærkninger (Bormann et al. 2002, 36), fremstår et krav om konsekvensvurderinger af afledte retsakter sammen med bemyndigelsesloven umuligt at

imødekomme. Dette understreges også af, at visse love, såkaldte samlelove, vedrører meget forskellige emner og områder (Bormann et al. 2002, 29–30; Pedersen, Ravn, & Christensen 2014), hvorfor mange konsekvensvurderinger i forvejen er spage. Skulle konsekvensvurderinger tillige indregne konsekvenserne af endnu ikke formulerede regelsæt i kommende bekendtgørelser, ville dette udvande konsekvensvurderingerne yderligere. Desuden ønsker man ikke at imødekomme kravet om konsekvensvurderinger af f.eks. bekendtgørelser allerede i fuldmagtsloven. Der er nemlig tale om to separate retsakter, der pr. definition skal behandles separat, selvom de står i et indbyrdes afhængighedsforhold og tjener samme politiske formål; det er i al fald opfattelsen visse steder i centraladministrationen (Erhvervs- og Vækstministeret 2013).

Ovenstående er dog ikke ensbetydende med, at bekendtgørelser og anordninger ikke konsekvensvurderes. Bekendtgørelser fra erhvervsrettede ministerier skal nemlig underkastes en konsekvensvurdering i Erhvervsstyrelsen (Finansministeriet 2005, 9). Denne slags konsekvensvurdering er dog ikke et juridisk krav, og den har næppe så vidtrækkende implikationer som konsekvensvurderinger af lovforslag, idet bekendtgørelser ikke er underlagt de andre proceskrav; en positiv samspilseffekt mellem de forskellige proceskrav opstår således i langt mindre grad. Særlig tre af de andre krav og deres forhold til konsekvensvurderingerne og til hinanden er relevante: Tidsfrister, der sikrer, at konsekvensvurderinger finder sted så tidligt, at de kan nå at påvirke beslutningsprocessen; krav om høring, som kan tilføje oversete aspekter til konsekvensvurderingen; og antallet af vetopunkter, som øger relevansen af en konsekvensvurdering, da ikke kun den udstedende myndighed (som jo har taget stilling) skal overbevises om regulering i en bestemt retning. Disse tre krav findes ikke i samme omfang for bekendtgørelser, hvorfor de potentielle følger af en misvisende konsekvensvurdering af en bekendtgørelse er væsentligt mindre end for lovforslag.

Af ovenstående kan konkluderes, at delegation i Danmark ikke nødvendigvis sikrer en teknisk-rational tilgang til reguleringen. Dette skyldes for det første, at delegationen sker til en politisk instans – en minister – og ikke til en uafhængig instans friholdt fra almindelige, politiske incitament; og det skyldes for det andet, at de proceskrav, der gælder i forbindelse med vedtagelse af lovforslag, og som netop skal korrigere politiske vilkårligheder og sikre den regulatoriske kvalitet, ikke i samme omfang som ved almindelige love finder anvendelse. Det betyder ikke, at delegation som sådan er utilrådelig; det betyder blot, at det er uhyre vigtigt, hvilke og hvor mange beføjelser det overlades til ministeren at udøve. Dermed bliver især omfanget af delegationen af afgørende betydning. Jo oftere og jo bredere, der anvendes delegation, des større bliver risikoen for, at ovenstående problemer vil

medføre regulering af lavere kvalitet. Hvis delegationen i Danmark er stigende, står vi med andre med stigende risiko for, at output-legitimiteten lider skade – til trods for, at denne output-legitimitet ofte bruges som argumentet for selvsamme delegation.

Input-legitimitetens relevans i den regulerende stat i dens danske udgave

Opsummerende kan det altså slås fast, at delegation i Danmark medfører en højere grad af risiko for politiseret regulering. Dermed sættes Majones grundlæggende argument, om at den teknisk-rationelle tilgang til regulering nødvendiggør et altovervejende teknisk-rationelt legitimitetskriterium, ud af kraft. Af dette følger, at vi må kigge nøjere på delegationens demokratisk-legitime grundlag, dens input-legitimitet. Ud fra gængse forestillinger om parlamentarisk kontrol med regeringen (Olsen 1978) er der meget, der taler til fordel for den danske måde at håndtere delegation på sammenlignet med den varige delegation af lovgivningsmagt til ikke-valgte organisationer: Der opretholdes parlamentarisk kontrol med reguleringens indhold – om ikke andet så indirekte. Dette understøttes også af, at delegationen sker diskretionært; ministrene får kun lov til at udstede de regler, som Folketinget bemyndiger ministeren til.

Imidlertid afhænger denne positive vurdering af det danske system i høj grad af omfanget af delegationen på mindst to måder. *For det første* er der det blotte antal af delegationsbeføjelser; dette må antages at have et naturligt loft, da man ellers på det nærmeste ville bemyndige regeringen til at stå over Folketinget. *For det andet* er der delegationens materielle indhold. Hvis ministeren ikke blot kan udstede regulerende regler, men tillige diktere overordnede retsprincipper, har Folketinget reelt sat sig selv uden for indflydelse. Der er altså grænser for delegation (Germer 2007, 100–102; Sørensen 1999, 41–42). Samtidig er det værd at bemærke, at delegationen jo sker til et politisk organ. Dermed må det som nævnt tidligere forventes, at reguleringen – selvom delegationen er foretaget ud fra et vurdering af et emnes tekniske karakter – kan antage politiske dimensioner og præges af de politiske incitament, som ministre er underlagt – herunder f.eks. ønske om genvalg og understøttelse af egne vælgergrupperinger. Dette understreger igen blot vigtigheden af omfanget: eventuelle politiske prioritetsforskydninger må antages at blive flere, jo større muligheden herfor bliver.

Sammenfattende kan det slås fast, at både argumentet om, at delegation er legitim, idet den bygger på en teknisk-rationel logik og dermed sikrer en højere kvalitet, og argumentet om, at delegationen er legitim, idet den sker parlamentarisk og diskretionært, afhænger af delegationens formelle og

materielle omfang: jo mere delegationen bruges, des større bliver risiciene. I det følgende er derfor foretaget en undersøgelse af delegationsomfanget i Danmark, hvor vi går i dybden med udviklingen inden for det erhvervspolitiske område, idet den teknisk-rationelle tilgang til delegation her må forventes at være særlig relevant.

Metodiske overvejelser

Det foreliggende studium bygger på materiale fra retsinformation.dk og lovtidende.dk, der samler ”alle love og regler (...), der udstedes af ministerierne og de centrale, statslige myndigheder, og (...) Folketingets dokumenter” (Civilstyrelsen udateret). Studiet bygger videre på andre studier, hvor særligt Jakobsen & Mortensen (2014) skal fremhæves. Formålet her er nemlig at supplere tidligere undersøgelser – som deres – af delegationens omfang. Sådanne undersøgelser omfatter typisk nye bekendtgørelser (Christensen 1991, 247; Jakobsen & Mortensen 2014, 39) og ser bort fra ændringer i eksisterende bekendtgørelser. Dermed fokuseres på regelproduktion frem for sanering. Derved overses, at f.eks. ændringsbekendtgørelser kan medføre nye regler, hvorfor en slig opgørelse sandsynligvis undervurderer omfanget af delegation forstået som delegeret regelfastsættelse. Ikke desto mindre kan disse undersøgelser bekræftende besvare det bagvedliggende spørgsmål: Antallet af nye bekendtgørelser er stigende relativt til antallet af nye love (Jakobsen & Mortensen 2014, 46).

Jakobsen & Mortensens undersøgelse fokuserer på fire love med samlet begrænset erhvervsregulatorisk relevans. Det her foreliggende studium undersøger derimod specifikt erhvervsregulering, da denne er omdrejningspunktet for den regulerende stat. Målet har således været at undersøge udviklingen i omfanget af delegationen i en række af den mest centrale love til regulering af erhvervslivet. For at identificere disse love blev en række juridiske eksperter i erhvervsorganisationen Dansk Erhverv konsulteret. I praksis foregik det således, at vi kontaktede et antal erhvervsjurister i pågældende organisation og bad dem liste de love, der er vigtigst inden for deres respektive felter. De 8 erhvervsjurister, der svarede, pegede på 15 love, som må forventes at være blandt de mest relevante kilder til regulering af erhvervslivet i almindelighed. En del blev nævnt ad flere omgange af de juridiske eksperter. En enkelt lov, straffeloven, er blevet udeladt her, da denne lovs fokus ikke er regulering af erhvervslivet, men håndtering af (strafferetlige) konsekvenser af brud på denne og anden regulering. De tilbageværende 14 love, som vi altså ikke har kvalificeret yderligere, er blevet analyseret i tre trin.

Første trin var juridisk identifikation af lovene, som de så ud i 1990, 2000, 2010 og 2013. Målet hermed var at opbygge en oversigt over retsudviklingen pr. tiende år, således at udviklingen i

delegation kunne undersøges i et juridisk datasæt bestående af 4 gange 14 love. Udgangspunktet var lovbekendtgørelser eller officielle, juridiske datasammenskrivninger for de pågældende år, da lovbekendtgørelser og datasammenskrivninger ”opsummerer” den gældende lovgivning. Det var imidlertid ikke muligt at identificere lovbekendtgørelser eller datasammenskrivninger for alle lovene for alle årene, hvorfor vi i visse tilfælde har konstrueret vor egen datasammenskrivning. Dette er sket på grundlag af den senest mulige lovbekendtgørelse eller datasammenskrivning før året med tillæg af efterfølgende ændringer frem til og med analyseåret. På denne baggrund er der nået fuldt overblik over gældende lovgivning i 1990, 2000, 2010 og 2013. Halvdelen af de 14 undersøgte love fandtes i alle fire udgaver; resten i tre eller færre. Der kan være tre årsager til, at en lov ikke kunne findes i alle fire udgaver: Loven kunne være forblevet uændret i en hel tiårsperiode efter 1990 (det gælder f.eks. handelsagentloven fra 1990); loven fandtes ikke et givent år (det gælder f.eks. selskabsloven, der er en sammenskrivning af aktieselskabsloven og anpartsselskabsloven, og det gælder f.eks. vikarloven, der implementerer EU-regulering), eller en kombination af disse to ting.

Det andet trin var en identifikation af bestemmelser, der indeholder delegationsbeføjelser. De op til 4 gange 14 love blev derfor nøje undersøgt med henblik på at identificere samtlige delegationsbestemmelser. For at sikre undersøgelsen validitet (at vi rent faktisk oplister omfanget af delegation og intet andet (Adcock & Collier 2001, 530) og reliabilitet (muligheden for, at undersøgelsen kan repliceres)) var metodikken at forlade sig så lidt på fortolkning som muligt. Optællingen indeholder således alene bestemmelser, hvori delegationen er fuldkommen entydig. Dette er eksempelvis tilfældet, når der står ”ministeren bemyndiges til at fastsætte regler om...”. Kodningen skete manuelt, da vi ikke – som er en forudsætning for automatiseret optælling – kan forudsige samtlige formuleringer, der godtgør delegation. Ydermere er optællingen sket alene på paragraf- og paragrafstykkenniveau. Denne tilgang er valgt særligt med henblik på reliabiliteten af undersøgelsen, selvom vi med denne metode risikerer at undervurdere delegationsomfanget. Denne risiko for skævhed i opgørelsen forårsages af, at der i flere paragraf(stykker) er oplistet flere delegationsbeføjelser f.eks. ved at opliste en række punkter, som ministeren nærmere kan definere. Det er eksempelvis tilfældet i markedsføringslovens § 13, stk. 8. I vores opgørelse er en sådan delegation kun talt én gang, selvom der i streng juridisk forstand muligvis er tale om flere delegationsbeføjelser. En lignende tilgang med fokus på simpel optælling er anvendt hos Jakobsen & Mortensen (2014), selvom opmærksomheden på denne metodes konservative islæt synes at være til at overse. Optællingen ledte til en oversigt over omfanget af delegation i hver enkelt lov i hver af de

fire udgaver af denne lov. Disse fire oversigter kunne derefter sammenlignes for at afgøre udviklingen i omfanget af delegation i den givne lov.

Det tredje trin var en kvalitativ kontrol af hver enkelt identificeret delegationsbeføjelse. Formålet var her at undersøge, om delegationen substantielt ændrede sig, idet trin 2 af undersøgelsen reelt har tre indbyggede potentielle fejlkilder: For det første kan udviklingen indeholde sammenskrivninger af delegationsbeføjelser til én samlet og bredere beføjelse. Og for det andet kan man støde på eksplicitering af hidtil bredere beføjelse (den omvendte situation af den første fejlkilde). Disse to fejlkilder vil blandt andet betyde, at omfanget af delegation reelt set er konstant fra år til år, selvom analysen på trin 2 vil afsløre en bevægelse i nedad- hhv. opadgående retning. En grundigere juridisk undersøgelse af delegationens indhold kan afsløre, om dette er tilfældet og sikre en korrektion. For det tredje kan enkeltbestemmelser (et enkelt paragrafstykke) indeholde mere end én delegationsbeføjelse, jf. eksemplet med markedsføringslovens § 13, stk. 8 ovenfor. Hvis denne fejlkilde er til stede, vil det betyde, at undersøgelsen undervurderer det reelle delegationsomfang. Markedsføringsloven er ikke det eneste eksempel herpå; f.eks. giver § 55, stk. 3 i selskabsloven Erhvervsstyrelsen mulighed for ”at fastsætte nærmere regler om besiddelse og om meddelelse om besiddelse af kapitalandele” og ”endvidere [at] fastsætte regler, som fraviger stk. 1, for så vidt angår aktier i aktieselskaber, som har aktier optaget til handel på et reguleret marked eller en multilateral handelsfacilitet...”. Som følge af undersøgelsens metodik vil denne delegation kun tælle med én gang. Dette konservative estimat er dog prisen for den metodiske styrke, for så vidt angår validitet og reliabilitet, som er beskrevet under trin 2. Opsummerende kan siges, at det tredje trin af undersøgelsen havde til formål at afsløre en ”falsk” stigning eller fald i omfanget delegation, f.eks. ved at en delegationsbeføjelse blev splittet op i to eller samlet i én paragraf. Denne juridiske undersøgelse af de enkelte paragrafstykker kvalificerede undersøgelsen på det andet trin med henblik på at øge validiteten; dette kvalificerende trin synes ej heller at have været genstand for tidligere undersøgelses interesse.

Brugen af delegation i dansk erhvervsregulering

Undersøgelser af delegation på alle lovområder afslører en temmelig entydig tendens, idet antallet af udstedte bekendtgørelser er stigende set i forhold til antallet og omfanget af nye love; dog spores en faldende tendens (Jakobsen & Mortensen 2014, 46–50). Dette billede kan tolkes på to måder: For det første kan det ses som udtryk for større brug af ”samlelove”, dvs. love, der samler mange love i ét forslag. Hvis brugen af sådanne lovforslag er stigende, vil det opgjorte antal lovforslag være lavere

end det ”reelle” antal lovforslag. Muligheden af denne effekt synes ikke at have fanget interesse i andre opgørelser. Der findes undersøgelser, der tyder på, at en sådan effekt gør sig gældende (Pedersen et al. 2014), om end den næppe er afgørende for konklusionerne her. For det andet kan det tolkes som et billede af, at delegationsgraden i almindelighed har været stigende, men muligvis bevæger sig mod et ”mæthedspunkt” (Jakobsen & Mortensen 2014, 50). Sandsynligvis gør begge dele sig gældende, om end det forekommer mest sandsynligt, at delegationsgraden er steget mere end brugen af samlelove.

Sådanne oversigter siger dog ikke noget om delegationsgraden specifikt i dansk erhvervsregulering, hvorfor vi må ty til den mere kvalitative undersøgelse. Denne analyse bestod som tidligere nævnt af tre trin. Det første trin var en identifikation af de 14 udvalgte love, sådan som de så ud i hhv. 1990, 2000, 2010 og 2013. Nogle af lovene skulle som beskrevet ovenfor kun identificeres én gang (f.eks. CMR-loven og handelsagentloven), mens andre fordrede større indsats at kortlægge. F.eks. er datagrundlaget for 2000-udgaven af forbrugeraftaleloven en datasammenskrivning fra 1993 (DSK nr. 11031 af 22. juni 1993), hvortil er lagt de ændringer af loven, der fulgte i hhv. 1994 (lov nr. 1098 af 21. december 1994) og 2000 (lov nr. 442 af 31. maj 2000). En oversigt over de analyserede love ses i tabel 1. Som det ses, har det været muligt at identificere halvdelen af de udvalgte kilder til erhvervsregulering i både en 1990-, 2000-, 2010- og en 2013-udgave (bemærk, at 1990-udgaven af søloven tillige inkluderer lov om skibsregistrering (lovbekendtgørelse nr. 588 af 29. september 1988), der senere blev skrevet ind i selve søloven).

Det næste trin i analysen var en gennemgang af disse love, lovbekendtgørelser og datasammenskrivninger for at identificere bestemmelser indeholdende delegation. To parallelle tendenser og en residualgruppe manifesterer sig: I den første gruppe af love ændrer omfanget af delegation sig ikke nævneværdigt. Det gælder aftaleloven, erstatningsansvarsloven og købeloven. Det er meget karakteristisk for lovene i denne gruppe, at delegationsomfanget ikke blot bevarer status quo, men også, at det i udgangspunktet er meget lavt.

Dernæst finder vi en større gruppe af love – det er faktisk halvdelen af de 14 – hvori delegation bruges i stadig stigende omfang gennem hele perioden. Dette gælder godskørselsloven, jernbaneloven, konkurrenceloven, luftfartsloven, markedsføringsloven, selskabsloven og søloven. I nogle af disse love er stigningen i antallet af delegationsbeføjelser mindre (f.eks. i godskørselsloven), mens stigningen i andre er ganske omfattende

Tabel 1. Hvilke udgaver af lovene er identificeret og analyseret?

Populært navn	1990	2000	2010	2013
Aftaleloven	X	X		X
CMR-loven	X			
Erstatningsansvarsloven	X	X	X	
Forbrugeraftaleloven	X	X	X	X
Godskørselsloven	X	X	X	X
Handelsagentloven	X			
Jernbaneloven		X	X	X
Konkurrenceloven	X	X	X	X
Købeloven	X	X	X	X
Luftfartsloven	X	X	X	X
Markedsføringsloven	X	X	X	X
Selskabsloven			X	X
Søloven	X	X	X	X
Vikarloven				X

Slutteligt kan man pege på en residualgruppe bestående af en række love, hvori det ikke giver mening at tale om en udvikling, idet de kun findes i én udgave i datasættet. Til denne residualgruppe hører desuden forbrugeraftaleloven, hvori delegation øjensynligt benyttes i et faldende omfang. De her beskrevne resultater er opsummeret i tabel 2.

Denne analyse mangler dog den sidste kvalifikation, inden en egentlig konklusion om brugen af delegation i dansk erhvervslovgivning kan drages. Denne kvalificerende undersøgelse skulle afdække, hvorvidt optællingen dækkede over ”falske” stigninger eller fald i brugen af delegation. Det viste sig, at alene én situation affødte et behov for kommentarer: Forbrugeraftaleloven. Som det fremgår af tabel 2, indeholdt denne lov i 1990 to bestemmelser med delegationsbeføjelser. Dette var bestemmelser om, at ”Justitsministeren kan fastsætte bestemmelser om oplysningens form og indhold”. Dette omhandlede en række oplysningsforpligtelser på særlige områder (f.eks. fjernsalg).

Tabel 2. Antal bestemmelser med delegation

Populært navn	1990	2000	2010	2013
Aftaleloven	0	0	–	0
CMR-loven	1	–	–	–
Erstatningsansvarsloven	1	1	1	–
Forbrugerftaleloven	2	4	1	0
Godskørselsloven	12	14	16	17
Handelsagentloven	1	–	–	–
Jernbaneloven	–	28	66	70
Konkurrenceloven	5	16	21	24
Købeloven	0	0	0	0
Luftfartsloven	67	77	85	85
Markedsføringsloven	7	9	14	19
Selskabsloven	–	–	26	37
Søloven	18	29	41	50
Vikarloven	–	–	–	0

Disse oplysningsforpligtelser (og den medfølgende delegation til at fastsætte oplysningsforpligtelserne) valgte man senere hen at udpensle, således at der i 2000-udgaven af forbrugerftaleloven var fire bestemmelser med delegation – selvom det reelle omfang af delegationen var den samme. Senere hen – i 2010 – valgte man at samle disse fire bestemmelser i én bestemmelse: ”Justitsministeren kan fastsætte nærmere regler om indholdet af og formen for de oplysningsforpligtelser, der følger af §§ 10-15. Justitsministeren kan endvidere fastsætte regler om yderligere oplysninger, som den erhvervsdrivende skal give.” Det faktiske omfang af delegationen var dog uændret. Først i 2013-udgaven ses en reel ændring, idet delegationsbemyndigelsen gled ud til fordel for en eksplicitering af informationsforpligtelserne. Selvom dette modificerer lovens historik, så ændrer det dog ikke på det samlede billede af en lov med faldende grad af delegation – som den eneste af de 14 analyserede love i øvrigt.

Konklusion

Denne artikel har sat sig for at gøre to ting: For de første at diskutere de teoretiske begrundelser for brugen af delegation af lovgivningsmagt. Dette blev gjort ved at undersøge begrebet ”den regulerende stat” sammenholdt med rammerne for delegation i en dansk kontekst. Den regulerende stat i Danmark manifesterer sig ganske anderledes end forudsat af f.eks. Majone og i litteraturen om den regulerende

stat, og det betyder, at der må stilles ganske andre krav til den normative vurdering af udviklingen af den regulerende stat i Danmark. Denne ministerielle delegationsform, vi har valgt her til lands, betyder nemlig, at hverken kriteriet om, at delegationen skal være defineret i politisk-økonomisk termer, have en selvstændig og uafhængig institution som mål eller være varig, imødekommes. Dette gælder også for ordinær (lov)regulering, der til gengæld er underlagt en række mekanismer til sikring af den regulatoriske kvalitet; disse mekanismer gør sig imidlertid ikke gældende i samme omfang for delegerede retsakter. Konklusionen er, at både det formelle og materielle omfang af delegationen må være afgørende for metodens almindelige legitimitet, idet risiciene for politiseret regulering af lavere kvalitet *ceteris paribus* vil være højere, når reguleringen i højere grad sker gennem delegation. En lignende konklusion – at delegationsomfanget har betydning for den normative vurdering – kommer man også til, når der anlægges mere traditionelle parlamentariske legitimitetskriterier.

For det andet og i forlængelse af ovenstående undersøgt delegationens omfang. Fra tidligere studier ved vi, at brugen af bekendtgørelser i almindelighed er stigende, men denne undersøgelse supplerede og kvalificerede disse opgørelser. Dette skete ved at se nærmere på erhvervsområdet og ved at foretage en mere dybdegående, juridisk analyse af brugen af delegation over tid i de 14 mest centrale erhvervslove. Konklusionen er, at delegationsgraden er stigende både kvantitativt og kvalitativt.

Det samlede billede er således, at hvis delegation i Danmark skal ansues som en legitim kilde til regulering, skal denne reguleringsform bruges med omtanke, da man hverken delegerer reguleringsbeføjelser til uafhængige tekniske instanser eller har installeret kvalitetssikrende mekanismer på samme måde som med almindelige love. Alternativt opstår både problemer med balancen mellem Folketinget og regeringen og risiko for lavere regulatorisk kvalitet. Om kvaliteten rent faktisk er faldende, er et empirisk spørgsmål, som denne artikel ikke har afdækket, men som – i forlængelse af det her fremførte argument om øget risiko for ringere regulering – passende kunne tages op i forskningen fremover.

NØGLEORD: Regulering, kvalitet, erhvervs politik, delegation

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ABSTRACTS

Tænketankes brug af dagbladene som et marked for politiske idéer i Danmark

Jesper Dahl Kelstrup

How has the visibility of think tanks in Danish newspapers developed in the recent decade, and how might this development be accounted for? The article shows that the ten most mentioned think tanks have become more visible in Danish newspapers in the period 2006-2015 compared to the most mentioned interest organisations. It is argued that think tanks are using the media as a means of supplying independent ideas which are in demand among decision-makers and other target audiences. In addition, the article suggests that think tanks with idea political stances are more visible in Danish newspapers than think tanks which focus on certain issues or policies.

Think tanks in Denmark – Media visibility and Network Relations

Mark Blach-Ørsten & Nete Nørgaard Kristensen

Though think tanks have a long history internationally, they have especially in recent years come to play an increasingly important role in both policy-formulation and public debate. In this article, we analyse the growing presence of think tanks in a Danish context during the 2000s and the first half of the 2010s, because in this national setting think tanks are still a relatively new phenomenon. Based on theories of mediatization and de-corporatization, we present 1) an analysis of the visibility of selected Danish think tanks *in* the media and 2) an analysis of their political networks *outside* the media. The study shows that the two largest and oldest think tanks in Denmark, the liberal think tank CEPOS and the social democratic think tank ECLM, are very active and observable in the media; that the media's distribution of attention to these think tanks, to some extent, confirms a re-politicization of Danish newspapers; but also that the news media as an arena of influence is only one part of the equation, since some of the corporatist political networks are still intact and working *outside* the media.

Norske tankesmier i mediene: En suksesshistorie

Paul Bjerke

The last decade have a number of advocacy think tanks established themselves as a part of the Norwegian political system. The think tanks' political goal is to influence decision makers and populations, and visibility in the traditional media is an important means. We know little about if they manage to reach their goals, but a content analysis of the largest Norwegian newspapers shows that they have significantly achieved media visibility. 12 advocacy think tanks were active in Norway in 2013. All of them are small. All together they employ 30-40 people. Despite this limited scope, they were in 2013 featured 565 times in the country's seven largest newspapers, substantially more than central and much mission-research institute. The review is mainly positive and according to the think tanks' own terms. They are largely labelled as a "neutral experts", not part-sources.

Swedish Advocacy Think Tanks as News Sources and Agenda-Setters

Sigurd Allern & Ester Pollack

The topic of this paper is the media visibility of Swedish advocacy think tanks, as measured by references to these think tanks in leading Swedish print newspapers. Advocacy think tanks are, in contrast with more research-oriented think tanks, characterised by their outspoken ideological and political agenda. In public debates, they often have a partisan role. Four research questions will be answered: How often are these advocacy think tanks referred to in the news? How important are they as commentators and opinion-makers? How are they presented as sources in the news? What is the relative strength of market-liberal and right-wing think tanks versus red/green think tanks, in terms of media representation and agenda-setting?

The selection criteria, type of newspapers, and time period used in this study of Swedish advocacy think tanks have been coordinated with parallel, national think tank studies by media researchers in Denmark, Norway, and Finland. Several changes in the think tank landscape took place after the turn of the millennium, which motivated us to select two full newspaper years, 2006 and 2013, to better cover these developments. To gain a deeper understanding of the think tanks' backgrounds, their cooperation with other think tanks, and their media strategies, we conducted background interviews with representatives from four advocacy think tanks. We met with Karin Svanborg-Sjövall, CEO of Timbro; Boa Ruthström, CEO of Arena Idé, and Maja Dahl,

communication manager of Arena Idé; Mattias Goldmann, CEO of Fores; and Daniel Suhonen, the leader of Katalys.

Think tank scene in Finland: Nothing spectacular?

Lotta Lounasmeri

This article discusses the think tank scene in Finland and the modest role think tanks seem to play in public debate. In 2005, the first Finnish think tanks associated with political parties were established, and since then, several new ones have popped up. Until now, they have not received substantial media attention. One notable exception is the traditional Finnish Business and Policy Forum (EVA) that was founded in the 1970s and has secured a position as a credible public discussant. However, in light of the great popularity of think tanks in the other Nordic countries, even the public attention granted to EVA seems modest. The article presents empirical results of a media analysis and discusses possible reasons for the lesser visibility.

Delegation of law-making powers: risks of poorer regulation?

Morten Jarlbæk Pedersen, Geert Laier Christensen & Jacob Ravn

Quality of regulation is a factor of great weight when it comes to the potential of regulation to meet its objectives. However, regulation through delegated law-making powers, regulation by decree, is still prone to short-sighted, political incentives and in addition not subject to the same legal mechanisms of scrutiny as ordinary laws. An increased use of regulation by decree can thus mean an increased risk of regulation of a lower regulatory quality and with a lower potential to meet regulatory goals. Delegation of law-making powers in Denmark is rising both generally and in the area of business regulations. This can be seen as a Danish version of a movement towards a 'regulatory state', in which the establishment of (independent) agencies has been replaced by continuously increased ministerial powers.