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Formål

Politik er et tværfagligt samfundsvidenskabeligt tidsskrift, der bringer artikler om politik ud fra mangfoldige akademiske perspektiver. Redaktionen lægger vægt på *faglighed* sikret gennem anonym refereebedømmelse, *formidling*, som gør Politik tilgængelig uden for universitetets mure, og endelig *politisk relevans*. Tidsskriftet Politik er en videreførelse af Politologiske Studier.

Introduction: New Media and Conflict in the Middle East

Isabel Bramsen, Simone Molin Friis, and Alexei Tsinovoi

The theme of this special issue is *new media and conflict in the Middle East*. During the recent decade, we have witnessed rapid changes in the global media and information environment. With the emergence of global networks of communication and the proliferation of communication technologies across the globe, the flow of information today is at an unprecedented magnitude, speed, and intensity. In the Middle East – a region, in which regimes' and elites' control of traditional print and audio-visual media has previously been close to complete (Weeden 1999; Lynch 2016)—these transformations have had profound social and political consequences. This special issue explores the various ways in which new media has become an inherent part of everyday life of millions of citizens, but also a crucial actor, tool, and arena in the conflicts of the region.

The media and communication revolutions of the 21st century have introduced new empirical, theoretical, and methodological puzzles for scholars focusing on conflicts in the Middle East, particularly as to whether the new virtual public sphere, established by new media, can provide a platform for democratization and resistance. With the advent of the Arab Spring, many believed in the inherently emancipatory nature of these technologies. Their hope was that new media would bring about a new and more democratic Middle East, and that information and communication technologies could become valuable tools in the hands of people committed to democratization (e.g. Shirky 2011). Indeed, in many ways, new media enables a larger, more diverse group of actors to participate in the communicative struggle, along with governments and traditional communication elites. In societies with strict regime-controlled media, new media platforms thus provides an opportunity for transcending one-way communication by empowering marginalized and otherwise silenced groups to develop counter-discourses to the hegemonic

narrative. Because new media facilitates forms of collective action that are cheaper, faster, and more accessible, they have often been regarded as tools of civil dissent and non-violent resistance, allowing citizens of the Middle East to challenge autocratic regimes. In relation hereto, these technologies have the potential to render local dynamics visible to international publics. Today, contemporary activists only need a mobile phone with a satellite connection to upload messages, images, and videos beyond the reach of the regimes and beyond the borders of their countries. This global interconnectivity enables activists to be in direct contact with foreign publics, and thus empower geographically dispersed groups to connect across physical divides.

However, new media and the global networks of communication are not only about emancipatory endeavours such as democratization, documentation of war crimes, giving voice to the marginalized, and non-violent forms of resistance. The media and communication revolutions of the 21st century have also lead to a surge of repressive and violent activities, such as cyber warfare, terrorist recruitment, hate speech, and violent propaganda. Evidence of authoritarian regimes attempting to mobilize the new technological affordances to crack down on opposition has swiftly illustrated the empirical complexity of the new media environment. Moreover, militant groups and terrorist organizations are becoming remarkably adept at manipulating their impact and establishing their presences through the global networks of communication. Particularly, the Islamic State has successfully managed to exploit the transformation of the communication and information environment to capture international attention and creep into the collective consciousness of multiple publics across linguistic, national, and cultural borders. While militant groups previously relied on being noticed by larger media corporations, new media are allowing groups like the Islamic State to bypass old media and communicate their actions to global publics through more direct forms of communication. Thus, the same communication technologies that are enabling civil activists and marginalized groups to connect across borders and strengthen their collective voice are likewise allowing militant groups and terrorist organizations to advance their cause and reach new audiences across the globe.

In response to the accelerating flow of activist, rebel, and militant communication, governments and institutions are reacting by introducing new policies and initiatives aimed at countering the flow of communication. Rapidly, new forms of censorship and

regulation are being introduced both by the regional regimes, who are desperately trying to regain control over the information environment, but also by the international powers, who are intervening in the region. As an example, the fifth pillar of Operation *Inherent Resolve* (OIR)[1] is aimed at 'exposing the Islamic State's true nature', partly through countering and delegitimizing the group's messaging online and preventing what is popularly termed "radicalization through the Internet" (U.S. Department of State 2016; U.S. Department of State 2014). Moreover, many social media corporations have increased the use of content moderation on their platforms – something, which fundamentally challenges the idea of an open, pluralist, virtual public sphere. In short, the online world has become a crucial battlefield of the rapidly evolving conflicts in the Middle East. However, the emergence of new media and the proliferation of communication technologies in conflict zones also present social science research with a number of new, more fundamental theoretical and methodological puzzles.

First, new media present new methodological opportunities and challenges. On the one hand, today's social media platforms, where millions of citizens offer their thoughts on a daily basis, present an unprecedented window into the internal debates taking place in conflict-ridden areas of the Middle East (Lynch 2016). Online communication thus offers researchers unique sources of insights and data, breaking the long-cultivated monopoly over information claimed by the regional authoritarian regimes. For example, videos recorded on smart phones and uploaded online provide unprecedented material for analysis of violent conflicts and atrocities. Nonetheless, accessing and analysing this data is not straightforward, as it is generated by messy networks of heterogeneous devices, which are in a state of permanent flux, contingent upon the policies of the private new media corporations. As the purpose of these public social platforms is not academic research, but private capital accumulation, innovative and often open-source approaches have to be further developed, to enable a better access for social scientists to the data generated by new media technologies.

Second, the proliferation of new media introduces conflict dynamics, which challenges key social science concepts. In many ways, modern-day combatants and activists are operating literally in a theatre of war, conducting operations as though they were on a stage, in an amphitheatre or Roman arena, acting out a drama in front of a global, yet

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[1] The operation of the international against the Islamic State.
[2] Formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra.
[3] The author wishes to thank Friedrich Kratochwil, Laura Roselle, Rasmus Gahrn-Andersen, the two

partial and selective audience (Smith 2005). As smartphones and cameras become tools almost as invaluable as weapons for combatants and activists, the traditional boundaries between active combatants and civilian observers, as well as between kinetic tools of destruction and virtual tools of perception are becoming increasingly blurred. Moreover, as images, videos, messages, and stories from conflict areas circulate across national, cultural, and interpretative borders, local conflicts not only become increasingly global in nature, but also exceed the normal confines of time, place, and meaning. Increasingly represented, observed, and executed through force fields of communication and information, contemporary conflicts often defy fixed definition and take on a multispectral, densely entangled, phase-shifting character (Der Derian 2013). The kind of reiterative and emergent violence associated with these multifaceted confrontations does not always lend itself to the assumptions of rational action, methods of linear regression, nor to hopes for a progressivist future, which drive much of contemporary social science research. Thus, new ways of theorizing, conceptualizing, and analysing the nature and dynamics of conflicts and violent confrontations in the digital age are needed. We hope that this special issue will contribute to these endeavours.

In the first article, **Chiara de Franco** argues that in order to better understand the role of new media in the Middle Eastern context, we need to create a conversation between the practice approach in IR, and the medium theory in media studies. Scholarly attention thus should not only focus on the content of the media, but also include its role as an environment in which international practices emerge. In turn, this enables analysing the shifting boundaries between the public and the private practices, and the emergence of new public spaces for politics. This argument is then illustrated by following a Facebook campaign, in which Israeli and Iranian citizens attempt at the creation of a transnational advocacy network, where individuals are brought together by the very act of sharing their private experience of the conflict. de Franco argues that the case thus illustrates how the study of everyday practices lends itself to the study of media ecologies, thus refocusing attention from the significance of media content, to media environment, and the new public spaces it creates for politics.

Second, **Joshka Ivanka Wessels** discusses how and whether YouTube videos from the Syrian revolution can be used as legal evidence in a post-war process of transitional justice. Wessels shows how many Syrian video-activists invested great courage in doc-

umenting war crimes to "provide evidence" and "tell the world" with the hope of chang-
ing the current situation or potentially use the videos as evidence in transitional justice.
The YouTube clips from Syria are divided into 8 categories and assessed individually in
terms of verifiability and probability for legal evidence. While the article acknowledges
the revolutionizing amount of video documentation it is argued that videos from the
Syrian revolution often lack contextual information such as date, time, geographical
location as well as identity of the perpetrator and victim necessary for establishing evi-
dence for transitional justice and war-crimes prosecution. A fraction of the YouTube
videos may however be used to document war crimes especially if these are supported
by other evidence.

In the third article, **Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen** addresses the media revolution's
implications for religious communication by examining the use of new media by Sunni
religious authorities in Syria. Skovgaard-Petersen begins by tracing the dramatic expan-
sion and transformation of media in Syria, from near to complete state control over the
intrusion of pan-Arab satellite television to the emergence of oppositional outlets and
rebel media. Following this overview, Skovgaard-Petersen turns to the question of how
the media revolution has manifested itself in the field of Sunni Islam. By tracing the use
of new media by Sunni religious actors, Skovgaard-Petersen identifies both the intro-
duction of new genres of religious communication, as well as significant transfor-
mations of classical genres of Islamic communication, including sermons (*khutba*), reli-
gious hymns (*anashid*), and Islamic legal pronouncements (*fatawa*). Moreover, Skov-
gaard-Petersen shows how more sinister religious messages are currently being spread
by Sunni jihadi militias that are mobilizing new media in their efforts to legitimize
fighting and killing. Particularly, the Islamic State and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham[2] have ven-
tured into the online world on a massive scale and have revolutionized Islamic media
messaging at many levels. However, as Skovgaard-Petersen argues, despite their "me-
dia-savviness", their lack of formal religious authority is potentially a point of weakness
for these groups and may provide a way for the Muslim *ulama* to overcome a Sunni
religious crisis.

Finally, **Kanar Patruss** examines the Islamic State's beheading videos of Western
victims, which gained international attention and caused widespread outrage during the

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[2] Formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra.

second half of 2014. After having noted how the images of the Islamic State's behead-ings were mobilized in a Western political discourse classifying the Islamic State as nihilistic evil, Patruss offers a Nietzsche-inspired critique of the value judgment of evil in the Western discourse. More specifically, Patruss argues that a "rhetoric-of-good-versus-evil" overlooks the *political* character of the Islamic State's struggle for power and makes a "doctrine of destruction" appear as the only possible political measure against the Islamic State. Subsequently, Patruss seeks to nuance our understanding of the Islamic State through a "re-reading" of the beheading image. Drawing on Lene Han-sen's concept of inter-iconicity (Hansen 2015), Patruss explores the inter-iconic rela-tions between the image of the Islamic State's beheadings, on the one hand, and the decapitations of the French Revolution and the trope of the body politics, on the other. In doing so, Patruss presents a historically-sensitive understanding of the image of the Islamic State's beheadings, thereby establishing a platform for a more nuanced debate about the on-going war against the Islamic State and a broader critique of politically motivated violence.

Because of the international nature of the theme of this special issue, we have decid-ed to allow our contributing authors to write in English, hoping that the articles may be of interest to audiences outside of Denmark.

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Media Ecology and the Blurring of Public and Private Practices: A Case from the Middle East[3]

Chiara de Franco

Few 'regions' of the world have received as much media attention as the Middle East. Public discourses about regional (in)security have contributed to shaping common understandings of regional conflicts and ultimately of that region as a distinct political entity (Bilgin 2004). Not surprisingly, the role of the media in the escalation and internationalization of conflicts in the Middle East has been subject of a significant number of scholarly works (e.g., Wolfsfeld 1997; Gilboa 2012; Melki 2014; Seib 2007). Furthermore, it has been arguably in response to events in the Middle East – from the Arab Spring to the rise of ISIS – that International Relations as an academic discipline has seen a significant increase of publications and conferences revolving around the role of the media in international politics. Nevertheless, the role of the media in the Middle East (and more in general in international politics) has been studied mainly on the basis of mainstream and homogeneous understandings of what the media are and what they do in and to our societies. This paper seeks to shift the focus from media outlets and organisations to the media as environments, and from media content to media ecology, which should be understood as the communication systems "within which human culture grows, giving form to its politics, ideologies, and social organization" (Milberry 2012). It therefore asks if and how the media ecology affects the development of international practices, here defined as "socially meaningful patterns of action which, in being performed more or less competently, simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly

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reify background knowledge and discourse in and on the material world" (Adler and Pouliot 2011, 6). To answer this question, the paper seeks to articulate a new approach to the study of the role of the media in international politics by creating a dialogue between the practice theoretical approach in International Relations (Adler and Pouliot 2011) and the medium theory in media studies (Meyrowitz 1985). The paper uses a case from the Middle East to explore the added value of such a new approach and to illustrate the need for a new research agenda in International Relations.

In the following, a sketch of the academic debates that have addressed the issue of the media's influence in international politics will be provided. In particular, three debates will be mentioned: The one surrounding 'media effects' in foreign policy (e.g. Bahador 2007; Cohen 1994; Robinson 2002; Strobel 1997), the one about the 'mediatization' of war (e.g. Cottle 2006; Hoskins and O'Loughlin 2010) and the one about the role of images in securitization processes (e.g. Friis 2015; Hansen 2016; Williams 2003). Second, it will be argued that while all these studies focus mainly on the content of the media, further attention should be instead given to the 'media ecology' and how it contributes to the emergence and change of international practices. In fact, it will also be argued that we cannot study international practices without taking the media ecology into account. In particular, it will be maintained that the media ecology creates constraints (or opportunities) to distinguish between (or blur) private and public dimensions of life and that this has repercussions on what we understand as competent behaviour. Transformations in the media ecology, therefore, may lead to the transformation of international practices (or the emergence of new ones) where appropriate and competent behaviour reconstitutes the private in the public (and vice versa).

To explore its core theoretical claims further, the paper discusses how an Israeli/Iranian movement catalysed by a Facebook (FB) page prompted the development of a Transnational Activist Network where people are brought together through shared private experiences. Far from being a fully-fledged case study, this example should be considered as a starting point for developing International Relations research agendas exploring the connection between media ecology and the articulation of public and private spaces in international practices.

The debates

An exhaustive review of all scholarly works theorizing the role of the media in international politics is beyond the scope of this article. Only the main research strands defining the field will be accounted for. These can be grouped on the basis of the debates they address as well as the epistemology they build on. First, the literature on the so-called 'CNN Effect' will be discussed together with some more recent works about the 'Internet Revolution'. Then, the mediatization literature will be analysed with a special reference to those works that have focused on the mediatization of war. Finally, post-structuralist analysis of how securitization and mass-mediated images connect will be examined.

The first strand of research to be analysed here is the CNN Effect literature, which refers to scholarly works investigating if and how media coverage affects foreign policy making. Having flourished in the 1990s and early 2000s, this body of work reacted to the rise of all news 24h satellite channels like CNN but it also draw on theories and analyses of the role of TV coverage in US military engagements, especially with reference to Vietnam. The CNN Effect literature developed not one but six different concepts offering explanations of how the media affect international politics (De Franco 2012). Four of them identify different types of media effects: the *CNN Effect* of course (Cohen 1994; Mandelbaum 1994; Kennan 1993; Entman 2000; Livingstone and Riley 1999; Robinson 2002; Strobel 1997), but also *Agenda Setting* (Ammon 2001; Entman 2000; Halloran 1991; Jakobsen 2000; Nye 1999; O'Heffernan 1993; Rose 2000), *Real Time Policy* (McNair 1999; Nye 1999; O'Heffernan 1993), and *Media Diplomacy* (Katz, Dayan and Motyl 1984; Gilboa 2002; O'Heffernan 1993; Seib 1997). The other two, namely *Indexing* (Hallin 1989) and *Consent Manufacturing* (Herman and Chomsky 1988), basically argue against any assumption that media affect politics and instead explain how media content mirrors political discourses (indexing) or is radically shaped by them (consent manufacturing).

Scholarly debates about the Internet have developed from these very notions, even if other labels have sometimes been used to mark a difference with the past (i.e. digital diplomacy instead of media diplomacy). On the one hand, the Internet Revolution thesis builds on the belief that the media can finally affect politics because the way online content is produced makes it more difficult for political and economic elites to manufacture

consent or to media outlets to simply 'index' political issues. Scholars supporting this view have argued that the Internet has transformed the public sphere through the opening of new multi-directional information flows and the 'democratization' of the media content (e.g. Benkler 2006; Chadwick 2006; Johnson and Kaye 2004; Matheson 2004; Sunstein 2007; Trippi 2004). On the other hand, scholars rejecting the Internet Revolution thesis start from the assumption that the media mirrors social and political dynamics but not really affected by them. Anderson (2011), for example, has refused to consider the Arab Spring as a product of the new media and argued that explanations for what happened in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya have to be found in the economic grievances and specific social dynamics of those countries. Wolfsfeld et al. (2013) have instead applied Wolfsfeld's Media-Politics model (1997) to insist that the role of social media in collective action depends on the political environment in which they operate and that therefore significant increase in the use of the new media is much more likely to follow a significant amount of protest activity than to precede it.

The second relevant body of research to be discussed is the literature on the mediatization of war. Building on authors like Mazzoleni and Schulz (1999), Jansson (2002), Schulz (2004), Hjarvard (2004), and Strömbäck (2008) who define mediatization as the "process through which core elements of a social or cultural activity (like work, leisure, play etc.) assume media form" (Hjarvard, 2004, 48), this body of research investigates how mediatization affects contemporary warfare. Most famously, Hoskins and O'Loughlin (2010) argue for the emergence of a specific paradigm of war, which they call 'diffused warfare', as the outcome of media-driven processes. According to them, the 'mediatization of war', which is the transformation and reconstruction of war in a media form, transforms the knowledge about war which is then employed in all those practices where force and violence are used (De Franco 2012). This then triggers more diffused causal relations between action and effects, which create increasing uncertainty for policymakers. The media, in this respect, are a factor shaping perceptions, enhancing social chaos and complexity, and making the relationship between the government and the public more unpredictable (De Franco 2012). Recently, however, the same authors have shown a strong disillusion about the transformative potential of the new media, as a consequence of governments' increasing ability to control the content available on the web and 'arrest' the diffusion of warfare (Hoskins and O'Loughlin 2015).

Finally, a last body of research to be taken into account is the new emerging literature investigating the role of visual imagery in contemporary conflict and security and elucidating how visibility and securitization connect (e.g. Friis 2015; Kirkpatrick 2015; Hansen 2011, 2014 and 2016; Williams 2003). These studies reject the positivist epistemology of the CNN Effect literature as problematic and instead of tracing causal relationships between media products and policy-making, they clarify how images are circulated, recognized and made part of the politics of war. The visual is approached as "an ontological–political condition rather than a variable" (Hansen 2011, 52), and an attempt is made to understand how the visibility of war becomes part of securitization processes. Friis (2015), for example, has explained how in the US and the UK, ISIS beheading videos have shaped "the political terrain in which decisions about war and peace have been produced and legitimized" (Friis 2015, 728).

Despite notable differences, the three bodies of literature sketched above share a common starting point: they all move from an essential interest in the content of the media. As a consequence, attention is paid uniquely to the message and to the conditions of its production and circulation, forgetting Marshall McLuhan's lesson that the medium *is* the message (McLuhan 1964) and that attention should be paid also to the environment that communication technologies generate.[4]

From media content to media ecology

Following the medium theory (Meyrowitz 1985), this paper argues that the form in which people communicate has an impact that goes beyond the choice of specific messages, because the media are not simply channels for conveying information between two or more environments, but rather environments in and of themselves. McLuhan (1964) explained how the media impose themselves upon all levels of our private and social lives and how this process creates a sensory environment as invisible to us as water is to fish, that is, an ecology of sorts. Thus, the media become extensions of the human senses and affect the organization of perception, feeling, and understanding. As a consequence, theorising the place of the media in our societies requires going beyond

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[4] Even the works on the mediatization of war, which do take the media ecology into consideration, end up paying attention to the media content as the starting point to understand the media logic and the way this affects social or cultural activities more than to the media as environment.

the study of media coverage and paying attention to the 'media ecology', which in turn implies studying the collision of communication technologies, culture and consciousness. By combining the bodies of work of McLuhan and Erving Goffman, Meyrowitz (1985) has argued that to understand the impact of the media on social behaviour we must start from the concept of social 'situation'. This can be understood as a 'system of information', that is "a given pattern of access to social information, a given pattern of access to the behaviour of other people" (Meyrowitz 1985, 37). As 'information systems', instead of physical settings as understood by most of the situationists, a society's set of social situations can be modified without building or removing walls and corridors and without changing customs and laws concerning access to places. The introduction of a widespread medium of communication alters the media ecology and "may restructure a broad range of situations and require new sets of social performances" (Meyrowitz 1985, 39). In fact, while the separation of people in different situations produces specific beliefs, worldviews and behaviours, the merging of those situations and related actors and audiences will produce new beliefs and behaviours. The media therefore affect social actions because they rearrange the division between different situations, in terms of both actors and audiences, and change the notion of appropriate behaviour for each situation. When previously distinct social situations are combined by a new medium (such as the radio, TV etc.), then a behaviour that was considered as appropriate can well become inappropriate and vice versa. Meyrowitz explains:

> "Electronic media have rearranged many social forums so that most people now find themselves in contact with others in new ways. And unlike the merged situations in face-to-face interaction, the combined situations of electronic media are relatively lasting and inescapable, and they therefore have a much greater effect on social behaviour" (Meyrowitz 1985, 5).

The media, in sum, construct and shape new social situations by building bridges between the existing ones. This is not to be understood as technological determinism because the 'medium' theorists have never neglected the transformative potential of human agency[5] and have in fact emphasized the interaction of communication, culture, and consciousness.

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[5] See for example how McLuhan discusses IBM's role in defining the 'message' of computer technology (McLuhan 1964, 9).

Reading Meyrowitz today can be quite striking. Almost everything he wrote about the advent of TV sounds all too familiar, all too echoing recent academic and journalistic pieces about the Internet. The application of medium theory to the Internet might be contested on the basis of the fact that the Internet is not a single medium, nor does it use a single technology. In fact, the Internet is made of a synergic network of different media and technologies which create so many information environments that a complete list is virtually impossible: online newspapers, TVs or radios, the blogosphere, the social networks, online telephoning systems, information/picture/video sharing platforms like YouTube, etc. Nevertheless, the lessons of the medium theory remain valid in so far as it pushes us to study not just a new medium but also the new media ecology (Postman 2000). This also makes it necessary to go beyond mainstream distinctions between 'old' (print, radio, TV) and 'new' media (digital media) since they do not live in separate universes but in a common ecology.

The argument here is that analysing the media ecology is necessary to understand how international practices and therefore international politics emerge as distinct phenomena in the first place. Opening a dialogue between medium theory and the practice theoretical approach to International Relations can help clarifying this point. In fact, an in-depth analysis of these two approaches, which developed in separate disciplinary realms, reveals a great potential for cross-fertilization. A common element in the varied contributions to the practice theoretical approach seems to be a call for studying social actions by taking practice as the fundamental unit of analysis and move away from models of action that focus on the calculation of interests or the evaluation of norms (see, e.g. Adler and Pouliot 2011; Bueger and Gadinger 2015). The practice turn is said to imply "emphasizing process, developing an account of knowledge as action, appreciating the collectivity of knowledge, recognizing the materiality of practice, embracing the multiplicity of orders, and working with a performative understanding of the world" (Bueger and Gadinger 2015, 449). Thus, on the one hand, what is interesting to these analysts are "concrete situations of life in which actors perform a common practice and thus create and maintain social orderliness" (Bueger and Gadinger 2015, 451) as well as change and the emergence of new practices (Adler-Nissen 2015). For practice theorists, "the intentions and motivations of actors are less relevant. Their actual activities and practical enactments in concrete situations matter. In other words, situations become

more significant than actors" (Bueger and Gadinger 2015, 451). On the other hand, medium theory suggests that we cannot understand social situations without taking the media ecology into consideration. This also means that changes to international practices might develop from the continuous co-constitution of media ecology and social situations. In this context, the new media ecology can be understood as transformative not only because it blurs the distinction between media consumers and producers and allows new agents to participate in international practices, but also because it transforms social situations, notions of appropriate and competent behaviour, and therefore the form of social interaction underpinning international practices. In particular, this paper intends to argue that in the new media ecology traditional boundaries between private and public spaces are blurred and that this has profound implications for how we understand and practice international politics.

Reconstituting private and public spaces

According to Meyrowitz, the traditional distinctions between people's 'onstage' and 'backstage' behaviours, which Goffman wrote about, built on the separate information worlds, which the printed media allowed for. Social and technological processes have progressively altered traditional separations between public, restricted, and secret spaces. What was supposed to be accessible to a restricted group of people has been progressively made into something visible to anybody. By showing everything to everybody, the electronic media first and the digital media later have contributed to altering social interaction and have been altered by it in return. In his view, the electronic media have enlarged the 'onstage' area and as a consequence behaviours that were once kept 'backstage' are reconstituted as 'onstage'. In Meyrowitz's own words, "the behaviour exhibited in this mixed setting would have many elements of the behaviour from previously distinct encounters, but would involve a new synthesis, a new pattern – in effect, a new social order" (Meyrowitz 1985, 6). Thus, a new 'middle region' behaviour emerges with a backstage bias. This should be understood as taking place through social practices, which at the same time transform traditional understandings of competent onstage and backstage behaviour and are transformed by the emergence of new 'middle region' situations. The Internet plays an important role in such a process because by using it people have put and found themselves in contact with others, in new ways or to a differ-

ent degree. In particular, the social media seem to offer the opportunity for a social restructuring where online encounters substitute face-to-face meetings, where people have at the same time more opportunities to construct their own image and identity and less control on what is visible and to which audiences. This implies that a neat distinction between onstage or backstage becomes more and more difficult and that most social practices develop in middle region situations.

This is of crucial importance for the evolution of international practices if we recognize that the articulation of private and public realms is key to the understanding of their very emergence (as very well explained by Kratochwil (2011) in his discussion of the inter/external and private/public nexus and by Abrahamsen and Williams (2011) in their discussion of security as a field of practice). Also scholars not belonging to the 'practice turn' have provided other important clues on this matter. Horowitz (1982), for example, has pointed out that the emergence of the nation-state and theories and practices of sovereignty caused "a distinctly public realm [...] to crystallize" (Horowitz 1982, 1423). On the other hand, the private realm of 'civil society' emerged as a "reaction to the claims of monarchs and, later, parliaments to the unrestrained power to make law" (Horowitz 1982, 1423), and therefore as a "countervailing effort to stake out distinctively private spheres free from the encroaching power of the state" (Horowitz 1982, 1423). Liberal understandings of natural-rights and free trade and consequent legal practices came to strengthen such a distinction that found clear expression in the "separation between constitutional, criminal, and regulatory law – public law – and the law of private transactions – torts, contracts, property, and commercial law" (Horowitz 1982, 1424). In reality, more than a neat separation of public and private, what Horowitz seems to describe is a dynamic process where public and private are redefined continuously and mutually. Such a process has been seen as being integral to the development of diplomacy (Anderson 1993) as well as to the very understanding of politics in relation to gender (Elshtain 1993) and 'the social' (Owens 2015).

By focusing on practices as visible on FB, the following pages will further clarify how the new media ecology contributes to the articulation of public and private and with what possible consequences on international practices. Originally conceived to serve interpersonal communication, FB has progressively evolved into an online public space for political discussion (among other things). In so doing, it has significantly re-

shaped the meaning of onstage and backstage in relation to friendship and other kinds of private relationships, but also blurred the division between onstage and backstage spaces in relation to political activism. Such changes have partly been led by how FB creators have originally designed the social network and continued to develop it, but they emerge also from how users are often appropriating it "*despite* the intent of [its] creators and in the face of determined attempts by the state to use [it]" (Aouragh and Alexander 2011, 1345).

A case of political activism will be used to explore the core thesis of this article. Further research is necessary to develop a fully-fledged case study, especially because following the practice theoretical approach, ethnographic research should be conducted to complete the analysis. To at least partly overcome such limitation, the analysis presented here is mainly based on interpretative digital-ethnographic methods (e.g. Coleman 2010; Murthy 2011), which compared to discourse analysis, shift the focus from the text to the practice – as observable with the simultaneous capture of verbal, audio, and visual texts. This is no solution for the lack of those thick descriptions of individuals, groups, communities and interaction that can only be the product of traditional face-to-face ethnographic methods. Nevertheless, this strategy forces the researcher to remain true to the ethnographic approach by, for example, recording a lot of observations as new interaction becomes visible online and independent of how relevant this is perceived at the time of the data collection (Murthy 2011). The FB page examined in the following analysis has been studied by the author through digital observation for about three years, which included following the initiatives and conversations taking place in the FB page but without any active engagement. In the next pages, some findings based on notes taken and reflections made in the past three years will be briefly presented.

Israel Loves Iran

In 2011, Israeli graphic designer Ronny Edry uploaded a poster to his FB profile depicting himself with his daughter holding the Israeli flag alongside the words "Iranians, we will never bomb your country, we [heart] you" (The Peace Factory 2012a). Attached to the poster there was a brief letter by Edry addressing the Iranian people:

"To the Iranian people. To all the fathers, mothers, children, brothers and sis-
ters. For there to be a war between us, first we must be afraid of each other,
we must hate. I'm not afraid of you, I don't hate you. […] If you see someone
on your TV talking about bombing you, be sure he does not represent all of
us. I'm not an official representative of my country. I'm a father and a teach-
er. I know the streets of my town, I talk with my neighbours, my family, my
students, my friends and in the name of all these people, we love you. We
mean you no harm. On the contrary, we want to meet, have some coffee and
talk about sports. To all those who feel the same, share this message and help
it reach the Iranian people" (The Peace Factory 2012a).

According to Edry's account, within hours tens of Israelis posted their own pictures
with the same message and within twenty-four hours messages from Iran started pour-
ing in, some as private messages, some as friend requests. Some did use their identities;
others contacted Edry with their identities concealed. As Edry's post had received more
than 7,000 likes he created the Israel-Loves-Iran FB page and blog together with his
wife Michal Tamir and 'Pushpin Mehina', a small preparatory school for graphic design
students. At this point Edry asked the Iranians who had contacted him to post photos of
themselves as a reply to his original message and to all the other posters he and his wife
had produced in the meantime. His Iranian contacts accepted to send him pictures but
requested him to post them himself on his FB page as they felt they were running the
risk of going to jail "over such a thing" (Yaron 2012). Within hours faceless portraits of
Iranians sharing messages of love towards Israeli were posted onto the 'Israel Loves
Iran' FB page and blog. An Iranian FB user even posted a direct message on the 'Israel
Loves Iran' page:

"We also love you. Your words are reaching us despite the censorship. The
Iranian people, apart from the regime, do not hold a grudge nor animosity
against anyone, especially not the Israelis […] We love you, love, peace. And
thanks for your message" (The Peace Factory 2012a).

In the ten months since the FB page was created, it received over 100,000 'likes' and
spawned a parallel movement headed by an Iranian graphic designer, Majid Nowrouzi,
unsurprisingly called 'Iran Loves Israel'. The campaign then moved into a completely
different phase, after a summit in Munich where Israelis and Iranians met each other to
develop a joint plan. A non-profit, non-political organization was created in October

2012, named The Peace Factory, and given the explicit goal of breaking down "the 'iron curtain' between the people" (The Peace Factory 2012b) in the Middle East and "making connection between people, opening new communication line, making people get to know each other, re-humanize people from 'the other side'. Iranians, Palestinians, Israelis, Egyptians, Syrians, Lebanese, Turkish, Jordanians and more" (The Peace Factory 2012b).

Initially focused on mass media campaigns to "advertise 'Peace in the Middle East" (The Peace Factory 2012b), including a campaign putting images of Israelis and Iranians on the sides of buses in Tel Aviv, The Peace Factory has slowly developed through new interactive practices taking place online, such as online meetings of Israeli and Iranian citizens or the sharing of portrait pictures, some of which have gone viral, like the one of a man and a woman kissing each other while holding their passports up to the camera: an Israeli passport and an Iranian passport respectively (Elgot 2012). Online activities thought have increasingly been complemented by offline practices too, which are promptly recorded using pictures and videos in a mixture of 'virtual' and 'real' encounters.

From an analytical point of view, the 'Israel loves Iran' initiative as well as The Peace Factory might seem as transnational networks developing from a quite naïf assumption that an increase in communication determines an increase in mutual understanding between the parties to a conflict. In reality, the name of the initiative tells the most important story here: The substance of the interaction between people on that page is sharing private experiences. Both promoters and participants in these initiatives see themselves as practicing political activism while sharing personal information, such as name, age, nationality and portrait pictures. On 'Israel loves Iran', rituals, symbols and forms of communication revolving around personal experiences and feelings are given political significance. Thus, Valentine's Day becomes a day for peace (FB post 14 February 2016); pictures of straight and gay couples are used to show that love equals peace (see, e.g. FB post 30 January 2016); pictures of friends that met on line through the FB page and then became friends off line are posted to show that friendship equals peace (see, e.g. FB post 11 January 2016); stories of private love and loss are collected with the 'sandbox story' initiative; pictures taken by Edry in Tel Aviv and Faramarz in Teheran are juxtaposes to show private moments of people in the public spaces of the two

cities with the 'Today/Tel Aviv/Teheran' initiative. If this might look as limited to prac-
tices related to the very production of the FB page's content, other practices emerge as
essentially blurring private and public and constitutive of inter-personal interaction.
Some examples could be found in the '+1' campaign launched in September 2015 that
connected about 60 people for (at least) one week of friendship, and the 'Friend me 4
Peace' and 'Coffee with you' initiatives that in the past two years have given members
of the page the possibility of 'meeting' online, but also offline if possible. To participate
in the 'Friend me 4 Peace' initiative, for example, people of any nationality only had to
visit the 'Israel Loves Iran' FB page and post a 'friend me' request with information
about their country of residence. The Peace Factory team had then to identify their pro-
file picture and profession, and design and publish the post so that the members of the
page could add them as a friend. In most cases, the person portrayed in the post was also
quoted and normally stating not what they thought about the conflict, but how they
'felt' about having friends on the other side.

The messages conveyed by the 'Israel loves Iran' page, as well as the conversations
taking place on the page tend to focus on the 'relationship' between members of the
page. This is consistent with how FB is used more in general. Compared to TV commu-
nications as analysed by Meyrowitz, the interaction taking place on a FB page might
seem as producing an even greater back region bias due to the fact that it becomes even
more difficult to separate participation in private and public threads of experience in
that specific environment. The audience of posts and comments is for members of a
page difficult to identify and in many ways visible only through replies and further
comments, but the way most FB users employ FB in their daily lives seems to push to-
wards back region behaviour. This is, at least, what we can observe as happening in the
page under examination. Members of 'Israel Loves Iran' use an 'expressive' language
to establish an emotional relation with the other members of the page more than to
transmit specific ideas. Their use of pictures can be read also as an attempt at communi-
cating personal attributes and expressing feelings, more than given political positions.
The tone of most discussions on 'Israel Loves Iran' is informal and modelled on
'among-friends' conversations, even if on FB there is clearly still room (and time) to
control, manipulate and even edit expressions.

While not reaching a particularly impressive number of people ('Israel Loves Iran' counts about 122.000 'likes' and 'Iran Loves Israel' about 33.000), the two FB pages seem to have set a model. Similar groups have been created, from 'Israel Loves Palestine' (about 16.000 likes) and 'Palestine Loves Israel' (about 15.000 likes) to the more recent 'Russia Loves Ukraine' (which now counts about 1100 likes) and 'Ukraine Loves Russia' (counting about 1000 likes). The way these groups emerge through the articulation of public interest and private experience is interesting because so far transnational advocacy networks have been understood as "networks of activists, distinguishable largely by the centrality of principled ideas or values in motivating their formation" (Keck and Sikkink 1999, 89). In contrast with such a definition, the network of activists gathering through FB pages and friendship connections under the 'country x loves country y' motto are distinguishable only on the basis of how they connect private and public experience of a conflict. The specific practices that identify this kind of advocacy network are constituted (and constitutive) of a continuous blurring of private and public where individual feelings about aspects of individuals' private lives are translated into public expressions of feelings about the conflict. In the FB environment the onstage space is significantly expanded and a middle region is produced by the very way in which the newsfeed puts together friends, acquaintances and different kinds of groups, including other political activists' pages. The kind of 'social situation', which is so constituted presents a backstage bias and brings typically backstage language and behaviour into a new form of 'political activism', which is different from traditional onstage political activism. In fact, it is a 'middle region' political activism. Clearly, the way FB has been designed and developed (also as a response to usage) has facilitated the emergence of these practices. However, they should not be understood simply as 'FB practices' as they play out also outside FB, on sister Twitter accounts for example, and most importantly also offline. They develop in a specific media ecology that includes FB but cannot be reduced to FB.

Studying the emergence of these practices is important, independent from their immediate political role in shaping, as in this paper's example, diplomatic relations between states or conflict transformation. Looking for a direct impact of these practices over politics would mean falling again in the 'media-effect' paradigm. Instead, we need

to study these practices because they have a long-term transformative potential. They are 'every-day' practices performed by

> "seemingly ordinary or subordinate people, non-elite groups, including lower-middle and middle classes, migrant labourers and diasporas whose lives are shaped by and shape the world politics 'from below', exploring their capacity to change their political, economic and social environment" (Adler-Nissen 2015).

Conclusions

This paper has argued that to understand the role of the media in international politics, research in the field should move beyond content-centred and effects-centred approaches and instead focus on the connection between media ecology and international practices. It has been claimed that we cannot study international practices without taking the media ecology into account, especially because the latter is critical to the articulation of private and public dimensions of life, which in turn has arguably important repercussions on what we understand as the realm of (international) politics. Finally, the paper has focused on the example of an Israeli/Iranian movement, which aims at using new communication technologies to foster peace by developing a transnational advocacy network where the participants are brought together by the very act of sharing their private experience of the conflict. Further empirical research is needed for a more substantial assessment of how the media ecology affects the articulation of private and public in international practices, but the paper provides some evidence that such a research agenda is not just viable but vital to further our understanding of international politics. This is especially important if we take seriously the invitation of the practice turn to study every-day practices as constitutive of that phenomenon that we call international politics.

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YouTube and the Role of Digital Video for Transitional Justice in Syria[6]

Joshka Ivanka Wessels

Introduction

Since its inception, the Internet started to offer alternative sources to mainstream news outlets and consistently provided a digital public sphere of contestation and counter-narratives (Jayyusi and Roald 2016; Askanius 2012; Castells 2001). The Syrian uprising, which started in 2011, is arguably the most (socially) mediated and video-recorded revolution of modern times, the most "YouTubed" war (Lynch et al, 2014; Elias and Omareen 2014; Al-Ghazzi 2014; Üngör 2013 and 2015; Boëx 2012). For decades, Syria was a closed media country (Al-Bunni 2008, George 2003, Wedeen 1999) and at the onset of the popular uprising, Syria became even more closed when foreign TV networks such as Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya were kicked out of the country early in the uprisings (Halasa 2014). To fill the media gap, thousands of Syrian street protesters used their mobile phones to record daily events to be uploaded on YouTube, which was banned in Syria until February 2011 (Wessels 2015b and 2011). Grass root video footage has been hailed as a useful tool to document and evidence war crimes. But the challenges to compile a body of evidence of war crimes are significant (Koettl 2014). Providing a conceptual categorisation of online digital video in eight different types of footage found on YouTube, this article focuses on the value of digital video for future transitional justice in Syria. The research methodology is based on observation (media-ethnography) of 400 YouTube clips, observational fieldwork in Turkey and Syria, 23

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semi-structured interviews with Syrian video activists inside and outside Syria and conversations with legal (media) experts.

Videos as expressions of moral outrage, grieving death, digital memories and evidence of war crimes

For Syrian video activists, YouTube provides an online platform to deposit and distribute their videos, to find a global audience to express their moral outrage and to build an archive of action and activist memory, for commemoration, for grieving death, and honouring heroes and beloved ones. Askanius (2012) identified three major roles for online videos on anti-capitalist video activism: 1) an archive of action and activist memory, 2) commemoration in an online environment for grieving death and 3) a space to provide and negotiate visual evidence of police violence and state repression: "Vast amounts of videos documenting street violence and narrating political resistance from a citizen gaze are uploaded onto YouTube everyday" (Askanius, 2012, 13*)*. Askanius (2012) draws upon Haskins (2007) who argues that digital memory bridges the conventional distinction between archival memory and lived memory by merging storage functions and ordering, to indicate that YouTube in particular is where amateur culture and user creativity meets history writing and archival documentation in an audio-visual online archive (Askanius 2012; Haskins 2007). This article takes into account the function of YouTube as a platform for digital memory and the three major roles of activist videos as identified by Askanius (2012), whilst posing the following question: What is the value of the available user generated video content (UGC) on YouTube in the constitution of *legal* evidence for Transitional Justice? To answer this question, the article is divided in four sections; the first section describes the emergence and development of online video content from Syria, why activists started to record and upload their videos on YouTube, the role of digital video in media discourses about 'truth' in the Syrian war and the transformation of online videos as evidence. The second section analyses how digital video from Syria has been introduced in the human rights discourses on the 'power of the camera' and 'citizen journalists' as eyewitnesses of atrocities. What are the guidelines for digital video as evidence? This section critically reflects on how the evidentiary value of digital media is emphasized and can lead to a false sense of the power of the video camera. The third section unravels a categorisation of the many dif-

ferent types of online video clips available on YouTube since 2011 in relation to the Syrian conflict, based on a media-ethnography of 400 online YouTube clips that were surveyed between 2014 and 2015. Finally, in the fourth section, the video categorisation of the third section will be used to assess the value of the available UGC on YouTube in the constitution of *legal* evidence for Transitional Justice.

Emergence and transformation of online digital video from Syria

Due to the lack of media presence in Syria, protesters began to take their own photos and videos of the events, which coincided with the emergence of revolutionary Local Coordination Committees (LCCs) throughout the country. LCCs are civil society groups across cities and towns that tried to organise the flurry of grassroots media activism (Halasa 2014; Khalaf et al. 2014). Since 2011, more than 300.000 video clips from Syria are estimated to have been uploaded on the internet (Wessels 2015b, Wessels 2014, Elias and Omareen 2014). For many video activists on the ground, the primary reason why they started filming was to "tell the world" what was happening in their neighbourhood (Wessels 2015b).

> "I didn't think of using my video collection as evidence, this was not the thing on my mind when I started filming. I filmed my feelings and wanted to document my neighbourhood, my area. I filmed a lot of injured people and martyrs and bombings but not with in the back of my mind to be able to use it as evidence. But I think there is so much around now that it should be possible to provide evidence and incriminate everyone who has committed crimes, we know who threw the bombs and at what time and how" - Video activist from Zabadani

Filming to "tell the word", can be understood in a variety of ways and does not necessarily indicate a desire to build an archive of *legal* evidence. First, the fact that international media access was extremely limited to the areas where activists lived, motivated many of them to pick up a camera. Second, some activists picked up a camera when they themselves experienced and observed direct violence of the war, such as aerial bombardments or sniper fire. The filming could be explained as expressions of moral outrage whereby the filmed use the camera as tool to direct their rage to the perpetrators and the outside world. Moral outrage is a special type of anger, caused by the observa-

tion of the mistreatment of others, violation of their rights and the violation of a moral norm or principle (not to hurt, rape, kill, bomb or shoot at others) by others, which then motivates the observer to speak up and take action (Goodenough 1997). When moral outrage about a war crime is mutually felt between Syrians and publics outside Syria, this emotion can unite people in defiance and protest. Thirdly, another reason that motivated Syrian video activists was the sudden occurrence of *extra*-ordinary events in their daily life. Bourdieu and Whiteside (1996) theorised about the use of everyday photography and found that the 'photographable' is directly associated to *extra*-ordinary events that occur in routine daily-life marking a break from it; i.e. a holiday, a wedding or a funeral. When applied in the Syrian context, extra-ordinary events like a street protest, a funeral or an aerial bombardment motivated filming. During the first phase of the Syrian revolution, filming happened spontaneously and reactionary, no specific documentation strategy was prepared (Halasa 2014). The majority of the YouTube footage in the first period of the Syrian uprisings consists of activist recordings of street protests to serve as a digital memory of a unique revolutionary event and not specifically as legal evidence. Early UGC can thus be seen as Bourdieusian everyday photography of extra-ordinary events. These videos also correlate with the first role that Askanius (2012) identifies as online videos being an archive of action and activist memory to document the street protests.

When the events turned violent and the regime crackdown deepened, using live ammunition and bombings, the videos went beyond everyday photography or activist memory and became tools to express moral outrage and eventually document the suffering and consistent war crimes. This relates to the two other roles identified by Askanius (2012), namely a digital vehicle to commemorate martyrs and grief death and a space to provide and negotiate visual evidence of violence and repression. Videos of funerals and extreme violence increasingly started to appear online (Üngör 2013), armed opposition groups would capture regime thugs (a.k.a. *shabihha*[7]), who carried personal phones. Mobile phone footage from *shabihha* contained self-recorded and/or perpetrated torture and violence against civilians or Free Syrian Army fighters, which was consequently uploaded on YouTube to provide evidence (Bashar Assads Crimes Archive

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[7] *šabbīḥa (arab. translit.)* means "ghost" or "spirit" in Arabic and is used to describe the mostly Alawite secret militias in support of the Assad-led Ba'ath party. The militias have been active since the eighties in Syria as irregular paramilitaries in civilian clothes connected to the Assad regime (Üngör 2013).

2013). For example, the YouTube channel 'Syrian Revolution in Languages of the World is an anti-Assad channel that uploaded mobile phone footage from captured As-sad regime soldiers and other self-incriminating video evidence of war crimes perpetrat-ed by the regime army (Bashar Assads Crimes Archive 2 2013). Opposition video activ-ists would also film and document the aftermath of aerial bombardments and massacres, such as those in Houla in 2012 (Syria Scenes 2012; Van Schaak 2014), Ariha market and Rasm al Nafl in 2013 (Shahba Press Agency 2013). Digital video footage also emerged documenting armed rebel groups committing human rights violations such as torture, summary execution of prisoners and beheadings.

Sometimes YouTube uploads primarily served as intimidating messages to victims; the clearest case in Syria were the videos by Syrian regime supporters of summary exe-cutions of rebels (often called 'nusra terrorist rats' and other animal references) or jihadi videos by ISIS, Jabhat al Nusra and other extremist factions, of beheadings uploaded by perpetrators themselves to intimidate their victims. What is clear from the videos is that violence is committed in Syria by all sides in the conflict. The regime has been employ-ing a kaleidoscope of violence which has been documented by video activists, including sniper fire, executions, massacres, tortures to death, detention and indiscriminate bom-bardment using a wide range of weaponry from chemical weapons, cluster bombs, scud rockets, incendiary bombs and barrel bombs (Üngör 2013 and 2015). Consistent denial is a key element in the media discourse of the regime (Üngör 2013). YouTube videos of regime staged interviews are introduced in online media discourses, they become vehi-cles to claim a '*truth*' about what is really happening on the ground in Syria, to counter and debunk the opposition-activists uploads leading to a battle of the digital images online and vice versa. The main argument introduced by Assad-supporters against UGC by opposition video activists is that their videos are faked; therefore do not provide proof or evidence of war crimes perpetrated by the regime.

However, Syrian state media and indeed Assad himself during media interviews both with foreign news agencies and pro-Assad Syrian channels such as Al Dounia TV, regularly refer to Syrian military operations as national cleansing operations, as de-scribed by President Bashar al Assad himself as "internal self-cleansing for the state first and then for the country in general" (Addounia TV English 2012) which indicates genocidal justification. When analysing video clips and YouTube content of channels

supportive of the regime, much of the rhetoric is indeed focused on the utter destruction of the opponents of the regime. These opponents are dehumanised and labelled as terrorists, vermin, cockroaches, beasts, apes and pigs (Üngör 2013). The regime supporters morally justify the mass violence they unleashed onto Syrian civilians as the only way to purify the country from these opponents.

Digital video has thus become a central tool in media discourses about which "*truth*" in the Syrian conflict prevails, between those supportive of the Assad regime, the secular opposition against the Assad regime and the more extremist factions such as Jabhat al Nusra and the Islamic State militants, whereby those supportive of the Assad regime try to portray all those in the opposition as terrorists and Islamic extremists. Making use of social media, YouTube, Twitter, Facebook and Instagram, the pro-Assad digital communications campaign works around the clock in teams to insert counter-narratives, ignoring, denying war crimes and repudiating grass root videos coming from besieged and bombarded rebel held areas in Syria (Prati 2015). In interviews for international media networks with Assad's media advisor and spokesperson, Buthaina Shabaan consistently denies any wrongdoing by the Syrian regime and emphasizes that the regime is focused on securing the country (BBC Newsnight 2016). On the regime's website, the collection of interviews with the Western Media portrays the Syrian president himself as secular, socialist, democratic, kind, loving, strong, open, modern, most of all, supported by his people (Al Assad 2011).

But a '*truth*' in a digital video does not necessarily reflect reality and in some cases digital video has indeed been blatantly faked. One of the advantages of online and social media is the immediate verification of content by many different online actors (Twitter, Reddit, Facebook users). One of the most recent examples is an interview with a supposed jihadi extremist from the Al Qaeda-linked Jabhat al Nusra by the German journalist Todenhofer on 17th September 2016, which was aired by Russian State Television (Russian Television 2016). Online activists and Reddit users (Syrian Civil War 2016) and other investigative journalists (Zaman al Wasl 2016) quickly exposed the interview as having been staged inside regime controlled territory with a regime supportive commander dressed up as a Jabhat al Nusra leader.

The Syrian revolt has led to possibly the widest range of digital and social media content produced, reproduced, rehashed and distributed through a variety of actors rang-

ing from political activists, witnesses, military staff, torturers, foreign media professionals and many more providing a vast archive of visual material that is of great scholarly importance (Üngör 2015; Ghazzi 2014). The recordings of violence that can be considered crimes against humanity have tremendous value for the sociological study of mass-violence and the role of perpetrators because the type of footage is unprecedented and many perpetrators are visible (Üngör 2015). In the transformation of online UGC from Syria from spontaneous videos of extra-ordinary revolutionary events to recordings of mass violence as evidence, international human rights organisations such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and Witness, have worked tirelessly to collect and assess digital video as evidence.

Online digital video as a 'game changer' for evidencing war crimes

UGC videos from Syria have been introduced in media and human rights discourses as having an enormous potential to provide legal documentation for future war crimes tribunals (Cole 2012; Koettl 2014; Matheson 2016). But there is a difference between a 'video recording' and a 'legal truth' and both do not necessarily coincide. This requires a critical discussion of the production of 'legal truth' and 'legal evidence'. In their article on the work of human rights NGOs in refugee camps in Chad to collect evidence of war crimes in Darfur, Aradau and Hill (2013) discuss the role of 500 children's drawings for an analysis of visuality and conflict, navigating humanitarian and legal realm (Aradau and Hill 2013). The International Criminal Court accepted these drawings as contextual evidence for war crime trials against Sudanese officials. What is important to realize is that the children's drawings per se do not constitute legal evidence but in combination with the interviews done by workers of Human Right Watch with children-witnesses and corroboration with other evidencing visuals such as photography and satellite imagery the visuals are extremely valuable (Aradau and Hill 2013). Only then, the drawings have a potential to serve as evidence for Transitional Justice. A similar challenge can be identified for the use of UGC on YouTube.

Transitional Justice is generally accepted as a key step in future peace building and conflict transition (Gready 2005; Kaminski and Nalepa 2006; Sandoval Villalba 2011). According to the International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) Transitional Justice refers to:

"a set of judicial and non-judicial measures that have been implemented by different countries in order to redress the legacies of massive human rights abuses. These measures include criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations programs, and various kinds of institutional reforms." (ICTJ 2016)

Due to the practical challenges, most Transitional Justice organizations plea for holistic approaches that encompass and consider a full range of factors and circumstantial events and fact recordings that may have contributed to the violations and abuses. The general consensus is that there is no single solution for Transitional Justice.

In the case of Syria, several initiatives for Transitional Justice are documenting human right violations and war crimes; the UN's Independent International Commission of Inquiry into human rights violations in Syria, the Violations Documentations Center and the Syria Justice and Accountability Centre[8] (SJAC) (IRIN 2012). The latter consists of Transitional Justice experts and practitioners, and was set up specifically to provide guidance on Transitional Justice and documentation issues. The SJAC facilitates a network of Syrian organizations working on documenting violations, accountability, transitional justice, and supporting a democratic transition in Syria. The SJAC "collects and preserves documentation of violations of human rights, humanitarian, and international criminal law in Syria in order to facilitate transitional justice and accountability efforts" (SJAC 2016). The objectives of the SJAC are three-fold: 1) to remind perpetrators that they will be held accountable one day, 2) to prevent recurrence of war-crimes in a future Syria and 3) to ensure the narratives of the victims are documented for Transitional Justice and historical archives. Within the framework of Transitional Justice, the SJAC open-software database archives videos, pictures, documents and Syria-specific meta-data such as source, location, time, types and methods of violations and actors involved, with both Arabic and English interfaces. Visuals are important entries in the SJAC database: When a Syrian photographer known as 'Caesar' defected from the Assad regime with 55,000 photographs of more than 11,000 victims of systematic torture by the Syrian security forces, a renewed call for transitional justice in Syria emerged

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[8] Set up by Syrian activists and international experts in exile, the SJAC registered in 2013 as a non-profit organisation based in the Hague, the Netherlands and also established an office in Washington D.C. The locations are strategically located at the geographical centres of international legal (International Criminal Court) and political power (U.S. State Department). SJAC's mission is to promote justice and accountability in Syria and ensure a Syrian state defined by justice, respect for human rights and for all Syrian citizens to live in a society without fear.

which focused on indictment of the Syrian Assad regime officials and leadership (Deknatel 2014). The existence of the SJAC opens up an opportunity for the enormous number of online videos from Syria to be considered as potential evidence of war crimes.

Cole (2012) emphasizes that most important for documenting violence and human rights abuses is the recording of proof of the date, time and geographical location (meta-tagging) in order to verify and corroborate crucial facts in the video. With the use of smartphones, Cole (2012) assesses, citizens are increasingly equipped with technology to push for accountability. Western narratives initially framed and celebrated citizen journalism and digital video activism in repressive contexts as ultimate vehicles for mo-bilisation and democratisation, in the end leading to social justice for the victims of the oppression (Ghazzi 2014). However, this argument, which has been greatly pushed by international media and organisations working on human rights and democratisation, can also create a false sense of *protection* from a phone or a camera. This has led to the unfortunate deaths of Syrian video activists and amateurs who have taken great personal risks to document the Syrian war, such as the death of Molhem Barakat, an 18-year old activist in Aleppo who got killed whilst covering a battle between the Syrian army and the rebels for Reuters news agency (Ghazzi 2014; Kenner 2014). Within the Syrian con-text, the video camera has not given protection neither led to accountability of perpetra-tors (yet), despite the somewhat utopian belief in the *power of the camera* as a weapon against oppression and authority, as propagated in western discourse on the importance of digital media.

Ghazzi (2014) criticizes the construct of citizen journalism as a panacea for democ-ratisation in Arab countries and argues that the conceptualization of digital media prac-tices through a modernist Western discourse fails to take into account the deadly chal-lenges citizens face within the context of the Syrian uprising. Another aspect is a false sense of the value, credibility and leverage that UGC from Syria has with Western me-dia and legal institutions. Indeed, Syrian video activists, whilst they are convinced of the credibility of the footage, have encountered resistance with international human rights organisations to take their video footage seriously. They became utterly disap-pointed over the years and expressed a lack of trust in the international community:

"I think the videos going out from Aleppo are all credible. But human rights organizations are closing their ears and eyes. They do not want to see the reality that is happening in Aleppo (…) They do not want to believe, they want to contradict the video. We give them a video, they try to falsify it. Although the video is so real but they do not want to think or believe the reality that there is a criminal in this world whose criminality has reached to an extent of killing for example in a short time more than 50,000 citizens and displaced over 1.5 million from Aleppo city. They do not want to know the truth. If they believe this truth and acknowledge it, Bashar al Assad would have been ousted. They are not ready to oust Bashar al Assad because they have interests with him" – Video activist from Aleppo

"The problem is that the video clips are used by all the organizations. Videos are the most used thing now and I mean the human [rights] organizations they use this regularly. The basic tools are the videos taken by us, the media activists. But the problem is that the international community does not have a serious desire to hold the criminals accountable. They are not serious in [working] to hold the criminals accountable (…) they have enough evidences, whether with videos or other than videos but they do not have the will, they are not serious to hold the regime accountable as a criminal or [anyone] other that it [the regime]" – Video activist from Azzaz

To help journalists, activists and researchers verify YouTube videos, Amnesty International launched a website, called the 'citizen evidence lab' (Amnesty International 2016). The citizen evidence lab contains all kinds of tools such as the You Tube Data viewer, which allows researchers and activists to extract data from a video-clip such as the exact timing of upload, location and whether other copies of the same clips exist on YouTube. Another useful tool for journalists and activists to use is the verification handbook for digital content produced by the European Journalism Centre in order to sort out authentic material from fakes (Silverman 2014). Koettl (2016) and Matheson (2016) both argue that open source UGC content can be instrumental in evidencing human rights abuse on the condition that proper fact-finding methodologies are applied. In his latest article for the Centre of Governance and Human Rights at the University of Cambridge, Koettl (2016) states that the shift to digital technology to store and distribute information and the rise of digital images and videos from unofficial observers such as bystanders, video activists, armed actors, shared through social media provide immense opportunities and at the same time challenges for human rights practitioners (Koettl 2016). Smartphones in combination with social networks constitute a game-

changer for research and human rights advocacy, according to Koettl (2016). He suggests the following analytical framework to provide guidance for human rights researchers using YouTube videos.

Table 1 Analytical framework to verify UGC on YouTube (Koettl 2016)

Step	Task	How?
Prerequisite	Secondary trauma prevention	Self-care plan
1	Material collection and preservation	Save & Download Archive
2	Metadata review	Free software online YouTube data viewer
3	Verification of provenance and source	Locate unique identifier(s) Cached websites
4	Content analysis: landmarks, language, dialect, season, date, symbols, uniforms, clothing, license plates, signs, names, streets, other recording devices in the image	Frame-by-frame Watch in slow motion
5	Optional: expert consultation	Hiring forensic experts
6	Integration with other research	Corroboration
7	Professional Standard Considerations	ICRC guidelines

Prior to verification and observation of video content containing evidence for war crimes and extreme violence, a self-care plan to prevent secondary trauma with desk researchers should be in place. Until recently, secondary trauma was an under-recognised challenge of the human rights work with videos (Dubberly *et al* 2015). The first step is the collection of material and its preservation whereby the material collected is specifically focused on the recording of human rights violations. Witness has developed an elaborate process on how to download, save and archive video for human rights, which requires a sophisticated method of cataloguing and back-up (Matheson 2016).

The next step is a meta-data review, including the sourcing of timestamps and GPS data (often removed when the video is edited and uploaded on YouTube) and triangulation. The third step is verification of provenance and source. Evaluating the credibility of a source is at the core of human rights fact finding and YouTube videos are no excep-

tion (Koettl 2016). Triangulation with other contextual data and remote sensing and other online media accounts, Twitter, Instagram, Google Maps that include meta-data are important in this step but also expert knowledge on languages, cultural dress, and location. For example, in the Syrian case, it has happened often that photographs and videos from Aleppo were remediated and re-circulated as being evidence videos of aerial bombardments of the Israeli summer offensive in Gaza. However it was clear that in the specific video footage, the men were speaking the Arabic dialect from Aleppo, they were dressed with typical Syrian headdress and fore mostly, the people were wearing winter clothes whilst the Gaza offensive took place in the summer. This also brings us to step four in the process content analysis, which is complemented with step five, the expert analysis. Step six is focused on integration with other research on the same event, including witness testimonies and geographical data analysis. Corroboration yields the highest results if this is done in combination with both traditional as well as innovative fact-finding methods. The final step, is to adhere to professional and ethical standards concerning the use of video for human rights and protection work. Informed consent, privacy and anonymity of victims depicted in the video material and other ethical considerations are important, specifically if the video deals with sexual violence and torture.

Verified video footage indeed helps in establishing that a crime has happened, but corroborated evidence is needed to *legally* establish who was responsible for the specific crime in the footage, where the act took place and who is the victim or group of victims. Preserving and archiving all footage from Syria is of crucial importance for Transitional Justice and several human rights organisations, Syrian lawyers and activists are currently compiling numerous files of possible evidence. One Syrian-led initiative, the 'Syrian Archive' provides an online violation database of systematically archived and verified YouTube clips (Syrian Archive 2015). However, Syrian activists with smartphones pushing for accountability in Transitional Justice may still have a long road to get the perpetrators prosecuted and convicted (Cole 2012). Citizen video is increasingly used as evidence of serious crimes, yet no standard protocol for authenticating exists (Bair 2012) and the use of video for war crimes tribunals has until now been very limited. Witness, a New York-based human rights organisation has developed a first field guide for the use of video to record human rights violations in 2016 (Mathe-

son 2016) and within journalism, Silverman's Verification Handbook for Digital Content (Silverman 2014) has been used to verify amateur videos. The handbook provides a step-by-step guide for how to deal with user generated content (UGC) during emergencies, verification of these kind of video clips consists of a mix of three main factors: a person's resourcefulness and sources' knowledge, documentation, and the number of sources willing to talk about the recorded event.

Results: Categorisation, From Trophy Videos to Puppet Sarcasm

To reflect on the central question of this paper about the *legal* value of UGC from Syria, we need to address how the archive of YouTube videos from Syria performs against an assessment of the verification guidelines described above. For this study, a conceptual thematic categorisation of eight different video-categories has been developed, based on observation, media-ethnography and regular monitoring of YouTube material coming out of Syria since 2011 and in-depth surveillance of YouTube material uploaded between 2014 and 2015. In total 400 YouTube video clips were surveyed, analysed and monitored between 2014 and 2015 (See Table 1). It is believed that these eight different categories cover most of the themes and types of videos that have been produced about the Syrian uprising and war violence since 2011[9].

Table 2 Syrian You Tube Video Categorisation observed and surveyed between 2014 and 2015 (#clips)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Humour and Creative Non-Violent Resistance (edited)	Videos from the First Phase: (mobile phones, digital cameras)	Torture and War Crimes (mobile phones, digital cameras)	Direct Frontline Battle Experience (GoPro, helmet cams)	Citizen experience of war (mobile phones, digital camera)	Pro-Assad (edited)	Anti-Assad (edited)	Jihadi ISIS Hezbollah Other religious (edited)
(30)	(15)	(65)	(40)	(40)	(80)	(80)	(50)

[9] The author does not pretend that the described categorisation is fully comprehensive and extensive. Therefore the typography will certainly have an overlap with other typographies that are applied in various studies on audio-visual media in and about Syria. This categorisation has left out semi-professional and professional documentaries of feature length, which are similarly uploaded on platforms like YouTube, however this is a special kind of category covering Syria and will be discussed in other texts that will be published from this postdoctoral study.

1. Humour and Creative Non-Violent Resistance: these edited videos are created in a humorous style to mock the Syrian regime as a form of non-violent resistance and counter-narrative. Humour has been an effective method for Syrian to counter authoritarianism (Wedeen 2013). The creative resistance in Syria ranges from cartoons, animations and puppet shows to theatrical performances and remixes of uploaded video material and television interviews (Wessels 2015a). Material has also been uploaded that mock the Jihadi and ISIS groups. This category thus provides a good insight to the various techniques of non-violent activism and resistance against all forms of oppression using YouTube as a platform to create a counter-public against authority.

2. Protest videos from the first phase of the uprisings: these videos are mainly activist footage of the early demonstrations and funerals that took place in Damascus, De-ra'a, Douma, Homs and Idlib recorded on mobile phones and digital cameras. This category is a stand-alone category due to the format of the amateur video clips and the relatively systematic presentation that these videos display. The recorded event, whether a street demonstration or a public funeral, is often shot in an unedited wide shot not longer than 5 minutes. The shot is introduced by a handwritten or printed A4-sheet held in front of the camera with the Syrian revolutionary three star flag or logo of the Syrian National Council (SNC), stating the location and the date, often read out loud by the videographer who narrates the rest of the video clip. The video clip depicts dancing crowds, slogans of the Syrian revolution, songs and in the case of funerals, the carrying of the body in the crowds.

3. Torture and War Crimes: the videos in this category are intended as possible evidence for human rights violations and war crimes. Videos display activities of torture recorded by perpetrators themselves, recordings of summary executions and unlawful arrests, secretly filmed by citizens or defected soldiers and also include mobile phone footage captured from mobile phones of army personnel and officers, videos made by Free Syrian Army, ISIS, Jihadi and other factions recording torture and executions. The category also includes self-incriminating 'trophy videos' taken by perpetrators themselves. All of the videos in this category are 18+ videos where murder, execution, beheading and severe torture is documented. Even though the majority of these videos are in violation of YouTube channel policy on material too gruesome to be shown, a large

collection of such videos remain online and have not been removed by YouTube. Most footage in this category is amateur material filmed on mobile phones.

4. Direct Frontline Battle Experience: these videos are uploaded by several warring parties; from the Syrian Arab Army, Free Syrian Army, Jihadi factions such as ISIS, Jaish al Islam and Jabhat al Nusra, and Russian Army. The footage originates from ground troops present on the ground in Syria wearing small cameras, GoPro cameras on tanks or helmet cams to record their direct frontline battle experience. Foreigners fighting inside the Syrian battlefield have also uploaded video material. Interestingly we also found clips that document "moments of peace at the battlefront" such as conversations between enemies trying to persuade each other party to defect (Baynetna 2013). Most of the video clips are amateur footage and consist of sequences of integral footage in some case over 30 minutes of unedited battlefront material.

5. Citizen experience of war: these videos document direct experiences of violence and war by citizens such as the aftermath of aerial bombings, grief and destruction. It consists mainly of amateur footage, but the longer the Syrian uprising has lasted, the more sophisticated the videos have become, more edited and its producers became more professionalized. Young media activists and citizen journalists started to edit their video material. Some of these video activists organized themselves in media centres dotted around the country. The videos in this category are targeted to Syrian audiences and are mostly in Arabic with the occasional English subtitles.

6. Pro-Assad media: conventional pro-Assad media also use YouTube channels as an outlet and include non-regime, but pro-Assad channels such as Addounia and SyriaNews, but also Assad-dedicated YouTube channels such as Syria Truth Network, Truth Syria, and Syrian Arab Nationalist. Other material in this category comes from foreign Assad-related media and political allies such as Hezbollah and foreign-based conspiracy theorists YouTube channels such as Syrian Girl Partisan, who has been outspokenly pro-Assad. State media YouTube channels from Russia and Iran, such as RT and PressTV also fall under this category. All of these videos are edited.

7. Anti-Assad Media: YouTube also includes new anti-Assad media centres such as the channels for the Free Syrian Army, Al Ghad TV, Free Media Syria, Free Syria Rev 2011 and the more established Orient TV, Ugarit TV and FNN Syria News, the Syrian Media Centre, the Aleppo Media Centre, Nour Media and Media Centre of Syrian Rev-

olution. The anti-Assad media channels and rebel stations are staffed with professional journalists, video journalists and young citizen journalists from all walks of life.

8. *Jihadi eschatology*: This last group is a special type of category that includes the YouTube videos and channels by apocalyptic Islamic extremist factions both from Sunni and Shia eschatological movements and their armed actors active inside the Syrian battlefront. Syria forms a mythical and symbolic location in Islamic eschatology and as such, Syria's crisis has inspired jihadis, both Sunni and Shia, to come to Syria and fight a holy apocalyptic Islamic war within the framework of an end-time theory to usher in the coming and return of the *Mahdi* (the prophesied redeemer of Islam). Eventually these jihadis believe that Islamic domination of the world will prevail over all evil. This category contains videos produced by Jihadi factions such as Jabhat al Nusra and ISIS but also Iranian and Hezbollah jihadi groups and material uploaded by foreign Jihadi fighters inside Syria. It consists mainly of jihadi videos and sermons, long footage of experiences of foreign jihadis and accompanying videos to justify their cause and jihadi recruitment videos.

The eight categories described above provide a useful analytical categorisation through which the vast collection of YouTube videos about Syria can be observed. For these categories we considered which type of digital video could have value for providing legal evidence of war crimes. What are the criteria?

Results: verifiability and legal potential of YouTube videos for Transitional Justice

Having devised a systematic categorisation of eight different categories to study YouTube videos about Syria, the question arises which categories are most likely to include clips that can contribute to Transitional Justice as legal evidence? Let us review the eight different categories in our categorisation (Table 2) in the light of verifiability, sourcing and corroboration for evidencing war crimes (Table 1).

The first category concerns **creative non-violent resistance.** According to the 7-step verification process described above, none of the surveyed videos and material in this category could be verified by the mere fact that content has been remixed, edited and constructed. All of the YouTube clips in this category are stripped of their original

metadata. Unless combined with triangulation and interviews with the owner of the material, the actual videographer, producer or production team of the video, solely using the video output of creative digital online resistance is not enough to verify these YouTube clips reliable data. The second category deals with videos from the **first phase of the uprisings**. These clips have some successful chance of verification. Many of these clips have not been edited and contain their original meta-data. The recordings document the events that happened and in some of the clips, the videographer holds up a sheet where the date, location and type of event a written either in Arabic or English or both. However, it remains difficult to verify whether the information on the sheet is correct unless it is possible to triangulate the paper with metadata (GPS position and date) of the original recordings. The third category of YouTube video clips concerns **torture and war crimes** video documentation. Indeed many of the clips monitored during this survey could form complementary evidence of war crimes to a certain degree. Matheson (2016; 2014) identifies main distinctions regarding types of legal evidence for which video could be used (New Tactics in Human Rights 2014):

- Lead Evidence – suggests a crime may have been committed
- Prima Facie Evidence – key fact established
- Corroborative Evidence – backs up other types of evidence
- Contextual Evidence – armed conflict or not
- Inferential Evidence – perpetrator's intent
- Character Evidence – information about the perpetrator in other videos
- Notice Evidence – informed by media about the event
- Exculpatory Evidence – alibi for the defendant
- Crime-based Evidence – proves the commission of a crime
- Linkage Evidence – proves who committed the crime

Providing verification can be carried out correctly of the torture and war crimes video clips, these YouTube clips have potential to function as legal evidence because the clips show and might establish that a crime took place. But many questions can still be raised whether the video clip legally proves the commission of a crime as crime-based evidence. In all clips of this category, there is a very low probability that video clips from

this category can function as crime-based evidence. To function as linkage evidence, i.e. proving *who* committed the crime, the probability of the validity of the video clips in this category is also very low because either the perpetrator is not present in the video clip or unrecognisable. Even with self-incriminating video clips, done by the perpetrator him- or herself, the chance of using this clip as linkage evidence is low. Self-incriminating video and photographic material whereby the narcissist torturer and abuser films himself committing the crime, so-called 'torture selfies' or trophy videos' found on the perpetrator's mobile phone, have the highest chance for verifiability and for functioning as linkage evidence. Video clips in this third category have also some probability to function as lead evidence suggesting a crime took place and can function as corroborative evidence.

The **direct frontline battle** video clips surveyed during this study usually contain their meta-data, which can be verified. However, for them to function as legal evidence for war crimes is very difficult. The actual perpetrator is rarely recognizable and the video clips consist of many hours of tank battle for example. Unless the owner of the helmet cam can be identified and providing that the helmet cam of GoPro documents a war crime, this UGC on YouTube can be relatively well verified but cannot function as legal evidence of war crimes.

Citizen experience of war and violence YouTube clips are similar to the above described category; verifiability is medium, although the meta-data question remains for every single clip surveyed and the potential for legal evidence is low, unless functioning as corroborative evidence.

Both the categories of **Pro-Assad and Anti-Assad** categories of video clips contain heavily edited and mediated UCG and material. In that sense the verifiability is low as all video-clips have lost their meta-data and are edited in a subjective matter often propagandistic, mixed with dramatic music, sound effects, and other characteristics of the video clips that blur and remove the potential to function as legal evidence for war crimes.

For the final category of **Jihadi** YouTube clips, many of these clips are edited, so the sourcing is difficult and meta-data are unverifiable. Some video clips, especially done by Al Hayat Media centre, the main production company of ISIS videos, whether for recruitment or beheading videos, have a high production value and are scripted and

edited. We simply cannot determine precisely when the footage was shot on the basis of the videos alone. However some of these clips provide clues on who has been killed because victims are recognizable and sometimes named. The clips also indicate who is the perpetrator (the case of 'Jihadi John') or which organisation has been responsible. The public executions or beheadings of Western and Syrian journalists are recorded on video and uploaded on YouTube, but it cannot be legally verified for certain where this crime has taken place and exactly by whom.

Table 2 Potential and feasibility of Syrian YouTube videos for Transitional Justice

	Verifiability	Probability for legal evidence
Humour and creative non-violent resistance	*Very low*	*None*
First phase of the uprisings	*Medium*	*Low*
Torture and war crimes	*Medium*	*Low*
Direct frontline battle experience	*Medium*	*Low*
Citizen experience of war & violence	*Medium*	*Low*
Pro-Assad	*Very low*	*None*
Anti-Assad	*Very low*	*None*
Jihadi ISIS Hezbollah other (Sunni/Shia)	*Low to medium*	*Low to medium*

Based on the above exercise, we can establish that only a small number of YouTube videos can be used for crime-based evidence in a process of Transitional Justice. It seems YouTube is a notoriously weak platform for archiving of video recordings of war crimes due to the fact that many digital video lose their geotagged metadata in the up-loading process. Moreover, in cases of extreme violence, the lifespan of videos is not long as the video clips violate YouTube's Community Guidelines on violent and graphic content. The most useful video data for legal evidence are thus not stored on YouTube but on the many servers, computers, hard disks and USB sticks that are in the hands of video activists themselves. This is the most valuable data for Transitional Justice. Other useful videos are self-incriminating video evidence, such as so-called 'trophy videos' stored on mobile phones of the perpetrators, whereby the actual perpetrator's identity is clearly recognizable when carrying out the act of war crime. If the clip can be

corroborated on other social media platforms such as Instagram and Facebook profile pictures and uploads, this can form crucial evidence for tribunals and court cases. In that way, Transitional Justice makes use of the narcissism of an abuser. In two separate cases in Sweden, Syrian men have been arrested for war crimes on the basis of uploaded online videos, photographs and other information on social media as well as two Swedish nationals who were sentenced to life in prison after a video appeared online showing them taking part in the killing of two men in Aleppo (The Local 2016).

Considering its weakness of verifiability, corroborative measures should be taken for the legal use of digital video and scholars are to be wary in using YouTube videos as their sole unit of analysis. Despite the challenges concerning legal verifiability of the videos, the uploaded UGC is still of immense knowledge value to give an insight in the Syrian war and form a vehicle for video activists to express their own moral outrage of the events happening in front of their eyes. They expressed a desire to gain attention from an outside audience in 'peace land' in the hope that some key decision makers and the public will take political and diplomatic action to stop the violence that they are suffering. There is a clear power asymmetry between those suffering the daily mass violence on the ground in Syria and the YouTube audiences in the West. Chouliaraki (2008) states that the division between safety and suffering captures a fundamental aspect of this asymmetry in the viewing relationships of videos:

> "This is the asymmetry of power between the comfort of spectators in their living rooms and the vulnerability of sufferers on the spectators' television screens. The viewing asymmetry of television does not explicitly thematize the economic and political divisions of our world but reflects and consolidates them. Who watches and who suffers reflects the manner in which differences in economic resources, political stability, governmental regimes and everyday life enter the global landscape of information. Similarly, who acts on whose suffering reflects patterns of economic and political agency across global zones of influence – North and South or East and West" - Chouliaraki 2008.

All of the video activists interviewed expressed a deep disillusionment with the apathy and silence and lack of collective action by Western audiences and politicians. Territoriality and distance play a role here (Goodenough 1997). We care more for people in our immediate surroundings than those whose rights are violated in far away places, in

other cultures with whom we cannot identify. Syrian video activists became aware of this selective empathy, poignantly emphasized by the remark by a Syrian Free Syrian Army fighter in a video where he points at a cat:

> "Film the animals, maybe this cat is more important to the Americans, more than the Syrian people, because I am sure the animals have rights in America more than the people here. They don't care about us. So maybe when you are filming three or four cats, and put it on YouTube, maybe one million will watch the video, will see the video in one hour. They don't care about the people. Maybe after the Americans see that, and find there is a cat here in Syria, I hope they will help the cat! … Maybe they will help Syria then". – (Kelze and Van Dyke 2013, quote at 12'55 minutes).

Conclusions

The enormous collection of UGC in the form of YouTube videos from the Syrian war provides an unprecedented and diverse collection of shared digital memories of conflict and violence. The central question of this article asks what the value is of UGC on YouTube for legal evidence of war crimes and future Transitional Justice.

It is beyond doubt that the surge of uploaded videos from the Syrian uprisings revolutionized the way in which contemporary wars are observed and documented. The sheer amount of user-generated content online has given rise to manifold ways of interpreting what is happening on the ground, inspired creative resistance, led to a surge of professional and independent Syrian documentary films and increased the connectivity between those who undergo the war inside the conflict zone and those who are observing the situation from a safe distance.

Many YouTube clips from Syria are likely to be rejected as stand-alone *legal* evidence though, as it often lacks sourced information about meta-data, date, time, geographical coordinates, identity of the participants, the identity of the perpetrator, and other contextual information crucial to establishing judicial facts for war crimes prosecution. The ever-expanding body of videos from Syria will give rise to a wide and varied landscape of interactive media that has surpassed the old approach of political mainstream media to inform and possibly manipulate their audiences for their own agendas, whatever those may be. As a platform of digital memory and space to express moral

outrage, YouTube served a crucial and important role in the Syrian crisis and the UGC is of immense value for digital memorialisation and historicization of the Syrian crisis.

The vast amount of UGC on YouTube was categorized in 8 different types of footage and we can conclude that only small number of video clips on YouTube can in fact function as crime-based evidence for war crimes. This does not mean that the UGC on YouTube has no value, however as *legal* evidence it can be problematic to use YouTube videos if not corroborated and verified properly. The main issue is the lack of meta-data in many of the UGC on YouTube. The YouTube video revolution in Syria did bring to the surface many brave video activists who are now professionally involved in producing high quality footage for international news broadcasters, the most recent example of that is the important work of Waad al Kataeb inside eastern Aleppo with the British Broadcaster Channel Four News (Channel 4 2016). Through a series of edited 5-6 minute mini stories from the ground, Al Kataeb's work provides a credible and important source of evidence.

Furthermore, as a primary source for social research on mass violence YouTube has an extremely important role to play because of the unprecedented detail and scale of the digital recordings of the war in Syria. Developments in this field go quickly and it is hoped that many of the clips that have the potential to serve as legal evidence can provide crucial necessary corroborative evidence of the many war crimes currently being committed and permitted in Syria. It is hoped that the extreme courage, energy and efforts of the many Syrian video activists who risk their lives everyday to document and record the on-going war, conflict, and violence inside Syria, will not have been in vain.

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A Religious Media Revolution? The Syrian Conflict and Mediated Sunni Authority

Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen

Media and revolution are two words often combined. Not only do we regularly speak of the introduction of new media as revolutions, we are also well aware that media are a crucial component in the spreading of a political revolution. In a Middle Eastern context, this was well captured in Annabelle Srberny's classic book, *Small Media, Big Revolution* (1994) on the role of cassette tapes of Imam Khomeini's sermons during the Iranian revolution. And it has been a vivid, if contested, theme in the analyses of the successful mobilization of youth in the Egyptian revolution of January-February 2011. While it would be a preposterous example of techno-determinism to claim that these political upheavals were somehow caused by new media technology, it would be equally absurd to deny that the new media gave the organizers new means of mobilizing and directing their fellow demonstrators, documenting regime violence, and disseminating their interpretations to the international community.

This has been equally in evidence in the case of the Syrian uprising, which began in March and April 2011. In Syria, the regime's control of traditional print and audio-visual media was close to complete, and Internet companies were owned by people from the inner circles of the regime. Even so, the mobile phone with a satellite connection empowered citizens to communicate, document and upload messages to media beyond the country's borders, and beyond the reach of the regime. These technologically innovative and artistic dimensions of the Syrian uprising have been studied and celebrated in numerous publications. It is, however, still difficult to assess their impact in

the real world, as the war has been grinding on between the regime and rebel militias, most of the latter not in any close connection with the early media activists.

This paper aims at investigating the use of the new media by Sunni religious authorities, and the transformations of religious communications that this has implied. This is done by tracing the introduction and development of new media by religious actors, and by looking into the kind of authority these actors seek to embody, whether regime supporting, oppositional or jihadist. Moreover, the paper will look into the particular genres employed, and how these have changed. While this is only a preliminary investigation, it points to both the introduction of new genres and transformations of classical genres of Islamic communication, such as *khutab, anashid* and *fatawa.*

Uprising and media revolution

Even by the standards of the Arab World, Syria before the uprising was a media backwater. As a media system it was characterized by Rugh (1979) as 'mobilizational', in that the state owned the media and the regime employed them to push for a political transformation of society and its inhabitants. Shortly after the take-over of Bashar al-Assad from his father Hafez in 2000, a liberalization of the media had been initiated but swiftly abandoned. Ever since the emergence in the 1990s of the 'New Arab Public Sphere', Syria had remained on the sidelines (Lynch 2006; 2015). No powerful pan-Arab television station was based in the country, and pan-Arab newspapers tended to ignore it, due to difficulties in getting reliable information from the authoritarian regime and its administration. All really powerful media were owned by the state, and cronies of the regime controlled the few private newspapers. Only in the production of TV dramas had private Syrian producers made their mark, but this was as suppliers to the major Gulf and Lebanese TV stations.

The uprising was to change all this. While initially the state media continued as if they were still the sole purveyor of news from the country, foreign media took a keen interest in the unfolding of the (initially peaceful) protests. Hesitant at first, also the two main Arab news channels, al-Jazeera and al-Arabiyya, covered the uprising with a clear sympathy with the protesters, much to the anger of the Syrian regime and Bashar al-Assad personally. Using satellite connections from their smartphones, the activists were

in direct contact with oppositional or foreign news services based outside the country, using the connection for documentation of regime attacks, but also for mobilization, coordination and strategic communication. Regime supporters set up private channels, as did opposition figures based in the Gulf. More importantly, Iran and its ally Hizbollah mobilized their media operations in support of the Syrian regime.

If the Syrian media had been state-controlled, unimaginative and underdeveloped, this was of course the case with religious media as well. Officially secularist, during the years of president Bashar al-Assad (2000-) the Syrian state and its leading Baath party had come to accept a certain measure of religious activism and visibility. Through publications and annual conferences it promoted the idea of a certain Syrian religious conservatism across the various religions and a message of inter-religious tolerance. But given its ban on the Muslim Brotherhood, and its general awareness of the political potential of Sunni Islamism, the regime was not interested in Islamic proselytism. For decades, the only Sunni religious publication allowed was the monthly *Nahj al-Islam*, published by the Ministry of Religious Endowments.

Still, this happy state of keeping the citizenry uninformed by alternative interpretations of events was not to last. The satellite media revolution meant that Syrians could choose between hundreds of television channels to watch, and the regime could do nothing about it. By the time of the uprising, there were some 1320 satellite channels broadcasting in Arabic, some 10% of which could be defined as Islamic, most of them Sunni Muslim (Galal 2014, 9-10). Especially from around 2007, channels proselytizing a Salafi (puritan) version of Islam were established in Egypt and Saudi Arabia and reaching audiences in all over the Arab World, unnerving Arab regimes. While the Syrian regime was staunchly anti-Islamist, like many other regimes it was mainly suspicious of Islamist media, and perhaps less concerned about the seemingly a-political Salafists (Pierret 2011, 134). Moreover, since the early 2000s, the Syrian secret services had a working relationship to some of the Salafi-Jihadi groupings in Lebanon and Iraq (O'Bagey 2012, 13-15).

Hence, already prior to the uprising, the Syrian regime felt under pressure to respond to the increasing amounts of Islamist and Salafi *daawa* (mission) entering the country by way of satellite television or the Internet. In addition to the Ministry's homepage, leading religious personalities loyal to the regime all opened their personal

websites; most importantly the grand Mufti of Syria Ahmad Hassoun, the leading TV preacher Said Ramadan al-Buti, and the popular radio preacher Rateb al-Nabulsi. Furthermore, in a private initiative a more advanced website, Naseem al-Sham, was introduced with an interactive fatwa service and the *khutab (*Friday sermons) of the major preachers, both on PDF and in audio.

Al-Buti, in particular, had a long history of countering abstract Salafism and posing a more grounded, traditional Islam in its stead, based on the theo-juridical tradition of Ash`ari-Shafiism that most Syrians would belong to (Pierret 2011, 99-106). He had a significant following and was rewarded for remaining loyal to Hafez, the father of president Bashar al-Assad, during the preceding Islamist uprising in the early 1980s. When the 2011 uprising began, al-Buti was once again in a position to extract concessions from Bashar for his continued and vocal support against an uprising the bulk of which were Sunni Muslims. One of his demands was an official Sunni TV-station, *Nur al-Sham*, which was instantly granted and opened in August 2011. As the name, 'Light of Damascus' indicated, the idea was to fend off Salafi and Islamist propaganda by means of a counter-propaganda based on the claim that these other renderings of Islam belong in the Arab Gulf and are alien to the religious traditions of the Syrians. The channel opened with a seminar featuring al-Buti, the Mufti and the Minister of Religious Endowments discussing the "aggression against Islam" conducted partly by the West and partly by Gulf preachers (al-Buti 2011a).

In March 2013 al-Buti, aged 83, was killed by a small bomb while teaching in a mosque in Damascus. The circumstances of his death are murky, as the national TV showed unconvincing photos of a suicide bombing, but it is difficult to understand why the regime's men would kill him. During the first two years of the uprising, al-Buti had unflinchingly supported the regime in sermons and fatwas. Some of his fatwas to the Nasseem al-Sham website reflect the degree to which violence was creeping into the sphere of religious authority and moral guidance; from his allowance of forced prayer on rugs with the portrait of the president, to a fatwa absolving a soldier who had shot indiscriminately into crowds of demonstrators to (al-Buti 2011a).

Al-Buti's fatwas are examples of how violent conflict gradually made its way into religious genres normally void of violent content, and how it is now distributed through new media. Soon, the top Sunni religious figures of the regime were fully involved in

the mobilization, declaring jihad and threatening the rebels. The Mufti, Ahmad Hassoun, who lost a son to the rebels in 2012, issued a declaration of jihad against the uprising (al-Tamimi 2013). He also threatened Europe with terrorism and is alleged to have permitted the killing of civilians (SA 2015).

The revolution will be YouTubed – and turn violent

In the opposition, an early example of this entrance of conflict into established Islamic genres were the YouTube sermons (*khutba*) first 'berating' the ruler to change his way (*nasiha*), and later denouncing him altogether in a sermon known as 'a word of truth' (*kalimat al-haqq*). Within months of the uprising, local men began to arm themselves, often in alliance with defectors from the army. Bands, units, battalions and the like announced themselves on YouTube, often with Islamic names and shouts of 'God is great'. First employed to film regime violence on and upload the videos for documentation, smartphones and YouTube became the medium of choice for Syrian activists, offering instant production, high credibility and swift distribution. This also meant a renaissance for classical Islamic genres that had suffered under the print-driven public dissemination of the 20th century: the *khutba*, but also religious hymns (*anashid*) and Qur'anic recitation (*qara'a*). YouTube sermons began to circulate with more radical Salafi preachers calling the believers to arms against the enemy – now also named by religious, rather than political, affiliation. The regime and its supporters were called Nosayris (an older word for Alawite, implying that they are following their own religious founder, and not Ali), and their Iranian backers were called Safavids (evoking the 17-18th century confrontations between the Sunni Ottoman and the Shia Safavid empires).

The most prominent of the early Sunni religious warmongers on the rebel side was Adnan al-`Ar`ur. A Salafi sheikh from Hama in exile in Riyadh, he was a fierce critic of the Assad regime long before the uprising broke out. Broadcasting from Riyadh, he called for war against the Alawites and Shia, thus actively working to turn the uprising into a sectarian struggle for the control of Syria. Al-`Ar`ur had a program on a TV-station which was then further distributed via his website, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube accounts.

Sheikh al-`Ar`ur is a relatively rare example of a Muslim scholar (`alim) taking full advantage of the new media. Most `ulama would not know how to do that, and the main regime preachers such as al-Buti and Hassoun merely had people (of another generation) to help them. It could be argued that the very fact that ordinary media outlets were closed to the oppositional sheikhs meant that they were forced to explore the new media whether they wanted to or not. The distance from Syria, as well as the money and media technology available in the Gulf capitals (Salafis typically in Riyad or Kuwait City, Islamist sheikhs typically in Doha), further enabled them to move into the new media. Without the spread of the smartphone in Syria (and constant struggles to secure electricity to load it), it would have been of little impact on the ground. As it were, in the rebel-controlled areas the new media hardly competed with the old ones, but simply filled a void.

Enter ISIS

From small beginnings in 2012, jihadist militias began to focus on Syria, and from 2013 they also made themselves noticed in the cyber sphere. Much has been written of the media savvy of ISIS or, after July 2014, Islamic State (IS). Comparing its media operation with that of al-Qaeda at the time of Osama bin Laden (who was killed in 2009) illustrates how far they have come. While al-Qaeda in Afghanistan produced gritty video tapes that were smuggled long roads to the correspondent of al-Jazeera who then decided whether to broadcast them or not, IS produces state of the art films, glossy magazines and news reels from every province and distributes dozens of them daily and instantly via the internet where they are reproduced and republished by supporters all over the world. Nevertheless, in his day, and with his more simple videos, ways Osama bin Laden was actually able to set the jihadist agenda as decisively as has IS, and right now al-Qaeda has geared up its media operation to match that of IS.

But there are other differences between the two groups' media strategy. Not least the way whereby they established and embodied authority. In al-Qaeda's videos of the early 2000s, it was Osama bin Laden who spoke. He was embodying al-Qaeda, and his style was calm and dignified; he was to project reason and self-control to convince the listener that he knew what he was doing. Such videos are still coming out from al-Qaeda with his successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri. In contrast, IS has only released a single

video of its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and that was his inaugural sermon as caliph from Ramadan (July) 2014, calling for jihad. It was homiletic and ceremonial, demonstrating his authority rather than arguing for it.

Instead, IS videos serve action. We witness IS men preparing for attacks, engaging in battles, blowing up ancient buildings, hunting Shiites, executing prisoners. They are many, often anonymous. But we also see interviews with them, we se them patrolling, interacting with citizens, teaching children, training prospects, taking people to court. And we see them relaxing, drinking tea, playing games, even swimming: an active, fulfilling life in the newly established but already god-fearing and harmonious state. Reasoning of the Osama bin Laden kind does appear, as well, but mainly in audios of the speeches of Abu Muhammad al-`Adnani, the official spokesman who was killed in the summer of 2016. The videos, however, have a different story to tell. Namely: come to the lands of the believers; you will be welcomed and valued, get friends and a family, and a higher sense of purpose. This is also stressed in the interviews with fighters who have arrived from Europe and who confess about a sinful life among sinful people, with the subtext: you are probably a nobody, so come and become a somebody. IS, of course, had a territory to reign and arm.

IS also publishes an online magazine in English (*Dabiq*), in French (*Dar al-Islam*), in Arabic (*an-Naba*) and similar ones in Turkish (*Kunstantiniyya*), Russian, and other languages, all very well produced. Since 2010 al-Qaeda has done the same, albeit more irregularly, producing first *Inspire* and from 2014 *Resurgence*, which has however only appeared in two, issues. The differences in strategy between al-Qaeda's and IS's magazines have been analyzed and compared to Dabiq by Celine Novenario who points out that al-Qaeda employ attrition directed towards the West, whereas *Dabiq* is mainly concerned with recruitment to the caliphate, but also strongly overbids when it comes to violence and intimidation (Novenario 2015). It should be added that when in 2016 IS was forced on the defensive, it changed its strategy towards recruitment of fighters who would stay and conduct attacks in Western countries.

Taking advantage of the ease of online distribution, the magazines are designed to look like offline magazines, but the al-Qaeda magazines seem mainly to be for the already convinced. The latest issue of al-Qaeda's *Resurgence* is a 90-page interview with

a martyred Western jihadi Adam Gadahn. Articles in the IS magazines are much shorter, and come with many, often violent, illustrations.

IS has also initiated an online publication of the works of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Abd al-Wahhab, a puritan preacher in 18th century Arabia, is clearly an inspiration to IS. But he is, of course, also the founder of Saudi Arabia's brand of Islam. Publishing and disseminating him is thus a claim to his legacy, directed against Saudi Arabia, which is considered a special enemy by Islamic State (Bunzel 2016, 1; 8).

The main jihadist media activity today is comprised of videos or small statements produced on PDF as press releases. These have, however, grown exponentially, with both IS and Jabhat al-Nosra, its Syrian rival, releasing up to ten videos daily, as registered by the clearing house website Jihadology.net. Most of these are about feats at the front, but others are about more peaceful, but still ideologically relevant activities. During Ramadan of 2016, Jabhat al-Nosra ran a daily series of major battles won by Muslims during Ramadan, and another series about the district da`wa offices in its territory. IS, on the other hand, has continued long-term broadcasts of *anashid* (male choir) and *qara'a* (recitation of the Qur'an). In Ramadan, its various 'governorates' published small videos of battles on longer thematic films for instance on 'Guiding the people', and 'Marking the second anniversary of the caliphate'.

The media operations of IS are extensive. According to its self-description, published by its official media company, al-Furqan, the media operations are administered by the Media council (*diwan al-i'lam*) which is one of 14 governmental councils in the state (Islamic State 2016b). Apart from the above-mentioned magazines, it also runs a TV-station, a string of local radio stations, a translation bureau and media training courses. In June 2016 one of its media outlets, Wilatyat al-Khayr, also published a film about the media war waged against the Islamic Stat and how IS is responding to it. Entitled 'Revelations of Satan', the video introduced five men who had reported to the outside world about their city, Deir az-Zor, under IS rule, allegedly for dollars (Islamic State 2016a). We see them confess and then executed, either having their throat slit, or being tied to their laptop or camera which is then wired and blown up. In between these five executions, a speaker tells about the first traitors at the time of the prophet and how they were dealt with, and at the end the video provides data about the media operations of IS, including its more than 40 affiliated media bureaus.

What, then, about religious authority? According to IS, there is one man who has the real religious authority, namely its caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Apart from his inaugural *khutba* he has only communicated sparsely, via audiotaped speeches. He is, however, frequently quoted in IS material. More common, but still rare, are the speeches of IS spokesman, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, also in the form of audio files. Neither man would count as a religious authority outside IS circles, although al-Baghdadi has a degree from a religious institution in Iraq. Overall, IS has had difficulties in appealing to *ulama* from outside its own organization. The nomination of al-Baghdadi for caliph was entirely done by IS own *ulama* who are not recognized as Sunni authorities of status outside the group. Major *ulama* networks, nationally and internationally, have vehemently condemned it. Even well known jihadist sheikhs have disowned it and engaged in polemics against it, and major polemics between IS and al-Qaeda have ensued (Skovgaard-Petersen 2016). This is easily explicable in the propaganda of IS which has devoted considerable space to denounce the false, weak and docile *ulama* of this world; holding a doctorate or other degree from a university outside the IS is not, in its view, a proof of learning but of corruption. It is, however, not beginning from scratch. Theologically, it professes a dogmatic position (`*aqida*) more or less in line with al-Qaeda and other Salafi currents. In law, it also follows in the footsteps of that tradition, and especially the above-mentioned Muhammad ibn `Abd al-Wahhab, taking its sentences and punishments much further than what Salafi-Jihadi groups have generally done. It will, however, still argue with Qur'an verses and *ahadith*, and commentaries on these verses by renowned classical scholars, thus demonstrating a faithful attitude to tradition and implicitly accusing its critics of deviating from it, for instance on the issue of slavery.

Conclusions

Ten years ago, practically all media material produced in Syria was directed and disseminated by the regime or its trusted men, and the regime had the will and competence to monitor and control it. Syrians had, by and large, come to live with this system, even if few of them believed that regime media conveyed a truthful picture of all events. It must therefore have been a confusing experience to witness the proliferation of media espousing very different views of the world.

We have followed the dramatic expansion of media in Syria, from near to complete state control over the intrusion of pan-Arab satellite television to the emergence of oppositional outlets and rebel media. And finally to the establishment of a rival state entity on Syrian territory, complete with its own media ministry and a plethora of channels, broadcasts and Internet outlets. The Islamic State is, of course, even more top down and in control of the media scene than the Baath party ever was, and in terms of media systems IS territory may qualify as a totalitarian media system, intent on making people in its territory believe and act on its propaganda, rather than merely disciplining them to acquiesce in the official rhetoric (Wedeen 1999, 74-75).

Nowhere will this have been felt more keenly than in the field of Sunni Islam. This was one of the areas where the regime was most watchful, and most restrictive. Nevertheless, even in this area change was in the airwaves even before the uprising of 2011. At the time of the uprising, important international TV sheikhs broadcast by specifically religious channels (and by the dominant channels al-Jazeera and MBC1) had found an audience inside Syria and were preaching versions of Islam at variance with the one propagated by the Syrian regime's own sheikhs. When the uprising began, Syrian sheikhs began to make opposition moves, as well, and found new and more forceful ways of getting their message through. The mediated sermon witnessed a revival, as new media broadcast much more political and emotional preaching. The longer literary genres gave way to oral and aural genres such as singing and the recitation of the Qur'an.

Since 2011 Sunni religious media, programs and content have come to the fore, and been at the fore, of public attention, concern, and scare. Within months of the largely peaceful demonstrations, more sinister religious messages were being spread by certain actors on the opposition side and, as we have seen, also by some of the Sunni authorities supporting the regime. Religious legitimation of fighting and killing became the norm on both sides of the political contestation, and not only among the Sunni Muslims. This led to a rise in Sectarian killings and paved the way for truly chauvinist and jihadist Sunni (and Shia) media.

The Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nosra, the two most important Sunni jihadi militias, have ventured into internet media on a massive scale and with impressive, and truly frightening, results. Employing their own brand of Salafi Jihadi ideology, they have

revolutionized Islamic media messaging at many levels. These are violent movements within a long tradition of Islamic revivalism. They are, however, not led by religiously charismatic figures, and although they do have *ulama* supporters, formal religious authority is not a point of strength for them. Rather, they launch the same kind of virulent criticism of the existing *ulama* in Syria and Iraq, as they reserve for these countries' political leaders. Their religious claims are vested in videos of their institutions and fighters, not in the promotion of religious leaders. This is potentially a point of weakness, and may also indicate a way for Muslim *ulama* to overcome a Sunni religious crisis that they, as much as anyone, have a responsibility to end.

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'The Face of Evil':
The Discourse on ISIS and the Visual Complexities in the ISIS Beheading Videos

*Kanar Patruss**

Introduction

Within recent years, a new and significant actor in the international field of politics has emerged. The militant group ISIS[10] put itself on the map when it in June 2014 took control of Mosul in Iraq and committed gruesome acts of violence against civilians. For the rest of 2014, ISIS continued to invade the international news cycle with the release of videos showing the beheading of American and British hostages. These videos quickly gained iconic status (Friis 2015, 733) and acted as key building blocks for the formation of the Western response to the videos, in which ISIS was dubbed 'the face of evil' (Kerry 2014). An American-led coalition was shortly after formed to carry out air strikes against ISIS in Iraq and Syria (McInnis 2016, 1–2).

Given the central role played by the ISIS beheading videos of Western hostages from the fall of 2014 in constructing ISIS as an international phenomenon, the *visuality* of ISIS is arguably an indispensable element of analysis, if ISIS is to be understood in a comprehensive manner. Apart from very few studies, however (see for example Friis 2015), the visual dimension has been largely overlooked in academic analyses of beheading videos, which have tended to focus on the tactical or symbolic-religious aspects

[10] The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is also known as The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), The Islamic State (IS) and as Daesh in Arabic.

of beheadings (See for example Andre 2015; Lentini and Bakashmar 2007; L. J. Campbell 2006; Furnish 2005; Jones 2005). While these are important contributions, they fail to thoroughly and in a theoretically informed way deal with the distinct *visual* aspect of beheading videos. Responding to this gap in the literature, this article explores ISIS from a 'visual angle' and in this endeavour draws upon theories that presents the visual as a 'political-ontological condition' for international politics (Hansen 2011, 52; See also D. Campbell 2007; Bleiker 2014).

Through its exploration of the visuality of the ISIS beheadings, the article delves into an examination of the Western political discourse surrounding ISIS and its relation to the image of ISIS beheadings. While drawing upon insights from Friis, who has demonstrated how the icon of the ISIS beheadings is mobilized in a securitizing political discourse (Friis 2015, 735–36), the article at hand focuses specifically on how the image of ISIS beheadings gives rise to a discourse, in which the *value judgment of evil* takes up a prominent space and discusses the *function* of such a value judgment. Inspired by Nietzsche's work on the concept of evil, I argue that the political discourse – referred to throughout as 'the rhetoric of evil' – misrepresents the struggle between ISIS and Western powers as a moral one, thus inhibiting a necessary critique of the violence generated and perpetuated by the West in the context of the war against ISIS.

On the backdrop of this assessment of the rhetoric of evil, the article further engages in an attempt to show how the foundation of the rhetoric of evil can be dissolved through a 're-reading' of the ISIS beheading image. Such a re-reading is made possible by expanding Lene Hansen's concept of inter-iconicity (Hansen 2015, 269) to reflect how not only the *status* of an icon but also its *meaning* is produced through its linkages to other icons. This expanded version of inter-iconicity is then applied to the image of ISIS beheadings and two other icons, namely, the guillotine beheadings of the French Revolution and the icon of the 'body politic' from the famous cover of Hobbes' *Leviathan*. Re-reading the ISIS beheading image in relation to those two other icons brings forth alternative meanings from the image that are lost in the account of ISIS as evil. These alternative meanings work towards unravelling the foundation for the rhetoric of evil and open up space for a broader critique of political violence to emerge.

The article thus makes a contribution to existing literature on three levels. Firstly, the paper brings to light an understudied case in visual International Relations (IR) liter-

ature and contributes to the knowledge and understanding of ISIS as a self-standing phenomenon. As an implication hereof, the article is able to situate itself within the political discussion on ISIS and offer a critical view on the war on ISIS, which includes a call for a broad critique of political violence. Secondly, by exploring the distinct visual aspect of the ISIS beheadings, the study brings forth a perspective on beheading videos that has, so far, been largely overlooked in the literature. Thirdly, the article inscribes itself into a stream of literature that brings images and visuality to the forefront of IR analyses and *adds* to this body of literature by introducing a new take on Hansen's concept of inter-iconicity. Given the relatively recent academic interest in imagery and international politics, a gap still exists when it comes to case studies within the field. In this regard, the article contributes to the literature on images and visuality in IR by *engaging empirically* with the theory and through this exercise advancing the analytical 'tool kit' available to visual IR scholars. The concept of inter-iconicity is thus refined and applied as an analytical tool that helps us better understand the complex constellation of meaning in the ISIS beheading videos.

I start out in the next section by outlining how the image acts as a political condition in connection to the surrounding political discourse. Subsequently, I present a Nietzsche-inspired critique of the rhetoric of evil, before engaging in a 're-reading' of the image of ISIS beheadings in light of its inter-iconic relation to the guillotine beheadings and the body politic.

The ISIS Beheading Videos and the Rhetoric of Evil

The Image as a Political Condition

Within recent years there has been a rising interest in imagery and 'the visual' within IR and security studies (See for example Williams 2003; D. Campbell 2003; Möller 2007; Vuori 2010; Hansen 2011; O'Loughlin 2011; Friis 2015). New technologies, including modern recording devices, extensive media coverage, the Internet and the growth of social media sites, have enabled the production and spread of images (both still and in the form of videos) to an extent not witnessed before. They have also facilitated the rise of events within the domain of international politics in which images appear to play a

significant role (Hansen 2011, 52). The dissemination of the ISIS beheading videos and the political reactions following them are a recent example of such events.

This article takes its cue from a constitutive branch of theory put forth by Hansen, Bleiker, and Campbell (D. Campbell 2007; Hansen 2011; Bleiker 2014), which approaches images as both products and producers of international politics. In this sense, images reflect as well as construct the conditions under which international politics unfold and as such the approach differs from causal studies of images in IR where images are analysed as independent variables directly affecting foreign policy responses (See for example McNulty 1993). From the perspective of this article, the visual is rather seen as a 'political-ontological condition' (Hansen 2011, 52) delimiting a frame within which politics can be understood. In other words, the visual facilitates the 'conditions of possibility' for politics, which is to say they form what can be thought, said and done (Bleiker 2014, 75). Visual images – especially iconic images, which form the unit of analysis in this article – function as tools working towards the discursive constitution of international identities (Hansen 2015, 267) making them interesting objects of study for international relations scholars. Given that iconic images are characterized by being widely circulated, recognized and remembered (Hansen 2015, 267–268) this category of images, in particular, can act as powerful 'visual nodal points' (Hansen 2015, 265) that actively shape and enable understandings of 'the international'. Through their ability to circulate extensively across borders as well as communicate across languages, iconic images crystallize as part of a cross-national public memory and consequently, colour the lens through which we understand international events and, perhaps more importantly, construct international Self/Other-constellations. From such a point of view, the icons are therefore active in defining meanings and identities.

The iconic images do not 'act' independently, however; they are established in relation to the linguistic discourses surrounding international politics. As Hansen has pointed out, "the visual does not enter the political without being the subject of debate or engaging in discourses already in place" (Hansen 2011, 53), which makes it relevant to gain an understanding of how the visual interacts with texts (Hansen 2011, 53). The same is true for the ISIS beheading image; as an icon it interacts with the international public discourse in a dialectic way that constitutes both the discourse and the meaning of the beheading image. Thus the ISIS videos penetrate the public political discourse

and become a strong reference point for a discursive identity constellation of the West and ISIS, while this identity constellation in turn consolidates the meaning ascribed to the image of ISIS beheadings contained in the videos.

The Value Judgment of Evil and the ISIS beheadings

Through the conduct of a thorough discourse analysis, Friis has shown within an American-British context, how the ISIS videos are constituted as 'visual facts' in a securitizing political discourse, which presents "ISIS as an imminent, exceptional threat to the West" (Friis 2015, 739). Viewing the Western discourse on ISIS through the lens of securitization adds an important layer to our understanding of how international politics around ISIS and the West are shaped. While drawing upon key insights from such an approach, the article at hand, however, concentrates on the role and function of the *value judgment of evil* in particular.

When the video of American journalist James Foley was released in August 2014, US Secretary of State, John Kerry responded by calling ISIS the 'face of evil':

> "There is evil in this world, and we all have come face to face with it once again. Ugly, savage, inexplicable, nihilistic, and valueless evil. ISIL is the face of that evil (…)" (Kerry 2014)

Similarly President Obama called the filmed decapitation of American aid worker Abdul-Rahman Peter Kassig 'an act of pure evil' (The White House 2014) and British Prime Minister David Cameron used the same expression after the video depicting the beheading of British aid worker David Haines surfaced online (LoGiurato 2014). I argue that 'evil' comprises a central concept in the discourse on ISIS (See also Friis 2015, 735–36), here referred to as the rhetoric of evil. I further argue that the image of beheading contained in the ISIS videos from 2014 acts as a strong visual reference point for the characterization of ISIS as evil – a point, I elaborate on in the following.

The first video of a beheading to spark overwhelming media attention was the video of American journalist James Foley who was killed in August 2014. The famous screen grab of the video shows Foley in an orange jumpsuit on his knees, next to a masked British-speaking ISIS fighter, identified in Western media as 'Jihadi John'. More videos of the beheading of American and British hostages followed in the fall of 2014 and the

screen grabs from the videos were widely circulated earning them the status of 'instant icons' (Friis 2015, 733; Hansen 2015, 10). Despite the large number of beheading videos produced by ISIS that exist on the internet – many with non-Western victims – only a few gained the public visibility that makes them iconic (Friis 2015, 743). These iconic videos were mobilized as visual pillars supporting the structure of the rhetoric of evil. An oversight of the videos can be seen below:

Videos of ISIS beheadings
August 19, 2014: James Foley, American journalist
September 2, 2014: Steve Sotloff, American journalist
September 13, 2014: David Haines, British aid worker
October 3, 2014: Alan Henning, British aid worker
November 16, 2014: 18 Syrian Army prisoners and Abdul-Rahman Peter Kassig, American aid worker

Apart from the last video with Abdul-Rahman Peter Kassig, where events might not have played out the way ISIS had wanted them to (Freeman 2014), the videos show striking similarities. They display the victim in an orange jumpsuit on his knees, while 'Jihadi John', later identified as Mohammed Enwazi (Akkoc and Henderson 2015), appears masked and dressed in all black, laying out which acts are being retaliated and threatening Western political leaders (Friis 2015, 740). The videos do not contain the actual beheading, but show the disfigured body in the end (Friis 2015, 743). It has been noted that the videos are of high quality and showcase media savvy and knowledge about film techniques (Friis 2015, 742). It seems evident, therefore, that a significant amount of effort has been put into making the videos – not only through the use of high quality technology, but also with regards to the method of killing.

As Regina Jane highlights, beheadings are not a naturally occurring practice; they are performed with difficulty and will (Jane 2005, xii). The insistence on using a method of execution that entails significant pain and disfiguration of the body despite the inconvenience it presents, intensifies the level of violence visually transmitted through the videos, which in turn forms a strong basis for the value judgment of evil contained in the rhetoric of evil. In ordinary uses of the word, 'evil' often designates actions that differ in degree from commonplace wrongdoing. In other words, we intuitively regard

that, which to an extreme degree appear wrong, as evil (Garcia 2002, 194)[11]. Ascribing evilness to ISIS on the grounds of the group's method of execution therefore seems to resonate with quite a few people and makes the image of beheading a viable visual reference point for the rhetoric of evil. Interestingly, the videos are usually not published on major news sites in their full length and consequently it is safe to assume that most people (this author included)[12] have not seen the actual videos. Rather it is the screen grabs of the videos that have been widely circulated, while the images of the beheaded bodies are left out. The intense circulability of the icons might be attributed to this absence of graphic content, which allows news media to spread the icons without worrying about viewer discomfort or ethical concerns (Zelizer 2010, 280). One might also argue that the 'unseeability' of the videos works to further intensify the brutality of the beheadings; the (self)censorship places the beheaded bodies in a category of images that are simply too awful to be seen at all. The very recording and spreading of these images by ISIS, that is, the act of *creating* the visuality of the beheading in the first place, therefore seems to emphasize the moral depravity of the organization. In this sense, the beheadings do not stand on their own as atrocious acts; they are perceived as evil partly *because* they are captured on tape. This affirms the fact that we cannot understand the ISIS beheadings or the reaction to them without incorporating the visual element of the executions.

Despite the 'unseeability' of the videos, the beheading itself does function as the visual reference point for the classification of ISIS as evil. How can this be? I suggest that we here think the 'visual' in broad terms such that it encompasses the imaginary visual of what is to come next. The imagined visual of a beheading is thus inherently present in the icons because the icons have an anticipatory character: They are a display of something-about-to-happen, and 'imbued with all the right clues for the viewer to imagine the end' (Friis, 2015: 734). The screen grabs of the videos are almost always accompanied by explanatory text and headlines that describe to a more or less detailed degree what happens in the videos. Moreover, after the screen grabs of the Foley-video

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[11] The concept of evil has been defined in many ways and is still a contested concept (See for example Singer 2004; Garcia 2002; Cole 2006). It is not within the scope of this paper to discuss the exact conceptual meaning of evil; rather the paper has sought to understand what the *use* of the concept does.
[12] Watching the videos in their full length has not been necessary for making the arguments and analysis of this paper, and I have therefore chosen not to do so due to ethical concerns about reproducing the humiliation of the decapitated person (Dauphinée 2007, 145).

gained iconic status, the following screen grabs displaying the same set-up with a kneeling, orange-clad Western victim and a masked 'Jihadi John' automatically held the promise of a beheading. In this way, the visual of the beheading is present in the imaginary sense even if only the screen grabs are physically *seen*, and the image of beheading is thus able to inform the labelling of ISIS as evil.

In the following I lay out a critique of such a labelling inspired by Nietzsche's questioning of the value judgment of evil. It is important to underline at this stage, that the critique of the rhetoric of evil presented below should not, in any way, be understood as a defence of the practices of ISIS or an attempt to inhibit highly valid criticism of ISIS. Although the rhetoric of evil might at first glance read as a *condemnation* of political violence, the critique seeks to show how it rather enables an *acceleration* of violence and as such the critique acts as rejection of violence in general. While it has been argued elsewhere that moralistic language could enable ISIS's use of force by lending credibility to its narrative (Boyle 2014; see also Winter et al. 2015), this article focuses on the rhetoric of evil's problematic implications with regards to enabling *Western* use of force. This is due to the fact, that ISIS's use of violence has – justifiably so – been the object of widespread outrage in mainstream media and the international public conversation, while voices with a critical outlook on the war on ISIS have been much more absent.

Nietzsche and the Critique of the Rhetoric of Evil

As has been argued, the political discourse crystallizes around the notion of evil through a linkage between the ISIS beheading videos and evilness. A critical assessment of the use of the beheading videos would therefore need to ask how the judgment of evil works and what it is able to do. For this purpose, I draw inspiration from Nietzsche, whose work has made him "the central figure in exposing and dismantling the idea of evil" (Cole 2006, 66). Nietzsche's ground-breaking essay *On the Genealogy of Morality* and its unique investigation of the judgment of evil thus helped induce a shift in academic discussions towards a questioning of the notion of evil itself (Cole 2006, 65–66). In *On the Genealogy of Morality,* Nietzsche argues that the value of values has been taken for granted and should be called into question (Nietzsche 1998, 6). In Nietzsche's

view, moral value judgments of good and evil are not absolute and given, but invented by man himself (Nietzsche 1998, 2) and therefore historically contingent. Based on this realization, he traces the origins of the judgments of good and evil and asserts that the notion of good has been *reformulated* by what he calls 'the slave morality' to signal 'low-mindedness' and 'weakness,' while 'strength' and 'nobility' are deemed 'evil' (Nietzsche 1998, 16-17). In Nietzsche's understanding therefore, what we call evil *is* not inherently evil, but rather *labelled* as such. This realization is fundamental in the context of ISIS, because it challenges the objectivity of the claims presented by the rhetoric of evil. Further, the judgment of evil has a certain *function*, which Nietzsche attempts to uncover (Nietzsche 1998, 3). This indicates that the judgment of evil does not act as a neutral classification, but carries with it an *effect*. Such an insight grants us the opportunity to understand the rhetoric of evil as active in the sense that it 'does something' and to further explore what that 'something' consists in.

Evil as Absolute

In *On the Genealogy of Morality,* Nietzsche draws a line between the slave morality setting up an opposition between good and evil, on the one hand, and the master morality organized around the judgments of good and bad, on the other (Nietzsche 1998, 30). The difference between the two pairs of opposition, good/bad and good/evil, is an important one.

The good/bad distinction can be seen as a difference in degrees of nobleness. There is a hierarchy between the two, but not necessarily an opposition that renders the two mutually exclusive:

> "As was stated, the pathos of nobility and distance, this lasting and dominant collective and basic feeling of a higher ruling nature in relation to a lower nature, to a 'below' – *that* is the origin of the opposition 'good' and 'bad'"(Nietzsche 1998, 11).

The bad occupy one place in a spectrum and the good another, which is perfectly natural in Nietzsche's view (Nietzsche 1998, 25). When the opposition changes to one that is good/evil, however, it takes on a new form. The evil is not merely a 'lower degree of goodness', so to speak, but a *dichotomist* opposite. Since the good is defined negatively

in relation to the evil (Nietzsche 1998, 19), evil signifies something that needs to be eliminated completely for the good to persevere; the two cannot simultaneously exist in the same space.

This is an important point to derive from Nietzsche when looking at the rhetoric of evil regarding ISIS. The finishing words of John Kerry's statement on the beheading of James Foley demonstrate this:

> "And make no mistake: We will continue to confront ISIL wherever it tries to spread its despicable hatred. The world must know that the United States of America will never back down in the face of such evil. ISIL and the wickedness it represents must be destroyed, and those responsible for this heinous, vicious atrocity will be held accountable." (Kerry 2014).

The concept of evil – whatever the specific content ascribed to it – bears with it a radicalism that makes destruction the only possible solution. As Friis also points out, the focus of the US foreign policy 'shifted from 'containment' to 'degrading and destroying' as the beheading videos emerged (Friis 2015, 734). Politically, the rhetoric of evil thus closes off a range of possibilities for addressing the problem posed by the existence of ISIS and privileges the use of violence as it calls for the elimination of ISIS as the only viable political option.

Further, the dichotomist relation between good and evil, revealed in Nietzsche's assessment, necessarily polarizes the two identities, collapsing any complexities in either of the positions. The same logic that calls for an elimination of all things evil implies that the good is only good in the absolute absence of evil. Whoever holds the identity of the good – in this instance the West – is therefore *purely* good; there is no in-between. This is problematic since it inhibits an understanding of the West as well as of ISIS as complex actors defined by a range of different aspects and characteristics. Viewing the West through the lens of the rhetoric of evil thus curtails the possibility of a critical assessment of the Western use of violence. I further unpack this point in the next section.

Legitimization of Power Structures

According to Nietzsche, the slave morality, which is fundamentally based on the concept of evil (Nietzsche 1998, 21), is characterized by a "will to lowering, to debasement,

to levelling, to the downward and evening-ward of man" (Nietzsche 1998, 32). The slave morality thus contains an element of repression, which for Nietzsche consists in pulling the strong down to the level of the weak. Nietzsche believes this to be in the interest of the priests who manipulate moral values to benefit themselves (Nietzsche 1998, 16). Without necessarily reproducing Nietzsche's general stance against equality (Nietzsche 1998, 24), it is useful to look at how the classification of evil creates a power position between those *classifying* those who are evil and those being *classified* as evil (See also Cole 2006, 74). In this light, we can understand the characterization of evil as an oppressive tool that works to keep a certain power structure in place. When categorizing whoever is against the current structure as evil, it delegitimizes their rebellion against their place in the established order and in turn legitimizes the repression of that rebellion (Cole 2006, 212).

The ISIS phenomenon can be seen as a rebellion against the power held by the West over the Muslim world and a threat to the dominance of Western values. A way for the West to withstand such a rebellion is to discursively delegitimize ISIS's uprising by presenting ISIS as pure evil and in the same instance casting the West as 'good' without further nuances. The rhetoric of evil in this way works towards whitewashing and glorifying the role played by the West in the war on ISIS. This is problematic, because by insisting on a black-and-white take on ISIS and the West, we overhear potentially valid points of critique waged against the Western political leaders and, by the same token, risk overlooking important push-factors that compel young Muslims to join ISIS. The rhetoric of evil renders every grievance put forth by ISIS – such as for example Western warfare in the Middle East – illegitimate altogether and erodes the possibility of holding Western actors accountable for the acts of violence they commit.

Bringing more nuances into play than the rhetoric of evil affords us, can widen the foundation upon which we are able to counter political violence from a range of actors, including *both* ISIS and the West. In recognition hereof, the next section seeks to provide an alternative inter-iconic reading of the ISIS beheading image aimed at subverting the foundation for the rhetoric of evil.

Re-reading the Image of ISIS Beheadings

It has been shown how the particular use that the rhetoric of evil makes of the iconic

ISIS beheading videos provides a legitimatization of violence. As Hansen has pointed out, however, icons should be viewed as 'inherently contested' (Hansen 2015, 267) and in this sense they contain within them the potential for conveying a number of different meanings. The subsequent discussions will explore further how these potential meanings can be drawn out through a reading of the beheading image that counters the rhetoric of evil. Such a reading works towards blurring the simplifying narrative of the good vs. the evil and increases the conditions of possibility with regards to a broad critique of political violence.

Inter-iconicity and Potentialities for 'Breaking Out'

Images work as important points within political discursive regimes that articulate collective identities. The image is not, however, the bearer of a fixed meaning. The meaning of the image is constantly constituted and re-constituted by effect of its circulation across contexts (Butler 2010, 9) and as such in relation to the discursive formations that adopt the image into their context. The instability, or ambiguity, of the image (Hansen 2011, 58) opens up an important potential for changing the conditions of possibility set up by a particular reading of the image. As Butler has pointed out the (visual) frame constantly breaks from its context and thus becomes exposed to subversion. She argues that this 'breaking out' might work as a critical potential for the emergence of a call to reject war and end violence (Butler 2010, 10-11). By this reasoning, the image then contains within itself potential ruptures to the very identity-constellations it has been used to support and can, in this sense, 'undo' and 'redo' itself. As has been argued so far, the rhetoric of evil calls for such an undoing.

In the following, I offer an analysis of the iconic image of the ISIS beheadings, aimed at 'breaking the image out' from the context of the rhetoric of evil. The analysis draws upon and further develops the concept of inter-iconicity presented by Hansen in her framework for icon analysis within IR (Hansen 2015, 277). While offering a good methodological basis for analysis, Hansen's three-tiered framework is not, in this context, relevant in its entirety. For this reason, I here only make use of tools in the framework that I deem beneficial for the purposes of the paper, while leaving out other elements that would not add value to the analysis, such as examining appropriations of the icon. In relation hereto, it is important to acknowledge that despite decent attempts at

setting up frameworks for the analysis of images within IR (See for example Hansen 2011; Hansen 2015), the academic field is still methodologically underdeveloped in this regard (Friis 2015, 732). The limited number of frameworks and corresponding analytical tools that are available cannot be seen as 'ready-to-use', comprehensive methodologies that are equally applicable across a range of cases. They have yet to be sufficiently empirically applied, challenged and refined within the literature. Therefore, they should rather be considered a good s*tarting point* for approaching images within IR (Hansen 2011, 69), making it sensible to apply them in a flexible and case-specific way. The subsequent analysis thus makes use of Hansen's work on images and icon analysis in IR in a fashion that is tailored to the case of ISIS beheading videos and the objects of the analysis at hand. In this way, the article is able to contribute to the further development of available analytical tools, in particular the concept of inter-iconicity (Hansen, 2015: 269).

Hansen describes inter-iconicity as the way in which an image claims its status *as an icon* by referencing other icons. In this article, I propose to go beyond this rather limited usage of the concept, as the focus on iconic *status* does not fully capture the complex ways icons are able to interact with each other. I argue here that the concept of inter-iconicity can further be used to shed light on how the *content* of the icons referred to is able to restructure and reconfigure the meaning of the icon under scrutiny – in this case, the image of ISIS beheadings. Analogous to inter-textuality (Alfaro 1996, 268), the icon is in this sense not understood as a self-sufficient or self-contained image but produced and transformed in relation to other icons. The meaning of an icon is thus not independent from the discursive field of imagery that surrounds it; it's meaning is dynamic in the sense that it is created and constantly recreated with reference to other icons.

Inter-iconicity is understood here first and foremost as an analytical tool that can help us draw out and understand meanings related to a given icon. It should not however, be seen as neutral or detached from the icon it is meant to explore; the tool of inter-iconicity is also active in *producing* the meaning of the icon by placing it within a particular context. In this article, inter-iconicity is therefore able to function as a critical intervention by situating the icon outside the *dominant* discourse on ISIS and within a certain web of iconic references that reconfigure the meaning of the icon, thereby wid-

ening the conditions of possibility for addressing ISIS in a new way that does not fall prey to the value judgment of evil. The inter-iconic analysis is thus able to extract *alternative* meanings to the hegemonic interpretation of the icon but should not be mistaken for an attempt to identify the icon's 'true' meaning; the meaning we attribute to the icon will always be partial, contingent and contextual. This is a condition for the following analysis as well; it does not claim to present an exhaustive reading of the icon but rather lays out an analysis limited to *certain* inter-iconic references.

There are a myriad of examples of iconic imagery that could make up the inter-iconic context in which the beheadings of ISIS inscribe themselves, both within a Western and a non-Western context. Since the rhetoric of evil presents an understanding of the ISIS beheadings within a distinctly Western context, I focus here on iconic references that are part of a Western collective memory and are thus able to contribute to an unravelling of the Self/Other-constellations inherent in the Western understanding of ISIS. The first inter-iconic reference is the beheadings of the French Revolution, which brings an element of liberation into the violence of the practice. The second refers to the 'body politic', which helps us understand ISIS's acts as part of a political, rather than a moral, struggle.

The Guillotine and the Narrative of Liberation

There are numerous examples of the practice of beheadings throughout the history of Europe, most widely used as a method of capital punishment. However, one image of beheadings stands out in the European mentality: the decapitations that took place during the French Revolution, of which the guillotine became a key image (Arasse 1989, 4). It can be argued that the visual of the guillotine execution became an icon given its high rate of visual reproduction both in a myriad of paintings and drawings and as various objects – for example, earrings and popular toys for kids (Friedland 2012, 252–253).

As with the filmed beheadings of ISIS, the decapitations of the French Revolution were highly theatrical (Arasse 1989, 88); the scaffold formed a stage making the operation more visibly accessible to the crowd. The beheadings functioned as public specta-

cles (Foucault 1995, 15), and, as a result, the guillotine was more a bearer of meaning than a machine.

The guillotine – used for the first time in France in April 1792 – became the official method for capital punishment in France (Friedland 2012, 246–47). Its use accelerated dramatically during the Reign of Terror from 1793-1794 where it beheaded as many as 40,000 people (Sage 2004, 21). Dr. Guillotin, whom the device is named after, originally proposed to make death by decapitation the official method of capital punishment in the spirit of equality – a principle considered one of the cornerstones of the French Revolution. He argued against the discrepancy in methods of capital punishment used on people from different social standings and the torture that came with many of the executions of common people, such as breaking on the wheel, hanging, and burning. The guillotine was a way of eradicating the torment connected to capital punishment and turning it into strictly the taking of life (Arasse 1989, 4). In this way, the decapitations of the French Revolution marked a transition into a modern period of humanitarian and democratic values; the executions were quick, merciful and equal for everyone.

The beheadings performed during the revolution gained a central visual-political position since the guillotine came to be an important representation of revolutionary justice; the execution of people was also the execution of the law of the people and thus of justice (Arasse 1989, 75). Further, the guillotine's geometrical elegance purported a celebration of mechanical, technical pureness and progress, which ensured the visual victory of reason (Arasse 1989, 55). In this way, the guillotine captured the central elements of modern thinking and the Enlightenment: Humanity, equality, and rationality.

One beheading stands out from the thousands of beheadings borne out by the Revolution and bears a principal status in the image of the Revolution: the beheading of King Louis XVI (Jane 2005, 72). Louis XVI was beheaded on January 21, 1793 and thousands had gathered to witness the execution on the Place de la Révolution. He was executed in order to "consolidate liberty and the peace and calm of the public with the punishment of a tyrant" (Arasse 1989, 51). The image of the beheading of the king embodies the inauguration of the modern French democracy. The decapitation of the king's head is at the same time the decapitation of the head of state and thus plays into a narrative of sovereignty loss, which will be discussed in the next section. The beheading acts as the spectacle of the desanctification of the king and his position (Arasse 1989, 53)

marking the transfer of sovereignty from the king to the people (Arasse 1989, 60). In fact, the execution of the king is the exercise of an act – the act of killing – that was previously monopolized by the sovereign (Jane 2005, 70-71; Foucault 1978, 136); by exercising the right to take life the people adopt the status of the sovereign. The scene of the execution thus comes to tell a story of liberation and modernity, on the one hand, entangled into displays of violence, on the other, showing that the two tendencies are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Both can be contained within the image of beheadings thus emphasizing the complexity of such an image. The symbolic co-existence of violence and liberation helps us understand the ISIS beheadings as more than mere acts of evil and as such undoes the underlying logic of the rhetoric of evil by affording complexity to the image of beheadings.

The Body Politic and the Signs of Sovereignty

The body politic – the trope of the social as a body (D. Campbell 1998, 75) – is the oldest political metaphor in history going all the way back to Aesop's fable and Plato's *Republic* (Harvey 1999, 85). It has most famously been visually represented on the iconic cover of Hobbes' famous *Leviathan*, where the body of the sovereign is comprised of the people while the head distinctly belongs to the powerful king, indicated by a crown. As mentioned, this image also informs the meaning ascribed to the beheading of the French king described above.

The image of the body politic places the 'Leviathan' – the sovereign that represents and rules the state – as the head of the body. The head is a site of power (Jane 2005, x); it is the centre that controls the body and the home of the ability to think. The head occupies the position as the highest authority of the body and thus possesses the supremacy that is indicative of sovereignty (Brown 2010, 22). In light of this, decapitation comes to represent a stripping of power.

The inter-iconic relation to the body politic produces the image of ISIS beheadings as symbols of power usurpations. The Western hostages in the ISIS videos function as symbolic stand-ins for their nation-states and the acts perpetrated against them become by proxy acts against the U.S. and the U.K. What is at stake in the beheading image when we take the icon of the body politic into account is a challenge to the sovereignty

of the Western powers. The repeated appearance of 'Jihadi John' as the main executioner acts as an additional symbolic layer in this context: The British accent reminds the West and its political leaders of the threats luring in their own backyards; of the many people living inside the borders of Western states that are supporters of ISIS, which is evident in the large numbers of Westerners – both women and men – joining ISIS (Trofimov 2015). This symbol feeds into the breakdown of the distinction between the inside and the outside of the sovereign nation and represents the *ungovernability* of the power of ISIS operating within the borders of (Western) nation states (Brown 2010, 24-25). The masked appearance of 'Jihadi John' further emphasizes the way in which these internal threats to Western states operate, namely as invisible and unidentifiable, making them hard for the state to address.

In addition to threatening Western sovereign state power, the scene of the beheaded body acts as a declaration of ISIS's sovereignty. As Foucault has shown, the sovereign is defined by the right to kill (Foucault 1978, 136) and the spectacle of public executions are to be understood as political manifestations of power (Foucault 1995, 47). The crime that is being punished (keep in mind, that the victims in the ISIS beheading videos are proxies of their political leaders) is an injury to the sovereign and the public execution acts as a reconstitution of the sovereign and a manifestation of his superior force and strength at its most spectacular (Foucault 1995, 48-49). The visuality of the ISIS beheadings can thus be read as a public declaration of victory:

> "(…) the public execution has two aspects: one of victory, the other of struggle. It brought to a solemn end a war, the outcome of which was decided in advance, between the criminal and the sovereign; it had to manifest the disproportion of power of the sovereign over those whom he had reduced to impotence." (Foucault 1995, 50)

As we can see, the image of the beheadings comes to represent a manifestation of sovereign power for ISIS and is thus used as a narrative of victory in the battle between the West and ISIS. More importantly, the reproduction of the image of ISIS beheadings that takes place in the inter-iconicity with the body politic transforms our understanding of ISIS from evildoers to political actors engaging in a power struggle.

Visual Complexities in the Image of ISIS Beheadings

As Regina Jane has argued, the operation of decapitation as a symbolic practice pre-
cedes the mere violence of the act (Jane 2005, xii; 3) and the previous two sections have
been aimed at getting at the symbolic layer underlying the immediate violence and bru-
tality of the ISIS beheadings, which are the elements that inform the rhetoric of evil.
At the level of inter-iconicity, we have seen how the image of the ISIS beheadings can
be reproduced in relation to the image of the guillotine beheadings of the French Revo-
lution and the body politic. Exploring these references undoes the reading of the ISIS
beheadings as facts of evil and thus presents a disruption to the rhetoric of evil. What
they uncover is a complexity of meanings inherent in the image, which can be drawn
out to expand the conditions of possibility when it comes to talking about and acting
towards ISIS. The inter-iconic reference to the body politic shows a strong element of
power struggle at play in the ISIS beheadings, which rewrites the moralizing effects of
the rhetoric of evil and recognizes the political character of the ISIS beheadings. The
image of guillotine beheadings, in addition, reveals the ability of the image of behead-
ings to simultaneously contain seemingly paradoxical elements of violence and libera-
tion thus rupturing the dichotomist distinction between evil and good – ISIS and the
West – inherent in the rhetoric of evil. The inter-iconic reference to the guillotine be-
headings adds an element to the ISIS beheadings that rejects the purity of evilness as-
cribed to ISIS, while at the same time muddling the moral innocence of the West by
demonstrating that beheadings are a historically important part of modern, Western his-
tory. This muddling offers an important opportunity for a critical assessment of the
West's engagement in acts of violence. Ultimately, this might "provide the conditions
for breaking out of the quotidian acceptance of war" (Butler 2010, 11).

Re-reading the image of ISIS beheadings trough an inter-iconic lens offers us a way
to rethink the roles of ISIS and the West as political and multifaceted, rather than moral
and one-dimensional. Transforming the way we see the ISIS beheadings thus enables a
widening of the conditions of possibility within the realm of international politics and
ultimately permits political actions, which are not necessarily informed by violence and
warfare.

Conclusions

The importance of images and visuality for international relations has become more and more apparent in recent years. However, the existing set of analytical tools for studying visual phenomena in international politics are still under-developed, and the number of case studies remains inadequate. This article has contributed to filling these gaps. Firstly, the article has added to the limited 'tool kit' available to scholars who wish to analyse images in IR by proposing an expansion of Hansen's concept of inter-iconicity and demonstrating how the concept can be empirically applied. Secondly, studying the case of ISIS within a visual IR framework has both presented a largely overlooked perspective on beheading videos and generated useful knowledge about an understudied phenomenon – ISIS's beheading videos – in academia.

The ISIS beheading videos of Western victims published during the fall of 2014 inscribe themselves into a series of events that have demonstrated the importance of visual imagery for international politics. The videos, which quickly spread across Western media and gained iconic status, have helped shape the conditions of possibility for the constellation of international identities and politics surrounding ISIS. The ISIS beheading videos thus functioned as visual building blocks for the rhetoric of evil that informed the subsequent military actions undertaken by Western political leaders, and which continues to condition a simplistic understanding of ISIS that legitimizes Western warfare. While characterizing ISIS as 'the face of evil' in reaction to the beheading videos might seem harmless at first glance, a closer examination of the value judgment of evil reveals how such a response reproduces problematic identity constellations between the West and ISIS, blocking a nuanced understanding of the complexities in the ISIS narrative and inhibiting critique of Western warfare. Further, the discourse privileges the use of violence in responding to ISIS and closes off possibilities for political action that could act as an alternative to warfare.

In response to the designation of ISIS as 'the face of evil', I have attempted to extrapolate meaning from the ISIS beheading image that runs *counter* to the rhetoric of evil. This was made possible by broadening Hansen's concept of inter-iconicity and using it as an analytical tool to draw out alternative meanings of the ISIS beheading image. Reading the image in relation to the guillotine beheadings of the French Revolu-

tion erases the sharp dichotomy between ISIS and the West and rejects the moral glori-fication of the West inherent in the rhetoric of evil, while the reference to the body poli-tic exposes the beheadings as political manifestations of power and sovereignty, rather than expressions of evil. The inter-iconic reading of the ISIS beheading image thus works towards breaking the image out of the context of the rhetoric of evil and rewriting the ISIS beheadings as more than merely depictions of pure evil.

I wish to stress, in conclusion, that challenging the mobilization of the ISIS behead-ing videos as visual evidence for evildoing should not be read as a defence of ISIS or the violence the group is responsible for. Rather it is an attempt to enable an expansion of the conditions of possibility for political action and foster a *general* critical stance against the acceptance of warfare and the spiral of violence, it feeds.

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Lige for lige? Kønssegregering i Folketingudvalg og i ledelsen af det private erhvervsliv[13]

Christina Fiig og Mette Verner

I den brede, internationale opinion anskues Danmark som en af 'verdensmestrene' i ligestilling både i relation til parlamentarisk politik, kvinders andel af den aktive arbejdsstyrke og uddannelsesniveau. Denne opfattelse afspejles også på en række parametre i de evalueringer af kønsmæssig ligestilling, som FN udarbejder i regi af CEDAW-konventionen, og som produceres i EU og World Economic Forum. Selvom Danmark hen over de sidste år har set sig overhalet af andre lande, er vores position stadig veletableret. Nordisk kønsforskning har påpeget, at nordiske kvinders indflydelse især ligger i den demokratisk valgte kanal som medlemmer af parlamenter (Dahlerup 1988, 2011; Hernes 1987; Bergqvist et al. 1999, Holli 2003, 2006; Raaum 1995; Skjeie 1992; Togeby 1995; Wängnerud 1998; 2009), som også typisk er et af de parametre, som Danmarks ligestillingssucces måles på. Den danske verdensmesterposition fremstår dog mere traditionel og mindre kønsligestillet, hvis man retter blikket mod andre områder end Folketingsvalg. Det er interessant at undersøge, hvordan kønsbalancen tegner sig, når vi netop *ikke* betragter fordeling af positioner på baggrund af demokratiske valg til Folketinget.

I denne artikel har vi udvalgt to typer af eliter med henblik på at beskrive, hvordan kønsbalancen fordeler sig og at diskutere årsager hertil. To eliter, der umiddelbart er karakteriseret ved hhv. en forholdsvis balanceret fordeling mellem kvinder og mænd (parlamentarisk politik) og af en skæv kønsbalance (den økonomiske sektor). Denne elitedefinition afgrænses til Folketingets Præsidium og stående udvalg på den ene side og de største danske virksomheders direktioner og bestyrelser samt de økonomiske organisationer på den anden. På baggrund af disse data undersøger artiklen spørgsmålet: Hvordan kan vi forklare datamaterialets udtalte horisontale og vertikale segregering i Folketingets ledelse og -udvalg samt i det private erhvervslivs bestyrelser og økonomiske organisationer?

Vores analyser af kønsfordelingen perspektiverer til debatter om køn, demokrati og beslutningsmagt. Personer med positionsmagt inden for disse eliter tager beslutninger med gyldighed for både det lokale, nationale (og internationale) niveau med betydning for borgernes velfærd, arbejdspladser og offentlige institutioner (Christiansen, Møller og Togeby 2001). Et centralt begreb er her vertikal og horisontal segregering, som beskriver opdeling af magt og ressourcer på forskellige niveauer. I litteraturen anvendes dette i et kønsperspektiv i diskussioner af kvinder og mænd i politik. Vi tilslutter os Raaums definition: "The vertical division of labour is concerned with the position of men and women in political hierarchies, while the horizontal division of labour focuses on the various policy areas in which women and men work" (Raaum 1995, 29; også i Baekgaard og Kjaer 2012, 467). I relation til vores analyse dækker den vertikale segregering ledelsesniveauet og en kønsmæssig opdeling eller arbejdsdeling mellem direktører, formænd og næstformænd og øvrige medlemmer af bestyrelser og udvalg. Den horisontale segregering dækker udvalg og bestyrelser på samme niveau, som adskiller sig i forhold til de policy-områder, som de beskæftiger sig med (Baekgaard og Kjaer 2012, 467).

Artiklen er struktureret som følger: Indledningsvist udfoldes den eksisterende litteratur og artiklens centrale teoretiske perspektiver, hvorefter to afsnit følger med en præsentation af undersøgelsens data. I det afsluttende afsnit diskuteres litteraturens forklaringer på den vertikale og horisontale segregering, som vores data dokumenterer.

Eksisterende litteratur

Tre kontekster for feltets litteratur er det kønsopdelte arbejdsmarked, den skæve køns-balance i topledelse og eliter samt kvinderepræsentation i parlamentariske udvalg. De skandinaviske magtudredninger har entydigt konkluderet, at mænd i langt overvejende grad besidder de magtfulde positioner i toppen af disse landes samfundshierarkier og har dokumenteret en parallel 'eliteintern rangordning' med relativt lige kønsfordeling blandt de valgte parlamentarikere og ganske få kvinder i de øvrige eliter (Christiansen, Møller og Togeby 2002; Göransson red. 2006; Guldbrandsen et al. 2002; Skjeie og Teigen 2003).

Det første felt er det danske arbejdsmarked, som er kendetegnet ved at være køns-opdelt (Dolado et al. 2004). Tidligere komparative studier dokumenterer, at Danmark og de øvrige skandinaviske lande har en særdeles høj grad af kønsmæssig horisontal og vertikal segregering, hvilket kan virke overraskende, idet disse lande – som omtalt ind-ledningsvist – er rangordnet blandt de lande med den højeste grad af ligestilling mellem kønnene (World Economic Forum 2014). En forklaring på den høje horisontale segrege-ring er, at den offentlige sektor i de skandinaviske lande er stor, og at kvinder har præfe-rencer for at arbejde i den offentlige sektor. En vigtig årsag til dette er at der i højere grad end i den private sektor er implementeret familievenlige politikker (Nielsen et al. 2004). Mange offentlige stillinger er at finde indenfor børnepasning, undervisning, sundhed og ældrepleje, og derfor er mange kvinder uddannede og beskæftigede i disse traditionelle 'kvindefag'. Årsagen til den høje grad af vertikal segregering af arbejds-markederne i de skandinaviske lande (Dolado 2004; World Economic Forum 2014) er i høj grad den lave andel af kvinder, der er at finde i de allerhøjeste stillinger i det private erhvervsliv. Smith et al. (2013) forklarer blandt andet dette med, at selv når kvinder avancerer til lederstillinger i de private virksomheder, ansættes de ofte som ledere i stabsfunktioner indenfor HR, forskning, udvikling og IT. Rekruttering og forfremmelse til administrerende direktør foregår sjældent fra disse områder, men oftest fra ledelsen indenfor økonomi, salg og produktion. Ifølge Smith et al. (2013) er der dog stadigt en høj grad af usikkerhed om, hvorfor kvinder og mænd ikke forfremmes i samme grad, selv når der i analyserne er taget højde for en række faktorer som forskelle i, hvilke an-svarsområder mænd og kvinder besidder, familievenlige politikker og barselsperioder.

Det andet felt er litteraturen omkring køn og den politiske og økonomiske elite, der lige-ledes beskæftiger sig med diskussionen af årsager til den skæve kønsbalance. Forsknin-gen peger her på forskellige forklaringer. En forklaring er, at den kønsmæssige skævhed på ledelsesniveau hænger sammen med homosocial reproduktion (Elliott et al. 2004). Dette begreb teoretiserer rekruttering. Idéen er her, at personer, som rekrutterer formelt og uformelt til stillinger, vil have en tendens til at vælge kandidater med karakteristika, der minder om deres egne. Mænds tilbøjelighed til at vælge mænd til magtpositioner kan hænge sammen med en genkendelighed i kvalifikationer, som den homosociale reproduktion lægger op til. På det private arbejdsmarked tyder undersøgelser på, at der kan findes ledelse, der består af 'mandlige homosociale enklaver' (Højgaard 2008, 146) f.eks. inden for primærerhvervene og fremstillingsvirksomhed. Virksomheds- eller or-ganisationsinterne rekrutteringspotentialer er meget forskellige i de forskellige sektorer (Højgaard 2008, 147). En anden forklaring hentes i den økonomiske forskning. Her for-klares en lav andel af kvinder blandt ledere ofte med teorien om 'statistisk diskriminati-on' (Phelps 1972). 'Statistisk diskrimination' kan forekomme i de tilfælde, hvor ar-bejdsgiver som baggrund for valg af en ny leder bruger sine forventninger til, hvor kva-lificerede medarbejdere henholdsvis kvinder og mænd er. Hvis arbejdsgi-ver/beslutningstager bygger sine forventninger på traditionelle kønsopfattelser og histo-riske data, kan man være mindre tilbøjelige til at ansætte kvindelige ledere.

En tredje forklaring på den skæve kønsbalance i ledelse hentes i Højgaards undersø-gelse (2002) af kvinder og mænd i toppositioner inden for erhvervsliv, offentlig admini-stration og politik. Hypotesen er her, at forskelle på de strukturelle betingelser for kvin-der og mænd inden for de tre sektorer og deres håndtering af disse betingelser bidrager til at forklare kønsforskelle på eliteniveau. De væsentligste forklaringsparametre er for-skelle i adgangsbetingelser og livssituation for henholdsvis kvinder og mænd. Med an-dre ord: Partners beskæftigelsesgrad og generelle livssituation danner strukturelle ram-mer for arbejdslivet. Kvindelige chefers partnere arbejder i langt højere grad end mand-lige chefers partnere på fuld tid. De kvindelige ledere og chefer, som er samboende, lever i højere grad end mandlige chefer i to-karriere-familier. Der er med andre ord asymmetri i partnerrelationer mellem de kvindelige og mandlige chefer, som derfor i overvejende grad har forskellige livsbetingelser som ramme for deres arbejds- og fami-

lieliv. Det samme gælder – om end i mindre grad – for danske kvindelige og mandlige Folketingspolitikere (Højgaard 2002).

Traditionelt har kvinder dannet par med partnere med længere uddannelse end dem selv, og dermed har det oftest været partneren i parforholdet, som har gjort karriere, mens kvinden i højere grad f.eks. har arbejdet på deltid og taget den største del af ansvaret for familien. Efterhånden, som kvinder i højere grad også får en universitetsuddannelse, er der flere og flere par, hvor begge parter er højtuddannede (Nielsen og Svarer 2009). Det betyder, at der er en større chance for, at begge parter potentielt har en krævende arbejdskarriere og disse dobbelt-karrierefamilier vil være udfordrede i forhold til at balancere familie- og arbejdsliv. Således viser Smith et al. (2013), at blandt mandlige topledere er andelen af partnere, der også har en tilsvarende høj stilling 3-5 %, mens det for kvindelige topledere er 12-15 %, der har en partner med en topposition. Analyserne viser, at mænd, der har en ikke-topleder partner, har større sandsynlighed for forfremmelse end de mænd, der har en topleder-partner. For kvinder findes der ikke en helt så entydig sammenhæng. I forlængelse af partnervalget følger arbejdsfordeling. Kvinder udfører stadig mest husarbejde og har i høj grad ansvar for børnepasning, ligesom de også tager langt den største andel af barslen. En lang række danske og internationale studier (Albrecht et al. 1999; 2015; Rossin-Slater 2013) viser, at højtuddannede kvinders benyttelse af barsels- og forældreorlov har langvarige konsekvenser for løngabet mellem kvinder og mænd. Løngabet skyldes for højtuddannede i høj grad, at de sidder i forskellige typer af stillinger (Nielsen et al. 2004).

Det tredje forskningsfelt belyser kvinders repræsentation i nationale parlamenters stående udvalg og spørgsmålet om forskelle mellem deskriptiv og substantiel repræsentation. Konklusioner fra disse studier peger i retning af, at kvinder generelt er underrepræsenterede på de mest magtfulde positioner, og at der er en tendens til at fordele udvalgsposter efter, hvad kan karakterisere som 'traditionelle' kønsopfattelser eller kønsstereotyper (Bolzendahl 2014; Heath et al. 2005; Pansardi og Vercesi 2016; Wängnerud 2009). Kvindelige parlamentarikere er udelukkede eller kun repræsenterede med få medlemmer i udvalg om økonomi, udenrigspolitik og finans. Derimod er der høj kvinderepræsentation i udvalg omhandlende uddannelse, sundhed, velfærd og familie (Heath et al. 2005, 434). Dette afspejles i flere landestudier.

I studiet af det italienske parlaments udvalg i perioden 1994-2013 konkluderer Pansardi og Vercesi (2016), at kvindelige parlamentarikere i højere grad udpeges til udvalg, som beskæftiger sig med stereotypt kvindelige policy felter end mandlige parlamentarikere, og at venstrefløjspartier i mindre omfang reproducerer dette mønster end højrefløjspartier. Dette gælder dog ikke i tilfælde af udpegning til de mest prestigefyldte poster. Det italienske studie viser, at der ikke er væsentlige ændringer hen over den undersøgte tidsperiode og konkluderer derfor, at kønsbias i udpegning til parlamentariske udvalg er et kendetegn ved italiensk politik. I Bolzendahls (2014) undersøgelse af det, hun karakteriserer som 'den kønnede organisering af parlamentariske udvalg' i Tyskland, Sverige og USA i en 40-års periode (1968/71-2009) er konklusionen parallel. På baggrund af de tre cases fastslår Bolzendahl, at der er nogle fælles institutionelle konstruktioner af kønsforskelle (2014, 870), og at den horisontale og vertikale kønsarbejdsdeling både i udvalgsposter og ledelse afdækker en tendens til, at mænd associeres med 'instrumental issues' (udenrigspolitik, transport, finans og skat) og at kvinder associeres med udvalgsposter med 'social issues' (kultur, sundhed og menneskerettigheder (2014, 870).

Et dansk studie af udpegning til kommunale udvalg efter kommunalvalget i 2009 bidrager ligeledes med værdifuld viden til vores analyse. Baekgaard og Kjaer (2012) konkluderer, at udpegning til udvalg i kommunalpolitik ikke er kønsneutral (2012, 479), og at en årsag til, at kvindelige og mandlige politikere er placeret i forskellige udvalg, er, at de har forskellige præferencer.

I litteraturen angives en række forklaringer på en kønnet fordeling af 'political offices' i form af kulturelle faktorer (udbredelse af ligestillingsværdier i et samfund, se f.eks. Inglehart og Norris 2003), institutionelle faktorer (udvælgelsesprocedure), partiforhold (partiideologi, se Heath et al. 2005), tilstedeværelse af kvinder i ledelse i partiorganisationen (Krook og O'Brian 2012) og individuelle faktorer som tidligere erfaring i parlamentet (Heath et al. 2005) (denne opdeling er fra Pansardi og Vercesi 2016: 3).

Teoretisk ramme

På linje med magtudredningerne abonnerer vi på et institutionelt magtbegreb, som bygger på en opfattelse af, at institutioner giver magt til personer, som er placeret på de øverste institutionelle poster. Vi afgrænser undersøgelsens genstand til beslutningstagere, som indtager formelle toppositioner ved ulige institutioner og organisationer i Dan-

mark. Disse institutioner besidder magtressourcer af ulige karakter, som står til beslut-
ningstagernes rådighed som økonomiske, organisatoriske og symbolske ressourcer,
sanktionsmuligheder samt muligheder for at belønne. Positioner, hvis indehavere dispo-
nerer over disse ressourcer, identificeres som magtpositioner (Göransson 2006, 14-15).
Elitepersoner forstår vi som betydningsfulde aktører med positionsmagt, der tager be-
slutninger med gyldighed for vigtige samfundsområder – altså de personer, som "besid-
der tilstrækkelige ressourcer til at kunne påvirke samfundets udvikling". Ressourcerne
vil ofte være en rimelig god indikator på faktisk magtudøvelse (Christiansen, Møller og
Togeby 2001, 12).

Begrebet om horisontal og vertikal segregering knyttes i det følgende sammen med
et begreb om køn og værdi inspireret af Göransson (2006) og Hirdman (1990). Görans-
son påpeger, at opfattelser af, hvad der er 'kvindeligt' og 'mandligt' varierer meget over
tid og rum, og påpeger samtidigt, at det er en generel tendens, at kvindelig handling
vurderes lavere end mandlig handling uanset, hvad en sådan går ud på (2006, 23). Op-
fattelser af en sådan værdisætning kan også variere således, at afstanden mellem det
kvindelige og det mandliges værdisætning er større i bestemte kulturer, tider og sam-
menhænge end i andre. Der findes med Göranssons ord en systematik trods forandrin-
ger og variationer, der bygger på et værdihierarki i samfundet, som er knyttet til køn, og
som forbinder mandlighed og overordning (Göransson 2006, 23-24). Göransson refere-
rer her til den svenske historiker Yvonne Hirdman (1990) og hendes principper om et
kønsmæssigt værdihierarki. Hirdmans argument er, at et hierarki medvirker til, at mand-
lighed associeres med overordning og kontrol, og at kvindelighed ikke associeres på
samme måde. Manden vurderes som norm, som kvinden mere eller mindre afviger fra.
Hirdmands to principper om hierarkisk ordning af køn og manden som norm manifeste-
rer sig på alle arenaer af samfundet.

I det følgende gennemgår vi centrale data, der beskriver kønsfordelingen inden for
den økonomiske og politiske elite.

a) Den økonomiske elite

Kønsfordelingen i ledelsen af den danske økonomi og det danske erhvervsliv belyses ved to forskellige parametre: kønsfordelingen i ledelsen af de børsnoterede virksomheder i det private erhvervsliv og i ledelsen af en række økonomiske institutioner.

I analysen af det private erhvervsliv vælger vi at inddrage alle de børsnoterede virksomheder i Danmark. Det betyder, at det er en selekteret gruppe af virksomheder, som ikke kan betragtes som repræsentative for hele det danske erhvervsliv. Denne afgrænsning medfører, at det er de største og mest toneangivende virksomheder der inddrages, og der kan argumenteres for, at det dermed er de virksomheder, der har de mest professionelle ledelser. Dermed kan det også forventes, at det er en stor del af den økonomiske elite, der indgår i ledelsen af disse virksomheder.

De børsnoterede virksomheder

Den vertikale segregering i ledelsen af de danske virksomheder er et kendt fænomen (Se f.eks. Smith et al. 2006; 2013). I denne undersøgelse fokuserer vi på kønssammensætningen i topledelsen i de børsnoterede virksomheder og dermed i de største og mest toneangivende virksomheder. Den administrerende direktør er ansat af bestyrelsen, mens bestyrelsesmedlemmer vælges af generalforsamlingen i virksomheden. Oftest er kandidater til bestyrelsen udvalgt og indstillet af bestyrelsen og dermed kan uformelle netværk have indflydelse på, hvem der sidder i virksomhedernes bestyrelser. Tabel 1 illustrerer den kønsmæssige sammensætning af den absolutte topledelse, nemlig blandt bestyrelsesformænd og administrerende direktører[14].

På baggrund af tabel 1 er det tydeligt, at kvinder stort set ikke er repræsenteret blandt danske topledere i de børsnoterede virksomheder. Andelen af kvindelige bestyrelsesformænd har i perioden ligget næsten uændret på 1 % (hvilket svarer til 2 kvindelige formænd). Kvindeandelen blandt administrerende direktører har i det meste af perioden været 1-2 %. Der er således en meget lav repræsentation af kvinder på de mest indflydelsesrige poster. Når ledelsesbegrebet udvides til at inkludere hele den daglige

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[14] Tallene adskiller sig fra bl.a. EU's tal. EU's statistikker indeholder kun data for de 20 største danske børsnoterede virksomheder. Dette vil sige, at talgrundlaget i nærværende undersøgelse er mere omfattende.

ledelse, fremgår det, at kvinderepræsentationen er noget højere, nemlig mellem 6 % og 12 %. Tendensen var i de første år stigende, mens den i de senere år er stagneret og i de seneste år en anelse faldende. Andelen af kvindelige bestyrelsesmedlemmer i virksomhederne er 12 % i 2012 (se tabel 2) og en stor del af disse er medarbejdervalgte bestyrelsesmedlemmer. Overordnet set kan vi konkludere, at den vertikale kønssegregering i de øverste ledelseslag er markant i disse virksomheder, og at udviklingen i perioden ikke har betydet, at dette billede har ændret sig væsentligt.

Tabel 1: Andelen af kvinder blandt bestyrelsesformænd, administrerende direktører og den daglige ledelse for de danske børsnoterede virksomheder.

År	Bestyrelses-formænd (%)	Adm. direktø-rer (%)	Daglig le-delse (%)	Antal virksom-heder
1996	1	2	6	241
1997	1	2	9	241
1998	1	3	8	233
1999	1	2	7	234
2000	1	1	8	236
2001	1	0	8	225
2002	1	1	7	205
2003	1	1	9	195
2004	1	1	10	188
2005	1	1	10	179
2006	1	1	10	171
2007	0	3	10	171
2008	1	2	12	183
2009	1	2	12	185
2010	2	2	12	175
2011	1	2	11	167
2012	1	2	9	163

Note 1: Kilde er Greens opslagsværk om dansk erhvervsliv – årbogen for hver af de respektive år. Kilde til de danske børsnoterede virksomheder er dels Greens opslagsværk om dansk erhvervsliv for hvert år samt Nasdaq OMX.

I forhold til andre danske undersøgelser (Smith at al. 2006, 2013) er det værd at bemærke, at den vertikale segregering er endnu mere udtalt, når man som her fokuserer på de børsnoterede virksomheder, end når man ser på et større udsnit af det danske erhvervs-

liv. Det bekræfter altså hypotesen om, at der i erhvervslivets økonomiske elite er store kønsskævheder.

I tabel 2 er de børsnoterede virksomheder klassificeret efter brancher for år 2012. Det fremgår, at der kun optræder kvindelige bestyrelsesformænd indenfor fremstillings-sektoren, og at de kvindelige administrerende direktører hovedsageligt er koncentreret i fremstillingssektoren samt indenfor forskning og udvikling. Når de øvrige bestyrelses-medlemmer og den daglige ledelse betragtes, er segregeringen dog ikke helt så tydelig, idet kvindeandelene her rent faktisk er størst i de øvrige brancher. Én sektor, der dog skiller sig ud, er 'bygge og anlæg', hvor der ingen kvinder er i nogle af de undersøgte kategorier (men her er der også kun 3 børsnoterede virksomheder i 2012).

Tabel 2: Procentdelen af kvinder i forskellige ledelseskategorier, hvor de danske børs-noterede selskaber er opdelt på branche. År 2012.

Branche	Bestyrel-sesfor-mænd (%)	Adm. di-rektører (%)	Daglig ledelse (%)	Bestyrel-sesmed-lemmer (%)	Medar-bejder-valgte bestyrel-sesmed-lemmer (%)	Antal virk-somheder
Finans og forret-ningsser-vice	0	2	6	13	38	87
Fremstil-ling	4	4	11	11	27	25
Bygge og anlæg	0	0	0	0	0	3
Forskning og udvik-ling	0	5	18	10	16	19
En gros, handel og transport	0	0	10	12	16	29

Note 2: Kilde er Greens opslagsværk om dansk erhvervsliv – årgang 2012.

De danske økonomiske organisationer

I dette afsnit belyses kønsfordelingen i ledelsen af en række danske økonomiske organisationer og institutioner i år 2014. Valget af disse økonomiske organisationer og institutioner er truffet ud fra en betragtning om, at de er fremtrædende i den offentlige debat og repræsenterer væsentlige økonomiske interesser i det danske samfund.

Tabel 3: Fordelingen af kvinder og mænd i ledelsen af diverse danske økonomiske organisationer. År 2014.

Organisation	Antal kvinder	Antal mænd	Kvinder (%)	Mænd (%)	Formandens køn
Offentlige institutioner					
Det økonomiske råd	3	18	14	86	
Det miljø-økonomiske råd	7	13	35	65	
De økonomiske råds formandskab	0	4	0	100	Mand
Nationalbanken	2	5	29	71	Mand
Kommunernes Landsforening	3	14	18	82	Mand
Danske Regioner	9	8	53	47	Mand
Arbejdstagerorganisationer					
LO Danmark	3	11	21	79	Mand
Akademikernes Centralorganisation	4	6	40	60	Mand
FTF – Hovedorganisationen for Offentligt og Privat Ansatte	6	6	50	50	Kvinde
Kommunernes Tjenestemænd og Overenskomstansatte	8	8	50	50	Mand
Ledernes Hovedorganisation	5	15	25	75	Mand
Centralorganisationernes Fællesudvalg	5	20	20	80	
Sundhedskartellet	9	2	82	18	Kvinde
Arbejderbevægelsens Erhvervsråd	2	7	22	78	Mand
Lønmodtagernes Dyrtidsfond	3	4	43	57	Mand
Erhvervsorganisationer					
Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening	0	21	0	100	Mand
Dansk Industri	1	11	8	92	Mand
Dansk Byggeri	1	11	8	92	Mand
Håndværksrådet	1	11	8	92	Mand
Finansrådet	1	8	11	89	Mand
Landbrug & Fødevarer	1	5	17	83	Mand
Dansk Erhverv	5	27	16	84	Mand

Note 3: Kilde til tallene er organisationernes hjemmesider, som det fremgår efteråret 2014.

Organisationerne er inddelt i 3 hovedkategorier, nemlig offentlige institutioner, arbejdstagerorganisationer og erhvervsorganisationer (inkl. arbejdsgiverorganisationer). Kvindeandelene i organisationernes ledelser generelt er højere end kvindeandelene i ledelsen af de børsnoterede virksomheder. I ledelsen af de offentlige institutioner udgør kvinder 14-50 %, med den ene undtagelse af det økonomiske råds formandskab, hvor der ingen kvinder er (og siden rådet blev oprettet i 1962 har der kun siddet én kvinde i formandskabet (1995-1998). I alle offentlige organisationer er formanden en mand.

Arbejdstagerorganisationerne er de organisationer, hvor kvinder er bedst repræsenteret i ledelserne. Den laveste kvindeandel findes i Centralorganisationernes Fællesudvalg (som repræsenterer 98c% af alle statsansatte) med ca. 20 %, mens kvindeandelen i ledelsen af Sundhedskartellet er den højeste, nemlig 82 %. Det er også i disse organisationer de kvindelige formænd er at finde, idet 2 ud af 8 formænd er kvinder.

I erhvervsorganisationerne er kvinderne kun meget beskedent repræsenteret, hvilket afspejler kvindernes lave deltagelse i ledelserne af de (store) danske virksomheder. I ingen af organisationerne er der mere end 17 % kvinder i ledelsen. Desuden er heller ingen af formændene kvinder i denne gruppe af organisationer.

Vi kan konkludere, at der er stor variation mellem organisationerne i forhold til kønsbalance i ledelse. I ledelsen af arbejdstagerorganisationerne er kvinderne godt repræsenteret, men også i de offentlige institutioner er kvindeandelen relativ høj, dog langt fra 'lige', som ligestillingsloven for nedsættelse af råd nævn og udvalg ellers foreskriver. Derimod er kvindernes andel af ledelsen i det private erhvervslivs organisationer meget begrænset, hvilket givetvis afspejler, at der rekrutteres fra virksomhedernes ledelser, hvor der netop er meget få kvinder.

b)   Den politiske elite

Den danske politiske elite er på linje med de øvrige skandinaviske landes politiske elite karakteriseret ved at være den elite, som har den største grad af kønsbalance med knap 40 % kvindelige og 60 % mandlige medlemmer af Folketinget. Desuden er denne elite

særlig, idet vælgerbefolkningen fungerer som ledvogtere ved et af leddene, nemlig i forbindelse med valg (Christiansen, Møller og Togeby 2001, 35).

I det følgende kikker vi på to parametre i relation til den parlamentariske elite i et 25-årigt perspektiv (1990-2015) i form af 1) ledelse af Folketinget (præsidiet) og 2) køns-fordelingen blandt formænd og næstformænd for Folketingets stående udvalg.[15]

Folketingets ledelse

Hvis vi betragter Folketingets Præsidium i perioden 1990-2015 (tabel 4), tegner der sig et billede af en institution, som er karakteriseret af vertikal kønssegregering. Præsidiet har i hele perioden en mandlig formand og mellem 0 og 2 næstformænd ud af 4 næst-formandsskaber. I sommeren 2015 udnævntes en kvindelig formand for Folketinget i forbindelse med regeringsskiftet. Der er med andre ord stadigt langt flere mandlige end kvindelige politikere i den vertikale politiske ledelse af det danske Folketing, om end der er bevægelse i fordelingen. Når det gælder formandskabet for de stående udvalg i Folketinget, er der ligeledes tale om en vertikal segregering i form af flest mandlige formænd.

I perioden 1990-2010 er andelen af kvindelige og mandlige formænd for de stående udvalg relativt skæv. Siden 2013 har der været over 40 % kvindelige formænd, og det bliver interessant at følge, hvorvidt denne udvikling fortsætter.

Tabel 4 over ledelsen af Folketinget demonstrerer en (gradvis) stigning i andelen af kvindelige formænd og især næstformænd for de stående udvalg i et 25-årigt perspektiv. Stigningen i antallet af kvindelige formænd har fundet sted relativt sent i perioden, hvorimod andelen af kvindelige næstformænd er begyndt at stige lidt tidligere.

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[15] "'Folketingets udvalg' er en række arbejdsgrupper, som Folketinget opretter og udpeger folketingsmed-lemmer til at deltage i. Et udvalgs vigtigste opgave at behandle de lov- og beslutningsforslag, der henvi-ses til behandling i udvalget, men herudover følger udvalget med i udviklingen inden for sit sagsområde, f.eks. ved at stille spørgsmål til en minister. Ministeren kan svare skriftligt eller mundtligt (ministeren kommer i såkaldt samråd med udvalget). Desuden kan et udvalg modtage henvendelser (deputationer) fra organisationer og andre. Der er to forskellige udvalgstyper: Stående udvalg, dvs. faste udvalg, og særlige udvalg. Folketinget har nedsat 30 stående udvalg, hvis sagsområder i vidt omfang svarer til ministeriernes ressortområder. Udvalgenes sagsområder besluttes af Udvalget for Forretningsordenen. Særlige udvalg, der også kaldes ad hoc udvalg, nedsættes til at tage sig af enkelte sager eller særlige emner. De fleste udvalg har 17 medlemmer, og udpegning af medlemmerne sker ved valg i Folketinget efter reglerne for forholdstalsvalg. Da partigrupperne ofte slutter sig sammen i valggrupper, afspejler et udvalgs sammen-sætning ikke nødvendigvis helt sammensætningen i Folketingssalen" (WIKIPEDIA 2016)

Tabel 4. Totalt antal kvinder og mænd i ledelsen af Folketinget. Årene 1990-2015.

Position	1990		1994		1998		2001		2005		2007		2009		2013		2015	
	K	**M**	**K**	**M**	**K**	**M**	**K**	**M**	**K**	**M**	**K**	**M**	**K**	**M**	**K**	**M**	**K**	**M**
Formand for FT	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0
Næstformand	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	3	0	4	0	4	0	4	2	2	2	2
Formand FT stående udvalg	7	20	5	25	18	9	11	16	14	16	11	18	8	21	14	15	13	17
Næstformand FT stående udvalg	18	9	9	21	10	17	15	12	12	18	15	14	11	18	15	15	15	15

Kilder: Folketingets Årbøger 1990-2008, partiernes sekretariater og referat af 2. møde i Folketinget jf. ft.dk 2008-2015.

På baggrund af tabellen kan vi konkludere, at kvindelige MF'er har langt lettere ved at få adgang til næstformandsposter end til den prestigefyldte formandspost for udvalgene. Det ser ud til, at tidsdimensionen også spiller en rolle her, idet det kønsmæssige segregeringsmønster ændrer sig i retning af større kønsbalance i stående udvalgs formands- og næstformandsskaber over tid. Denne udvikling kunne måske pege i retning af en bekræftelse af tesen om 'time-lag': at den relative underrepræsentation af kvinder vil falde over tid (Raaum 1995, 30; se også Dahlerup 2011, 76-78).

Vi har ikke undersøgt, hvilke stående udvalg kvindelige og mandlige parlamentarikere har været og er udvalgsformænd og -næstformænd for, som det f.eks. er blevet gjort i Finland. Finske studier (Forstén 2005) peger i retning af, at kvindelige politikere bliver valgt til formænd for parlamentariske udvalg, der traditionelt har en høj andel af kvindelige medlemmer.

Tabel 5. Folketingsudvalg med over 40% kvindelige medlemmer og under 60% mand-lige medlemmer. Årene 1991-2015.

Udvalg*	1997/98 Antal		1997/98 Andel (%)		2003/04 Antal		2003/04 Andel (%)		1991/92 Antal		1991/92 Andel (%)	
	K	**M**	**K**	**M**	**K**	**M**	**K**	**M**	**K**	**M**	**K**	**M**
Udvalget til valgs prøvelse	9	8	53	47	7	10	41	59	7	10	41	59
By- og Boligudvalget	7	10	41	59	10	7	59	41	8	9	47	53
Indfødsretsudvalget	9	8	53	47	6	11	35	65	7	10	41	59
Kirkeudvalget	10	7	59	41	9	8	53	47	9	8	53	47
Kulturudvalget	8	9	47	53	5	12	29	71	8	9	47	53
Socialudvalget	11	6	65	35	7	10	41	59	12	5	71	29
Uddannelses- og Forsknings-udvalget	10	7	59	41	7	10	41	59	10	7	59	41
Retsudvalget	8	9	47	53	7	10	41	59	7	10	41	59
Sundheds- og Forebyggelses-udvalget	11	6	65	35	10	7	59	41	10	7	59	41

Udvalg*	2009/10 Antal		2009/10 Andel (%)		2014/15 Antal		2014/15 Andel (%)	
	K	**M**	**K**	**M**	**K**	**M**	**K**	**M**
Udvalget til valgs prøvelse	6	11	35	65	7	10	41	59
By- og Boligudvalget	4	13	24	76	14	15	48	52
Indfødsretsudvalget	8	9	47	53	7	10	41	59
Kirkeudvalget	8	9	47	53	11	18	38	62
Kulturudvalget	7	10	41	59	13	16	45	55
Socialudvalget	13	4	76	24	22	7	76	24
Uddannelses- og Forsknings-udvalget	11	5	69	31	14	15	48	52
Retsudvalget	9	8	53	47	13	16	45	55
Sundheds- og Forebyggelses-udvalget	12	5	71	29	16	13	55	45

*Alle udvalg har 17 medlemmer. Efter 2011 består de fleste udvalg dog af 29 med-lemmer. Udvalgenes nyeste navne er brugt. F.eks. Transportudvalget hed tidligere Trafikudvalget osv. Kilder: Folketingets Årbøger 1992-2004 og referat af 2. møde i Folketinget ifølge ft.dk 2008-2015.

Tabel 6. Folketingsudvalg med under 40 % kvindelige medlemmer og over 60 % mandlige medlemmer. Årene 1991-2015.

Udvalg*	1997/98				2003/04				1991/92			
	Antal		Andel (%)		Antal		Andel (%)		Antal		Andel (%)	
	K	M	K	M	K	M	K	M	K	M	K	M
Det Udenrigspoliti-ske Nævn	2	15	12	88	3	14	18	82	4	13	24	76
Finansudvalget	5	12	29	71	4	13	24	76	4	13	24	76
Forsvarsudvalget	3	14	18	82	3	14	18	82	0	17	0	100
Udvalget for Fødeva-rer Landbrug og Fiskeri	4	13	24	76	5	12	29	71	4	13	24	76
Skatteudvalget	5	12	29	71	7	10	41	59	5	12	29	71
Transportudvalget	3	14	18	82	3	14	18	82	2	15	12	88

Udvalg*	2009/10				2014/15			
	Antal		Andel (%)		Antal		Andel (%)	
	K	M	K	M	K	M	K	M
Det Udenrigspoliti-ske Nævn	4	13	24	76	7	10	41	59
Finansudvalget	3	14	18	82	2	15	12	88
Forsvarsudvalget	4	13	24	76	7	22	24	76
Udvalget for Fødeva-rer Landbrug og Fiskeri	5	12	29	71	12	17	41	59
Skatteudvalget	2	15	12	88	9	20	31	69
Transportudvalget	3	14	18	82	7	22	24	76

*Alle udvalg har 17 medlemmer – Efter 2011 består de fleste udvalg af 29 medlem-mer. Udvalgenes nyeste navne er brugt. F.eks. hed Transportudvalget tidligere Trafik-udvalget osv. Kilder: Folketingets Årbøger 1992-2004 og referat af 2. møde i Folke-tinget ifølge ft.dk 2008-2015.

Folketingets stående udvalg

Tabellerne 5 og 6 beskriver kønsfordelingen i en væsentlig del af Folketingets stående udvalg i udvalgte år (1991- 2015). Udvalg, som ikke er inkluderet i denne tabel er bl.a. de udvalg, som ikke har fungeret i hele tidsperioden. Tabellerne er klassificeret på bag-

grund af deres høje andel af medlemmer af det ene køn og hermed en relativt klar køns-segregering. [16]

Til analyse af data over Folketingsudvalgene er vi inspirerede af Hallbergs klassificering (2003). Én kategori af udvalg klassificeres som høj kvinderepræsentation, hvilket omfatter over 40 % kvinder og under 60 % mandlige medlemmer. Dette gælder f.eks. Kirke-, Social-, Uddannelses- og Forskningsudvalget, Retsudvalget og Sundhedsudvalget (tabel 5).

En anden kategori er i hele tidsperioden karakteriseret af en høj grad af repræsentation af mandlige parlamentarikere (defineret som over 60 % mandlige medlemmer og under 40 % kvindelige medlemmer) som f.eks. Det Udenrigspolitiske Nævn, Finansudvalg, Forsvarsudvalg, Fødevarer- Landbrug- og fiskeriudvalg, Skatteudvalg og Transportudvalget (tabel 6). Flere af disse Folketingsudvalg har under 30 % kvindelige medlemmer i hele undersøgelsesperioden. Der er med andre ord tale om en udpræget horisontal segregering og en kønsmæssig arbejdsdeling i de stående udvalg, hvilket ligeledes er en tendens, som afspejles i andre landestudier (Bolzendahl 2014; Hallberg 2003; Niskanen 2011: 26, Pansardi og Vercesi 2016; Wängnerud 2009).

Der optræder dog en interessant undtagelse til denne konklusion, idet Sveriges Rigsdag ser anderledes ud. Siden valget i 2006 har der ikke været nogle stående udvalg i Rigsdagen, som er så tydeligt kønssegregerede, som det er illustreret ovenfor (Niskanen 2011: 26). Den svenske parlamentsudvalgsstruktur karakteriseres af Bolzendahl som en "egalitarian-trending gendered organization" (2014).

Hvis vi samlet betragter kønsfordelingens udvikling i de stående udvalg i et 25-årigt perspektiv, tegner der sig nogle interessante hovedtræk.

Diskussion af forklaringer på horisontal og vertikal kønssegregering

Artiklens beskrivende analyse lægger op til en diskussion af spørgsmålet om, hvordan vi kan forklare datamaterialets horisontale og vertikale kønssegregering i Folketingets udvalg, det private erhvervslivs bestyrelser og de økonomiske organisationer? I lyset af

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[16] De ikke medtagne udvalg er følgende: Udvalget for Forretningsorden, Underudvalg for Forretningsorden, Markedsudvalget, Tilsynet med Folketingets bibliotek, Tilsynet Grundlovens § 71, Sikkerhedspolitisk Udvalg, Udvalget vedr. Grønlandslove, Udvalget vedr. bæredygtig landbrugsudvikling, Udvalget vedr. borgernes rettigheder, Udvalget vedr. analyse af demokrati i Danmark, Udvalget til prøvelse af valgene, Det særlige undersøgelsesudvalg, Udvalget for udlændinge og integrationspolitik, Udvalget for Videnskab og teknologi, Udvalget vedr. Færøerne samt Udvalg til behandling af Grundlovsforslag.

vores data kan vi konkludere, at der er tale om en udtalt grad af kønssegregering på tværs af danske parlamentariske udvalg og det private erhvervslivs bestyrelser/organisationer. En sådan segregering kan måske overraske i lyset af det internationale 'ligestillingsbrand', som Danmark har brystet sig af i flere årtier og i lyset af den relativt høje grad af kvinderepræsentation blandt Folketingets politikere. Der er noget, som tyder på, at kulturelle faktorer i Danmark som udbredelse af ligestillingsværdier i et samfund (Inglehart og Norris 2003; herfra Pansardi og Vercesi 2016) er slået igennem i forhold til valg af kvinder til Folketinget og i forhold til flere kvinder på næstformandsposter i udvalg (den vertikale kønssegregation). Derimod er der ikke noget entydigt, der peger i retning af, at den horisontale kønssegregering er under afvikling i Folketingets udvalgsstruktur. Nordisk kønsforskning har ligeledes påpeget en række felter, hvor kønsligestilling inden for politik ikke er slået stærk igennem (Borchorst og Dahlerup red. 2015; Dahlerup 1988; 2011; Fiig 2009a; 2009b).

Vores data og forskningsspørgsmål afføder to hypoteser, som kan indramme den følgende diskussion. Disse teser bør afprøves i andre og mere kvalitative studier.

Göransson (2006) og Hirdman (1990) argumenterer, som nævnt tidligere, for en sammenhæng mellem segregering, køn og værdi. De identificerer et samfundsmæssigt hierarki, som medvirker til, at mandlighed associeres med overordning og kontrol. I relation til vores problemstilling er ideen, at visse policy-områder som f.eks. økonomi-, finans- og udenrigspolitik associeres med noget mandligt og hermed kommer til at repræsentere (policy-) områder, hvortil kvinder ikke har adgang (også jf. Bolzendahl 2014). Vi kalder dette for tesen om kønsmæssigt værdisætning. Den anden tese henter vi hos Göransson (red. 2006), og den karakteriserer vi som tesen om 'the public eye' eller det, der på dansk kunne kaldes tesen om et 'offentligt blik'. Ideen er her, at jo mindre synligt og jo mindre under offentligt opsyn et politisk område er, jo mindre ligestilling og krav om ligestillingstiltag er det præget af. Det anses for at spille en rolle, i hvor høj grad offentligheden har indsigt i rekrutterings- og ansættelsesprocesser, (om rekrutteringen til en given position er genstand for offentlig debat), om der er formelle regler, der tilsigter en kønsmæssig ligebehandling, og om offentligheden eller politikerne stiller krav til udvælgelse af forskellige typer af topledere/medlemmer (jf. Göransson 2006). Der er her tre trin i form af 1) et offentligt pres, 2) bevidsthed om pres for ligestilling og 3) områder, hvor der hverken er ønsker eller pres for ligestilling.

Tesen om kønsmæssigt værdisætning virker overbevisende i forhold til en vertikal og horisontal segregering i både Folketingsudvalg og i det private erhvervslivs bestyrelser. Spørgsmålet om den horisontale segregering eller arbejdsdeling i Folketingsudvalg og hvad en sådan skyldes, er genstand for debat i litteraturen. Vores data afspejler som nævnt ovenfor studier af parlamentsudvalg i Italien (Pansardi og Vercessi 2016) og i Tyskland, Sverige og USA (Bolzendahl 2014). Vores studium af både det danske erhvervslivs bestyrelser, erhvervsorganisationer, Folketingets ledelse og -udvalgsstruktur peger i retning af, at der udspiller sig en form for kønsmærkning af ledelse og af visse policyområder, som kvinder kun i begrænset omfang har adgang til. Der er hermed centrale demokratiske beslutningsprocesser med gyldighed for samfundet, hvortil kvinder ikke har adgang.

Tesen om et 'offentligt blik' og hermed et offentligt pres for ligestilling virker overbevisende i forhold til valg af medlemmer til Folketinget, hvortil der tilsyneladende er et offentligt pres for at vælge flere kvinder ind, end der er opstillede; et offentligt pres for ligestilling i form af vælgerne, der fungerer som ledvogtere i relation til det antal kvindelige kandidater, som indvælges i Folketinget. Der er – muligvis – kommet en vis bevidsthed og et pres for ligestilling i forhold til at have flere kvinder på næstformandsposter i Folketingets udvalg, som er øget noget igennem undersøgelsesperioden. I udgangspunktet er det private erhvervsliv og det private erhvervslivs bestyrelser et område, hvor der traditionelt hverken har været ønsker om eller et pres for ligestilling. Lidt populært kan vi fastslå, at jo mere privat erhvervsliv, jo mindre offentligt pres. Den kønsskæve sammensætning af bestyrelser og topledelse tilskrives snarere homosocial reproduktion og netværksrekruttering, og dette afspejler sig også i ledelsen af erhvervslivets organisationer.

Der kan muligvis identificeres en antydning af et mere markant offentligt blik på det danske erhvervsliv i form af lovgivningsmæssige krav om måltal for andelen af kvindelige ledere og opfølgning herpå, hvilket blev vedtaget i 2012.

På baggrund af det norske eksempel kan vi konkludere, at et offentligt blik har betydning for kønssegregeringen i det private erhvervslivs bestyrelser – om end resultaterne af den norske lovgivning anskues forskelligt (Teigen 2012; 2015). De omfattede norske virksomheder (ASA-selskaberne) opnåede alle de påkrævede 40 % kvinder i bestyrelsen pr. 1. januar 2008. Iflg. Teigen (2015) har dette dog (endnu) ikke haft den (af

nogle) forventede afsmittende effekt i de lavere ledelseslag. Økonomiske analyser har divergerende konklusioner mht. konsekvenserne af kvoteordningen for bundlinje og aktiekurser (Dale-Olsen et al. 2013; Matsa og Miller 2013). Kvoteordningen i Norge har været effektiv ift. opnåelse af balance i de norske bestyrelser, sandsynligvis i kraft af det offentlige pres i kombination med 'truslen' om sanktioner. Lignende kvoteordninger til det private erhvervsliv er siden den norske indførelse vedtaget i en række andre europæiske lande (Belgien, Tyskland, Italien og Frankrig). Kvoter til det underrepræsenterede køn i politiske forsamlinger har vundet indpas globalt som et 'fast-track' til opnåelse af en højere grad af ligestilling i politik (Dahlerup 2011).

Konklusion

De skandinaviske magtudredninger har entydigt konkluderet, at der er relativt få kvinder i de forskellige typer af eliter, når vi ser bort fra den parlamentariske kanal. Det er altså typisk mænd, som besidder de magtfulde positioner i toppen af disse landes magthierarkier (Christiansen, Møller og Togeby 2001; 2002, Göransson red. 2006; Skjeie og Teigen 2003). En konsekvens er, at megen nordisk samfundsstyring formes i og præges af 'samtaler mellem mænd' (Skjeie og Teigen 2003, 11).

Vores nye data over kønsfordelingen i erhvervslivets bestyrelser, økonomiske organisationer samt Folketingets ledelse og stående udvalg tegner et flertydigt billede. Kvinder og mænd i magtpositioner er kønssegregerede, samler sig altså inden for bestemte områder og udøver forskellig form for magt. Kvinder er bedst repræsenterede på områder, hvortil der rekrutteres via den politiske kanal (valg), hvorimod mænd besidder toppositioner i det private erhvervsliv og i Folketingets ledelse. Der er med andre ord stadigt ganske få kvinder i direktioner, bestyrelser og i positioner som administrerende direktører i det private erhvervsliv.

Hen over de sidste år er der sket visse bevægelser i fordelingen af magtpositioner i Folketinget; især i form af de stående Folketingsudvalg, hvor dele af den vertikale segregering er i forandring. Den horisontale fordeling af medlemmer i de stående udvalg er stadigvæk traditionel, kønssegregeret og peger i retning af behovet for flere, kvalitative undersøgelser. Sådanne kan undersøge tesen om kønsmærkning af politik og hermed også betydningen af det fænomen, som Raaum (1995, 31) har karakteriseret som

'den funktionelle arbejdsdeling i politik' (1995, 31): den horisontale arbejdsdeling i Folketingets stående udvalg og ledelse samt tesen om det offentlige blik. Kvindelige politikere sidder med ved forhandlingsbordet i udvalg, men ikke i vidt omfang i specifikke udvalg med fokus på udenrigspolitik, økonomi/finans og transport. Vores undersøgelse er eksplorativ og kalder på nye kvalitative studier af den horisontale og vertikale kønssegregering i toppen af dansk politik og økonomi.

Litteratur

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Fra krisevalg til jordskredsvalg

Jørgen Goul Andersen og Ditte Shamshiri-Petersen (red.), 2016
Fra krisevalg til jordskredsvalg: Vælgere på vandring 2011-2015
Frydenlund Academic, Frederiksberg
383 sider, 299 kr.

Anmeldt af Erik Gahner Larsen

Fra krisevalg til jordskredsvalg: Vælgere på vandring 2011-2015 er ingenlunde en bog, der er nem at anmelde i én sammenhængende anmeldelse. Det skyldes, at der grundlæggende set er tale om to bøger i én. Forhåndenværende bog er på den ene side en antologi, hvor en lang række kyndige forskere og eksperter stiller skarpt på forskellige aspekter af vælgernes politiske overbevisninger, og på den anden side en traditionel monografi, hvor én forfatter gennem forskellige - men relaterede kapitler - belyser et overordnet tema. Bogen er på overfladen førstnævnte, men fungerer bedst som sidstnævnte.

Konteksten for bogen er perioden mellem 2011-valget, der stod i den økonomiske krises tegn, og 2015-valget, der bliver betegnet som et jordskredsvalg. Hvis man har interesse i at blive klogere på, hvad der er sket med vælgerne i denne periode, eller blot har en generel interesse for dansk politik, er der her tale om en bog, der bør læses.

Det er ellers ikke fordi, det skorter på bøger omhandlende de danske vælgeres politiske adfærd i løbet af de senere år. Således har vi relateret til folketingsvalget 2011 fået bøger som *Krisevalg: Økonomien og folketingsvalget 2011* og *Folketingsvalgkampen 2011 i perspektiv*, der begge fokuserede på, hvordan vælgerne agerede op til og under 2011-valget. Ligeledes kommer der en bog om folketingsvalget 2015 i forbindelse med Det Danske Valgprojekt, så læsere med en særlig interesse for dette valg bliver heller ikke overset. Ikke desto mindre udfylder *Fra krisevalg til jordskredsvalg* et hul i markedet. Det er især grundet bogens eksplicitte fokus på det, der skete med vælgerne mellem de to seneste folketingsvalg.

Heri ligger også bogens største svaghed, nemlig det forhold, at ikke alle kapitler passer lige godt ind i dette fokus. Der er således mange måder at læse bogen på, men der er ingen grund til at læse bogen fra første til sidste side. Til trods for at bogen giver indtryk af at beskæftige sig med vælgerne mellem to valg, er det ikke noget alle bogens forfatte-re fokuserer på, endsige forholder sig til. Den positive udlægning er, at det vil være svært at læse bogen fra første til sidste side uden at læse noget, der fanger ens interesse, hvis man er bare det mindste interesseret i politik.

Én sammenhængende bog?

I bogen er 13 af de 21 kapitler (med)forfattet af Jørgen Goul Andersen, og disse beskæf-tiger sig i de fleste tilfælde med perioden mellem valgene i 2011 og 2015. Disse kapitler fungerer godt sammen, hvorfor det også er uklart, hvorfor det ikke blot er disse 13 ka-pitler, der er skrevet til én sammenhængende bog. Kapitlerne har den fornødne kvalitet til at stå alene, og de andre kapitler, desuagtet den høje kvalitet flere af dem har, står primært i vejen for en samlet læseoplevelse.

Kapitlerne forfattet af Jørgen Goul Andersen er en minutiøs gennemgang af, hvad der skete med og i vælgerkorpset i perioden 2011-2015. Man kommer kort sagt ned i materien og bliver klogere på de danske vælgere. Kapitel 1 leverer et overordnet per-spektiv med nogle grundlæggende ligheder og forskelle mellem 2011- og 2015-valget. Det er en fin introduktion, der formår at sætte rammen for resten af bogen. Fokus er på en analyse af partiernes - og især blokkenes - opbakning i perioden mellem de to valg. 2015-valget sættes her også i en historisk kontekst, hvor det vises, at vælgervolatiliteten er den højeste siden jordskredsvalget i 1973. Omvendt er kapitlet meget deskriptivt med et par overflødige tabeller, der mere har karakter af at være indhold til et opslagsværk end at formidle en pointe. Dette går desværre igen i flere af bogens kapitler. Ligeledes er der nogle aspekter, der med fordel kunne blive diskuteret mere fyldestgørende, og som ikke passer ind i resten af bogens fortælling, herunder hvordan Socialdemokraterne kan betegnes som et antireformparti i perioden 2011 til 2015.

En lang række af kapitlerne, mere specifikt kapitel 2, 3, 4, 7, 14, 16, 20 og 21, der alle har det tilfælles, at de ikke er (med)forfattet af Jørgen Goul Andersen, passer des-værre ikke ind i den ramme, der sættes i det indledende kapitel. Fælles for disse kapitler

er, at de ikke fokuserer på perioden *efter* 2011-valget. Det tætteste flere af kapitlerne kommer på dette er at anvende data, der er indsamlet op til eller under 2011-valget.

Kapitel 2 fokuserer på meningsmålingerne op til 2011-valget. Til dette anvendes udelukkende data fra Epinion, hvilket fungerer godt i gennemgangen af vælgernes opfattelse af de ni partiledere og analysen af tvivlerne, hvor der ikke er sammenlignelige data fra andre meningsmålingsinstitutter. Omvendt virker det, givet netop forekomsten af meningsmålinger fra flere institutter, som et unødigt afgrænsende fokus i analysen af partiernes opbakning. Kapitel 3 bidrager med viden om, hvad vælgerne synes om valgkampen 2011. Dette kapitel bygger på kvalitative data indsamlet gennem nogle vælgeres valgdagbøger. Udfordringen for kapitlet er ikke de indsamlede data, men fraværet af en teoretisk ramme, der kan guide en kvalitativ analyse af de indsamlede data. Dette kapitel pointerer retmæssigt vigtigheden af at anvende mere end spørgeskemaaundersøgelser for at kunne forstå vælgernes holdninger, men er desværre primært en potpourri af pessimistiske udmeldinger fra vælgerne om valgkampen, medierne, politikerne osv.

Kapitel 4 undersøger i hvilket omfang vælgerne tænker på samme måde som de politiske kommentatorer, altså om vælgeren agerer som en politisk kommentator, der ser spin alle vegne. Forfatterne finder først tydelige forskelle i, hvor udbredt strategispilsassociationer er blandt vælgerne, men det er mindre klart fra tolkningen af analysen, om det udvikler sig i løbet af valgkampen 2011. Først skrives der, at vælgerne får statistisk signifikant flere strategispilsassociationer, hvorefter det nævnes, at strategispilsassociationerne kun vokser med en procent, som *ikke* er statistisk signifikant. Sidst undersøges det, om strategispilsassociationer korrelerer med partivalg, men det står ikke klart efter endt læsning, om vi er blevet mere eller mindre kloge på verden, efter at være blevet præsenteret for disse korrelationsanalyser.

I kapitel 5 og 6 er vi tilbage til bogens hovedfokus. Kapitel 5 undersøger vælgervandringer og årsager hertil. Fokus er her på, hvilke partier vælgerne skiftede fra og til mellem de to valg. Til dette anvendes paneldata, der går igen i mange af bogens kapitler og giver nogle klare styrker i forhold til de fænomener, der kan belyses. Kapitel 6 fokuserer på, hvad klassiske (socio)demografiske forhold som køn, alder, klasse og bolig betød for sandsynligheden for at stemme på et socialistisk parti. Der er intet nyt under solen her, hvorfor dette forholdsvist lange kapitel nemt kan læses kursorisk.

I kapitel 7 er vi igen væk fra bogens hovedfokus, og læseren skal forholde sig til værdi-politik i perioden 1990-2011, især med fokus på vigtigheden af værdipolitik vis-à-vis fordelingspolitik. En af de interessante pointer heri er, at vigtigheden af værdipolitik kan variere fra valg til valg. Således betød fordelingspolitik mere ved folketingsvalget i 2011, sandsynligvis på grund af den økonomiske krise. Dette overrasker nok de færre-ste, men pointerer, at det på ingen måde er afgjort på forhånd, hvad der bliver udslags-givende for, hvor vælgerne sætter deres kryds ved et folketingsvalg.

I de efterfølgende kapitler er vi tilbage på hovedsporet og kigger på partivalg og politiske holdninger fra 2011 til 2015. I kapitel 8 vises det, at mange arbejdervælgere givetvis er gået mod højre, men deres holdninger er stadig venstreorienterede. Kapitel 9 kigger på holdningerne til flygtninge og de politiske implikationer heraf. Kapitel 10 belyser miljøpolitiske holdninger. Kapitel 11 undersøger relevansen af en konflikt mel-lem center og periferi med et særligt fokus på udkants-Danmark. Kapitel 12 kigger på vigtigheden af privatøkonomisk tryghed, kapitel 13 på vigtigheden af samfundsøkono-mien.

I kapitel 14 diskuteres den del af velfærdslitteraturen, der beskæftiger sig med væl-gernes respons til nedskæringer. Her er der primært fokus på perioden op til 2011-valget, og især Venstres kursskifte i form af opgøret med Hjort-doktrinen. Der er tale om et ganske interessant kapitel, der dog som sagt ikke passer ind i bogens ramme, og som ligeledes ikke formår at perspektivere til anden relevant litteratur, der også har be-skæftiget sig med især VK-regeringens efterlønsinitiativer. I kapitel 15 kigges der også på perioden op til 2011-valget med et fokus på hvilke emner, der var afgørende for, at vælgerne skiftede parti. Kapitel 16 belyser blokskiftere fra 2007 til 2011, hvor der både kigges på skift inden for og på tværs af rød og blå blok.

Den politiske tillid i fokus

En af de overordnede pointer, som bogen fremhæver - herunder også i pressematerialet, er, at vælgernes tillid til politikerne er rekordlav. Dette emne tages for alvor op i kapitel 17, hvor vælgernes politiske tillid behandles, både konceptuelt og begrebsmæssigt, i et komparativt perspektiv, over tid og med forskellige datasæt. Dette kapitel er med sine 43 sider klart det kvantitativt længste og kvalitativt mest gennemarbejdede. For alle læsere med en interesse for politisk (mis)tillid er dette kapitel ikke til at komme uden-

om. Dette kapitel sætter ligeledes rammen for de næste to kapitler, hvori først vælgernes politiske mistillid og partiskift belyses i kapitel 18, og den politiske mistillids betydning ved EU-afstemningen i 2015 belyses i kapitel 19.

I de to sidste kapitler, kapitel 20 og 21, der tilsammen er på under 20 sider, er der nogle overordnede refleksioner om vælgervandringer og vælgerens politiske holdninger. Der er dog ingen klar disposition i disse kapitler, og det er begrænset, hvad man får ud af at læse disse, hvorfor disse også blot kan læses kursorisk. Ligeledes forspilder bogen her desværre dets mulighed for at bruge de sidste sider på at binde værket sammen til en helhed, der hjælper læseren med at konkludere på de mange forudgående kapitler. Bogen kommer vidt omkring, og dette fungerer fint for de dele af den, der passer ind i den overordnede ramme, men får desværre andre dele af bogen til at fremstå irrelevante og malplacerede.

Departementschefsrollen sprængt i stumper og stykker

Peter Loft og Jørgen Rosted, 2016
Hvem har ansvaret? Revner og sprækker i det danske embedssystem
Gyldendal
278 sider, 299,95 kr.

Anmeldt af Tim Knudsen

Problemstillingen

Om tiden er løbet fra den særlige danske udformning af ministerialsystemet med kun en politisk udpeget minister – dog tilsat en eller to særlige rådgivere – og en mængde karriereembedsfolk i hvert ministerium har været diskuteret længe. Lidt forenklet har der været to synspunkter. Det ene er, at nok har der været en del skandalesager, men det skyldes enkeltpersoners fejl. Systemet er godt nok i sig selv. Der kan dog godt foretages nogle småjusteringer for at følge med tiden. Det andet synspunkt er, at der er ganske mange uheldige sager, hvor love overtrædes, hvor der misinformeres, og hvor embedsfolk tilsidesætter faglige standarder af politiske grunde. Det er til skade for retssikkerheden, effektiviteten og befolkningens tillid til systemet. Departementerne har udviklet sig til politikfabrikker og deres embedsmænd til politikmagere. Det er et systemproblem, fordi det er blevet svært for embedsfolk at skræve over både at producere politik til ministerens bedste og samtidig tilgodese de klassiske krav, der knytter sig til begrebet god forvaltningsskik.

To erfarne topembedsmænd

To tidligere topembedsmænd med erfaringer fra tilsammen 27 år som departementschefer slutter sig i denne bog til sidstnævnte synspunkt. Så vidt kommer de ikke med noget

nyt. Lignende diagnoser findes for eksempel i bogen *Ansvaret der forsvandt* af Pernille Boye Koch og Tim Knudsen samt i bøger af Jesper Tynell og Christian Nissen samt i akademiske arbejder af Birgitte Poulsen. Forfatternes praktiske erfaring giver imidlertid deres ord vægt, når de skriver, at især departementschefernes rolle er blevet overbelastet med til dels modsatrettede krav.

Departementscheferne er på den ene side ministrenes vigtigste rådgivere og hjælpere. Ministrenes succes er således blevet et væsentligt succeskriterium for en departementschef. Det forplanter sig ned i ministeriernes organisation og kultur, så der er en større risiko end tidligere for, at der opstår 'møgsager' på kanten af loven, sandheden og fagligheden. Forfatterne peger samtidigt på, at mens departementscheferne er underlagt et ofte modsatrettet krav om partipolitisk neutralitet, som skal gøre det muligt for dem at betjene en ny regering, så er de yderligere underlagt nogle grænser for, hvor meget politisk hjælp de kan give ministrene. Det ytrer sig for eksempel ved, at de har vanskeligt ved at gribe ind, når der er interne konflikter i regeringen eller i konflikter mellem ministeren og dennes partibagland. Eksempelvis kunne det være lettere for en politisk hjælper end en karriereembedsmand at hjælpe i sagen om den forsmædeligt kulsejlede betalingsring ved at tale med socialdemokratiske omegnsborgmestre. De to forfattere antyder tillige en passant, at en departementschef med en minister, der også sidder i de centrale regeringsudvalg, også skal råde i sager, som departementschefen kan have lige så lidt begreb om både fagligt og politisk som ministeren. Et eksempel, som er hentet fra en departementschefskollega, er, at Socialministeriets departementschef har rådet ministeren om resurser i Arktis.

Forfatterne kunne have nævnt, at Danmark det sidste årti er sejlet økonomisk agterud ift. nabolandene. Spørgsmålet er her, om det blandt andet skyldes manglende kreativitet i departementerne. Endelig kunne forfatterne også godt have pointeret lidt mere, at det er demokratisk betænkeligt, når kun en i hvert ministerium har et parlamentarisk ansvar. Med et system af viceministre bredes det parlamentariske ansvar ud. Derimod giver forfatterne eksempler på møgsager, som de formoder, kunne have være afværget, hvis man havde et mere smidigt korps af politiske hjælpere udpeget på både politisk og fagligt grundlag, som man har det i vore nabolande.

De to veje at gå

De peger på to mulige veje at gå. Begge veje vil (gen)skabe et større skel mellem det politiske og det faglige. Enten kan man tilnærme sig en svensk model med en række politisk udnævnte topembedsmænd i departementerne. I øvrigt bevares en række karriereembedsfolk i departementerne. Modellen indebærer, at ministeransvaret for sagsbehandlingen i styrelser og direktorater forsvinder. Ansvaret for 'møgsager vil ligge i styrelserne. En ulempe ved modellen kan være, at det kan blive sværere at inddrage styrelsernes erfaringer i det lovforberedende arbejde. I øvrigt var det det modsatte, der foregik i Skatteministeriet, da Peter Loft var departementschef der. Her gennemførte man en såkaldt enhedsorganisation, som man efter Lofts afgang opgav til fordel for en klar deling mellem departement og styrelse.

En anden model er, at der udnævnes viceministre og en hel stab af politiske rådgivere i hvert departement. I mange stater har man netop sådanne 'kabinetter' eller sekretariater. Ved siden af har man almindelige partineutrale embedsfolk. I toppen for disse sidder en departementschef. Ministeren får både politisk og faglig rådgivning, men rådgivningen opdeles mellem politiske hjælpere og karriereembedsmænd. Politisk vigtige sager får så ofte en tresidet behandling i samtaler mellem minister, toprådgiveren og departementschefen. Denne model er formentlig nemmere at udvikle i forlængelse af det eksisterende danske system.

De nævnte forslag er meget løst skitserede (det vides ikke, om det skyldes uenigheder mellem de to forfattere, men det kunne være en medvirkende årsag). Eksempelvis nævnes muligheden for at indføre viceministre kun i forbifarten. Flere overvejelser om rekrutteringen af politiske hjælpere til ministrene, og om ansvarssystemet kunne let være gjort. Efter min opfattelse bør en rekruttering af politiske hjælpere ligge hos den enkelte minister, hvis ikke man skal risikere, at de bliver opfattet som regeringsledelsens spioner i ministeriet. Forfatterne kunne også med fordel have ofret Folketingets kontrolfunktion med den udøvende magt lidt mere opmærksomhed. En kvalitet ved netop viceministermodellen er som nævnt, at en viceminister vil have parlamentarisk ansvar. Folketinget vil med andre ord direkte kunne stille flere end en minister til ansvar i hvert ministerium.

Forandring kommer under alle omstændigheder

Forfatterne skal have stor ros for, at de har skrevet denne debatbog. De har ganske ret i, at systemet som altid vil forandre sig langsomt, selv hvis man ikke træffer bevidste valg. Spørgsmålet er alene, om man vil foretage et bevidst og gennemtænkt valg, som forklares for alle. Eller om man hellere vil lade udviklingen foregå inkrementelt. Allerede for tretten år siden forudsagde Svend Auken, at systemet med særlige rådgivere gradvist vil udvikle sig til politiske kabinetter. Jeg tror, han havde ret. Problemet ved ikke at træffe klare forvaltningspolitiske valg er, at en sådan udvikling så vil give rolleproblemer og konflikter. De to forfattere har desuden den frygt, at der vil komme en snigende partipolitisering af departementscheferne ind ad bagdøren. I forvejen skiftes departementschefer i nutiden langt hurtigere ud end i fortiden. Det kunne ende med, at nye regeringer skifter så godt som hele toppen ud, når de træder til.

Departementscheferne burde efter forfatternes mening have en klar stillingsbeskrivelse, så de kunne koncentrere sig om at sikre, at ministeriernes organisation fungerer effektivt, og at der arbejdes inden for rammerne af lovlighed, sandhed og faglighed. Det er jo egentligt også grotesk, at man tre gange har skrevet fyldige betænkninger om de særlige rådgiveres rolle (betænkningerne 1354, 1443 og 1537), men officielt aldrig har defineret departementschefernes rolle.

De foreslår også, at en departementschef ikke alene skal drøfte sagen med Statsministeriets departementschef, hvis ministeren presser embedsfolkene til ulovligheder. Departementschefen skal også sige fra skriftligt og sende meddelelsen om sin advarsel videre til Statsministeriet, så det efterfølgende står helt klart, hvad de har advaret ministeren mod. Det kan forebygge de møgsager, hvor minister og embedsmænd efterfølgende giver stik modsatte forklaringer, som vi eksempelvis har set det i statsløsesagen.

Det beståendes inerti

Det er aldrig sket før, at embedsfolk så udførligt redegør for deres surt erhvervede erfaringer.   Langt de fleste af de to forfatteres forgængere tog helst deres erfaringer med i graven. Resultatet er, at det vigtige offentlige anliggende, som embedsmandsrollen er, henligger i halvmørke. Den nye bog indeholder mange gode og oplysende argumenter

og eksempler. Naturligvis med departementscheferne i centrum, man mærker, at de to er optaget af at sikre departementscheferne mod at komme galt af sted. Sådan må det nok være, når man betænker, at Peter Lofts mange år i det i øvrigt problembefængte Skatte-ministerium fik en brat afslutning med det, der blev kaldt Helle Thornings skattesag.

Stærke kræfter forsvarer det bestående. Statsministeriets departementschef Christian Kettel Thomsen har allerede taget til genmæle mod de to forfattere. Departementsche-ferne er blevet bedre kvalificerede, siden forfatterne blev departementschefer, hævder Thomsen. Men problemet er ifølge bogen ikke bare kvalifikationerne, det er også tiden, arbejdspresset og de mange til dels modsatrettede krav. Eftersom Thomsen i praksis har været hovedmand bag udnævnelsen af de nuværende topembedsmænd, er det kun, at Thomsen forsvarer det bestående. En anden indvending vil være, at de to forfattere kun har erfaringer fra få ministerier, men at de ikke kan overføres på andre ministerier. Det er jeg nu ikke så sikker på. Men det ville unægteligt være lettere at gøre sig den slags overvejelser, hvis andre tidligere topembedsmænd redegjorde for deres erfaringer. De to forfattere er dog ikke ganske alene. Tidligere topembedsfolk som for eksempel Michael Christiansen, Anders Troldborg og Christian Nissen har hver på deres måde og i kortere form også tilkendegivet, at det danske system kunne være ved at nærme sig vejs ende. De og andre tidligere topembedsmænd måtte gerne fortsætte med at delagtiggøre os i deres erfaringer.

ABSTRACTS

Media Ecology and the Blurring of Public and Private Practices: A Case from the Middle East
Chiara de Franco

This paper aims at posing the basis for a new conceptualization of the impact of 'old' and 'new' media in international politics by creating a dialogue between the practice theoretical approach in IR (Adler and Pouliot 2011) and the medium theory in media studies (Meyrowitz 1985). Building on these approaches, the paper argues that in order to understand the role of the media in international politics it is necessary to shift the focus from media outlets and organisations to the media as environments, and from media content to media ecology. In fact, the paper argues that changes in the media ecology can produce changes in the social settings where international practices develop. It particular, it argues that the media ecology can affect the articulation of public and private and lead to the emergence of international practices where appropriate and competent behaviour reconstitute the private in the public (and vice versa). To explore its theoretical claims further and clarify how useful this approach can be to understand the role of the media in the Middle East, the paper discusses how an Israeli/Iranian movement catalysed by a Facebook (FB) page attempts at fostering peace. It explains how such a group has developed a Transnational Activist Network (TAN) bringing people together through shared private experiences.

YouTube and the Role of Digital Video for Transitional Justice in Syria
Joshka Ivanka Wessels

International media access is extremely limited in Syria and many human rights organisations rely on individual citizens and activists to provide them with evidence that could indicate war crimes and crimes against humanity. The role of YouTube and digital video for transitional justice in Syria is the central theme of this research paper. Research

methodology is based on systematic observation of video clips on YouTube, visits to Syrian grass root audio-visual media centres and semi-structured interviews with Syrian video activists on the ground in Turkey and Syria. Fort this study, a conceptual thematic categorisation of eight different video-categories has been developed, based on observation, media-ethnography and regular monitoring of clips coming out of Syria since 2011 and in-depth surveillance of YouTube material uploaded between 2014 and 2015. In total 400 YouTube video clips were surveyed, analysed and monitored between 2014 and 2015. The paper assesses the feasibility of using these clips for legal evidence of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The   paper considers the latest approaches to using and verifying digital audio-visual material and how video can be used for future transitional justice and conflict resolution.

A Religious Media Revolution? The Syrian Conflict and the Mediated Sunni Authority
Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen

This article is a preliminary survey of the media usage of Sunni religious actors during the Syrian conflict. It traces the adoption of new media by religious actors, and analyses the kind of authority these actors have sought to embody, whether regime supporting, oppositional or jihadist. It argues that the conflict has completely altered the means and modes of Sunni religious communication, transforming classical genres and bypassing them with new ones. It concludes that the lack of formal authority in the messaging of the jihadist groupings, and their failed efforts to build up credible religious leaders, is a weakness that could well be exploited in the period to come.

'The Face of Evil': The Discourse on ISIS and the Visual Complexities in the ISIS Beheading Videos
Kanar Patruss

This article deals with ISIS's beheading videos of Western victims from 2014 and inscribes itself into an emerging body of literature on visuality in IR. The paper contends that the image of ISIS beheadings has been mobilized in a Western political discourse that classifies ISIS as evil, and has hereby helped shape the conditions un-

der which international politics operate. The article offers a Nietzsche-inspired critique of the value judgment of evil in the Western discourse and, in extension, seeks to nuance the assessment of ISIS through a 're-reading' of the beheading image. For this purpose, the article proposes to expand Lene Hansen's concept of inter-iconicity to capture how an icon's meaning is produced in relation to other icons and, in this light, explores the inter-iconic relations between the image of ISIS beheadings, on the one hand, and the decapitations of the French Revolution and the image of the 'body politic', on the other. The inter-iconic reading draws out alternative meanings of the image of ISIS beheadings that counter the classification of ISIS as evil, thereby expanding the conditions for political speech and action regarding ISIS and opening up space for a broader critique of politically motivated violence.

Lige for lige? Kønssegregering i Folketingsudvalg og i ledelsen af det private erhvervsliv

Christina Fiig og Mette Verner

In this article, we describe and discuss the vertical and horizontal gender segregation in the elites of Danish Parliamentary politics and private business. Our new data on the gender distribution on corporate boards of publicly traded firms show how women are absent among board chairs and CEOs and illustrates the low representation of women among board members. Among members of Parliamentary committees a more equal gender representation is found, however, there is a clear tendency toward a vertical and a horizontal segregation. Our findings show that women MPs are less represented in certain Parliamentary committees on foreign affairs, economy, finance, tax and transportation. This distribution mirrors other country studies on Parliamentary committees. We propose two hypotheses in order to explain our explorative study: a thesis on a gender bias of certain policy areas and a hypothesis on the significance of the 'public eye'. Concerning the latter, our results illustrate how institutions subject to 'the public eye' have more balanced gender compositions than institutions with less public attention, like corporate boards.