Afterword:
The Arctic Security Constellation

Ole Wæver, Professor of International Relations and Director of Centre for Resolution of International Conflicts, Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen.

The Arctic carries some peculiar paradoxes. As a space, it invokes an unusual degree of concreteness with its momentous geographical features and the relatively minor human presence compared to most other parts of the globe. And yet, at the same time, it is so obviously overloaded with cultural and mythological interpretations. On most maps it is the ultimate anchor at the top of the globe – and often what the map captures with least claim to correctness. Traditional security used to be about the states at the top of the hierarchy of stateness with superpower strategies colliding during the Cold War. Today the most important decisions are made in places like Nuuk, the capital of something that is sometimes a state, and sometimes prefer not to be one (Wæver 2004; Adler-Nissen and Gad 2012). When expanding the security perspective beyond states, the two new forms of security that pop up most often in relation to the Arctic are possibly those at opposite ends of a time spectrum. One is the most ‘traditional’ in the form of defending Indigenous cultures and other forms of life, and the other the most future-oriented one, climate change. Finally, the usefulness of the Arctic for testing and developing theory seems limited because it is surely not ‘typical’ in any normal sense, and thus hard to generalize from. Yet it is potentially productive for that same reason: an extreme case can be a demanding and sometimes creative challenge to the theory used.

I am grateful to the authors and especially the editors first for taking the effort to explore the potential value of securitization theory for understanding Arctic international relations, and secondly for allowing me the opportunity to read, learn from, and comment on these interesting articles.

In this brief postscript, I would like to reflect on three questions. First, what kind of total picture emerges from the analyses, i.e. how does it add up to an understanding of ‘Arctic international relations’ and ‘Arctic security’. And what are the main implications hereof?

Second, some of the theoretical observations and innovations made by the contributors along the way deserve to be identified and evaluated for their potential general relevance beyond an Arctic setting.
Third, although this special issue focuses on two of the three constitute elements of the ‘Copenhagen School’, securitization and sectors, the third leg – regional security complexes – could play a role.¹

Arctic International Politics

The articles in this special issue sum up to a rounded and relevant picture of Arctic International Politics to an unusual degree. This is impressive given that they do not have survey character and are not mandated to cover each a part of the landscape. Each constitutes a research article with its own clearly delineated case and a particular angle aiming to push theoretical and methodological innovation. Nevertheless, they manage to cover most of the important dimensions and complement each other in interesting ways.

Standing on the shoulders of the contributors, I therefore feel enabled to offer a kind of integrative take on Arctic International Politics as seen through the lens of securitization (theory). Naturally, they are not to be blamed for my re-appropriation of their analyses, but here comes:

Security dynamics were, for a while (say: half a century, from the birth of ‘national security’ as a key concept around 1940 to the end of the Cold War in 1990), centered on the military security of states. So at least as a matter of conventional courtesy it seems reasonable to start the mapping from this sub-set of securitizations and then add the other ones. Does the Arctic have a driving dynamic of military security concerns and mutual moves of a military nature? No, at most they operate at two ghostly levels: one is the underlying frame of a Cold War past that cannot be put fully to rest because it continues to be a structural underlying speculative reality. The point here is that the whole nuclear deterrence ‘reality’ was always a strangely hyper-real one of scenarios that nevertheless became incredible material and real. Because weapon-systems were installed partly on the basis of these theories, decision-makers had to – and have to! – react to game-theoretical social facts relatively independent of the political relationship (Kahn 1960; Tunander 1989; Baudrillard 1995; Wæver and Buzan 2010). Given that these nuclear systems still have some of their important touch points in the Arctic, the strange, ongoing simulations of nuclear scenarios unfold as a constant rumbling beneath the military security landscape of the Arctic. Not least the Russian reasonable worry that the US missile defense could overturn the basic nuclear constellation is relevant in an Arctic setting due to the continued centrality of radars at Thule Air Base and Russia’s increasing reliance on submarines in Arctic waters for its nuclear deterrence.

The other military security spectre is future oriented and takes the form of speculative security in a world where climate change has melted much ice, opened new sea

¹ Regional security complexes have been discussed elsewhere more than a few times in reference to the how to fit the Arctic into the global map of security complexes (or not). (Åtland 2007; Lanteigne 2016; Burke and Rahbek-Clemmensen 2017; Kluth and Lynggaard 2017; Padrtová 2017).
lanes, and possibly transformed the economics of various mineral and carbo-hydrate resources. As reported by several of the articles in this special issue, most of the sober analyses of this issue point to the conclusion that we are not heading for a ‘Scramble for the North Pole’ or some similar semi-colonial race for the last ‘white spots’ on the map. However, in our current media reality of fake news and cyber capitalism, it is far from inconceivable that the self-confirming reward system on telling the most interesting stories will turn the militarization of the Arctic into a sufficiently real virtuality.

Still, as argued most systematically in the article by Exner-Pirot and Murray, the conditions for military competition are weak in the region – an interpretation which is reinforced by the desecuritization story by Jacobsen and Strandsbjerg. In sum: a film is played in the background about military security in the Arctic, and it matters. Everybody has an eye on it now and then, but it is not the driving dynamic in the region. It is more of a passive resonance that could be mobilized. Interestingly, as demonstrated by several articles here, this scenario of military rivalry has served to elevate many other issues, sometimes simply because the military scenarios have contributed to the general validation of Arctic ‘importance’ in an age of attention competition, sometimes more directly by justifying other agendas as a way to re-focus attention. On to other securitizations that need to be positioned in relation to this part of the puzzle.

The next layer should be ‘new security’ issues (or ‘non-traditional security’ if you want pre-emptively to adapt terminologically to the near-future where we follow Asian leads). What security threats in the environmental, societal, economic, or political sectors are mobilized in a situation where military security does not exhaust the imagination? Here, it is useful to take a transnational perspective. The fact that ‘climate security’ is generally elevated in the global hierarchy of security issues has implications in a local setting where it is not a given that ‘climate change’ would have a similar prominence if looking only at the local power structure. (This need to bring in the transnational factor is not about the objective severity of threats because climate change does hit harder in the Arctic than most other places. However, if balanced out politically on the local arena, it is not given that a securitization of climate change could be mobilized. Probably, it is due to the global circulation of the climate issue, that the issue figures high on the Arctic agenda as well.) The effects on the regional constellation of climate securitization are complicated and contradictory. As argued by Victoria Hermann and others in this issue, it empowers Indigenous organizations to speak more strongly on the international arena, while at the same time it acts as a driver on the shadow securitization of state-to-state rivalry as well. So far, the securitization of climate change has mostly impacted relationships between regional actors and extra-regional ones, i.e. Indigenous actors have mobilized on the global scene but also the states of the region have become more central in global climate politics by the Arctic gaining symbolic standing worldwide. However, some of the internal tensions in the region that are identified by several authors also run down through the climate issue. Especially Nunavut and Greenland as the two most state-like Inuit polities benefit both from climate change itself (Barkham 2016) and from climate concerns (eg. through climate tourism), and are able to make at least a case for
exemption from emission reductions (for reasons similar to developing countries) – while also called upon to defend vulnerable communities against it.

Here, we see strongly the interaction with the other very powerful security issue of a non-traditional nature, what the Copenhagen School calls ‘societal security’, i.e. groups that defend their identity. Even if it is concretely the same people who are defended, they will appear as a different kind of referent object for security policy if approached in state terms or non-state, i.e. as a polity or as an identity community, defended in the realm of sovereignty and states or in the world of groups and identities. Often it will be possible for Arctic actors to coordinate those two layers in relation to the climate, because when pointing to threats to culture, identity, and traditional modes of sustenance, the most important human addressees for climate change culpability are naturally the biggest emitters (as when the ICC sued the US at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights for its climate inaction), not their own states, but the tension is likely to grow more evident as both climate change and statehood strengthen.

The fulcrum of the general constellation seems to be what Jacobsen and Strandsbjerg discuss in terms of a displacement from horizontal to vertical controversies; interstate rivalry has become less threatening due to amongst other things the Ilulissat desecuritization, but this has intensified disputes between the signatory states to that declaration and the Indigenous peoples (as well, we might add, some states struggling to achieve high enough degrees of arcticness to be involved in political processes).

Thus, when mapping the constellation of securitizations, it is important to be attentive to the simultaneous role of referent objects of many kinds that are often partly invisible to the security gaze of each other. When states articulate security, this typically has ‘sovereignty’ as defining standard and tends to privilege as (rhetorically admissible) threats from other states or domestic political forces, while actors relevant to the sectors of societal security and environmental security will not count here. Nevertheless, these different securitizations are causally connected so that security relations among states can be impacted by security actions taken by other kinds of units, e.g. societal defenders of identity such as transnational religious movements or even environmental groups. Vice-versa it is very often the case that those who strive to secure ‘non-traditional’ forms of security will have to be attentive to the possibility that they trigger security concerns by states. Greenpeace’s #SaveTheArctic campaign is an example of a political project that on the surface (!) is a relationship between ‘people’ and Shell and Climate Change, but it invariably will affect the interests of states like the US and Greenland (Gerhard et al forthcoming).²

Concretely in the Arctic, some of the main interconnected securitizations that are not easily translated into each other but nevertheless impact each other are the two layers of military security – US-Russia nuclear security and potential escalation over territorial delineations as well as new patrolling needs – and the politics of climate change as such (as a politics over climate actions), plus the spin-off securitization of societal

² Thanks to Marc Jacobsen for pointing my attention to this example.
survival for Indigenous communities and settlements and not least the complex political security of polities of inbetweenness. The central position in the region of political units that are on the move sovereignty-wise makes for very peculiar security dynamics.

It is far from unique that the referent object is not a ‘status’ or ‘being’ but a process. This is in various ways also the case for the EU defending ‘integration’, countries defining themselves as ‘developing’ and maybe most intriguingly revolutions/revolutionary states (Holbraad and Pedersen 2012). However, what is particularly challenging in cases like Greenland is that not only Greenland itself has a security referent object that is a process, a movement, a direction of change, ever closer to full statehood – this is also accepted by the most important other actors including ‘Copenhagen’ (cf. Gad as well as Kjærgaard Rasmussen and Merkelsen in this issue; (Adler-Nissen and Gad 2012)). Route, speed and destination are unknown, but the direction is not. This means that any calculation of an overall equilibrium of stability of the security constellation has to be a mobile one, a stability of instabilities, and balance of imbalances.

As Kjærgaard Rasmussen and Merkelsen show, the politics on sensitive issues (as in their case: uranium) is often shaped by latent securitizations. This is an observation that comes naturally when taking a securitization perspective (even if it has not been exploited analytically as much in securitization studies as it could have been). Given that securitization constitutes a breaking out of limitations, a setting-oneself-free to do what one deems necessary for survival – an act that often triggers chain-reactions of escalation – it is often in the interest of one actor to avoid that another one does so. A given political order – not least an international order – will therefore often rest on the main parties assessing the ‘red line’ of the other actors in order to avoid pushing them across to actual securitization (Waever 1995a; Waever 1995b; Waever 2018) – much like the classical art of diplomacy and the Kissingerian concept of ‘a legitimate order’ (Kissinger 1957). Therefore, in a constellation that is generally characterized by cooperation and mutual adjustment, securitization will often play a role as potentiality, as a move that matters also when not made – it matters because it could be made and therefore all parties have to consider the what-if of securitization. These mutual considerations of where other actors might play the securitization card is part of the overall constellation.

This all amounts to a security constellation, where the different securitizations are interlocking and form a dynamic, structuration-like context for further securitizations. (Buzan et al 1998: 166-171, 201; Buzan & Waever 1997, 2003) The concept of ‘security constellation’ is much wider than regional security complexes – the most known ‘relational’ concept from the Copenhagen School. Regional Security Complexes are units who have their securitizations inter-mingled to such a degree that they can’t be handled separately, and where this happens in a territorially coherent manner. However, it is possible that a number of securitizations interact and condition each other in a way where general transnational processes or movements become involved, global issues like climate change become part of the constellation, and actors who have their main regional anchorage elsewhere get interlinked in a constellation that is in this instance ‘Arctic’.
Theorizing Securitization via the Arctic

All of the articles do more than make use of (Copenhagen School style) securitization theory; they all contribute to it as well.

In the introduction, the editors talk of ‘cascading effects’ among the different securitizations. It is not a point that is developed systematically later on in either the introduction or any of the chapters, but actually many illustrations can be found in the articles. The point that securitization by one actor in one sector often triggers securitizations by other actors in other sectors is an observation that is made surprisingly rarely (given how widespread it is and how straightforward it is to observe it with the help of securitization theory). Probably, the infrequency follows from a polarized attitude by many securitization scholars to the concept of sectors (military, economic, etc): Either you don’t like sectors and organize your work around actors, issues or events, and then the cross-cutting dynamics remain unobserved (because you don’t care for those sectoral lines they are crossing). Or you emphasize sectors and do a study confined to a particular sector, e.g. environmental security or economic security, and then the cross-cutting dynamics do not show up clearly either. However, most of the contributors to this special issue strike a healthy balance of taking sectors sufficiently serious that they designate issues, yet keep the wider perspective.

This is in my view close to the original impulse behind the concept of sectors. It was not meant to support a view of security dynamics being compartmentalized in separate sectors – it served to highlight characteristic dynamics peculiar to security of the different kinds, i.e. securitization on identity issues (societal security) had particular physiognomies and privileged actors that differ from what you meet when looking at say economic security. Therefore, it would very often be most relevant to study political struggles or processes cross-sectorally but based on an understanding of the ‘form shaping’ effects of the different sectors. Cascading was thus to be expected, but demonstrations and illustrations haven’t been as common as expected. This special issue offers quite a few. The most consistently illustrated case is probably the one of climate change that impacts all kinds of other security concerns relating to societal security, food security, potential geopolitical rivalry and the politics of gradating sovereignty. But the issue also presents a link between food security and societal security, as observed by Greaves and Pomerants, and between societal security (language policy), economic security and international positioning in the analysis by Gad.

Jacobsen and Strandsbjerg organize their analysis around the two interlinked conceptual innovations of pre-emptive desecuritization and desecuritization as a shift of technique of government. The first is quite straightforward and hard to meet with anything but acceptance and appreciation. There is an almost structural built-in bias to the

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3 The concept of ‘cascade’ has been used in securitization debates before, probably most ambitiously by Thierry Balzacq (Balzacq 2010) who refers to the phenomenon that people react to securitization the same way as their friends. Jacobsen and Herrmann seem to use it in a more sense of securitization in one setting and one sector triggers securitization by others in other places and often in other sectors.
The concept of ‘de-securitization’ that it sounds like something that comes after securitization. The easy image is one where something has become securitized, and the challenge is then what can then be done to shift it out of the security realm and into one that relieves us of those particular dangers and drawbacks associated with securitiness, such as undemocratic urgency and exceptionalism? However, it is clearly possible that perceptive politicians sometimes manage to see a securitization spectre arising as did Danish foreign minister Per Stig Møller and others in 2007-8 leading to the Ilulissat Declaration, the consolidation of an A5 format and mutual reassurance that the way to deal with territorial rights was through international law and geoscience. Pre-emptive desecuritization? Yes, indeed.

While this is the part of their argument that is politically and practically of most far-reaching implications, in academic circles, it is probably more controversial and with more wide-ranging implications when they add the argument that the alternative to securitization was not in this case ‘normal politics’, but rather another ‘technique of government’ that was not necessarily closer to ideal politics (law and geo-science). This speaks into a long debate; one where - the authors are right and the original formulation of the theory unfortunate. Passages in the ‘Framework book’ and elsewhere can certainly be read as equating de-securitization and re-politicization. This should not be held as an automatic or one-to-one relationship. What de-securitization implies by necessity is only that minimum which is implied in the definition: that something is then not dealt with in security mode (Wæver 2011). This removes the particular mechanisms that securitization trigger including the potentially positive one of focused attention and the negative ones of over-writing debate by necessity and installing a relationship of protector-protected.

What form it then takes instead is an open and separate question. In the literature, this has most aggressively (and first) been argued by Claudia Aradau (Aradau 2001) as the likelihood that security issues will often instead become dealt with in the modus of ‘risk’ which entails its own – different but potentially equally strong – shaping effects on politics, typically an economistic logic of cost-benefit optimization through expertise. But many other forms are certainly possible. Other parts of the Framework book, especially the ‘sector chapters,’ point to a set-up where securitization competes with a sector-specific rationality (market in economics, environmentalism in the environmental sector, faith in relation to religion, etc). The book is in tension with itself (or some specifications need to be introduced): Securitization competes both with (normal? ideal?) politics in general and with sector-specific rationalities. The reason why securitization is contrasted to ‘normal politics’ is that one of the effects of securitization is to reduce the possibility of politics, because questions of survival can easily be insulated from contestation through rhetorics of urgency, loyalty and cohesion. When de-securitization is achieved, one particular barrier to politicization has been removed. This does not mean that all such have, and the very route of de-securitization can involve the instalment of other mechanisms that are equally strong in hindering politicization, such as logics of expertise, privacy, efficiency or proprietorship. The analysis by Jacobsen and Strandsbjerg in terms of displacement of controversies and techniques of government is a helpful step towards correcting this part of the theory. Not least their point that pre-existing formats into which
the issue can be shifted probably make de-securitization easier while simultaneously making ‘normal politics’ more difficult. This shows the necessity to specify more clearly the different types of politics involved 1) in the very event of issues moving to or from security status, 2) the processes leading into these events, and 3) the ongoing politics ‘inside’ situations that are securitized, technisized or riskified, politics that is then always formed by that particular speech act but still political (Waever 2011).

Greaves and Pomerants contrast ‘adjectival’ use of security language to more explicit designation of threat-referent object constellations (cf. McSweeney 1999). It is a helpful way to handle what probably confuses many students: we are allegedly looking at what people do with ‘security’ and then we have all these domains of ‘food security’ and ‘drug security’ that don’t look really securitized. In this context, it is important to bring that powerful McSweeney observation back in view that often these ‘adjectival security’ discourses are really less about existential threats (i.e. the ever-metastazing use of that original ‘national security’ move on new fields) and more about domain-specific security discourses and – according to McSweeney – basically about the more positive aspiration to satisfy needs in this domain (cf. the more recent debate on ‘positive security’).

However, it is also worth reminding that what is ‘technically speaking’ adjectival always deserves closer analysis as to whether it is strict securitization in the sense of threat-to-a-referent-object or it is a domain of needs to be satisfied, because in many cases what is grammatically speaking adjectival will be a confusing meeting point for the two kinds, as seen for instance in the cases of energy security and cyber security. Much of the literature on energy security is quite confusing because it mixes up ‘security’ in an issue specific sense (typically security of supply) with one that links to security in the more general sense, i.e. when energy issues arrive on the ‘security agenda’. Similarly, ‘cyber security’ has been notoriously confused because the field of computers and networks have had its own ‘security’ concerns since the beginning, and until recently the dominant meaning was simple integrity and system stability. Over the last decades, more and more usages of the term have used security in the sense derived from ‘national security’ through the process of widening, and thus in this field too, much of the conceptual literature has been about sorting out the interwoven meanings that with some simplification can be seen as originating from the two main sources of the field-specific terminology and the general security logic. Whereas conceptual analysis can try to clarify these differences, political actors naturally utilize the ambivalences and continuities along a sliding scale.

Clearly, it is possible for a statement to be made in adjectival form and still be clear-cut securitization as in the case of the original five sectors from the ‘Framework book’, e.g. ‘military security’ or ‘economic security’. The Greaves and Pomerants article has found a good way to handle this by checking in each instance whether there is a clear threat-defense logic invoked and that should in most cases work. However, my argument here about the duality of adjectival security introduces a distinct possibility that one does not find the explicit securitization, exactly due to the inherent duality in much of this adjectival security. Because of the slidings between the two basis origins of each of these, securitization can be done by connotations and vague implications.
This could be an ironic effect of the ‘excessive success’ of security talk as well as of increased reflexivity where there is a growing awareness among practitioners that one does something by using security language - not only an implicit, ‘practical’ and ‘tacit’ knowledge of how to do it, but increasingly a reflexive, conscious understanding of these dynamics. This makes it increasingly viable to get an issue half-way securitized with the advantage of not having to spell it out. Similar dynamics can be observed in the US with the various instances of a ‘war on …’ drugs, poverty, etc.

This creates a methodological problem for securitization studies. Concretely, in relation to the case study, it means that the findings of Greaves and Pomerants especially regarding ‘food security’ as close to actual securitization probably can be strengthened one notch. There is more ‘security’ connotations involved than if one had talked ‘food security’ 20 years ago, simply because the general idea of widened security has made it more likely that the terminology triggers speculation about those threat-defense sequences that are maybe less clearly spelled out than they would have had to be in the past. Possibly, the concept of ‘human security’ that they observe in the documents could also be explored further with an angle like this.

Hermann’s article is the one that most clearly zooms in on societal security. In this case, it is particularly about the defense of the collective identity of Indigenous peoples in relation to climate change, and an important element here is how both the categories of the threat but also the identity of the referent object and its agency are partly constituted through climate research and risk communication. This opens up for an interesting meeting between two otherwise quite separate if not opposed strands of debate in security/securitization theory. On the one hand the ‘soft’ societal security focus on identities and on the other hand the ‘harder’ interest associated with new materialism and Actor-Network Theory in objects and artefacts (Amicelle et al. 2015). While the article also involves a meeting between the environmental and the societal sectors, it is a more theoretically challenging cross-over to see science and scientific objects in such a central role in relation to identity processes.

Another theoretical point made in this article is that the exact form of societal security in this case is neither horizontal competition between two parallel identities, nor vertical competition as in conflicts over integration or secession, but rather about threats to the reproduction of identities that work through the demolition of the infrastructural ‘basis’ for the reproduction of a form of life. This route was mentioned and discussed both in the original main book that launched the concept of societal security in the Copenhagen School (Wæver et al. 1993) and in the societal chapter in the framework book, but it did not make ‘top 3’ in the standard model and has consequently been overlooked. It is therefore positive to see this form of societal security dynamic re-analysed with such a clear illustration.

Also Kjærgaard Rasmussen and Merkelsen make (as did Hermann) interesting links between security studies and risk theory. It is both correct and potentially misleading when they say that “securitization is nothing but a special case of riskification” and that the main difference is that “securitization involves only a certain kind of risks that can
justify governing through extraordinary means”. Especially the ‘nothing but’ and ‘only’ phrasing tends to draw attention mostly to the similarity, not the distinctiveness. Where exactly is the specialness – what certain kind of risk is securitization? Naturally, it cannot be the threat in itself that has special features; it is a structural property of the narrative. It is an instance of securitization when referent object, securitizing actor, threat etc are form a particular pattern that is structured in time with a characteristic rhythm.

It is a great idea to re-introduce structural narratology (which played a key role in the original paper presenting securitization (Wæver 1989), but it invites some complicated theoretical discussions. Greimas’ style semiotics obviously pulls the theory in a more structuralist direction, and this seems to be in tension with the other move in the article of presenting risk theory as being more sophisticated than securitization theory because the former has a differentiated (not monolithic) view of audience. They make the point about ‘social theories of risk’ that “what is an object of risk for one actor may or may not be a risk object for another” – which they contrast with the allegedly monolithic view of the audience in securitization theory. However, the issue is not whether the audience is monolithic or not, because the audience does not pre-exist the situation; what matters is the audience-in-the-situation; and it is not to be decomposed into individuals, because focus is the political event of securitization and the audience is those who make a crucial difference as to whether the securitizing actor manages to shift the boundary of possibility based on a security argument. The audience is exactly a structural position in a Greimas-like manner.

Probably, the ambivalences in the article on this point has to do with the widespread misconception that securitization theory is about communication and perceptions – about a securitizing actor making a threat argument to convince an audience. However, this sender-receiver model of communication is problematic and the original Austin version of speech act theory aims to analyze social acts and events – that which happens in and to the modal competencies in a relationship through a speech act. Therefore, the audience is not those listening to a speech – it is the co-producing actor that is necessary in order to bring about a transformation of a social situation (in casu a securitization). (Wæver 2011; Wæver 2015)

As the reader has probably already noticed, I have entered more into debate with the authors here than in relation to the other articles, and this is a sign that they have made a particularly important theoretical move that in my view is important to get more than half-right. Much can be gained by deepening securitization theory with the help of the structural narratology (and structural semiotics) of Greimas. However, then it is important to avoid a step backwards on the concept of audience; backwards both in relation to the sophistication achieved in the evolution of Copenhagen School Securitization Theory and

4 In their empirical case study, it is not clear that the use of ‘object-at-risk’ and ‘risk-object’ terminology is helpful compared to normal securitization terminology. Actually, there is a risk that it unsharpens the clear sense of the criteria for securitization. Here their own argument about risk of a special kind seems to turn into risk without any special kind; and consequently what is gained as a clearer picture of relationality is lost in relation to threshold clarity. Nothing seems to prevent that future analyses optimize on both accounts.
paradoxically in relation to the structuralism and formalism of Greimas. Actually, there seems to be a very promising correspondence between the relational construction of roles according to Greimas and the attention to constitution of relational rights and duties in illocutionary speech acts according to Austin’s original version of speech act theory (especially as re-read by Marina Sbisa; (Sbisa 2007; Wæver 2015)). The defining event in a securitization is exactly the rights and duties exchanged between defender and defended.

Furthermore, Kjærgaard Rasmussen’s and Merkelsen’s idea of ‘securitization controversies’ is promising as a way to encapsulate that process that leads to more definite outcomes as to both whether and exactly in what form something becomes securitized. The term ‘controversy’ will send some scholarly minds off in the direction of ANT and ‘controversy mapping’, and that is probably an added benefit (Venturini 2009; Venturini et al. 2015).

Gad is in the final article of this issue as always incredibly precise both in his own arguments and in his attention to exactly where he deviates from the standard version of the theory. He shows convincingly how a securitization analysis of debates over language policy in Greenland can generate a more general map of the principled pathways for Greenland. Some of the mechanisms in the analysis have striking similarities to the one suggested by Kjærgaard Rasmussen and Merkelsen, because it is the relational constellation of identities that organized the insights. The meta-analytical strategy of explicating very precisely what principles and assumptions of the theory are relaxed and for what purposes is a generally exemplary observation because it opens for a transparent follow up process of loosening and tightening these assumptions and thereby observe what they entail. It is fitting for a special issue where the mobilization of a theory has proven so productive for development of the theory, that it ends with an article that even develops general principles for one way to do such theory development.

An Arctic Regional Security Complex?

The primary Copenhagen School concept for looking at regions is that of ‘regional security complex’, and therefore it could have been expected that the special issue would include such an analysis. Fortunately, it doesn’t because ultimately the Arctic is not a regional security complex. Nevertheless, it might be useful to reflect a little on the ways it comes close to and why it is not, and what that means, because this can actually help deepen the analysis in this special issue of the regional order, the article by Exner-Pirot and Murray that makes use of English School concepts of regional international society as primary lens.

In the original Copenhagen School presentation of the theory as well as the global map of regional security complexes (Buzan and Wæver 2003), the Arctic is not one of the security complexes. Recently, this has been challenged by several scholars who see it as either a mistake already back then or overtaken now by events. (Lanteigne 2016; Kluth and Lynggaard 2017) At first, the analyses presented in this special issue would seem to support this claim because indeed we find a lot of securitizations in the region.
and they are interconnected, so this does look like a RSC, “a set of units whose major processes of securisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another” (ibid: 491). However, for theory internal and theory building reasons, Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) works with the premise that the RSCs are exclusive, i.e. not overlapping. It is a way to carve up the world into a map of regions. Thus, the question is whether the Arctic is the primary context for the dominant security problems of especially the major powers in the region, or it is secondary to their over-arching security dynamics. Here, the dominant RSC for Russia remains the post-Soviet one in combination with their participation in global level security. Similarly, the US is nested in North America and very active in global security. Seen from eg. Copenhagen, the main RSC is Europe. Thus, the Arctic should not be placed as a RSC. For the states mentioned, it is relatively easy to see how the Arctic can be treated as an additional arena where they interact with various actors from the same and different RSCs, much like inter-regional dynamics. However, the Arctic does raise some additional challenges to RSCT that can’t be solved in the brief space here, not least due to the complications that emerge as especially Greenland becomes more and more of a state, and its primary security context is the Arctic. Also, the involvement of states from several RSCs means that it cannot be analyzed as a sub-complex in one RSC (Åtland 2007). As a temporary solution until this has been worked out, let us just notice 1) that the Arctic is not a RSC, and 2) the main players can all be placed on the global map in relation to both their own RSC and their relationship to other regions as well as the global level.

Exner-Pirot & Murray present an analysis of the Arctic through the classical English School concept of international society, and more specifically the more recent concept of regional international societies. A regional international society can differ from the simultaneous global one to the point where the same global powers have different relations to each other in the regional context than they have elsewhere. This is most helpful, especially given that the Arctic can’t be analyzed as a RSC. However, some open questions in their analysis might be resolved through linking it to the RSC analysis.

What is ultimately the mechanisms in the regional international society that enables it to keep relationships among especially the great powers from fluctuating with general developments? Can this be achieved purely by normative/institutional means or does it demand also a channeling of power political impulses? The English School after all is different from American institutionalism both in its more thick constructivist and historicist elements but also in the opposite direction by including more realism and power politics (Wæver 2017). One element of how this is achieved involves a key role for region-specific actors in orchestrating. Possibly, this has some similarities to what was called the Nordic Balance during the Cold War. This was not a balance of power between either the local states or the superpower, it was a configuration of unexploited possible escalation (increased entry into the region), that the Nordic countries across their alliance divide could orchestrate to keep both super powers at a relative distance and thus preserve the Nordic sub-region as a low-tension area despite the fact that it was a part of a European
region with a higher level of tension. Similarly, the more local Arctic states need to be conscious about the challenge that stems from the great powers regularly having impulses that point towards militarization. Exner-Pirot & Murray offer a very helpful list of reasons why even the great powers actually have strong interests in cooperation and weak in rivalry in the region. However, it is a classical IR insight why such situations often turn sour nevertheless; joint absolute gains are often derailed by relative gains logic, even if not rational according to a conventional cost-benefit calculation. So, it is important to manage quite actively the potential spill-down from global dynamics.

Enter RSCT. To manage this downward pressure, one needs an analysis of the global system and the main regional-global interactions (Wæver 2017). Therefore, even if the Arctic is not one of the RSCs; it is important to know those regional and global dynamics that drive the main powers. Especially, it is useful to see how the balance has shifted from global to regional, and the global structure that has emerged in recent years has relatively weak global competitive dynamics, and have the main tensions located at the intersection of especially the post-Soviet region and the global level and between East Asia and global. This probably explains much of the restraint by great powers in the Arctic, but it is important for Arctic actors to keep up to date with this global analysis to be able to channel Great power impulses in the future as well.

A further premise for a regional international society to work is that the regional identity is sufficiently strong. Especially the introductory article by the editors places the Arctic in the context of the problematics of region building. As explained in Regions and Powers (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 48) Regional Security Complex Analysis is complementary to analyses of region-building, the two are not rivaling attempts to do the same. Studies of region-building explore how a regional identity gets established and consolidated. With some characteristic similarities and differences to nation-building, the imagined community of a region gets a social standing that in turn makes it more ‘natural’ to do all kinds of concrete things along those lines (Wæver 1993; Wæver 1997). Arguments about culture, history, geography etc. get articulated into a relative strengthening of this regional format compared to other affinities. This is complementary to RSCs (and security constellations), because they are about the actual interdependences among securitizations and actors might prefer to see their own region as different from the one that is practiced through security interactions, eg. Arab states preferring to see an Arab region (and/or an Islamic transnational community), instead of a Middle Eastern region that includes Israel and Iran, but when mapping interlocking securitizations, one ends up with the Middle East. Various region-building projects interact with the RSCs but one is not the key to the other; to one it is crucial how actors self-identify, to the other not. A regional international society will most likely depend on a regional identity.

Finally, as I surmised above, the concept from the Copenhagen School vocabulary that might be most productive in this context is the underused one of ‘security constellation’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 201-3; Buzan and Wæver 2003: 51f; Buzan and Wæver
It is the network of securitizations and desecuritizations, interlinked both ‘internally’, when one enters the other (“It is a hostile act that they depict us as a threat”) and when they interact in a more external, causal manner.

Four perspectives then supplement each other: region-building, regional international society, regional security complex and security constellation. They support each other primarily through the following links: region-building explores the extent to which regional identity takes shape. This in turn is an important pre-condition for managing a regional international society, especially when it is out of synch with Regional Security Complexes and therefore unable to develop strong security institutions and/or anchor stability in the general security outlook of the powers. The regional international society is the repository of norms and institutions that limit security rivalry and escalation, but again given that main actors are anchored outside the region, a particular task falls upon the regional actors in orchestrating figurations that make mutual restraint viable among powers that have at times a more tense relationship due to developments in other parts of the world. The RSC analysis offers a tool to grasp the drivers of powerful external actors that need to be orchestrated for the region to remain orderly and cooperative.

This special issue has demonstrated many ways that securitization analysis of the Arctic helps to capture regional security dynamics, but the analysis has also provided a productive articulation of securitization theory – a number of innovations that deserve to be applied to other parts of the world.

Bibliography


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