

Solidarity (In)action?

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Is the externalization of border control a viable way for the EU to ensure solidarity between its Member States, third countries and towards migrants? Central EU discourses can be interpreted as an argument to this effect, yet a critical assessment of the EU border system leads to questions about the internal consistency of this argument.

Introduction

The 2000s witnessed an increase in EU externalization, defined as Member States' cooperation with third countries and non-state actors on migration control on third country territory (cf. Betts and Milner 2007). Since externalization has been pursued via different venues, Christina Boswell (2003:613) distinguishes between preventive externalization addressing the root causes for refugees and the export of classical migration control to other countries. Others, like Thierry Balzacq (2009:2-3), sees externalization as instances where one actor through international negotiations may gain »remote control« over the border control of other actors, which results in extraterritorial migration control. As the visible manifestation of externalization, practices of extraterritorial control are hotly disputed, and has given rise to legal debates about whether European states honour their responsibility for human rights when they offshore border practices beyond their territorial boundaries (Gammeltoft-Hansen 2011). While most critical discussions of externalization have

been from this legal perspective, this article adds to these a more normative focus capable of assessing the moral strengths and weaknesses of arguments concerning European externalization.

A number of EU discourses found in policy documents deal with aspects of externalization and in the article's first section, they are interpreted as the argument that externalization facilitates solidarity (the EFS-argument). It should be noted, though, that the EU is not a unitary actor freed from internal differences. The various EU-forums differ regarding their acceptance of supranational and intergovernmental competences regarding border control. Thus, while the EC and Frontex pursue supranational solutions to immigration, Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Councils are more prone to intergovernmental strategies retaining competences within the individual Member States (Lavenex and Wagner 2007). The article's interpretation of the various EU discourses as one normative argument is, then, not equivalent to the claim that the forums producing the discourses agree on all political counts. Rather, it is undertaken as an illustrative way of bringing out those normative and empirical premises, which central EU institutions nonetheless do seem to share.

In its second section, the article argues that externalization is multifaceted and takes place through venues some of which are not normally considered border politics, such as privatised border functions and EC-donations to humanitarian actors. These examples are then used as empirical backdrops to problematise the EFS-

argument's empirical premise that externalization facilitates solidarity. The third section of the article analyses how Dublin-concepts like Safe Third Countries (STCs) and »first country of arrival« affect the solidarity between European states, third countries and migrants adversely. Instead of facilitating solidarity, it is claimed, the political and economic pressure of powerful EU Member States creates a »ripple effect« in the border politics of entire regions, which I conceptualize as the systemic production of border-induced displacement. This has grave humanitarian consequences for migrants and those states unable to deflect the flows of forced migration. The EFS-argument's empirical premise is therefore undermined, revealing an inconsistency between the argument's normative goal of securing basic rights and the humanitarian consequences of externalization.

The argument that externalization facilitates solidarity

The EU's 'Strategy for the External Dimension of JHA: Global Freedom, Security and Justice' offers a justification for externalization which is typical for EU discourses: in order to respond to the threats of terrorism, corruption and unmanaged migration flows, the 'development of the area of freedom, security and justice can only be successful if it is underpinned by a partnership with third countries on these issues which includes strengthening the rule of law, and promoting the respect for human rights and international obligations.' (Council of the European Union 2005). This discourse, then, justifies externalization via a commitment both to liberal values such as basic, human rights as well as the EU's value as an 'area of freedom, security and justice' (AFSJ).

A discourse grounded in these values and featuring prominently in EU policy documents on externalization, is that of solidarity. More specifically, EU externalization and its border system are said to facilitate solidarity on three related levels: between EU Member States, between the EU and third countries and between the EU and refugees. Thus, the funding mechanism behind the Frontex Agency, the External Borders Fund, is presented as the »main solidarity mechanism« between Member States since it supports »the fair share of responsibilities concerning the financial burden arising from the management of the Union's external borders« (Commission Communication 2006:5).

Similarly, the Commission asserts that externalization facilitates solidarity between Member States and third countries when claiming that the »EU must share the responsibility for managing refugees with third countries and countries of first asylum, which receive a far greater percentage of the world's refugees than Europe.

In this regard, more financial support will be available to enhance protection capacity in third countries« (Commission Communication 2008: 9). The transfer of funds to third countries is thus seen as the way to show solidarity. Finally, the EU also claims that externalization facilitates humanitarian solidarity towards refugees since it is based on »firmness, solidarity and shared responsibility (...) to avoid the recurrence of tragedies at sea« (Brussels Presidency Conclusions 2009:11).

Taken together, we can interpret the appeals to solidarity found in the above-mentioned policy documents as an argument to the effect that externalization facilitates solidarity (EFS):

1. The EU ought to secure basic rights for EU- and third country-citizens as well as migrants (cf. Council of the European Union 2005).
2. Securing basic rights, requires a solidary border system that protects both communities and migrants (cf. Commission Communication 2008).
3. EU externalization manages migration in a way that facilitates solidarity between Member States, between the EU and third countries and towards migrants (cf. Brussels Presidency Conclusions 2009).
4. *Therefore:* All things being equal, the EU ought to implement externalization to secure the basic rights for EU- and third country-citizens as well as migrants.

The EFS-argument starts with a normative premise that basic rights are to be promoted for all, be it EU-, third country-citizens or migrants. A second normative premise says that this requires a border system based on solidarity and a third, empirical, premise states that EU externalization fulfils this function by facilitating solidarity between the EU's Member States, third countries and migrants. This then yields the normative conclusion that the EU ought to implement externalization.

The second premise of the EFS-argument can be interpreted as a particularist view akin to what David Miller calls »liberalism-on-communitarian-foundations« (Miller 1995:193). The premise highlights the need to protect citizens which connects to the view that communities are of intrinsic moral value and that the unilateral ability to exclude migrants through border control is therefore legitimate. However, just like the EU-discourses, Miller's view differs from pure communitarianism because he also grants normative importance to basic rights (Miller 1995:73). Together, then, the communitarian and liberal components make for a view where moral responsibility is seen as falling in two dimensions determined by memberships. The first is derived from everyone's membership in the global human community

whereas the second concerns people's national or, in the case of Schengen-citizens, supranational, memberships. According to Miller;

in considering relationships to outsiders, we should not fall into the trap of thinking that our only relationship to them is of one human being to another. We are certainly related in that way; but, in considering my ethical relationship to, say, a Tanzanian, I should not forget that we are also related as Briton to Tanzanian. Each of us is linked internally to our own national community, and this creates a second dimension to our relationship alongside the first, which complicates the ethical picture (Miller 1995:73).

On this particularist view humanitarian and national responsibilities are juxtaposed and European states have a special responsibility for the rights of their own citizens, a responsibility, which can outweigh that towards third countries and migrants (Miller 1995:73). European states are rarely responsible for accepting migrants because the universal obligation to aid »falls in the first place on the national and smaller communities to which the needy rights-bearer belongs« since these are responsible for the production of forced migration in the first place (Miller 1995:75-6). Similar to the EU-discourses, Miller says that the European obligation to show solidarity, in most cases can be discharged by transferring funds to, or exercising political pressure on, those countries producing refugees or experiencing transit migration.

A lot of weight in the EFS-argument is carried by the third, empirical, premise that externalization facilitates solidarity between European states, third countries and migrants. As mentioned, though, externalization is pursued through a number of different venues and the premise therefore needs further specification. In principle, these other venues need not pose problems for the EFS-argument as long as they facilitate solidarity. However, if the empirical premise is found to represent a flawed account of externalization, the EFS-argument's normative conclusion becomes problematic. If the empirical premise does not correspond to the actualities of externalization, this can create an inconsistency between the normative goal of securing basic rights and the actual consequences of EU externalization. To assess whether this is the case the relation between the EFS-argument's empirical premise and its normative conclusion must be examined. This is the topic of the following section.

Externalizing through private and humanitarian venues

The political goal of externalizing migration control can be pursued through actors and venues falling outside border politics as they are traditionally understood. Two such venues are the outsourcing of border functions to private actors and the ear-marking of European UN-HCR-donations.

When it comes to the privatisation of EU border control, the first clear-cut case came with the 1990 Schengen Convention's carrier sanctions. These obliged transport companies, under threat of substantial fines, to conduct pre-arrival screening of travellers for visas, passports and other travel-documents. Private companies were thus effectively transformed into actors in the European border control. Yet, while border control may be an obstruction to economic interests of transport and travel companies, it has also become a profitable market for other companies. Thus, the 2000s has witnessed an unprecedented introduction of Private Security Companies (PSCs) into European border functions.

The multinational security conglomerate G4S has, for instance, been contracted by the UK Border Agency (UKBA) to operate British detention camps, like Brook House, Dungavel, Oakington and Tinsley House, manage all transports of asylum seekers between these as well as running all deportations out of Great Britain (a contract which, however, was not renewed following the death of an Angolan national during a deportation in late 2010). The EU-subsidised EUROSUR border project, to be completed in 2013, illustrate a different kind of private involvement in EU border control. EUROSUR is premised on the European desire to create »full situational awareness« for European states through a so-called »common pre-frontier intelligence picture« of the migration movements in third countries close to Europe. To this end a plethora of primarily European security and weapons companies are developing a wide range of projects on surveillance and control of irregular migrants. Most of these projects are being subsidised via EU financial instruments.

The Italian defense giant Finmeccanica's contracts for border control, is yet another example of PSC-involvement in European border control, in particular with the political context of externalization. In 2008 a Friendship Pact was made between Italy and Libya where Italy agreed to pay 255 million dollars annually over twenty years as a gesture of solidarity and apology for the colonial occupation in the previous century (Gazzini 2009). Some of these funds were earmarked to private Italian investments in the Libyan control-infrastructure. Thus, Libya, Italy and Finmeccanica formed the joint venture

Libyan Italian Advanced Technology Company (LI-ATEC) providing technology and equipment to Libya's security infrastructure. Finmeccanica-subsiaries simultaneously landed contracts for the sale of helicopters, aircrafts and drones to Libya. Finally, in 2009, Libya gave the Finmeccanica-subsiary SELEX SI a €300 million contract for a C3 (Command, Conquer and Communication) border infrastructure along Libya's entire northern coastline. The rebels fighting Gaddafi have already promised to honour this contract.

As the cases of G4S, EUROSUR and Finmeccanica show, privatised border control comes in different forms. Some concern the transfer of control functions like camps and deportations from public to private hands, while others concern the development of border-infrastructures at Europe's territorial edges or in third countries. Granting themselves the role as security experts, PSCs portray their products as the most expedient and cost-effective alternative for politicians and civil servants facing the »threats« and »risks« of migration. Proponents of privatised border control can thus depict PSC-involvement in European border control as a better way of reaching the EFS-argument's normative goal of securing basic rights through solidarity.

However, PSC-involvement in border control does not only herald a shift in actors, but also a shift in the very function of the borders. Finmeccanica's sales of drones to Libya illustrate that the technologies deployed thoroughly transform the European border-regions, and thus also the internal politics of third countries. Despite Human Rights Watch's characterization of the Libyan camps as corrupt and ranging from negligent to brutal (Human Rights Watch 2009: 74), the privatised drive to boost the Libyan control-power has continued unabated.

Critics of privatised border control can argue that since the border functions on sale have the goal of combatting illegal migrants, the underlying technologies are premised on the administrative criminalization and exclusion of irregular migrants. PSCs compete fiercely to offer such »solutions« by developing technologies for monitoring irregular migrants before they enter European territory. One case in point is the EUROSUR seaBILLA-project, which involves PSCs like Eurocopter, EADS and Finmeccanica-subsiary Aleania Aeronautica, and is designed to »fight illegal immigration«, which is to say boatmigration in the Atlantic and South Mediterranean Seas, through UAVs and networks of passive sensors (Commission Staff Working Paper 2011). However, the 1951 Refugee Convention explicitly says that states »shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened (...) enter

or are present in their territory without authorization« (UNHCR web-page). Pointing to the Refugee Convention, critics can therefore say that the current privatisation drive seems to create an entire border infrastructure premised on functions, which are counterproductive to the EFS-argument's goal of securing basic rights through solidarity towards third countries and migrants.

When it comes to externalization through humanitarian venues, proponents of the EFS-argument argue that humanitarian donations is a legitimate way to discharge European states' obligation for solidarity with third countries and migrants. However, as the case of donations to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) illustrates, humanitarian donations in themselves do not guarantee solidarity.

As a state-based structure the UNHCR depends upon the political will of its members to donate funds and in 1994, 95 percent of its donations came from the EC and fourteen governments of industrialized countries (Hyndman 2000:57). Observing the funding flows to the UNHCR in the 1990s and 2000s a clear trend stands out: UNHCR-projects aiming to offer migrants the opportunity to live in European states do not attract anywhere near as much funding as projects designed to contain migrants in their regions of origin. A critique against the EFS-argument's is thus that while agencies like the UNHCR can be used to show solidarity, their structural dynamics also makes them vulnerable to attempts from powerful donors to utilise the agency for their own political agendas (Hyndman 2000; Bakewell 2008).

Thus, the EC earmarks all of its project-donations and given that it is the second-largest donor (after the US) in the world, this grants the union a powerful influence on the overall UNHCR-capacity. The vast majority of EC-funds are directed towards projects of extraterritorial migration control like repatriation, resettlement, »assisted returns«, »voluntary repatriations« or refugee camps. Such UNHCR-projects therefore play an important indirect role in the EU's creation of 'space and distance' to migrants. Critics of the EFS-argument can argue that the EU's donations to UNHCR are used primarily to contain migrants in their regions of origin, which, in turn cautions us against accepting the EFS-argument's assumption that the transfer of funds can straightforwardly discharge EU's obligation to exhibit solidarity with third countries and migrants.

The overall EU system of migration control can, in the words of Matthew Gibney be described as producing »engineered regionalism« (Gibney 2007:63-4), that is, conditioning migrants to remain in their regions of origin. A case in point is the ten thousand hunger-inflicted Somalis arriving at the UNHCR-funded Dadaab camp

in Kenya every week during the summer of 2011. By choosing to increase funds to the Dadaab camp instead of, say, temporarily housing Somali refugees, European states effectively contain the migrants in their region of origin. Originally built for 90.000 people, Dadaab currently hosts a population of almost 440.000 people, much more than the annual amount of asylum seekers to all EU Member States combined. The notion that EU countries are discharging their obligation to exhibit solidarity by donating funds to Dadaab bypasses that such »engineered regionalism« makes the world's poorest and most unstable countries bear the brunt of humanitarian obligations towards refugees (Gibney 2007:64). The way in which European states utilize UNHCR-projects and set the premises for PSC-involvement according to their own political agendas therefore problematises the EFS-argument's empirical premise.

At this point proponents of the EFS-argument might acknowledge the asymmetrical utilization of these venues for European agendas, but argue that this is still in accordance with the argument's liberal-communitarian requirements since it permits that Schengen-citizens are prioritized over communal aliens. The requirement of securing basic rights for migrants, they can say, is still discharged since European states actively promote the Dublin Regulation's solidary foundations, such as »safe third countries« and »first countries of arrival«. Through these foundations, this line of thought goes, European states can impose some measure of stability for migrants and third countries instead of allowing regions to succumb to the chaos of unmanaged migratory movement. This justification of the EFS-argument is assessed in the article's final section.

Externalization and border-induced displacement

At the outset the claim that the EU border system is based on foundations of solidarity faces difficulties as recent years have witnessed an ever-increasing number of disagreements between EU Member States.

One source of great debacle has been the Dublin Regulation's notion of »country of first arrival« which ascribes responsibility for processing asylum claims to the European country migrants reach first. Due to their geographic location at the EU's external borders, this effectively force Southern Member States like Greece and Italy to process the brunt of asylum claims. Thus, while Denmark in 2008 made 1725 asylum decisions, Italy and Greece made, respectively, 20.260 and 30.915 decisions (Eurostat 2009). It is those states that fail to control the external borders of the EU, which end up with responsibility for asylum claims (Gil-Bazo 2005:574).

Moreover, even if migrants succeed in transiting a Southern Member State country and arrive at a Northern Member State, the Dublin Regulation ensures that the latter can deport them back without assessing their asylum claims. The tensions between Italy and France following the refugee flows from Tunisia and Libya in early 2011 showed, Northern Member States are reluctant to aid Southern Member States. To this, the Italian minister Roberto Maroni commented that; »Europe prides itself on grand principles, but when called on to demonstrate its solidarity, nothing happens.« (AGI 09.04.2011). As a matter of fact, then, the claim that the EU's border system facilitates intra-European solidarity does not bear up to the facts. Instead, the system seems to be based on the self-interest of European states, and, in particular, of Northern Member States to avoid migrants. As the camp conditions in Greece and Italy illustrate, this has serious humanitarian consequences for migrants.

The lacking solidarity is also illustrated by another disagreement between EU Member States, namely the issue of responsibility for responding to boatmigrants' distress calls. In May 2011, survivors from a boat carrying 72 migrants away from the Libyan turmoil, told of how NATO helicopters and ships as well as the Italian coastguard repeatedly ignored their distress calls effectively abandoning them to the Mediterranean for 16 days (Guardian 8.May 2011). Being forced to drink seawater and their own urine, the survivors woke to new deaths every morning. When the boat washed back up on the Libyan shore, 61 of the 72 refugees, many women and children, had died. This tragic case is not unique as thousands of people have drowned in the Mediterranean following the North African spring.

Proponents of the EFS-argument may at this point argue that even if the EU Member States' do not show solidarity towards each other, the external dimension of the border system is nonetheless imposing some measure of stability for migrants and third countries. Thus, they can say, European Neighbourhood Policy-negotiations between the EU and third countries like Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and Libya have proven to be highly effective ways of consolidating readmission agreements between the EU and third countries. This has paved the way for Member States to determine »safe third countries« (STCs) to which irregular migrants can be deported in a responsible manner. While deportations may appear not to exhibit solidarity towards migrants, the claim is that the STC-list ensures that they end up in safe countries.

Yet, the claim that deportations to STCs impose safety and stability in regions of migration can be challenged. For one thing, the EU's STC-list has been criticised severely for including repressive police states, like

Morocco, with records of beatings and exploitation in their detention facilities (Gadem 2010; Human Rights Watch 2002). Furthermore, it has been argued that EU countries use the notion of STC as a mechanism to deflect their obligations to assess asylum claims to other countries (Costello 2005:49; Gil-Bazo 2006:596). Moreover, the »safe« countries receiving deportees most often do not allow them to stay. Seeking to avoid being turned into dumping zones for deportees, these countries arrange their own readmission agreements with other countries to which the already-deported migrants are deported again, creating the phenomenon of »chain deportations« (Byrne&Shacknove 1996: 185; Costello 2005:45).

Another case in point is the Ceuta and Melilla-incidents. In these Spanish Enclaves at the Moroccan borders, hundreds of irregular migrants attempted to climb the border-fences in order to reach European territory. Tragically, Spanish and Moroccan security forces fired live rounds at the migrants resulting in the deaths of over 100 from shots or falls (Goldschmidt 2006:1-2). Over the following weeks, the EU put the Moroccan authorities under considerable pressure to avoid similar scandals and they reacted by deporting thousands of irregular migrants either to the Saharan desert without food, water or medicine (Doctors Without Borders 2006: 42) or to countries like Algeria and Mauritania. From there the migrants were deported onwards to yet other countries and in the end many ended up in the countries they had escaped to begin with. Similarly, between 2003 and 2006, Libya deported 198,000 persons to countries like Egypt, Sudan, Mali, Ethiopia and Eritrea (Fortress Europe 2007:6).

The lacking solidarity in the EU border system illustrates a crucial point about its overall function: political pressure from powerful European states creates a »ripple effect« in the border politics of both Southern European and North African states. The result is the creation of a decentralized system of enforced displacement whose function cannot be reduced to a 'Fortress Europe'. This is because the system does not simply accumulate migrants at the EU »walls«, but instead, as the cases of chain deportations show, continuously produces flows of forced migration, transferred between states. Externalization in particular relies upon the establishment of transportation channels between extraterritorial control-elements rather than singular control-points. Put differently, the Ceuta and Melilla-fences, Moroccan deportations, Libyan and Algerian camps or Frontex operations in the waters of Senegal, Mauritania and Cap Verde all serve to deflect, manage and steer migrants within the externalized border space. The system depends upon the ability of individual states to traffic migrants between each other as they at-

tempt to deflect responsibility for them, in effect consigning migrants to a state of quasi-permanent displacement.

This problematizes an assumption shared by most discussions of European border control, namely that it is a response to already-existing forced migration. Alexander Betts (2009: 5) defines forced migration as »movement that takes place under significant structural constraints that result from an existential threat«. As Betts (2009:11) rightly points out, understanding the causes of forced migration requires looking at global political trends and the concept of forced migration is a useful way of highlighting that people often flee for reasons which transcend the Refugee Convention's narrow interpretation of refugee-hood as persons individually persecuted for reasons of nationality, race, religion, or membership in ethnic and political communities. Hence, besides refugees, the category of forced migration also includes migration caused by conflict-induced displacement, development-induced displacement and environmental-induced displacement (Betts 2009:4-10). Since these kinds of displacement can jeopardize basic rights, there are also strong moral reasons for using the category of forced migration. On this view, then, European states may be causing forced migration through, say, fishing policies, debt-policies or military interventions, and the border control they impose is then only a response to the forced migration resulting from such policies (Betts 2009:13-4).

Yet, although the engineered regionalism enforced through EU externalization is also very much a global political trend, the above categorization of forced migration means that it is conceptualized as a phenomenon external to the enforcement of border control. This, however, bypasses the fact that the EU's decentralized border network is a socio-geographical space that produces enforced mobility in itself. The categorization thus removes from the causes of forced migration the way states' deflect and transfer migrants between each other. The EU border system should therefore also be seen as a cause of a forced migration in itself and to capture this, I shall call the forced migration caused by the EU border system for *border-induced displacement* (see also Lemberg-Pedersen forthcoming).

The difference between the original forms of displacement and border-induced displacement is one between first order and second order categories. Thus, civil wars, occupations, the disintegration of livelihoods or natural disasters do lead to displacement, but when the people forced to migrate for these reasons are intercepted, detained and chain deported within the EU-conditioned border network, they experience another kind of displacement. Border-induced displacement, then, is not equivalent to the original displacement of people, but

functions instead as a displacement imposed upon already-displaced people.

The phenomenon of border-induced displacement generates two severe problems for the EFS-argument. Firstly, although the argument's particularism deems it legitimate for the EU to prioritize Schengen-citizens over communal aliens, the view's liberal component still requires the protection of migrants' basic rights. However, the continuous production of border-induced displacement in the EU border system undermines the claim that externalization imposes safety and stability for migrants. While the system may appear stable it is so only for certain European countries, and only at the expense of migrants, third countries and the Southern European Member States. Secondly, a key assumption in the EFS-argument's second normative premise, its two-dimensional account of moral responsibility, is that the border control itself is not causing forced migration. Yet, since the responsibility for causing forced migration cannot be isolated to refugees' countries of origin, but also resides with the EU qua its externalization, further responsibility for receiving asylum seekers is generated according to the union's own normative premise (see also Lemberg-Pedersen 2011).

A critical inquiry shows that the empirical premise of the EFS-argument represents a flawed account of externalization. The EU border system does not facilitate solidarity, but seems instead based upon the wish of Northern European states to deflect their responsibility for migrants. This has created a decentralized system that trades upon the continuous production of border-induced displacement and space and distance between Northern European countries and migrants. This problematizes the two normative premises in the EFS-argument: externalization seems to undermine both the liberal requirement to secure migrants' basic rights as well as the assumption that responsibility for forced migration can be determined according to a two-dimensional account of moral responsibility. At the end of the day, a critical assessment of the EFS-argument's premises reveals a grave inconsistency between the normative goals espoused by the EU and the actual consequences of externalization.

Conclusion

To conclude, this article interpreted central EU discourses on externalization as the EFS-argument with its dual normative commitment to basic rights and the value of communities. Its particularism was seen as based on the assumption that the EU can legitimately prioritize its moral responsibilities according to people's status as com-

munal members or aliens. States from which migrants flee were seen as having the biggest responsibility for their plight, while externalization through the transfer of funds or political pressure in most cases were seen as a legitimate way for European states to discharge their obligation to exhibit solidarity towards basic rights.

It was then pointed out that the legitimacy of the EFS-argument's normative conclusion depended on the accuracy of its empirical premise that externalization in fact does facilitate solidarity. Yet, it was argued, European states' utilization of UNHCR-projects through EC earmarking and PSC-contracts accorded more to the political agendas of Europe than that of third countries or migrants. The empirical premise did not take into account, firstly, how European funds are used to assign the brunt of responsibility for refugees on the world's poorest states and, secondly, how PSC-contracts under the EUROSUR-umbrella or those between Finmeccanica and Libya are premised on border politics seemingly at odds with the 1951 Refugee Convention.

Following this, the claim that the EU border system despite its faults nevertheless imposes some measure of stability for third countries through the Dublin Regulation was assessed. However, since repressive police states are included in the safe list and these also conduct chain-deportations it was argued that the STC-concept deflects rather than facilitates EU solidarity towards third countries and migrants. The disagreements between European states concerning both Dublin's »first country of arrival«-concept and responsibility for answering boat-migrants' distress calls further exacerbated this critique and highlighted the humanitarian consequences of the lacking solidarity.

Turning the claim of intra-European and third country solidarity on its head, the article therefore argued that the European border system should be seen as a decentralized system of enforced displacement caused by the political and economic pressure from powerful European states. As these attempt to deflect their responsibility towards migrants through externalization »ripple effects« are created affecting the border politics of countries interacting with the EU. As such, the decentralized border system was seen as trading upon the continuous production of what I termed border-induced displacement, in order to create space and distance between Northern European countries and migrants. The article therefore concluded that a critical assessment of the EFS-argument's premises reveals a grave inconsistency between the normative goal, claimed to be at the heart of EU externalization and the actual consequences of its multifaceted practices.

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