Russian foreign policy in the increasingly important Arctic region reflects an ambiguous combination of assertiveness and cooperation in accordance with international law. Against this background, the existing literature on the Arctic tends to polarise around revisionist and status quo interpretations of Russian foreign policy in the region. Based on case studies this article provides support for a modified version of the status quo interpretation which incorporates insights from the revisionist interpretation.

1. Russia and the Arctic

The existing literature on Russian foreign policy in the Arctic is divided into two competing camps. One approach emphasises assertive Russian actions like the Russian flag planting on the seabed beneath the North Pole in 2007 and downplays Russia’s adherence to the legal framework in the Arctic region whose economic potential is increasingly highlighted by the effects of global warming (Borgerson 2008: 65-74, Petersen 2008: 47, Baev 2010: 25-26). Ominously, it has been suggested that Russia is merely ‘paying lip service to international law’ and appears to believe that ‘credible displays of power will settle conflicting territorial claims’ in the Arctic (Cohen, Szaszdi & Dolbow 2008: 1). Russia’s actions in the Arctic have in fact even been linked to a looming ‘New Cold War’ between Russia and the West (Lucas 2009: 186-187).

Another approach, by contrast, is inclined to dismiss assertive Russian actions like the flag planting or the resumption of Soviet-era strategic bomber flight patrols over the Arctic Ocean and underlines Russia’s adherence to the existing legal framework in the Arctic (Rowe 2009: 10, Zysk 2009: 106, Trenin 2010: 10-12, Indzhiev 2010: 117-118). Specifically, the approach stresses that Russia bases its claims in the ice-covered Arctic Ocean on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and has abrogated the Soviet sector principle according to which the Soviet Union unilaterally claimed a triangular sector between the Soviet Union’s North-eastern and North-western borders and the North Pole in 1926 (Indzhiev 2010: 16-20, Kazmin 2010: 15). The approach also highlights Russia’s participation in the ‘Arctic Five’ cooperation with the other Arctic coastal states (Canada, Denmark, Norway, and the United States). The ‘Arctic Five’ cooperation is based on the UNCLOS and was formally launched at the Ilulissat Summit in May 2008 when the ‘Arctic Five’ signed the Ilulissat Declaration and committed themselves to an ‘orderly settlement of any possible overlapping claims’ based on the existing legal framework in the Arctic (Ilulissat Declaration 2008). For these reasons, a Russian observer has posited that Russia’s Arctic policy aims to maintain ‘the status quo in the Arctic waters which exists from the Soviet period’ until Russia achieves UN recognition of its claims (Golotyiuk 2008: 3).

The divergent interpretations make it relevant to study Russian foreign policy in the Arctic in further detail. Drawing on the distinction between the ideal types of revisionist and status quo powers in international relations, the existing literature can be synthesised into revisionist and status quo interpretations. The realist premise underlying the distinction between revisionist and status quo powers suggests that all policies seek to either increase or keep power. Accordingly, a state whose foreign policy aims at acquiring more power conducts a revisionist foreign policy, while a state whose foreign policy aims at maintaining the distribution of power pursues a policy...
of the status quo (Morgenthau 1973: 40-41). In operational terms, a state’s attitude towards the rules of an international system distinguishes revisionist from status quo powers. From this perspective, a revisionist power is discernable from a status quo power by its compliance with the existing international institutions and the framework of international law (Gilpin 1981: 34-36, Johnston 2003: 8-12). Given the importance of the UNCLOS in an Arctic context, adherence to the UNCLOS therefore constitutes an important indicator of whether Russia is best classified as a revisionist power challenging the provisions of the UNCLOS or a status quo power adhering to the existing legal framework.

The present paper aims to test the competing interpretations through case studies of the Russian flag planting in 2007 and the Ilulissat Summit in 2008 which can be treated as ‘crucial cases’ given their centrality to the competing interpretations (Eckstein 1975: 113-123, Gerr ring 2007: 115-122). The possibility of testing hypotheses using single case studies is disputed for various reasons and case studies entail obvious limitations with respect to external validity (King, Verba & Keohane 1994: 209-211, George, Bennett 2005: 220-222). The ‘crucial’ case studies can, however, be seen as a ‘plausibility probes’ which attempt to determine whether the potential validity of the competing interpretations may reasonably be considered great enough to warrant further inquiry (Eckstein 1975: 108-109). The case studies, accordingly, seek to explore the validity of the two competing perspectives on Russian foreign policy in the Arctic and do not attempt to give a full account of Russia’s Arctic policy which is beyond the scope of the paper. Conducting the case studies, the paper primarily relies on official statements from the Russian government and news coverage of the selected cases.

2. The Russian Flag Planting on the North Pole Seabed

In the summer of 2007, Russia performed the first ever manned descent to the seabed beneath the North Pole. The descent took place as a part of the expedition Arktika 2007 which was conducted by the Russian research vessel Akademik Fyodorov with the help of the icebreaker Rossiya. On 2 August 2007, the deep-submergence vehicles MIR-1 and MIR-2 submerged from the Akademik Fyodorov in the morning and reached the North Pole seabed around noon. MIR-1 and MIR-2 collected a number of specimens from the seabed, but most famously the MIR-1 also placed a large Russian titanium flag on the North Pole seabed (McDowell, Batson 2007: 11-13). After the descent, the leader of the expedition, the presidential advisor Artur Chilingarov, forcefully commented that ‘there is the law of the sea and there is the right of “the first night” (...) the North Pole belongs to Russia’ (Moskovskiy komsomolets 2007). The flag planting consequently sparked sharp reactions from the other Arctic coastal states. For instance, then Canadian foreign minister Peter MacKay was quoted saying that ‘this isn’t the 15th century (...) you can’t go around the world and just plant flags and say “we’re claiming this territory”’ (Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press 2007). Against this background, the flag planting could be seen as a revisionist attempt to challenge ‘the rules of the game’ in the Arctic based on the UNCLOS. Nonetheless, classification of the flag planting as a revisionist challenge of the UNCLOS would seem to depend on the certain conditions. Given the operationalisation of a revisionist power as a power challenging the existing legal framework based on the UNCLOS, it seems possible to deduce the following minimum conditions. First, the flag planting expedition would have to reflect continuity with Russia’s previous foreign policy in the Arctic. Second, the flag planting would need to have had an international direction to assert Russia’s claims vis-à-vis the other Arctic coastal states. Third, high-level decision-makers in Russia would need to have welcomed the flag planting. What follows explores the extent to which the three conditions are satisfied.

2.1 Policy continuity

The origins of Arktika 2007 are somewhat obscure. Russia has previously organised similar expeditions known as Arktika 2000 and Arktika 2005 in order to collect scientific data and prove Russia’s claims within the UNCLOS framework (Indzhiyev 2010: 37, ITAR-TASS 2005). The continuity between Arktika 2007 and Russia’s previous foreign policy in the Arctic region has also been stressed by the Russian member of the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), Yury Kazmin. According to Kazmin, ‘the political significance of [the flag planting] can be hardly overestimated’ since the flag planting ‘confirmed that Russia has not abandoned its claim to the continental shelf and the resources of the seabed up to the North Pole (...) and that she shall never revise the limit once outlined’ (Kazmin 2010: 27). The continuity between Arktika 2007 and Russia’s previous foreign policy in the Arctic is, nonetheless, far from perfect. In fact, the idea of performing a manned descent to the seabed of the North Pole appears to have been conceived already in 1997 among a group of international explorers led by the Australian Mike McDowell. The original idea was to conduct the endeavour as a passenger-funded expedition using the Russian MIR deep-submergence vehicles, but it proved difficult to find enough passengers willing to pay for the project. For that reason, the
plan did not develop further until the Swedish-German businessman Frederik Paulsen joined the project in 2005 and agreed to ‘funding a significant proportion of the costs’ in return for a place in one of the MIR submersibles (McDowell, Batson 2007: 8). Still, the organisers had difficulties securing icebreakers and the expedition did not get underway until the prominent Russian polar explorer and presidential Arctic representative, Artur Chilingarov, took over the organisation of the logistics and used his clout ‘to fund the remaining cost of mounting the expedition’ (McDowell, Batson 2007: 9). With the assistance of Chilingarov, who is also a deputy speaker of the Russian State Duma representing the dominant United Russia party, the expedition was authorised by the Russian government and approved by the Maritime Board under the Russian government. Formally, Arktika 2007 was organised by the Institute of Oceanography under the Russian Academy of Sciences. The Institute of Oceanography, in turn, delegated the task of carrying out the expedition to the non-commercial Russian Polar Research Foundation which is established by the Russian Association of Polar Explorers headed by Chilingarov. Interestingly, though, officials from the Institute of Oceanography are reported to have refused to comment on the financial sources of the expedition (Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press 2007, ITAR-TASS 2007d, ITAR-TASS 2007c). All told, the unclear level of government involvement in the organisation and funding of Arktika 2007 suggests that the first condition of policy continuity is not satisfied.

2.2 Policy Direction

According to Chilingarov, the most important result of Arktika 2007 was that ‘we showed that the Arctic is ours, the Russian Arctic (...) the Arctic has always been Russian and will always be Russian’ (Moskovskiy komsomol 2007). Chilingarov’s words could suggest that the flag planting had an international direction and aimed to challenge the other Arctic coastal states. Chilingarov’s statements concerning the purpose of the expedition are, however, not entirely consistent. In another interview, Chilingarov has simply called Arktika 2007 ‘a geographic expedition’ whose main goal was the descent to the North Pole seabed (Moskovskiy komsomol 2007). Moreover, Arktika 2007 incorporated a number of symbols relating to the dominant United Russia party which seem superfluous outside a Russian context. Apart from Chilingarov, United Russia was represented by another State Duma member, Vladimir Gruzdev, who was also onboard the MIR-1 when the Russian flag was placed on the North Pole seabed. The MIR-1 also left a time capsule on the seabed which contained a United Russia banner. The leading United Russia member and head of the International Affairs Committee in the Russian Federation Council, Mikhail Margelov, publicly welcomed the capsule with the United Russia banner as ‘an excellent PR move by his party colleagues’ (Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press 2007). The domestic direction of Arktika 2007 is also indicated by the fact that assertive Arctic endeavours have resonance among the Russian public according to opinion polls. More than 70 percent of the respondents in one poll, for example, had an ‘encouraging attitude’ towards Arktika 2007, while 90 percent had no doubts as to the legitimacy of a Russian claim to the North Pole (ITAR-TASS 2007a). The references to United Russia suggest a domestic purpose which is difficult to combine with the second condition of an international direction to assert Russia’s claims vis-à-vis the other Arctic coastal states.

2.3 High-level reactions

Arktika 2007 might have developed outside the traditional channels of Russian foreign policy in the Arctic, but the Russian authorities quickly embraced the project once the descent to the North Pole seabed was successfully carried out (Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press 2007). Then President Putin, for example, personally phoned the participants shortly after the descent to congratulate them (ITAR-TASS 2007c, ITAR-TASS 2007b). The praise from President Putin was seconded by similar statements from other prominent Russian officials like the speaker of the State Duma and leading member of United Russia, Boris Gryzlov (ITAR-TASS 2007c). Even the Russian Patriarch at the time, Aleksiy II, welcomed the descent, commenting that Arktika 2007 was a historic event which had ‘enhanced Russia’s prestige’ (Kolodkin, Glandin 2007: 15). As another sign of high-level support, Chilingarov was invited for a private meeting at the presidential residence upon his return to Russia and was told that the expedition members had ‘accomplished a great deed for our state’ (Moscow News 2008). In January 2008, the high-level support was reiterated when President Putin signed a decree awarding the title Hero of the Russian Federation to the crew members of the MIR-1 ‘for the courage and heroism they showed under extreme conditions and the successfully conducted operation’ (ITAR-TASS 2008a).

The enthusiastic official response to Arktika 2007 notwithstanding, however, high-level Russian officials have also been cautious not to link the flag planting to Russia’s claims in the Arctic. At the meeting with Chilingarov at the presidential residence, for instance, President Putin explicitly stressed that the results obtained by Arktika 2007 should become the basis of Russia’s stand during future discussions with the other Arctic coastal
is in well with the status quo interpretation. Even so, classification of Russia as a status quo power on the basis of the Ilulissat Summit would also seem to depend on certain basic conditions. Given the operationalisation of a status quo power as a power adhering to the existing legal framework based on the UNCLOS, the following minimum conditions can be deduced. First, a status quo interpretation would depend on evidence of a positive Russian engagement before the summit. Second, the findings would have to reveal a constructive Russian behaviour during the summit. Third, Russia would need to have communicated its participation domestically and internationally following the summit.

3.1 Pre-summit Engagement

The Ilulissat Summit was convened ‘at the invitation of the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Premier of Greenland’ (Ilulissat Declaration 2008). The summit emerged as a continuation of an informal brain-storming session among the ‘Arctic Five’ which Norway hosted in Oslo in October 2007 and the invitations for the Ilulissat Summit were issued only after informal consultations with Norway (Petersen 2008: 56). Russia, by contrast, was not directly involved in the preparations for the Ilulissat Summit, but has by and large supported the launch of ‘Arctic Five’ cooperation. In Oslo, for instance, Russia’s representatives noted the applicability of an extensive international legal framework to the Arctic Ocean including the UNCLOS and emphasised Russia’s commitment to continued cooperation in the Arctic (Norwegian Foreign Ministry 2007). Russia also acted in a cooperative way during the preparations for the Ilulissat Summit. In January 2008, for example, the Danish government presented the participating states with a discussion paper which noted the adequacy of the existing legal framework. Russia accepted the discussion paper and was particularly satisfied with an explicit reference to the UNCLOS (Petersen 2008: 59-61). Russia’s cooperation during the initial preparations for the Ilulissat Summit was followed by a highly proactive engagement immediately before the summit. Notably, the Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov visited Copenhagen on his way to Greenland (Rossiyskaya gazeta 2008). According to a Russian newspaper, Foreign Minister Lavrov aimed to reassure his Danish colleague of Russia’s cooperative attitude in advance, downplaying Russia’s assertive moves in the Arctic and emphasising the importance of the UNCLOS (Vremia novostey 2008). On the whole, the evidence relating to Russia’s pre-summit engagement would therefore seem to fulfil the first condition.
3.2 Behaviour during the Summit
The actual negotiations of the Ilulissat Summit took place on 28 May 2008. The first half of the day was devoted to less disputed matters like the effects of climate change and issues pertaining to indigenous peoples in the Arctic. Afterwards, the controversial issue of Arctic sovereignty was discussed during the second half of the day (Rossiyskaya gazeta 2008). The level of diplomatic representation constitutes an instructive starting point when examining Russia’s behaviour during the summit. Russia has historically been very conscious about parity in the level of diplomatic representation in general and parity with the United States in particular. Russia’s particular emphasis on the relationship with the United States is clearly reflected by the fact that Foreign Minister Lavrov held bilateral talks with the US Deputy Secretary of State, John Negroponte, on the sidelines of the summit (Russian Foreign Ministry 2008a). For these reasons, it is worth noting that Russia, unlike Denmark and Norway, was represented by its foreign minister, whereas Canada was represented by the Canadian Minister for Natural Resources and the United States was represented at the level of Deputy Secretary of State. While the absence of the Canadian Foreign Minister reflected his resignation on the eve of the summit, the lower level of American representation appears to have been a conscious choice. Russian observers, in any case, note that the representative of the United States was a less influential figure and the representation by a ‘secondary figure’ is seen as an indication that the United States did not attach great importance to the summit (Kommersant 2008, Usviatsov 2009: 4).

The presence of Foreign Minister Lavrov at the summit despite the level of American representation suggests a constructive Russian behaviour insofar as Russia could have sent one of Russia’s eight Deputy Foreign Ministers of whom one is primarily responsible for multilateral diplomacy and climate change related issues (Russian Foreign Ministry 2010). In that way, Russia could have given the impression of complying with the framework of international law and maintained diplomatic parity with the United States simultaneously.

The congruence between Russia’s official position at the summit and the wording of the Ilulissat Declaration also indicates a constructive Russian behaviour. The minutes of the negotiations are not publicly accessible, but the Russian position is reflected by a speech which Foreign Minister Lavrov gave at the summit. In the speech, Foreign Minister Lavrov emphasised the common interests uniting the Arctic coastal states and avoided reference to extra-regional actors like Finland, Iceland, and Sweden which are also members of the Arctic Council, but do no border directly on the Arctic Ocean. Specifically, Foreign Minister Lavrov made it clear that Russia did not share ‘alarmist prognoses’ of a future ‘battle for the Arctic’ (Lavrov 2008b). Instead, he explicitly stressed the importance of the UNCLOS and concluded by noting how the Arctic is becoming ‘our common home’, echoing Gorbachev’s vision of a ‘common European home’ (Lavrov 2008b).

Russia’s focus on the Arctic coastal states and the existing legal framework based on the UNCLOS is clearly reflected in the final wording of the Ilulissat Declaration. The declaration repeatedly refers to ‘the five coastal states’ and their special status in the Arctic and makes a clear distinction between the coastal states and ‘other interested parties’ (Ilulissat Declaration 2008). Moreover, in keeping with the Russian position, the Ilulissat Declaration emphasises the existing framework of international law and explicitly mentions the UNCLOS (Ilulissat Declaration 2008). The level of Russian representation and the congruence between Russia’s official position and the final wording of the Ilulissat Declaration would seem to satisfy the second condition of a constructive Russian behaviour during the summit.

3.3 Communication
Immediately after the summit, Foreign Minister Lavrov spoke at a joint press conference with the other participants. At the conference, Foreign Minister Lavrov called the results of the summit ‘substantial and useful’ and added that the summit ‘showed that we have common interests’ (Lavrov 2008a). Notably, the Ilulissat Declaration was said to reflect the resolve of all the participants to solve all potential problems ‘on the basis of international law’ (Lavrov 2008a).

The day after the summit, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a short press release on the results of the Arctic Ocean Conference. The press release mentioned the intent of expanding cooperation among the Arctic states and the commitment to legal solutions of any disputes (Russian Foreign Ministry 2008b). The press release was also published in English and French versions which were clearly addressed at an international audience. On the contrary, it has not been possible to identify evidence of similar domestic communication apart from the Russian version of the press release. Likewise, few domestic actors seem to have commented on Russia’s participation at the summit.

Again, however, the presidential representative Artur Chilingarov stands out. After the summit, Chilingarov publicly refuted Foreign Minister Lavrov’s remarks that Russia has no claims to the North Pole, saying that Foreign Minister Lavrov ‘speaks as a diplomat’ (Kommersant 2008). Chilingarov stated that Russia did not need to
and Norway finally agreed to resolve a long-standing dispute over the maritime border in the Barents Sea (Trenin 2010). Prime Minister Putin told an international audience in March 2010, for instance, Russia confirmed the support for the existing legal framework at the ‘Arctic Five’ follow-up summit in Canada where the ‘Arctic Five’ reiterated their commitment to an orderly resolution of overlapping claims ‘within the extensive international legal framework that applies to the Arctic Ocean’ (Canadian Foreign Ministry 2010). The following month, Russia and Norway finally agreed to resolve a long-standing dispute over the maritime border in the Barents Sea (Trenin 2010: 10). Russia’s adherence to the UNCLOS was once again demonstrated when the Akademik Fyodorov sailed off from St Petersburg in July 2010 to gather additional data to substantiate Russia’s claims within the UNCLOS framework (ITAR-TASS 2010a). Most recently, Russian Prime Minister Putin told an international audience in Moscow in September 2010 that he had ‘absolutely no doubt that the existing Arctic problems (…) could be solved in the spirit of partnership through negotiations and on the basis of the existing norms of international law’ (Putin 2010).

On the other hand, the assertiveness emphasised by revisionist interpretations highlights the fact that Russia is not a unitary actor. The forceful rhetoric from Chilingarov demonstrates the existence of more assertive views on the Arctic which the Russian leadership sometimes seems to accommodate. Remarkably, even Chilingarov has recently moved to emphasise Russia’s adherence to the UNCLOS following the commotion in connection with the flag planting (Moscow News 2008, ITAR-TASS 2010b). Chilingarov is, however, not the only proponent of an assertive Russian stance in the Arctic. Notably, the commander in chief of the Russian navy, Admiral Vladimir Vysotskiy, has warned that while there is presently peace and stability in the Arctic a power-based revision up to the point of armed intervention cannot be excluded in the future (Usviatsov 2009: 3). Noting an increase in the military activities of the NATO members in the Arctic, the secretary of the Russian Security Council and former director of the Federal Security Service (FSB), Nikolai Patrushev, has similarly urged that Russia should ‘take action now’ to prevent NATO members from driving Russia away from the Arctic (Zyśk 2009: 118).

A modified version of the status quo interpretation incorporating revisionist insights would therefore suggest that Russia is an Arctic status quo power seeking international cooperation despite some domestic support for an assertive stance which can explain the existence of revisionist interpretations.

4. Conclusion

Status quo and revisionist interpretations both capture important elements of Russian foreign policy in the Arctic. On the one hand, in keeping with the status quo interpretation, the case studies show that the UNCLOS enjoys considerable support within the presidential administration and the Russian foreign ministry which favour international cooperation in the Arctic. Recent events provide additional support for a status quo interpretation of Russian foreign policy in the Arctic. In March 2010, for instance, Russia confirmed the support for the existing legal framework at the ‘Arctic Five’ follow-up summit in Canada where the ‘Arctic Five’ reiterated their commitment to an orderly resolution of overlapping claims ‘within the extensive international legal framework that applies to the Arctic Ocean’ (Canadian Foreign Ministry 2010). The following month, Russia and Norway finally agreed to resolve a long-standing dispute over the maritime border in the Barents Sea (Trenin 2010: 10). Russia’s adherence to the UNCLOS was once again demonstrated when the Akademik Fyodorov sailed off from St Petersburg in July 2010 to gather additional data to substantiate Russia’s claims within the UNCLOS framework (ITAR-TASS 2010a). Most recently, Russian Prime Minister Putin told an international audience in Moscow in September 2010 that he had ‘absolutely no doubt that the existing Arctic problems (…) could be solved in the spirit of partnership through negotiations and on the basis of the existing norms of international law’ (Putin 2010).

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Notes

1. The UNCLOS specifies the conditions under which coastal states can claim an outer continental shelf beyond a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone which is automatically stipulated in the UNCLOS (Colson 2003: 92-94, Kunoy 2007: 465-470). Russia ratified the UNCLOS in 1997 and became the first state to submit a claim within the UNCLOS framework for an outer continental shelf in the Arctic to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) in 2001. The CLCS rejected Russia’s initial claim because of inadequate scientific evidence, but Russia has been gathering more data ever since in order to submit a new claim in 2013 or 2014 (Kazmin 2010: 27-28).

2. The word ‘pravo’ both means ‘law’ and ‘right’ in Russian.