skelligartede bøger, jeg har omtalt, supplerer hinanden og med fordel kan benyttes sammen.

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Alexander Davidson, *Two Models of Welfare: The Origins and Development of the Welfare State in Sweden and New Zealand, 1888-1988*, Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Uppsaliensis, 1989, 432 s., SEK. 198,00.

This comparative study was a dissertation, and its strengths and weaknesses reflect that fact. Strengths first. Davidson attempts an ambitious dialectical task. He tries to use the Millsian methods of difference and similarity to test a broad range of theories about the welfare state, and at the same time to use those theories to explain why New Zealand rather consistently has opted for an incomes policy based, selectivist form of welfare state, while Sweden has developed a bureaucratized, universalised form. Davidson thus in effect is extending and amending Gösta Esping-Andersen's argument in *Politics Against Markets* that the resilience of social democratic political power and of the welfare state is a function of the *institutional* form the welfare state takes. Unlike Esping-Andersen, who compared only social democracies, Davidson stands a truly »liberal« case – New Zealand – against a »social democratic« case – Sweden.

Davidson carries out the comparison with highly detailed empirical studies of the origins and development of his two welfare states, the causes and consequences of particular ideological orientations and leadership struggles in the major left parties, and the failure of corporatist structures to contain wage struggles. The information on New Zealand provided by Davidson helps fill a major current gap in the literature on the welfare state, and should be particularly useful to Scandinavian scholars. Davidson's evidence seems to support Esping-Andersen's basic claim about the political consequences of particular *institutional forms* of welfare policy. For Davidsen, the political difficulties of winning middle class support for a selectivist welfare system largely explain why, under the post-1984 *Labour Party* government, New Zealand suddenly lurched towards an extreme residual form of welfare provision, towards a very flat tax structure, and towards a general *recommodification* of economic *and* social life.

Now weaknesses. Despite a self-conscious theoretical and methodological orientation to the study, Davidson's work falls apart in two ways. First, the rich empirical detail is not integrated particularly well into the theoretical discussion. This is especially true of the earlier chapters, where he tries to explain the emergence of both welfare states. Both explanations rely rather heavily on the decisions made by specific political leaders at specific moments in time. For those of us steeped in Machiavelli's writing, this is not necessarily a sin. What makes it problematic is the absence of any effort to connect political choices and political

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parties to specific social groups – to what extent did classes, and class structure delimit the options available to parties, and to what extent did parties and the act of organization structure classes and class interests? Similarly, while Davidson argues for a skocpolian 'autonomous state', he never provides evidence that such a state existed in either country. This is not simply a theoretical problem, as a plausible claim could be made that such a state is currently transforming the welfare system in New Zealand.

Second, the juxtaposition os cases is somewhat problematic. Davidson selects New Zealand because of its pioneering role in the welfare area both in the 1890s and 1930s, and Sweden because there the welfare state seemingly has developed into its fullest and most institutionalized form. Both, of course, are also relatively small, vulnerable, and to a certain extent »open« economies. But the similarities end there, even granting that Davidson makes a deliberate choice to contrast selectivist and universal welfare states. A better comparative logic emerges if one constructs a 2×2 table factoring industrial structure (industrial or agricultural) against welfare state type (liberal or social democratic). This yields four extreme cases: in the northwest corner liberal-industrial Australia; in the northeast social-democratic-industrial Sweden; in the southwest liberal-agricultural New Zealand; and in the southeast social-democratic-agricultural Denmark. (A number of intermediate and/or mixed cases also exist, and a similar, but six-celled table could be drawn up using Esping-Andersen's typology of liberal, conservative, and social democratic forms of institutionalizing welfare). Using a Millsian method of difference, any of the horizontal or vertical comparisons would be sounder than the diagonal comparison between Sweden and New Zealand. The horizontal comparison implicitly underlies Francis Castles' fine study, *The Working Class and Welfare,* which contrasts the extreme selectivism in Australasia with a generic version of European universalism. The vertical comparison has been made in the Swedish-Danish case by Esping-Andersen, albeit paying too much attention to political factors and not enough to the consequences of their different industrial sectors.

Davidson's diagonal comparison makes it impossible to show with certainty to what extent change in New Zealand has been caused by the institutional form of welfare or New Zealand's weak industrial structure, or political realignment by social groups. New Zealand's foreign debt, proportionate to GDP, is roughly twice the size of Sweden's and equal to Brazil's, suggesting many motives for the autonomous kind of state Davidson posits to seek cheaper forms of social welfare. Putting aside the political difficulties (evidenced by the failure of factions in the New Zealand Labour Party as well as some unionists who have pushed for this), implanting a Seedish style welfare state in New Zealand would quickly run into severe balance of payments constraints – certainly more severe than those Sweden currently is experiencing. The reverse is also true. Sweden's relatively sophisticated and diversified industrial economy, its links to the European economy, and its lower debt pressures permitted it to lower its budget deficit while only making minor reforms (relative to New Zealand) to its elaborate and bureaucratized welfare state in the 1980s. Similarly, the reversion of New

Zealand's much less corporatised political system, in which corporate groups largely relied on state enforced monopolies of representation, to more individualistic politics and policy making is no more surprising than the persistence of Sweden's strong, internally supporting peak organizations. The very extremeness that makes the New Zealand-Sweden comparison interesting thus also hampers its utility. The best, though also most difficult solution would be to compare all four extreme cases. Difficult not just because of the amount of work a four country comparison involves, but also because it would require a much better theoretical understanding of how differently institutionalized welfare states interact with, maintain, and help create (different) industrial structures.

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Peter Esaiasson, *Svenska valkampanjer 1866-1988*, Stockholm: Allmänna Förlaget, 1990, 493 s.

I bogen, der dækker 42 svenske valgkampe, tilbydes læseren faktisk to vidt forskellige bøger, og forfatteren skelner selv mellem disse dele med henvisning til, at den ene har større underholdningsværdi end den anden. Den anden er – igen med forfatterens ord – skrevet med »överdreven respekt för genrens krav på allvar och höjtidlighet«. Forklaringen på henvisningen til genrens krav er, at bogen er skrevet med henblik på erhvervelse af den svenske doktorgrad.

Bogen er velskrevet og giver med sine forskellige bestanddele et særdeles informativt og tankevækkende bud på udviklingen i partiernes kamp om vælgerne. En del af denne kamp er i de seneste årtier foregået via specielle valgfilm, men generelt er konklusionen, at TV er det medium, der dominerer dagens svenske valgkampe.

Peter Esaiasson tager tråden op fra Kent Asps og andres påpegning af politikkens »medialisering«, og gennem påvisning af, hvordan politikerne tenderer til at tilpasse sine handlinger til massemediernes måde at dække politik på. De svenske valgkampe er i dag dominerede af TV, og partierne har gennem tiden fået sværere ved at gøre sig gældende. TV har ifølge de svenske partiforskere mindsket behovet for medlemmer, idet »arbejdet« med kontakten til vælgerne bliver gjort af den centrale partiledelse via medierne og her specielt via TV, og ikke af partimedlemmer rundt omkring i landet.

Gennemgangen omfatter alle de 42 valg, der i perioden 1866 til 1988 har fundet sted til Riksdagen inklusive overgangen til etkammersystemet i 1970. Esaiasson har centreret sin historie omkring partiernes gøren og laden. Datamaterialet kommer fra partiernes arkiver og fra medierne, og for de første mange år fra aviserne. Analysen starter med gennemgangen af »andrakammervalet« efteråret 1866, og fortsætter kronologisk. Det er partiernes organiserede kampagneaktivitet med valgmøder, brochurer, personligt opsøgende arbejde og mediekontak-