positions a mass phenomenon among party members in Finland, Norway, and Sweden. Mass membership is therefore a necessity in these countries whereas the supply of individual rewards are fewer in Denmark, where parties can be run with less members.

**Mikael Skov Andersen**  
*Environmental Protection in Denmark: A problem of Implementation.*

The basic Danish environmental law, passed in 1973, was structured with extension of the traditional Scandinavian patterns of participation, not only delegating local authorities a major responsibility, but also allowing interest organizations of the regulated to play a major role during implementation. The chosen regulation was solely administrative and during the decision-making process the different actors managed to complicate the law with further veto points as well as access points for influence. The implementation gap in Danish environmental regulation is to be explained by the genuine political character of the implementation process. The complicated procedures and rules are defended by the strong interests, and the resulting administrative overload influences the strategies of the street-level environmental bureaucracy. Often ignoring formal rules the local inspectors seek an advisor role helping companies to comply, but leaving more than half of the especially polluting firms unattended, according to official figures.

The prevailing neo-corporate regulation seems unable to cope with the need for change arising from the ecological crisis.

**Jesper Bo Jensen**  
*The Institutional Structure and Deregulation.*

The development in the regulation in three distinct fields of the financial markets in Denmark in the 1980s has been very different. The foreign exchange control was deregulated, whereas only a liberalization of the rules was carried through within the field of mortgage loans. This difference in development can be explained from differences in the institutional structure of the three fields of regulation. The institutional structure is examined by looking at the relations between the regulating institutions and their surroundings. The result is that the deregulation has been practicable where there has been a relatively autonomous regulating institution with good relations to the regulated parties and a small degree of political conflict, and where the institution had a way of solving problems that tended towards regulation and an entrepreneurial type who could implement changes.