

værdighed først og fremmest er en funktion af »consistency in expressed intentions« (s. 94), dvs. af en deklatorisk politik. Efter Carlsnaes' opfattelse afhænger troværdigheden ikke så meget af, hvad Sverige siger, men af, hvad man gør og kan med hensyn til at overbevise supermagterne om, at Sverige ikke vil lade modparten anvende svensk område imod dem. Eller som han udtrykker det: svensk neutralitets troværdighed er et ontologisk, ikke et epistemologisk fænomen.

Carlsnaes er hermed nået frem til bogens pointe, som er, at mens svensk energipolitik på rent indenrigspolitiske præmisser har været et rimeligt svar på energisårbarheden, har den samtidig været med til at svække troværdigheden af svensk neutralitetspolitik. Carlsnaes tvivler i øvrigt også på, at Sverige har købt sig en *tilstrækkelig* forsikring mod de økonomiske konsekvenser af fremtidige oliekriser, idet han anser oliemarkedet for grundlæggende ustabil. I denne forbindelse anser han Sveriges afhængighed af IEA for både forsyningsmæssigt og udenrigspolitisk farlig. Forsyningsmæssigt, fordi IEA ikke hidtil har været og heller ikke i fremtiden kan være en garant for en retfærdig og tilstrækkelig forsyning i en krise, og udenrigspolitisk, fordi IEA er led i det bipolarø Øst-Vest-system. Sveriges deltagelse i og afhængighed af IEA svækker derfor tendentielt den ene supermagts (Sovjetunionens) tro på svensk autonomi i en ny oliekrise.

På dette punkt er kritikken af energipolitikken klar og tydelig, mens den er mere uklar, hvad angår den »interne« energipolitik. Her kritiserer han implicit miljøhensynets overordnede betydning: »The ecology issue seemed to have become so important that it effectively squashed any serious consideration of its effects on foreign policy« (s. 120). Men ellers er denne diskussion ganske kortfattet.

Det er en virkelig interessant og tænksom bog, Walter Carlsnaes har skrevet. Men han kunne måske have gjort lidt mere ud af nogle af de generelle perspektiver, som hans analyse aktualiserer. For det første beskæftiger han sig kun med ét aspekt af relationen mellem energisårbarhed og national sikkerhed, nemlig det politisk-diplomatiske. Der er også en vigtig militær side, som ikke bliver analyseret. For det andet rejser hans analyse og specielt hans afsluttende argumentation spørgsmålet om foreneligheden mellem neutralitet og interdependens. Er det i det hele taget muligt at overholde de strenge neutralitetskrav, som Carlsnaes stiller op, i en verden, hvor den gensidige afhængighed bliver stadig mere udtalt? Dvs. er svensk neutralitet fortsat mulig i dens hidtidige definition? Dette afgørende spørgsmål giver hans analyse ikke svar på.

Nikolaj Petersen
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Metin Heper & Ahmet Evin (eds.), *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s*, Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 1988, 256 s., \$ 49.95.

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rope it desires to be, the European Community. Although a member of the NATO Alliance, membership of the Community remains a distant prospect while the country's internal politics remain vulnerable to military intervention, three in the past 28 years. The problem with military interventions is that they tend to be violent affairs, profoundly undemocratic, and difficult to bring to an end. Once the line between the barracks and political office has been crossed, subsequent respect for their separation declines and it is a style of politics Western Europe might accept alongside, but is reluctant to accommodate closer than alliance politics demand.

Based upon papers from a conference in 1985, this volume sets out to examine whether the Turkish military might finally have reorganised its country's politics through its most recent intervention such that liberal democracy can flourish and the military retire from politics.

From the outset it is clear that the authors do not want to enter an assessment of the military seizure of power or its subsequent methods. By so doing they sidestep the difficult issue of whether seizure of the state by a small elite with a monopoly on the means of force can be justified. Instead the writers begin with that elite's stated goal of liberal democracy and assess the progress achieved. But the subject matter makes it difficult to sustain such a position, particularly when assessing different theoretical approaches and Turkey's recent history. The writers also need to be aware that identification with a goal can carry an implicit acceptance of the means by which it is pursued. In practice the authors tacitly accept the necessity for the 1980 military intervention as an inevitable response to the political chaos of the seventies.

Collectively the essays provide detailed descriptions of the political and constitutional reforms undertaken by the military; how these differ from previous policies; and how the intervention itself differs from previous interventions in 1960 and 1971. Most end with brief assessments of how the process is proceeding, particularly with the first »open« elections held in 1987 for which several of the writers updated their conference papers.

There is a general agreement that Turkey's problems result from a patrimonial state tradition with a strong state elite defending its concept of politics from a disorganised periphery that is politically excluded or marginalised. Political disorder and chaos has been the consequence. A similar conceptualisation of politics in third world states in the sixties led S.P. Huntington to explain the need for an authoritarian state to re-establish a politics of order. In his essay Dodd makes just this comparison, the Turkish state faces the third world challenge of a political structure, »permeated by society« and unless a »state-minded military steps in it will disintegrate into an extractive regime«, where neo-patrimonialism and political decay replaces legal-rational authority and any hope of liberal democracy. Hepin describes the position as a »zero sum game between the arena of the state and that of politics«. By implication the military acted to defend the former.

The use of an authoritarian state as a means for achieving the goal of a transcendentalist state is accepted as dangerous. Several of the papers detail the extreme restrictions placed upon politics by the 1982 Constitution. But the consensus re-

mains that the Constitution is a »fair enough plan for the creation of a liberal democratic state«. What is more the state imposition of order as a response to political crises in post-war West Germany and France offers successful precedents. That these were not third world states but economically developed states with long democratic traditions is not seen as a problem. In Turkey if the reorganised parties can break with the old style of party politics and if a strong state elite will hold fast to liberal democratic ideals then liberal democracy will prevail.

Is the plan being followed? With respect to the reformed political parties Turan describes the National Security Council's attempts to reorganise the politicians and their parties through the imposition of an extremely rigorous code of conduct: from what political and financial associations a party is allowed to have, to how long a leader can serve and the monitoring of party membership. As Turan suggests, in practice one would be hard pressed to find a party anywhere that fitted the idealized conception of a party embodied in such rules. More important is the power wielded in deciding which party is legal and as to how the parties shall practice politics. In the 1983 elections the military denied a number of parties the opportunity to stand while supporting others it favoured. In June 1983, just four months before the elections the National Security Council extended its power of veto to the individual candidates in its desire to introduce »a new ecology of political life in Turkey.«

The 1987 elections were the first real test of this ecological engineering being open to all parties operating within the terms of the new legal code. The result is described by several of the writers as being not so much a break with the past as a synthesis of old and new. One senses that the attempt to create a new political ecology is held to have been only a partial success and one whose future is far from certain.

Essays elsewhere in the volume provide supporting evidence as to the fragile state of Turkey's political condition. Kalaycioglu examines the 1983 Parliament and the nature and conduct of its members. Erguder and Hofferbert analyse recent voting patterns and conclude that an unintentional consequence of military government might have been the relocation of the party system within a framework for consensual conflict management as found in Western democracies. Both they and Tachau in his study of political leadership confirm the view that much in Turkey's post-1983 politics retains a continuity with what existed prior to 1980.

Because the writers wish to avoid passing judgement on the military's intervention the section on »the Military, the State and Politics« is something of a disappointment. None of the essays examines factors that underwrite the relationship between the military and the state in any depth or the forces which shape the elites involved. The papers tend towards description and their explanatory power suffers accordingly. Even Harris in his examination of the role of the military falls short of a critical appraisal. He readily accepts that the initial popular response to the generals' takeover was positive, that the action was seen as legitimate given the then political condition of Turkey, without the need for substantive evidence or to question the moral or political implications.

However, a short essay by Ahmet Evin in the final section, »The State and Democracy«, does offer some insights into the military's actions and continuing relationship with the state. He suggests that behind the repeated interventions lies a desire to impose its concept of the state upon the society. Any reforms that have resulted in greater popular participation in democratic processes have been the consequence of the military's desire to have a modern state and not from any commitment to pluralistic politics per se. This recognition of the undemocratic nature of the military reveals 1980 as a further imposition of the military's authority over the state rather than a restoration of the state's authority by ending its subordination to interest politics. It is an argument that in many ways questions the writers' acceptance of the liberal democratic goal and the tolerance of the means held as necessary to achieve it.

There is no doubting that this volume provides a valuable contribution to analysis of Turkey's political condition as the writers are extremely knowledgeable on the matter. Unfortunately it seeks to canvass support for Turkey's present path towards liberal democracy at the expense of those who have suffered most from its recent denial. It is important that human rights remain an issue despite Dodd's complaint of writers being fixated by them, and writers such as Rustow must recognise that while Turkey might appear to possess an almost complete coincidence of national and state identities not all can identify with the concept of nation the state now projects, many remain excluded and marginalised and will in the absence of participatory democracy resist and rebel against post-1980 Turkey.

If the military is an elite imbued with strong liberal democratic ideals then there is evidence in this volume for a cautious optimism. The authors have seen enough to suggest that they might be just such an elite, but for the moment it is probable that elected politicians see the real opposition as sitting in the barracks rather than on the parliamentary benches opposite and that is an indicator of poor political health.

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Hans Chr. Johansen, *Industriens vækst og vilkår 1870-1973*, Odense: Odense Universitetsforlag, 1988, 389 s., kr. 198,00 i abonnement (kr. 268,00 i løssalg).

I 1984 igangsatte Carlsbergfondet og Statens Humanistiske Forskningsråd et omfattende forskningsprojekt, »Industriens vækst og vilkår. Dansk industris historie efter 1870«. Projektet muliggjorde ansættelse af yngre stipendiater og inddragelse af et antal seniorforskere, og planen var, at projektet skulle resultere i en række bøger. Den foreliggende bog er bind 1 i værket »Dansk industri efter 1870«, der udarbejdes af seniorforskerne, hvoraf nogle også sidder i projektets styringsgruppe og værkets redaktionskomité.