Desværre er dette lettere sagt end gjort, da intrastatslige konflikter typisk har karakter af et nul-sumsspil.


Alt i alt har vi her et læsværdigt festskrift, som kommer langt omkring i det teoretiske landskab og derfor viser, hvordan studiet af europæisk sikkerhed gribes an anno 1995.

Peter Viggo Jakobsen
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What has changed since the 1970’s? What kinds of changes have taken place and why? Have uneven globalization and the end of the Cold War produced a new world order? Indeed, these are the questions all IR scholars should be working on. Or at least they should have a well-grounded opinion about them.

What is original about the volume edited by Holm and Sørensen is the attempt to avoid the Eurocentrism that is implicit in so many other studies. Both studies on the causes and effects of the end of the Cold War and on the processes of globalization tend to concentrate on the particular area of the world these authors call the „zone of peace“, consisting mainly of Japan, North America and Western Europe, and occasionally also on the Central Eastern Europe and Russia. This time most geographical areas of the globe are covered and, moreover, the authors are, at least in principle, „actually rooted in the country of region on which they were asked to contribute“. The regions and countries covered are: Africa, Latin America, South Asia, China, Russia, Pacific Asia and EU-Europe. In addition to these regional and country-specific studies, there are introductory and concluding chapters by the editors. Finally, there is also a chapter by Robert Keohane called „Hobbes’s Dilemma and Institutional Change in World Politics: Sovereignty in International Society“.

In the concluding chapter, the editors take some steps towards developing a „theory“ of their own. It is summarised in Figure 1. As the figure shows, the emphasis is on the states. The world system consists of states, but there are different kinds of states and they tend to change, in the long run mainly because of uneven globalization, but in the 1990’s the end of the Cold War has played a big role, too. They argue, partially correctly in my view, that system dynamics „change rather than reduce the role of the states in the system“. These changes depend on the different societal structures and state capabilities as well as on the positioning of states and regions within the globalizing capitalist world economy. There are also different types of states. Although the choice of the words „premodern“, „modern“, and „postmodern“ is somewhat unfortunate - for it seems to suggest the commitment of Holm and Sørensen to a linear (post)modernisation theory - the basic idea of distinguishing between dif-
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Figure 1. Global dynamics according to Holm and Sorensen

System dynamics → State units change → Present system:

Uneven globalization
End of Cold War

Three main types of state:
- pre-modern
- modern
- post-modern

Different kinds of states are firm, if not that novel.

African states are typically "premodern quasi-states", with little, if any, capabilities for "providing substantial goods for its citizens". Japan and the US are examples of "modern states" that "are their own masters". Members of the European Union are becoming "postmodern states" in that they are "allowing outside interferences in their domestic affairs because they get something in return: influence on a supranational level of governance".

Upon closer look, however, these distinctions conceal more than they reveal. For instance, I am quite unsure whether the African states can be understood as "premodern" or even as "quasi-(states)". I think Claude Ake is closer to truth when he argues, in his contribution to this volume, that "the [African] rulers hung on grimly to the enormous power of the colonial state by all means, and those who were excluded from this power and exploited by it used every means to get it". Ake is right in a sense that his statement presupposes that African states have many of the administrative and destructive powers of modern states. It may well be true, due to historical development of the production and exchange relations, unsuccessful self-reliance strategies of development, the authoritarian, neo-liberal Structural Adjustment Programmes of the IMF, ubiquitous political violence in the area, and the peculiar processes of state formation in that region, that these states have little, if any, capabilities for "providing substantial goods for its citizens". However, they certainly do have modern capabilities for surveillance, punishment, and violence.

Also the distinction between "modern" and "postmodern" states is less than clear. Although there are important differences in the conditions of Japan and the US, on the one hand, and the member-states of the European Union, on the other, I wonder whether it is possible to characterise Japan and the US as "their own masters". This seems to indicate that Holm and Sorensen think that the modern ideal of state sovereignty is able to describe reality accurately at least in some contexts. I doubt. Japan and the US, too are taking part in multilateral governance of the globalizing political economy (including ecological systems) and thus exchanging some of their de facto sovereignty for influence. Moreover, many US-American political actors are acutely aware of recent changes in the world economy. A more and more common line of thought in the left of the US is that "the transnational corporations, which have no loyalties beyond zealous devotion to their shareholders, have the advantages of international mobility and
unlimited resources. American workers, who come attached to families, homes, and communities, do not. As smokestack industries desert the U.S., the American worker is left behind." The ruling elites, in their turn, are more than ever oriented toward maintaining the American competitiveness in the world economy, as also pointed out by Keohane in this volume.

Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the complexities of the European Union can be adequately captured with the notion of "postmodern state", as developed by Holm and Sorensen. In his very nice piece, Michael Zürn is able to illustrate and even tentatively explain some of these complexities. Zürn argues that change in international governance need not necessarily be the result of interactions between states. It can also be caused by change in transnational social constellations, and in turn, transnational social constellations may be shaped by international governance. He argues further that in order to understand turbulence in European politics we need to study also social change, not only state interactions. He does this in terms of two big trends, globalization and individualization, and is able to show some interesting connections between integration and fragmentation in Europe and in the world.

In this book, there are also other nice chapters, such as Osvaldo Sunkel's "Uneven Globalization, Economic Reform, and Democracy: A View from Latin America", which discusses "the dialectics of transnational integration" in terms of long term trends in world economy, and Takashi Inoguchi's "Dialectics of World Order: A View from Pacific Asia", which, even if in fact less dialectical than Hayward Alker's or Thomas Biersteker's works in the "Dialectics of World Order" project (not published here), is nonetheless able to pose some interesting questions. Also, the book provides all kinds of nice quotations for all kinds of purposes. What would you say about this: "the end of the Cold War is not the 'end of history' but the 'return of history'"? Or about this: "Global peace is hardly on the agenda. There is a zone of peace among the consolidated liberal democracies of the North, but even here there are old and new risks, brought about by processes of fragmentation and by the deficit in the capacity to govern caused by uneven denationalization"?

There are thus many nice chapters as well as at least some illuminating insights to our changing globe. By and large, however, the discussions of this book move at the level of extended journalism and introductory level IR textbooks. Perhaps this is in this particular case justified. But there is an unfortunate tendency in the field to be co-opted by the pragmatics of foreign-policy makers and the logics of commercial Anglo-American publishers. All books published must be simple and topical, mostly they must use common-sensible language, and it is preferable that in the edited volumes there are some big names. Whose World Order? Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War is no exception. All the papers in this volume are relatively short and simple. There is neither any systematical empirical work - in fact, all the references are to second-hand sources - nor that much original conceptual analysis. Zürn is more an exception than the rule in his attempt to formulate some explicit causal hypotheses, and nobody discusses methodological problems at any greater length.

For many pragmatic and teaching purposes this book may be just right and, as said, there are interesting non-Euro-
centric insights into the processes of globalization and the end of the Cold War. Although it is true that one may wonder, for instance, why the Arab and Islamic worlds are not covered at all or how the authors were chosen, or may be willing to problematize some of the underlying theoretical assumptions, the lack of deeper reflection and systematic research is perhaps more noteworthy than any substantial problems.

In general - and this should not be read as a criticism targeted to this particular book - it is, in my view, in a high time to start to think alternatives for those publishing practices where too criteria overrun all the others: (i) whether the managing editors are able to read and enjoy the texts by themselves, and (ii) what is the estimated number of sold copies. In this turbulent, globalizing, neoliberalised, and mediatised world it might be too old-fashioned and risky to ask for state-run or -subsidised publishing houses, but perhaps it would not be entirely futile to turn our eyes to the European Union?

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Med denne let tilgængelige bog har de to forskere fra Center for Udviklingsforskning ydet et tiltrængt bidrag til den danske litteratur om FN. I overensstemmelse med såvel den danske som den internationale FN-debat i 50-året for verdensorganisationens oprettelse fokuserer forfatterne på de store administrative, økonomiske og politiske udfordringer FN står overfor netop nu, men den undergangsstemning, som antydes i pressemeddelelsen fra forlaget, er nu langt fra bogens gennemgående tone. Frem for at stille spørgsmålstegn ved FN's videre eksistens ser Gorm Rye Olsen og Lars Udsholt på, hvilken rolle FN kan spille og på mulighederne for reform, ligesom de giver en nuanceret fremstilling af succeser og fai-
skoler. Det skal de roses for.

Forfatterne lægger forsigtigt ud med en hurtig indføring i FN-systemet og en række af de teorier, som en analyse eller diskussion af FN med fordel kan bygge på (kapitel 1 og 2). Mest interessant er den udmærkede introduktion til den engelske skole. Med fremhævelsen af det internationale samfund som et normstyret og ordensfremmende alternativ til både realismens fokusering på anarki og umoderificeret magtpolitik, og idealismens tilflugt i håbet om, at staterne vil optræde mere moralsk i fremtiden, tilbyder denne retning en solid basis for at forstå såvel FN's muligheder som begrænsninger i tiden efter den kolde krig.

I den forbindelse er det vigtigt at understrege, at det væsentligste for skolen er antagelsen om, at staterne erkender deres fælles interesse i ophøjdelsen af international orden, sikkerhed og fred. Denne erkendelse er ikke så meget et udslag af idealisme som af, hvad skolen kalder „raison de seonne: the belief that it pays to make the system work”. Hermed udvides rummet for international samarbejde betragteligt, eftersom man inden for den engelske skole ikke behøver at tilskrive staterne et element af idealisme for at forklare deres vilje til at udvide tilbageholden. Forfatterne er opmærksomme på denne pointe, men de demonstrerer ikke dens potentielle i forhold til