Anticipating the future in the organisation of home: Bergson, Whitehead and mental health service users

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Abstract

This paper develops an approach to analysing the importance of anticipations of the future on present actions in the lives of mental health service users, for whom sensing stability in the future is important. The work of Henri Bergson and Alfred North Whitehead is drawn upon to argue that past and future experience only exists in relation to the shaping of present activity. Both though introduce notions of fluidity and flux, which can be problematic for perceptions of stability and security to develop. The aim of the paper is to explore how a sense of stability is produced through the future acting as an anticipatory force on the present. Drawing on empirical work with community mental health service users the paper focuses on the home as a key site for organising the present in anticipation of future life. This involves analysing accounts of home making in which we see the role of anticipatory futures in the ordering of domestic space. The paper concludes by arguing that home spaces are a key site related to ongoing psychological well being, and that analysis of such spaces is important in terms of highlighting practices through which service users attempt to ‘make the future’.

The shifting spaces of mental distress

The changing nature of the landscapes of mental distress has been well documented (Bennett, 1991; Coid, 1994; Hoult, Reynolds, Charbonneau-Powis, Weekes, & Briggs, 1983; Knapp, 1992; Pinfold, 2000; Scull, 1979), particularly in relation to the shift from hospitalisation to community care as the primary mechanism for locating people suffering with mental distress. Community care has been a well established model through which mental health services are provided to those in need, and has come under considerable scrutiny with regard to the ‘efficacy’ of its operation (Bayne Smith, 1996; Ekeland & Bergem, 2006; Mechanic, 2001; Williams, 1999). This has involved analysing the provision of care in a number of community locations (e.g. day centres and out-patient hospital services). A key result of the shift to community care is mental health service
users spending a lot of time outside of formal ‘care environments’, such as out patient clinics or community day centres. The high level of unemployment in the service user population means that they can have a lot of ‘free’ time, and understanding and analysing where and how this time is filled is central to highlighting the challenges facing community based service users. This has led to interest in the nature of the locations of everyday living; with the home found to be a place service users can spend a considerable amount of time (see Tucker, 2010a; Tucker, 2010b).

The home as a space is not just important in terms of being the container of present experience, as if daily activity just goes on ‘within’ it, but is actually formed through the activities that produce it. The idea of space being created has become well established within social and cultural geography (Anderson, 2006; Davidson & Milligan, 2004; Lorimer, 2005; Thrift, 2008) and has started to permeate related disciplines (e.g. psychology, Tucker, 2010a, 2010b). This idea sees spaces not as having inherent properties, but as made through relations between people and objects. An important consequence of this is the notion that spaces can change, as they do not provide stable identities, but are produced through relations between people and objects that themselves are subject to variation and flux. That is, that they are not de facto stable forms that exist unchanged across time, but always have the potential for alteration. It is this possibility for future change that features as a central interest of this paper. Firstly, in terms of necessitating analysis of the practices that make domestic home space for service users.

And, secondly the idea that the organisation of home is critical for perceiving potential future life. This second point is important for community mental health service users, as organising the present in anticipation of the future is often a prominent part of life due to suffering with mental distress, and the associated negative life experiences (e.g. lack of employment, societal discrimination) that can result from being a service user (Repper, 2000; Thornicroft, 2007). In this paper I will explore this idea of organising the present, and argue it is important in terms of anticipating the future, with specific reference to the importance of having a space that allows for creative anticipations of the future.

Theories of the ‘future’ have not featured heavily in the social sciences. There have, however, been moves in recent times to critically engage with the role of memory in forming present experience, and how we may want to theorise this relationship (Brown, Middleton, & Lightfoot, 2001; Middleton & Brown, 2005; Middleton & Edwards, 1990; Reavey & Brown, 2006, 2007). These are valuable in terms of building a theoretical account of how the past and future act as forces on the present. Such accounts have argued against traditional models of memory that frame it as a purely cognitive activity allowing for the direct and unmediated recollection of past events. Instead, the argument has been that memory impacts upon the present in a transformative way as it involves the selective recollection of past events according to the concerns of present context. As such, memory is transformed by present concerns and activities, and is always the relational production of past and present, not just past. The work on memory has specifically sought to argue that we need to understand memory as a relational transformative force that is produced according to social and collective needs. In doing so, the focus has been on analysing how the past is recruited into the present. This provides a valuable starting point when thinking about temporality and life, and how awareness of past and future impinges on present activity.
Bergson, Whitehead and past-present-future

The work of the French philosopher Henri Bergson (1859-1941) has been a catalyst for (re)engaging critical thought of the relationship between past and present (and future) (Brown & Stenner, 2009). For Bergson, the traditional view of time acting in a linear manner according to precise units of time (i.e. seconds, minutes, hours, days) does not accurately present the lived reality of temporal life. Bergson argues that the past and future do not exist as separate distinct realms of time that have occurred or are yet to occur, but are best understood in terms of their role in the production and organisation of the present. As such, past and future can only be considered, and thus analysed, through their impact on present activity. This means that present activity is always a combination of past and future experience shaped according to present context. Indeed, Bergson goes on to argue that what we perceive as the present is actually the immediate past; as soon as we consciously consider the nature of the present it is gone, past. Accordingly, whereas at first Bergson’s line of argument seems to suggest that nothing exists aside from the present (as past and future can only be ‘known’ according to their manifestation as present action) in fact Bergson is arguing that what we ‘know’ of the present is actually the immediate past. Indeed he states: “[P]ractically, we perceive only the past, the pure present being the invisible progress of the past gnawing into the future” (1908/1988: 150, emphasis in original). For Bergson then, what is important are the ways that the past shapes present activity. This non-linear experience of time he refers to as duration, which he uses to offer a version of experience that is not reducible to a rule of equal measurements (i.e. linear time) but is formed as a continuous whole, a flow of continuity through which life emerges:

“This is to replace ourselves in pure duration, of which the flow is continuous and in which we pass insensibly from one state to another: a continuity which is really lived, but artificially decomposed for the greater convenience of customary knowledge” (Bergson, 1908/1988: 186)

Duration is not about the experience of time defined according to clearly ordered sequential (or ‘clock’) time, or according to a measurable model of space but rather in a fluid multiple form that resists stable measurement due to an inherent potential for change. As such, past and future feature extensively as the present rather than according to a mode of chronological ordering. It is not suggested that past-present-future exist as separate distinct times, in the manner accorded by the common understanding of time as chronological and as the universal passing of successive units (i.e. seconds, minutes, hours, days). This is a significant shift in thought, and one that directs attention towards duration, the form of relational experience in which time does not pass in a uniform manner, but is felt in a way that is constituted in the multiple factors inter-connecting in the present. It is not a cognitive facet, but a form of psychological experience that occurs through the infolding of multiple spatial and material forces into forms of experience. Bergson argued that in everyday life we do not experience ‘clock time’ but rather life is experienced as the ‘present as depth’ rather than on a continuum of time (length). Central to Bergson’s account is the idea that time cannot be separated from the experience of it. That is, time does not exist as a reality outside of psychological experience; Bergson states “[W]hat we wish to establish is that we cannot speak of a reality of that endures without inserting consciousness into it” (1922/1999: 35). This is crucial, as it means that we have to take seriously the idea of time as experience, not as some objective neatly quantifiable
reality within which psychological experience is formed. For Bergson, experience is primary, and temporality needs to be analysed with regard to how it features as psychological experience, rather than theorising experience as operating according to the regimented workings of an objective time. This is the crux of his argument against Einstein’s theory of relativity. Duration, for Bergson, is the formation of the present produced as experience. Indeed, experience is duration for Bergson, the multiple relational formation of present constituted by selective recollections of the past and anticipations of the future. Accordingly the present cannot be distinguished from past and future, but every present is already ‘past-present-future’. The consequence of this is that when thinking about the future we conceptualise how it is produced as the present, as we can, of course, never know the future. We can though analyse how future activity becomes a shaping factor through present action. Moreover, to do this, it is necessary to illuminate the practices through which this process unfolds in terms of the inter-relations between people, objects and spaces. In the case of the mental health service users focused on in this paper, it is the forms of anticipatory space that form home life, and in doing so, present forms of stabilisation that are so important for service users.

The philosophical ideas underpinning Bergson’s account of duration and memory are ones that are useful in terms of conceptualising the lived experience of the present, and how the past and future feature as the present rather than as separate chronological entities. Bergson’s focus has largely focused on memory, and it is this that has been influential in contemporary applications of his work (e.g. memory studies). His thoughts about the past and future constituting the present resonate with another great of early twentieth century philosophers, namely Alfred North Whitehead, whose own process philosophy engaged more explicitly in the notion of future action. In this sense, Whitehead’s version of temporality augments Bergson well, but whilst Bergson was primarily interested in memory and the past, Whitehead sought to highlight the importance of the future to the constitution of present experience. This point is made clearly in stating: “[C]ut away the future, and the present collapses, emptied of its proper content” (Whitehead, 1933: 192). For Whitehead present experience is formed as a combination of immediate past (as Bergson also believed) and immediate future. Here life is seen as continuity, formed through processes within which past and future intertwine. Bergson offered a valuable account of how the past features as a ‘totality’, although in recalling past events we can only ever perceive a selective account, which is shaped by present concerns/actions (Middleton & Brown, 2005). As such, the past has occurred but cannot be recalled in a ‘pure’ sense. The future though is trickier, as it has yet to happen. For Whitehead it shapes the present through forms of anticipation, which is a necessary force as unlike the past, a series of actual experiences does not exist to be ‘recalled’ in the present. So, when thinking about the shaping force of future action on present experience we need to consider how the process of anticipation works.

The ideas on past-present-future are key constituents of process philosophy, which itself has been taken up in psychology and the human sciences more broadly in recent times. This is not only in terms of memory, but also in studies of consciousness spanning the psychology-psychobiological realms (e.g. Pred, 2005; Riffert & Weber, 2003). Such work has not been concerned with the role of the future on the present, although cognitive psychology has offered some theories as to the impact of future on present action, such as in relation to adaptation to negative events (Vaillant, 2000), and focusing on expectation, such as ‘expectation-states theory’ (Cohen, 1982; Wagner & Berger, 2002). In such
accounts, the underlying form of anticipation is taken as cognitive, that is as a psychological feature through which we, as individuals, engage in our day-to-day business. It is seen as a cognitive facet, thereby stored ‘internally’. The argument being developed in this paper is that anticipation is a name that we can give to a mode of organising present activity through perception of future experience. Perception though does not have to denote an individually-based cognitive action (as cognitive psychology would have us believe) but instead is a relational process of engaging with life that is spatio-temporally bound, rather than a mode of understanding the ‘reality’ of the world as if we exist as a distinct cognitive actor perceiving the world ‘out there’. Whitehead’s notion of prehension is a more useful concept for understanding this process. For Whitehead prehension is the mode of extracting from the ongoing continuity of life aspects relevant to our everyday contexts. Moreover this involves engagement with processes through which new forms of relation between multiple objects and people intersect into new connections. This is dependent on processes of individuation, each prehension being a unique ‘event’ (or actual occasion for Whitehead) constituted in a particular set of relations. As such, no two prehensions will be the same. Erin Manning captures this in stating: “[W]hat we perceive, we perceive always at a delay such that perception is already composed of the holes of experience. I do not perceive an object per se, the objectness is prehended (drawn out from a pastness that is qualitatively new) as an event that space-times me” (2009: 66-67). Thus prehension is a process by which new modes of relational activity are extracted from the continuous whole of life. For Whitehead this is not a purely cognitive activity, but is formed through the prehension of connections made between objects and people, through ‘extraction’ from the immediate past.

The present, for Whitehead, is at once the product of past and future imprinting themselves on current action. In Adventures of Ideas he states:

“The future is immanent in the present. The future is immanent in the present by reason of the fact that the present bears in its own essence the relationships which it will have to the future. It thereby includes in its essence the necessities to which the future must conform” (1933: 194)

Whitehead argues that the present is formed in light of future action, with the latter implicated in present action. On the one hand this seems rather like common sense, in that future activity can only emerge from the constituents of present experience. But the process by which future and present relate is different to that of past and present; “[B]ut the objective existence of the future in the present differs from the objective existence of the past in the present” (1933: 194). For future activities have not yet occurred, unlike past ones, so future possibilities exist in the present as anticipations. The nature of how this kind of anticipation operates for Whitehead is through the process of prehension, as previously stated. Analysing the subjective elements of this process, which come to bear as modes of anticipatory consciousness is the focus of this paper, which is based on the idea that modes of perceiving the present as ‘cut out’ of the continuity of life can be performed through the organisation of present activity.

To summarise at this point, this paper develops an argument that we need to think about the nature of the process through which future experience features in the present. This is potentially useful for the empirical need of the paper to study the organisation of the present in the homes of mental health service users, for whom the home is an important
place given how much of everyday living is located there. The home becomes a key site for present activity, and subsequently the place produced in anticipating the future. This is not purely a cognitive activity, but a relational process formed through the organised connections between service users, objects and home. Following the theoretical trajectory set out through Bergson and Whitehead the empirical analysis that follows concentrates on the impact of the future as an anticipatory and organising force on the present home space.

‘Making future homes’

The ‘bulking’ of space

In the following section I will draw on some interview material with community mental health service users. The data is taken from a project analysing the spaces and places in which service users spend their time, which involved semi-structured interviews with service users in day centres in an East Midlands city in the UK during 2006. The day centres through which access was gained to service users were not part of formal mental health services, but were charity run centres for service users not currently in in-patient care. This generally meant that service users taking part were not experiencing an acutely distressing episode at time of interview, but were using mental health services and receiving medication treatment. The focus in interviews was to get a sense of the challenges of living as a service user in community settings with particular focus on the spaces and places in which day-to-day living takes place. In theory community care means that service users are free to live in the same urban or country community landscapes as non-service users. Indeed, this was a key justification of the move away from in-patient to community care that took place in mental health services twenty to thirty years ago, on the basis that it would improve social inclusion. Whether this has been the case is the subject of much debate (e.g. Campbell, 2001). Many of the service users in the project though reported occupying relatively few spaces, often predominantly moving between community day centres and home spaces, with little time spent elsewhere (see Tucker, 2010b). In the following extracts the focus then was on the home environment as a key location for everyday living with mental distress, as an anticipatory space. The first extract is with a service user Chris who had been a service user for over fifteen years and was in his early forties at time of interview.

Lines 112-142 - Chris
I sometimes I do my shopping (on here) and I do lot of shopping at the Co-op and they’ve known me for years now (.) and I do bulks and bulks of shopping, I get bulks and bulks of food and drinks in my flat (.) cos at the moment I spend my money on videos, cds, food (.) drinks (.) hot and cold drinks (.) clothes (.) and (.) cigarettes (.) and paying my bills (I: mm) and because I’m on special (.) benefits cos of my illness I can afford to buy things (I: mm) I never run out of cigarettes cos I always have a supply but I’ve had to change my brand again because I (.) had problems getting the other ones so (.)three days of the week I’m usually out doing things (I: mm) (.) and the other four days I’m in the house (.) relaxing
I: do you live on your own?
C: no (.) I live in a three bedsit flat on Briary Road (.) (I: oh yeah) there’s three bedsits in the house and I live in the bottom floor bedsit flat……..(.) the residents upstairs are only told they can stay a year (.) but I’ve got a different agreement, I can live there as long as I like (.)

1 Pseudonyms are used throughout.
but they’ve been living there longer than a year and a half and I’ve also heard a rumour that this
various person is moving into the address, which I don’t believe is true but I’ve heard rumours
so (1) they should be moving out soon and some more people be moving in (.) because I have
said I can live there as long as I like where the residents upstairs can only stay there a year

In this extract Chris is discussing his living arrangements, which consist of him living in a
bedsit in a house with two other bedsits. The interesting features of Chris’s account are the
details provided about the nature of his home in relation to questions of space and time.
He begins by talking about his shopping habits, a seemingly rather banal feature of his
everyday life. Yet, it quickly becomes clear that shopping, and more precisely, the objects
of shopping, are central to the production of his home. Chris talks about purchasing “bulks
and bulks” of groceries. The use of the term ‘bulks’ suggests he purchases more than is
actually needed. There is nothing specific about his living arrangements that necessitates
the mass storage of groceries, such as living far from the nearest shopping facilities.
Indeed, Chris lives in an inner city area of a medium sized East Midlands city in the UK.
The large amounts of food and drink are not serving their usual purpose of providing
sustenance per se. Instead they constitute the physical objects that make his home space.
They provide a visible marker of sustainability, of future planning. Chris can survey his
bedsit and see that he has sufficient food and drink for some time. The space becomes one
in which the future is marked out as sustainable. Indeed not just that, but this filling is an
anticipatory act in terms of being able to see the food and drink that will be consumed in
the future. I would argue this is important for Chris as it provides some sense of stability
to his life, which is something that has been missing in the past due to many changes to his
domestic living arrangements due to his status as a service user.

In the second half of the data extract we see how Chris narrates an account of longevity,
and thereby security, of his home space. He discusses the tenancy agreements for each of
the three bedsits in the house (one of which he occupies). His he marks out as different to
the other two. He states that he can “live there as long as he likes” whereas the tenants in
the other two bedsits are claimed to only be able to stay for a year. No further details are
given regarding any possible reasons why he has a different agreement. But that is not
really the point (neither is whether he does actually have a different agreement or not).
What this feature of his account does is to further display the relation between space and
time in his home space. Firstly, the future is an anticipatory force on the present through
bulk buying groceries, and the subsequent sense of control doing so engenders. Secondly,
Chris guards against the threat to the control of his bedsit that comes with it being
externally managed rather than owned by him, by discursively placing control over the
tenancy firmly in his own hands (through stating he can stay there “as long as he likes”).
This is important for Chris as it allows him a sense of control that is central to the overall
production of space as sustainable, and consequently stable.

The relations we see between past-present-future are indelibly bound up in the production
of Chris’s home space. Indeed, they are formed as his home space. Moreover we see how
the space is produced as a relational form between the objects and Chris. The future is an
anticipatory and organising force on the present. The ‘bulks’ of shopping can be seen as a
manifestation of this anticipatory organisation that produces a sense of stability for the
future. Having said that, the large pile of groceries (e.g. cans of food, drinks bottles,
packets of dried goods) does not have precise spatial or temporal consistency as we can
imagine how its exact constituents change over time as a can of food is eaten and bottles
of drink consumed. These though will be replaced, may be by the same item, or quite possibly a different variety of canned food or drink. As such, the ‘bulk’ is subject to constant change, its actual form at two different moments can be different, and yet is has an ‘enduring’ effect of providing a form of spatio-temporal consistency, but not an exact non-changeable actuality. In the following extract we see a different account of the production of home in anticipation of the future.

**Objects as spatio-temporal stabilisers**

This extract comes from a service user who at time of interview had recently taken over the tenancy of his mother’s house, who had recently passed away. Consequently Roy finds himself in a situation of having sole occupancy and control over a three bedroom house. The processes involved in taking ‘ownership’ of this space are seen below:

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I: do you live um (.) do you live by yourself then?
R: I do at the moment [I: mm] but I’m trying (.) like I said (we’re) trying to work things out at the house now [I: mm] (1) a couple of the rooms are more or less decorated and (.) you know I’m still getting (.) around there at the minute
I: mm mm (2) is it a big house is it or?
R: it’s a three bedroom [I: oh right] (1) but (there was no one) who could (.) take it on (.) because before that (1) I was never really (.) stable at any address [I: mm mm] and um (.) with taking on (.) the place on (.) you know because it’s a tenancy like I said [I: mm] (.) since taking the place on (.) I’ve become a lot more stable in other ways too. I do enjoy [I: yeah] being in a big house on me ow.. (.) you know and calling it my own home
I: mm (2) ho..how does having that space make you feel then?
R: more independent [I: mm] (1) I mean when I had small places I didn't I didn't feel that [I: mm] (.) because when I was in London I (.) they gave me a small place [I: mm] (1) and in small places I always k.. felt trapped [I: mm] (.) you know like walls closing in and stuff like that [I: mm] (.) but that place since my mum (.) when my mum was alive it was all cluttered [I: mm] (1) since my mum's died I've got rid of all the clutter (laughs) (1) I mean I love space I do when it (.) in anything
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In the above extract Roy, a service user in his fifties who has been using mental health services throughout his adult life, narrates the circumstances of coming to live in a new house, and how it differs from previous places he lives. Within the first few lines a close link between space and his psychological well being is formed. He states that “since taking the place on” he has “become a lot more stable”. The idea of having some permanency with the home space, in the form of a tenancy agreement in his name, he relates to a feeling of stability. This stability seems to act as a foundation from which he can engage in practices of organising his home. This he claims to be significant as he relates previous home spaces with lower psychological well-being, e.g. through giving the example of when he was living in London in a “small place’ he “always felt trapped”. A direct relationship is developed between the physicality of the space and psychological health. Firstly in terms of the small space of his London home, to the initial “cluttered” space of his new home (which was previously occupied by his mother). In the first extract we saw the notion of psychological well-being produced in spatialised terms, with regard to home space, with some foundational work of stability being performed. Later in Roy’s interview he provides further detail of the processes of organising home space, with a particular focus on the anticipation of the future:
I: are you quite an organised person are you?
R: yeah I am now (.) anyway eventually I know that (.) while I sort everything out (.) all the stuff is starting to disappear now all that was (.) cluttering I: mm] (.) I mean (let's say you've got) a table like this [I: mm] (.) I don't like papers all over the tables [I: yeah yeah] (.) so I keep it clear [I: mm] (1) (only) thing I got for my birthday I got a chess set [I: mm] I put it on the Welsh dresser I’ve got [I: mm] (.) and e::r (.) you know I have sort of strategically put things out just how I want them [I: mm mm] (inaudible) become (.) orderly in that way (.) sort of helped me become orderly in other ways [I: mm] (3) I mean I still have problems when it comes to keeping clean [I: mm] (1) cos I you know (.) at one time I used to live among hippies [I: mm] (.) and stuff like that [I: mm] so cleanliness is not one of my strong points but (.) I do tend to get a bath (.) bath often [I: mm] and I don’t know whether that sort of compensates for it
I: mm (1) do you have (.) do you have like (.) where do you (.) so you spend a lot of time at home do you?
R: yeah I do at the moment
I: mm (1) where where (.) what kind of rooms do you like staying in or
R: any of the rooms [I: yeah] (1) I mean I've got my own private room [I: mm] which is the master bedroom [I: mm] where my mam used to be in [I: mm] (.) and even that place is going to get how I like it (.) before long [I: mm] (2) but I do I feel as though I am becoming more stable and the (.) place is becoming more stable [I: mm] (3) and now I've got all the space I need (.) I can sort of look in other places for other things now
I: mm (1) what other things would you like?
R: I think the biggest problem is finding a mate [I: mm]…..(lines 376-402)

In this extract the process of Roy organising his home is detailed, which primarily involves the sorting out of the objects filling the space. In the earlier extract Roy talks about the ‘cluttered’ nature of his home when he took over the tenancy. The process of making the space his own revolved around the systematic (re)organisation of his home. This process involves the de-cluttering of his mother’s belongings that filled the house previously. This is an active process for Roy (“while I sort everything out”), leading to the “stuff disappearing”. The use of the word disappearing is interesting as it denotes a semi unexplainable occurrence (it just disappeared), which could work to limit the claim that Roy actively cleared the house himself. And yet, we see from the previous claim that he is “sorting” the space and the subsequent specific detail of arranging a particular object of furniture (a Welsh Dresser), that he was very active in organising his home in a clear and tidy manner. The use of the term disappearance seems to be important as it points to the unambiguous and unequivocal removal of the clutter that troubled Roy; even though he risks belittling the role he played in organising home space to make the point that there is no question that the “stuff” is gone. It is now a clear and organised space. This general point about tidiness is further strengthened by specific detail of a Welsh Dresser, which Roy describes being a key part of the strategic ordering of his home. He details how he positioned a chess set (a birthday gift) on the Welsh Dresser, which then becomes an visible part of the self derived ordered space which is his home. The point about the chess set and Welsh Dresser is interesting as it makes use of the aesthetic features of the objects rather than their functional aspects. This is perhaps not surprising with the Welsh Dresser itself, as they are often purchased for aesthetic reasons, but the chess set is more often utilised for its functional attributes, namely as a strategic game between two people, rather than as an ornament. For Roy, it is the aesthetic relations between these two objects, and
their part in producing the wider space of his home, that is of import. Once arranged as he likes, they become a visible marker of an ordered and de-cluttered home, which as we go on to see in the extract, is vital in terms of his psychological well being.

The production of psychological activity as a relational spatio-temporal form is most marked in details given towards the end of the extract. After discussing the process by which he has ‘made’ his home space as ordered and organised, he talks about the effects, as he sees them, this has had on his mental health. Firstly he relates his ordered space to facilitating orderliness in other parts of his life (“become (.) orderly in that way (.) sort of helped me become orderly in other ways”). This becomes more specific further on, when he explicitly claims that he feels more stable following the newly formed stability of a self ordered home (“but I do I feel as though I am becoming more stable and the (.) place is becoming more stable”), and that this new found stability acts as a foundation for the seeking of other factors in his life that are important, such as forming a romantic relationship, which he points to with the term “finding a mate”.

With Roy we see quite a lot of detail of the organisation of present in anticipation of the future (hopefully a better future for Roy). All the work of de-cluttering and ordering his home space is done in anticipation that it will help enact a more positive and stable level of psychological well being, which will provide a foundation from which he can seek other things that are important for him in further improving his life (such as forming a romantic relationship). This organisation of present in anticipation does not operate in a traditional temporal sense, i.e. he is not experiencing the present as the succession of neatly quantifiable units with the future coming in the same form. It is also not spatial in the sense that his home is a space that allows for time to pass in a measurable way. Instead, it is Roy’s psychological experience produced relationally through the anticipation of the future in the organisation of his home. His psychological experience is not necessarily stable, or reducible to the perceived spatial stability of his home (which in reality will actually be subject to continual variation, e.g. dust collection on Welsh Dresser), but is aided by the anticipatory organisation of home in such a way that Roy can perceive stability in the present.

Organising the present in anticipation of the future

The ideas of time and space developed in this paper are valuable for analysing the impact of anticipatory future experience on present psychological experiences of Chris and Roy. The important aspect of the argument developed is the notion the present is produced in anticipation of the future. The experience of the present is felt as the organisation of home. This shifts our conception of temporality away from a quantifiable linearity towards the extensive depth of the present. Following the theoretical trajectory of Bergson and Whitehead, neither time nor space are seen to take measurable form in Chris and Roy’s lives, but feature as the ongoing relational processes that their present lives take. Paul Stenner sums this up well in stating that for Whitehead perceived continuity comes through the relations between actual occasions, when they come to form a nexus or society:

“The actual things that endure and change and have histories – including ourselves – are always societies or nexuses of actual occasions. They are organized groupings of occasions, arranged spatially, as contemporaries, and arranged temporally, in an unfolding sequence” (2008: 101)
In the extracts the future was seen as a force on present spaces through anticipatory organisation that emerged as the relational experience between objects and Chris and Roy. The individual objects that constituted the space (e.g. Roy’s chess set) can be seen in the first instance as actual occasions, Whitehead’s concept of the manifestation of a ‘thing’ (human and/or non-human) at a particular space-time. To create a sense of endurance through space-time, actual occasions need to collectivise, and we can see that with the home spaces of Chris and Roy. Chris’s ‘bulks’ of shopping and Roy’s ordered chess set and Welsh Dresser become nexuses or societies of actual occasions, which is crucial for the perception of stability as an anticipatory force of the future on the present. The point being made is that both space and time are created as processes, manifested as relational practices that are produced involving people, objects, and places. Following a careful reading of Whitehead, Erin Manning makes this point well in stating “[W]hen space-time is no longer entered but instead created, it becomes possible to think the body-world as that which is generated by the potential inherent in the preacceleration of movement. Movement takes time. But movement also makes time.” (2009: 17). The future then impacts upon the present in terms of the organisation of home spaces for Chris and Roy. Thus, the present is produced through relational processes as forms of space-time, rather than referring to space and time as distinct features of the world. Moreover, they are analysed as experience, rather than forms of objective structural factors that provide the framework for experience to be formed within. Experience becomes primary.

For community mental health research the argument developed in this paper offers a concentrated attunement to the organisation of the present, and its importance in terms of everyday living. For Chris and Roy their home spaces were central to their psychological well being and consequently their engagement with life. At these stages their well being is not related to some form of more traditional psychiatric classification, such as whether they are currently experiencing an acutely distressing episode (e.g. auditory hallucinations or grandiose delusions), but is much more closely enacted as part of the ongoing organisation of the home as a key site of everyday living. The fact they can spend so much time at home indicates that they may have few other spaces in which to spend time and/or they do not feel comfortable occupying more mainstream spaces (Tucker, 2010b). Moreover the process of organising the home is one that occurs as driven by anticipations of possible futures. Chris and Roy spend time creating a home space that can endure into the future, and therefore be perceived as forms of stability created in the present that will endure into the future. Producing a stable space is seen as important as it allows for foundations to be laid down, from which other factors can be sought (e.g. Roy looking for a romantic relationship). It is argued that space is pivotal to the ongoing everyday life experiences of service users like Chris and Roy, and that their mental health is intrinsically linked to space. Understanding how valuable it can be to have spaces that allow for a sense of control, facilitating perceptions of stability should be an important part of mental health research, especially given changes in provision of ‘community spaces’ for service users currently. Many social service funded day centres are facing financial cut backs, which along with the ‘personalisation’ agenda for social service care, is leading to reductions in day centre opening hours across the UK (Beresford, 2009; Duffy, 2010). Such centres offer vital opportunities for service users to meet friends, partake in a variety of informal and formal activities, and consequently can provide a broad range of support, and are often one of the few spaces available for service users that they are comfortable to occupy (Tucker, 2010b) Without them service users available spaces reduce and they can end up spending even greater amounts of time in home spaces (Tucker, 2010a). This
makes understanding the production of home spaces and the impact that future activity has on the present a priority.
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