

# Abstracts

## **»Brokenhagen«: Elements in comprehension of COP-15**

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That COP-15 turned into a chaotic affair, balancing at the edge of a break-down, is related to the deep divide between old industrialised countries and emerging economies, with USA and China respectively being the leading forces. Climate policy-making is a two-level game, and although as well Barack Obama as Wen Jiabao are reformers, with sympathy for climate issues, both were constrained by perceptions and mandates from their respective constituencies. With the financial crisis a new economic world order materialised, and it turned upside down established perceptions as to whom could give and take in global climate negotiations, while it reduced the potential, acceptable »win-set« for the negotiations.

## **Mitigation pledges and their climatic impact**

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Up to COP15 many countries communicated mitigation commitments and actions for 2020. Most of these have later been submitted to the appendices of the Copenhagen Ac-

cord, and are thus part of the basis for the further negotiations. In the Copenhagen Accord countries recognize, that global warming should stay below 2 degrees. Current pledges are, however, not sufficient to meet this target, but may lead to more than 3-degrees warming by the end of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In order to meet the 2 degree goal further mitigation beyond the current pledges for 2020 will thus be necessary.

## **REDD: The Role of Forests in Climate Protection**

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Emissions from deforestation and forest degradation make up 12-18 percent of global greenhouse-gas emissions. Efforts to reduce them, known as REDD, count among the few measures that developed and developing countries can agree on in climate negotiations. Most deforestation could be compensated at relatively low prices, and these compensations could benefit South, North, and global climate. Unfortunately, important institutional obstacles to REDD implementation are often overseen, such as unclear property rights to forests, converted mostly to gain possession of new farmland. Asymmetric information between the environmental principal and deforestation agents around deforestation threats, opportunity costs, and their spatial distribution, also make it difficult to con-

struct baselines and target spatially. It is argued that a combination of incentives, command and control, and institutional strengthening would be needed to make REDD work. It would also require us to keep REDD focused on environmental goals, donors to stick firmly to the conditionality principle, and REDD programme designers to strike a careful balance between efficiency and equity.

### **The Surprising Change in Brazil's Climate Policy**

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Brazil is due to its size and its economic and political significance an important actor in the international climate negotiations. It has usually followed G-77 positions and has declined to make commitments to emissions reductions. However, up to the meeting in Copenhagen (COP-15) it changed its position and opened up to making voluntary emissions reductions, which then subsequently has been implemented with Brazil's domestic climate legislation. In this article we review the reasons and find that the improved tackling of globalization, the upshot of forestry related measures as a potential source of income and interests linked with the, globally significant, bio-ethanol-production have contributed to this change. Underlying these factors are the improved capacity, obtained with reforms in the previous decade, to reduce de-

forestation as well as the circumstance that Brazil over several decades has established a bio-ethanol industry, which now supplies more than 50 per cent of the fuel demand of Brazilian passenger-vehicles.

### **Climate change negotiations, impasses and issue linkages**

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International negotiations on greenhouse gas emissions suffer from an unfortunate paradox: All parties have an incentive to reduce emissions; yet most parties refuse to take on ambitious commitments. This article explains why negotiations on emissions reductions reach an impasse and discusses a potential solution. First, it assumes that parties will maximize their national gains without concern for the other parties' gains. Using basic game theory, it then hypothesizes a collective action problem, where each party has an incentive to minimize its own commitments and maximize the commitments of other parties. The hypotheses are confirmed by a tentative analysis of parties' commitments and behavior over the past few years. Building on the notion of a collective action problem and illustrations from COP15, the article goes on to discuss whether linkages between the negotiations on emissions reductions and negotiations on other issues such as financing and deforestation can help break the impasse. Finally, the article calls for further research on issue linkages in the international climate change negotiations.