

EMMANUEL LEVINAS'S AESTHETIC CONSCIOUSNESS

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ABSTRACT

Emmanuel Levinas is widely known for his polemical stance towards art. Especially in his earlier writings in the 1940s, he famously calls into question its ethical potential. In this article, I analyse some of Levinas's early writings in order to answer the following questions: How does Levinas understand the nature of art, and how does this understanding allow him to criticise it, often in harsh terms? I turn to Hans-Georg Gadamer's concept of *aesthetic consciousness*, which I argue shares similarities with Levinas's stance on art.

I argue that re-evaluating Levinas's stance allows one to tackle topical issues of aesthetics from the viewpoint of his ethical philosophy. Through showing how Levinas's aesthetic consciousness hinges on a problematic relationship between conceptual truth and art, and through emphasising the role of criticism, I suggest that Levinas's thought can be utilised in approaching contemporary questions of the autonomy of art and aesthetics.

KEYWORDS

Aesthetic Consciousness, Emmanuel Levinas, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Criticism

Emmanuel Levinas is widely known for his polemical stance against art. Famously he argues that “art, essentially disengaged, constitutes, in a world of initiative and responsibility, a dimension of evasion.”¹ Statements like this have given rise to the prevalent idea that Levinas, especially in his earlier writings, is critical of the ethical potential of art. In this article, I will not be making any overarching assessments regarding the extent to which art and aesthetics can be taken to be in harmony with Levinas’s ethical philosophy as a whole. I am mainly interested in answering the following questions: How does Levinas understand the nature of art in his early writings in the 1940s, and how does this understanding allow him to criticize art, often in such harsh terms? I am also intent on showing how Levinas’s early philosophy of art shares striking similarities with Hans-Georg Gadamer’s theory of *aesthetic consciousness* (*das ästhetische Bewusstsein*). I suggest that analysing Levinas’s thought from a Gadamerian perspective allows one to highlight some of its problematic presuppositions.

Aesthetic consciousness is a concept Gadamer created to describe the modern, post-Kantian approach to aesthetics which emphasizes the autonomy of art and the centrality of aesthetic experience (*Erlebnis*). Kirstin Gjesdal summarises these aspects of aesthetic consciousness well. She writes that, according to Gadamer, the “Romantic misreading of Kant” has led to the position “that either the work of art presents itself as free from conceptual and intellectual reference, or it is not a proper work of art.”² Aesthetic consciousness reduces the work of art to an experience (*Erlebnis*) of the spectator which is divorced from the continuity of tradition and historical knowledge. It is important to emphasise that for Gadamer, this view describes a general development in the history of Western philosophy instead of any particular aesthetic theory. I will argue throughout this article that such an aesthetic consciousness is still prevalent today.

It might seem odd to suggest that Levinas would have anything to do with the post-Kantian aesthetic tradition. However, I suggest that many of the central features of Levinas’s early philosophy of art map well onto the aesthetic consciousness. This shows how Levinas (perhaps unwittingly) adopts certain parts of a pre-existent tradition of modern aesthetics, which increasingly emphasises the autonomy of art and its separation from non-aesthetic values. My main argument is that Levinas’s early critique of art and its assumed irresponsibility is made possible by his adoption of this view, which at first glance might seem alien to his own thought.

I choose to focus mostly on Levinas's early writings on art as their shadow looms large over almost all treatments of his aesthetics. Especially the polemical nature of Levinas's 1948 article "Reality and Its Shadow" (*La réalité et son ombre*) has been emphasized numerous times. For example, Françoise Armengaud describes its tone as "harsh and severe."³ Robert Eaglestone agrees with Armengaud's assessment, arguing that Levinas's early writings betray a "deep seated antipathy" and at times "outright hostility" towards art.⁴

More recently, writers have emphasized the ambiguous nature of Levinas's text, perhaps most extensively Richard A. Cohen, who argues that Levinas is not criticizing art *per se* but rather a certain strand of aestheticism, which seeks to hold art as the highest value of humanity over, for example, ethics.⁵ While I maintain that Levinas's philosophy of art is indeed more nuanced than some of his rather blunt claims might suggest, it is still undeniable that at least *some* art and *some* ways of approaching it are to Levinas, as he famously states, "inhuman" (*inhumain*) and "monstrous" (*monstrueux*).⁶ While the principle undertaking of this article is to understand (with the help of Gadamer) the theory of art which allows Levinas to make such assertions, in the end of my text I highlight the way in which Levinas's call for interpretation of art marks a breach in his aesthetic consciousness. This allows for a potential integration of art into the world of ethics.

I AESTHETIC CONSCIOUSNESS: TWO POTENTIAL ISSUES

Kristin Gjesdal argues that in Gadamer's philosophy, "aesthetic consciousness" refers to a tendency to separate aesthetic matters from "cognitive, ethical, or political orientations,"⁷ a tendency which Gadamer himself famously criticises. Before studying the concept any further, however, two potential issues ought to be highlighted from the get-go. First, the concept of "aesthetic consciousness" is not without its critics. Gjesdal herself goes as far as to state that Gadamer's analysis of Romantic aesthetics in the first part of *Truth and Method*, which accompanies the introduction of aesthetic consciousness, is faulty enough to arouse "mild embarrassment."⁸ Second, aesthetic consciousness is for Gadamer a feature of post-Kantian European aesthetics. How can one, then, use this concept to analyse Levinas's philosophy of art, seeing that Levinas is not a follower of the German idealist tradition?

I suggest that both aforementioned issues can be done away with if, after Gjesdal, one notes that “aesthetic consciousness” has validity beyond the context of its origin. Gjesdal writes:

Gadamer’s critique of aesthetic consciousness is much more than a critique of the romantic aesthetics of genius. It is, in fact, a critique of any orientation towards pure, aesthetic immediacy. As such, its relevance exceeds the boundaries of eighteenth-century art and philosophy.⁹

I maintain, after Gjesdal, that while the birth of aesthetic consciousness might be tied to very specific historical circumstances, the concept still describes a currently existing stance towards art and aesthetics.¹⁰ I argue that one current issue where the presence of aesthetic consciousness is still felt concerns the Anglo-American debate over the “autonomism” and “moralism” (or “ethicism”) of art. The former refers to a stance which would separate aesthetics from other values, whereas the latter describes a view that, for various reasons and to various extents, sees these values as linked.¹¹ In current discussion, this issue has gained new relevance in the field of environmental aesthetics where the possible interaction between aesthetic and non-aesthetic values is debated.¹²

I suggest that analysing Levinas’s aesthetic consciousness is also worthwhile due to the primacy of ethics in his thought. A critical reading of Levinas’s views on art opens a way to re-examine the relationship between aesthetic and non-aesthetic values which, admittedly, would imply going beyond Levinas’s own writings while holding on to the spirit of his ethics. Thus, my aim in this article is not to offer a theory of “Levinasian” aesthetics, or to save his philosophy of art from all criticism. Rather, I will be partaking in such criticism myself in order to show how Levinas’s early critique of art rests on the shaky ground of aesthetic consciousness and, furthermore, how it might be enriched by some Gadamerian insights.

In the next section, I will focus on three features of aesthetic consciousness, which I deem to be central, and which serve to highlight the extent to which Levinas’s philosophy of art can be approached with the aid of Gadamer’s concept. I maintain that these features do not stand absolutely separate but are rather essentially linked. They are here separated only for the sake of analytical purposes.

II THREE CHARACTERISTICS OF AESTHETIC CONSCIOUSNESS

While aesthetic consciousness only became a central theme in Gadamer's philosophy in the 1950s onwards, the concept first appears in "Plato and the Poets" (Plato und die Dichter) from 1934. Here, aesthetic consciousness is brought up briefly in the context of Plato's critique of poetry in the *Republic*. Gadamer argues that Plato was mainly targeting the effects of *mimesis*, which in his analysis leads to "self-forgetfulness" (*Selbstvergessenheit*) or "self-alienation" (*Selbstentfremdung*): the person imitating another is not fully themselves, but at the same time not fully the other person either.¹³ The antidote to the aesthetic consciousness brought about by *mimesis* is, according to Gadamer, revealed in Plato's own dialogues: these texts with their "poetic" accounts of myths do not give rise to self-forgetfulness but rather to a heightened knowledge of the self.¹⁴

In *Truth and Method (Wahrheit und Methode)*, aesthetic consciousness is analysed partly from the viewpoint of self-forgetfulness as well. Not from the perspective of one partaking in *mimesis*, however, but from a wider viewpoint of a general stance towards art. In Gadamer's *magnum opus*, aesthetic consciousness still brings about it a certain leave from the self, an alienation. This alienation refers to the capacity inherent in aesthetic consciousness to disassociate every possible object of aesthetic evaluation from its practical context: "The sovereignty of aesthetic consciousness consists in its capacity to make this aesthetic differentiation everywhere and to see everything 'aesthetically.'"¹⁵

This alienation or the moment of "aesthetic differentiation" or "distinction" (*ästhetische Unterscheidung*) is the *first* feature of aesthetic consciousness to be emphasised. According to Gadamer, from the viewpoint of aesthetic consciousness, everything can be seen as purely aesthetic. This results in the separation of the object from its place in "the world to which it belongs insofar as it belongs instead to aesthetic consciousness."¹⁶

The *second* feature to be highlighted is the "non-cognitive" dimension of aesthetic consciousness, which is closely connected to the moment of aesthetic differentiation. Aesthetic experience is taken to be separated from conceptual knowledge, as is famously the case in Kant's philosophy. Gjesdal summarises the idea as follows:

[M]odern aesthetics, as it develops in the wake of Kant's critique of aesthetic judgment, remains inclined to see the experience of

art as something subjective, something that may well have to do with immediacy, inwardness, and feeling but that is of no relevance for our cognitive, ethical, or political orientations.¹⁷

It must be emphasised that the idea of *all* post-Kantian aesthetics holding on to this non-cognitive view of art would be a crude oversimplification, one which Gadamer does not subscribe to.

Elaborating on the meaning of the “non-cognitive” dimension of aesthetic consciousness, I approach the issue negatively by pointing out how Gadamer sets his own theory of truth in art against it. In a telling passage from “Truth of the Work of Art” (*Die Wahrheit des Kunstwerks*) he writes:

In the subjective universality of the aesthetic judgment of taste, he [Kant] discovered the powerful and legitimate claim to independence that the aesthetic judgment can make over against [*sic*] the claims of the understanding and morality.¹⁸

In *Truth and Method*, Gadamer’s aim is to reunite art and truth, to show that “art is knowledge and experiencing an artwork means sharing in that knowledge.”¹⁹ Interestingly, Frederick Beiser argues in *Diotima’s Children* that due to this effort, Gadamer is the torchbearer of aesthetic rationalism. His mission is to counteract “Kant’s disastrous subjectivization of aesthetic experience.”²⁰ Against this subjectivisation, Gadamer offers his own theory of art as play (*spiel*), in which the experience of art is not reduced to subjectivity, neither the artist’s nor the spectator’s.²¹

The *third* aspect of aesthetic consciousness important for this article is closely tied to the two already described. What I call here “aesthetic immediacy” refers to the idea that aesthetic experience, separated from the concept, is reduced to a purely subjective “Erlebnis.” Against this aesthetic “Erlebnis,” Gadamer argues for the “Erfahrung” of art, which is distinct from the former since it is not to be understood as pure presence:

The appeal to *immediacy*, to the instantaneous flash of genius, to the significance of ‘experiences’ (Erlebnisse), cannot withstand the claim of human existence to continuity and unity of self-understanding. The binding quality of the experience (Erfahrung) of art must not be disintegrated by aesthetic consciousness.²²

As Gjesdal emphasizes, this critique of immediacy is tied to a general argument against the possibility of non-universal aisthesis, taken from Aristotle (via Heidegger).²³ Later this argument will turn out to be important for the sake of the analysis of Levinas's aesthetic consciousness.

The above list of traits does not purport to be exhaustive. Rather I have chosen to emphasize features, which I argue are central to Gadamer's concept and which best allow to highlighting the similarities between aesthetic consciousness and Levinas's early philosophy of art. Next, I will turn to the latter topic and offer a brief overview of Levinas's thinking on art in the 1940's, emphasising the three characteristics.

III AESTHETIC CONSCIOUSNESS IN LEVINAS'S EARLY WRITINGS

The First Characteristic

The first characteristic of aesthetic consciousness described above was "aesthetic differentiation" or "distinction" (*Unterscheidung*). This concept refers to the way in which post-Kantian aesthetic art has gained autonomy in being separated from non-aesthetic occupations. As Grondin argues, this distinction is a result of the modern tendency to reduce the realm of truth to scientific truth which in turn leads to art being separated into its own distinct dimension:

[Aesthetic distinction] is thus a pure abstraction induced by the secret empire of science over hard, pure reality. Art acquires sovereignty, but it is finally concerned only with the imaginary, with non-reality.²⁴

In his early writings on art, Levinas subscribes to a form of aesthetic differentiation as he clearly sees works of art as being characterised by their separation from the world. This is perhaps the most evident in his *Existence and Existents* (*De l'existence à l'existant*) published in 1947, where art is tellingly introduced in a chapter titled "Existence Without a World" (*Existence sans monde*). In this chapter, Levinas argues that art is essentially tied to the realm of sensation which reveals the aptness of the term "aesthetics." He writes: "The movement of art consists in leaving the level of perception so as to reinstate sensation, in detaching the quality from this object reference."²⁵ This "detachment" is, incidentally, already brought up in the notebooks Levinas wrote during his time as a POW. The essential nature of art and aesthetics lies in the fact that

art introduces a dichotomy into being between the being itself and its sensible qualities.²⁶

It is worth emphasising that this “detaching” is characteristic of all art according to Levinas. All forms of art, from music to painting, instantiate a detachment of sensible qualities, which leads to the works being separated from their world.²⁷ With representational art in mind, Levinas writes that when represented in a work objects become exotic “in the etymological sense of the word”²⁸ This refers to the way that the object finds itself “outside” (in Greek “exo”) the world, in which it has its proper place.

This analysis is related to the elaboration of the meaning of *images* in “Reality and Its Shadow.” Here Levinas introduces the concept of the “shadow” (*ombre*), which refers to the sensible qualities of being which are captured in an image. The shadow is what makes resemblance in an image possible, because it refers to an ever-present dichotomy in being between its existence and its sensibility, or “quality” and “object reference,” to use the language of *Existence and Existents*. Levinas argues that resemblance in an image is not merely a similarity between the original and the copy but rather points towards a deeper structure of reality. Reality is not “only what it is, what it is disclosed to be in truth” but also “its double, its shadow, its image.”²⁹

Interestingly, Levinas suggests that all objects from cultures and worlds which no longer exist are essentially aesthetic. These objects have lost their place in the world and their potential “usefulness” – perhaps even their *Zuhandenheit* – and thus reveal themselves only as objects of aesthetic observation. Gadamer seems to have noted the same phenomenon. He writes of the faith of antiques, which to him are “profaned,” when they are seen merely as sources of aesthetic pleasure.³⁰ To Gadamer, detaching an object from its “intimate life” (*intimin Lebens*) and making it an object of mere aesthetic pleasure amounts to profanation, whereas Levinas sees it as the essential reality of all art. Thus, he holds on to the idea of “aesthetic differentiation.”

The Second Characteristic

The second feature of aesthetic consciousness is the separation of art from knowledge. This I have described as its “non-cognitive” moment. In “Reality and Its Shadow,” Levinas in fact distinguishes

his own stance on art by juxtaposing it with what he describes as the “dogma” of modern aesthetics, which maintains that art has an essential connection to truth.³¹ To counteract this dogma, Levinas introduces his own idea of how art deals essentially with the “non-truth” of being: art “contrasts with knowledge.”³² It is interesting to see Levinas subtly tie his own theories of art to those of Kant, the forefather of aesthetic consciousness, when he writes that “the well-known disinterestedness of artistic vision [...] signifies above all a blindness to concepts.”³³ He subscribes to this same idea of art’s blindness regarding concepts, which I suggest is an important aspect of his aesthetic consciousness.

Levinas’s theory of art as non-truth is built on the foundation of aesthetic differentiation. As the choice of term implies, his analysis of the concept of “shadow” draws inspiration from Plato. Just like the latter in his *Republic*, Levinas argues that the shadow which is captured in the image does not allow us to grasp the truth of the object depicted therein. Explicitly evoking Plato, he states that instead of allowing us to grasp the concept, rising towards the realm of the ideas, art leads us to the “hither side” of being. In a passage which reveals the connection between the shadow and the non-truth of art – thus, the first two features of aesthetic consciousness—Levinas writes:

[Resemblance] is the very structure of the sensible as such. The sensible is being insofar as it resembles itself, insofar as, outside of its triumphal work of being, it casts a shadow, emits that obscure and elusive essence, that phantom essence which cannot be identified with the essence revealed in truth.³⁴

The non-cognitive moment of Levinas’s philosophy of art is connected to his idea of the enchantment that art brings about. It is easy to see a link between his descriptions of the intoxicating power of art and the criticism of this same phenomenon in Plato, which Gadamer analyses in 1934 while first introducing the concept of “aesthetic consciousness.” Gadamer speaks of self-forgetfulness and self-alienation, whereas Levinas describes the magic of aesthetic experience and “the captivation or incantation of poetry and music.”³⁵

The second moment of Levinas’s aesthetic consciousness is, then, manifested in his reversal of the “dogma” of contemporary philosophy of art which seeks to establish a connection between art and truth. It is worth noting, however, that whereas autonomist readings

of aesthetics—Kant’s philosophy of art being the paradigmatic example—allow for the sharp distinction between art and the concept, this does not result in judging art ethically questionable as Levinas seemingly does in “Reality and Its Shadow.” Indeed, I maintain that Levinas’s aesthetic consciousness allows him to criticize art, but this does not mean that the characteristics of aesthetic consciousness described here would *necessarily* lead to this result.

The Third Characteristic

The third and final characteristic of Levinas’s aesthetic consciousness is his appeal to the idea of what I have described as “aesthetic immediacy.” In this context, immediacy refers to what Gjesdal calls “pure aesthetic presence.”³⁶ Aesthetic experience is taken by aesthetic consciousness to be an immediate experience, “Erlebnis” in Gadamer’s vocabulary, which does not require reference to anything outside the work of art. The moment of aesthetic immediacy is intrinsically linked to the previous moment of non-cognitive nature of art: it is due to art being approached via immediate “Erlebnis” that its truth-value is denied. Gjesdal summarises this characteristic of aesthetic consciousness:

In drawing attention to the role of art in human life, aesthetic consciousness stresses the immediacy of aesthetic creation and experience, claiming that the work of art is presented to consciousness in terms of pure aesthetic qualities.³⁷

The question of pure aesthetic perception goes hand in hand with the question of the possibility of immediate experience in general, a possibility that Gadamer denies. Citing Aristotle as his source he argues “that all aisthesis tends toward a universal”, even if in aesthetic experience our perception does not “hurry” (*eilen*) towards the universal.³⁸ Levinas, on the other hand, seems to grant the possibility of this immediate experience or pure perception and to locate it in art.

Because the sensible qualities of an object—or its “shadow”—are detached from it in an image, Levinas argues that we are impeded from grasping the object conceptually. This means that our consciousness is halted at the level of aesthetic qualities without being able to pierce them, so to speak, in order to seize the object. Levinas holds that unlike phenomenological accounts of images claim, images do not work like windows which would allow us to reach the

object depicted.³⁹ I suggest that this “halting” at the level of sensible *qualia* is comparable to the idea of “pure aesthetic qualities,” which Gadamer describes as being a part of aesthetic consciousness. To put the matter in Gadamer’s terms, in Levinas’s analysis aisthesis does not reach the universality of the concept.

In summary, Levinas’s aesthetic consciousness is revealed in his early writings on art through the presence of three interlocking characteristics. First, the separation of art from its world is made possible by the detachment of the aesthetic qualities from the object, which, secondly, allows Levinas to argue that art is non-cognitive. Artworks take objects and cut their ties with their place in the world. As reality is captured merely in its shadow, art cannot teach us anything. It is the very “event of darkening of being.”⁴⁰ *Third*, the reduction of reality to an image and shadow makes art a domain of pure aesthetic qualities, of pure perception which Gadamer claims is an abstraction.

IV THE APORIA OF LEVINAS’S AESTHETIC CONSCIOUSNESS

Levinas’s aesthetic consciousness allows him to critique certain aspects of art in harsh terms. I argue that *if* art is understood to be autonomous and “exotic,” it is easy to see why Levinas would deem it to be ethically irresponsible. Furthermore, I maintain that Gadamer’s notion of aesthetic consciousness does indeed capture a very palpable aspect of the nature of art and aesthetics in our time. If aesthetic value in art (or in general) is taken to be autonomous with regards to other values, ethical or environmental for example, it does risk making art incapable of tackling the foremost issues of our time.⁴¹ I suggest that this is the risk induced by modern autonomist views which in all cases hold on to the possibility of excluding other values from aesthetic evaluations. In the following, I further analyse Levinas’s aesthetic consciousness and show how, in the end, it leads to some incongruities. These in turn lead me to suggest that Levinas’s account of art can be strengthened by introducing some insights from Gadamer.

Jean Grondin describes aesthetic consciousness as a paradoxical result of the worldview inaugurated by the scientific method which seeks to hold a monopoly on truth. In the face of this dominance of “the method,” art seeks to find its place in retreating to its autonomy, which however merely works to confirm the hold of the scientific worldview: art holds on to its relevance in the modern world by letting go of its claim to truth.⁴² The same argument is made by Gjesdal as well. She writes that aesthetic consciousness ends up

“embracing the deepest-held convictions of the position it initially wanted to defeat.”⁴³ It seems that Levinas unwittingly comes to hold on to an aspect of this worldview when he claims that art cannot have a relationship with truth, which can only be attained via the concept.

That being said, Levinas certainly does not subscribe to the idea that truth can be grasped only through the scientific method or the concept. As virtually all his *oeuvre* attests to, clearly there is room in his philosophy for other forms of understanding. How is it, then, that Levinas subscribes to the tenets of the aesthetic consciousness but at the same time does not hold on to the worldview which first made it possible? I argue that Levinas’s early philosophy of art is beset by an aporia and tension. This comes to the fore most clearly in his use of the term “concept” when discussing the truth-potential of art. I suggest that Levinas’s aesthetic consciousness hinges on this premiss which is questionable at best: the strict separation of art from knowledge due to its failure to measure up to *conceptual* knowledge.

It is worth noting that Gadamer himself argues that the truth and meaning of art cannot be subsumed under conceptual knowledge.⁴⁴ Indeed, the whole project of hermeneutical aesthetics is based on the presupposition that art can have a non-conceptual relationship to truth. In addition, many other philosophers find the truth of art to lie outside conceptual knowledge as well, including Heidegger, the erstwhile teacher of both Levinas and Gadamer. Heidegger’s characterisation of art as “a becoming and happening of truth” is certainly not tied to conceptual truth.⁴⁵ Considering that Levinas’s criticism of the dogma of art is partly targeted towards Heidegger, it is surprising that he focuses on conceptuality in the first place.

In the next section, I wish to briefly compare Levinas’s position on art to Gadamer’s with the aim of showing how this comparison helps to bring to light some issues with Levinas’s account. I also note how, by questioning certain features of aesthetic consciousness, there is a possibility of presenting a more positive account of art, based on Levinas’s own emphasis on criticism. It is worth highlighting again that my goal is not the “save” Levinas’s reputation regarding art or to reveal him as a secret aesthete. I rather aim to study the consequences of Levinas’s own analyses of art, even if this entails going where Levinas himself might not be willing to follow.

V REINTEGRATING ART THROUGH CRITICISM

I will begin the comparison between Gadamer and Levinas by focusing on the idea of “aesthetic differentiation.” In *Truth and Method* Gadamer makes a subtle but decisive dichotomy between aesthetic differentiation as brought forth by aesthetic consciousness and *separation* which is a part of the experience of truth in art. The former implies a total distinction between art and the world, whereas the latter pays heed to the fact that art is separated from our everyday world to its own spheres, like concert halls or theatres, but that the separation is never absolute. Grondin summarises this idea by writing that the work of art

is certainly “separated” from our daily lives, but it is its configuration, indeed its elevation, that allows us to rediscover our world. In the work’s artistic separation, reality becomes “transfigured.”⁴⁶

The separation of the work of art from our daily world does not mean that art cannot reveal the truth which it does by “transfiguring” our reality. Thus, in one fell swoop Gadamer pits his own theory against two major tenets of aesthetic consciousness: aesthetic differentiation and the non-cognitive nature of art.

Gadamer’s understanding of the separation of art stands in contrast to Levinas’s analysis of the “detachment” of sensible qualities. The major difference lies in the fact that Levinas—due to him arguing that the nature of images lies in the detachment of the shadow from the being—denies the possibility that art could have any relationship with the truth. In this regard, he stands in exact opposition to Gadamer. Levinas argues that images impede our access to truth (understood as conceptual truth), whereas Gadamer thinks that presentation (*Darstellung*) in a picture brings about an “increase in being” (*Zuwachs an Sein*).⁴⁷

When analysing this increase, Gadamer refers to the concept of “emanation.” In the Neoplatonic context he evokes, emanation means the overflowing of the One which however does not result in its diminishment.⁴⁸ Similarly, the object or a person depicted in a painting does not become any “less” in being thus depicted. Rather, Gadamer argues that the artwork can reveal something hitherto unknown of the object or person represented or even add novel meaning. Thus he breaks with the Platonic tradition of mimesis as a copy of the original.

Now, the important question to ask is why Levinas denies the possibility that images could be an increase in being. All comes down to the dichotomy between shadow and concept which Seán Hand describes as “rigid” and “highly schematic.”⁴⁹ I tend to agree with Hand’s assessment: the straightforward juxtaposition of images with knowledge in “Reality and Shadow” seems somewhat poorly motivated. It is built upon the, from a Gadamerian standpoint questionable, idea that if art does not deal with conceptual truth, it has no recourse to understanding whatsoever. Furthermore, it is based on this dichotomy that Levinas commits to “aesthetic differentiation.” If art could have a connection with knowledge, Levinas’s aesthetic consciousness would lose its foundation.

If the “rigid” and “highly schematic” juxtaposition between being and its shadow, between conceptual knowledge and art, was Levinas’s last word on the matter, his philosophy of art would hardly warrant all the attention it has received. It is not, however. As Richard Cohen points out, “Reality and Its Shadow” is sandwiched between two descriptions of *criticism*.⁵⁰ Indeed, the importance of criticism for Levinas’s early philosophy of art can hardly be overstated. It is brought up both in “Reality and Its Shadow” and in the article “Transcendence of Words” (“Le transcendance des mots,” 1949). In the latter text, Levinas argues that in creating beauty art also creates silence: the spectator stands before the work enthralled.⁵¹ The beauty of art engenders passivity. However, Levinas suggests that the spectator is not satisfied with this enthrallment alone. They feel the “need to enter into a relation with someone” which Levinas argues is the impetus for criticism.⁵²

In “Reality and Shadow” Levinas describes this same situation of the spectator: “Not content with being absorbed in aesthetic enjoyment, the public feels an irresistible [*sic*] need to speak.”⁵³ It is exactly criticism called forth by this “need to speak” which allows for the possible overturning of aesthetic differentiation. After describing the ethical irresponsibility of art Levinas adds:

But all this is true for art separated from the criticism that integrates the inhuman work of the artist into the human world. Criticism already detaches it from its irresponsibility by envisaging its technique. It treats the artist as a man at work.⁵⁴

Criticism can thus reintegrate art into the world. Levinas seems to be here hinting towards a kind of criticism which would break the

myth of the artwork and artists as somehow situated above the ordinary world, which, I might add, is only necessary in the first place due to Levinas's adoption of aesthetic distinction. This process of integration is something that the artist themselves can partake in by "interpreting their myths himself [*sic*]."55

Cohen notes how Levinas's idea of "criticism" comes close to interpretation or exegesis.⁵⁶ This reading is supported by Levinas's own writings on art, which do not seem interested in offering an evaluative assessment of works of art, but rather to interpret them from a philosophical standpoint. Perhaps this leaves the door open for hermeneutical interpretation of art as a possible mode of reintegrating the artwork into "the human world"? This would mean that interpretation would counteract aesthetic distinction and possibly allow for art to be rejoined with other values, be they epistemological or moral.

CONCLUSION: THE ORIGIN OF INTERPRETATION

I have argued that Levinas's at times harsh criticism of art in his early work can be partly explained by his aesthetic consciousness. This refers to the stance he adopts towards art which allows him to view it as separated from truth: art is separated from our world due to it only capturing the "shadow" of being, not the being itself. In the previous section, I argued that the emphasis on criticism seems to show that already in his early writings on art Levinas himself offers a way of breaking with aesthetic consciousness. Criticism can help to reintegrate art into the world. To use the terms of analytic philosophy, Levinas would be revealed as a type of "moralist" even if his early aesthetic consciousness seemingly led him to hold (and criticise) an autonomist view.

Even though the present context does not allow for a full analysis of the issue, I wish last to tackle the question of the "origin" of criticism. If criticism or interpretation can reintegrate works of art into the world, is it something in the work itself which makes this possible? As stated above, in "Reality and Its Shadow" Levinas argues that art gives rise to the irresistible need to speak but at the same time he suggests that this need is counteracted by the fact that the work of art is "complete." It does not allow for anything to be added or subtracted and is thus "exotic": the artwork "does not give itself out as the beginning of a dialogue."⁵⁷ Artworks call forth speech but remain themselves silent.

But if the artwork itself is not the impetus for criticism, then what is? To me it seems as if the possibility of philosophical criticism is always present in the work itself, which would go against Levinas's description of aesthetic differentiation.⁵⁸ It has already been noted that, at least in some cases, Levinas grants the possibility of the artist partaking in criticism in the very work itself. Thus, the call for criticism can be speculated to be an essential feature of art itself, which would again spell a breach of aesthetic consciousness by Levinas himself.

While Levinas's later philosophy of art falls outside the scope of this article, I wish to briefly analyse Levinas's reading of the poet Paul Celan. In his article "From Being to the Other" (*De l'être à l'autre*) on the writer whom both he and Gadamer hold in high regard, Levinas argues that there is something in Celan's poems themselves that gives them a potentially ethical character. Furthermore, it would also seem that, in the case of Celan at least, the impetus for this criticism lies in the work itself. Levinas is here partaking in the project of criticism or exegesis which he called for in "Reality and Its Shadow", although it must be stated that his interpretation is not without its problems.⁵⁹

Levinas interprets Celan's poetics as manifesting "a rectitude of responsibility before any appearance of forms, images, or things."⁶⁰ This focus on the presence of responsibility (a central ethical term for Levinas) preceding "images" is interesting because it contradicts his prior insistence on all art being characterised by the presence of images. Some art can have an ethical dimension which is *prior* the level of images, but Levinas does not make it clear whether this applies to all art and art forms or perhaps just certain "great" works. It is, then, uncertain whether Levinas's brand of moralism implies that the ethical dimension of a work increases its aesthetic value or whether the former is a necessary condition of the latter.⁶¹ I find it more feasible that Levinas sees the call for criticism as characteristic of all art, even if I am not able to elaborate the view here.

Interestingly, in his article on Celan, Levinas still argues that art, poetry in this case, is beyond conceptual knowledge.⁶² However, this "deconceptualisation" is now understood to ally the poem with ethics. Thus, the same feature of art which in previous writings was deemed to be negative is now reinterpreted as the root of its potential link to ethics! It seems as if Levinas is still holding on to an aspect of his aesthetic consciousness but has come to reinterpret its

consequences. However, the deconceptualisation of art introduces major issues in the project of a “Levinasian” interpretation of art: if the ethical dimension of art precedes all conceptualisation, how can this be put to words? Furthermore, how can art ever be interpreted as a cultural and historically meaningful entity, which many (Gadamer for one) would argue it always is, if it moves on a level prior to concepts and images? I argue that here Levinas’s call for interpretation can meaningfully be enriched by a recourse to a Gadamerian hermeneutics.

With this issue in mind, it is interesting to contrast Levinas’s interpretation of Celan with Gadamer’s. In his reading of Celan’s *Atemkristall* (“Breath-Crystal”) in *Who am I and Who are You? (Wer bin Ich und wer bist Du?)*, Gadamer argues boldly for “the unalterable demand that anything written make sense, especially true for a text that is intended as a poetic statement.”⁶³ Thus, for him the source of interpretation lies decidedly in the work itself. Gadamer also speaks of the “address” art makes to us, calling us to understand. This idea of an address answers Levinas’s rhetorical question made at the beginning of “Reality and Its Shadow”: “Is not to interpret Mallarmé to betray him? Is not to interpret his work faithfully to suppress it?”⁶⁴ In Gadamer’s view the answer would be a resounding “no.” Not to interpret, not to answer to the works address, would be more of a betrayal. As he writes in the epilogue to *Who am I and Who are You?*: “Whoever does not understand more than what the poet could have said without his poetry understands far too little.”⁶⁵

Thus, the possibility that art essentially harbours in itself a call for criticism and interpretation, that it demands to be understood, points towards a breach in Levinas’s early idea of aesthetic differentiation. The self-sufficiency of art which aesthetic consciousness calls for is never perfect. Art always already harbours in it the potential for integration. I maintain that this in turn points towards a possible integration of the “Levinasian-Gadamerian” point of view with the modern debate over autonomism and moralism. The call for interpretation which art itself puts forth in addressing us makes it difficult, if not impossible, to find an absolute logical basis for whether non-aesthetic values *must* or *must not* be taken into account in aesthetic evaluations. As aesthetic consciousness shows, a work can always be abstracted into an autonomous piece and its ties with the world severed: everything can be viewed aesthetically. What is needed is an interpretation of individual works which functions to “tease out” their potential ethical implications.

This, I might briefly add, is analogous to Levinas's philosophy of ethics in relation to politics. For ethics to exist in a society one must always have recourse to justice and politics. Politics derives its transcendental ethical grounding from the face-to-face situation with the other, but actual political action requires calculation and application. Similarly, it can be argued that the normativity of art is dependent on the transcendental ground of morality which Levinas locates in the radical alterity of the other, but the ethicality of an individual work is always a question of the application of interpretation. Following Nielsen, I suggest that there is no reason why Gadamer's hermeneutics could not be utilised in a manner which does justice to this ethics of alterity.⁶⁶ Perhaps Levinas can offer the normative ground for future discussions of morality in art whereas Gadamerian hermeneutics can offer better tools for reintegrating the seemingly autonomous work back to the world of meaning.

- 1 Emmanuel Levinas, *Les imprévus de l'histoire* (Paris: Librairie Générale Française, 2021), 124; Emmanuel Levinas, *Collected Philosophical Papers* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1998), 12. The extent and essence of Levinas's anti-art stance has rightly been debated. Richard Cohen's article "Levinas on Art and Aestheticism: Getting 'Reality and Its Shadow' Right," *Levinas Studies* 11 (2016): 149–194, is perhaps the most thorough on the topic of reevaluating Levinas's stance on aesthetics and art. On other treatments on Levinas's aesthetics which emphasize its ambiguous nature see for example Tanja Staehler, "Image and Shadows: Levinas and the Ambiguity of the Aesthetic," *Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics* 47, no. 2 (2010): 123–143; and Gerald L. Bruns, "The Concepts of Art and Poetry in Emmanuel Levinas's Writings," in *The Cambridge Companion to Levinas*, eds. Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). On the topic, see also Jussi Pentikäinen, "Eros and Sensation: Art and Aesthetics in Emmanuel Levinas's Prison Notebooks," *Journal of Aesthetics and Phenomenology* 9, no. 1 (2023): 31–45.
- 2 Kristin Gjesdal, "Against the Myth of Aesthetic Presence: A Defence of Gadamer's Critique of Aesthetic Consciousness," *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 36, no. 3 (2005): 300.
- 3 Françoise Armengaud, "Éthique et esthétique: de l'ombre à l'oblitération," in *Cahier de l'Herne: Emmanuel Lévinas*, eds. Catherine Chaliel and Miguel Abensour (Paris: Éditions de l'Herne, 1993), 605.
- 4 Robert Eaglestone, *Ethical Criticism: Reading After Levinas* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997), 7.
- 5 Cohen, "Levinas on Art and Aestheticism," 168.
- 6 Levinas, *Les imprévus de l'histoire*, 124; Levinas, *Collected Philosophical Papers*, 11.
- 7 Gjesdal, "Against the Myth of Aesthetic Presence," 298.
- 8 Gjesdal, "Against the Myth of Aesthetic Presence," 293.
- 9 Kristin Gjesdal, *Gadamer and the Legacy of German Idealism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 76.
- 10 The same argument is made by Cynthia R. Nielsen as well in her book *Gadamer's Hermeneutical Aesthetics: Art as Performative, Dynamic, Communal Event* (New York: Routledge, 2023), 23.
- 11 The *locus classicus* of this debate is Noël Carroll's article "Moderate Moralism," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 36, no. 3 (1996): 223–237. For an insightful and recent discussion on the topic, see Panos Paris, "The 'Moralism' in Immoralism: A Critique of Immoralism in Aesthetics," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 59, no. 1 (2019): 13–33. James Harold offers a thoughtful defence of autonomism in his article, "Autonomism Reconsidered," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 51, no. 2 (2011): 137–147.
- 12 For a discussion of moralism versus autonomism in the context of climate change, see Emily Brady, "Aesthetic Value, Ethics and Climate Change," *Environmental Values* 23 (2014): 559–560. See also Matthew R. Auer, "Environmental Aesthetics in the Age of Climate Change," *Sustainability* 11 (2019) for an evaluation of Brady's critique of moralism.
- 13 Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Plato and the Poets," in *Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato*, translated with an introduction by P. Christopher Smith (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1980), 64; Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Gesammelte Werke, Band 5: Griechische Philosophie I* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1985), 206.
- 14 Gadamer, "Plato and the Poets," 66–7; Gadamer, *Gesammelte Werke, Band 5*, 207.
- 15 Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, translation revised by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (London: Continuum, 2006), 74; Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Gesammelte Werke, Band 1: Hermeneutik I, Wahrheit und Methode* (Tübingen: Mohr 1986), 91.
- 16 Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 76; Gadamer, *Gesammelte Werke, Band 1*, 93.
- 17 Gjesdal, *Gadamer and Legacy of German Idealism*, 59.
- 18 Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Heidegger's Ways*, trans. John W. Stanley (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 100; Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Gesammelte Werke, Band 3: Neuere Philosophie I* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1987), 253.
- 19 Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 84; Gadamer, *Gesammelte Werke, Band 1*, 103.
- 20 Frederick C. Beiser, *Diotima's Children: German Aesthetic Rationalism from Leibniz to Lessing* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 27. This connection between aesthetic rationalism and Gadamer is pointed out, in passing, by Nicholas Davey as well in his book, *Unfinished Worlds: Hermeneutics, Aesthetics and Gadamer* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 113. Cynthia R. Nielsen offers a useful summary of Gadamer's appraisal of Kant in the first chapter of her work *Gadamer's Hermeneutical Aesthetics*.
- 21 A good overview of Gadamer's notion of play is given by Nielsen in *Gadamer's Hermeneutical Aesthetics*, 124ff.
- 22 Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 84; Gadamer, *Gesammelte Werke, Band 1*, 103. Gadamer shares this antipathy towards aesthetic *Erlebnis* with his erstwhile teacher Martin Heidegger, who in his reading of Hölderlin's hymn "Germania" criticises the theory of poetry which would reduce its meaning to outward expression of inner *Erlebnis*. With characteristically acerbic humour Heidegger claims that this would make poetry comparable to dogs barking which too counts as an expression. Martin Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe, Band 39: Hölderlins Hymnen "Germanien" und "Der Rhein"* ed. Susanne Ziegler (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999), 28.
- 23 Gjesdal, *Gadamer and Legacy of German Idealism*, 70.
- 24 Jean Grondin, *The Philosophy of Gadamer*, trans. Kathryn Plant (London: Routledge), 36.
- 25 Emmanuel Levinas, *De l'existence à l'existant* (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 2013), 74; Emmanuel Levinas, *Existence and Existents*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2003), 47.
- 26 Emmanuel Levinas, *Oeuvres: Tome 1, Carnets de captivité et autre inédits* (Paris: Bernard Grasset/IMEC, 2009), 131–2. Levinas began writing the fifth "prison notebook", in which this idea is present, in 1944.
- 27 Here I will have to forego the question of how true Levinas's description actually holds for all forms of art.

- 28 Levinas, *De l'existence à l'existant*, 73; Levinas *Existence and Existents*, 46.
- 29 Levinas, *Les imprévus de l'histoire*, 115; Levinas, *Collected Philosophical Papers*, 6.
- 30 Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 144; Gadamer, *Gesammelte Werke, Band 1*, 157. This analysis is akin to Heidegger's "Ursprung des Kunstwerkes," where the latter writes of the effects of "world-withdrawal and world-decay" (*Weltentzug und Weltzerfall*) on artworks. See Martin Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe, Band 5: Holzwege*, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977), 26.
- 31 Levinas, *Les imprévus de l'histoire*, 107; Levinas, *Collected Philosophical Papers*, 1. This remark was mostly like made in reference to Sartre and Heidegger. Annabel Herzog argues that Levinas might have Hegel in mind. See Annabel Herzog, *Levinas's Politics: Justice, Mercy, Universality* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2020), 15.
- 32 Levinas, *Les imprévus de l'histoire*, 110; Levinas, *Collected Philosophical Papers*, 3.
- 33 Levinas, *Les imprévus de l'histoire*, 110; Levinas, *Collected Philosophical Papers*, 3. "Later in "Reality and Its Shadow," Levinas does in fact claim that aesthetic experience would be more properly called "interested" in the etymological sense of the word, of being among things. He sees that in the borderline magical and ritualistic experience of art the spectator loses their subjectivity and is thus reduced to a mere being among other "things." (Levinas, *Les imprévus de l'histoire*, 112; Levinas, *Collected Philosophical Papers*, 4). Still, Levinas holds on to the idea that art is separate from the concept, just like Kant.
- 34 Levinas, *Les imprévus de l'histoire*, 117-8; Levinas, *Collected Philosophical Papers*, 7.
- 35 Levinas, *Les imprévus de l'histoire*, 111; Levinas, *Collected Philosophical Papers*, 4.
- 36 Gjesdal, "Against the Myth of Aesthetic Presence," 298.
- 37 Gjesdal, *Gadamer and Legacy of German Idealism*, 48. For a good summary of Gadamer's critique of "Erlebnis-ästhetik," see Davey, *Unfinished Worlds*, 70-80.
- 38 Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 78; Gadamer, *Gesammelte Werke, Band 1*, 95-6. See also Hans-Georg Gadamer, *The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays*, trans. Nicholas Walker, edited with an introduction by Robert Bernasconi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 29; Hans-Georg *Gesammelte Werke, Band 8: Ästhetik und Poetik I* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1993), 120.
- 39 Levinas, *Les imprévus de l'histoire*, 114; Levinas, *Collected Philosophical Papers*, 5. Levinas does not name any names, but it is likely that he has Husserl, Sartre, and Eugen Fink in mind.
- 40 Levinas, *Les imprévus de l'histoire*, 121; Levinas, *Collected Philosophical Papers*, 9.
- 41 For a recent discussion of how aesthetic values relate to global crises in our time, see Emily Brady, "Global Climate Change and Aesthetics," *Environmental Values* 31, no. 1 (2022), 27-46.
- 42 Grondin, *The Philosophy of Gadamer*, 30.
- 43 Gjesdal, *Gadamer and the Legacy of German Idealism*, 64.
- 44 Gadamer, *The Relevance of the Beautiful*, 37; Gadamer, *Gesammelte Werke* 8, 127-8. On the non-conceptual truth of art, see Davey, *Unfinished Worlds*, 34.
- 45 Martin Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, trans. and eds. Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 44; Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe, Band 5: Holzwege*, 59. "[E]in Werden und Geschehen der Wahrheit."
- 46 Grondin, *The Philosophy of Gadamer*, 43.
- 47 Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 135; Gadamer, *Gesammelte Werke, Band 1*, 145. Italics in the original. Levinas in fact refers to emanation in his philosophy as well, but in an entirely different manner. For example, he brings up the concept in the context of the Platonic idea of "Good beyond being" which functions as an inspiration for his philosophy of alterity, see Emmanuel Levinas, *Totalité et infini, essai sur l'extériorité* (Paris, Librairie Générale Française 2006), 325; Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity, An Essay of Exteriority*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1979), 292.
- 48 Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 135; Gadamer, *Gesammelte Werke* 1, 145.
- 49 Sean Hand, *Emmanuel Levinas* (London: Routledge, 2009), 66.
- 50 Cohen, "Levinas on Art and Aestheticism," 169.
- 51 Emmanuel Levinas, *Outside the Subject*, trans. Michael B. Smith (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 147; Emmanuel Levinas, *Hors sujet* (Paris: Fata morgana, 1987), 219.
- 52 Emmanuel Levinas, *Hors sujet*, Admittedly, Levinas argue that the paradigm of criticism is a discussion with a "flesh and blood" person, not a written text.
- 53 Levinas, *Les imprévus de l'histoire*, 108; Levinas, *Collected Philosophical Papers*, 1.
- 54 Levinas, *Les imprévus de l'histoire*, 126; Levinas, *Collected Philosophical Papers*, 12.
- 55 Levinas, *Les imprévus de l'histoire*, 127; Levinas, *Collected Philosophical Papers*, 13.
- 56 Cohen, "Levinas on Art and Aestheticism," 161.
- 57 Levinas, *Les imprévus de l'histoire*, 109; Levinas, *Collected Philosophical Papers*, 2. It is interesting to note that Gadamer shares the idea of the "achievement," of artworks being brought to a completion (*Vollbracht*) which allows them stand independent as unique and irreplaceable, even as regards to its creator. See Gadamer, *The Relevance of the Beautiful*, 34; Gadamer, *Gesammelte Werke* 8, 124-5. To him, however, this does not mean that the work would stand outside the possibility of interpretation or dialogue.
- 58 This is also Staehler's conclusion in "Images and Shadows," 135-136. See also Akos Krassoy, "The Ethics of the Face in Art: On the Margins of Levinas's Theory of Ethical Signification in Art," *Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics* 53, no. 9 (2016): 55.
- 59 Levinas's reading of Celan has been criticized for the way he seemingly finds in the poet's work only an echo of his own thinking. See for example Annelies Schulte Nordholt's article "Tentation esthétique et exigence éthique. Lévinas et l'oeuvre littéraire," *Études littéraires* 31, no. 3 (1999), 69-85.

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- 60 Levinas, *Noms Propres* (Paris: Fata Morgana, 2014), 65; Levinas, *Proper Names*, trans. Michael B. Smith (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 43.
- 61 The latter suggestion would make Levinas's philosophy rare case of "radical moralism," to use Carrol's terminology, see "Moderate Moralism," 236.
- 62 "Moderate Moralism," 236.
- 63 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Richard Heinemann and Bruce Krajewski, *Gadamer on Celan: "Who am I and Who are You?" and Other Essays* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 182; Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Gesammelte Werke, Band 9: Ästhetik und Poetik II* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1993), 463.
- 64 Levinas, *Les imprévus de l'histoire*, 108; Levinas, *Collected Philosophical Papers*, 1.
- 65 Gadamer, *Gadamer on Celan*, 133; Gadamer, *Gesammelte Werke* 9, 432.
- 66 Nielsen, *Gadamer's Hermeneutical Aesthetics*, 151.