https://tidsskrift.dk/mef-journal <p><br><br></p> Københavns Universitet da-DK Journal of Media, Cognition and Communication 2245-9855 <p>Creative Commons: CC by-nc-nd</p> https://tidsskrift.dk/mef-journal/article/view/129151 <p>Introduction on behalf of the editorial board</p> Bolette Moldenhawer Sabrina Ebbersmeyer Copyright (c) 2021 Tidsskrift for Medier, Erkendelse og Formidling http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2021-10-28 2021-10-28 9 1 1 3 https://tidsskrift.dk/mef-journal/article/view/121808 <p>The status that Aristotle’s Poetics gives to Empedocles seems double: He is first and foremost physiologon, a natural scientist, but seemingly also a poet. Keeping in mind the Aristotelean distinction between theoretical and practical sciences, where natural science belongs to the former and the study of poetry to the latter, this double status requires explanation – how can the same work be the object of both theoretical and practical science? Commencing from Aristotle’s concept of metaphor, this article proposes three such explanations: One rooted in Aristotle’s thoughts on style, one in epistemology, and one in his writings on language.</p> Frederik-Emil Friis Jakobsen Copyright (c) 2021 Tidsskrift for Medier, Erkendelse og Formidling http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2021-10-28 2021-10-28 9 1 4 22 https://tidsskrift.dk/mef-journal/article/view/118569 <p>The letter correspondence between Elisabeth and Descartes is well known for its discussion of the mind–body problem, yet in addition, a considerable part of the correspondence discusses how to live well and to reach the ‘good life’. Descartes’s neo-Stoic (or rationalistic) position on this topic is reflected in the three rules for living that he advises Elisabeth to follow, especially when she faces great challenges in life, though Elisabeth is sceptical to Descartes’s advice. This paper shows how Elisabeth’s scepticism is founded on considerations of the ethical significance of the body. According to Elisabeth, the body and certain states of it are necessary for living well. Aside from the basic philosophical interest in this view and the arguments Elisabeth provides for it, her view contributes to and informs a very old discussion in ethics about the conditions for living well. In relation to Elisabeth’s contribution, this article ends by suggesting that her contribution could reasonably be seen as philosophy and that she could plausibly be attributed the status of philosopher herself.</p> Victor Lange Copyright (c) 2021 Tidsskrift for Medier, Erkendelse og Formidling http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2021-10-28 2021-10-28 9 1 23 43 https://tidsskrift.dk/mef-journal/article/view/118636 <p>This paper analyzes a series of central texts from the Danish parties The New Right and the Danish People’s Party with emphasis on their use of the populist figure of the heartland: A narrative about the always already lost or threatened harmonic community that needs to be protected against enemies of the people. The paper concludes that the idea of the heartland is strongly present in the discourses of both parties, and that in The New Right’s discourse the heartland is equally threated by foreigners and the elite, while in the discourse of the Danish People’s Party it is mostly threatened by immigrants whereas the antagonism to the elite is downplayed.</p> Silas Marker Copyright (c) 2021 Tidsskrift for Medier, Erkendelse og Formidling http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2021-10-28 2021-10-28 9 1 44 68 https://tidsskrift.dk/mef-journal/article/view/121779 <p>This paper attempts to answer the question of whether strong emergence is a tenable concept and examine how it relates to philosophy of mind. Strong emergence is the idea that truths about a given high-level phenomenon are not reducible, even in principle, to the low-level phenomenon on which it depends. This article advances the position that strong emergence, though a tenable concept, cannot present any convincing and unproblematic instantiations in nature. Furthermore, strong emergence might imply counterintuitive conse-quences for causational structures and philosophy of mind.</p> Ida Skovhus Hansen Copyright (c) 2021 Tidsskrift for Medier, Erkendelse og Formidling http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2021-10-28 2021-10-28 9 1 69 87 https://tidsskrift.dk/mef-journal/article/view/121619 <p>Epiphenomenalism is the view that mental events have no causal impact on physical events. One of the most potent objections to this view is the self-stultification objection, which aims to show that epiphenomenalism is incompatible with knowledge about our own experience. William Robinson (2006) argues that epiphenomenalism can escape charges of self-stultification by appealing to the common underlying cause between mental events and our reports of mental events. In this paper, I defend Robinson’s proposal against several objections raised by Dwayne Moore (2012). I conclude that Moore’s argu-ments fail to undermine Robinson’s solution to the self-stultification objection.</p> Marcus Damm Strøm-Hansen Copyright (c) 2021 Tidsskrift for Medier, Erkendelse og Formidling http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2021-10-28 2021-10-28 9 1 88 105