

# Thinking is a Thing: Hegel's use of Examples

## I. THE EXAMPLE

What is the act of giving an example? What kind of thinking is done when a concept is exemplified? Are there different ways of using examples? I have for some time been working on these questions, which I think touch the core of what one could call the method of philosophy. Philosophy is about doing conceptual, not empirical, work, but how does philosophy bring its concepts to life? Maybe one of the most prominent ways of doing this is in the process of giving examples. Before I get to the specific topic of this article, namely Hegel's use of examples, which is quite astonishing, I would like briefly to rephrase my basic approach to the topic of the example.

In the ordinary understanding of the function of the example, we use examples when we mean to illustrate or clarify something (usually a difficult concept or theory). In this "heuristic" use of the example, the example is meant to transform something rather abstract into something concrete or understandable. At the University of Manchester, they maintain a so-called Academic Phrasebank, which has achieved an almost iconic status, when it comes to explaining academic lingo. The article on "Giving Examples" says that: "Writers

may give specific examples as evidence to support their general claims or arguments. Examples can also be used to help the reader or listener understand unfamiliar or difficult concepts, and they tend to be easier to remember. For this reason, they are often used in teaching.”<sup>1</sup> As the article has it, examples *support* general claims, and they are *helpful* to the reader and listener.

However, there is also, undeniably, something else at stake, when we use examples. The example is not always as smooth-running and helpful as it should be. In philosophy, this is a well-known experience: When you give examples of some of the fundamental concepts, like freedom, anxiety, negativity etc., you get the feeling that this is not quite it. You give an example of freedom, but it is only a “petty” example, not the thing itself. Approaching the example heuristically, this is easily explained: The example is here understood simply as a helpful device for transferring *some* of the content of a concept to someone more stupid than yourself, a student for example. It is no surprise, then, that the example delivers less than what its concept promised. It delivers less, but you understand more, because abstract thought has been reduced to a concrete, palpable example. However, there is, I claim, another way of approaching the example.

What if examples not only deliver less, but also sometimes *more*, than what their concepts promised? What if there in this way is a certain materiality of the example, a certain “excess of stuff” connected to the example, even a retroactive force, so that good examples backwardly change the ideas and concepts they were merely supposed to exemplify? This is, I think, also related to a very common experience in philosophy: There is no “neutral” example, examples are highly telling, sometimes the example even takes the center-stage of a certain philosophical position, so that we really only engage in the philosophy of Plato when engaging in the example of the cave, the philosophy of Descartes when engaging in the example of the piece of wax, the philosophy of Sartre when engaging in the example of the walk in the park, or of looking through a keyhole, or hanging out at the café, and so on. Examples are “at work” in philosophical texts. There is a certain incompatibility between concept and example, which is productive for thought itself. There is, one could say, “example-work”, in the same way as there a “dream-work” in Freud. My claim would be, then, that the ways in which philosophers use examples provide (one of) the royal roads towards the way they think and develop thought.

It seems that some thinkers are able to exploit this capacity of the

example to its full, and as Slavoj Žižek has articulated it, this amounts to what he calls “the materialist use of examples”<sup>2</sup>. What does this expression mean? There is a materiality of the example, not because it is concrete, in contrast to the abstract, spectral ravings of the concept, but because it brings in something extra, which shouldn’t be there, but which still is essential for the concept itself. Wasn’t Freud one of the great masters of the material use of examples, when he gave the famous example of the dream of Irma, which was absolutely crucial for the development of the concept of the unconscious? The unconscious really only became the unconscious due to the intervention of this example. When such an example is given, we realize that it touches something at the core of a concept, at the same time – and maybe exactly therefore – as it transgresses the very conceptual frame it was put in. Put in another (more Lacanian) way: Thought does in some sense lose itself in the example, but what is hereby expressed is only thought’s own “real” kernel, thought’s own antagonistic relationship to itself. Of course, it is Žižek himself, which is today’s master of such a practice. In this article, however, I’m going to trace what could be called the roots of the materialist use of examples in classical philosophy, maybe at the very climax of classical philosophy, namely in Hegel’s use of examples, especially in his masterpiece *The Phenomenology of Spirit*.

It should be obvious that Hegel does not have the same “aggressive”-materialist use of examples as for example Žižek (in Žižek you will be bombarded with examples, totally overburdened by them, or the same example will be repeated again and again and again, i.e. the Rabinovitch-joke). However, what is so interesting about Hegel is that he brings the tension between concept and example to its maximum. This is what I will investigate in the following. I do not claim to present a total interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy, but I do think that from this (limited) perspective a slightly new Hegel comes to light. Not the Hegel of an “absolute spirit” in the sense of a total reconciliation of spirit with itself (the Hegel that Lacan often criticizes). But the Hegel of a certain unrest in spirit; a surplus-spirit, one could say, which is exactly played out in its examples.

## II. EXISTENTIAL DRAMATIZATIONS

*The Phenomenology of Spirit* is no normal book, even among philosophical books it stands out. The project of the book is no less than to make a theory of “it all” (“das Ganze”). Hegel is a philosopher, but he is

also what one could call the “philosopher’s philosopher”, in that he does not restrict himself to defending a certain philosophical truth, in competition with others; his project is rather to conceive of the very work of reason, the very creation and succession of philosophical truths. The project is to fathom how reason, also called spirit, moves through history, how there is a historicity of spirit. But how is this exactly possible? From what position is one allowed to do this? This is where the originality of Hegel’s position lies. His project is very ambitious, in that he wants to surpass all previous philosophical positions – this is why he sticks to the “master-concept” of spirit – and it is at the same time very modest and respectful in its approach: Surpassing philosophy can only be done beginning from the inside of philosophy, from a thorough working-through of the philosophical positions that must be surpassed.

How can this approach can be articulated in terms of concept and example? Even though Hegel has a master-concept, called spirit, spirit is not a Platonic idea, firmly placed in the heaven of ideas. To become itself, spirit must move out of itself – spirit is not monologic, but dialectical. This is what is played out repeatedly in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*: the concept of spirit is exemplified – in the different chapters “Sense-certainty”, “Observing reason”, “Self-alienated spirit” etc. – and the strange thing is that the example every time produces more than one could expect, *and this is spirit*. What I mean here by “exemplified” is central: At stake is first of all a relation between universal (spirit) and particular (scientific or philosophical position), but there is in Hegel’s acts of exemplification also a certain wager: That *this* particular/example, this showing or appearance of spirit, has something important to say. The particular is not interesting if it is simply particular, but only if it can begin to function as an example, as something that relates to, and challenges, the universal concept it exemplifies. To exemplify would in this sense also be to challenge and to raise the stakes, to dramatize, as I shall argue in the following. If spirit was a pure Platonic idea no example would be able to match up to it. But in Hegelian thinking it is almost the other way around: The very work of the example, which brings the pure concept into trouble, precisely *is* “unrestful” spirit. To be clear: Spirit is all, it is “das Ganze”, but it is not pure, not one, not unity, it is conflict, equivocal; it is in conflict with itself. Spirit is thus played out in its examples. In a certain way, spirit gives these examples – the examples are examples of spirit – but it only “moves” by being undermined by them<sup>3</sup>. There is a certain suc-

cess of the example, precisely when it undermines its concept, brings something extra into it, or points to a certain conflict in it.

Spirit is only accessible through these examples, which we will have to work through, before we can enter new examples. *The Phenomenology of Spirit* is thus somewhat like a *Bildungsroman*, as Judith Butler has put it. Hegel does not mechanically lay bare some general principles for spirit; the book is more like a pilgrimage of the spirit: “The narrative”, says Butler, “discloses and enacts a strategy for appropriating philosophical truth; it sets the ontological stage in a variety of ways, compels our belief in the reality of that staged scene, encourages our identification with the emergent subject that the scene includes, and then asks us to suffer the inevitable failure of that subject’s quest for identity within the confines of that scene” (Butler 2012: 21). In prolongation of Butler’s description, Žižek has convincingly remarked how *The Phenomenology of Spirit* could be characterized as a kind of “hysterical theater»<sup>4</sup>. Throughout the book, we see the different figures, shapes, of consciousness. These are not abstract, “dead” positions – they are not like well-formed textbooks examples of different philosophical positions or paradigms. They are scenes, where consciousness posits itself, tries to reflect itself and come to terms with itself, but fails. The scenes are, in Žižek’s words, “existential dramatizations” of theoretical positions – they are dramatizations, which always produce some kind of surplus<sup>5</sup>. Spirit is put in scene, but once the drama begins to unfold, the scene evolves into something, which was not accounted for in the first place, even though nothing from the outside is brought in. Butler is right to emphasize not only the tragic, “blind” side of spirit’s adventures, but also the comedy of it. There is a Mr. Magoo-like quality of spirit: Mr. Magoo is the little funny cartoon-character, who (from Wikipedia) “gets into a series of comical situations as a result of his extreme near-sightedness, compounded by his stubborn refusal to admit the problem”,<sup>6</sup> but always lands on all four wheels of his little car again.

So, what is the result of all this? I would claim that Hegel is all about a fundamental unrest of spirit. What is interesting about Hegel from this perspective is not his way of synthesizing different positions with each other, but his way of making existential dramas out of theory. Spirit always presents itself in an example, which does not fit, or which brings the concept into trouble, and – once again – this is exactly the point. There are many examples of spirit in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, and spirit is fully in each and every one of them. It is not

that spirit is partially exemplified in the chapter of “Sense-Certainty”, partially in the chapter on “Observing Reason” etc. Spirit is fully there, as the very conflict the example brings forth in relation to the starting point. Thus, it is the function of the example, not to illustrate spirit, or to make us better understand what spirit is or can be, but to continuously change the very concept of spirit. The examples perform a kind work, which in a certain sense borrows its energy from spirit – for Hegel spirit still has ontological priority – but without which spirit would not be what it is. The example seems to be the site of an essential symptom of spirit (I borrow the gist of this argument from Mladen Dolar<sup>7</sup>): When spirit is exemplified, or played out in a dramatic scene, something always goes wrong, a symptom appears, and yet the symptom cannot be removed – if we remove it, we remove spirit itself. Therefore, spirit is nothing but the very succession of symptomatic examples, each of them ridden with new contradictions.

This could also be expressed through one of Žižek’s readings of Hegel<sup>8</sup>. What if a good, dialectical example in fact shows us a universal dimension (the dimension of spirit), not directly, but by exposing some unstable particular situation? In Hegel, universality is not the pure dimension of spirit, untouched by the particular (e.g. “the pure idea of the state” as opposed to all existing states), but Hegel’s investigation does neither simply aim to show how every universality is tainted by certain particular forces (“the pure idea of the state” is only the state of the ruling class). The universal shows itself, according to (Žižek’s reading of) Hegel in another way. It shows itself when a given particular situation comes into conflict with itself, when it cannot come to terms with itself. It is, from Žižek and Hegel’s viewpoint, precisely when a state cannot come to terms with itself (and become fully integrated and harmonious), but is haunted by conflict and antagonism, that it shows its true universal dimension. For a dialectician it is all about identifying these “thwarted particularities”. One must set out to find the examples that cannot live up to their concept, but which exactly in this way come to reveal the true split core of the concept. The universal concept is by necessity linked to a failed exemplification; a failed exemplification which – again – is turned into success.

### III. THINKING IS A THING

Hegel has an astonishing use of examples, which lays bare spirit’s conflict with itself. He knows how to push them, so that every example ends up giving more than what was planned for. What I will argue is

that there is a “strategy of the example” in Hegel; a strategy which is played out in the very composition of the work, as well as implicit in the development of the different examples, or ontological scenes, that the book consists of. My argument could in some regards be seen as drawing on certain deconstructionist approaches<sup>9</sup>, but I nonetheless think there is a crucial difference (though I will not engage in a substantial discussion with these approaches here). In Irene E. Harvey’s seminal work on examples, she wants to think ways of using examples that would finally redeem the traditional Western metaphysical framework of general and particular. “Examples always exceed whatever frame one seeks to place around them, or whatever cage one tries to capture them with”, she argues, and there is in the example an “excess from every theory to date”<sup>10</sup>. What she wants to do is to somehow free this excess from its conceptual framing; she wants to engage in the plurality, multidimensionality and “dissemination” of the example, beyond identity and unity, and the way in which it cannot even be usurped by dialectical oppositional thinking<sup>11</sup>. However, this is not my project. I do not want to give up Hegelian metaphysics and go into the non-conceptual, non-dialectical excess; rather, I want to show that if there is a non-dialectical excess in Hegel – if the example does not fit into the conceptual framework – this feature can exactly be deployed to think metaphysically in a materialist way. The way the materialist example fires back into the concept is for me what is central.

But how is this done? How does Hegel push his examples? There is one passage in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, which seems to be perfect in order to answer these questions. What I have in mind is the famous chapter on “Observing Reason”, the chapter where Hegel engages in physiognomy and phrenology, among other things<sup>12</sup>. The chapter is in many ways highly relevant in our time, because of its treatment of the relation between philosophy and empirically informed natural sciences, but in what follows I will not go deep into this discussion. What I want to do here, is to describe Hegel’s approach: Why does this topic interest him at all? Why is this a good example? And what does his reading produce?

In the chapter on “Observing reason” the stakes are in fact really high. We are at a point in the drama where spirit begins to reflect itself in its relation to the outer world, and in a somewhat scientific way. We have gone through the figures of consciousness and self-consciousness and now we must examine reason, scientific reason. How can spirit observe itself, how can it understand itself in relation to its immedi-

ate actuality. The question could also be posed: How can spirit understand itself as matter? How can thinking be a thing? Today, these questions are asked all the time, and they are very much researched in modern cognitive science. Modern brain-sciences would of course dismiss the concept of “spirit” to replace it with “processes”, “firing neurons” and so on, but the problem remains. What is this “thing” which moves inside the MR-scanner, when you scan the brain? And whom or what “thing” is it that reflects and looks at itself as the “thing” moving? The question for Hegel is not whether the results of modern brain-sciences are true or false according to external reality (there are very likely true in relation to the premises behind the experiments conducted). The dialectical question is rather if these sciences can contribute to the unrestful, conflictual self-reflection of spirit. Hegel’s wager is that they can. Even if these kinds of sciences try to “mend the gap”, even if they try to once and for all explain how mental processes unfold (or at least make models to predict the processes), they often contribute to something else and much more fascinating namely to create new gaps and inconsistencies. If this piece of meat that I call my brain, which lights up in the MR-scanner, is the very definition of my mental abilities and its processes – reason itself explained – what kind of reason did then produce it as such? If we succeed in predicting what the brain does, does this mean that we have to obey these predictions? Today, you can “optimize your brain” as it is articulated in slogans, so you can concentrate better, make better decisions etc. But what kind of self is able to say yes or no to optimizing the brain? Is this self also in the brain somewhere, or in another place? What kind of scanner would be needed to predict this “other self”?

The question of the observability of spirit interests Hegel, because it points to a number of difficult questions, which in fact can be solved neither by philosophy nor by the natural sciences. Hegel’s way to intervene into the debate is primarily through a critique; a critique, which relates to a conflict in the very scientific position investigated. What is interesting in this position is how it cannot seem to come to terms with itself. But the critique also has a positive undercurrent. If Hegel could have known modern brain-sciences, he would probably see progress in them; both in terms of increased technical power, but also in terms of progress of thought. All it takes would be to take seriously the critical potentials of the brain-sciences themselves. What does its experiments mean for the very concept of spirit?

There would of course be an easy way out of all the questions. A

Platonic-idealist approach to the question of spirit would (in a caricature) probably simply state that “spirit” is so comprehensive a concept that no example will ever be able to exhaust it. In this way, the example of the brain-sciences can effectively be downplayed: The description of brain in the MR-scanner would just be one out of many examples of what spirit is. The “humanistic” idealist would maybe even take one step further and claim that the example of brain-sciences is not very existentially engaging: What this science describes “from without” must be described from an insider-perspective, or else the complexity of spirit is lost. But it is exactly here that a dialectician will take up the fight, maybe even seek it out. The example of the brain-sciences is interesting, precisely because the stakes are so high. Brain-sciences is an example of an approach which seriously tries to give an exhausting explanation of spirit, and thus it will eventually, this is the wager of the dialectician, end up in contradictions. Its example will undermine its own conceptual starting-point.

This is why “observing reason” seems to arouse Hegel’s interest. Something is played out in this example that contributes to the investigation of spirit, because it touches on some fundamental conflicts in the very concept. In *The Phenomenology of Spirit* Hegel does of course not investigate modern brain-sciences, but some sciences that today must strike us as somewhat odd; the science of physiognomy (“the assessment of character or personality from a person’s outer appearance”<sup>13</sup>) and the science of phrenology (which would then be: the assessment of a person’s character and personality from the form of his skull). There is no direct connection between e.g. phrenology and modern brain-science and a critique of the brain-sciences of today cannot simply be done by reference to Hegel’s critique of phrenology. What is interesting, however, is that a certain conflict is played out in both examples, and that they both fall within the borders of the paradigm, which in broad terms can be termed “observing reason”. At the same time, something is to be learned from the way Hegel approaches this example of phrenology. He not only accepts the challenge, he goes all in, so to speak, and this is important in order to understand Hegel’s way of using examples; his method of the example.

In the beginning of the investigation of the relation of self-consciousness to its immediate actuality, we are presented with the philosophical problematic of inner and outer. If spirit is something inner, how can we ever come to know it? In what kind of expressions can we come to know it? Hegel then presents us with (roughly) two different

ways to go: We could examine the expressions of spirit in the *deed* of men (as when you commit a murder), or we could examine the expressions of spirit in the mere shapes of corporeal material; we could perform hand reading, “chiromantia”, physiognomy, phrenology etc. It seems obvious that we should go in the direction of examining deeds as the expression of spirit, and Hegel first drags in this direction. However, something is not solved if we do this. The solution is to some extent too ideal; by relying on a “humanistic” vision of deeds, it bypasses the central question. We did not truly engage in the challenge of investigating observing reason as an exhaustive theory of spirit. Therefore, instead of deeds, we have to discuss organs, brains, spinal cords and skulls.

To cut a long story short (and it is not my intention to go into the details of the argument here), Hegel ends up discussing phrenology, and this is where we find the culmination of the drama in this passage. Spirit must be understood as a dead thing, if it has to satisfy the very standards of the position in question, namely observing reason. It cannot be the deed, it even cannot be the organ, not even the brain, which is still too vibrant, it has to be the skull. The actuality of spirit is turned into a thing, “the spirit is a bone”, as the famous dictum goes. <sup>14</sup>However, at the same time as this result has been reached the final and fatal contraction of this position arises. If spirit is nothing but a dead thing, how can this dead thing then comprehend itself? How can a bone think itself as a bone? This is the last stage, the most vulgar and stupid stage of them all, says Hegel<sup>15</sup>, that observing reason reaches, and this is where some kind of reversal is called for. But this stage is still, nonetheless, very important for the further development of spirit; in the words of Hegel, “because Spirit is all the greater, the greater the opposition from which it has returned into itself; but it creates this opposition for itself by setting aside its immediate unity, and by alienating its being-for-self”<sup>16</sup>. The progression of spirit is dependent on precisely such a radical identification with a given example, even though this radical identification ends up in contradictions. This is what makes spirit “greater” than it was before (or simply what makes spirit spirit). What seems to be a methodological failure must be turned into a positive condition. It is only through sticking to the example that Hegel ends up transgressing it. Once again, at this stage, spirit is not something controlling the different succession of examples from behind the scenes; there are only these scenes. We have to follow the immediate consequences of *this* example, and nothing else, and it is only through doing this that the position is undermined.

From the basis of the example of phrenology, I think one could rephrase the famous Hegelian “speculative proposition”<sup>17</sup> in terms of concept and example: In the speculative use of examples, concept and example do not play their usual roles – in the same way as in the speculative proposition, subject and predicate do not play their usual roles. A speculative sentence is, according to Hegel, a sentence, which is produced by philosophy, and this is why philosophy so often is misunderstood. A normal sentence of everyday-language has the structure of subject plus predicate; we say for example, “the rose is red”. In philosophy, the problem is that we do not simply operate by way of subject and predicate, but by way of subject and a *substantial* predicate. The predicate in a philosophical sentence describes – not some accidental features of a thing – but the substantiality of the thing. When we say, and this is Hegel’s example, “God is being”, this is not the same kind of sentence as “the rose is red”. What we mean to say is that God *substantially is* being. In this way, the philosophical or speculative proposition causes trouble: We find ourselves thrown back into the subject of the sentence; if God is being, we sort of loose God to being. We lose the firm ground under our feet, we cannot refer back to God and simply describe God – God has a long beard, God is wise, God is old – because the very notion of God has suffered a counter-thrust in the speculative proposition. The attempt at defining God substantiality destroys the otherwise self-evident ontological position of God. God is not simply God anymore, but also, substantially, being. And this is where thinking proper begins, this is where the concept, the notion, itself begins to work, begins to move itself. Thinking is this very movement back and forth in a sentence, in a philosophical exposition, where subject becomes substance, and substance becomes subject.

Now, the same goes for the different dramatizations of spirit in the course of the book. We have spirit, which is subject, and we get the example, but the trick is that the example must be read as substantially *it*. There is no “mere” example, when we read Hegel in this way. Every example is a substantial investigation of spirit, which even causes spirit to lose itself. “The spirit is a bone”, we learn in the section on the immediate actuality of spirit, and this is serious, because Hegel engages in this sentence philosophically, as if it were philosophy. The contradiction that spirit gets itself involved in here makes spirit greater than it was; the very example retroactively changes the stage that spirit was in.

#### IV. THE MATERIALIST USE OF EXAMPLES

To conclude, and in the light of what I have argued about Hegel's use of examples, let me rephrase what a materialist use of examples consists in. A materialist use of examples consists in a rather peculiar relation of concepts to examples, where concepts are subverted or undermined by examples. Examples can be used to dramatize or stage the concept in question, not only for didactical reasons, but because something must be *played out* in this dramatization. The aim would be to confront the concepts with their own repressed kernel, as Žižek also puts it. The materialist use of examples is thus exactly also a highly theoretical use of examples. It is not done for the sake of easing something, i.e. giving good examples of how to understand difficult things or learning to cope with difficult situations – it is not about defending a certain pragmatism of the example, where the abstract must be deflated into the concrete. The materialist use of examples is a critical enterprise. You use examples in this way, not when you want to enhance understanding of something, but when you want to transform the understanding.

For Hegel, this means that we must give ourselves over to the material of philosophy in a new way. When investigating spirit, we must stick to the conceptual framework of spirit trying to come to terms with itself. We must not engage in “loose” or detached phenomenological descriptions of anything that comes to mind. Hegel judges this kind of procedure rather hard, he calls it “material thinking”, which is the work of “a contingent consciousness that is absorbed only in material stuff”<sup>18</sup>. Using examples in the true materialist sense is not like the technic of “stream of consciousness”, where you simply put down to paper everything that comes to mind, simply for the sake of describing all the things you know in the flow of the moment. You have to restrain yourself, to hold back, to not “intrude into the immanent rhythm of the Notion”, as Hegel puts it, and to not use “wisdom obtained from elsewhere”<sup>19</sup>. Instead, you have to patiently follow a figure of consciousness to its own edge, where it shows what it is grounded in, and where it comes to display its own internal contradictions. Where, for example, the spirit is a bone and thinking is a thing. What is at stake here is, I think, very close to the way the psychoanalyst operates; what he must do is exactly not to intrude with wisdom, in order to set things right or explain things away – he must only intervene, either to push things further, to worsen things, or at the exact moment when the symptom begins to show itself. Neither Hegelian philosophy, nor

psychoanalysis, is about solving problems, it is simply about describing, showing problems, allowing them to be unfolded, played out, it is sometimes even about aggravating problems. The good example is, in these disciplines, when something is produced that hits the very core of a concept by subverting or transgressing it.

The materialist use of examples does not amount to some kind of finished theory or “world-view”. It is there whenever there is something more in the example than in the concept, this has been the simple definition, that I have been working with. It is there when one touches the real of the concept by way of an example. This can be done in different ways. It can be done in the way of Hegel, which investigates forms of knowledge, and the turnover of spirit into something other than itself. It can be done in the way of Freud, who in his three books on the unconscious somehow creates the category of the unconscious through its own excessive examples. It can also be done in the way of the later Wittgenstein, who invents his own example-giving machine, testing different examples of language-use against each other, making them jar against each other. And it can be done in the witty and provocative way of Žižek, who uses examples to intervene into frozen conceptual frameworks.

As there is no neutral example, there is no neutral *use* of examples. And as we all use examples all the time, this is an excellent place to begin, if we want to *think* instead of simply reproducing.

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1 See: <http://www.phrasebank.manchester.ac.uk/giving-examples/> (downloaded October 5<sup>th</sup> 2019).

2 Žižek 2012: 364

3 see also Žižek 2012: 364

4 Žižek 2008: 143

5 Žižek 2008: 142

6 See: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mr.\\_Magoo](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mr._Magoo) (downloaded October 5<sup>th</sup> 2019).

7 Dolar 2016

8 In what follows I rely on Žižek 2012: 359-367.

9 such as Derrida 1986; Warminski 1981; Harvey 2002

10 Harvey 2002: ix

11 Harvey 2002: 154

12 Hegel 1977: 145-210

13 See: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physiognomy> (downloaded October 5<sup>th</sup> 2019)

14 see Hegel 1977: 200 – translation altered

- 15 Hegel 1977: 206
- 16 Hegel 1977: 206
- 17 Hegel 1977: 38
- 18 Hegel 1977: 35
- 19 Hegel 1977: 36

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