

Love and Forms of Spirit: Kierkegaard vs. Hegel*

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I.

Throughout the history of Christianity, the notion of love has played an essential role in theological and philosophical reflection. The New Testament assertion that “God is love” (I John 4:16) places love at the heart of Christian thought and practice in a way that demands careful and continual consideration. In his provocative and influential book, *Agape and Eros*,¹ Swedish churchman Anders Nygren argues that the distinctive features of Christianity and Platonism emerge most clearly through an investigation of their alternative interpretations of love. Even the most cursory acquaintance with the Christian tradition, however, discloses wide disagreement among theologians about the character of love and its place in the life of a faithful person. As one probes the issue more deeply, it becomes evident that the idea of love is inseparably bound to questions of ontology, cosmology, and anthropology.

The writings of Kierkegaard and Hegel offer a vivid illustration of the Christian preoccupation with love. Love plays an extraordinarily important role in the thought of these two seminal authors. In numerous works, Kierkegaard repeatedly approaches love from a variety of perspectives, always attempting to ascertain the relationship between love and realized selfhood. The significance of love for Hegel’s philosophy is less evident and is less often recognized. Through his reflection upon the nature of love, Hegel discovers the logical and ontological structure that forms the foundation of his complex philosophical system. The concern with love is not simply an academic matter for Hegel and Kierkegaard. Their personal lives mirror their intellectual grappling with the issue of love. The response of each philosopher-theologian to the institution of marriage reveals significant aspects of their views of love. Hegel married, and became a thoroughly domesticated husband, father, and some would argue, Christian philosopher. Kierkegaard never married, and spent most of his life trying to come to terms with his refusal or inability to wed, and at-

tacking the domestication of selfhood and Christianity. Perhaps inconsequential biographical facts. But I think not, for sometimes a philosopher lives out his philosophy, even if that philosophy is idealistic rather than existential.² In this paper, we shall attempt to come to terms with some of the important differences between the positions of Kierkegaard and Hegel by investigating the complex relationship between interpretations of love and models of selfhood developed in their writings. We can begin by analyzing Hegel's argument.

II.

Hegel records his analysis of love and his initial efforts to identify the basic principles of his system in a series of essays and fragments collected under the title *Early Theological Writings (Frühe Schriften)*. Written prior to his arrival at his mature position, these early works offer a unique glimpse of the development of Hegel's thought. During his years at the *Tübinger Stift*, Hegel was deeply influenced by liberal theologians such as Immanuel Diez, and was highly critical of the attempts of orthodox theologians such as Gottlob Christian Storr to defend Christianity against Enlightenment critiques of revealed religion.³ Hegel's earliest theological writings elaborate a variation of Kant's *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft* in which the essence of all true religion is defined in terms of human morality. In "Die Positivität der christlichen Religion" of 1795 and in his *Leben Jesus*, Hegel follows the example Schelling set in his commentaries on Romans and Galatians written in 1792–3, by presenting a picture of Jesus as a teacher of a purely moral and thoroughly rational form of religion that became encumbered with historically positive elements as the result of the recalcitrance of early Christians. To overcome the errors of historical Christianity, Hegel insists one must return to the kind of rational moral religion described by Kant in his Second Critique.

By the time of the 1796 essay, "Der Geist des Christentums und sein Schicksal", Hegel's position has changed substantially. He no longer regards Kant's moral religion as the most complete expression of the essence of Christianity. To the contrary, Hegel now associates Kantianism with the Judaic legalism he believes has been overcome by the emergence of the Christian religion. Obedience to the categorical imperative is no longer viewed as the realization of autonomous selfhood, but is seen as heteronomy in which one becomes a slave to an internalized master. In Hegel's own words, "the universal becomes the

master and the particular the mastered.”⁴ By establishing an opposition between particular inclination and universal obligation, Kant’s morality and Jewish law threaten the unity of the personality, and consequently remain forms of alienation that must be negated if reconciliation is to be actualized. Christianity, by contrast, is the religion of “absolute reconciliation” in which opposition, intrapersonal as well as interpersonal, is resolved. This extraordinary revolution in Hegel’s thought grows out of his discovery of the importance of the phenomenon of love. In love, Hegel finds a principle that enables him to overcome a relatively unimaginative Kantianism and sets him on the course that eventually leads to his mature philosophical system. Hegel’s attention is directed to the problem of love by a friend from student days in Tübingen: Friedrich Hölderlin. Early in 1797, after writing “Die Positivität der christlichen Religion” but before writing “Der Geist des Christentums und sein Schicksal”, Hegel moved from Bern to Frankfurt, and became associated with the philosophical circle that had formed around Hölderlin. As Dieter Henrich has demonstrated in his provocative article “Hegel und Hölderlin”,⁵ this move proved decisive for the development of Hegel’s thought. A brief consideration of Hölderlin’s influence on Hegel will help us to understand more fully the significance of love in Hegel’s philosophy.

Hölderlin’s circle at Frankfurt was deeply involved in contemporary philosophical discussions. Hölderlin himself had returned recently from Jena, where he had heard the lectures in which Fichte was developing his *Wissenschaftslehre*.⁶ The ideas of Hölderlin that most deeply impressed Hegel during this formative period grew out of Hölderlin’s critique of Fichte. In the first significant work of post-Kantian idealism, Fichte attempts to overcome the bifurcation of subjectivity that persists throughout Kant’s critical philosophy. Combining and elaborating Kant’s analysis of the transcendental unity of apperception in the First Critique and his comments about the primacy of practical reason in the Second Critique, Fichte argues that in the process of self-actualization, the self, or subjectivity, posits objectivity, or the not-self. Selfhood involves the constant activity of self-objectification and negation of the self so objectified. Fichte believes that this interpretation of selfhood overcomes the separation of subject and object that had led to the agnosticism implied in Kant’s notion of the thing-in-itself, and makes knowledge possible. Rather than being an unknowable X, objectivity is nothing other than the objectification of subjectivity that is in the process of self-realization.

Hölderlin rejects Fichte's effort to mediate the oppositions engendered by Kant's philosophy. Subjectivity, Hölderlin insists, can never serve as the first principle of philosophical explanation, for it always presupposes objectivity from which it is differentiated and to which it is opposed. The subject-object split can be overcome only by pointing to the undifferentiated ground that is antecedent to all separation. Recalling Spinoza and anticipating Schelling, Hölderlin names this ground "being" (Sein), which he distinguishes from judgment (*Ur-Teilung* — meaning literally "original separation").

Judgment: is in the highest and strictest sense the original sundering of Subject and Object most intimately united in intellectual intuition, the very sundering which first makes Object and Subject possible, the *Ur-Teilung*. In the concept of division [*Teilung*] there lies already the concept of the reciprocal relation [*Beziehung*] of Object and Subject to one another, and the necessary presupposition of a whole of which Object and Subject are the parts.⁷

Since the self's original separation from pure being is the result of its own characteristic mental activity, Hölderlin maintains that the complete reunion of Sein and Dasein is impossible apart from the annihilation of concrete human existence. Selfhood always involves competing tendencies that strive toward reunion with and separation from the ground of being. These two propensities, however, need not lead to the type of inner conflict that Hölderlin and Hegel regard as inherent in the Kantian self. In keeping with the critique of Kant formulated by his patron, Schiller,⁸ Hölderlin argues that love is the means by which the contradictions of the self's striving are resolved. In Hölderlin's early philosophy and poetry, love effects the unification of the yearning for infinitude and involvement in finitude. In more general terms, love overcomes opposition and brings harmonious integration that preserves distinction. An early poem captures Hölderlin's belief in the salvific power of love.

Doch, wie immer das Jahr kalt und gesanglos ist
 Zur beschiedenen Zeit, aber aus weissem Feld
 Grüne Halme doch sprossen,
 Oft ein einsamer Vogel singt,
 Wenn sich mälig der Wald dehnet, der Strom sich regt,
 Schon die mildere Luft leise von Mittag weht
 Zur erlesenen Stunde,
 So ein Zeichen der schönern Zeit,

Die wir glauben, erwächst einziggenügsam noch,
Einzig edel und fromme über dem ehernen,
Wilden Boden die Liebe,
Gottes Tochter, von ihm allein.⁹

Love is the principle of unification that integrates the personality and reconciles self and other, or subject and object, by disclosing their common ground. When viewed in this way, Hölderlin believes love offers a more adequate synthesis of unresolved antinomies in the Kantian critical philosophy than Fichte had developed in his analysis of the genesis and structure of self-consciousness.

These remarks about the significance of love in Hölderlin's philosophy and poetry help us to understand changes in Hegel's position evident in his *Early Theological Writings*. We recall that in the opening essay of this collection, Hegel presents Jesus as a teacher of Kantian morality who proclaims obedience to the categorical imperative to be the most complete form of self-realization. In "Der Geist des Christentums und sein Schicksal", Hegel regards his earlier Kantianism as a form of Jewish legalism that exacerbates the inward distension of the personality, thereby rendering impossible integrated selfhood. Christianity, Hegel now insists, is not a religion of morality, but is "raised above morality."

Unmittelbar gegen Gesetze gekehrt zeigt sich dieser über Moralität erhabene Geist Jesu in der Bergpredigt, die ein an mehreren Beispielen von Gesetzen durchgeführter Versuch ist, den Gesetzen das Gesetzliche, die Form von Gesetzen zu benehmen, der nicht Achtung für dieselben predigt, sondern dasjenige aufzeigt, was sie erfüllt, aber als Gesetze aufhebt, und also etwas Höheres ist als der Gehorsam gegen dieselben und sie entbehrlich macht.¹⁰

Christianity advances beyond mere legalism by viewing human fulfillment in terms of love, rather than moral obedience. At this stage of his development, Hegel maintains that morality presupposes, and therefore cannot overcome, division within the self. More precisely, Kant convinced Hegel that ethical awareness grows out of the tension between universal moral obligation and particular or idiosyncratic inclination. Since duty necessarily entails a conflict between inclination and obligation, moral activity cannot accomplish the synthesis of universality and particularity toward which it seems to be directed. At best the moral agent can achieve self-mastery by subordinating one to another dimension of his personality. Hegel insists that in this situation, the self remains at war with itself: particularity set against universality, inclination

against obligation, desire against duty, passion against reason, self against self. In short, continued self-alienation rather than reconciliation results from moral striving.

Hegel argues that love overcomes such self-alienation and brings self-integration by reconciling inclination and obligation. For the lover, desire and duty do not oppose one another. The lover wants to fulfill his obligation to the beloved. Discussing love in an extended passage that discloses his early disaffection with Kant's argument, Hegel suggests:

... man kan dies mehr in sich Enthaltende eine Geneigtheit, so zu handeln, nennen, wie die Gesetze gebieten würden, Einigkeit der Neigung mit dem Gesetze, wodurch diese seine Form als Gesetz verliert; diese Übereinstimmung der Neigung ist das *πληρωμα* des Gesetzes, ein Sein, das, wie man sich sonst ausdrückte, das Komplement der Möglichkeit ist; den Möglichkeit ist das Objekt, als ein Gedachtes, das Allgemeine; Sein [ist] die Synthese des Subjekts und Objekts, in welcher Subjekt und Objekt ihre Entgegensetzung verloren haben; ebenso jene Geneigtheit, eine Tugend, ist eine Synthese, in der das Gesetz (das Kant darum immer ein objektives nennt) seine Allgemeinheit und ebenso das Subjekt seine Besonderheit, -- beide ihre Entgegensetzung verlieren; da [hingegen] in der Kantischen Tugend diese Entgegensetzung bleibt und das eine zum Herrschenden, das andere zum Beherrschenden, das andere zum Beherrschten wird ... Da aber hier in dem Komplement der Gesetze (und was damit zusammenhängt) Pflicht, moralische Gesinnung und dergleichen aufhört, Allgemeines, der Neigung [entgegengesetzt], und die Neigung aufhört, Besonderes, dem Gesetze entgegengesetzt zu sein, so ist jene Übereinstimmung Leben und, als Beziehung Verschiedener, Liebe, eine Sein, das als Begriff, Gesetz ausgedrückt notwendig dem Gesetze, d. h. sich selbst gleich, oder als Wirkliches, als Neigung, dem Begriffe entgegengesetzt, gleichfalls sich selbst, der Neigung, gleich ist.¹¹

It should be clear that in developing his critique of Kant, Hegel draws upon the notion of love elaborated by Hölderlin. For Hegel, as for Hölderlin, love is the principle of unification that harmoniously integrates the competing tendencies within the personality that Kant's philosophy leaves unresolved. Through love, the self reconciles itself to itself, and in so doing overcomes self-alienation. This insight does not, however, exhaust the significance of Hegel's early reflection upon love occasioned by his association with Hölderlin.

In the course of his consideration of love, Hegel makes another discovery that becomes determinative for his mature philosophical system. Love, Hegel believes, is inherently social. When the sociality of love is combined with the contention that love negates self-alienation and actualizes authentic selfhood, an important conclusion follows. The reconciliation of the self with itself arises through or is mediated by the reconciliation of self and other.

In our brief discussion of Fichte's and Hölderlin's responses to Kant's critical philosophy, we noted a dissatisfaction not only with Kant's apparent failure to come to terms with the inner conflict of the personality, but also with his inability to offer an adequate explanation of the relation between self and other, or between the domains of subjectivity and objectivity. While Fichte attempts to solve the persistent subject/object problem by deducing objectivity from the activity of subjectivity, Hölderlin seeks to reconcile subject and object by pointing to the undifferentiated ground of being that is prior to all separation. Hegel agrees that Kant has not given a satisfactory explanation of the relation between subjectivity and objectivity, but disagrees with the alternatives proposed by Fichte and Hölderlin. In an early fragment entitled "Die Liebe", Hegel suggests that further analysis of love offers a way out of the impasse of Kant and his critics.

... die Liebe die Reflexion in völliger Objektlosigkeit aufhebt, dem Entgegengesetzten allen Charakter eines Fremden raubt und das Leben sich selbst ohne weiteren Mangel findent. In der Liebe ist das Getrennte noch, aber nicht mehr als Getrenntes, [sondern] als Einiges, und das Lebendige fühlt das Lebendige.¹²

Jean Hyppolite clarifies Hegel's insight when he explains that in the *Early Theological Writings*, "Love is the miracle through which two become one without, however, completely suppressing the duality. Love goes beyond the categories of objectivity and makes the essence of life actually real by preserving difference within union."¹³

Through his analysis of love, Hegel discerns a form of unity that includes rather than excludes difference or distinction. In terms more characteristic of his later thought, lover and beloved form a differentiated unity or an integrated plurality in which self-identity is fully relational. Professor Stephen Crites points out that "Although lovers remain distinct from one another, they are no longer foreign to one another, no longer in opposition to one another, no longer mutually limiting as mere objects are."¹⁴ In love, selves overcome isolated indi-

viduality and abstract opposition, and maintain self-identity by virtue of relationship to each other. Borrowing the organic metaphor that had been revitalized by nineteenth century Romantics, Hegel suggests that "each separate lover is one organ in a living whole."¹⁵ The whole, of course, is nothing other than the relationship itself. The members, in this case the lovers, both sustain and are sustained by their relationship. Organs and organism, lovers and love, *relata* and relationship have no independent reality, but live only in and through each other. It is essential to understand this subtle argument in order to see Hegel's disagreement with thinkers such as Fichte and Hölderlin. Hegel's effort to reconcile self and other involves neither the attempt to deduce one from the other (as with Fichte) nor to join self and other by grounding both in an antecedent third (as with Hölderlin).¹⁶ Hegel insists that the source of unity between self and other is the internal relationship between the two. As Dieter Henrich points out:

Und dies ist nun Hegels eigentümlicher Gedanke: dass die *Relata* in der Entgegensetzung zwar aus einem Ganzen verstanden werden müssen, dass dieses Ganze ihnen aber nicht vorausgeht als Sein oder als intellektuale Anschauung, -- sondern dass es nur der entwickelte Begriff der Relation selber ist.¹⁷

The difficult point to understand in the complex analysis of the nature of relationship that grows out of Hegel's examination of love is that relationship is at once the source of unity and distinction. Self and other are joined in a substantial unity that simultaneously establishes their determinate distinction from one another. Love presupposes both the unity of and the difference between the lovers. When the purely dialectical character of this relationship is grasped, we begin to see how Hegel's analysis of love leads him to the conviction that self-reconciliation must be mediated by the reconciliation of self and other. From the lovers' perspective, genuine self-realization is impossible apart from the relationship to each other. The particular identity of the lover grows out of the association with the beloved. Self-identity and relation-to-other are not exclusive opposites, but in the final analysis, are inseparable. Lovers find themselves in each other, and in so doing, sublimate each other's otherness or foreign character. Relationship to each other is at the same time self-relation. This, for Hegel, is genuine freedom -- the abrogation of heteronomy and the achievement of autonomy.¹⁸ Since "love excludes all opposition, and neither restricts nor is restricted, it is not finite at all,"¹⁹ but is infinite. A unity that sustains

distinction, and distinction that generates unity. Twoness-in-oneness and oneness-in-twoness; identity-within-difference; the miracle of love.

At the beginning of our inquiry, I suggested that Hegel's early investigation of love led to the discovery of the logical and ontological structure upon which he builds his mature system. To those who understand Hegel as the bloodless philosopher of the Absolute, endlessly generating dialectical triads, that must have seemed an outrageous claim. A quotation from *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion* helps to clarify this important issue.

Denn die Liebe ist ein Unterscheiden zweier, die doch füreinander schlechthin nicht unterschieden sind. Das Gefühl und Bewusstsein dieser Identität ist die Liebe, dieses, ausser mir zu sein: ich habe mein Selbstbewusstsein nicht in mir, sondern im Anderen, aber dieses Andere, in dem nur ich befriedigt bin, meinen, Frieden mit mir habe -- und ich bin nur, idem ich Frieden in mir habe; habe ich diesen nicht, so bin ich der Widerspruch, der auseinandergeht --, dieses Andere, indem es ebenso ausser sich ist, hat sein Selbstbewusstsein nur in mir, und beide sind nur diese Bewusstsein ihres Aussersichsein und ihrer Identität. Dies Anschauen, dies Fühlen, dies Wissen der Einheit, -- das ist die Liebe.²⁰

When love is defined in this way, it becomes apparent that the structure of the love relation is homologous with what Hegel later calls "life" and finally identifies as "spirit". In the *Phänomenologie des Geistes* Hegel argues that

... der Geist ist das Wissen seiner selbst in seiner Entäusserung; das Wesen, das die Bewegung ist, in seinem Anderssein die Gleichheit mit sich selbst zu behalten.²¹

He clarifies this point when he explains that spirit is

... diese absolute Substanz, welche in der vollkommenen Freiheit und Selbstständigkeit ihres Gegensatzes, nämlich verschiedener für sich seiender Selbstbewusstsein[e], die Einheit derselben ist; *Ich*, das *Wir*, und *Wir*, das *Ich* ist.²²

Having emerged from his interpretation of love, Hegel's notion of spirit is, from the outset, fundamentally social. Selves reach completion in and through each other. As the self-differentiating totality that is the ground of being (Sein) for all determinate being (Dasein), spirit is divine. In the theological language Hegel is attempting to conceptualize, spirit is God, and God is love. If we invert the subject and predicate of the last clause, we recognize that for Hegel, love is divine. It is the power of reconciliation that overcomes estrangement by "harmonizing all things, even absolute opposition."²³ Self-realization comes

through love in which self is united with other by virtue of direct participation in the divine. Love simultaneously effects reconciliation of the self with itself, with the other, and with God. I John 4:16 aptly summarizes Hegel's conclusion. "God is love and anyone who lives in love lives in God, and God lives in him."

Discussing the family in *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, Hegel discloses the abiding influence of his early reflections on love. Love involves

Die Identifizierung der Persönlichkeiten, wodurch die Familie *eine Person* ist und die Glieder derselben Akzidenzen [sind] (die Substanz ist aber wesentlich das Verhältnis zu ihr selbst von Akzidenzen ...), ist der sittliche Geist...²⁴

Put differently:

Die Familie hat als die *unmittelbare Substantialität* des Geistes seine sich *empfindende* Einheit, die *Liebe*, zu ihrer Bestimmung, so dass die Gesinnung ist, das Selbstbewusstsein seiner Individualität *in dieser Einheit* als an und für sich seiender Wesentlichkeit zu haben, um in ihr nicht als eine Person für sich, sondern als *Mitglied* zu sein.²⁵

Words that could have been written only by a thoroughly domesticated philosopher.

Hegel's vision of authentic selfhood or realized spirit is fundamentally social. Therefore the self is actualized most completely in community with or in relation to other selves. With this notion of selfhood, love is essential and not accidental to self-realization. Moreover, since Hegel gives priority to God's immanence in rather than transcendence of the world, he makes no sharp distinction between religious devotion and involvement in ongoing social and natural processes. In terms of the present discussion, Hegel does not consistently differentiate faith and love. In the final analysis, he sees faith in God and love of other persons as virtually identical.

III.

Kierkegaard is highly critical of Hegel's view of the nature of love and of his interpretation of the relationship between love and faith. Throughout his extensive authorship and in his revealing Journals, Kierkegaard relentlessly probes the phenomenon of love in an effort to develop an alternative to the position proposed by Hegel.²⁶ Kierkegaard's analysis is both complicated and enriched by his extraordinary sensitivity to the significance of an individual's

Sitz-in-Leben, or to the importance of the relativity of perspective. He gives no single interpretation of love, or of anything else for that matter. Kierkegaard presents his works under the guise of various pseudonymous personae, each of whom represents a distinctive outlook on life. Amid the variety of viewpoints he explores, Kierkegaard discerns three fundamental forms of life, which he labels aesthetic, ethical, and religious existence. Love is interpreted differently from the perspective of each Lebenswelt. In light of the complexity and diversity of Kierkegaard's analysis of love, it will be helpful to focus our attention on the only single work in which he discusses all three forms of existence -- *Stadier paa Livets Vei*. In this book, Kierkegaard attempts to delineate the distinguishing features of aesthetic, ethical, and religious existence by exploring views of the nature and significance of love characteristic of each stage.

In the first part of *Stadier paa Livets Vei*, entitled "*In vino veritas*", pseudonym William Afham relates an account of a rather unruly banquet held late one summer evening in a forest retreat a few miles outside of Copenhagen. The banquet was attended by five Copenhagen gentlemen, four of whom appear elsewhere in the pseudonymous authorship. The evening centers around eating, drinking, and a discussion of love. Following the motto of the occasion, "*In vino veritas*", each participant, after having imbibed sufficient wine, is called upon to deliver a discourse on love. The speeches progress from a young man who concludes that love is indefinable and inexplicable through Constantine Constantius who urges that woman is merely a jest capable of offering endless amusement, Victor Eremita who, despite his name, takes delight in woman's ability to inspire men to great deeds, a Ladies' Tailor who insists that the essence of woman is her absorption in appearance or fashion, to Johannes, the celebrated seducer of the first volume of *Either-Or*, who summarizes most completely the aesthetic view of love. Before proceeding to Johannes' remarks, we should note that the banquet scene Kierkegaard describes is a parody of Plato's *Symposium* -- a drinking party centered around a discussion of love. In Kierkegaard's dialogue, Johannes plays the role Socrates had assumed for Plato.

As if to emphasize continuity with Plato's dialogue, Johannes begins his discussion of love with a variation of the mythic origin of the two sexes recounted by Aristophanes in the *Symposium*. Johannes suggests that "originally there was one sex, that of man."²⁷ The gods created man so perfectly, however,

that they gradually became envious of him, and "feared . . . that he might cause heaven itself to totter."²⁸ In an effort to counter this perceived threat, the council of the gods decided:

Fanges og tvinges maatte han da ved en Magt, der var svagere end hans egen og dog stærkere og stærk nok til at tvinge. Hvilken vidunderlig Magt maatte dette ikke være! Dog Nød lærer Guder selv at overgaae sig selv i Opfindsomhed. De søgte og grundede og fandt. Denne Magt var Qvinden, Skabningens Vidunder . . .²⁹

Woman, Johannes insists, is the enchantress, the temptress who holds man "captive in all the proximites of finitude."³⁰ But in every generation, there are a few men who recognize the trickery of the gods and refuse to be duped. These are the erotics or the seducers, who "dine constantly upon bait -- and are never caught."³¹ Satirizing the ethicist and summarizing the fundamental tenet of aesthetic existence, Johannes contends "there is a categorical imperative: Enjoy thyself."³² Whether through the naked sensual immediacy of a Don Juan or through the reflective plotting of a Johannes, the aesthete seeks enjoyment. From the aesthetic perspective, gratification is to be found in the novel, unusual, spontaneous situation. Johannes' account of the careful intrigue by which he seduces Cordelia testifies to his incessant quest for interesting erotic situations. To maximize pleasure, one must seek a plurality of erotic encounters, and must never allow oneself to become bound to a single relationship. For this reason, love can exist properly only outside marriage. "By means of marriage," Johannes maintains, "the Gods conquer."³³ By immersing one in triviality, domesticity smothers love. Kierkegaard hardly could have conceived a more graphic illustration of this point than his description of the boring, plodding, respectable relation between Eduard and Cordelia, and the interesting, titillating, secretive relation between Johannes and Cordelia elaborated in "Forførerens Dagbog".

To those familiar with the history of literature, it should be evident that Johannes' discussion of love shares much with and draws extensively from various elements of nineteenth century Romantic views of love that grew out of a protest against bourgeois society. In his Magister dissertation, *Om Begrebet Ironi*, Kierkegaard points out that

. . . den hele romantiske Skole traadte eller troede at træde i Forhold til en Tid, i hvilken Menneskene vare aldeles ligesom forstenede i de endelige sociale Forhold . . . Alt skete paa Klokkeslet. Man sværmede i Naturen St. Hansdag, man var sønderknuset store Bededag, man forliebede sig, naar

man fyldte sit 20de Aar, man gik i Seng Klokken 10. Man giftede sig, man levede for Huuslighed og for sin Stilling i Staten . . .³⁴

The form of existence represented by Johannes first appears in Kierkegaard's analysis of Friedrich Schlegel's novel, *Lucinde*.³⁵

Having concluded the banquet with Johannes' speech, the five gentlemen begin the return trip to Copenhagen. On their way home, several of the party-goers happen upon a modest country cottage inhabited by "a happy pair, too much absorbed in domestic pleasures . . . to believe themselves the object of anyone's attention."³⁶ The couple is none other than Judge William and his devoted wife.

Judge William, the primary spokesman for Kierkegaard's ethical stage, represents everything Johannes rejects and all for which Kierkegaard himself longs, but never can realize. Human fulfillment, for the Judge, lies in the bourgeois existence of faithful family life and responsible civic conduct. In opposition to the aesthetic and religious perspectives, Judge William insists that love comes to complete expression only in the marital relationship. Marriage involves a resolution of the will in which the partners assume moral responsibility for their relation. For married persons, love no longer is subject to the unpredictability of desire, but assumes constancy and continuity throughout temporal duration.³⁷ In one of his less prosaic moments, the Judge comments:

Saaledes er Ægteskabet. Det er guddommeligt, thi Forelskelsen er Vidunderet; det er verdsligt, thi Forelskelsen er Naturens dybeste Mythe. Forelskelsen er den uudgrundelige Grund, som er skjult i det Dunkle, men Beslutningen er Seiervinderen, der liig Orpheus henter Forelskelsen for Dagen; thi Beslutningen er Forelskelsens sande Form, den sande Forklaring, derfor er Ægteskabet helligt og velsignet af Gud.³⁸

To Johannes who finds moral commitment and love antithetical, William responds that duty is not love's foe, but "comes as an old friend, an intimate, a confidant whom the lovers mutually recognize in the deepest secret of their love."³⁹ In agreement with Hegel, the Judge sees love as a synthesis of inclination and obligation. Through the resolute decision involved in fulfillment of duty, first love attains its fondest desire by preserving itself in the face of inevitable fluctuation. Though not preoccupied with erotic gratification, marriage does not exclude sensual pleasure. To the contrary, the Judge is convinced that the enjoyment Johannes seeks is more fully present in a healthy marriage

than in a multiplicity of passing affairs. The ethicist is able to establish an “equilibrium between the aesthetic and the ethical in the composition of the personality.”⁴⁰

Judge William goes so far as to assert that marriage is “the highest *telos* of individual human existence.”⁴¹ In marriage, two persons assume concrete historical identities by virtue of a relation that is established and maintained by their free decisions. In words that echo Hegel, William acknowledges:

Hvad jeg er ved hende, det er hun ved mig, og Ingen af os er Noget ved sig selv, men ere det i Foreningen.⁴²

Since the ethicist regards selfhood as inherently social, self-realization presupposes relationship to another person. From this perspective, marital love is the most complete form of human interrelation, and therefore is the fullest actualization of selfhood.

A final factor must be added to complete our picture of the ethical view of love. Judge William maintains that “in the resolution the lover would put himself in relationship with God through the universal.”⁴³ By means of love, one is related not only to another person, but also to God. The ethicist apprehends moral responsibility as divinely ordained, and thus sees religious practice and ethical activity as essentially identical. At the ethical stage of existence, love simultaneously effects reconciliation of the self with itself, with the other, and with God. In other words, Kierkegaard’s ethical form of existence bears a remarkable similarity to important features of the Hegelian notion of selfhood.⁴⁴ Kierkegaard regards the bourgeois life described in his discussion of the ethical stage as the existential correlate of Hegelian philosophy. The self is thoroughly finitized by reconciliation with existing social structures, and existence loses its decisiveness. In a late Journal entry, Kierkegaard at once offers a scathing critique of the form of life epitomized by Judge William and indicates the consequences of tendencies we have seen to be implicit in Hegelian philosophy.

The hearty twaddle of family life constitutes the worst danger for Christianity, and not wild lusts, debauchery, terrible passions and the like. They are not so opposed to Christianity as this flat mediocrity, this stuffy reek, this nearness to one another . . . There is no greater distance from obedience to the either—or than this flat, hearty family twaddle.⁴⁵

Since the ethicist believes that love establishes a harmonious equilibrium among aesthetic, ethical, and religious dimensions of experience, it is virtually

impossible for him to admit a conflict between ethical and religious demands upon the self.⁴⁶ Kierkegaard's analysis of the religious form of existence in the third part of *Stadier paa Livets Vei* focuses on an individual in the throes of a personal crisis precipitated by his perception of precisely such a conflict between ethical and religious obligation. In the most painfully autobiographical work of his pseudonymous authorship, Kierkegaard's differences from Hegel become altogether apparent, and the distinctive features of his view of love and selfhood emerge clearly. As always, the form of the work is important. It is a diary entitled "'Skyldig?/Ikke-Skyldig?' En Lidelseshistorie." By using the diary form, Kierkegaard offers a contrast to Johannes' aesthetic *Forførerens Dagbog*⁴⁷ and explores the existential dilemma created by the apparent contradiction between ethical and religious responsibility through the eyes of a person in the crisis situation, rather than from an outside perspective as Johannes de silentio does in *Frygt og Bæven*. The title of the diary alludes to the Biblical narrative of Christ's passion. This diary, Frater Taciturnus⁴⁸ tells us, was found during an expedition to the isolated, overgrown lake near Søborg Castle, where "the border conflict is carried on day and night between the lake and the mainland."⁴⁹ As Abraham journeying to Moriah to sacrifice Isaac, Quidam, the young man of the diary, lies suspended over Kierkegaard's famous "70,000 fathoms," on the boundary between the secure mainland of ethical life and the dreadful silence and isolation of faithful existence. For Quidam, faith in God and love of other persons are not identical, but are distinguished in such a way that a conflict between them not only is possible, but becomes actual.

The problem with which Quidam wrestles throughout the diary is whether or not his belief in his religious calling justifies the breaking of his engagement to his beloved and the renunciation of marriage and family life. This dilemma, of course, is the one that Kierkegaard faced in his relation to Regina. From the ethical point of view, authentic selfhood is a function of the interrelation of selves consummated in marital love. To the ethicist, love of another person assumes religious proportions. The faithful individual, however, sees this as a divinization of social relations that spells the death of religious belief and practice. Criticizing both Hegelian philosophers and ethical existence, Johannes de silentio argues that

Det Ethiske er det Almene, og som saadant igjen det Guddommelige. Man har derfor Ret i at sige, at enhver Pligt i Grunden er Pligt mod Gud; men kan man ikke sige mere, da siger man tillige, at jeg egentlig ingen Pligt har

mod Gud. Pligten bliver Pligt ved at henføres til Gud, men i Pligten selv træder jeg ikke i Forhold til Gud. Der er saaledes Pligt at elske sin Næste. Det er Pligt derved, at det henføres til Gud, men i Pligten træder jeg ikke i Forhold til Gud, men til den Næste, jeg elsker. Siger jeg da i denne Forbindelse, at det er min Pligt at elske Gud, da siger jeg egentlig kun en Tautologi, forsaavidt 'Gud' her tages i en aldeles abstrakt Forstand som det Guddommelige: det Almene: Pligten. Menneskeslægtens hele Tilværelse afrunder sig da fuldkommen kugleformet i sig selv, og det Ethiske er paa eengang det Begrænsende og det Udfyldende. Gud bliver et usynligt, forsvindende Punkt, en afmægtig Tanke, hans Magt er kun i det Ethiske, der udfylder Tilværelsen.⁵⁰

At the religious stage of existence, obligation to God and love of neighbor remain distinct. Consequently human fulfillment does not come simply by means of association with other selves, but arises as the result of the faithful relation between an individual and the transcendent God. The knight of faith constantly stands ready to resign his relation to his beloved in obedience to the higher *telos* toward which his life is directed. As Kierkegaard puts it in his Journal:

Christianity does not join men together -- no, it separates them -- in order to unite every single individual with God. And when a person has become such that he can belong to God, he has died away from that which joins men.⁵¹

Since the divine and the human, the infinite and the finite, are qualitatively different, ethical and religious obligation are distinguishable, and in principle can come into conflict. Love is not faith. As God transcends the world, so faith surpasses love. The contradiction between duty to God and to another person Kierkegaard labels "en teleologisk Suspension af det Ethiske."⁵² If confusion is to be avoided, it is essential to recognize that the religious stage sublates (*ophæve*), and does not annihilate the aesthetic and ethical stages. As a result of the dialectical relationship among the stages of existence, Kierkegaard insists that faith in God relativizes, but does not negate love of other selves. Faith is a paradox that requires the simultaneous maintenance of an absolute resolution to the absolute, and a relative relation to the relative. In other words, the faithful person sustains the tension between absolute devotion to God and relative commitment to other selves. This tension generates Abraham's fear and trembling, as well as Kierkegaard's and Quidam's passion. Kierkegaard goes

on to suggest that while the faithful person understands himself to remain morally bound, religious obligation can transform his relation to other persons into what from the ethical point of view appears to be immoral. Johannes de silentio explains that if the duty to God is absolute,

... saa er det Ethiske nedsat til det Relative. Heraf følger dog ikke, at dette skal tilintetgjøres, men det faaer et ganske andet Udtryk, det paradoxe Udtryk, saaledes at f. Ex. Kjærlighed til Gud kan bringe Troens Ridder til at give sin Kjærlighed til Næste det modsatte Udtryk af hvad der ethisk talt er Pligt.⁵³

Although the religious stage preserves the love central to ethical existence, this form of love is not uniquely religious. To discover the love characteristic of religious life, we must move beyond Kierkegaard's pseudonymous authorship to his book entitled *Works of Love (Kjerlighedens Gjerninger)*.⁵⁴ Despite the complexity of Kierkegaard's argument, its essential features can be grasped readily by noting certain terminological distinctions. For the Christian form of love, Kierkegaard uses the word "Kærlighed", from which he distinguishes "forkærlighed" and "elskov". "Forkærlighed" means partiality, and "elskov" refers primarily to erotic love. In the final analysis, both "forkærlighed" and "elskov" are variations of self-love. Taken together they denote approximately what Anders Nygren calls "eros".⁵⁵ The love typical of aesthetic and ethical existence is erotic in the sense of being determined by particular qualities in the beloved and self-fulfilling for the lover. "Kærlighed", by contrast, is close to Nygren's "agape". It is altogether gratuitous, totally impartial, undetermined by the character of the beloved, and unessential to the self-realization of the lover. Having recognized the fundamental features of "Kærlighed", the religious person maintains that any form of love essential to one's self-completion (as is the case in Hegel's interpretation of love) is not love of the other person, but really is self-love. In Nygren's terms, Kierkegaard would insist that Hegel never advances from "eros" to "agape". Only if the self is complete apart from the love relation can self-love be overcome and genuine love be reached. Against the ethicist, the faithful individual contends that one's relation to God is not identical with or mediated by his relation to other persons. Quite the opposite, the God relation is the basis of a proper relation to other selves. In traditional Lutheran terms, Kierkegaard can argue that faith makes love possible.

Kierkegaard's vision of authentic selfhood or realized spirit is fundamentally

non-social. The self is actualized most completely in isolation from other selves and in relation to a transcendent God. Transcendence of God and independence of self are inseparable. This notion of selfhood and of the self's relation to God precludes the possibility of confusing religious devotion with involvement in ongoing social and natural processes. Kierkegaard consistently differentiates faith and love. The loss of the distinction between faith and love, Kierkegaard believes, vitiates faith and renders impossible genuine love of other selves.

IV.

Perhaps we can summarize the dialogue between Hegel and Kierkegaard that we have been exploring by posing two questions: If the relation to other is essential and not accidental, then is the other other? If the other is other, then is the relation to other accidental and not essential? From the perspective of Hegel's philosophical system, Kierkegaard's notion of individual selfhood appears self-contradictory. In the *Phänomenologie*, Hegel argues that being-for-self necessarily entails being-for-other. That which "is equal to itself and is for itself is such only in its absolute difference from every other. And this difference implies a relation with other things, a relation which is the cessation of its being-for-itself."⁵⁶ In Hegel's own words, something

... ist gesetzt als *Fürsichsein* oder als absolute Negation alles Anderssein, daher absolute, nur sich auf sich beziehende Negation; aber die sich auf sich beziehende Negation ist Aufheben *seiner selbst* oder [dies,] sein Wesen in einem Anderen zu haben.⁵⁷

Individuality cannot be defined apart from its relation to otherness. By this very fact, otherness ceases to be merely other and becomes constitutive of the individual's identity.

Durch den *absoluten Charakter* gerade und seine Entgegensetzung *verhält* es sich zu *anderen* und ist wesentlich nur dies Verhalten; das Verhältnis aber ist die Negation seiner Selbständigkeit, und das Ding geht vielmehr durch seine wesentliche Eigenschaft zugrunde.⁵⁸

Relations between self and other are internal, mutually defining. Individuality comes to expression only through a relationship with otherness. Hegel concludes that the self

... ist vielmehr *in einer und derselben Rücksicht das Gegenteil seiner selbst: für sich, insofern er für Anderes, und für Anderes, insofern er für sich ist.*

Er ist *für sich*, in sich reflektiert, Eins; aber dies *für sich*, in sich reflektiert, Eins-Sein ist mit seinem Gegenteile, *dem Sein für ein Anderes*, in einer Einheit und darum nur als Aufgehobenes gesetzt; oder dies *Fürsichsein* ist ebenso *unwesentlich* als dasjenige, was allein das Unwesentliche sein sollte, nämlich das Verhältnis zu Anderem.⁵⁹

Put more simply, for Hegel selfhood or spirit is inherently social. He insists that this fact is established even in the effort to negate it. Therefore any perspective that views human fulfillment in terms of isolation from, instead of community with other selves leads to self-alienation and not to self-realization. Hegel believes that if the social character of human existence is acknowledged, love becomes essential rather than accidental to authentic selfhood. Within Hegel's system, the form of human spirit requires love for its completion. Hegel asks Kierkegaard: If other is other, then is the relation to other accidental and not essential?

Throughout his work, Kierkegaard tries to reestablish distinctions he thinks Hegel obscures: God and man, infinite and finite, self and other, faith and love. Most importantly Kierkegaard believes that Hegel's system negates unique individuality by abolishing the clear boundaries separating self and other. Distinction is absorbed by a more essential identity. In *Sygdommen Til Døden*, Kierkegaard explains:

Hvor er da her Forargelsens Mulighed? Den er, at et Menneske skulde have den Realitet: som enkelt Menneske at være til lige over for Gud, og altsaa igjen, hvad deraf følger, at Menneskets Synd skulde beskjæftige Gud. Dette om det enkelte Menneske -- for Gud faaer Speculationen aldrig i sit Hoved; den universaliserer blot de enkelte Mennesker phantastisk i Slægten.⁶⁰

In opposition to Hegel's "phenomenology of spirit", Kierkegaard develops an existential dialectic marked by the increasing differentiation of self and other that culminates in an isolated individual whose identity is established by virtue of difference from other selves and the wholly other God. Contrary to the sociality of selfhood characteristic of Hegelian philosophy, the religious person recognizes that

The criterion of a man is: how long or how far can he endure being alone without the understanding of others. The person who in the decisions of eternity can endure being alone for a whole lifetime is poles apart from the infant, from the social mixer, which are the animal definition of what it is to be human.⁶¹

Kierkegaard maintains that this understanding of the nature of selfhood and of the self's relation to God opens the possibility of a proper interpretation of love. Though closely related, faith and love are not identical. The faithful relation to God is the basis of a loving relation to other selves. For Kierkegaard, Hegel's notion of love remains erotic. Relation to other is not really relation to other, but is self-relation directed to self-realization. Kierkegaard asks Hegel: If relation to other is essential and not accidental, then is other other?

In his suggestive book, *The Spirit and the Forms of Love*, the late process theologian, Daniel Day Williams, asks "What light does our understanding of love throw upon what it means to be?"⁶² Our examination of "Love and Forms of Spirit" in the writings of Kierkegaard and Hegel has disclosed the intimate connection between love and ontology. The interpretations of love offered by Kierkegaard and Hegel are inseparable from their conceptions of human spirit or selfhood. Conversely, they both propose a close relation between love and realized spirit or authentic selfhood. The exploration of the alternative views of love developed by Kierkegaard deepens our understanding of the phenomenon of love and enables us to grasp more firmly the complex relationship between these two important thinkers.

NOTES

- * I would like to thank the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst for a grant that enabled me to conduct research for this article.
- 1 Anders Nygren, *Agape and Eros*, trans. P. S. Watson (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1953).
- 2 For an elaboration of this point, see Stephen Crites, *In the Twilight of Christendom: Hegel vs. Kierkegaard on Faith and History* (Chambersburg, Pa.: American Academy of Religion, 1972), pp. 4 ff. I have benefited greatly from repeated discussions with Professor Crites about issues examined in this paper. The other work I have found most helpful is Professor Niels Thulstrup's detailed study entitled *Kierkegaards Forhold til Hegel* (København, 1967).
- 3 See: Dieter Henrich, "Some Historical Presuppositions of Hegel's System", *Hegel and the Philosophy of Religion*, ed., D. E. Christensen (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), pp. 33 ff.
- 4 G. W. F. Hegel, *Werke in zwanzig Bänden* (Frankfort, 1971), vol. 1, p. 326. Hereafter, cited G. W., followed by volume and page numbers. *On Christianity: Early Theological Writings*, trans. T. M. Knox (New York: Harper and Row, 1961), p. 214. Hereafter cited E. T. W., followed by page number.
- 5 Dieter Henrich, "Hegel und Hölderlin", *Hegel im Kontext* (Frankfort, 1967), pp. 9-40. I have drawn the main points of this part of the discussion from this essay, and from Henrich's elaboration of his argument in: "Hölderlin über Urteil und Sein", *Hölderlinjarbuch*, 1965-66, pp. 73-96; and *Between Kant and Hegel: Post-Kantian Idealism - An Analysis*

- of its Origins, Systematic Structures and Problems, unpublished lectures delivered at Harvard University in the spring of 1973.
- 6 Fichte, *Science of Knowledge*, trans. Heath and Lachs (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970).
 - 7 "Über Urtheil und Sein", in H. S. Harris, *Hegel's Development Toward the Sunlight* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), p. 516.
 - 8 See: Schiller's *Theosophie des Julius*.
 - 9 Friedrich Hölderlin, *Poems and Fragments*, trans. M. Hamburger (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1966), p. 144.
 - 10 G. W., 1, 324. E. T. W., 212.
 - 11 *Ibid.*, pp. 326–7. E. T. W., 214–15.
 - 12 *Ibid.*, p. 246. E. T. W., 305. It is important to note that in this text, Hegel indicates that love cannot be grasped properly through rational reflection. He makes this point frequently in the *Frühe Schriften*. As will become apparent in what follows, Hegel modifies his position on this issue considerably in his mature system.
 - 13 Jean Hyppolite, *Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. S. Cherniak and J. Heckman (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), p. 164.
 - 14 Stephen Crites, *The Problem of the "Positivity" of the Gospel in the Hegelian Dialectic of Alienation and Reconciliation*, unpublished doctoral dissertation, Yale University, 1961, p. 30.
 - 15 G. W., 1, 249. E. T. W., 308.
 - 16 Henrich argues persuasively ("Hegel und Hölderlin", pp. 12 ff.) that many of the characteristic features of Hegel's notion of the Absolute are developed in his critique of Hölderlin's early philosophical speculation, rather than in his criticism of Schelling's *System des Transcendentalen Idealismus*, as usually is assumed.
 - 17 Henrich, *Hegel im Kontext*, *op. cit.*, p. 36.
 - 18 See: G. W., 17, 204. *Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, trans. E. B. Spiers and J. B. Sanderson (New York: Humanities Press, 1968), vol. II, p. 346.
 - 19 G. W., 1, 246. E. T. W., 304.
 - 20 G. W., 17, 221–222. *Philosophy of Religion*, III, pp. 10–11.
 - 21 G. W., 3, 552. *The Phenomenology of Mind*, trans. J. B. Baillie (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967), p. 758.
 - 22 *Ibid.*, p. 145. *Phenomenology*, p. 227.
 - 23 G. W., 17, 300. *Philosophy of Religion*, III, 102.
 - 24 G. W., 7, 313–314. *Philosophy of Right*, trans. T. M. Knox (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 112.
 - 25 *Ibid.*, 307. *Philosophy of Right*, 110.
 - 26 The emphasis on the philosophical and theological dimensions of love should not minimize the importance of Kierkegaard's personal experiences for his reflections on this issue.
 - 27 Søren Kierkegaard's *Samlede Værker*, eds. A. B. Drachmann, J. L. Heiberg, and H. O. Lange (København, 1901 ff.), vol. VI, p. 73. Hereafter cited S. V., followed by volume and page numbers. *Stages on Life's Way*, trans. Walter Lowrie (New York: Schocken Books, 1967), p. 83.
 - 28 *Ibid.*, p. 73. *Stages*, 83.
 - 29 *Ibid.*, p. 73. *Stages*, 83.
 - 30 *Ibid.*, p. 74. *Stages*, 84.
 - 31 *Ibid.*, p. 74. *Stages*, 84.
 - 32 *Ibid.*, p. 71. *Stages*, 81.
 - 33 *Ibid.*, p. 77. *Stages*, 87.
 - 34 S. V., XIII, 371–2. *The Concept of Irony*, trans. L. Capel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965), p. 318.
 - 35 *Ibid.*, pp. 357 ff. *Irony*, 302 ff.

- 36 S. V., VI, 80. *Stages*, 90.
- 37 For further discussion of these points, see: S. V., VI, 98 ff. and S. V., II, 90 ff.
- 38 S. V., VI, 113. *Stages*, 121.
- 39 S. V., II, 132. *Either-Or*, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 149.
- 40 Of course, this is the title of the Judge's second essay in *Enten-Eller*.
- 41 S. V., VI, 98. *Stages*, 107.
- 42 *Ibid.*, p. 91. *Stages*, 101.
- 43 *Ibid.*, p. 156. *Stages*, 161.
- 44 This is not to suggest that the ethical stage is identical with Hegel's position. It differs in many significant ways. Most importantly, the ethicist emphasizes the importance of free decision more strongly than Hegelian philosophy. For an elaboration of this point, see my discussion in *Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Authorship: A Study of Time and the Self* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 185 ff.
- 45 *The Last Years: Journals 1853-1855*, trans. R. G. Smith (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 265. *Søren Kierkegaard's Papirer*, eds. P. A. Heiberg, V. Kuhr, E. Torsting (København, 1909 ff.), XI² A 152.
- 46 Both in *Enten-Eller* (S. V., II, 216 ff.), and in *Stadier paa Livets Vei* (S. V., VI, 161 ff.) Judge William considers the problem of a justifiable exception to moral obligation. While his response to this possibility is largely negative in *Enten-Eller*, in *Stadier paa Livets Vei*, the Judge outlines the necessary conditions that would have to be met by such an exception. The young man whose diary forms the last part of the book falls within the strictures identified by the Judge.
- 47 It is important to note that while from an outward perspective, the lives of Johannes and Quidam seem quite similar, inwardly they are at odds with each other.
- 48 This name (as Johannes de silentio) suggests the importance of the theme of silence at the religious stage.
- 49 S. V., VI, 178. *Stages*, 182.
- 50 S. V., III, 117. *Fear and Trembling*, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 78.
- 51 *Papirer*, XI¹ A 96. *Søren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers*, trans. Hong and Hong (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1970), no. 2052.
- 52 See: S. V., III, 104 ff. *Fear and Trembling*, 64 ff.
- 53 *Ibid.*, 119. *Fear and Trembling*, 80.
- 54 See: S. V., IX. *Works of Love*, trans. Hong and Hong (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1962).
- 55 Nygren, *op. cit.*
- 56 Hyppolite, *op. cit.*, p. 116.
- 57 G. W., 3, 103. *Phenomenology*, 174.
- 58 *Ibid.*, 103. *Phenomenology*, 174.
- 59 *Ibid.*, 104. *Phenomenology*, 175. Although Hegel is discussing objects in this text, it should be clear that his remarks are equally applicable to selves.
- 60 S. V., XI, 195. *The Sickness Unto Death*, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 214.
- 61 *Papirer*, XI¹ A 384. *Journals and Papers*, no. 2067.
- 62 Daniel Day Williams, *The Spirit and the Forms of Love* (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 111.