"Melancholy" and "Religious Melancholy" in Kierkegaard

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In Kierkegaard's religious psychology, four moods predominate in the analysis of the human heart seeking peace and of the spirit seeking fulfillment in a restored God-relationship. Our concern here will be to discuss facets of one of those moods, viz. melancholy (the others being irony, anxiety, and despair). Of the four moods, one notes that melancholy is the sole in Kierkegaard's authorship which does not have a treatise explicitly devoted to it. There are The Concept of Irony, The Concept of Anxiety (Dread), and The Sickness Unto Death to deal with irony, anxiety, and despair respectively. But there exists no formal treatise on melancholy. However, melancholy is a major theme and category throughout most of what may be termed Kierkegaard's earlier authorship in which he engages aesthetic categories. The later pseudonym Johannes Climacus states that the first part of Either/Or has melancholy [Tungsind] as its essential character. On the basis of this, one might make an analysis of Either/Or's treatment of melancholy and possibly even reach the conclusion that indeed this is the "missing treatise".

To do that in these pages, however, would be too lengthy a task. But since Kierkegaard tends to reorchestrate and develop themes in later works, in the instance of melancholy as well we shall be able to locate a restatement and even clearer analysis of the two types of melancholy with which we here propose to concern ourselves. Two types of melancholy! Yes, that is the point we intend to argue Kierkegaard makes very clearly in Repetition (1843) and Stages On Life's Way (1845), particularly in "Guilty?/Not Guilty?" in this latter. The two types of melancholy, which for lack of adequate translation we leave in their Danish forms Melancholi and Tungsind, also appear in Either/Or. But there the analysis is more complicated, and a disentangling of the two terms requires structural as well as contextual analysis of the work. In Repetition and Stages, there is no danger of confusion. For the former employs the term
Melancholi and the latter the term Tungsind almost exclusively. What clearer ground then to explore similarities and differences. In these works there is not the temptation to think that Kierkegaard was merely alternating between the two possibilities of expression which the Danish language provides. Indeed he loved his language and excels all others in its use, but he allows its richness of vocabulary to express fine distinctions of ideas — a fact which the Lowrie translations of Kierkegaard, for all their merits, sometimes fail to convey. German is more fortunate than English in having two terms as well, Melancholie and Schwermut, to correspond to the Danish. In English, as in French, we have the single term "melancholy" and unfortunately this is all the present translations of Kierkegaard give us.

The autobiographical content of so many of Kierkegaard's works, and especially the works with which we shall be here concerned, is too obvious to ignore. Kierkegaard was himself a melancholy man and knew this mood intimately, as he did the others. Moreover, his father also suffered from this malady. Kierkegaard even adds that melancholy is the problem of the age. In saying this, however, he speaks of his own age and historical context and in this instance is not the contemporary he seems to us in The Present Age. For Kierkegaard's times were those of the early Romantics. Melancholy, and irony as well, were important categories for the Romantic poets. And it is the excesses of the Romantics, or aesthetes, which he so roundly criticizes. In the analysis of both melancholy and irony, Kierkegaard affirms that the Romantics represent a spiritual rejuvenation, but that in their enthusiasm they give the stuffy and stultified human spirit (represented by Classicism) too strong a youth potion and take it not back to spiritual youth but rather to spiritual infancy. Serving here too as a corrective, Kierkegaard hoped to affirm the significance of melancholy and irony but to give a more probing analysis of them, by way of providing a greater perspective for understanding the movement underway within the human spirit. Thus the religious, and eventually the Christian religious, provides the perspective for understanding the meaning of the turbulence in the human spirit and the sole direction in which this turbulence is to be channelled by the will in order for a resolution to come about.

In the case of melancholy then, Kierkegaard sees a Romantic and a religious type. Melancholi is essentially the melancholy of the Romantics, of poets, and of young men. Tungsind is fundamentally the same longing, sensitivity and suffering, but a higher level. It is reflective, even brooding, and reaching a crisis
point demanding resolution. And none of Kierkegaard's pseudonyms hesitates to add that the sole solution lies in the religious.

Kierkegaard himself knew both Melancholi and Tungsind. The story of Repetition and of Quidam's Diary in "Guilty?/Not Guilty?" clearly parallels in part Kierkegaard's own engagement to Regine Olsen and may indeed contain the secret, strange reason which terminated the affair. But that is not the point of our examination here. We mention it only by way of emphasizing it as a danger into which all too many have fallen, viz. of treating the early works more for their autobiographical content about an admittedly fascinating Romantic character himself than for the ideas and analyses contained therein. Yes, Kierkegaard was melancholy and reserved, and perhaps in part he wanted his authorship to communicate his true feelings and sufferings. But whatever his hopes of regaining Regine Olsen and whatever moral scruples he let torment him for a broken engagement, he emphatically intended his works to go beyond his own personal circumstances to more decisive issues. Events in his own life provide the inspiration for many of the works, but Kierkegaard always moves away from the personal level to suggest the universal individual situation. This is the challenge of his analyses which the victims of biographical distraction have apparently missed.

The Terms MELANCHOLI and TUNGSIND.

Scrutinizing terms is highly appropriate in the case of so self-conscious a stylist as Kierkegaard. He begins with normal usage but like so many philosophers he often makes unmistakable departures from that usage by adding new meaning. This is certainly the case with the terms for melancholy. In Danish, the two terms are not identical but yet are often used interchangeably in colloquial speech. Yet if one tries to pindown the meaning of each term, one can at minimum find native speakers in agreement that there is after all some difference between them and, furthermore, that Tungsind represents a higher degree of the same basic mood. This then is the base Kierkegaard builds on and expands.

In addition, Kierkegaard also plays upon the images contained in the terms. Melancholi is of course the same opaque term from medieval medicine which we have also in English and which literally means "black bile". Tungsind however is a transparent term in Danish. It means literally "heavy mind" or
"heavy spirit" (*Tung-sind*). Were we to attempt to fashion a new term in English to correspond to it, we would perhaps suggest "heavy spiritedness". But rather than succumb to a clumsy neologism, we here propose to maintain the Danish terms in our discussion. As an adjective, the form *tungsindig* means not only "melancholy" or "melancholic" but also "gloomy" and "brooding". In each term, Kierkegaard is conscious of the image and plays upon it, viz. blackness and heaviness respectively. (This is most clearly done in *Either/Or* in the instance of *Melancholi*.)

May not some critic at this point object that we have become overly sensitive to language and that Kierkegaard himself was merely using the stylistic alternation provided by Danish? The reply to this has two parts. The first is a simple rule-of-thumb. That is, when there are in Danish both a Danish-root word and a foreign loan word for the same general concept, in Kierkegaard's usage the Danish-root word often acquires a special meaning. This is brought out by Lowrie's translation of *Existents* and *Tilværelse* in the *Postscript*, for example, and not to make the distinction would hopelessly confuse the work. Having invoked the rule-of-thumb, we shall now set out to prove its validity in the case of *Melancholi* and *Tungsind*. We therefore propose, in the second part of our reply to the possible criticism, to demonstrate the clear differences between the two terms in *Repetition* and "Guilty?/Not Guilty?".

*Repition* and "Guilty?/Not Guilty?". *Repetition* and "Guilty?/Not Guilty?" are parallel writings and self-consciously so. Moreover, their similarities serve to create a backdrop which highlights their differences.

Both works are pseudonymous, but more than that. In each work the pseudonym at first claims that the love story to be told is that of another, of a young man in *Repetition* and of Quidam in "Guilty?/Not Guilty?". But at the end of each work the pseudonym acknowledges that the fiancé of each work is but a poetical creation of the respective author.

Both works deal with the melancholy of a young man engaged to a younger woman. And both are concerned with the surprising phenomenon that melancholy endures in spite of the fact that each man is truly in love and that indeed melancholy seems only to be aggravated by the love. Quite deliberately each
pseudonym contrasts the phenomenon of an enduring and increasing melancholy to the dictum that falling in love will cure a young man's melancholy. And in contradicting the dictum each poses the more important question of the real nature of melancholy.

Both works entertain the moral scruple of possible guilt towards the young woman in the termination of each relationship. In Repetition, this question is raised toward the end of the work. In “Guilty?/Not Guilty?”, where the theme of the moralistic self-tormentor is explicit, the question is engaged throughout. But the question of guilt is extended further to asking whether such a melancholy man did not take on guilt in forming such a relationship to begin with, thus suggesting that not only does love not cure melancholy but that a melancholy man either transcends human love by force of melancholy or else must solve the problem of melancholy before being able to commit himself to the ethical responsibilities of married love. Kierkegaard's own conduct and that of the characters here would suggest the former possibility, while the character of Judge William in Part Two of Either/Or suggests the latter also as a genuine possibility.

Both works posit a religious element involved in the suffering longing of melancholy and suggest that this religious element takes the young lover in fact beyond the beloved. In Repetition, we are confronted with a young man who has moved beyond his beloved due to his melancholy but is only gradually becoming conscious of the fact. In “Guilty?/Not Guilty?”, we have a man who has consciously transcended her and who knows why, and even tries to awaken her religious nature in one last desperate effort at saving the engagement, as if she too might somehow transcend and join him at some new level. But because she does not and perhaps cannot, the solitary nature of the individual's religious life is underscored the more.

The parallels and similarities are many, but here they end. For while both deal with the problem of melancholy, each deals with a decisively different phase of it. In Repetition, the religious is awakening, according to the analysis of the pseudonym Constantine Constantius, and while eventually the young man is drifting towards Tungsind, his problem in the main is Melancholi."Guilty?/Not Guilty?" deals with an advanced case of melancholy, termed constantly Tungsind, in which the reflective, self-conscious character and religious element are explicit in the character and text from the very beginning.

In turning now to consider each of the works individually, we will consider
the story of each and the character of each lover, and in the process discern
the significance of using a different term for the melancholy discussed in each.

Melancholy in REPETITION.

In Repetition, Constantine Constantius describes the love problems of a
melancholy young man who is at the age “when maturity of spirit announces
itself.” He has quite suddenly and recently fallen in love and become engaged.
Visibly transformed, he comes to tell his friend Constantine who finds him
a beauty to behold. In the past they have had long discussions, in which the older
Constantine’s psychological penchant has attempted to entice the young man’s
melancholy forth from him. We emphasize at this point that the young man is
in a state of Melancholi, which is the term used throughout except for the few
instances which we shall note. When the young man returns one day in a
terrible state, Constantine is taken aback, at first does not understand and is
set to wondering about his past conceptions of melancholy. For he remarks,
“Such a melancholy [Melancholi] has never before presented itself in my
practice.”

The young man is suffering in a Melancholi which has apparently only be­
come greater by this love. Although this is a new phenomenon for Constantine,
he nevertheless quickly musters the detachment and acumen to see that this
melancholy is going to grow into tungsind, that by this melancholy [tung­
sindig] longing the young man will eventually forsake his beloved, for by it
he has already leapt across to the end of love. Constantine adds that eventually
this will all lead to a terrible explosion. (An explosion does occur in “Guilty?/
Not Guilty?” when another young lover probes himself and his relationship
further.)

Constantine’s commentary is the key to understanding this curious love
affair and the key too to discovering the meaning of the Melancholi which is
responsible for the apparent impossibility of the engagement’s continuation.
Constantine regards the young man first of all as a very sensitive being. His
sensitivity is what makes him feel the suffering pangs of melancholy to begin
with. He is, we will recall, at the age when maturity of spirit is announcing
itself, and in this love for a young girl the “Idea” is stirring. Constantine sees
that the young girl is not the true object of his yearning, that she is not the ideal
but rather the muse which unconsciously and inadvertently leads him toward
the ideal. Eventually he will see, as Constantine does, that the young girl was "only the visible semblance whereas his thought, his soul was seeking something else which he transferred figuratively to her." Constantine also says, "The young girl was not his love, she was the occasion of awakening the primitive poetic talent in him and making him a poet." In doing such, she signed the death warrant of their love, for the young man has now transcended it and can be satisfied with nothing less than the ideal as his object of longing.

At this point, Constantine briefly shifts terminology and refers to Tungsind in order to signal melancholy at a higher level, becoming aware of its longing for the ideal and entering too into a more critical phase. But because this phase is only just beginning, and because the young man is not yet at all conscious of it, the term Melancholi returns and is used for the remainder of the work. For considered from the outside and in its completeness, the young man's melancholy is indeed the serious, reflective melancholy which will only be satisfied with the religious and as such is Tungsind. But until a greater consciousness of the religious arises, it is still Melancholi.

Constantine sees that the movement in the young man is religious in nature and withdraws at the limits of his competence. For, considered in terms of Kierkegaard's "stages", Constantine is an ironist and thus in the aesthetic stage and incapable as yet of fully understanding the religious which he can yet perceive.

The young man never makes the full transition in this work into Tungsind. In fact, the story ends very abruptly as he discovers the young girl's sudden marriage to another. This is patently autobiographical in origin and reveals Kierkegaard's own astonishment, in the course of penning the work, to discover Regine Olsen engaged to Schlegel. It signals too the underscoring of the futility of seeking "repetition" in any external sense, as Constantine himself also discovered on his return visit to Berlin. Repetition is to be effectively sought only in an internal sense, in the pristine reintegration of the self. Here the meaning of melancholy is tied to the riddle of the meaning of the new category repetition. For both are essentially religious in meaning.

In his concluding letter to the reader, Constantine rightly remarks that "even where all ends in melancholy [Melancholi], there is a hint about him, about his condition." Constantine has in fact given more than a hint. He states quite openly that the young man has a religious sentiment that he (the young man) is unable to understand, and Constantine foresees this mounting into a crisis
of Tungsind. We, along with Constantine, leave the young man in his Melancholi which is already advanced beyond the pained sensitivity and passive sufferings of the poets because of the religious element beginning to break through. The young man has initially confused his longing for an ideal object, about which he becomes gradually conscious, with the love object at hand, viz. the young girl. And she serves to awaken and make more conscious the higher longing for the ideal which is at the root of the problem Melancholi-Tungsind and which he is in the middle of, although he does not know it.

Melancholy in "Guilty?/Not Guilty?"

As we have already indicated, the similarities between Repetition and "Guilty?/Not Guilty?" are numerous. No one is more aware of this than Frater Taciturnus, the pseudonymous author of the latter. In Repetition, he notes, love makes the young man a poet. The lover in his own work is not a poet but is "demonic in a religious direction" and conscious of the religious element. Taciturnus remarks explicitly, "The reader who is acquainted with the little book of Constantius will perceive that I resemble in a way that author but yet am very different." The essential difference, as we have already suggested, lies in the meaning of Tungsind and the intensification it represents of Melancholi. For what Frater Taciturnus adds to the story of an unhappy engagement is a different degree of melancholy which may be justly termed "religious melancholy".

The story of the tragic love in "Guilty?/Not Guilty?" takes the form of a diary by the poetical creation Quidam and a commentary by Frater Taciturnus. The diary consists of morning entries which trace the events of "a year ago" and chronicle the disintegration of the engagement, much as if it were a memoir in approximately daily installments. Alternating with the morning entries are a series of midnight entries which refer to the aftermath of the broken engagement and the problem of guilt which continues to haunt Quidam.

On the first page of his memoir, Quidam tells us that "Melancholy [Tungsind] is my very nature." Yet, twelve days after falling in love at first sight with a young woman, he becomes engaged, in the false hope of being transformed and saved, only now to muse "And are there not as it were two natures striving within me?" A year later he sees more clearly than ever that the second nature is the religious nature and that is was "the eternal, a God-
relationship, relationship to ideals" which moved his soul. He becomes aware that the woman does not share his sensitivity for the religious, while he himself is overwhelmed by it. He is perhaps even obsessed with the religious and with setting it in motion in her. But he is not yet a religious individual himself. "I am not actually a religious individual, I am only a properly and completely formed possibility of such a thing," he writes a year later in his midnight commentary, thus indicating that, while he is clearly aware of the religious and even of the religious base of his Tungsind, he has not yet reached a resolution. In pushing her toward the religious unwisely, he brings forth the explosion which Constantine predicted for the young man of Repetition. His Tungsind is momentarily wafted away and he sees her not as any longer an ideal figure but rather as "a saucy little miss." At this point, a rupture is unavoidable. The religious, which he recognizes to be connected integrally with the crisis of his intensifying Tungsind, now makes a marriage impossible. The engagement is broken, both parties are plunged into suffering and his entire life-view collapses. This is a decisive development in terms of the three stages of existence in Kierkegaard’s thought. (And of course the diary is found in the larger work entitled Stages On Life’s Way.) The aesthetic is shattered, for this is what his former life-view amounted to. At the same time, he finds himself thrust beyond the ethical. For he finds himself in the ethical problems of duty toward the young girl and the implicit duty of every ethical man to reveal himself in the (ethical) state of marriage, yet at the same time is placed in conflict with his apparent ethical duty by virtue of a higher commitment, viz. the religious (which is also the central issue in Fear and Trembling). He cannot reveal himself; he is closed-in (indesluttet) because of the Tungsind which is not resolved. And he feels projected towards the religious in a way which for him transcends the normal course of marriage. “I was melancholy [tungsindig] . . . I required an ideality under the weight of which I sank,” and he continues, “Only religiously can I now understand myself before God.” For only the religious will now make sense of himself. The aesthetic has not, for it has collapsed. The ethical does not seem to be able to, for ethically he is caught up in the problem of guilt. He is in a crisis which for him can only be resolved religiously. It is not a melancholy which can be cured by falling in love, but rather one which has been aggravated and brought to a religious crisis by such a love.
Towards the end of his memoir he remarks, “Yes, it is true, a melancholy man is in a certain sense mad, but it requires a great deal of dialectic and a great deal of pathos to comprehend this madness.”\textsuperscript{31} It is in fact a divine madness. Quidam’s \textit{Tungsind} is individual, even unique, but its religious ground is not. Taciturnus, in his commentary, remarks that there is a form of \textit{Tungsind} which poets experience. This is different from the \textit{Melancholi} normally associated with poets and Romantics, for it is a melancholy gone into a crisis phase and become self-conscious. But Taciturnus distinguishes between the crisis which may come about by warmed-up sufferings merely brooded over and the suffering of a crisis which may swiftly find positive resolution in the religious. Such melancholy is Quidam’s.\textsuperscript{32}

Taciturnus writes, “So the melancholy [\textit{Tungsind}] of this lay figure of mine is a crisis anticipatory of the religious experience.”\textsuperscript{33} It is sensitivity become sensitivity to the religious, and it is longing which has transcended any human substitutes and requires the religious, the eternal. As such, \textit{Tungsind} does not represent the religious but is rather a starting-point for the religious.\textsuperscript{34}

As we have seen, Taciturnus creates Quidam to be different from Constantine’s young man. While both are immersed in problems of melancholy which they do not overcome in the course of each respective narrative, there is a fundamental difference of degree between each. The young man’s \textit{Melancholi}, Constantine predicts, will become \textit{Tungsind} as the religious element present in it and in him becomes clearer to him. For the moment, he suffers at the poet’s level. But Quidam’s religious nature and religious possibility are clear to him even before his engagement. His engagement and its rupture only intensify the critical aspect of his \textit{Tungsind} as they deprive him of any illusory alternative solutions either in aesthetic or ethical categories. For his aesthetic life-view has collapsed, and ethically his situation torments him with a problem of guilt which he cannot resolve in ethical terms. His mad situation, which transcends the ethical, demands the higher solution of the religious which he already knows has been at the base of his \textit{Tungsind}.

Having considered two works which speak of two distinct phases of melancholy, we here turn now to attempt to schematize what the texts present. We propose to move from the analyses of the melancholy of two aesthetic characters to formulate the missing “concept of melancholy” which is never explicit in Kierkegaard’s authorship but is implicit throughout.
The Concept of Melancholy.

In all the analyses of melancholy which Kierkegaard makes (among which we have considered but two), melancholy always emerges as a "given": it is already there in the personality and is now to be accounted for. No state is entirely without melancholy, from the dullest aesthete who only faintly senses it to the religious man who still senses it faintly (as Judge William remarks in Either/Or). This Melancholy is the innocent throb of suffering longing within a sensitive nature and it indicates both sensitivity and religious potentiality. (It remains even in the individual who exists in religious categories for so long as he lives he has always greater religious potential.) Melancholy indicates a personality already impregnated with the eternal, with a spiritual dimension. But in its initial phases, it indicates a gestating, "unborn" religious nature. In the language so frequent in the authorship, spirit sleeps. However, it will awake. And the first awakening, which we witness in Repetition for example, comes about as the result of a natural dynamism of spiritual growth within the evolving personality. The beginning of the evolutionary movement is referred to as the stirring of spirit, or the stirring of the Idea. The image of stirring is important, for it speaks of an agitation by laws of inner necessity within the depths of the person. The agitation seeks a resolution — something which comes about gradually through transformation of the personality.

As the stirring increases, a conflict emerges between one’s way of life (which is aesthetic) and the hidden essence of the movement. For the given, posited way of life is the "natural" state beyond which the dynamism of spirit calls one. This natural state is not to be abandoned, but rather modified and transformed.

The stirring within the personality reveals that an encounter with the Absolute is sought, with the grounding and transforming Power. The longing for the Absolute, the Ideal, the eternal, might even be spoken of as a "metaphysical wound". For it seeks its healing, and ultimately can only find it, in religious experience in which the Absolute is encountered. It is a wound which festers so long as it is not healed, and a wound which is never entirely healed (thus the enduring melancholy in the religious man).

But the demand for the Absolute does not reveal in itself where such an encounter can take place. Repetition teaches, in its riddles, that the search for
an external solution, in frantic activity, in love, or even in intellectual endeavors results in only so much frustration and even worsening of one's pained longing. The key lies in understanding the kind of emotion melancholy is. For melancholy is a reflexive emotion. Emotions are generally directed outwards, toward some object (as in love, hate, etc.). But melancholy has no object, in two senses. First, it has no object because the Absolute is an impossible object for human longing (understood in the external sense). Second, it has no object because the "object" which is ultimately the solution is the Self grounded in a relationship to the Absolute which is its Constituting Power (cf. Sickness Unto Death). Properly speaking, the Self is not an object for oneself. Melancholy is an emotion which is "about" the Self and which seeks the incorporation of the life of the Absolute into the personality which already participates nascently in it.

While there is no clear line of demarcation between the two degrees of melancholy, Tungsind indicates that the state of melancholy is taking on new seriousness and urgency. Tungsind is a natural development of the state of melancholy, as spirit begins to stir actively. A new degree of reflection enters in, and one begins to perceive that one's failure to resolve the problem of melancholy, by moving in the direction in which it prompts, is finally responsible for the aggravation of the "wound". Guilt and brooding arise as natural consequences of passive continuation in the mood.

The heaviness of melancholy, of which the image in Tungsind ("heavy spirit") speaks, is constituted by the "burden of the self" which is felt more and more. The refusal to will the transformation of the Self into religious categories is the refusal to lift the weight (and to allow Grace to remove the burden finally). By process of elimination, one comes to see in melancholy that the sole resolution lies in the internal, in following the religious which one senses, in taking on the task of becoming a centered person by allowing and affirming the centripetal movement underway.

"Despair" as the affirmation of the Self in ethico-religious categories is the first decisive step to be taken by the will in overcoming despair. For this alone prepares the way for attaining the birth of the eternal in the personality and thus a union with the Ideal, the Absolute, such as one desires. (The Ideal, the Absolute and the eternal are, for Kierkegaard of course, synonyms of God.) Full resolution of melancholy comes about only by moving completely through
despair and the limits of the human to the point of recognizing the need for God’s forgiving Grace in order for a full restoration of the Self (in “repetition”) to come about and for the longing for union to be consummated.

However, Kierkegaard’s aesthetic writings trace the consequences of the non-resolution of melancholy in an exploration of the eccentric characters who resist the centripetal movement. Non-resolution brings about the enfeeblement of the will which refuses to will. The refusal to move toward a cohesion of the personality leaves one in a state of fragmentation in which the mis-channeling of the energy of spiritual transformation wreaks havoc within the emotional life. As a consequence, one is more and more the victim of moods and rides the crests of enthusiasm and despair. One becomes prisoner of oneself, locked in upon oneself, closed in (indesluttet) and unable to go out to others. These consequences are all vividly portrayed in the young aesthete of Either/Or and particularly in the “Diapsalmata” as his unwilling self-revelation.

In summary, the essence of melancholy is the longing for a restoration of one’s God-relationship. In melancholy, the desire and the need for a religious dimension and religious grounding of the Self is experienced in two phases, first in the unconscious longing and suffering of Melancholi and then in the reflective and discerning longing of Tungsind. Through both phases, the individual discovers the shattered religious possibility (cf. Concept of Anxiety [Dread]) of the Self and one’s urgent need for an incorporation of the religious in order to achieve the peace which the human heart yearns for and the growth which a natural spiritual dynamism propels it towards. For those who find in this analysis an echo of Augustine’s “Cor nostrum inquietum donec requiescat in Te, Domine,” we might add that Kierkegaard would be the first, no doubt, to agree. For while the categories and terms of the ages change, the uniquely possible “Object” of human longing remains the same.

NOTES
2 I have done this at length in The Meaning and Dialectic of Moods in Kierkegaard, Ph. D. Dissertation (Stanford, 1974).
3 Either/Or was published in February 1843, Repetition appeared in October of the same year.
4 Cf. Kierkegaard’s Papiere II A 484 (July 20, 1839).
6 Ibid., p. 38.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., p. 39.
9 Ibid., p. 43.
10 Ibid., p. 44.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid., p. 40.
13 Ibid., pp. 39–42.
14 Ibid., pp. 90–91.
15 Ibid., p. 126.
16 Ibid., p. 134.
17 Ibid., p. 135.
19 Ibid., p. 363.
20 Ibid., pp. 395–396.
21 Ibid., p. 188.
22 Ibid., p. 205.
23 Ibid., p. 214.
24 Ibid., p. 222.
26 Ibid., p. 251.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., p. 298.
29 Ibid., p. 326.
30 Ibid., p. 322.
31 Ibid., p. 351.
32 Ibid., p. 389.
33 Ibid., p. 389.
34 Ibid., p. 343.