Moral Accounting:
Kierkegaard's Social Theory and Criticism

by MICHAEL PLEKON

In a journal entry from October 1854 (Pap. XI 2 A 36) Kierkegaard reflected metaphorically upon the task of a »Christian accountant«: the sorting out of the counterfeit from the valid in Christian faith.1 Throughout his writings, he of course emphatically claimed that his concerns revolved around Christian faith and practice. First and foremost, he was a theologian, despite contemporary scholarship's transformation of him into the »father« of existentialism. However, as Malantschuk has pointed out, Kierkegaard also recognized his intellectual enterprise as one of »anthropological contemplation«. (Pap. III A 3, 211)2 In addition to his philosophical and theological contributions, he sought to interpret human consciousness and existence and it is no exaggeration to observe that his appeal in this century is rooted precisely in this anthropological focus. However, his social theory and criticism are only lately being recognized as essential elements of his theological vision. Kresten Nordentoft has produced magisterial analyses of Kierkegaard's social and psychological work.3 There are also the Hongs' new translations, and studies by Kirmmse, Deuser, Sløk, Elrod and Henningsen.4

Clearly the richness and complexity of Kierkegaard's social theory and criticism cannot be comprehensively analyzed here. Yet it is possible to outline their principal elements and clarify their significance. Thus I will concentrate on 1) the social psychology in Kierkegaard's earlier pseudonymous works, 2) the social criticism after 1848 and 3) the fusion of theological and social criticism in the years 1848-55. My claim is that his social theory and criticism are integral elements of his theological perspectives. Indeed, as I see it, the two so converged as to become inseparable. As Sløk has recently argued, Kierkegaard is one of modernity's most eloquent Christian humanists. I think it is also accurate to reverse this formulation, following Berger, to claim that Kierkegaard is one of the most perceptive crafters of an inductive, anthropological theology.5
I. The Grounded Self: Kierkegaard’s Social Psychology

In his early journals and books, Kierkegaard seemed intrigued by the methodological possibilities of using literary figures or types such as Faust, Ahasuerus and several characters from Mozart operas. These were joined by personalities such as Socrates, Abraham and Isaac and by the characters and pseudonyms Kierkegaard himself created. While this large, diverse cast was employed in a number of ways, a function many seemed to perform was that of an »ideal type« in a manner not unlike that of Max Weber. Kierkegaard seems to have intended these figures to personify and enact different »life views« much like the participants in Socratic dialogues and Platonic discussions. It is through these figures that Kierkegaard presented much of his social psychology, investigations of the distinctive features of consciousness and the development of personality and identity in the process of socialization. He also examined the background of institutions and significant others, the social contexts and relationships in which socialization unfolds as well as some of the crises in human development.

In the Judge William-»A« exchanges of Either-Or, the Abraham narratives of Fear and Trembling, the dissections of memory, despair, angst and guilt in Repetition, The Concept of Anxiety and Stages on Life’s Way and of course in the investigation of the self and of sin in The Sickness unto Death, Kierkegaard’s social psychology is vividly expressed.6 He recognized that every individual is a processual being, constantly developing and changing. He underscored the material/biological dimensions as fundamental and interdependent with the other components of human nature. For him the individual is always located or grounded within the confines of an array of relationships, ranging from those of the biological species to the social bonds of the family, church, and nation. Further, the individual is always located within history, grounded in time as well as in the timelessness of eternity. Judge William particularly emphasizes the self’s definition and concreteness in social, political and psychological statuses and roles. (SV II, 235-6)7 The relationship of the self to the eternal, to God, was paramount for Kierkegaard, but his theology was built upon the anthropological foundations presented in his early works, the social psychology of the grounded self.

Other aspects of his social psychology are expressed in The Sickness unto
Death. The self is depicted as relational, that is, socially constructed and dependent. (SV XI, 127-8) Despite its biological, historical and social determination, the self is able to reflect upon itself, to think beyond its confines, to both accept and reject its present situation and identity. It is something of an oversight to note only Kierkegaard’s affirmations of subjectivity, his emphasis on passion and decision. These emphases are for him always paralleled by his view of the self’s groundings and thus his social psychology is a subtle, dialectical understanding of the relationship of self to society. Metaphors of motion and action, the leap, traveling, growth, are frequently used to underscore the dialectical relationships of the self to the natural world, others and to itself. (SV IV, 236-51; VII, 297; Pap. IV C 97; Breve og Aktstykker, nos. 184-6).

Perhaps the strongest assumptions in Kierkegaard’s view concern the ethical and religious dimensions. Clearly his theological presuppositions distinguish him, at least in relative terms, from later social theorists with respect to his view of the self’s creation by and grounding in God. Of course Kierkegaard shares important theological perspectives with the dominant theorist of his time, Hegel, despite equally substantial dissent from speculative idealism. Nevertheless, particularly with respect to his ethics and social criticism there is also kinship between him and later theorists such as Weber, Durkheim and Simmel. Kierkegaard approaches ethics neither from the Kantian nor the Hegelian standpoints. While a good deal of Hegelianism echoes in the Judge William letters, there seems to be something perfunctory and hollow about the Judge’s concern for Sittlichkeit, for adherence to one’s social roles and statuses. Both the disturbing diapsalmata at Either-Or’s beginning and the sermon at its conclusion intimate as much. (SV I, 3-27; II, 303-18) While the ordinary, »universal« or normative forms of existence and their ethical demands are acknowledged, Kierkegaard, like the later social theorists, also recognized the precariousness of social reality. He perceived the inherent chaos beneath the surface of society and consciousness, »dark abysses«, as Durkheim would later call them. Further, Kierkegaard noted possibilities other than esthetic angst, despair and anomie, namely that one could become empty, in ethical and religious terms, caught in »spiritlessness«. (Aandeløshed) The bourgeois (Spidsborgere) were particular targets in this respect. (SV II, 152-61, 307-18; III, 61-73, 86-93, 105, 117-30; IV, 323-49, 363-7; VI, 87-174; VII, 476-7; XI, 150-60)
So it is inaccurate to judge Kierkegaard as insensitive towards social structure and history as some have done. In the years up to 1848 his social psychology unmistakably grounds the self in society and history. When he turned to social criticism, Kierkegaard made it clear that modernity was not just a time of spiritual disintegration but also one of political crisis. As a moral accountant of modernity, he was interested not only in its spiritual costs but also in its material dimensions, its social and political problems. Such is the case despite his many protests and claims that he was no reformer, that he offered not a single proposal for »external« change. (SV XII, 436-44) Kierkegaard sought to provide a phenomenology of the individual’s experience of the world, others and self and this from a critical Christian point of view. However, he refused to allow his Christian presuppositions to intrude as easy dogmatic explanations. Rather he permitted a variety of values and possible resolutions to play themselves out in his pseudonymous books. His use of a Socratically informed »indirect communication« further contributed to a style and method which could be called »inductive«, in Peter Berger’s view, an anthropological theology which begins with and utilizes human experience in working towards a Christian understanding of existence in modern society. Perhaps no better example of such an approach (in addition to the pseudonymous writings) is Kierkegaard’s most explicitly ethical book, *Works of Love*. Here the human experience of love is built upon to depict the selfless love of neighbor called for by the Gospel. In a startlingly affirmative approach, Kierkegaard identifies love as an *a priori*, a presupposition in the heart of God and of humankind. Love is the »sprout in the grain«, the ever present possibility of »fundamental healing« for the individual and society. (SV IX, 204-15)

II. Against the »Market-Town « and the Age: Kierkegaard’s Social Criticism

Kierkegaard’s social psychology, particularly in his earlier writings, affirms the dialectical relationship of self to society. As we have also seen, his orientation was as probing and critical as it was affirmative and sensitive to the nuances of identity and consciousness. Kierkegaard could not consider the individual apart from his/her grounding or social-historical location. Judge William’s marital status, occupation, class location are integral shapers of his life views. So too for the young esthete and any of Kierkegaard’s
other characters. With his own skills and inspiration from the romantics, from Blicher and J. L. Heiberg and Fru Gyllembourg and other authors, Kierkegaard captured a gallery of scenes from everyday life in Biedemeier Copenhagen during the last years of Denmark's »Golden Age«. The details of the parlor and dining room, the accents of conversation and the sermons in city churches, the Sunday outings along Langelinie, in Dyrehaven and Frederiksberg Have and Gribskov are not accidental touches of realism but crucial ingredients for Kierkegaard's examination of his Denmark and thus also important components of his social thinking. (SV VI, 78-83, 87-181; VII, 133-57, 404-45) His literary and dramatic interests, evident throughout his pseudonymous writings and journals, are also evident in A Literary Review.

In the first portion, Kierkegaard meticulously assesses Fru Gyllembourg's Two Ages. Her Story of Everyday Life had captured Copenhagen's reading public and Kierkegaard indicated his appreciation of both her technical abilities and social-moral criticism. He took Gyllembourg's depiction of the collision and contrast between the 18th century's revolutionary spirit and the conservatism of the mid-19th century as a point of departure for his own polemics. Some of his most familiar social criticism is drilled out here — his condemnation of the lack of passion and individuality in modernity, his identification of the mass-movement character of modern politics, the pandering to a nebulous »public« by the press, the »leveling« of authority and traditional institutions, relationships and values. He also singled out modernity's ethical ambiguity, superficiality and hyperreflectivity for attack. (SV VIII, 57-105) To be sure, Kierkegaard's position here and in many other journal entries and published works up until the late 1840's was fairly conservative. Nordentoft makes such a judgement but as he, Sløk and Kirmmse also argue, Kierkegaard was hardly a pure, consistent conservative. Rather, his stance was ambivalent, paradoxically mixed, shifting, consistent only in its dissent from other available viewpoints. His argument was not so much that the present age had gone too far but that it had not gone far enough. Compared with the profound transformations of the 18th century throughout Europe and at home in Denmark, those of the 19th century looked pale and mediocre indeed. Toward the conclusion of A Literary Review Kierkegaard's tone shifts. Perhaps modernity's chaos could be a purgative force after all, its emptiness exactly the impulse for individuals.
to develop ethical and religious independence. These final pages reveal
both the ambivalence and complexity of Kierkegaard's criticism in the late
1840's and beyond. It was in ferment.

So too was Denmark in 1848-49. In the years from 1848-55, Kierke­
gaard's journals dwarf the material published and in them can be traced
a gradual but fundamental shift in his thinking. While Kierkegaard was
silent, as Slok has observed, a veritable ocean of writing flowed into the
thousands of journal pages. About some subjects he droned on almost ad
nauseam: Mynster, Martensen, Corsaren, Regine. Although dealt with in a
similarly repetitious manner, other concerns were more significant: his deeper
understanding of the radical pattern of Jesus' life and the New Testament
call to a discipleship of imitation, the proclamation of the Gospel for the
poor, the sick and the suffering over against the Danish Church and
society and the emergence of the common people in modernizing Danish
society. It is not just the consensus of Bukdahl, Lindhardt, Nordentoft,
Kirmmse, Slok, Deuser and myself that in the last years of his life Kierke­
gaard's thinking changed and came to revolve around these issues. His
journals as well as published works confirm it. (SV XII, 154-235, 308-37,
402-19, 457-75)

The emergent common man class and the church-state synthesis formed
the immediate social structural objects of Kierkegaard's concentration. These
two had clashed almost continuously from the beginning of the century in
the Awakening movements (Vækkelser) and gradually in more explicitly
political contexts. Conflicts between the state-church clergy's more ration­
alist theology and preaching and the pietism/orthodoxy of rural farmers, city
workers and servants and some intellectuals erupted in the 1820's and
1830's. At times these involved clashes between particular pastors and their
congregations but also more widespread conflict such as lay rejection of
Bishop Balle's new catechism and hymnal, Grundtvig's attack on H. N.
Clausen, and legal action against laity who persisted in holding prayer and
preaching meetings despite a 1741 statute banning such activities outside
the state-church's control. Later conflict included the aftermath of Grundtvig's
attack, the polemics of J. C. Lindberg, A. G. Rudelbach and others in oppos­
tion to theological and liturgical distortions by state-church clergy and the
increased activity of lay preachers such as Rasmus Sørensen and Rasmus
Ottesen. Still later such conflict also came to touch upon the loosening of
parish bonds for baptism and confirmation, liturgical freedom for the clergy, and the possibility of laity forming a congregation and calling a pastor.

Kierkegaard was directly acquainted with some of these ecclesiastical conflicts through his father's membership in the Copenhagen Herrnhutterite congregation and through his brother Peter Christian's friendship with Grundtvig. The Rudelbach sisters' correspondence and Peter Christian's journals attest to at least minimal contact. Although it is difficult to prove any direct influence of this ecclesiastical turmoil on Kierkegaard it is nevertheless important to recognize his location in this period of social and religious upheaval. In this light, Kierkegaard's own growing theological and social criticism in the years after 1848, culminating in the public attack on the Danish church and society in 1854-55, does not seem so singular an aberration but rather an action with the pattern of some forty years of precedent conflict before it.18

It should also be noted that the tradition of church conflict in which Kierkegaard found himself was not only theological in nature. Research by Danish ecclesiastical historians in the past thirty years has examined the complex social, economic and political roots and significance of the Awakening and Grundtvigian movements.19 Among the factors involved were the land and school reforms in the last years of the 18th and the first decades of the 19th centuries which rapidly transformed the lives of the lower class. There was also the economic depression, loss of ships and territory following Denmark's devastation in the Napoleonic conflicts. Later came recovery and once again economic downspin in the late 1840's, along with the swift political transformation of 1848-49 in which absolutism gave way to constitutional democracy.20 Throughout this period, despite the accomplishments of the Golden Age luminaries, the rising group in Danish society was the no longer silent majority, namely the small landowners, tenant farmers, workers and craftsmen and others gathered under the label of »common people«. As these became more literate and economically established they also became more religiously and politically independent.21 The state-church and its clergy -- Copenhagen-educated civil servants as well as spiritual functionaries -- not only symbolized the authoritarian-hierarchical social structure of absolutism. They were, with notable exceptions such as those linked to the Awakening and Grundtvigian movements, the last to relinquish support for the old political-religious synthesis, especially those influenced
by Mynster's policies during his long episcopate, 1834-54. Yet despite re­
sistance to change under Frederik VI and Christian VIII, the transformation of both church and society began. 22

Against this background it is possible to see Kierkegaard's growing criti­
cism in the years 1848-55 as more than a purely theological debate or ecclesiastical squabble. He drew his weapons from a powerful arsenal: the Gospel's stark requirements and the figure of the crucified Christ. The suffering servant Jesus, the apostles and martyrs of the early church, all are contrasted with the state-church's well educated, respectable, decently paid pastors. (Pap. X 1 A 135; X 2 A 27; SV XII, 161-7, 185-235; XIV, 217-25, 257-72, 314, 325-6, 356) 23 Christ is presented by Kierkegaard as the »prototype«, the pattern to be imitated, not the gentle Savior-Friend nor the glorified risen Lord but the despised, repulsive man of sorrows. (SV XII, 29-65, 81-134, 182-5, 206-31; Pap. X 1 A 154; X 2 A 30, 361; X 3 A 409) Christ's life of proclamation and service, his love for the poor and the suffering, finally his own horrible suffering and death — all this is juxtaposed with the velvet and silk-robed, royally decorated clergy, especially with Mynster as the paradigm of social prestige and political shrewdness. (SV XIV, 55-75, 104-13, 117-23, 159-60, 234-58; Pap. X 2 A 418) On the one hand, crucifixion and suffering, on the other sonorous organ peals and eloquence during the »quiet hours« of worship in magnificently appointed churches. Kierkegaard's criticism was not merely a bookish battle launched on the many writing desks in his apartment or from the pages of his library. It flew out through Copenhagen's stately churches, cozy parlors and cafés; out past the city walls to the cottages of the peasants and within to the crammed quarters of the urban poor. It was not just a grappling with the ghosts of Hegel and Mynster but a one-man war against his church and society. Kierkegaard aimed at the church and then at the social order in which this church was established and which the church in turn supported. Slowly but inexorably Kierkegaard's theological and social criticism converged and became inseparable.

III. Kierkegaard at the End

It is not an exaggeration to observe that the late Kierkegaard's thinking and writing is provocative, important and, at the same time, perplexing. The
task of interpreting the late Kierkegaard has plagued scholarship for decades. The later writings are formidable in volume and forbidding in substance. The journals, in particular, are an overgrown jungle of repeated themes, shifts, experiments, contradictions and uncertainty. Then there is the overwhelming negativity of these later writings: Kierkegaard's obsession with Christianity's hostility to human life, with suffering as the only mark of authentic discipleship. (SV XIV, 56-60, 117, 141-9, 181-93, 200-2, 211-17, 244-51, 254-64, 294-302, 333-6) Lindhardt has concluded that Kierkegaard comes close to a one-sided, rigid reading of the New Testament, a distorted picture of Christ and Sløk also admits as much, noting that the finely nuanced dialectics of the earlier authorship are gone in the late writings. Kierkegaard, he suggests, lost the ability to express how Christianity could be lived, day in and day out. Nordentoft too points to the excesses of Kierkegaard's negativity, his misogyny and ridicule of human love, friendship, sexuality and parenthood.

The problems of the late Kierkegaard's writings far surpass the limitations of analysis which must be imposed here. Beyond the difficulties of the texts themselves is the thicket of literature which has grown up around them, scholarship which all too often seeks either to defend »Saint Søren« and explain away the excesses or which all too easily dismisses the late Kierkegaard as a disturbed mind. Yet no assessment of Kierkegaard would be complete or valid without rigorous examination of these later years when his theological and social criticism merged. Recently, as noted here, the late years have become the focus of some of the best Kierkegaard scholarship and deservedly so. It is not so much because these late years reflect the disintegration of a brilliant mind that we should pay more attention to them but because they were, in an important sense, the culmination of a life's work. I would argue that we have spent comparatively too much time on the earlier Kierkegaard and thus comparatively too little time trying to understand his later thinking. Further, the late Kierkegaard deserves to be taken seriously in an increasingly secular, even allegedly post-Christian era such as ours. This is not just because Kierkegaard's offensive against institutional Christianity opened the doors to the later break in Denmark's Christianity-culture synthesis or because Kierkegaard paved the way for further radical challenges to faith and practice. All of which would have happened without him. No, the reasons for the late Kierkegaard's significance inhere
more in the fact that his criticism came not from outside but from within the community of faith, not from one who had rejected Christianity and attacked from without, like Feuerbach or Nietzsche, but one who acted as an internal traitor, a Christian subversive. (Pap. X 2 A 163)

Kierkegaard rediscovered that the Gospel, while incommensurable with this or that particular social order or ideology, was not so transcendent as to completely part ways with history and society. Put differently, he came to recognize that Christian faith was inseparable from praxis, from the works of love for the neighbor here and now. He came to see that the Gospel's stance was one of prophetic witness against the social order. This more negative posture, a modern theology of the cross, is most easily read in the late Kierkegaard's concentration on the pattern of the suffering servant Christ and his ministry to the poor, the sick, the suffering, in short to the *anawim*, the little ones of Yahweh. The good news is proclaimed for them and for us who will not see them and come to their aid as fellows in suffering. Kierkegaard's condemnation fell most heavily on those who viewed the suffering with contempt, ignored them or tried to forget their pain in a contorted version of Christianity. (Pap. X 1 A 2, 135, 269, 644, 669; X 2 A 48, 55; X 3 A 48; X 4 A 578) It is no exaggeration to sense in Kierkegaard's paradoxical Christ, the symbol of impotence in suffering and death, a resonance with the vision of contemporary theologians in the Third World.26 It may be precisely a *theologia crucis* that the church needs to rediscover in the last years of the 20th century when the Christendom Kierkegaard attacked has long since vanished. I do not mean that Kierkegaard offers all we need but simply that there is much to rediscover in his focus on the suffering servant Christ, on imitation, performing the works of love and standing in witness against the social structures and ideologies, right or left, that oppress and enslave.

Of course there has been much debate about the late Kierkegaard. His own contemporaries were of the opinion that the theology of the public attack was indecorous, unbiblical, a return to »monkish« works-justification, very possibly the product of a disturbed mind.27 As noted here, subsequent generations of scholars have also struggled with the late Kierkegaard, often arriving at some of the same conclusions. Such verdicts are understandable, as both Nordentoft and Slok observe, given the overwhelming negativity of the later writings. Although I cannot fully describe and analyze it here, I
would argue that there was another side to this negativity, an affirmative point of view which was not only parallel to the harsh perspectives made explicit but which Kierkegaard assumed as fundamental to authentic understanding and practice of Christianity. Elsewhere I have called this positive dimension Kierkegaard’s »incarnational optimism« because it was rooted in his realization of God’s continual mercy and presence for humankind in Christ.28 I would not claim that this »other side« is a direct continuation of Kierkegaard’s earlier thinking but a result of his post-1848 transformation just as much as the more obvious negativity of the later years. Likewise I cannot claim that this more affirmative perspective rescued Kierkegaard from the fanaticism of the late period. Contra Løgstrup, I would simply suggest that it is important to listen to what Kierkegaard »also said«, i.e. what is there alongside, even beneath the negativity, obscured for the most part, perhaps even intentionally, dialectically by Kierkegaard himself. This »incarnational optimism« can be glimpsed in places far too numerous to catalogue here. For example it very clearly surfaces in the Christian Dis­courses’ view of the always available gift of grace. (SV X, 101-52, 190-204, 264-71, 295-309) One can remember it from Works of Love (SV IX, 44ff., 72, 185-6, 204-30, 295-8, 344-57) and hear it sporadically but forcefully in the journals. (Pap. VIII 1 A 640-9; X 1 A 246, 279; X 6 B 241) Christ is the prototype but also the gift, the merciful savior.29 And lastly there is the conspicuous positioning of the sermon, »God’s Unchangeableness« towards the end of the public attack on August 1, 1855. (SV XIV, 277-94) Here Kierkegaard directly emphasizes the permanence of God’s presence and love in counterpoint to the rigor and suffering of Christianity otherwise stressed in the public attack literature. All the condemnation of this literature notwithstanding, Kierkegaard still points to the »Father of lights«, the giver of every good and perfect gift. Here, in my opinion, Kierkegaard brings suffering and grace together, making the point Bonhoeffer was to proclaim from his prison cell a century later, that the cross and the res­urrection are inseparable, that there can be no grace without suffering.30 In short, even in the middle of his public attack Kierkegaard did not completely forget the grounding of creation, of the human creature in the creator and God’s continual invitation of conversion and reconciliation to fallen creation, in the Incarnation, in Jesus of Nazareth.

So we conclude as we began with Christian proclamation and anthro-
political contemplation. Kierkegaard's work in plotting out the pilgrimage of faith was also a pilgrimage of human consciousness and experience. Put differently, Kierkegaard's understanding of the Gospel required inspection and criticism of history and society. Kierkegaard, at the end and in the end is both a theologian and a social thinker. I would argue that for him the roles were inseparable. We do well to remember, in this regard, Kierkegaard's rejection of Christianity as mere doctrine or ecclesiastical structure and function. The Gospel, for him, was, as for the earliest disciples, »the everyday life of the disciple, a life which trails through history and society towards eternity.

In conclusion then, we should not be surprised that Kierkegaard bears little resemblance to most contemporary social theorists and critics or to professional theologians for that matter. He was, of course, very much a child of his age, of a time when theology had not been so definitively differentiated from social thought. We need only think of Hegel in this respect or of earlier figures such as Augustine and Luther, or, dare I say it, of the theology which persisted even in Marx's »scientific« dialectical materialism. Only in our century is it difficult to imagine theology and social thought as intimately related, even fused in the thought of one individual. Yet this is precisely how we must understand Kierkegaard's enterprise of Christian proclamation and anthropological contemplation. Perhaps we will not find the variety of theories or sophistication of measurement that we do in modern social science. Yet as Robert Nisbet has so eloquently put it, we will find that the creation of sociological portraits and landscapes was important for Kierkegaard, not only in serving the eternal but in its own right.31

NOTES

1. Assistance instrumental in the preparation of this essay and for the research on which it is based was provided by a National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowship for study at the Institute for Systematic Theology, the University of Copenhagen, in 1979-80 and by released time from the Dean and School of Liberal Arts and Sciences, Baruch College, the City University of New York.


