The First Article of the Creed in Kierkegaard's Writings

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In the Introduction to The Concept of Dread, Kierkegaard's pseudonym Vigilius Haufniensis points out »the fact that science, fully as much as poetry and art, assumes a mood both on the part of the producer and on the part of the recipient, that an error in modulation is just as disturbing as an error in the exposition of thought.«

This observation might well be worth taking seriously when one treats the importance of the first article of the Creed (»I believe in God the Father Almighty, maker of heaven and earth«) in Kierkegaard's writings. Indeed we can find such a mood-setting quotation in Kierkegaard's writings.

The first of the Three Edifying Discourses (1844) contains an exposition of the text from Ecclesiastes: »Remember now thy Creator in the days of thy youth.« (Eccl. 12:1).

»And in youth one does it most naturally; for a man thinks most naturally who can think this thought in conjunction with all the other things he thinks; and he thinks it most naturally who does not himself have to be changed in order to think it, and who does not need to have the thought changed in order to think it, because in the thought he finds the childlike simplicity which makes the game the best ... He understands immediately that a God exists, for to the young, God's house lies next door to his father's yard, and it seems quite natural to him to be there ... To youth God dwells close at hand; in the midst of sorrow and joy he hears God's voice calling ...

Youth understands at once that God is the Creator, that He has created »the heavens and the earth, and all that is in them.« »All that is in them« — — is not this a great word, is it suitable for young people? What has youth really seen? It has merely glanced at the world. What does it understand about the world in comparison with one who has circumnavigated the globe? But youth understands about God, and since He is never far away, if one is to find Him he should not look for Him far away ...
But as the youth quite naturally thinks that God is the Creator, so he just as naturally thinks what follows from that ... And what is this except thanksgiving in quiet humility, confidence resting in a childlike intimacy, the pain over the interruption of the harmony so deep that peace cannot long remain away, the concern so childlike that youth does not need to go far in order again to live and move and have his being in God.

Kierkegaard concludes his exposition by calling the youth's remembrance of the Creator »the angel of salvation of the retreat« sent by heaven to the grown man.

»For the thought of youth about the Creator is a rosebud that does not wither, because it knows neither times nor seasons, and it is the child's most beautiful ornament, the bride's most glorious adornment, and the best raiment for the dying.«

These excerpts from the exposition of Ecclesiastes' exhortation to remember the Creator may more likely be true of the child's than of the adult's faith in God, a possibility of which Kierkegaard was certainly aware. The passage cited will, in any case, arouse astonishment when taken in connection with statements to the effect that Kierkegaard, for a variety of reasons, is incapable of giving expression to a creation-centered Christian faith. A few examples of this kind of critical estimation of Kierkegaard will be sufficient.

Wilhelm Anz concludes his book, Kierkegaard und der deutsche Idealismus (»Kierkegaard and German Idealism,« 1956), with the verdict that the theological view of the creation is missing in Kierkegaard.3

K. E. Løgstrup agrees with Anz's criticism especially in his book, Opgør med Kierkegaard (»A Reckoning with Kierkegaard,« 1968). He maintains for example that for Kierkegaard, actual, temporal, earthly life has nothing to do with eternity.4

Gustaf Wingren follows Løgstrup in his view of Kierkegaard but goes further than his teacher in the severity of his critical estimation: »It is not an exaggeration to maintain,« Wingren writes in his work, Credo, (1975) »that Kierkegaard hated creation-centered faith in its Old Testament, Early Church and Reformation form. The difficulties in understanding creation-centered faith ever since its emergence in European theology of the 1920's derive essentially from only one person -- Kierkegaard.«5

In his Edifying Discourses Kierkegaard has deliberately chosen texts from the Old as well as the New Testament that reflect the concept of a creation-
centered faith. The fact that he has written no less than 12 times on Jesus’ parable of the lilies of the field and the birds of the air shows that at least he did not hate biblical, creation-centered faith. It is of course another question whether he has been able to deliver the essence of the biblical message about the God of creation in a comprehensive, undistorted way. In relation to Wingren’s second assertion about Kierkegaard (that he is the source of the difficulties in understanding creation-centered faith), it must be asked whether it is Kierkegaard himself, or a one-sided – perhaps intentionally warped – interpretation of his writings that has fostered such a view.

Respecting Løgstrup’s reckoning with Kierkegaard which had been begun in several earlier works, one cannot escape the impression that Kierkegaard-derivatives, rather than Kierkegaard himself, have challenged him to make objections. As regards Wilhelm Anz, he has changed his position in fundamental ways since 1956, which was made evident by his lecture at the symposium on »Kierkegaard and German Philosophy« in Copenhagen in November 1979. Yet, there is reason to continue to examine his work of 1956.

It is remarkable that neither Anz nor Løgstrup, in their interpretations of Kierkegaard’s writings, has paid due consideration to the edifying or »upbuilding« works. In this connection it should be borne in mind what Kierkegaard writes in the draft of one of his proposed lectures on »The Dialectic of Ethical and Ethical-Religious Communication.« (1847).

»Especially in the communication of ethical truth and partially in the communication of ethical-religious truth, the indirect method is the most rigorous form. Yet a more direct form which runs parallel to this can also be necessary in order to support that by which in another sense it is itself supported. This I have understood right from the beginning of my activity as an author. Therefore along with the pseudonymous there always was direct communication in the guise of the edifying or upbuilding discourses, and the last few years I have used direct communication almost exclusively.«

According to Kierkegaard’s own opinion, the edifying and the pseudonymous writings support each other, and consequently it is also necessary to let them interpret each other if one wishes to do justice to his intentions and discover his real meaning.

For Kierkegaard, creation-centered faith has least of all to do with the
attempts to prove God's existence and their rather questionable results. He never tires of speaking ironically of such attempts to produce reliable and convincing proofs of God's existence. These attempts, he says, only mean that God must sit in Heaven waiting for it to be decided whether he exists at all, and so he finally comes into existence with the help of some proofs.7

For to prove the existence of one who is present is the most shameless affront, since it is an attempt to make him ridiculous; but unfortunately people have no inkling of this and for sheer seriousness regard it as a pious undertaking. But how could it occur to anybody to prove that he exists, unless one had permitted oneself to ignore him before,« as Kierkegaard has it in his Concluding Unscientific Postscript. To make the God-idea crown the proud edifice of »the system« in which the whole complexity of existence is explained means that God is made into a mere product of thought and laced up in the system's straitjacket. »It must be the very devil to be God in that manner,« adds Climacus.8

If the doctrine of the God of creation becomes an expression of worship, — as a prayer or a hymn of praise — one must acknowledge that it has a predominant place in Kierkegaard's writings. In his own words, it expresses both fear and bliss, — fear of not being able to act without being in God, and bliss in the conviction that God is always near one who calls for His help.9

The first article of the Creed expresses three essential tenets which distinguish the Christian belief in God; 1) God is the creator of Heaven and Earth, 2) He is almighty, 3) He takes fatherly and loving care of his creation. In Kierkegaard's writings his references to God as the Father Almighty, the Supreme Lord, are probably the most conspicuous and striking feature. But the idea of God the Creator who takes constant and fatherly care of his creation is indissolubly connected with the idea of omnipotence.

In The Gospel of Suffering (1847) Kierkegaard writes, »But what indeed is all eternal truth other than this: that God rules? And what is obedience except this: letting God rule? And what other connection and agreement is indeed possible between the temporal and the eternal than: that God rules and allowing God to rule!«10

This compact formula with its central content is expounded by Kierkegaard in a variety of ways. At the basis of the idea of omnipotence are statements regarding God's creation out of nothing. »For God who creates
out of nothing, who almightily takes from nothing says, »Let there be.« And as everything has come into existence through God's omnipotence, it is the same power that continues to maintain and to bear the whole of existence. If, for a single instant, the world were to be without God, it would be reduced to nothing again.

In his kingdom of infinite space the Creator sustains the stars and at the same time, with fatherly care, concerns himself with the sparrow. The whole creation bears witness to his omnipotence. He is present also in the world of events, in the slightest occurrence as well as in the greatest. Invisible, he has put on the visible world like a garment.

Because, although hidden, the Almighty is omnipresent, the fundamental conditions of human life are determined by the fact that, every moment, man exists in the presence of God. He has been created out of nothing, so he belongs to God as a bondservant, and in such a way as no bondservant has ever belonged to an earthly master, who nevertheless concedes that thoughts and feelings are free. But he belongs to God in every thought, the most hidden, in every feeling, the most private, in every motion, the most inward. Consequently, the highest state a man can attain is not to be free and independent but to be capable of being an instrument in the hands of Governance.

As Kierkegaard's emphasis on the omnipotent sovereignty of God in relation to man is one of the most prominent features in his writings, it would be strange if this contention were not clearly shown in his essential description of man. In his anthropological thinking, however, Kierkegaard uses for the most part the same terminology as German idealism — in spite of his increasingly intense struggle against this movement. The question whether he was able to avoid being fundamentally influenced has long been the subject of debate. Wilhelm Anz, in his work cited above, maintains that Kierkegaard, in spite of his vigorous protest against Hegel's philosophy, shows a fundamental conformity with Hegel's idealistic thinking in his conception of the spirit which results from existential dialectics. In Kierkegaard the ontological sovereignty of the subjective view prevails over objective religious truth, according to Anz. A human spirit as a synthesis of the finite and the infinite knows only the reality built up by itself — self-created truth. This is the reason why the theological view of creation-centered faith is missing in Kierkegaard, and therefore the accomplished synthesis
between the finite and the infinite leads to the annihilation of the finite.\textsuperscript{17}  

First a few words concerning Anz's criticism when it is taken to mean that the Creator's sovereignty is dethroned by man's sovereignty as a spirit and a self. In \textit{The Sickness Unto Death} (1849), Kierkegaard's anthropological definitions reach their greatest precision. In this book man is seen as a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of things temporal and eternal, of possibility and necessity. But the relation between the conditions which make up the synthesis and which is inherently present, does not yet constitute man as a self. Not until this combination of opposites is related to an ideal relation can one speak about the self as a positive third condition. As this is also expressed in the formula, »the self relates itself to itself,« it becomes clear that, on the one hand, the self stands for the ideal or absolute relation, and on the other for man as standing in relation to it. When the self is related to the absolute self, it thereby is related to the power that has »established« it. In other words, through this relation man finds his relation to God. Despair, the sickness unto death, arises out of the inevitable relation of the self to its Creator and results when this relation is out of order. If a man is not conscious of himself as spirit and self, he cannot be helped out of his despair. For he can as little free himself from the God-relation as he can get rid of God's »co-knowing« with him in the relation of conscience.\textsuperscript{18} The formula in \textit{The Sickness Unto Death} which defines faith — the state in which there is no despair at all — is expressed as follows: »in relating itself to itself and in willing to be itself, the self rests transparently in the power that established it.«\textsuperscript{19} That man becomes transparent before God as the basis of his life means that he is conscious of his relation to God and does not try to conceal this from himself or to hide from God's presence. As a synthesis of spirit and \textit{sjæl}, man is by no means master of his situation or of absolute truth. Instead, he is inescapably bound to his Creator whose supreme power is the chief factor in his existence.

God created man in his own image. But God is spirit, and, as in man, the expression of spirit is not physically visible. As far as man is spirit — and this is his invisible glory — he can and shall praise the Creator in worship. »Man and God are like one another, not directly, but inversely; only when the infinite God has become the eternal, omnipresent object of worship, and man is always a worshipper, only then are they like to one another.« Thus Kierkegaard has it in his discourse, »How Splendid it is to
be a Man.«20 »Splendid to be clad like the lily, yet more splendid to be the erect sovereign, but most splendid to be nothing, in adoration!«21 This quotation, taken from the same discourse, with its emphasis upon »being nothing«, leads to the question whether man's God-relation means that the finite is annihilated (Anz) or that real, temporal, earthly life has nothing to do with eternity (Løgstrup).

The second part of Either-Or contains a section about mysticism which is of interest in this connection. Kierkegaard has Judge William point out that one can truly say that the mystic chooses himself absolutely. But he chooses himself in his complete isolation, since the whole world is dead and annihilated to him. He has fallen in love with God, but it could be argued that he disdains God's love, since he disdains the reality of the existence to which God has assigned him. Judge William regards the life of a mystic as a deceit against the world in which he lives and against the people with whom he is connected. The Judge goes on to say that »hardly could a more frightful thing be conceived than that there might be a collision between love for God and love for the persons for whom love has been planted by Him in our hearts.«22

There is no reason to doubt that the proffered criticism of mysticism expresses Kierkegaard's own conception. The same ideas can be found in other places in his writings, for example in Works of Love. In the section dealing with our duty to love the people we see, Kierkegaard refers to 1 John 4:20: »for he who does not love his brother whom he has seen, cannot love God whom he has not seen.« The apostle means, argues Kierkegaard, that this is a divine statement opposed to human enthusiasm which feels that the more one neglects the people he sees, the more he loves the unseen God. »But when this is the case, God is changed to an unreal something, a fancy. Such a thing can occur only to a hypocrite or to a deceiver in order to find an escape, or to one who misrepresents God, as if God were grasping for his own interest and his being loved, rather than that the holy God is gracious and therefore always points away from himself, saying, as it were, 'If you wish to love me, love the men you see. Whatever you do for them you do for me' ... Christian love is not supposed to vault into heaven, for it comes from heaven and with heaven ... But we men talk about finding the perfect person in order to love him ... We men want to look upward in order to look for the perfect object (but the direction is
always towards the unseen), but in Christ perfection looked down to earth and loved the person it saw.«23

In his *A Reckoning with Kierkegaard*, Løgstrup recurs several times to the assertion in *Works of Love* that, Christianly understood, love for one's fellow man consists in helping him to love God. »All other actions seem to be without connection to this ethical-religious demand. Never once has the ethical shut itself up and kept all the world out as has happened with Kierkegaard.«24 With this critical interpretation of the statement there exists an obvious contradiction to other statements in *Works of Love* where Kierkegaard wants to show how Christian love should permeate every condition of life. But this contradiction is illusory. According to Kierkegaard, to help one's neighbor to love God does not mean to support him in his private piety, but to help him fulfil the role in life that God has given to him.25

In his discourse on 1 Cor. 13:5, Kierkegaard develops the outlook that »love seeks not its own,« but what is appropriate for each individual. With infinite love God concerns himself with all the variety of nature — even to the point of letting a small flower become distinctive (»eiendommeligt«). Divine love »makes infinite distinctions in loving the differences«. Thus every man who has the courage to be himself also has distinctiveness (»Eiendommelighed«) which he has received as a gift from the Creator. Seen in this way, true love loves every human being according to his or her individuality.26

An additional quotation from *Works of Love* will not be out of place:

»People usually warn piously against wasting God's gifts, but which of God's gifts can be compared to love, which he implanted in man's heart — alas, and then to see it wasted in this way! The shrewd foolishly think that one wastes his time in loving imperfect, weak men. I should think that this would be making use of one's love, employing it. But to be unable to find an object, to waste love in vainly seeking, to waste it in empty space by loving the invisible — this is truly to waste it ...

Understand that the mistake lies in your conception of love that it should be a demand ... that it is the very reverse of a requirement, that it is a credit (Tilgodehavende) to which God binds you.«27

Kierkegaard expresses his conviction that eternity has to do with earthly and temporal life in two of his most distinctive conceptions, namely »the
double movement of infinity« and »the repetition,« — both of which he develops in different connections. In *The Sickness Unto Death*, for example, the meaning of the double movement can be shown in the following thought: »To become oneself is to become concrete. But to become concrete means neither to become finite nor infinite, for that which has to become concrete is a synthesis. Accordingly, the development consists in moving away from oneself infinitely by the process of infinitizing oneself, and in returning to oneself infinitely by the process of finitizing.« The examples of different forms of despair that Kierkegaard cites show plainly what he wants to say by the words »to become concrete«. In the despair of infinity when man wishes to be wholly infinite, he becomes fantastic in his attitude. For instance, he may lose himself in abstract sentimentality; or he may acquire a large amount of knowledge but not advance in self-knowledge to the same extent; or make great decisions but let the matter rest there, so that a part of the task which could have been completed in the concrete situation of the present moment is not carried out.

In a similar way, the despair of possibility, which consists in the lack of necessity, may be described as the absence of strength to obey, to submit to the necessary in one's self, to that which constitutes man's limitations.

To sum up, man may be said to be in despair if he tries to break away from his given natural and historical situation which he cannot deal with after his own devices as it is enclosed by God's commanding, creative will. In the same way, the despair of finiteness is described as a lack of infinity, as having deprived oneself of one's primitivity, as not being oneself, but merely a number in a grey mass. The despair of necessity in turn, may be characterized as fatalism or triviality. To this despair Kierkegaard advances the conviction of the belief that »with God all things are possible«.

But yet one wonders whether Kierkegaard has described the first stage of the double movement of infinity in a way that makes man as a created being inferior to man as an existing, eternal and infinite, spirit with the power to create his own reality. This is the opinion of Wilhelm Anz as well as of K. E. Løgstrup.

Kierkegaard uses many different expressions to describe the first movement of infinity. He speaks of self-annihilation, of becoming nothing, of man realizing that before God he is always in the wrong, of not being capable of accomplishing anything by oneself, of infinite resignation, of
letting the world go to ruin, of dying away from immediateness, of infinitely getting away from oneself by making the self infinite.

In this connection Kierkegaard’s point of departure is the Biblical belief, which according to him is basic, that God created man out of nothing. This is as true of man as of nature. Yet, in the world of nature everything is unconditional obedience, and everything is, as it were, nothing, for it exists by the will of God. The very instant that it might not be God’s will, it has ceased to exist. As far as he is spirit, man shall, in liberty and responsibility, give expression to the same obedience in the understanding that without God’s will he is not even capable of lifting a finger. Man has been created to take everything from God’s hand in obedience to his conscience, and so the highest perfection that he can attain is to express the belief that, without God, he is not able to accomplish anything. In this attitude lies the bliss of faith. For the belief that man is not capable of accomplishing anything by himself is the negative expression for the fact that he is capable of everything by the help of God. Becoming nothing does not mean the obliteration of the self in its distinctiveness, but rather of the selfishness that wants to put itself in the place of God. Nor does it mean that man’s actual situation is to be ignored. For the movement of infinite resignation is not to become man’s whole religion. This might lead to the knight of infinite resignation becoming lost in a kind of dreamy contemplation of the omnipotent deity. But this would be to take God in vain, as Kierkegaard has it in his discourse, »Man’s Need of God Constitutes his Highest Perfection.«

Just as resignation must have the character of an unfinished movement within the double movement of infinity in order to be true, so shall man’s belief that he is not capable of accomplishing anything be a preparation for his being blessed by God with the assurance of his destiny. God does not want man to lounge in a kind of spiritual effeminacy in the contemplation of his glory, but he wants to create a new man. For where God is truly present, there one always finds creativity. If a man lets God rule, the result is both the realization of his own God-given destiny, and a contribution to the realization of God’s intentions for his fellow men. When God is allowed to rule in a man’s life, one will discover his neighbor and one’s duty to love him, as Kierkegaard has it in Works of Love.

The category of repetition, which corresponds closely to the double
movement of infinity, has been posited by Kierkegaard as the Christian concept answering to the Greek notion of »recollection«. Repetition is Kierkegaard's attempt to explain how man can, by freely taking responsibility for his life and acknowledging his guilt, can cancel the repetitive condition through which evil returns (i.e. sin), and can instead create the condition necessary for the good (i.e. faith). Man's efforts alone, however, only lead him to despair over the possibility of a repetition of the good. But this possibility can be made actual by believing in the forgiveness of sins which wipes out the despair of »the old Adam« and gives birth to a willingness in »the new man« to let himself be created by God. Then, in this condition of penitence, Christ dwells in man and fights the good fight against despair which is not overcome once and for all. »It was Christ who came in the fullness of time; it was He who completed what the Father had begun, He who completed the creation and transformed the shape of the world,« as Kierkegaard writes in The Gospel of Suffering.37 The fact that Christ has come into the world, thereby confronting every man with the necessity »to have an opinion about Him,« is the conclusion that Kierkegaard draws in The Sickness Unto Death.38

By faith, the believer is helped to become wholly contemporary with himself, a thought which Kierkegaard develops in one of his discourses on »The Anxieties of the Heathen«. (Christian Discourses, 1848)

»The believer is present ... therefore he is quit of the next day. One who rows a boat turns his back to the goal towards which he labours. ... When by the help of eternity a man lives absorbed in today, he turns his back to the next day. The more he is eternally absorbed in today, the more decisively does he turn his back upon the next day, so that he does not see it at all ... whereas by the help of eternity he sees quite clearly today and its task ... One might think that the believer would be very far from the eternal when he turns his back to it and lives today, while the glimpseer stands and looks towards it. And yet it is the believer who is nearest the eternal, while the apocalyptic visionary is farthest from the eternal. Faith turns its back to the eternal in order precisely to have this with him today.«39

This examination of the place and importance of the first article of the Creed in Kierkegaard's writings has not touched upon the final writings included in The Attack Upon »Christendom«, distinguished as they are by their strongly ascetic pronouncements which sound hostile to life and
creation. In my book, *Efterføljdens teologi hos Søren Kierkegaard*, (»The Imitation of Christ in the Thought of Kierkegaard,« 1956), I tried to show that in the satiric statements which make up the attack upon »Christendom«, there is not only an array of conscious exaggerations and one-sided arguments, but also a modification in essential points in Kierkegaard's way of thinking occurring over a stretch of several years. Such a change can be seen in his view of Christianity as a religion of hidden inwardness; in his stress upon self-denial as a Christian practice; in his perception of Christ as the pattern; and in his thoughts on individual and community life.

This change, however, does not have its source in a new conception of God, the father almighty, maker of heaven and earth, but, as far as it can be discovered, is based upon an ever more intense demand to express one's following of Christ in imitation. It would be too involved, in this connection, to deal with the problems of Kierkegaard's conceptions of creation and providence. But it is clear that only if one chooses to interpret Kierkegaard backwards, as it were, by viewing all of his writings in the light of the final period, can one put a negative or downright hostile stamp on his view of creation-centered faith.

NOTES

(Note: The translations from Kierkegaard's works have been taken from the English editions listed in McKinnon's *Kierkegaard Indices*, Vol. I., *Kierkegaard in Translation*. The references in the footnotes are to the Danish Second Edition of Kierkegaard's Works, *Samlede Vaerker* — cited here as *S.V.*)

1. *S.V.* IV, p. 318, note.
8. *S.V.* VII, 536, 142.
10. *S.V.* VIII, 400.
12. *S.V.* XII, 177; *Papirer*, II A 622.

4 Kierkegaardiana XII
15. S.V.² IX, 135.
16. S.V.² IX, 103.
17. Anz, op. cit. p. 69 f.
18. S.V.² XI, 147; VII, 169.
20. S.V.² VIII, 326 ff.
21. S.V.² VIII, 328.
22. S.V.² II, 260-270. cf. VI, 186 f.
23. S.V.² IX, 183 f. See also IX, 198 f.
26. S.V.² IX, 300-308.
27. S.V.² IX, 187.
29. Løgstrup's distinction between compassion and mercy (op. cit. p. 94) according to which mercy does not get any further than resigned sympathy, cannot fail to remind one of Kierkegaard's notion of a sentiment that has become fantastic.
31. S.V.² IX, 121 f.
32. S.V.² XI, 36; VII, 232.
34. S.V.² V, 116.
35. S.V.² IX, 72, 94.
36. Papirer, IV B 111 (p. 267); S.V.² XI, 145 f. Compare this to Løgstrup's opinion, op. cit. p. 33: »Faith does not consist in being restored to new life through forgiveness, but it consists in a life beyond man's created possibilities and comprehension, — — it consists in the imitation of Christ.«
37. S.V.² VIII, 395.
38. S.V.² XI, 269 f.
39. S.V.² X, 90 f.