
CRITIQUE

Kierkegaard on Knowledge and Faith

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Introduction

Louis P. Pojman has claimed to find in the Climacus writings an implicit argument to the effect that the truth of Christianity can be rationally known. The success of this claim rests on two crucial assumptions: first, that Kierkegaard embraced the Platonic doctrine of recollection; and second, that Kierkegaard thought that there could be objective knowledge of the historical existence of God. My aim in this paper is to show that there is not adequate textual evidence to support either of these assumptions; and hence, that Pojman does not succeed in making his case for the epistemological reading of Kierkegaard.

I

In his book *The Logic of Subjectivity*, Pojman draws our attention to various passages in Kierkegaard's private papers where it seems that he endorses the Platonic doctrine of recollection.¹ In one such passage, dated 1844, Kierkegaard writes:

With respect to the existence of God, immortality, etc., in short, with respect to all problems of immanence, recollection applies; it exists altogether in every man, only he does not know it, but it again follows that the conception may be very inadequate.²

And in another passage from the following year, he remarks: "I do not believe that God exists, but know it; whereas I believe that God has existed (the historical)."³ In further support of his thesis, Pojman reminds us that the maieutic method of Socrates formed the very cornerstone of Kierkegaard's theory of indirect communication. In a passage dated 1847, Kierkegaard argues that all communication of the ethical must be indirect, since every individual possesses knowledge of the ethical.⁴

The general idea behind the epistemological argument is that Kierkegaard believes the truth of Christianity can be recollected through the passionate subjectivity of faith. The argument, which Pojman claims is implicit in the *Postscript*, proceeds roughly in the following way. According to Kierkegaard, there are two possible ways to be related to the eternal truth, either in objective reflection or in subjective reflection. Since the objective way of reflection is shown to fail in this regard, it is concluded that eternal truth can only be reached through the process of subjective reflection. But not just any form of subjectivity will do. Only the subjectivity of Christian faith, which results from reflection on the Absolute Paradox, is sufficient to raise the passions to the height necessary to realize the eternal truth. In this condition of maximal passion, the finiteness of human existence is momentarily transcended and the eternal truth is guaranteed. Thus, Pojman continues:

If maximal passion guarantees believing in a true proposition, and if Christianity is the proposition necessary to raise the passions to their peak, then one cannot be wrong when one believes in Christianity. If this is so, we can know that Christianity is objectively true.⁵

On this view, “maximal subjectivity is a sufficient condition for having metaphysical knowledge, even when it is of the highest kind, centered on the absolute paradox.”⁶

If Pojman is correct, then it would appear that commentators have misunderstood the motivation for Kierkegaard’s rejection of traditional apologetics. The currently dominant view is that Kierkegaard regarded the objective or rational nature of the apologetic inquiry as an obstacle to spiritual development, and hence, as ultimately destructive of Christianity.⁷

According to the epistemological reading, however, Kierkegaard rejected proofs for the existence of God because he viewed them as “simply redundant and improper ways to get the [objective] truth.”⁸ The failure of objective inquiry, on this view, is that it uses the wrong means to get to the right goal.⁹ Or, somewhat differently: the objective inquirer seeks to reach by objective means that which is already available subjectively through recollection.¹⁰

Given Kierkegaard’s repeated assertions to the effect that Christianity exists only in subjectivity,¹¹ and that objectivity, when viewed as highest, is precisely irreligious,¹² it would appear that Pojman reveals a profoundly anti-Christian Kierkegaard.¹³

This consequence is then developed to show that Kierkegaard’s argument in the *Postscript* leads to an absurd conclusion.¹⁴ The demonstration proceeds roughly as follows. If the truth of Christianity could be objectively known, then the element of risk, which Kierkegaard considers essential to cultivating the passionate inwardness of faith, would be removed. In order to sustain the condition of faith, it would then be

necessary to invent another paradox, a new absurdity. But then the very process of faith (subjectivity) used to generate knowledge would turn out to be self-defeating, for every possible candidate absurdity would be annulled in that moment its objective truth became known.¹⁵

It is, however, highly implausible to suppose that Kierkegaard had consciously set out to construct a Christian epistemology.¹⁶ This point is firmly supported by his frequent insistence that the realms of knowledge and faith be kept entirely distinct.¹⁷ It is further supported, ironically, by Pojman's own demonstration of the disastrous consequences this would have for the religious purpose of the authorship.

Nevertheless, this does not rule out the possibility that the premises of Pojman's argument are in fact implicit in Kierkegaard's writings. Indeed, it is not claimed that the epistemological reading is faithful to Kierkegaard's stated intentions, only that it correctly draws the logical implications of the argument developed in the *Postscript*. In what follows, I shall try to show that there are compelling reasons for rejecting even this more modest claim.

II

Let us begin with the primary assumption underlying the epistemological reading, namely, that Kierkegaard fully embraced the Platonic doctrine of recollection.

We know from passages such as those cited above, and in particular from extensive discussions in *The Concept of Irony*,¹⁸ *Either/Or*,¹⁹ *Philosophical Fragments*,²⁰ *Repetition*,²¹ and *Stages on Life's Way*,²² that Kierkegaard was much occupied with the notion of recollection. The first thing to be observed is that his use of the word (in Danish *Erindring*) does not appear to be entirely uniform across these contexts. In some places, it describes a process of moral reflection, the examination of the moral conscience.²³ In other places, the reference is to the familiar philosophical doctrine adumbrated in Plato's middle dialogues. But even where Kierkegaard invokes the latter sense of the word, there remains a question as to how he aligns himself with the metaphysical presuppositions of the Platonic doctrine.

In the *Postscript*, for example, Kierkegaard explains that although the principle of recollection belongs to Socrates as well as to Plato, there is an important difference in the way that principle frames their respective modes of inquiry: "This proposition [all knowledge is recollection] is not for Socrates a cue to the speculative enterprise, and hence he does not follow it up; essentially it becomes a Platonic principle."²⁴ Socrates gives recollection an ironic-negative determination. On the one hand, knowledge of the eternal truth requires taking oneself back in eternity through recollection; while on the other hand, this possibility is constantly nullified by the claims that existence makes upon the individual.²⁵ Thus: "In order to gain a foothold, Socrates argues *e concessis* by positing the good as the pleasurable, and the knowledge he thereby vindicates becomes the

art of measurement ... But such a knowledge essentially cancels itself, since it always presupposes itself."²⁶ Whereas Plato uses the doctrine of recollection to develop a positive theory of knowledge, Socrates emphasizes the essential tension between existence and recollection, the result of which is a theory of knowledge that is self-annihilating.²⁷

In *The Concept of Irony*, Kierkegaard draws a distinction between the historical Socrates of the early dialogues and the Platonic Socrates of the middle and late dialogues. This distinction is later reaffirmed in the pseudonymous authorship. In the *Fragments*, for example, Climacus declares that it would scarcely have occurred to (the historical) Socrates to demand a proof for the existence of God. Rather, he presupposed God's existence and sought "to interpenetrate nature with the idea of purpose."²⁸ Nor did Socrates seek proofs for the immortality of the soul. Instead, he wagered his life unconditionally upon it "as if it were the surest thing of all."²⁹ This interpretation is not without textual support. In the *Crito*, Socrates reveals his faith in immortality,³⁰ while in the *Gorgias* it is openly declared.³¹ But nowhere in the so-called "elenctic" dialogues does Socrates offer a proof for the immortality of the soul.

These early dialogues portray a Socrates who conceives of thought and action as standing in a dialectical relation to each other. It is not enough to possess immanent knowledge of the ethical; one then has the task of becoming an ethical individual. As Kierkegaard puts the point: "The ethical does not begin with ignorance which is to be changed to knowledge, but begins with knowledge and demands realization."³²

Kierkegaard does not take the Socratic proposition that virtue (*ἀρετή*) is knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*) to mean that virtue can be achieved only through intellectual insight into the nature of right and wrong. Ethical knowledge must be exhibited in a technique; it is knowing *how* to be ethical. Or in Kierkegaard's words, one may be said to possess ethical understanding only in proportion to becoming that which one understands.³³

In the early dialogues, Socrates employs the elenctic method of argumentation for the exclusive purpose of investigating ethical propositions. It can be argued that his primary aim in this is not to produce objective knowledge, but rather to produce character and action. It will be remembered that Socrates uses the word *ἐπιστήμη* (knowledge) in two senses: first, to denote "subjective certainty", in the sense that "S knows that p" does not presuppose "p is true"; and second, to denote "skill" or "practical ability", in the sense of knowing how to do something. This latter sense of the word, which is equivalent to *τέχνη* (skill), is especially clear in those passages where Socrates draws an analogy between virtue and the crafts.³⁴

For Kierkegaard, the decisive factor in Socratic thought is not the intellectual, but a profound faith in the ability of every individual to develop a "technique of morality", and thereby to achieve the practical certainty that is founded upon competence.³⁵ As Kierkegaard explains: "The significance of Socratic ignorance was precisely to keep ethics from

becoming scholarly knowledge – instead of practice. There is nothing more dangerous than to transform into scholarly knowledge something which should be practiced.”³⁶ The epistemological reading of Kierkegaard assumes an intellectual and aesthetic element that stands in direct opposition to all that Kierkegaard admired and emulated in Socrates.

How then does this insight into Kierkegaard’s appreciation of Socrates help us to understand the remark that it is possible to recollect knowledge of God’s existence?

There is an implicit assumption throughout the authorship that we have a primitive capacity to introspect and to discover something about our essential nature or *telos*. But there is also an implicit assumption that we have, in some nonstandard sense of the word, knowledge of God, in so far as God is the power that constitutes and sustains our being. In his private papers, Kierkegaard tells us that this knowledge is grounded in conscience (*Samvittighed*).³⁷ In the *Postscript*, conscience is characterized as a kind of knowledge we share with God (*Samviden*).³⁸

There is in Kierkegaard’s choice of the word *Samviden* (co-knowledge) as opposed to *Viden* (knowledge) a clear etymological implication that he does not have a propositional conception of knowledge in mind here,³⁹ but rather something closer to what Bertrand Russell called “knowledge by acquaintance”, in so far as it involves a direct apprehension of its object.⁴⁰

It would not be implausible to suppose, therefore, that there is a sense in which the development of conscience is at the same time a kind of recollection of God. In this sense of recollection, however, there is no presumption that the process it describes yields objectively certain knowledge of its content, it is characterized rather as a process of moral and spiritual development through which the individual strives to become transparent in the power that grounds its being.⁴¹ This transparency before God, as Kierkegaard explains in *The Sickness Unto Death*, is precisely the religious conscience.⁴²

Consider Kierkegaard’s Abraham. It is through the terrible crisis of conscience, striving to align himself with the divine will, that Abraham develops a deep and abiding relationship with God. It would constitute a profound misreading of *Fear & Trembling* to suppose that Abraham knew (in the sense of having a true justified belief) that it was God who spoke to him through the medium of conscience. Indeed, the coherence of Kierkegaard’s text depends on this not being the case. For otherwise Abraham is not the revered “knight of faith”, and the concepts of trial (*Prøvelse*) and temptation (*Anfægtelse*) have no religious significance. The epistemological reading of Kierkegaard assumes an intellectual and aesthetic element that stands in direct opposition to all that Kierkegaard admired and emulated in Abraham.

The anti-epistemological interpretation is directly supported by another passage in Kierkegaard’s private papers, where he writes:

It is a thought just as beautiful as profound ... which Plato expresses when he says that all knowledge is recollection ... But ... here in the world of knowledge there rests upon man a curse (blessing) which bids him eat his bread in the sweat of his brow.⁴³

This is, once again, the Socratic insight that the spiritual principle must be expressed existentially. It should not be forgotten, however, that Kierkegaard sees Christianity as making an advance upon the Socratic. For there is a qualitative difference between the Socratic level of conscience, which is a purely *immanent* awareness of the spiritual principle, and the Christian level of conscience, which is potentiated in the encounter with a *transcendent* revelation. Because he lacked revelation, "Socrates did not have the true ideal, neither the conception of sin, nor that the salvation of man requires a crucified God."⁴⁴ Thus, Socrates possessed only a limited conception of the divine. In Christianity, Socratic ignorance is replaced by the definite revelation of Christ, whose life becomes the ideal pattern for our moral and spiritual development.

Far from claiming that recollection forms the basis for a Christian epistemology, Kierkegaard sees it as part of a dialectical process of moral and spiritual growth, a process through which believers strive to align themselves in conscience with the will of God. Thus Kierkegaard says that knowledge of God is essentially a transformation of the individual: "God does not ... entrust the religious to every frivolous or curious observer, but only to a person in proportion to his being existentially transformed."⁴⁵

III

Let us turn now to the second assumption underlying the epistemological reading of Kierkegaard, namely, that he thought there could be objective knowledge of God's historical existence. There are good reasons for thinking that Kierkegaard wanted to deny the possibility of there being such knowledge. In the *Fragments*,⁴⁶ for example, he distinguishes sharply between objects appropriate to belief and objects appropriate to knowledge. Like Plato, Kierkegaard maintains that belief grasps contingent facts, while knowledge is reserved for objects which are eternal and unchanging in nature. A brief discussion of this distinction is now in order.

Kierkegaard's understanding of knowledge and belief is tied to a particular view of history, which in turn rests on a fundamental distinction between actual and logical change. The conceptual model of change presented in the "Interlude" is a simplified version of the model developed by Aristotle in the *Physics*.⁴⁷ Kierkegaard divides all change into two basic types. The first type of change, κίνησις (*kinesis*), designates the transition from possibility to actuality, or coming into existence.⁴⁸ The second type of change, ἀλλοίωσις (*alloiosis*), designates change with respect to the quality or accidental features of a pre-existing subject.⁴⁹ The

salient feature of κίνησις is that it presupposes an agent who freely chooses to actualize a possibility. All coming into existence is thus effected by free agency. The salient feature of ἀλλοίωσις is that it falls under the rubric of logical necessity.

Kierkegaard distinguishes the modal notions of possibility, actuality, and necessity in the following way. Possibility is defined as that which has the potential to come into being, while actuality is defined as potential that has been realized. It is by virtue of κίνησις that potential being is transformed into actual being.⁵⁰ Possibility and actuality are thus shown to differ not in essence, but in their mode of being.⁵¹ Necessity, by contrast, is defined as that which eternally is. To say that something is necessary is to affirm that its being is identical with its essence.⁵² In more modern terms, a state of affairs *x* is said to be *possible* if and only if it is logically possible for *x* to come into existence; *actual*, if and only if it now exists; and *necessary*, if and only if it always has and always will exist.

Given this interpretation of the modal concepts, Kierkegaard concludes that the necessary cannot come into existence. The argument is as follows: (1) in order for *x* to come into existence it must suffer a change, but (2) if *x* is necessary, then it cannot suffer any change. Therefore, it follows that (3) if *x* is necessary, then it cannot come into existence.⁵³ Everything that comes into existence does so by virtue of a “freely effecting cause” (i.e. human agency), which in turn points to the existence of an “absolutely freely effecting cause” (i.e. divine agency).⁵⁴

Historical existence, which bears the mark of actuality, denotes a dynamic flux of movement and change, while the logical, which bears the mark of necessity, denotes a static realm of ideas entirely devoid of actual change. The speculative blurring of this fundamental distinction between the logical and the actual is objectionable for three reasons: first, because it confuses reasons with causes;⁵⁵ next, because it confuses the past with the future;⁵⁶ and finally, because it confuses freedom with necessity. In as much as the change of coming into existence occurs in freedom, all historical events are contingent and could have happened otherwise.⁵⁷

Kierkegaard then addresses the problem of how the historical is to be apprehended. He begins by distinguishing between the immediate happening of an event and the historical *per se*. It is explained that the happening of an event is a matter about which one can be certain. That is, one can be certain about the immediate content of one’s consciousness (as, for example, when a subject claims to be “appeared to” in a certain manner, where “appeared to” is used in a descriptive, phenomenological sense). However, once an event becomes past, and this occurs as soon as one begins to reflect upon it, the “how” and “what” of the happening become subject to doubt.⁵⁸ Wherever the dialectic of coming into existence is involved, as is the case in relation to the historical past, there is an uncertainty attaching to even the “most certain” of events.⁵⁹

Although the actuality of a state of affairs can be grasped in immediate sensation, it is only the specious present of the actual that is apprehended.⁶⁰ As a consequence, the actuality of a state of affairs is not itself a sufficient basis upon which to establish its possibility. Given that immediate sensation cannot grasp possibility, it follows that it cannot grasp the historical either:

The historical cannot be given immediately to the senses, since the *elusiveness* of coming into existence is involved in it. The immediate impression of a natural phenomenon or of an event is not the impression of the historical, for the coming into existence involved cannot be sensed immediately, but only the immediate presence.⁶¹

It would not be incorrect, of course, to say that the immediate presence of an event involves a coming into existence, for otherwise it would not be the historical.⁶² The salient point is that what can be sensed immediately is not the coming into existence itself, but rather the *issue* of the coming into existence.⁶³ When an observer sees a star, for example, she may be certain that she is being appeared to in a particular way. This is not something she merely believes, but something that is “directly evident” to her, and hence something she knows.⁶⁴ However, once the star is posited as the cause of the appearance, it becomes subject to doubt.⁶⁵ There are no grounds for making the cognitive inference from effect to cause, to the “indirectly evident”, since for the immediate apprehension it merely is.⁶⁶

The historical can be apprehended only by virtue of there being a cognitive faculty whose structure is itself analogous to the historical. This faculty is belief.⁶⁷ The historical comes into being by pre-empting alternative possible futures. In analogous fashion, belief comes into existence by virtue of pre-empting alternative possibilities of knowledge. Just as the transition of coming into existence involves a leap which cannot be construed in logical terms, so the transition from the many possibilities of knowledge to the single reality of belief is not necessitated by knowledge, but is an act of will.⁶⁸ It is through the exercise of will that the individual’s personality reveals itself. The will to believe is a fundamental expression of the individual’s freedom.⁶⁹

The type of belief described here is equivalent to opinion, in that it is an objectively uncertain judgment concerning the truth of an empirical proposition. Kierkegaard understood this to be the proper philosophical use of the word: “What the modern philosophy understands by faith is what properly is called an opinion, or what is loosely called in everyday speech believing.”⁷⁰ It is this sense of the word “belief” that corresponds to ordinary historical events. It is also in this sense of the word that it is appropriate to speak of beliefs as being more or less probable. For while it is true that all historical beliefs are subject to doubt, not all beliefs are doubtful in the same degree.

The event of Incarnation is not an ordinary historical event, however, because it presupposes the coming into existence of God. More specifically, God's appearance in history signals the Absolute Paradox. The difficulty of the paradox lies in the fact that there cannot be an empirical or even a purely immediate relationship to God, who is spirit.⁷¹ It follows that the relationship to God in time cannot be one of belief in the philosophical sense of the word:

To have an opinion presupposes a sense of ease and security in life ... [I]t is a privilege not to be enjoyed by one who must keep himself in readiness night and day, or is without assured means of support. Such is my situation in the realm of spirit.⁷²

The only relationship that an existing individual can have to a spiritual being is the spiritual relationship of faith.⁷³

But what is meant here by a "spiritual relationship"? In Kierkegaard's private papers it is explained that "the whole intrinsic world of spirit is precisely the world of imitation."⁷⁴ Thus faith, in contrast to ordinary belief, is not based on the traditional picture of truth as a correspondence between mind and reality (*adequatio mentis ad rem*), but as a correspondence between self and God. Faith is a process through which the believer strives to bring his life into conformity with the ideal pattern of Christ.⁷⁵

It follows from the foregoing discussion that neither belief nor faith are forms of knowledge.⁷⁶ They not only represent different attitudes, but also have distinct and proprietary objects. Whereas belief is the faculty that apprehends the historical, knowledge concerns only that which is by its nature eternal and unchanging. "It is easy to see," writes Kierkegaard, "that faith is not a form of knowledge; for all knowledge is either a knowledge of the Eternal, excluding the temporal and historical as indifferent, or it is pure historical knowledge."⁷⁷ The only kind of knowledge we can have concerning historical propositions is hypothetical or logical in nature. It is possible to know, for example, that a given conditional statement is true, in so far as it can be shown that the conclusion follows logically from the premises. However, the actual existence of the state of affairs upon which the empirical judgment depends cannot be inferred from anything; it must be believed.

If the foregoing is an accurate account of Kierkegaard's position, then it is clear that God's historical existence could not be an object of knowledge, except in some abstract and uninteresting sense.

IV

In conclusion, Pojman has not succeeded in showing either that Kierkegaard endorsed the Platonic doctrine of recollection, or that he thought there could be knowledge of God's historical existence. However, I do think that Kierkegaard attempted to align himself with a

“Socratic” understanding of the way recollection stands in relation to existence, and that this interpretation is consistent with what Pojman has called the “reduplication model of subjectivity”.⁷⁸

If there is an epistemology to be found in the Climacus writings, it will find its parallel neither in the philosophical traditions of ancient Greece, nor in any of the “analytic” treatments evident in contemporary philosophy. Rather, as Kierkegaard has told us already, it will have to be an epistemology based entirely on Christian terms.⁷⁹

1. Louis P. Pojman, *The Logic of Subjectivity* (University of Alabama Press, 1984), pp. 68–71. An earlier formulation of the argument is contained in “Kierkegaard, Subjectivity and Paradox: A Response to Gregory Schufreider”, *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 13 (1981), pp. 165–169.
2. *Søren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers*, 7 vols., edited and translated by Howard Hong and Edna Hong (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1967–78), vol. 3, p. 662 (V B 40:11).
3. *Ibid.*, vol. 3, p. 404 (VI B 45).
4. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 271 (VIII 2 B 81:10).
5. Pojman, *op. cit.*, p. 140.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 71.
7. See, for example, Malcolm Diamond, “Kierkegaard and Apologetics”, *Journal of Religion* (1964), p. 123.
8. Pojman, *op. cit.*, p. 68.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 139.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 68.
11. See, for example, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, translated by David Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1941), p. 116 (SV IX, p. 108).
12. *Ibid.*, p. 70 n. (SV IX, p. 66).
13. Cf. Herbert M. Garelick, *The Anti-Christianity of Kierkegaard* (Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), pp. 59–71.
14. Pojman, *op. cit.*, p. 142.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 141.
16. *SKJP*, vol. 2, pp. 529–530 (III A 211).
17. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 7 (X⁶ B 79).
18. *The Concept of Irony*, translated by Lee M. Capel (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1965), pp. 96–98 (SV I, 113–115).
19. *Either/Or*, vols. I–II, edited and translated by Howard Hong and Edna Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), vol. I, pp. 222–225 (SV II, pp. 204–206); vol. II, p. 16 (SV III, pp. 20–21).
20. *Philosophical Fragments*, translated by David Swenson and revised by Howard Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 11 ff. (SV VI, p. 15 f.).
21. *Repetition*, edited and translated by Howard Hong and Edna Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 131–133 (SV V, pp. 115–117).
22. *Stages on Life's Way*, translated by Walter Lowrie (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1945), pp. 27–36 (SV VII, pp. 15–24).
23. For a discussion of this use of the word see Jeremy Walker, *Kierkegaard: The Descent into God* (McGill-Queen's University Press, 1985), pp. 127–146.
24. *CUP*, p. 184 (SV IX, p. 171).
25. *Ibid.*
26. *CI*, pp. 97–98 (SV I, p. 114).
27. *Ibid.*, p. 98 (SV I, p. 115).
28. *PF*, p. 54 (SV VI, p. 44).
29. *SKJP*, vol. 1, p. 27 (X² A 406).
30. *Crito*, 54b-c.
31. *Gorgias*, 523a ff.
32. *SKJP*, vol. 1, p. 271 (VIII² B 81).
33. Pojman, *op. cit.*, p. 61.
34. The most comprehensive discussion of this distinction is presented by John Gould in his book *The Development of Plato's Ethics* (Cambridge University Press, 1955). According to Gould's interpretation, it is not enough to say that there is an element of knowledge in addition to an element of skill in the Socratic *episteme*; in the sphere of morality such knowledge is expressed exclusively in action. Though this view is not shared by the majority of contemporary scholars, it seems to me that it is very close to Kierkegaard's own interpretation. For a critical appraisal of Gould's thesis see Gregory Vlastos, *Platonic Studies* (Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 204–210. An interesting discussion of these issues can be found in Jaakko Hintikka, “Knowing How, Knowing That, and Knowing What: Observations on Their Relation in Plato and Other Greek Philosophers,” in *Modality, Morality and Other Problems of Sense and Nonsense* (CWK Gleerup Bokförlag, 1973), pp. 1–12.
35. Gould, *op. cit.*, p. 66.
36. *SKJP*, vol. 4, p. 24 (XI² A 362).
37. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 320 (III A 196).
38. *CUP*, p. 138 (SV IX, p. 129). Swenson and Lowrie render *Samviden* as “complicity”.
39. It may be conceded that such knowledge can be formulated propositionally. It should be

- noted, however, that the real issue here does not concern propositions, but truth. The Platonic doctrine of recollection is thought to yield knowledge of the true justified belief variety. Kierkegaard's point seems to be that although we have something like justified belief, we do not know that it is true.
40. Bertrand Russell, "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description", in *Mysticism and Logic* (Doubleday Anchor Books, 1957), pp. 202–224.
41. *Sickness Unto Death*, translated by Walter Lowrie (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1954), pp. 147, 182 (SV XV, 74, 105).
42. *Ibid.*, p. 255 (SV XV, p. 173).
43. *SKJP*, vol. 2, p. 528 (III A 5).
44. *Ibid.*, vol. 4, pp. 213–214 (X³ A 235).
45. *Ibid.*, vol. 3, p. 420 (X³ A 609).
46. *PF*, pp. 89–110 (SV VI, pp. 67–80).
47. Kierkegaard's reading of Aristotle was supplemented by Tennemann's *Geschichte der Philosophie*, I–XII (Leipzig: 1798–1819). See especially III, pp. 125–127.
48. *PF*, p. 90 (SV VI, p. 67).
49. *Ibid.*
50. *Ibid.*, pp. 91–92 (SV VI, pp. 68–69).
51. *Ibid.*, p. 91 (SV VI, p. 68).
52. *Ibid.*
53. *Ibid.*, p. 92 (SV VI, p. 69).
54. *Ibid.*, p. 94 (SV VI, p. 70).
55. *Ibid.*, p. 93 (SV VI, p. 69).
56. *Ibid.*, p. 96 (SV VI, p. 71).
57. *Ibid.*, p. 98 (SV VI, pp. 72–73).
58. *Ibid.*, p. 104 (SV VI, p. 76).
59. *Ibid.*, p. 99 (SV VI, p. 73).
60. *Ibid.*, p. 100 (SV VI, p. 74).
61. *Ibid.*
62. *Ibid.*
63. *Ibid.*, p. 101 (SV VI, p. 75).
64. I use the expressions "directly evident" and "indirectly evident" in the technical sense given them by Roderick Chisholm in his *Theory of Knowledge* (Prentice-Hall, 1977), pp. 16–33.
65. *PF*, p. 101 (SV VI, p. 75).
66. *Ibid.*, p. 104 (SV VI, p. 76).
67. *Ibid.*, p. 101 (SV VI, p. 74).
68. *Ibid.*, p. 103 (SV VI, p. 76).
69. *Ibid.*
70. *Training in Christianity*, translated by Walter Lowrie (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 140 (SV XVI, p. 136).
71. *SKJP*, vol. 1, p. 107 (IX A 32).
72. *PF*, p. 6 (SV VI, p. 11).
73. *SKJP*, vol. 1, p. 107 (IX A 32).
74. *Ibid.*, p. 108 (IX A 32).
75. *TC*, pp. 200–202 (SV XVI, pp. 192–194).
76. *PF*, p. 105 (SV VI, p. 77).
77. *Ibid.*, p. 76 (SV VI, p. 58).
78. Pojman, *op. cit.*, p. 65.
79. *SKJP*, vol. 3, p. 496 (I A 94).