British Kierkegaard research: A historical survey
by J. Heywood Thomas and Richard Summers

The impact of Kierkegaard on British intellectual life has so far been limited.* For the most part British Kierkegaard scholarship has been the concern of a few dedicated individuals, working largely in isolation; but the contributions of these scholars, however, range over the diverse aspects of Kierkegaard's production. We shall examine these, classifying them by subject.

It seems right to start with the translations and scholarly aids on which so much depends. The first British translation, which was also a landmark in the translation of Kierkegaard into English, was Alexander Dru's edition of the Journals (The Journals of Søren Kierkegaard, a selection Edited and Translated by Alexander Dru, London 1938 with an abridged paperback edition in 1958) based on the selection by Theodor Haecker, through whom Dru was first introduced to Kierkegaard. Following Haecker Dru also translated and published on its own as The Present Age the part of A Literary Review in which Kierkegaard summarised his view of his age, together with the essay 'Of the Difference between a Genius and an Apostle' (Søren Kierkegaard, The Present Age and Two Minor Ethico-Religious Treatises, translated by Alexander Dru and Walter Lowrie with an introduction by Charles Williams, London 1940). These two translations were subsequently published as a paperback (Søren Kierkegaard, The Present Age, London 1962) with an introduction by Dru.

When Dru's edition of the Journals came out, the final volume of the Danish edition of Kierkegaard's Papers was still incomplete, and had not appeared so that only some twenty pages relate to Kierkegaard's last period. It was not until 1965 that the Journals of that period became available in English with the publication of Ronald Gregor Smith's selection which consists of the diary entries from 1 March 1854 onwards and some loose sheets dating from 1852 to 1855. (Søren Kierkegaard: The Last Years. Journals 1853–1855. Edited and translated by Ronald Gregor Smith, London 1965). In his introduction Gregor Smith examines the 'new form of human reality', as Jaspers calls it, which appears in history with someone like Kierkegaard. His critique of Protestantism is seen by Gregor Smith as a challenge to all traditional forms of

* Vide the account given by J. Heywood Thomas in 'Influence on English Thought', Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana vol. 8.
‘Christianity’. Kierkegaard was in fact, he thinks, moving away from any objective certainty with his own faith’s self-transcendence as the sole Archimedean point.

Between the works of Dru and Gregor Smith, there appeared in 1958 a translation by T. H. Croxall of ‘Johannes Climacus’ (Søren Kierkegaard: Johannes Climacus or, De Omnibus Dubitandum Est and A Sermon, London 1958) with an introduction covering the general and philosophical context of the work, including the Danish intellectual background.

Kierkegaard’s literary achievement has also been recognized by British scholars. Thus Roger Poole, a distinguished literary critic and great Kierkegaard enthusiast collaborated with the novelist and essayist Henrik Stangerup to produce a selection from Kierkegaard, the declared aim of which was to get away from the stereotypes (Dansemesteren. Sider af S. Kierkegaard. En tekstfortælling ved Roger Poole og Henrik Stangerup, Copenhagen 1985). It is composed as ‘a dancing and meditating text-narrative’, presenting Kierkegaard as a master of dance, a sensitive, witty and dramatic writer, fascinated by the possibilities of life and with something new to say to us today in the age of the gulags. Another strange or at least unusual view was presented in the piece that won the Prose Medal in the Royal National Eisteddfod of Wales in 1978, Harri Williams’ Y Ddaeargryn Fawr (The Great Earthquake). The competition was for an imaginary autobiography and Williams quarried the Journals to produce this fictitious autobiography by Kierkegaard in Welsh.

Resuming the history of translations we note that of Fear and Trembling by Alastair Hannay (Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling translated with an introduction by Alistair Hannay, Harmondsworth, 1985). Hannay has aimed to combine accuracy with a modern style, and his translation is compared with the other English versions of the work by Professor W. Glyn Jones (‘Søren Kierkegaard in English Translation’, Yearbook of Comparative and General Literature, No. 35, 1986, p. 105–111). The hitherto untranslated early material, ‘Articles from Student Days 1834–6’, ‘From the Papers of One Still Living’ and ‘The Battle between the Old and the New Cellar Soap-Shops’, has been translated by Dr. Julia Watkin for Volume I of Kierkegaard’s Writings (ed. Howard Hong) which is to be published in 1990.

Dr. Watkin has put Kierkegaard scholars many times in her debt. For not only has she also produced a Danish edition of the ‘Book on Adler’ (Søren Kierkegaard, Nutidens Religieuse Forvirring. Bogen om Adler, udgivet med indledning og noter af Julia Watkin, Copenhagen 1984), but ever since 1979 she has produced the International Kierkegaard Newsletter. Mention ought also to be made of the beneficial aid to those beginning to read Kierkegaard in Danish, A Key to Kierkegaard’s Abbreviations and Spelling (Copenhagen and Montreal, C. A. Reitzel and Inter Editions, 1981).

If we now consider the various introductory works special mention ought to be made of those published before 1935 though they are now of
little more than historical interest. The study by F. W. Fulford, a Cambridge parson, published in 1911 has the distinction of being the earliest English book on Søren Kierkegaard and – evaluated against the background of the data then available – is a judicious and useful contribution. 1935 saw the publication of works by E. L. Allen, a very prolific scholar, an immensely popular theologian and revered teacher, and J. A. Bain. Both were interesting introductory studies of Kierkegaard’s life and work. T. H. Croxall, an Anglican clergyman, who was a gifted musician, produced an introduction that was slightly different inasmuch as he showed himself aware of Søren Kierkegaard’s aesthetic interests and perceptiveness (Kierkegaard Studies, London, 1948). Later, after serving as Priest in charge of the English Church in Langelinie, he published A Kierkegaard Commentary and Meditations from Kierkegaard (both London 1956). Though these shared with the earlier work the weakness of not cutting deep enough into the material they were useful in that they took account of the Danish material which had not been made available in Britain. A more substantial work was Denzil G. M. Patrick’s Pascal and Kierkegaard, A Study in the Strategy of Evangelism (London 1947), the second volume of which provides a thorough exposition of Kierkegaard’s life and work in its context and from an apologetic point of view. Though he had only the German translations of Schrempf and Haecker to work from Patrick refers in the book to the work of Bohlin, Geismar, Hirsch and Diem. His vigorous pursuit of the apologetic purpose and his critical attitude make this a book that has some abiding significance. For the sake of completeness we mention H. V. Martin’s Søren Kierkegaard, The Melancholy Dane (London 1950), a very readable but quite elementary introduction. George Price in The Narrow Pass, A Study of Kierkegaard’s Concept of Man (London 1963) attempted something more usefully penetrating by offering a guide to Kierkegaard’s work which takes his concept of man as the principle of unity. What will probably remain the outstanding achievement in this genre is Ronald Grimsley’s Kierkegaard: a biographical introduction (London 1973), an up-to-date and well-informed account of the development and main themes of Kierkegaard’s thought in the context of his life history.

Finally, there are the works which provide the knowledge of historical context so essential for an adequate understanding. The earliest is Croxall’s posthumously published Glimpses and Impressions of Kierkegaard (London 1959) which includes a translation of Hans Brochner’s Recollections with an introduction and notes as well as extracts from Henriette Lund’s Recollections from Home and some newspaper reports and other documents relating to Kierkegaard’s final struggle with the Church and his death. A very useful brief introduction to the political, social, literary and ecclesiastical milieu in which Kierkegaard wrote is given in W. Glyn Jones’ Denmark (London 1970). Professor Jones had already written a brief but important article on the relationship between Kierkegaard and Poul Martin Møller (Søren Kierkegaard and Poul Mar-
tin Møller, *Modern Language Review*, vol. 60, 1965, pp. 73–82) which, besides stressing the importance of Møller’s personal influence, also shows the influence of his works and literary technique, commenting on the views of the Danish scholars, Frithiof Brandt and Vilhelm Andersen.

Interest in Kierkegaard as a philosopher amongst British philosophers was undoubtedly – first, at least – due to the association of his name with existentialism. One of the first to discuss this relationship was Dorothy M. Emmett in a not unsympathetic article in 1941 (‘Kierkegaard and the “Existentialist” Philosophy’, *Philosophy*, 1941, pp. 257–71). There she indicates the connection between Kierkegaard and contemporary German theology and philosophy and points to the difference in the understanding of the central concept of the ‘choice of oneself’ between Kierkegaard, on the one hand, and Jaspers and Heidegger, on the other. Miss Emmett also contributed a similarly understanding summary of Kierkegaard’s thought to the Chambers Encyclopedia. H. B. Acton, the Kant scholar, contributed a fairly full article on Existentialism to the *Encyclopedia Britannica* which has a section entitled ‘Kierkegaard as the Originator of Existentialism’ (vol. 8, p. 964).

Notwithstanding the neglect (if not indeed the hostility) of British academic philosophy there was a certain interest in Existentialism in Britain in the 1950s and this contributed to the popularisation of a view of Kierkegaard that still holds sway in some quarters. One of the first to present and discuss him in this light was the émigré philosopher, F. H. Heineman (*The Existentialist Mind*, London 1953). Another was the humanist H. J. Blackham whose popular introduction, *Six Existentialist Thinkers* (London 1951, latest reprint 1985) has a chapter on Kierkegaard. Blackham does identify in Kierkegaard, alongside the contrasting of faith and reason, some properly philosophical concerns, such as the protest against pure thought, and the insistence that thought had to be related to the life of the thinker, and that ethical life was a commitment based on a decision. These points have become standard in popular accounts of existentialism, such as those of Mary Warnock (*Existentialist Ethics*, London 1967; *Existentialism*, London 1970) who also singles out the role of decision, of the acceptance of a belief as true for the person holding it, and the resultant need to be free from illusion, particularly the illusion of objectivity, as the features of Kierkegaard’s ‘existentialism’. A more adequate treatment of Kierkegaard’s work as a whole is given in Ronald Grimsley’s similarly general *Existentialist Thought* (Cardiff 1955). On a more scholarly level, Professor Grimsley has also contributed articles on ‘French Existentialism’ and ‘Chestov’ to *Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana*, Vol. 8 (Copenhagen 1981). In a lighter vein, the story of Kierkegaard’s influence on Jaspers, Heidegger and Sartre, among others, has been engagingly presented by Roger Poole, in the form of imaginary encounters, in ‘The Travels of Kierkegaard’, *Raritan* (Rutgers University) Vol. IV, No. 4, Spring 1985, p. 78–90.

Existentialism left no lasting mark, either on British philosophy or on
British Kierkegaard scholarship, and it is significant that the first major British study of Kierkegaard, John Heywood Thomas’ *Subjectivity and Paradox* (Oxford 1957), approached him from the standpoint of linguistic philosophy, seeking with its aid to present Kierkegaard’s thought in a form intelligible to modern readers. Heywood Thomas’ method, however, is first of all to set this thought in its context. An initial chapter showing how Kierkegaard’s early thinking developed from a philosophical view of faith to the position that faith has nothing to do with philosophy, is followed by a chapter on the historical situation, devoted primarily to Hegel and his followers, including Heiberg and Martensen, and their views of religion, in order to explain Kierkegaard’s polemic. The principle of subjectivity is treated as the fundamental part of Kierkegaard’s philosophy of religion, and again first of all the influences are considered – among them Hamann, Von Baader and Schelling, who is regarded as particularly important. For Heywood Thomas Kierkegaard’s claim is that though truth can very properly be dealt with objectively, in religion it is the individual’s personal appropriation of the truth that is the essential thing. The philosophical and religious use of the principle are distinguished. Philosophically, the principle of subjectivity is a critique of Hegel, asserting that the metaphysician too is a human being living in space and time who can therefore have no access to a view of things sub specie aeterni. This view of faith as subjectivity involves a critique of proofs for the existence of God, and is intimately connected with the notion of paradox, for the fact that the object of faith, God existing in history as a particular man, is a contradiction, stresses the contrast between faith and reason, and heightens the aspect of passionate commitment. Rejecting the charge of intellectualist antirationalism sometimes levelled against Kierkegaard, Heywood Thomas shows that Kierkegaard’s paradox must nevertheless be understood as logically a contradiction and not as simply a non-logical, suprarational paradox. The role of the paradox is to remove the possibility of a merely intellectual assimilation of the fact of the Incarnation and to demand an existential decision. Once the act of commitment has been made, however, the paradox is no longer seen as absurd. In a final chapter on Kierkegaard’s importance, Heywood Thomas points to the way Kierkegaard showed how religion could be regarded as meaningful discourse by stressing its ‘existential’ aspect. The religious attitude, on this interpretation, is born of certain experiences and is a policy of action in face of those experiences. This aspect of Kierkegaard’s achievement can be best appreciated, according to Heywood Thomas, by applying the technique of linguistic analysis, a very interesting claim, in the light of the attention paid to Kierkegaard by philosophers of this school in the next decade.

This kind of interpretation had, of course, been made possible by the powerful influence of Wittgenstein on Cambridge philosophy. The more widespread impact of his later philosophy with its talk of ‘language games’ and ‘forms of life’ was welcomed by some philosophers as en-
abling a more tolerant view of religion, recognizing that it is a game with its own rules, a form of life with its own logic. Thus D. Z. Phillips, one of the foremost exponents of this interpretation of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, heralds in *The Concept of Prayer*, his later oft-repeated sympathy with Kierkegaard’s notion of subjectivity. This is interpreted as an attitude to the world, which is a response to the recognition of God’s agapeistic love – one of Phillips’ basic concepts – and which presupposes the distinction between the world-historical and the personal, the objective reality (e.g. death) and the attitude to life adopted in the face of it (‘Subjectivity and Religious Truth in Kierkegaard’, *Sophia* 1968, reprinted in *Faith and Philosophical Enquiry*, London 1970, p. 204–222). It is axiomatic for Phillips that the love of God cannot be inferred from the way things go in the world, but that it is rather the measure by which the world as a whole is judged. It follows that belief in this love is an absolute that cannot be shaken by anything which happens in the world. In a later essay, ‘Philosophy and commitment’ (*Metaphilosophy*, Vol. 11, No. 1, January 1980, p. 1–16), Phillips examines Kierkegaard’s use of pseudonyms, arguing that by enabling him to develop and reveal the implications of particular points of view, the pseudonymous works fulfilled a genuinely philosophical function, and cannot therefore be fairly dismissed as self-projections and an escape from reality and commitment.

Though Wittgenstein’s admiration for Kierkegaard had been well-known and recognized in Heywood Thomas’ book the actual relationship between Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein was not discussed till 1968 (Michael P. Gallagher ‘Wittgenstein’s Admiration for Kierkegaard’, *The Month*, Vol. 39, p. 43–49). Gallagher points out that although for Wittgenstein the subjects of most concern to Kierkegaard, namely aesthetics, ethics and religious discourse, were beyond the limits of significant language, and therefore could not be said, they could nevertheless be shown. This is the point of contact with Kierkegaard, the strategy of whose works could, in Wittgensteinian terms, be described as one not of saying but of showing. Gallagher sees this concern in Wittgenstein’s philosophy for showing, for which he finds the paradigm in the aesthetic judgement about the ‘rightness’ or otherwise of a work of art, and which causes him to emphasize clarification, analysis, awareness and description, as constituting a significant point of similarity between the analytical and the existentialist schools. This is not the place to discuss the question of the connexion between Wittgenstein’s philosophy and Kierkegaard’s; but something should be said. First, the mere recollection of his enthusiastic reply to Malcolm: quoting Kierkegaard (*Ludwig Wittgenstein, A Memoir*, London, 1958, p. 71) shows the parallel in the recorded philosophy of religion. Secondly, Heywood Thomas knew from von Wright of the profound personal admiration. Other philosophers in the analytical tradition have also found that Kierkegaard has things of value to say to their concerns. Thus Peter Winch, in a discussion of the idea that a good man cannot be harmed (cf. Plato, *Gorgias* 479 D), makes
use of Kierkegaard's notion of willing the good in *Purity of Heart* ('Can a Good Man Be Harmed?', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1965–66, p. 55–70). The point about both these ideas is that they express an attitude, a recognition that it is possible to meet the afflictions of life in a certain way. To will the Good is to accept that the importance of always acting justly overrides all other considerations. Such an attitude is a relation to eternity, and is expressed in Kierkegaard's conception of patience, which Winch defines as 'the voluntary acceptance of unavoidable suffering'.

One of the more 'impartial' and therefore significant evaluations is Patrick Gardiner's study of the 'aesthetic' and 'ethical' views of life in *Either/Or* ('Kierkegaard's Two Ways', *Proceedings of the British Academy*, Vol. 54 1968, p. 207–229). The problem he identifies there of reconciling the two aspects of the ethical choice, individualism and self-determination on the one hand, and the acceptance of social norms and values on the other, is, he contends, relevant to contemporary British moral philosophy. It raises the question of whether the criteria for the application of moral concepts derive from our language or whether they are ultimately determined by personal choice and judgement, and in what way they are thus the responsibility of the individual alone. In 'Kierkegaard's Theory of Action' (*The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, Vol. 7, 1976, p. 111–22), Peter M. Simons has undertaken a detailed analysis and critique of Kierkegaard's account of the relation between thought and action as set out in a passage of the *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*.

A somewhat larger treatment is the chapter Stewart Sutherland devotes to Kierkegaard in his *Faith and Ambiguity* (London 1984). He identifies points of agreement between Kierkegaard and Hume on such matters as the impossibility of arguing from the world to God, and the mistakenness of attempting to deduce moral laws from the nature of God. Although accepting that on the central issue of the difference between belief and unbelief the two would not agree, Professor Sutherland nevertheless sees a parallel between contemporary philosophy and Kierkegaard's view that his task was to establish what Christianity is and where the confusions in Christendom lie. Sutherland is sensitive to Kierkegaard's method and to his intention in the *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* 'to present Christianity in its true form' so that it could be clearly understood by an unbeliever, a goal requiring the strategy of indirect communication, in which the central insights about Christianity were presented by uncommitted pseudonymous authors. What is involved here are thought experiments, and this, for Sutherland, makes another point of contact between Kierkegaard and the twentieth century dialogue between theology and philosophy, where the decision is left to the individual. And since this decision relates to a transcendent God it cannot be communicated directly either. On this basis, Sutherland claims that for Kierkegaard, ambiguity remains the essence of faith.
For their part, Kierkegaard scholars have been keen to show, by recon­struction and analysis of his arguments, that his philosophical work is not without relevance today. Heywood Thomas, in ‘Logic and Existence in Kierkegaard’ (*Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, Vol 2, No. 3, October 1971, p. 3–11), argues that the basic theme of Kierkegaard’s philosophy is his disagreement with Hegel over the doctrine, expounded in the *Logic*, of the identity of thought and being. For what Kierkegaard saw was that within being a distinction had to be made between being in the conceptual sense and being as real existence or actuality. Here Heywood Thomas stresses the importance of Kierkegaard’s reading of Trendelenburg in clarifying his understanding of the relation of logic to existence. This distinction gives rise to the problem for the thinker of the relation of his thought to his life, and explains Kierkegaard’s interest in kinesis, the transition from thought to being which, since it involved two distinct modes of being, could only take place in a leap. But this did not mean for Kierkegaard the end of philosophy, the task of which, as an activity of the existing person, is now to unite the intel­lectual and the ethical. Fundamental to Kierkegaard’s concern is that we take choice seriously, and the question of choice is, of course, related to his understanding of time, which Heywood Thomas examines in ‘Kierkegaard’s View of Time’ (*Journal of the British Society of Phenomenology*, Vol. 4, No. 1, January 1973, p. 33–40), distinguishing four areas in Kierkegaard’s thought in which the category of time is of central importance, namely his critique of the speculative system, his conception of the human person, his understanding of ethics, and his analysis of the relation between necessity and existence. In addition, Heywood Thomas shows how Kierkegaard’s conception of time plays an essential role in his Christology, with its emphasis on the temporal aspect of the Incarnation, and in his understanding of Christian existence as a process with the realisation of the eternal in time as its goal. Basic to Kierkegaard’s view of time, according to Heywood Thomas, is duration. Experienced time is a unity in which the modalities are distinguished by reference to human purposes and decisions. For Kierkegaard, the existing subject has a personal history, and it is from this perspective, when we try to see time in terms of our finite experience, that past, present and future arise. In the succession of time there is no present, which only comes into being through the relation to the eternal. The significance of time is thus ultimately to be explained by reference to the point in time where eternity meets it in the Incarnation.

In ‘Lukács’ Critique of Kierkegaard’ (in George L. Stengren ed., *Faith, Knowledge and Action*, Copenhagen 1984, p. 184–198), Heywood Thomas tackles a persistent misconception about Kierkegaard by means of a detailed critique of Lukács’ argument in *The Destruction of Reason* that he was an irrationalist. Heywood Thomas shows that despite Lukács’ sensivity to the historical context, he misinterprets Kierkegaard in such essential respects as his critique of Hegel, his view of history and
his ethics, and also fails to notice Kierkegaard’s role of political
prophet.

The most ambitious attempt so far to show from within the analytical
perspective that Kierkegaard has an important contribution to make as a
philosopher is that of Alastair Hannay. In ‘A Kind of Philosopher: Com-
ments in Connection with Some Recent Books on Kierkegaard’ (Inquiry,
Vol. 18, 1975, p. 355–365), Professor Hannay outlined the basis of an
approach to Kierkegaard as philosopher, arguing that his work as a whole,
including his Christianity, could be seen as a coherent philosophical
undertaking if his position was construed as a modified Kantianism, the
modification consisting in the focus on the practical realisation of ethi-
cal life, its concrete requirements, psychological conditions and philo-
sophical implications, these different aspects of the underlying project
being the reason for the different types of works making up Kierke-
gaard’s oeuvre.

The case is put to the test in Hannay’s major study, Kierkegaard
(Lon-
don 1982), published in ‘The Arguments of the Philosophers’ series,
where his stated aim is to give a coherent and critical account of Kierke-
gaard, the detailed examination of his argument enabling the philosop-
ical quality of his thought to emerge. As his point of departure, providing
the context, Hannay takes Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel. The problem
of the contradiction between the finite and the infinite – Hegel’s ‘un-
happy consciousness’ – is what they have in common. They respond to it
in radically different ways, the one in faith, based on an act of will, the
other in knowledge. The aesthetic works are Kierkegaard’s denial of the
goal of becoming properly human as essentially linked to knowledge and
mutual understanding. Guilt is the rock on which the ethics of
Sittlichkeit with its advice to the agent that he choose himself as a mem-
ber of the political system founders. Is there a way open to ‘exceptions’?
Hannay discusses Fear and Trembling in some detail, arguing that the
suspension of the ethical does not mean the abandonment of morality.
Rather it is its extension and recreation. The paradox is that a person be-
comes human by his private relation to the transcendent. The dialectical
works, Hannay sees as Kierkegaard’s characterisation of faith. Belief has
its subjective rationality related to the paradox. He examines the claim
that truth is subjectivity, insisting on its scope – an ingredient in the con-
volution that truth is a gift of the eternal in time. Following a suggestion of
Wittgenstein he suggests that Kierkegaard viewed some states of mind as
self-confirming. On the problem of communication too Hannay relates
Kierkegaard to the early Wittgenstein, though he is very much aware of
the contrasts between them.

In the exposition of the psychological works, The Concept of Anxiety
and The Sickness unto Death, that follows, Hannay argues that Kierke-
gaard personalizes the Hegelian dialectic of the emergence of spirit,
while at the same time denying the ability of thought to overcome the
imperfection and achieve the reconciliation of finite and infinite. The
Hegelian context leads Hannay to compare Kierkegaard with Feuerbach who also attacked Hegel for his personification of the human characteristics of individuals as universal agents – though, unlike Kierkegaard, Feuerbach believed that the reconciliation between the imperfect and the perfect could be achieved through the realisation of the divinity of man. In two chapters on Kierkegaard’s ethical works, Hannay discusses the important similarities and differences between the ethics of Kierkegaard and Kant. Against Kant’s purely intellectual cultivation of practical reason, Kierkegaard insists on the transformation of the will, which requires the cultivation of a moral disposition. However, Hannay sees Kierkegaard’s presentation of the agapeistic ideal of Christian love in *The Works of Love* as a Christian amendment to a basically Kantian ethics, relating Kierkegaard’s case against preferential love to Kant’s principle that people should be treated as ends not means. Hannay sees in Kierkegaard’s conception of dutiful love an argument for an attitude of openness towards others, stressing that for Kierkegaard the ‘neighbour’ is, nevertheless, a theological not an ontological concept.

Hannay also devotes some attention to Kierkegaard’s social philosophy, his understanding of his age, and his concept of levelling, showing that he saw the goal of establishing a harmonious society as not only important in itself but as intimately connected with the fulfilment of true individuality, though characteristically Kierkegaard saw the conditions for achieving this social goal as lying within the private sphere. This leads to a consideration of the charge of abstraction that Marxists and others have levelled against Kierkegaard. This, says Hannay, is not as clear-cut as it may seem and Kierkegaard has a defence on several counts. The most significant point is Kierkegaard’s critique of the eudemonism which is basic to Marx’s ideal of fulfilment so that Kierkegaard’s most powerful riposte to Marx would be that an interest in eternal happiness is a human constant. Because it is so sympathetic, painstaking and essentially philosophical an account of Kierkegaard’s thought, debatable though that is in its detail, Hannay’s book is a milestone in British Kierkegaard studies. One fundamental worry about it is whether Kierkegaard has not been made the spokesman of modern concerns that were foreign to his intentions so that, for instance, his view of Christianity becomes a Wittgensteinian fideism. Hannay devoted an article to the problem that the religious framework and perspective of Kierkegaard’s authorship raises for the reader who does not share that viewpoint – ‘Refuge and Religion’ (in George L. Stengren (ed.) *Faith Knowledge and Action*, Copenhagen, 1984, pp. 43–53). Again on the basis of some remarks of Wittgenstein he argues that religion should be seen not as providing an answer to an existing need but rather as supplying a new framework or vision of life in which a spiritual need can be satisfied. Kierkegaard’s merit was that he saw this need to be a universal problem. Likewise Hannay devotes an article to the criticism of an ‘action-theoretical’ analysis of Kierkegaard’s concept of the self – ‘Ham-

The historical question of Kierkegaard’s relation to other philosophers was a relatively early concern of British scholars. Thus Ronald Gregor Smith (‘Hamann and Kierkegaard’, in Eric Dinkler (ed.), *Zeit und Geschichte*, Tübingen 1964 pp. 671–683 also in *Kierkegaardiana V*, 1964) emphasises the importance of Hamann as an intellectual and biographical influence on Kierkegaard and argues that with its decline Kierkegaard’s understanding of Christian existence became more and more unsatisfactory. Kierkegaard’s early fascination with Hamann was centred on humour which, for Hamann, was a way of relating to life as a whole, based on faith in the activity of God in the world. In Hamann Kierkegaard also found support for his movement away from the Enlightenment and for his critique of systematic philosophy as a substitute for existential decision. A further bond between the two was the sense of being an exception. The fundamental difference, according to Gregor Smith, is in their attitudes to the world which Kierkegaard denied in the strength of the paradox. While Hamann remained a humorist to the end Kierkegaard ended as an anti-rationalist.

As well as his introductory study of Kierkegaard in the context of Existentialism Ronald Grimsley made some scholarly examinations of Kierkegaard’s historical connection, in particular with Leibniz and Descartes (‘Kierkegaard and Leibniz’, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 26, 1965, pp. 383–396 and ‘Kierkegaard and Descartes’, *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, Vol. IV, 1966, pp. 31–41). Grimsley shows that what Kierkegaard found of particular interest was Leibniz’ discussion of freedom and necessity (cf. *Fragments*) – his distinction between freedom and ‘indifferent will’, *liberum arbitrium* and his painstaking efforts to distinguish between various ‘categories’ of thought and experience. A more dubious connection perhaps is made between Leibniz and Kierkegaard’s notion of the leap; but Grimsley is on stronger ground in suggesting that what Leibniz understood by repetition was given a more existential significance by Kierkegaard and again when he points to the connection in the distinction between what is ‘above reason’ and what is ‘against reason’. Especially useful is the way Grimsley maps Kierkegaard’s increasingly critical attitude as he became more and more suspicious of harmonising metaphysical theology. The second article offers a very interesting account of Kierkegaard’s development, locating as it does Kierkegaard’s first awareness of Descartes in the lectures he heard Martensen give in the early 1830s before showing his embarking in 1842 on a proper study of Descartes’ own work – probably reading the *Discourse on Method*, the *Meditations*, the *Principles of Philosophy* and the *Treatise on the Passions*. What is illuminating in this article is the way in which it shows Kierkegaard’s serious reservation about the purely intellectual character of Cartesian doubt. By contrast for Kierkegaard doubt was an act of will and so he complained that modern philosophy had not done
what it said. His view of the cogito as a ‘petrified proposition’ and a logical pun and in particular his characterisation of Descartes as a divided thinker are data which contribute to a proper understanding of Kierkegaard’s philosophical perspective. Also very interesting is Grimsley’s account of Kierkegaard’s disapproving attitude towards Descartes’ influence on modern philosophy, for this lends credence to the interpretation of Kierkegaard that would link him with Wittgenstein.

We turn next to the study of Kierkegaard in the context of Theology since much of 20th Century theology can be said to be in his shadow whether one thinks of Barthian theology or what is sometimes called existentialist theology. The interest of British theologians in Kierkegaard has been documented by Heywood Thomas in his article ‘Influence on English Thought’ (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, Vol. 8, Copenhagen 1981, p. 160–177). With the exception of P. T. Forsyth, who is commonly described as the English Barth before Barth Kierkegaard’s direct influence on British theology has been slight. In ‘The Influence of Kierkegaard’s Thought on Contemporary English-speaking Theology’ (Liber Academiae Kierkegaardiana Annuarius, ed. Alessandro Cortese, Vol. 1 (1977–78), Copenhagen and Milan, 1980, p. 41–61), Heywood Thomas deals, in addition to Forsyth, with Kierkegaard’s influence on Tillich, and also refers to the recent debate in British theology on the doctrine of the Incarnation occasioned by the book The Myth of God Incarnate (London, 1977), showing the relevance to this debate of Kierkegaard’s discussion of the Absolute Paradox and his insistence on the specific humanity of Christ. A problem connected with the uniqueness of the Incarnation is of course the relation of Christianity to other faiths, and here Heywood Thomas finds an affinity between some ideas of Professor W. Cantwell Smith, developed in response to this problem, and Kierkegaard’s concept of subjectivity.

By the beginning of the 1950s the popular studies of the early 1900s such as M. Channing-Pearce’s two books: The Terrible Crystal (London 1940) and the later Søren Kierkegaard (London 1945) were beginning to be superseded. Thus J. V. Langmead Casserley had devoted a section (pp. 150–182) of his The Christian in Philosophy (London 1949) to Kierkegaard and this exposition was acclaimed as the best English introduction to Kierkegaard’s theology. However, that is an over-enthusiastic description of this compact but sketchy account and it was probably H. V. Martin who first demonstrated the value of looking at the detail of the portrait. He followed his two earlier books The Prophet of the Absolute (Madras 1942), a slight book on the absoluteness of Kierkegaard’s message, and Søren Kierkegaard, The Melancholy Dane (London 1950), an elementary but sound and readable introduction to Kierkegaard’s life and work, with a short discussion of Kierkegaard’s view on the nature of faith. The Wings of Faith (London 1950) is not a profound study; but Martin probes ‘the greatest force’ behind the revolt against Liberal Theology. Kierkegaard, he says, posed the problem of Theology in a dif-
ferent way, asking what does it mean for me to become a Christian? and maintaining that the How of faith is primary and the What is secondary and derivative. So he analyses Kierkegaard’s contribution to our understanding of the nature and meaning of the act of Christian faith. That workmanlike study was rather useful; but the book thus typified the perplexity of the 1950s theologian in evaluating Kierkegaard. Conrad Bonifazi, a Congregational minister who emigrated to the USA to become a college teacher, published in 1953 an interesting but rather brief comparison of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. This was Christendom Attacked which is a comparison of the understanding of Christianity in these two 19th Century critics of Christendom. Though it was an interesting perspective and raised some fundamental questions about the nature of faith and especially Christian morality it did not make any significant contribution to the development of Kierkegaard research.

In two articles of that period Heywood Thomas had examined the influence of Kierkegaard on Barth and Bultmann. In ‘The Christology of Søren Kierkegaard and Karl Barth’ (The Hibbert Journal, Vol. 53, 1954–55, p. 280–88), he wants to put the record straight, arguing that Barth’s Christology was mainly derived from the theme of the paradox in Kierkegaard’s writings, a fact that Barth himself was happy to recognize up to 1927. Thereafter he tried to conceal Kierkegaard’s influence, possibly for fear of being bracketed together with Jaspers and Heidegger and of his theology being thereby made to seem dependent on an anthropology. This does not, however, alter the fact of the relationship, which is seen in Barth’s insistence that the revelation of God in Christ can only be grasped by faith, and his emphasis on the human life of Jesus which, in the historical context, was a concealment rather than a revelation of God. For Barth, as for Kierkegaard, the revelation in Christ was in a particular historical person and, like Kierkegaard, Barth insisted on the contemporaneity of Christ. ‘The Relevance of Kierkegaard to the Demythologising Controversy’ (Scottish Journal of Theology, 1957, p. 239–52; reprinted in J. H. Gill ed., Essays on Kierkegaard, Minneapolis 1969) is engaged in a systematic as well as an historical task. After showing how Kierkegaard, through Heidegger, is one of the sources of Bultmann’s thinking, it identifies three areas where Bultmann’s de-mythologising project can be criticised from the standpoint of Kierkegaard’s understanding of Christian faith. Firstly, Bultmann like Hegel seems to make the mistake of equating understanding the truth with being in the truth. Secondly, Bultmann comes very close to the empirical reduction of ‘faith’ which Kierkegaard criticised in Schleiermacher and Hegel. And finally, like the Hegelian theologians, Bultmann turns Christianity into a philosophy and one, moreover, with which it is ultimately not compatible. Otiose though it is to discuss them, for the sake of completeness we mention Heywood Thomas’ articles on Kierkegaard’s theology in Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, ‘Christianity as Absurd’ (vol. 2), ‘Paradox’ and ‘Commensurability’ (vol. 3), and ‘The Mes-
sage of Christianity' (vol. 5). Similarly it might be added that his article on Kierkegaard’s philosophy of religion ‘Kierkegaard ar Grefydd’ (Efrydiau Athronyddol, vol. XVII, 1954, pp. 41–54) was his first statement of the positions we have described.

When we considered Hannay’s book we had occasion to mention Kierkegaard’s social thought and to this area we turn for the next part of this account. Duncan Forrester in ‘The Attack on Christendom in Marx and Kierkegaard’ (Scottish Journal of Theology, Vol. 25, 1972, p. 181–196) points to the similarity between what Marx, under the influence of Hegel, took as the whole of religion, namely its social and intellectual embodiments, and Kierkegaard’s concept of Christendom. Kierkegaard’s distinction between Christianity and Christendom thus makes it possible to acknowledge the truth in Marx’s critique, while at the same time being aware of its limitation. From this perspective the attacks on Christendom of Marx and Kierkegaard can be seen as largely complementary and as still being relevant today, for they remind us that the Gospel can never be at home in any age or domesticated in any culture.

The importance of Kierkegaard’s social thought had been recognised by that pioneer of British Kierkegaard study, Alexander Dru, as far back as 1940, when he published the second half of A Literary Review on its own as The Present Age. For the republication of this translation in 1962, together with the essay ‘Of the Difference between a Genius and an Apostle’, Dru provided an introduction relating Kierkegaard’s views to contemporary and subsequent currents of thought, and incidentally serving as an excellent brief introduction to the context of Kierkegaard’s work as a whole (Søren Kierkegaard, The Present Age, translated and with an introduction by Alexander Dru, London 1962). More recently, Roger Poole has discussed Kierkegaard’s social and political views, and their relevance to our own age, in an article in the London Review of Books of 21 February 1980 on the occasion of the appearance of translations of A Literary Review, (Søren Kierkegaard, Two Ages: The Age of Revolution and the Present Age – A Literary Review, edited and translated by Howard Hong and Edna Hong, Princeton 1978), and of his Letters and Documents. Without doubt, however, the most important study of this aspect of Kierkegaard is an article by the sociologist, Werner Stark, whose Sociology of Religion is a well-known text in this field, ‘Kierkegaard on Capitalism’, (Sociological Review, vol. XLII, 1950, pp. 87–114 reprinted in Lawson (ed.), Kierkegaard’s Presence in Contemporary American Life, Metuchen, N. J. 1970, pp. 120–149). The article opens with a comment on the sureness of the touch which Kierkegaard shows when he comes to handle a sociological problem and this is evident, he thinks, in what Kierkegaard has to say about the sociology of religion and the sociology of knowledge. He concludes that if anything is surprising about Kierkegaard’s sociology it is that he so clearly grasped the features of capitalism: not only did he realise the future triumph of
democracy but he also foresaw quite clearly and accurately the shape, life and expression of the coming mass society. This leads him to characterise the difference between Marx and Kierkegaard very neatly as that between levelling up and levelling down. He insists on the precision of Kierkegaard’s sociology and not merely its earnestness. His final assessment is that Kierkegaard was more of a realist than Marx.

The literary aspects of Kierkegaard’s work have also been of interest to British scholars. Ronald Grimsley’s *Søren Kierkegaard and French Literature* (Cardiff, 1966) consists of 8 comparative studies. Prefaced by a brief review of Kierkegaard’s knowledge of French literature as a whole these are studies not so much of influences but rather of Kierkegaard’s attitudes to particular questions. Grimsley devotes two studies to the subject of Kierkegaard and the Don Juan legend, showing that Kierkegaard’s interest in Molière’s *Dom Juan* is motivated by a desire to throw light on Mozart’s *Don Giovanni* thus illustrating aspects of the ‘aesthetic’ life as a life of ‘immediacy’. For Kierkegaard, Don Juan is important as the personification of a type of existence which has more than a merely individual or particular meaning. Underlying his discussion is the distinction he makes between the ‘immediate’ (sensual) seducer – Don Juan – and the ‘reflective’ (selective) seducer – Johannes the seducer. Grimsley explores the character and psychology of Johannes the seducer in a comparison of *The Seducer’s Diary* with Laclos’ *Les Liaisons dangereuses*. Despite significant similarities in attitude, goal and method there are important differences between the two seducers. Valmont is primarily motivated by vanity, and needs the approbation of other people, while Johannes is more subjective, and has no interest in other people’s reactions.

Fundamentally Johannes is a victim of melancholy, and it is this characteristic feature of Romanticism that Grimsley explores in a study of Kierkegaard and Chateaubriand, comparing the way it is treated in *Either/Or* and *René*. Studies of Kierkegaard and Montaigne, Pascal and Rousseau follow. In Montaigne, whose *Essais* he appears from the Journals to have studied closely in the period 1847–50, Kierkegaard found much that he liked. Above all he valued Montaigne for his honest appraisal of human motives and exposure of hypocrisy and self-delusion. It was only late, from the evidence of the Journals that Kierkegaard came into direct contact with Pascal’s thought, finding an anticipation in the latter’s insistence on the need for the expression of religious truth in personal existence of his own notion of reduplication. In Pascal’s call to re-establish an honest, radical religion in an age of false values, he saw a confirmation of his own criticism of the modern age. As to Rousseau, the Journal of 1850–2 shows that it was the personal writings of his last years that interested Kierkegaard most, and it was Rousseau’s deficient understanding of Christianity and of suffering that he fastened on. Agreeing in their opposition to the values of their contemporaries Rousseau and Kierkegaard, however, differ in their so-
lutions to the problem of ‘true humanity’, Rousseau trusting in a ‘return to nature’ and Kierkegaard insisting on man’s choosing himself before God. In the study devoted to Kierkegaard and Scribe Grimsley explains Kierkegaard’s interest in this minor dramatist by referring to the general esteem in which Scribe was held by the Danes at this time and points out Kierkegaard’s use of him in the critique of the aesthetic attitude to love.

The final essay, on Kierkegaard and Vigny and ‘the Poet’, provides an occasion for examining Kierkegaard’s view of the relation between poetry and religion, and the particular position the poet occupies on the borderline between the ‘aesthetic’ and the ‘religious’ through having a relation to the ideal, but only in the imagination. Both writers look to a new kind of poetry, which would incorporate reflection. They approach this from different angles, however, in the light of fundamentally different conceptions of man and his destiny.

In addition, Grimsley has looked elsewhere at the relationships between Kierkegaard and Victor Hugo, and Kierkegaard and Voltaire. In the case of Hugo, the similarity is in the way both he and Kierkegaard portray the figure of Nero (in the poem ‘Un chant de fête de Neron’ published in 1826 in Odes et Ballades, and in Either/Or respectively), both finding the key to his character in melancholy (‘Hugo, Kierkegaard and the character of Nero’, Revue de Littérature Comparée, Vol. 32, 1958, p. 230–236). The point of contact between Kierkegaard and Voltaire is the use of irony (‘Some Implications of the Use of Irony in Voltaire and Kierkegaard’, in F. Jost ed., Proceedings of the IVth Congress of the International Comparative Literature Association, The Hague/Paris 1966, p. 1018–24). Here Grimsley shows how they both linked irony with a certain attitude to life, and both used it against metaphysical speculation divorced from human experience, the difference being that Voltaire was working within the framework of a finite human ideal, while the Kierkegaardian ironist, influenced by the Romantics, saw irony as a means of attaining a negative freedom from the whole sphere of finite reality. That irony can also have a positive role is shown in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, where it is assigned to an intermediate stage between the ‘aesthetic’ and the ‘ethical’ stages, but even there it can turn the individual away from action towards reverie and contemplation.

Grimsley has also examined Kierkegaard’s conception of the imagination (‘Kierkegaard and the educative function of the imagination’ in Bernard Curtis and Wolfe Mays (eds.), Phenomenology and Education, London 1978, p. 13–22), showing how it was related to his view of the cultural situation of his time and to his reactions to Romanticism. The value of imagination, which the Romantics discovered, was its capacity to offer a new vision of reality to oppose to the drabness of life in an age of anonymity and levelling. But when it was not kept under control, as Kierkegaard showed in his critique of Schlegel’s Lucinde, imagination became an excuse for escapism, offering a false harmony in an alterna-
tive world. The task of man is therefore to integrate his imagination with the will in a higher stage of existence. Failure to do this leads to a pathology of the imagination as can be seen in such figures as the young man of *Repetition*, Quidam, and Johannes the Seducer.

Kierkegaard’s view of the imagination has also been investigated by George Pattison (‘Kierkegaard and Imagination’, *Theology*, Vol. 87, Jan. 1984, p. 6–12), who points to a resemblance between Kierkegaard and Coleridge, both being practitioners as well as theorists of the imagination, and both drawing on the resources of German Idealism and early Romanticism. Pattison too emphasizes the danger Kierkegaard saw that the fantasy world of imagined possibilities opened up by the Romantic conception of the imagination might be treated as a means of escape from reality, and from the task of actualising the possibilities of the self in ethical existence. Pattison’s article ‘Friedrich Schlegel’s *Lucinde*: A case Study in the Relation of Religion to Romanticism’ (*Scottish Journal of Theology*, Vol. 38, 1985, p. 545–564), discusses briefly Kierkegaard’s reaction to that work as expressed in *The Concept of Irony, Either/Or* and his later writing. In ‘Søren Kierkegaard: A Theatre Critic of the Heiberg School’ (*British Journal of Aesthetics*, Vol. 23, No. 1, Winter 1983, p. 25–33), Pattison discussed Kierkegaard’s approach to theatrical criticism as derived from the idealist aesthetics of Heiberg. Another article of his (‘Nihilism and the Novel: Kierkegaard’s Literary Reviews’, *British Journal of Aesthetics*, Vol. 26, No. 2, Spring 1986, p. 161–171) discusses Kierkegaard’s novelistic reviews, showing how his critical approach is based on his concept of the ‘life-view’. More fundamentally, the theme of these reviews is the problem of the novel in the modern, secular age, which becomes clear in *Two Ages*. It is here Pattison argues, that Kierkegaard reveals the bankruptcy of the Romantics’ claim that art will liberate us from de-personalisation and nihilism, for this is something that only the hidden inwardness of religion can do.

Kierkegaard’s own literary practice was determined by his strategy of indirect communication, and this is the subject of an article by Roger Poole, who sees the development of Kierkegaard’s communication strategy after the ‘Corsair’ affair of 1846 as resulting from his belief that the life of the thinker must necessarily ‘re-duplicate’ the written works, in such a way that both the works and the *vie vécue* contribute to a total indirect statement of meaning, which derives its power from the fact that it operates on a more than purely verbal level (‘Indirect Communication I. Hegel, Kierkegaard and Sartre’, *New Blackfriars*, Vol. 47, July 1966, p. 537–8; see also R. C. Poole, *The Indirect Communication of Kierkegaard*, unpublished PhD thesis, Cambridge 1965). According to Poole, it is the recognition of the visual dimension of communication, i.e. the total impression upon the sensibility of an individual in a society and the total impression upon the sensibility of a society created by an individual, that is of decisive importance in indirect communication. It was precisely because he exploited this insight that Kierkegaard displayed
such originality. Poole’s labours in a literary appreciation of Kierkegaard have extended into the interpretation of the oeuvre and also to the methodology of interpretation. First he contributed to the textual interpretation by singling out the importance of the dissertation, \textit{Concept of Irony}, for a proper understanding of his subsequent production (‘Kierkegaard on Irony’, \textit{New Blackfriars}, Vol. 48, February 1967, pp. 245–49, which is a review of Lee Capel’s new translation). Secondly, perhaps his most important contribution so far is his advocacy of the potential for a deconstructionist analysis when he declared in a review of Joseph H. Smith (ed.), \textit{Kierkegaard’s Truth} and Mark Taylor, \textit{Journeys to Selfhood} in the \textit{Times Literary Supplement} of 5 March 1982 that the time was ripe for applying to Kierkegaard ‘the new kind of literary expertise devoted to the rhetoric of the text’. The challenge was taken up by Christopher R. Norris for whom Kierkegaard, despite his appeal to a higher truth as the factor determining the structure of his authorship, is an important precursor of the deconstructionists. (‘Fictions of Authority: narrative and viewpoint in Kierkegaard’s writing’ \textit{The Southern Review}, 1983, Vol. 16, pp. 174–90 reprinted in Christopher Norris, \textit{The Deconstructive Turn}, London 1983, pp. 85–106, together with an appendix (pp. 174–78) on Henning Fenger’s \textit{Kierkegaard: the myths and their origins}). It is the notion of a higher truth that Norris then seeks to deconstruct in an analysis of \textit{The Point of View for My Work as an Author} where he identifies alongside the dialectical presentation of the authorship a confessional motive, revealed in the treatment of Regine. For the way in which the crisis of the broken engagement is integrated into the dialectical development betrays the operation of a narrative concern re-ordering events to form a plot. That there is here a fictional element serves to call in question the authority of the religious account of the authorship. The deconstructionist principle of the irreducibility of writing to authorial design being thus vindicated, Norris sees the whole issue of the viewpoint for interpreting Kierkegaard’s work as once more an open question.

This inevitably rather bare account of the whole progress of British Kierkegaard scholarship will serve to show the several different concerns that bring scholars to the study of the extraordinary authorship; and since the research is increasingly on the Danish text there is perhaps a quite new kind of scholarly cooperation yet to be seen. Be that as it may what is clear is that there is a very significant legacy and that there are enthusiastic lively scholars who are eager to inherit and appropriate it. The new interest in the literary problem will generate some very interesting studies of Kierkegaard’s work as an author. Fortunately there are scholars who, while thoroughly familiar with the techniques of deconstructionist criticism and able practitioners of the art, have nevertheless been engaged in Kierkegaard research before this period of literary fashion and so are able to view its results in proper perspective. Work of that kind has been done and is yet to see the light of day. Equally some more conventional historical work has been done on Kierkegaard’s
philosophical development and this too is largely unpublished. The time is indeed ripe for a study of Kierkegaard as a European thinker who gathered up in his own philosophical investigations the threads of contemporary and earlier philosophical thought. Because he possessed so remarkable a perception into the ramifications of man's thinking and was so securely grounded in Theology he managed to articulate those problems of a theological and practical character which continue to exercise theologians. Abundant as the literature is on his religious thought there is still room for a discussion of his basic intellectual stance in faith, his theory of what that faith's content is – the incognito – and his view of a Kenotic Christian life. Truly a man for the 21st century he will doubtless attract the attention of other different kinds of scholars yet again.

We have referred to one Ph.D. thesis and it might be useful to list the various theses written on Kierkegaard by British researchers. The list is chronologically arranged and we do not claim completeness.


1980 Richard Summers, *A Study of Kierkegaard's Philosophical Development up to Om Begrebet Ironi*, PhD, University of London.