
The Logic of Søren Kierkegaard's Misogyny 1854-1855

by Julia Watkin

When one reads the Journals of the last two years of Kierkegaard's life, one cannot help being struck by the negative expressions about women. We read that "woman is personified egoism. Her burning, hot devotion to man is neither more nor less than her egoism", whereas man "is not originally an egoist", he does not become that until "he is lucky enough to be united to a woman", when he becomes the thorough egoist in the union "commonly known as marriage ... the proper enterprise of egoism".¹ We learn that woman's characteristic fault is, "cunning, subtlety and lies", she is "the weaker sex", expected to "wail and scream".² Man "was structured for eternity" but woman "leads him into a digression". Woman in her relation to the religious "explains nothing", her devotedness "is essentially related to interjections, and it is unfeminine if it is more than that".³ For she relates to things directly, "breathes the air of directness"; she "participates in religion at second-hand, through the man".⁴ So "at the greatest distance from the ideal is: mother, madam. The real fury against the ideal comes from family life, from the lioness, or, to say it another way ... from the suckling sow".⁵ – Parallel to these statements are Kierkegaard's many comments (often invoking the authority of St. Paul)⁶ praising celibacy and rejecting the sexual drive with its begetting of children as something anti-Christian, as in the piece headed "Propagation of the Species, Christianity wants to bar the way".⁷

Several reasons have been given as to why Kierkegaard in his last years seems to make a violent attack on women, sex and marriage – an attack that seems all the more strange when one considers his positive attitude earlier towards marriage.⁸ – Most obvious is a psychological-pathological explanation. One can suggest that Kierkegaard could not fulfil his engagement in the reality of marriage to Regine Olsen;⁹ over the years he developed a vicious "sour grapes" attitude concerning women and sex. Eduard Geismar considers that Kierkegaard's struggle with his "thorn in the flesh" is an element in the situation when he develops his view that the philosophy of Schopenhauer is to blame. Kierkegaard, who was already leaning in a similar direction, developed "an asceticism hostile to life" because he was influenced by Schopenhauer's cynical disgust with life. Schopenhauer's thought encouraged Kierkegaard to relieve his

feelings in the Journals from 1854 and in several numbers of "The Instant".¹⁰

Yet another possibility is that advanced by Birgit Bertung, who sees in Kierkegaard's statements about women a "poetical provocation or repulsion". By using such negative language Kierkegaard aims at a dialectical attack on, not women, but on the mixing up of a temporal relationship to the husband with the spiritual relationship to God, something that they are in risk of doing, since woman as the child-bearer is in danger of falling into the role of existing only as "being for others", of becoming a victim to the animal-temporal side of human nature and thus moving away from spirit and the command of her own personality. On this view, Kierkegaard is not an ascetic, but is ironizing over the domination of women by men to which women give their assent. By using such language he hopes to provoke Society, and especially women, into an insight into the situation and to movement towards the proper preservation (in this world) of the equality of men and women before God through the relation to God.¹¹

From the above it can be seen that an important consideration must influence an assessment of Kierkegaard's final statements about women. It has to be decided whether or not he means his attack to be taken directly at face value. Linked to this question is the problem of Kierkegaard's description of women. Is it meant to apply to women only in the cultural situation of his time, or does he regard it as a true account of women in every age? Is it the case, as Sylvia Walsh suggests in her article "On 'Feminine' and 'Masculine' forms of Despair", that in his use of "stereotyped characterizations of the sexes", he reflects and helps perpetuate such characterizations, even though his analysis of the self rests on a common structure of selfhood for both sexes?¹²

With respect to the second question, I am inclined to think that even in his last years, Kierkegaard was describing Society the way he observed it around him, and that he probably never considered the question of cultural conditioning on personality the way we understand that question today, even though he realized that each individual starts out from an historically-conditioned situation. Although he respected and idealized women and asserts a fundamental equality of the sexes before God, Kierkegaard, like many other authors of his generation and later, also perceived fundamental external and natural differences between the sexes, seeing woman as frail, as needing the support of the man, and as instinctive and intuitive in intellectual matters. Thus one must try as far as possible to distinguish between Kierkegaard's nineteenth-century view of women – a view that includes his above-mentioned and very modern emphasis on fundamental equality – and the extreme polemic of his final years.¹³

Regarding the first and main question, I would like here to develop the view that Kierkegaard's attack is to be taken directly at face value, but that it is not aimed exclusively at women and that it makes sense in

terms of the structure of his authorship as well as of the cultural situation of the time. The extreme statements of the last years are in agreement with the logic of basic metaphysical assumptions in the authorship.¹⁴ In this connection I will be taking a look at Kierkegaard's view of God, the world and humankind, with special reference to the significance of marriage, before finally turning to his cultural situation.

Kierkegaard makes it clear many times in his authorship that he presupposes the existence of the personal God of Christianity, a God who is pure personhood, "pure subjectivity" and who "creates out of nothing".¹⁵ As Kierkegaard explains in a Journal entry from 1846, in the act of creating from nothing God withdraws himself so that creation may come into being. – He withdraws himself in order to give himself, because it is by so doing that he "makes the recipient independent". I.e., in finite relationships, the recipient of a gift is not independent because he is obligated to the giver, who, in turn, lacks the power to give without creating obligation. Although God omnipotently creates human beings "out of nothing" in that humankind is not already in independent existence prior to creation, he renounces the obligation established through humanity's factual total dependence on him in order that human beings may truly be free.¹⁶ Kierkegaard's thought here is very like Simone Weil's "creative renunciation of God",¹⁷ and already comes to expression in the early years in his criticism of Solger in the comment that "in that God sacrifices himself, he creates".¹⁸

God's self-giving, self-sacrificing creativity has two expressions. On the one hand, the divine omnipotence is "able to create the most fragile of all things – a being independent of that very omnipotence", but on the other, it is also able to create "the most impressive of all things – the whole visible world".¹⁹ This latter is directly dependent on God, it is the realm of nature, of the aesthetic, where life in its immediate state unconsciously fulfils its development according to God's design.²⁰ The former, since the individual is independent while partaking of the substance of visible creation, is a synthesis, not only of psyche and body, but also of the temporal and the eternal. The individual is animal, but also spirit.²¹ God has created humankind in his own image and since the eternal God is spirit, to be spirit is a person's "invisible glory".²² Yet, as Judge William points out in *Either-Or*, the individual is "finite spirit" assigned to temporality, which latter is the possibility of that spirit's glorification.²³ Within the realm of temporality each person is as yet only finitely "like God" and must use the period allotted to him to fulfil and make real his God-given potentiality or possibility.

For Kierkegaard then, there are two realms, temporality, and eternity the abode of God, which latter is in transcendent continuity with the temporal, being above all time, past, present and future. ²⁴ These two realms stand in an inverse relation to each other and "God is always the inverse of man" because of the character of the nature of God and of eternity. For Kierkegaard, God's realm is the realm of the intensive,

whereas temporality is the realm of the extensive.²⁵ In the temporal world, it is the nature of all existence to extend and assert itself. Creation is Being, opposite God, as it were, and humankind in its self-consciousness is actively ego opposite God in freedom and not passively so like animals and the rest of nature, which follow instinct according to God's will. To the world of temporality belong progression and assertion of selfhood, quantity, expansion, to the realm of eternity belong self-denial, quality, renunciatory withdrawal. The opposite of the extensive life of the world is the intensive life of the spirit.²⁶

Such a life can be lived in the world and is expounded by Judge William to the young man in *Either-Or*. For Judge William temporality "exists for the sake of humankind and is the greatest of all the gifts of grace" because in it each member of the community can relate to the Christian God, "the eternal Power who omnipresently pervades the whole of existence". Authentic community is formed by each individual living unselfishly in relation to God and neighbour. The aesthetic world-order of human nature in the raw is brought under control of the ethical-religious.²⁷ This thought is expanded in the Journals where Kierkegaard regards the individual in his relation to God as being "decisive as the presupposition for forming community", true neighbour love being "self-denial, rooted in the relationship to God".²⁰ "Earthly love ... at its highest is love only for one single human being in the whole world", "spiritual love ... loves more and more people, has its truth in loving all". "Erotic love and friendship are preferential" but in authentic love to the neighbour there is an equality belonging to eternity.²⁹

In this way, the individual can live the life of eternity now, within the context of human relationships. Instead of living the competitive life of the temporal world in the manner of the animal kingdom, he dies to self-centredness and lives the life of fellowship with God and the transcendent kingdom of heaven, something that is everlasting in that at death the individual enters into full membership of that realm.³⁰

Yet just because the realm of eternity is the end and aim of existence, marriage and physical continuity of the race are treated ambiguously in Kierkegaard's writings. For Judge William, if the temporal is the realm where the individual is placed by God, then, as we have seen, the individual's duty is to aim at the highest within the finite sphere by living a self-denying and hence eternally-orientated life within finite relationships. Marriage must be the highest and a duty in the finite sphere because otherwise the physical and spiritual structure in which individuals make up families and the social whole would disappear. In this sense marriage unites the spiritual and the physical, providing the spiritual and physical continuity of the race. Yet the Judge's outlook is not to be confused with that of one for whom this life is all. – Marriage does not exist merely for the sake of continuing the race, but as the necessary presupposition for the possibility of ethical-religious life in temporality. The temporal world remains the sphere of humankind's unavoidable

self-orientation as the individual extends himself in space and time, and even the Judge can see that this is what gives marriage – “the deepest form of life’s revelation” and “the beautiful mid-point of life and existence” – a natural egocentricity from which it cannot be freed by the most unselfish love.³¹

For what hampers the God-like self-renouncing life in the temporal order is the unavoidable fact of natural preference. In concrete terms, a man or woman who neglects partner and children in order to give the appropriate love and care to others is hardly the paragon of love. There is a sense in which individuals must put the selfhood of the family unit first, however unselfishly they live. Similarly, even where a nation has an idealistic democratic constitution, it is impossible to escape conflict of interest, not only within the state but between nations where a government must put the interest of the nation before that of other nations.³² Viewed in that light, the state, as Kierkegaard points out, functions as a “higher egoism” with the task of controlling personal egoisms³³ and cannot be regarded as Christian. Instead, the best government aims at the greatest happiness of the greatest number as best it can, with emphasis on protecting posterity.

This fact of natural preference is thus the reason why Johannes Climacus in *Philosophical Fragments* points out that “self-love” is “the ground in all love”, the basic starting-point of all human relationships before they are transformed into something higher, while Judge William in *Stages on Life’s Way* says that “from the essentially religious point of view ... it makes no difference whether or not a person has been married” and that not marrying is “higher” than marrying, the Judge’s revision of his earlier statement being a necessary consequence of a standpoint that has the transcendent realm of God as the ultimate goal. This is seen clearly in Climacus’ discussion of “Religiousness A” in *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, where the individual is shown as directing his attention more profoundly towards the transcendent. Here, “self-annihilation is the essential form of the God-relationship”. – The individual concentrates on his God-relationship with greater detachment from human relationships though paradoxically participating in them more effectively because aiming to do so on a totally non-self-regarding basis.³⁴ The movement of the authorship is away from any form of self-orientation to a God-centredness that requires an ever-increasing self-denial and self-renunciation.

At this point, it is useful to take a look at Kierkegaard’s view of humankind’s place in creation in connection with the Christian doctrine of the Fall. For the factor of unavoidable natural self-concern must be taken into consideration when looking at Kierkegaard’s later statements that treat procreation as a fall into sin. The “ideality” preceding the Fall is for Kierkegaard here, God’s intention that humankind should be like him by relating to him wholly self-denyingly. The Fall itself is the human race “lost” or separated from God, seen as occurring when self-conscious

man first failed to be willing to renounce everything for God and thus consciously asserted himself. In that sense, procreation is particularly “the Fall” as the assertion of the human ego in physical existence. From this standpoint, every child and generation is lost and fallen through being born, the child sharing in the parental egoism insofar as it is a part of it.³⁵ As early as 1844 we learn from Vigilius Haufniensis in *The Concept of Angst* that if Adam had not sinned, i.e. by his disobedience stressed humankind’s opposite relation to God as opposition to God, he would have become eternal immediately, “would in the same moment have passed over into eternity”,³⁶ instead of which, the emphasis on man as separate ego means that the sexual because of sin, becomes “the centre of human egoism”, a propensity to carry him further away from God. In a Journal note from the draft of *The Concept of Angst* Kierkegaard’s pseudonym even goes as far as to state that “first with sin time actually comes into being”, implying that temporality originates through sin, a thought that occurs in the Journal entries of the final years. Adam asserts himself, and expands his ego self-assertively on the horizontal plane of history, instead of relating in total self-denial to God on the vertical plane of eternity. Sexuality leads to the fact of human history, and with the advent of human self-consciousness, procreation becomes a purposive instead of an instinctive activity. Viewed in that light, existence can be described by Kierkegaard as “crime” and “punishment” in that humankind, having defied the divine purpose, wilfully continues in a situation that tends to isolation from God.³⁷

God can therefore be seen as self-denyingly creating nature so that man in freedom can choose between the two ways he seemingly can be like God, have “kinship with the Deity”. The individual can either be as physical creator in giving life or he can surrender himself to an existence of total self-denial: he can propagate the species as “animal creature” or as “man of spirit” – choose to be naturally self-asserting in creation to a greater or lesser extent, or, in utter self-denial can be an example encouraging others to do likewise in following the pattern of God’s nature, Jesus, incarnate God and suffering, atoning servant, who gives up everything even life itself.³⁸

Humankind, however, interprets and wants God’s omnipotence as self-assertive monarchic power. The individual wishes to be independent lord of creation. Hence his first idea is to propagate his kind. He expresses his egoism through reproduction: “Man wants to dabble in the creator’s activity, if not by creating man, at least by giving life”, says Kierkegaard, but “to create is reserved for God . . . the giving of life is a weak analogy to this . . . human egoism culminates at this point”. In humankind, “the instinct for the propagation of the race” is in fact as strong as “the instinct of self-preservation” because through the strength of numbers it is part of self-preservation, while family life centred round the mother with her children becomes, as in the animal kingdom, a species of egoism, in which “woman most certainly does not love herself

foremost but through (egoistically) loving her own she loves herself”.³⁹

For this reason, Kierkegaard points out that “the way marriage is regarded is decisive for every religious view of life” and that “propagation of the race is a substitute for immortality”.⁴⁰ All life-views – even religions that presuppose a personal God and advocate individual self-denial for the sake of others – are rejected by Kierkegaard if they postulate a false “unity of the divine and this life”. Humankind in defiance of God wishes to remain within the realm of temporality. It establishes family life as “a form of godliness”, centring its hopes on this world in terms of extension of the human ego in the form of race, relationships and goods. There is a tendency to identify the natural order of existence with the religious, nationality with religion and to recast God in the image of man.⁴¹ Not willing himself to be a real Christian, the individual turns Christianity into “Christendom” when he “undertakes to beget children who shall become Christians and these children in their turn behave in the same way” thus turning Christianity into enjoyment of life in “the ordinary human sense”.⁴²

It can thus be seen that Kierkegaard does not become distorted in his later writings about marriage and sexuality. It is his metaphysical assumptions about God and creation, the eternal and the temporal, that make it difficult, if not impossible, for him to reconcile marriage and procreation with an ideal likeness to God that demands total self-renunciation. Thus his attitude to marriage shifts when he moves from discussing how the Christian individual relates to God in and through the temporal world to how he relates to God from the temporal world in the light of the demand of Christian ideality. In the writings of the Judge, marriage is the important relationship sanctifying the temporal under God, though he is careful to emphasize it as a relationship rather than in its aspect of continuing the race. Later though, when Kierkegaard begins to speak of the exception and of self-annihilation before God, marriage becomes viewed not just as something one may give up under certain circumstances, or as something one has no time for if one intends to serve the Absolute absolutely, but as something one must normally give up in order to fulfil the divine command totally, especially where the human emphasis on marriage is on having children and on the continuation of the race. – If the true spiritual path consists of dying to selfishness, denying the natural self, expansion of the ego in space and time in one’s descendants can be seen as a form of the assertion of selfhood difficult to reconcile with self-denial when absolute ideality is demanded.⁴³

The ideality of the renunciation of marriage is in a sense implied at the beginning of Kierkegaard’s authorship, because Kierkegaard does not have a closed definition of Christianity. – Judge William does not set up his ethical-religious way as ultimate perfection, but puts it forward as the path of development, after which the situation is seen as being between God and the individual.⁴⁴ Even towards the end of the authorship, however, when Kierkegaard as the “corrective” scornfully rejects the thought

that “everyone is duty-bound to marry and that marriage is the genuinely ennobling life”, he still allows the permissibility of marriage, in “the Moral” in *Training in Christianity*. In the last years, side by side with demands for a “stop” to procreation and a rejection of Christian “epicureanism”, he points out that there are exceptional dialectical situations where the ideal of total renunciation may in fact require the individual to marry, as in the case of Luther. There are times when to keep “the things of the world does not signify that one wants to keep them – no, but that one wants to do something still higher than to give them away”.⁴⁵ Also, although Kierkegaard regards the Christian injunction to hate one’s life in this world as a principle logically “so asocial that it cannot constitute community” and says that he is “unable to comprehend how it can occur to any man to unite being a Christian with being married”, he points out that he is “not thinking of the case of a man who was already married and had a family, and then at that age became a Christian” but of the one who “is unmarried and says he has become a Christian”.⁴⁶ In retrospect he believes that his own desire to marry was a mistake, and it is surely his own situation he is describing when he speaks of letting the loved one go “in order to love God”.⁴⁷ – The New Testament “hatred of men” thus does not mean “conceitedly and arrogantly” wanting to “despise man and love God”, but is a rejection of temporality whenever and wherever it becomes divorced from God.⁴⁸

We can now return to the statements about women with which we started, having ascertained that Kierkegaard’s misogyny is rather a “misogamy” or attack on marriage in which both male and female roles are sharply criticized. Here, it should be noted that the bulk of the negative statements, and especially those dealing mainly with women, appear in the Journals and not in the Works, and that there is nothing to suggest that the Journal entries in question were sketches for a proposed special “attack” on women only, dialectical or otherwise.⁴⁹ We should therefore see Kierkegaard as dealing here, not with the relationship between men and women, but with the attitude towards marriage current in the society of his day in the light of his view of Christian ideality. Certainly one can regard Kierkegaard’s published “anti-marriage” statements of the last years as shock tactics, as a part of his attack on “Christendom”, but these and the Journal entries on marriage and women ought also to be viewed in the light of other Journal entries that tell us not a little about attitudes in society towards married and single persons.

We learn from a number of Journal entries that whereas celibacy was regarded as belonging to holiness in the Middle Ages, after the Reformation the reverse has become the case: “Fasting, celibacy, etc. is ridiculous extremism, madness, unreasonable worship of God. But marriage is the true and reasonable worship of God.” Under the influence of Protestantism, marriage has not only come to be “well-pleasing to God”, it now also “constitutes the meaning of life”. This has affected attitudes towards the unmarried. We thus also learn that “the unmarried girl who

is not lucky enough to marry ... is overlooked and minimized". – Whereas the married are regarded as the only "genuine citizens in this world", the single person "is an alien", "ridiculous". Married people regard such a person as "selfish", and just as families prefer their doctor to be married because "they are afraid that an unmarried man will be lecherous", so the congregation "will have no confidence in someone as a spiritual adviser etc. if he is not married." Even Kierkegaard's brother, Peter Christian, has, by 1848, come to believe that "the blessing of God does not rest upon an unmarried person".⁵⁰

Even if we must consider Kierkegaard's harsh comments about women and marriage as having reference only to the situation of his time, can they say anything to us today in our cultural situation where both men and women concentrate their energies on career and family? I think they probably can. – To the extent that we live in a time of over-emphasis on the pursuit of sexuality in various forms, Kierkegaard's statements ought to give us pause for thought, for the "abstainer" is still regarded with suspicion as selfish and as a deviant from the "norm",⁵¹ while various forms of self-denial and self-renunciation tend to be understood only in relation to this-worldly goals, for example, fasting as a political protest in China. As we have seen, Kierkegaard's statements are to be understood as being linked to the basic point that he is making in his authorship, his definition of Christianity and Christian ideality, with final emphasis on asceticism in relation to the traditional hope of eternal life. It can be argued that this is still something that we can take into consideration as a possibility, instead of taking it for granted that it is "ridiculous extremism" about something untrue because it goes against our natural inclinations and our current assumptions about the nature of existence.

Kierkegaard's Works and Papers: references are to: Kierkegaard's Collected Works: *Søren Kierkegaards Samlede Værker*, 1st edition, A. B. Drachmann, J. L. Heiberg and H. O. Lange, 14 vols., (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1901–06). SV. *Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers*: *Søren Kierkegaards Papirer*, 2nd edition P. A. Heiberg, V. Kuhr, E. Torsting, N. Thulstrup, I–XIII, (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1968–70), index (vols. XIV–XVI) N. J. Cappelørn, 1975–78. Pap. *In English*: Søren Kierkegaard, *Kierkegaard's Writings*, ed. & tr. Howard and Edna Hong and others, General Editor Howard V. Hong, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978–). KW. Other translations are named in the appropriate notes.

Søren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers, ed. & tr. Howard and Edna Hong, I–VII, (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1967–1978). JP.

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1. Pap. XI, 1 A 226 cf. 281 1854 (JP IV 5000, 5003).
2. Pap. XI, 1 A 228, 233 1854 (JP III 3175, IV 5002).
3. Pap. XI, 1 A 426 1854, XI, 2 A 70 1854 (JP IV 5005, 5006).
4. Pap. XI, 2 A 192 1854 p. 207–9, cf. SV XI 163 ft. (JP IV 5007, cf. KW XIX *The Sickness unto Death* SUD 50 ft.).
5. Pap. XI, 2 A 271 1855 (JP II 1823 p. 306).
6. I Cor. 7:7–9; cf. e.g. Pap. XI, 1 A 157, 169, 313, 1854, SV XIV 199, 254, 261 (JP III 2908, 2618, 2621 p. 138, Søren Kierkegaard, *Kierkegaard's Attack Upon "Christendom" 1854–1855*, tr. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968 ed.) AX 165, 213, 220).
7. Pap. XI, 2 A 150 1854, cf. XI, 1 A 129, 150, 169, 253, 295, 313, 1854, XI, 2 A 153, 154, 160, 172, 176, 231, 238, 241, 1854, 372, 1854–55 (JP III 2622, cf. 2616–2621, 2623–2631).
8. See Pap. XI, 1 A 210 n.d., SV II 5–140, VI 85–74, V 204–25 (JP VI 6882, KW IV *Either-Or* EO

II 5–154, KW XI *Stages on Life's Way* SLW 87–184, Søren Kierkegaard, *Thoughts on Crucial Situations in Human Life* Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions, tr. David F. Swenson, (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1941) 3DIO 43–74, “On the Occasion of a Wedding”, where Kierkegaard refers to, for example, “the sacred vocation of marriage”, SV V 219, 3DIO 65 (Ægteskabets hellige Kald).

9. In a paper to the Søren Kierkegaard Society Denmark (Vartov, Copenhagen, 24.3.1988) psychiatrist Dr. Thorkil Vanggaard suggests that Kierkegaard was very scared of a close relationship with a woman and could not cope with the physical side of marriage.

10. Eduard Geismar, *Søren Kierkegaard*, I–II, (Copenhagen: G.E.C. Gads Forlag, 1927) II, section VI 40–45. For the references to comments involving women in “The Instant” see SV XIV 175, 197, 252–56, 260, 265 (AX 145, 163, 212–16, 219–20, 223).

11. Birgit Bertung in her paper “Yes, a Woman Can Exist”, in *Kierkegaard Conferences I “Kierkegaard Poet of Existence”*, (Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzels Forlag, 1989). See also her book, *Om Kierkegaard, Kvinder og Kærlighed* en studie i Søren Kierkegaards kvindesyn, (Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzels Forlag, 1987).

12. *International Kierkegaard Commentary*, ed. Robert L. Perkins, *The Sickness unto Death*, (Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1987) IKC vol. 19, 121–35.

13. On the individual's historical context see, for example, SV I 123, II 193–4, 231, IV 301 (KW III EO I 145, KW IV EO II 216, 258, KW VIII *The Concept of Anxiety* CA 28–9). On the assertion of spiritual equality of men and women before God mentioned with their external and psycho-physical differences, see, for example, SV IX 133–34, Pap. III A 234 1842, V B 53:25 1844, XI, 1 A 231 1854, XI, 2 A 192, 193 1854 (Søren Kierkegaard, *Works of Love*, tr. Howard and Edna Hong (New York & London: Harper & Row, 1962) WL 139–40, JP I 95, IV 4989, 5001, 5007, 5008). In the last two Journal entries women are depicted as relating directly to things, as unable to “endure a dialectic”. – It is interesting to compare Kierkegaard's entries here with a statement by J. L. Heiberg in 1833, when he went as far as to invite women as well as men to attend his philosophy lectures. He observed that: “Although men usually have a sharper and more consistent reason, a greater capacity for dialectic, women usually have a surer, more infallible feeling for immediately grasping truth”. J. L. Heiberg, lecture programme: *Om Filosofiens Betydning for den nuværende Tid* (Copenhagen: 1833), 53.

14. In this I will be following up the thought of Gregor Malantschuk in his article, “Kierkegaard's View of Man and Woman” in his *The*

Controversial Kierkegaard, tr. Howard and Edna Hong, The Kierkegaard Monography Series, ed. Alastair McKinnon (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfred Laurier Press, 1980) 37–61. Malantschuk sees Kierkegaard in the last years as looking at everything from an “extreme Christian point of view, consequently as one who in his thinking and in his life earnestly tried to break with this world.” From such a viewpoint, “the whole earthly enterprise looks different than when one feels altogether bound to it.” Kierkegaard now looks at woman from the “plane of the solitary hermit”. See esp. p. 58–9.

15. Pap. XI, 2 A 54 cf. 97 1854, II A 359, 758 1838, VII, 1 A 181 1846, X, 2 A 563 1850, XI, 1 A 491 1854, XI, 2 A 3 1854, SV I 210, IV 352 ft. VI 118, VII 220 (JP III 2570, IV 4571, 4412, II 1310, 1251, 1299, 2099, 1224, KW III EO I 236, KW VIII CA 83 ft., KW XI SLW 122, Søren Kierkegaard, *Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, tr. David F. Swenson & Walter Lowrie, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941) CUP 232–3. See also on God as creator out of nothing in the Church Fathers, Anselm, Aquinas, Augustine, references in e.g. F. C. Copleston, *Aquinas*, (Gt. Britain: Penguin Books, 1955) 70–1, 141–8, and Copleston, *A History of Philosophy I–VIII* (London: Burns Oates & Washbourne Ltd., 1946–1966) II 74–7.

16. Pap. VII, 1 A 181 1846 (JP II 1251).

17. Simone Weil, *Waiting on God – The Essence of Her Thought* (England: Collins, Fontana 159) 113–14, 102.

18. SV XIII 382, Søren Kierkegaard, *The Concept of Irony*, tr. Lee M. Capel (London: Collins 1966) CI 329.

19. Pap. VII, 1 A 181 1846 (JP II 1251).

20. See e.g. Søren Kierkegaard, *Edifying Discourses in Different Key*, “What we Learn from the Lilies of the Field and the Birds of the Air”, SV VIII 245–296, esp. 269, cf. SV II 201, 161, 172 (Søren Kierkegaard, *The Gospel of Suffering and The Lilies of the Field*, tr. David F. and Lillian M. Swenson (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1948) GS 165–236, esp. 197, cf. KW IV EO II 225, 178, 191).

21. SV II 38, IV 355, 358, VII 258, XI 127–131, II 224 cf. 238, Pap. XI, 1 A 408 1854 (KW IV EO II 41, KW VIII CA 85, 88, CUP 267, KW XIX SUD 13–17, KW IV EO II 250 cf. 265, JP I 87).

22. SV VIII 278–279 (GS 210–11).

23. SV II 224 (KW IV EO II 250).

24. SV IV 360 (KW VIII CA 90).

25. Pap. XI, 2 A 123 1854, XI, 1 A 402 1854 (JP IV 4814, II 1807). Thought about opposition of the intensive and the extensive is repeated a number of times in Kierkegaard's authorship: Pap. IX A 126 1848, X, 4 A 219, 392, 1851, X, 4 A 541 1849, X, 5 A 26 1852, XI, 1 A 189, 402, 414, 468, 500, 1854, XI, 2 A 64, 76, 123, 146, 1854 (JP III 2640, II 2100, 2101, 1852, 2102, 2056, 1807, III

- 2448, IV 4810, II 2103, 2104, IV 4813, 4814, III 2994).
26. Pap. XI, 2 A 123, 51, 53–55 1854 (JP IV 4814, III 3099, II 1444, III 2570–71).
27. SV II 224, 152, 133, 229, 235, cf. 18 (KW IV EO II 250, 167, 147, 255–56, 262–63, cf. 19).
28. Pap. X, 2 A 390 1850, VIII, 1 A 196 1847, X, 2 A 351 1850, VII, 1 A 20 1846, cf. SV IX esp. 58–60 (JP III 2952, 2410, IV 4170, 4110, WL esp. 68–70).
29. SV II 57, IX 54, 59–60 (KW IV EO II 62, WL 65, 70).
30. On Kierkegaard's view of death see my article: "Kierkegaard's View of Death", in *Journal of the History of European Ideas*, vol. 11, No. 1, 1990.
31. SV II 56–7, 224, 270, VI 97–8, 162–3, VII 214, Pap. IV A 234, SV VI 44–5, 112–14 (KW IV EO II 60–1, 250, 302, KW XI SLW 101–2, 171, CUP 227, KW XI SLW p. 42–3, 117).
32. As, for example, in the "cod war" between Britain and Iceland in the seventies.
33. Pap. XI, 2 A 108, cf. 111 (JP IV 4238, cf. 4501).
34. SV IV 206, 215, VI 104, 161, 164, VII 401, 335–484, IX 135 (KW VII PF 39, 48, KW XI SLW 107, 169, 172, CUP 412, 347–493, WL 141).
35. Pap. XI, 2 A 154, 201 1854, SV XIV 267, Pap. XI, 1 A 289 1854, XI, 2 A 150 1854, XI, 2 A 439, 434, 420, 1855 (JP III 2624, II 1818, AX 226, JP III 3643, 2622, VI 6969, II 1940, Søren Kierkegaard, *The Last Years Journals 1853–55*, ed. & tr. Ronald Gregor Smith (London: Collins, Fontana, 1968) JRGS 346–7). In following up Kierkegaard's thought about Fall-doctrine I will also be following up a comment by Eduard Geismar, *Søren Kierkegaard II*, section VI, 45, "that if one believes that most people are eternally lost, fallen, it is difficult to look positively at procreation."
36. SV IV 363, 348, 319 (KW VIII CA 93, 79, 49).
37. Pap. XI, 2 A 154, 150 1854, V B 55:12 1844, XI, 2 A 176, 202 1854, XI, 1 A 289 1854, XI, 2 A 439 1854, SV XIV 265, 267, Pap. XI, 2 A 434 1855 (JP III 2624, 2622, cf. KW VIII CA 198, JP III 2627, IV 3970, 3643, VI 6969, AX 223, 226, JP II 1940).
38. SV XIV 330, cf. 256, Pap. XI, 2 A 150 1854, XI, 1 A 194 1854, X, 3 A 150 1850, XI, 1 A 158, 22, 358, 115, 1854 (AX 265 cf. 215, JP III 2622, II 1803, I 1061, II 1929, 1925, I 83, IV 4980).
39. Pap. XI, 2 A 154 1854, XI, 2 A 439 1855, SV XIV 199, Pap. XI, 1 A 141 1854 p. 99 (JP III 2624, VI 6969, AX 165, JP IV 4998).
40. Pap. XI, 1 A 150 1854, XI, 2 A 154, 176 1854, SV XIV 262 (JP III 2617, 2624, 2627, AX 221).
41. Pap. IX A 24 1848, X, 3 A 293, 139 1850, XI, 1 A 139, 151, 184, 1854, X, 3 A 426 1849, X, 3 A 157 1850 SV VII 38–9, 349, Pap. XI, 2 A 183 1854, SV XI 209–10, 226–38, Pap. XI, 1 A 168 1854, XI, 2 A 164 1854, XI, 1 A 552, 524, 1854 (JP II 2217, 2221, 2218, 2224, 2225, 2227, I 843, II 2219, CUP 49, 360, JP II 1766, KW XIX SUD 99, 117–29, JP II 2054, I 370, III 3209, IV 4352).
42. SV XIV 255–6, 53, 252, Pap. XI, 1 A 259 1854, XI, 2 A 222 1854, XI, 1 A 295 1854 (AX 215–16, 38, 212, JP IV 3969, III 2337, 2620).
43. SV XIII 359 ft., SV XIV 252–56, 259–63, Pap. X, 2 A 181 1849, XI, 2 A 231, 226, 1854 (CI 305 ft., AX 212–16, 219–22, JP III 2608, 2628, IV 5000).
44. See e.g. SV II 306–18, VII 100, Pap. X, 3 A 509 1850 (KW IV EO II 341–54, CUP 110, JP II 1789).
45. Pap. X, 4 A 15 1851, XI, 1 A 226 1854, SV XII 64–5, Pap. XI, 1 A 295, 313, 1854, XI, 2 A 150, 153, 1854, XI, 1 A 552, 546, 1854, XI, 2 A 301 1853–4 (JP I 708, IV 5000, Søren Kierkegaard, *Training in Christianity*, tr. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941) TX 71, JP III 2620–2623, 3209, I 602, III 2543). On the duty of marriage it is interesting to note a fairy story recorded by Carl Ewald in his *Eventyrskrinet Gamle Danske Sagn og Eventyr I–V* (Copenhagen & Kristiania: Gyldendalske Boghandel Nordisk Forlag, 1906–07) IV p. 35–45, "Præstekonens Synd" (The Pastor's Wife's Sin), where because the wife deliberately marries when she is too old to have children she is regarded by the heavenly powers as having murdered her unborn children.
46. Pap. XI, 1 A 190 n.d., 313 1854, SV XIV 253–4 (JP II 2057, III 2621, AX 213). On hating and forsaking the temporal in the New Testament see: Matt. 10:37, 19:19 & 29, Mk. 10:29, 13:12, Lk. 12:52–3, 14:26, 21:16–17, Jn. 15:18.
47. Pap. XI, 1 A 226 1854, SV XIV 197 (JP IV 5000, AX 163).
48. Pap. XI, 1 A 279 1854 (JP III 2443).
49. See notes 1–2 and 11 above.
50. Pap. XI, 1 A 129 1854, XI, 2 A 154, 238 1854, XI, 1 A 169 1854, VIII, 1 A 190 1847, X, 1 A 440 1849, IX A 245 1848, X, 3 A 293 1850 (JP III 2616, 2624, 2629, 2618, 2569, 2605, 2601, II 2221).
51. I have encountered this outlook as late as Autumn 1988 in Copenhagen, where a married man with a university education described Mother Teresa of India as "selfish" for not marrying. The reason given was that she had "run away" from the responsibilities and difficulties of marriage.