In a well-known journal entry from 1854 Kierkegaard made the following suggestive alignment between imagination and women:

Imagination is what providence uses to take men captive in actuality, in existence, in order to get them far enough out, or within, or down into actuality. And when imagination has helped them get as far out as they should be – then actuality genuinely begins.

Johannes V. Muller says that there are two great powers around which all revolves: ideas and women. This is entirely correct and is consistent with what I say here about the significance of imagination. Women or ideas are what beckon men out into existence.¹

In what follows I will argue that there are two different levels of appreciation of the feminine within this alignment of imagination with the feminine. These levels of appreciation constitute first, a simple but insufficient response to a feminist ethical critique and second, a deeper, more sophisticated response. I will initially consider how two of his pseudonymous works illustrate and explain the very positive assessment of imagination which is expressed in the above journal entry, and hence support a correspondingly positive evaluation of the feminine. I will then suggest in Sections 2 and 3 how that positive evaluation of imagination and the feminine might nevertheless be one with which a feminist ethical theorist could be dissatisfied – that is, since it is the character of the use of imagination (not its indispensability) which determines whether a given ethic is congenial to feminist concerns, Kierkegaard’s emphasis on ethical imagination does not automatically save him from
feminist criticism. Finally, by showing in Section 4 how this feminist ethical dissatisfaction is not necessarily warranted, I will be introducing the second level of appreciation of the feminine found in these accounts. The feminist critique will itself indirectly highlight the way in which a Kierkegaardian ethic can be congenial to feminist concerns.

Despite the fact that imagination is often spoken of in the Kierkegaardian corpus in very negative or derogatory ways (he condemns wandering in what he terms the "fairyland of imagination," and warns that imagination can take us so "far out" that we lose ourselves), in at least two of the pseudonymous works – those by Judge William and Johannes Climacus – the role of imagination in ethical (or self) development is clearly the positive role expressed in the journal entry noted at the outset. I will consider these accounts in turn, indicating how they reveal the value and indispensability of imagination. This understanding of ethical imagination, when correlated with the feminine, provides support for the first level of appreciation of the feminine and hence for the first level of response to a feminist challenge.

Judge William’s account of the ethical in Either-Or includes the following crucial elements. The hallmark of the ethical is "choice," and in choice a person "becomes himself, quite the same self he was before, down to the least significant peculiarity, and yet he becomes another." Moreover, "he who chooses himself ethically has himself as his task, and not as a possibility merely, not as a toy to be played with arbitrarily." Although this task of "becoming" oneself-and-yet-another does not involve "possibility merely," it does nonetheless involve possibility (and hence, imagination), for he writes:

The self which the individual knows is at once the actual self and the ideal self which the individual has outside himself as the picture in likeness to which he has to form himself, and which, on the other hand, he nevertheless has in him since it is the self.

The "ideal self" is a possibility; ethical development requires the appropriation of the possible – i.e., it requires an "imagination of otherness." The ideal or possible self is the "other" one becomes while becoming oneself, and likening oneself to that "picture" is what constitutes ethical development.
The self one becomes is "himself ... yet ... absolutely distinct from his former self." Since only imagination can give us access to such a possible self and since only imagination can achieve the requisite holding of actual and ideal self together in simultaneous tension, the importance of ethical imagination in such an account is clear.

Climacus’s account of subjectivity in the *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* carries on many of these same themes. For example, Climacus puts imagination on a par with thought and feeling, rejecting a hierarchy. "In existence," he writes, "thought is by no means higher than imagination and feeling, but coordinate"; our task is "not to exalt the one at the expense of the other, but to give them an equal status, to unify them in simultaneity." Moreover, Climacus reinforces Judge William's characterization of ethical development as centrally involving imagination. The "ethical demand," he explains, "is that he become infinitely interested in existing," and that means remaining within the "tremendous contradiction" which "existence involves," understanding "the greatest oppositions together." Affirming "oppositions together" – holding opposites in tension – is a distinctive function of imagination. Likewise, Climacus claims that genuine selfhood requires maintaining a tension between infinite and finite which is achievable only through imaginative activity – it is through what he terms an "imaginative representation" that we are rendered infinite, and only imagination can maintain that infinity in irreducible tension with our finitude. Thus, the indispensability of imagination to the task of subjectivity and the ethical is similarly affirmed in both accounts.

One might ask at this point, however, how much scope for genuine "otherness" is really implied in these accounts of ethical imagination. The question whether there is a genuine "other" can be raised in two forms (or from two directions). The first form concerns the separate or social other, and is raised by those who fear the Kierkegaardian ethic is solitary and individualistic, failing to do justice to concerns about community, solidarity, and relationship. This criticism (one not limited to feminists) is that the imagination of "otherness" in his works seems limited to the solitary self in its ideal representation. In support
of such a charge, one could point, for example, to Judge William's claim that the ethical individual "has himself as a task ... the aim of his activity is himself." Such an imagination of "otherness" does not seem to go beyond a solitary self-fulfillment ethic.

Such a criticism ignores the way in which ethical imagination in these accounts is bound to the notion of a concrete agent, bound in such a way as to preclude a prescriptive individualistic insulation. I shall argue that a limitation of the "other" to the ideal self is precluded because both Judge William and Climacus wholeheartedly and repeatedly affirm the concreteness of the ethical agent, and insofar as they do this they affirm not only the agent's particularity and specificity and uniqueness, but also its embeddedness in a context of relations.

The development of self which is described by Judge William is not a formal matter – the self is "not conscious simply of freedom in general," but of freedom realized in relatedness. The ethical is unpacked in terms of seeing "tasks everywhere." This implies a contextual web of social relations and demands; this implication is borne out in Judge William's claim that "one can choose oneself ethically only by repenting oneself," and such "repentance puts the individual in the most intimate connection and the most exact cohesion with a surrounding world." The concreteness of the self inevitably implies relation to other selves beyond the self, for they are part of the "manifold variety of determinants" which determine the self as concrete. An imaginative extension to a genuinely separate other is in this way built into a genuine acknowledgement of the agent's concreteness.

This is also made explicit by Judge William as he details what is implied in maintaining "continuity with the finite." References to the "deep and heartfelt sense of community" at the bottom of family life and the sense of "responsibility" which distinguishes the ethical from the aesthetic, to remaining among people, to going out of oneself, to uniting oneself with mankind, and the importance of all those to whom one is "bound by obligations and with whom he might have come into relationship": all of these references render explicit the sociality implied in concrete agency. Thus, an emphasis on contextuality implies an affirmation of solidarity and community. The concrete self is necessarily a related self, a self in relation to other selves. Just as the ideal self calls me, is seen as a demand, so too the other-
beyond-the-self calls me, places a demand – or more precisely, the demands are co-extensive.

Such an ethic of relatedness, however, insures only that there be an appreciation of a genuinely separate other – a minimum recognition of duty and obligation. The demands of such an ethic can in principle be met within the rubric of a very formal understanding of the other as an abstract, universalized other. A second form of criticism of an ethical orientation can be raised, therefore, which takes for granted that ethical attention is oriented toward the other-beyond-the-self, but questions the way in which that other is addressed. The question is not about genuinely separate others, but about concrete others. The question no longer concerns solitariness, but, rather, abstraction – and the possibility of this kind of criticism of ethical orientations in general has been most strongly put forth by proponents of feminist ethics.

I turn now to a brief consideration of one contemporary account of such a feminist criticism. I will be arguing that this formulation of the criticism indirectly turns our attention to the Kierkegaardian commitment to concreteness which provides resources for a defense against the criticism – that is, the implications of “concrete” agency which I used to answer the charge of the solitariness of the Kierkegaardian ethic (and the limitation of the “other” to the ideal representation of the self) can also address this second kind of criticism.

Seyla Benhabib expresses a central feminist concern in her discussion of two concepts of self-other relations, two perspectives on the “other” which inform contrasting moral orientations: namely, an orientation toward the “generalized other” and an orientation toward the “concrete other.” The former, she argues, represents the dominant Kantian-based moral tradition, and the latter represents a feminist challenge to that tradition. I will argue in what follows that her delineation of these two orientations indirectly serves to illustrate two contrasting views of the role of ethical imagination, and hence indirectly reveals how a positive valuation of ethical imagination does not in itself necessarily guarantee an adequate valuation of the feminine.
The Kierkegaardian emphasis I have noted on the importance of imagination for ethical development and its correlation with the feminine might seem unquestionably welcome to feminist theorists or those advocating a feminist ethics. The alignment he makes is without doubt a positive one from his own standpoint – the question is whether it is positive only at the expense of ignoring or denying what many today would argue is central to many feminist self-understandings. Someone might affirm the value of the feminine or woman while nevertheless misunderstanding or misrepresenting it – that is, depending on the way in which imagination is directed to the "other," an alignment between imagination and the feminine might, even if put forth as positive, imply an understanding of the feminine which feminist theorists would nevertheless want to reject as ignoring what is characteristic of feminist concerns. This is possible because a positive valuation of ethical imagination is underdetermined – the role of ethical imagination is open to two quite different readings, and one of these is at odds with a central concern of feminist theories of ethics. By bringing this possibility to our attention, Benhabib's account allows us to focus on a second and more important way in which Kierkegaard's appreciation of the feminine is expressed in his understanding of ethical imagination.

Benhabib argues that the tradition of "universalistic, contractarian theories from Hobbes to Rawls" illustrates the perspective of the "generalized other" because it views the moral self as a "disembedded and disembodied being." Relation to the other, in this perspective, is "governed by the norms of formal equality and reciprocity," and informed by categories of right, duty, and entitlement, whereas the perspective of the "concrete other," by contrast, is "governed by the norms of equity and complementary reciprocity," and informed by categories of responsibility, need, and sharing. In the perspective of the "generalized other" we abstract from individuality and address "humanity"; in the perspective of the "concrete other" we abstract from commonality and address "human individuality."

Attention to the "other" as a concrete other, rather than a merely generalized, abstracted, other is characteristic of that moral orientation which was highlighted by Carol Gilligan as representing a "different voice" in accounts of moral judgment: the orientation of care and responsibility, in contrast to the orientation of justice and rights. Although in her samples she
found such an orientation to be "by no means characteristic of all women, it was almost exclusively a female phenomenon."\textsuperscript{24} The tradition of Kantian universalistic moral theories, Benhabib insists, reveals, on the contrary, a "male" perspective of the "generalized other" because such theories are "substitutionalist" in their emphases on universalizability and reversibility; they effectively require that "we abstract from the individuality and concrete identity of the other."\textsuperscript{25} A striking example of this is found, she argues, in the Kantian views of moral judgment put forth by Kohlberg and Rawls, since both assume that mature and just moral judgments can only be made by reference to what Rawls calls a "veil of ignorance" in which we make irrelevant any knowledge we could have of particular identities. The result in both cases is that "the defensible kernel of the ideas of reciprocity and fairness are [sic] thereby identified with the perspective of the disembedded and disembodied generalized other."\textsuperscript{26}

Benhabib notes that such an understanding of the ethical emphasizes the importance of (in Kohlberg’s words) "taking the viewpoint of the others," and she questions whether such an emphasis "is truly compatible with this notion of fairness as reasoning behind a "veil of ignorance"." She suggests that there is an "epistemic incoherence" in such theories:

The problem can be stated as follows: according to Kohlberg and Rawls, moral reciprocity involves the capacity to take the standpoint of the other, to put oneself imaginatively in the place of the other, but under conditions of the "veil of ignorance," the other as different from the self disappears.\textsuperscript{27}

Although Rawls’s account is not strictly speaking subject to Benhabib’s charge that it is "substitutionalist," and although it does not, as Kohlberg’s does, speak of taking the viewpoint of the other, it does in the end remain one which, like Kohlberg’s, requires that the self and other must be generalized abstractions – for both, "the other as different from the self disappears."\textsuperscript{28} Both we and the other are prescriptively seen in "total abstraction" from our/his/her identity. On such an account, attention to the particular concreteness of the other is thought to obscure moral judgment or taint moral assessments. What such an account is blind to, Benhabib suggests, is that when
reference to and relevance of "how I, as a finite, concrete, embodied individual, shape and fashion the circumstances of my birth and family, linguistic, cultural, and gender identity into a coherent narrative" is precluded, there can no longer be "individuated" selves or others. Under such conditions of blindness to the concrete (the embedded, the embodied) there can no longer be individuated moral situations either. To sum up, Benhabib argues that

a definition of the self that is restricted to the standpoint of the generalized other becomes incoherent and cannot individuate among selves. Without assuming the standpoint of the concrete other, no coherent universalizability test can be carried out, for we lack the necessary epistemic information to judge my moral situation to be "like" or "unlike" yours.

The alternative to such a limiting view of interchangeable reciprocity or identification is one which "acknowledges that every generalized other is also a concrete other." An understanding of ethical imagination as directed toward an appreciation of the concrete other rather than the generalized other would then be an understanding of ethical imagination entirely congenial to feminist ethical theory. Such a view of ethical imagination both would be understandably aligned with the feminine and would, on feminist terms, appropriately value the feminine. The question is whether Kierkegaard's alignment of the feminine with ethical imagination expresses and underlines a challenge to a traditional (Kantian) view of ethical imagination, with its emphasis on an atomistic, individualistic model of an autonomous self in relation to abstract, universalizable others – or whether instead it values the feminine only by assimilating it to the traditional (masculine) model.

What I find most interesting about Benhabib's account of the orientation to the "generalized other" is that, although she focusses on the "incoherence" of a position which acknowledges the role of the imaginative activity of taking the viewpoint of others at the same time as it is prescriptively blind to individual identity, her account indirectly reveals that there are two very different ways in which ethical imagination can function. Both orientations (toward the generalized other and toward the concrete other) involve a concern with the "other" and to that
extent both centrally involve imaginative activity. This is so because only imagination can effect the required extension—whether the extension is one of abstraction or of concretizing. But, although the orientation toward the “generalized other” emphasizes ethical imagination, it does so in a truncated way, for it emphasizes one function of imagination at the expense of other functions—it emphasizes the imaginative activity of abstraction to the exclusion of the imaginative activity of making concrete. It is, ironically, the use of imagination to limit imagination. The result is that the paradigm of the ethical becomes what Benhabib calls the “silent thought process of a single self who imaginatively puts himself in the position of the other,” but the “other” it posits is seen in abstraction from anything that could identify and individuate her or him.

To put the matter concisely, since imagination is integral to both perspectives on the “other”—generalized and concrete—an emphasis on ethical imagination does not as such guarantee that a given moral theory is congenial with or supportive of feminist moral orientations. Thus, an alignment between imagination and the feminine (such as we saw Kierkegaard affirm) does not guarantee that imagination will be understood in ways that feminist ethics will find adequate. The understanding of imagination as abstracting and generalizing reinforces traditional concepts of ethical obligation and autonomy, while the understanding of imagination as concretizing is more congenial to a feminist challenge to that tradition. The question is whether Kierkegaard’s view of ethical imagination is one which in fact supports the orientation towards the concrete other, or, instead, follows the dominant tradition in its emphasis on the “universal” and hence expresses an ethic of relationship, but only in terms of substitutability, reversible reciprocity, or effective identification. The answer to that question will reveal what understanding of the feminine lies behind his alignment of imagination and the feminine.

The emphasis on the universal in various Kierkegaardian accounts of the ethical calls to mind just that universalistic moral theorizing (whether of the Kantian or Rawlsian variety) which a feminist ethic challenges. Indeed, in Fear and Trembling,
for example, the understanding of the ethical as the "universal" seems a straightforwardly Kantian one, premised on the irrelevance of particulars and exceptions—a lack which is only made up in the religious realm. In what follows I will briefly explore the understanding of the "universal" found in the two pseudonymous works I have been considering to see whether through his emphasis on the "universal," ethical imagination is really directed to a "generalized other".

Some texts which appear to provide grist for the feminist ethical mill can be found in Judge William's account. He repeatedly affirms that "the ethical is the universal and so it is the abstract," and claims that "the task which the ethical individual sets himself is to transform himself into the universal man." Although we have seen that Judge William's ethic is clearly not a solitary one, such texts might suggest that ethical relationships are paradigmatically universalizable and hence abstract. I suggest, on the contrary, that in Judge William's account the contextualizing of the agent which expresses the concreteness of the self and is constituted by social relationships can be extended to include the concreteness of other agents—the concrete other constitutes a deeper contextualization of the concrete self. This can be shown in a variety of ways.

First, the orientation to a concrete other is implied in the two-fold way in which Judge William relates the ethical to the aesthetic, for both aspects of that relation emphasize concreteness and particularity as distinctive of the ethical. One expression of the relation between the ethical and the aesthetic is in terms of Judge William's rejection of the superficiality of the aesthete: his flitting around in possibilities, his "hovering" above himself, his failure, in other words, to be deep "down into actuality" and existence. This, repeatedly illustrated by Judge William's rejection of the aesthetic stance of the "observer," is conversely an affirmation of relationships to concrete others. The entire book can be seen as a set of variations on the theme that the limit of the aesthetic is that for the aesthete things come to pass "rather in abstracto than in concreto."

The other expression of the relation between the ethical and the aesthetic, which equally emphasizes the concrete, is found in Judge William's constantly repeated claim that the ethical "preserve[s]" and "transfigure[s]" the aesthete's appreciation of the richness of the concrete. He realizes the value inherent in the aesthetic interest in particularity and distinctiveness
and difference, and insists that such value is not left behind, for it is the "whole aesthetical self which is chosen ethically." The concreteness of the aesthetic retains its "validity" and is "preserved"; indeed, its "transfiguration" means that the ethical has a deeper appreciation of the concrete, "one concrete expression the more, deeper than every aesthetic expression."

The feminist and/or ethical critic might argue that Judge William's claims to the contrary notwithstanding he represents the ethical as an orientation to an abstract, generalized other in that, for example, however much he raves about the preservation of the aesthetic in the ethical, he never once refers to his wife by name. This is in stark contrast to the concrete identifying which occurs in the papers of the aesthete where individuals have a particular name and are not treated as a general type. But that, I think, would be to be misled by a surface difference, for although he does not present the details about the "other," his wife, to the reader, he does give evidence of how important those details are to him, including the way her "small" nose "turns itself saucily to the world." It is this kind of attentiveness to detail which is part of the "reverence" for the other without which, he insists, one cannot love; it is why he says love is not blind, but rather "is an absolute alertness, an absolute beholding." When the individual "becomes conscious of himself as this definite individual, with these talents, these dispositions, these instincts, these passions, influenced by these definite surroundings, as this definite product of a definite environment," he is conscious of the definiteness of the other. To be "influenced by these definite surroundings" is to see choice as contextualized by the concreteness of the other to whom one is related.

Thirdly, Judge William explicitly distinguishes between two modes of being ethical in a way which is reminiscent of the discussion of the "general" vs. the "concrete" other. He refers to an orientation which is admittedly ethical even though in it "I detach myself from the whole world till by this detachment I end in abstract identity." "The imperfection of this life view," he continues, lies "in the fact that this individual had chosen himself altogether abstractly," whereas genuine ethical choice "puts the individual in the most intimate connection and the most exact cohesion with a surrounding world." Such "intimate" and "exact" cohesion surely describes an orientation to concrete others.
Moreover, although Judge William refuses to investigate "the relation between the Aristotelian and the Kantian interpretation of the ethical," he nonetheless explicitly approves as "more perfect" the Aristotelian appeal to "the social sense" as contrasted with "the modern view which bases justice upon duty, the abstract categorical." Reinforcing his claim that "an abstract calling is no calling," he reiterates that duty is particular and the relation to duty should not be "abstract." 

In keeping with these kinds of claims, Judge William's understanding of the task of transforming oneself "into the universal man" is radically qualified by his insistence on the concrete and particular: a person, he says, "makes himself the universal man, not by divesting himself of his concretion ... but by clothing himself with it." The task of becoming the universal man is equivalently the universal task of "being this particular man who is yet at the same time the universal man," for every one is both "the universal-human" and the "exception."

That "unity of universal and particular" which is at the heart of the ethical makes of duty a "dialectic": "my duty is the particular, something for me alone, and yet it is duty and hence the universal." The universal exists, and only exists, in the particular: "the universal exists nowhere as such, and it depends upon me, upon my energy of consciousness, whether in the particular I will see the universal or merely the particular." Seeing "the universal in the particular" is an imaginative activity – indeed, it has been called "the very central function of the imagination." In claiming that it is as wrong-headed to see only the particular (as the aesthete does) as it is to see only the abstract universal, William is clearly arguing that the tension between them must be sustained – and only imagination can hold such opposites in tension. Such an understanding of the ethical use of imagination clearly seeks to avoid the pitfalls of an abstract, universalizable ethical orientation. Judge William's claim, then, that the ideal is the "possession of the universal in the peculiarity" rather than the "universal in abstracto" echoes Benhabib's feminist conclusion that the alternative to a "generalized other" orientation is one which "acknowledges that every generalized other is also a concrete other."

Climacus's account of ethical subjectivity is, if anything, even more forceful than Judge William's in its emphasis on the concrete, the particular, the finite. "The real subject," he writes, "is the ethically existing subject" – when we ask about existence
we “ask ethically.” Climacus here contrasts the ethical sphere of reality, actuality, and existence, with the “sphere of the possible.” Since, as we have seen, imagination is necessary to ethical choice, he is contrasting the engaged, concrete, use of imagination with the abstract, objective use. His strident condemnation of the “abstract” in the realm of existence echoes Judge William’s rejection – both imply the rejection of an orientation to a disembodied, disembedded, generalized other. Just as we cannot abstract our self from its concreteness, so we cannot abstract others from their concreteness. What is true of the self in relation to its other (ideal) self is true also of the social other – in this respect they are echoes of each other.

The emphasis on the concrete, for Climacus, is a dual-edged one: the concrete is delimited and yet inexhaustible. The concrete has definition, as opposed to the infinite abstract, but its exploration is inexhaustible. The emphasis on the concrete, the finite, in his account of ethical subjectivity is clearly one involving an imaginative appropriation of the other who is as much a person to be explored as oneself. The emphasis on the “individual” is an affirmation of the individuated – in relation – rather than of the individualistic.

In sum, feminist theorists in general have rejected gendered concepts of both rationality and morality which place a premium on abstraction. In his concern with ethical subjectivity Climacus rejects an abstract concept of rationality, and both he and Judge William reject an abstract concept of the ethical response. Although it is not always the case that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” in this case it does seem that Kierkegaard’s alignment of imagination with the feminine symbolizes an appreciation of ethical imagination congenial to feminist ethics.
Notes


4 Ibid., p. 262.

5 Ibid., p. 263.


8 CUP, pp. 310-11.

9 Ibid., p. 280.

10 Ibid., pp. 313, 316.

11 Ibid., p. 176.


14 Ibid., p. 227.

15 Ibid., p. 256.

16 Ibid., pp. 252, 245.

17 Ibid., pp. 227, 256.

18 Ibid., p. 253.

19 Ibid., pp. 86, 87, 106, 111, 244, 249.


21 (unpublished).


23 Ibid., pp. 163-64.


27 Ibid., p. 165.

28 I am indebted to Margaret Mohrmann for pointing out to me that in these respects Benhabib’s characterization of Rawls is strictly speaking inaccurate.

30 Ibid., p. 167.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid., p. 168.
33 Ibid., p. 167.
36 Ibid., pp. 7-8, 51, 322.
37 Ibid., p. 17.
38 Ibid., p. 227.
39 Ibid., pp. 182, 230, 233; also see 8, 9, 11, 31, 243.
40 Ibid., pp. 233, 260.
41 David Barrett-Johnson suggested this interesting possibility.
43 Ibid., pp. 112, 43.
44 Ibid., p. 255.
45 Ibid., p. 244.
46 Ibid., p. 245.
47 Ibid., p. 327.
48 Ibid., pp. 298, 309, 268-69.
49 Ibid., p. 260.
50 Ibid., pp. 280, 337; see p. 261.
51 Ibid., pp. 46, 268.
52 Ibid., p. 334.
55 CUP, pp. 281, 279.