Kierkegaard, Jews, and Judaism

Bruce H. Kirmmse

At one point in his journals Kierkegaard writes: "Goethe notes ... that when the Jews killed the Egyptians it was the reverse of the Sicilian Vespers. In the latter case the host murdered the guests, but in this case the guests murdered the host. But this is certainly the situation with respect to the Jews in Europe in our time."2

This is strong and unpleasant language, even when it is viewed against the background of the level of antisemitism then considered normal and acceptable in Denmark and in Europe. What does Kierkegaard mean when he says this sort of thing? And there are more and even worse statements of this type. And why Jews?

The old legend of the Wandering Jew tells of the shoemaker Ahasuerus, who refused to allow Jesus Christ to rest in his shop as he dragged his cross to the crucifixion. Christ is supposed to have said to Ahasuerus that because of this he was condemned to remain alive until the end of time, awaiting the second coming. Shortly after this Ahasuerus repented his faithlessness to the Lord and converted to Christianity, but nonetheless had to wait until the end of the world, wandering about and showing others the way to Christ. Therefore Ahasuerus, the Wandering Jew, stands as a symbol of the Jewish people, who denied the Savior and who are therefore condemned to witness to Christianity throughout the ages. The idea of "the Jew" stems from the late Middle Ages, when a widespread antisemitism was developed quite deliberately as a part of the Western Church's consolidation of its power.3 "The Jew" is defined as the outsider, whose role is to confirm Christianity's truth and cohesiveness. If there were no Jews, Christendom would have had to invent them, and in a certain sense it can be said that this was what in fact happened. It is Ahasuerus' task to be such an invented Jew - a Jew who had had the chance to accept Christ but who refused to do so - who is assigned to wait and bear witness until the end of time. The legend had an appeal for many authors, including many Danes, and it was retold many times during the Danish Golden Age. Among those who
did so were Kierkegaard's teacher Poul Martin Møller (1836 or 1837, published posthumously) as well as Hans Christian Andersen (1847) and the poets B. S. Ingemann (1833) and Frederik Paludan-Müller (1854).

Let us examine Kierkegaard's mention of Ahasuerus in his journals. "The present age is the age of desperation, the age of the Wandering Jew (many reforming Jews)." The Wandering Jew is closely connected with despair, and both the Jew and despair are symptomatic of modern times; Kierkegaard also asserts that liberalism and political reform movements are part of this modernity. Yet there is also a strange note sounded: "One often hears people say that someone is a Don Juan or a Faust, but not often that he is a Wandering Jew. But aren't there also individuals like that, who have incorporated in themselves too much of the spirit of the Wandering Jew?"

Is Kierkegaard speaking of himself here? If this is so, it means that he participates both in modernity and in the despair to which it is connected. As we will soon see, this is in fact the case: in Kierkegaard, antisemitism is a reflexive concept which recoils more upon Kierkegaard himself and upon the Christianity of his society than it does upon any actual Jews.

Kierkegaard wonders whether, "like the Jew in the charming folk tale, [I] was destined to lead pilgrims to the Promised Land, but not myself enter it; whether I was thus to guide people to the truth of Christianity and ... not come in myself, but only serve as a harbinger of a wonderful future." Here Kierkegaard makes it clear that he himself could be the Wandering Jew – that is, the embodiment of despair, who can make people aware of Christianity but cannot himself believe in it. In 1849 Kierkegaard returns to the theme of the Wandering Jew for the last time, and here again it is clear how closely this dialectician has identified himself with the Wandering Jew as the personification of a despair which is specifically modern: to know all about Christianity and about choosing Christianity, without being personally capable of practicing it. Thus, throughout much of his career, Kierkegaard was intrigued with the theme of the Wandering Jew, fearing that he himself embodied this figure. And it is very important that the Wandering Jew is in fact a Jew. We will understand this when we investigate the Golden Age context as well as Kierkegaard's other thoughts on Jews and Judaism.
Kierkegaard’s View of Jews in General

When Kierkegaard discusses Jews in general, he usually connects them with such characteristics as abstractness, or, better, a tendency toward abstraction and a belief in things numerical, especially money. “The abstract character of the Jews can also be seen in their preference for money — not for property, etc. which has a cash value — because money is a pure abstraction.” Thus Kierkegaard, like his teacher Poul Martin Møller, views Jews as typical of the preference of modern times for “numbers” and for three other things which are essentially numerical in character — “money,” “politics,” and “the public”:

“The public is entirely devoid of ideas. Indeed, it is the very opposite of an idea, because the public is a number. And this is why Jews are especially well-suited to be publicists, something which our times demonstrate and of which Poul Møller had been aware earlier, though without explaining it. The Jew generally lacks fantasy and sensibility, but he does have abstract understanding, and numbers are his element. For the publicist, the battle for public opinion is neither more nor less than stock-exchange business.”

This immersion in the abstract, which Kierkegaard attributes to the Jews, also seems to entail a fundamental unhappiness, and it seems to be on this basis that Kierkegaard identifies himself with Jews.

“There is a great question about the sense in which one can call the Jews the chosen people. They were not the happiest of peoples. They were closer to being a sacrifice which was required by the entire human race. They had to endure the pain of the Law and of sin as no other people. They were chosen in the same sense that poets often are the chosen: they were the unhappiest.”

Here and elsewhere, one has the sense that it is not only Jews Kierkegaard is talking about, but also himself. And as is well-known, in 1846 and afterwards Kierkegaard also saw a connection between The Corsair, its editor Meir Aron Goldschmidt, love of money, the new
political stirrings among “the public” – and the Jews. “The Corsair, is of course a Jewish rebellion against the Christians (the opposite of a pogrom) …”

“And what was all that which happened here with The Corsair? It was the public’s mad desire for power, and it was a Jew who was to serve as the means. Just as, in France, a prostitute was at one time the goddess of Reason, I believe a Jew could be suited to the sort of tyranny which is the most ambivalent of all, even more ambivalent than that of a usurer (for which, however, Jews are most suited) …”

The ambivalence was not only Goldschmidt’s, however. When Kierkegaard describes the despair which stems from the Jew Goldschmidt’s craving for respect, it could equally well describe Kierkegaard’s own situation in relation to Heiberg, Mynster, etc. This, I believe, is the subtext when Kierkegaard writes:

“And G[oldschmidt] himself understands this. He is like a person who despairs at being rejected by the circles of the important, the cultured, and the noble. That is where his longing and his aspirations are directed – and now he is admired in a dance hall, i.e., by people whose judgment he despises. Only a Jew, I think, could endure it. Because in a Jew there is always a certain despair.”

Only a Jew – and perhaps Kierkegaard himself! There was of course also an ambivalence in Kierkegaard’s relationship to what he called “the coteries”: “The grand coterie is Mynster, Heiberg, Martensen, and suite.” Kierkegaard is projecting onto Goldschmidt his own mixed emotions and his despair about the lack of acceptance accorded him by the highest circles of the Golden Age. Just as “the Jew” functions as a mirror for society as a whole, “the Jew” serves Søren Kierkegaard as a tabula rasa on which is written that which he most fears in his times and in himself.
When we direct our attention away from Jews in general and from individual Jews and focus on Judaism as such, we see that Kierkegaard looked upon Judaism as a part of a tripartite schema: paganism, Judaism, Christianity. He differentiates the three thusly: "The pagans believed that the gods claimed revenge as their exclusive property because it was sweet; the Jews think that revenge belongs to God because He is just; the Christians, because He is merciful." Kierkegaard's remarks fit in nicely with his well-known theory of stages: the Aesthetic (sweetness), the Ethical (justice), and the Religious (mercy). Kierkegaard also develops this theory of stages – and he quite straightforwardly calls them "stages" [Stadier] – with respect to suffering. In a passage in his papers which is entitled "Gradations in the Relationship to God – the Majesty of God," Kierkegaard maintains that in paganism the relationship to God means that "everything succeeds. ... The transformation begins in Judaism, where to be God's friend, etc. is expressed in suffering. But this suffering is really only temporary; it is a testing, and then everything in this life becomes prosperity and happiness. ... In Christianity to be beloved of God is suffering, sheer suffering – the closer to God, the more suffering. ... Gradations in God's majesty correspond to these three stages." This same point of view is repeated a bit later: "The pagan will not suffer at all. The Jew will endure [suffering] for a number of years, but nonetheless desires to be a victor in this world and to enjoy this life. The Christian will suffer his entire life." But there is also a development toward a dualistic structure, a two-stage either/or: either Christianity or everything else, whether that everything else be paganism, Judaism, or whatever. As time goes by this shift becomes quite clear. The greatest example of religiosity in Judaism was the testing of Abraham in the Old Testament. Kierkegaard eventually downgrades the importance of this trial, however, because it was of relatively short duration: "The 'testing' in the Old Testament is a category of childhood"; as soon as the trial is over,
one can enjoy life. But "things are otherwise in Christianity," where the important thing is that one "has become spirit" – i.e., that one suffers throughout one's entire life. "Christianity has to do with being a man, Judaism with being a child."18

Kierkegaard ends up merging the category of Judaism entirely into that of paganism. He abolishes the difference between paganism and Judaism more or less unambiguously for the first time in 1850, when he writes: "The possibility of offense is what is dialectically decisive; it is 'the boundary' between paganism, Judaism – Christianity."19 (Kierkegaard's punctuation makes it clear that he is assuming a dualism of which paganism and Judaism are seen as forming one side and Christianity the other.) This same assumption can be seen a little later in the same year, when Kierkegaard writes: "Oh, but people have forgotten completely what it means to decide to be a Christian and have thus reverted to the internal categories of paganism or Judaism ...")20

This same evolution can be tracked when one examines Kierkegaard's direct comparisons of Judaism and Christianity. The inclination toward worldly well-being and good fortune, which Kierkegaard connects with paganism, becomes attributed to Judaism, and his earlier reservations – to the effect that Judaism was at any rate connected with some suffering – disappear over time, as he speaks of Judaism in increasingly "pagan" terms as an "immediate," natural, worldly, and eudaimonistic religion. Thus he comes to designate Judaism – not paganism! – as the religion which is most attuned to our worldly lives. Kierkegaard moves away from his earlier statements – in which Judaism had occupied a middle position – and embraces a definition of Judaism which is pretty much identical with his earlier definition of paganism: it is a religion of worldly happiness, promises of temporal good fortune, familial joys, etc. In other words, Judaism is identified with everything Kierkegaard finds despicable in the established Christian religiosity of Golden Age Denmark! Let us look a bit more closely at what it means, in Kierkegaard's peculiar usage, to be a "Jew" and to practice "Judaism."
To Be a Jew: “Nature” contra “Spirit”

Kierkegaard's presentation of the difference between Judaism, as a religion in which the individual is defined as “Nature,” and Christianity, in which the individual is defined as “Spirit,” can be seen as early as the draft of “The Book on Adler” from 1846-47. “Judaism is essentially connected and bound to the categories of Nature.” This is demonstrated by the fact that one can be born a Jew. On the other hand, one cannot be born a Christian, because “Christianity is a category of Spirit,” and Spirit is something one cannot be born as, but can only become. Furthermore, when we are dealing with categories such as Nature and Spirit we are not talking of equal things, because “categories of Spirit are higher than categories of Nature.”

Thus, the difference between Christianity and Judaism (i.e., the difference between Christianity and worldliness, because “Judaism” now signifies worldliness in general) is that Christianity defines both God and man as “Spirit,” and Judaism does not. At about the same time that he wrote the above comment, Kierkegaard explains the difference thusly: Christianity is “renunciation” [Forsagelse], while Judaism is “promise” [Forjættelse], and this has two consequences, one involving sexuality and family life and the other involving politics and the life of society. Thus Judaism is “marriage,” while Christianity is “virginity; ... it must have the repulsion of offense, and most certainly has it here.” Likewise, in its view of politics and society, Judaism expects “a theocracy here on earth,” while Christianity says “my kingdom is not of this world.” Therefore, according to Kierkegaard, the difference is quite clear: to be a Christian is “to be Spirit,” and to be a Jew is to cling to this life in a worldly way.

Sexuality and Family Life

During the last year and a half of his life, Kierkegaard repeatedly speaks of Christianity's spirituality as the enemy of sexuality, while Judaism, on the other hand, emphasizes sexuality. It was particularly during that final period of his life, when he was engaged in his attack on the Church, that Kierkegaard viewed familial love, children, and sexuality in general as un-Christian, indeed, as “Jewish.” If the
word “paganism” appears at all, it now becomes scarcely possible to
differentiate between it and “Judaism.” “Judaism,” “Jew,” and “Jew-
ish” now take on their full dimension as derogatory words in Kierke-
gaard’s vocabulary.

“... [W]e are not Jews, nor has Christianity proposed prizes for
those who can beget the most children. ... Christianity knows
very well where children come from, and that when people talk
about marrying only to beget children it is only pompous
speech with which they cloak their lust.”23

God knows us all too well, according to Kierkegaard, and there-
fore He demands “the unmarried state,” “heterogeneity,” “dying
away,” and “a death’s head” instead of “weddings and births,”
“Venus,” “allusions to sexuality,” “women’s culture [as] elegant flirta-
tion,” and “the Jewish notion that begetting children is a blessing in
this life.”24 “Christ came in order to kindle a fire, and that is why vir-
ginity was required of the Christian – in order to preserve the fire.
Christendom became a stud farm where, in Jewish or pagan fashion,
breeding children became true Christianity.”25

Kierkegaard’s notorious asceticism has become so radical that
the manner in which he speaks of women, childbirth, sexual matters,
and, be it noted, Jews and Judaism, as well as his fixation upon veteri-
nary expressions such as “breeding” and “stud farm” unavoidably
strikes us as grotesque. Kierkegaard is revolted by his society’s senti-
mental compromise between Christianity and bourgeois smugness
(especially in the treatment of sexuality and the family), and he labels
much of what he finds offensive and repugnant as “Jewish” and as
“Jewish-or-pagan.” This same pattern recurs in his judgment of the
social and political developments of his times.

Politics and Society

D uring the last eight or nine years of his life, from the time of the
Corsair attack and afterwards, Kierkegaard became convinced
that Danish society, both the state and the church, was afflicted with a
sort of “Jewish” perdition. Kierkegaard believes that this unfortunate
state of affairs began as early as the consolidation of the Church’s
power during the late Middle Ages. He claims that with this new position of power "the Church became analogous to the Jewish people or even to the pagans, and God became a sort of national God. ..." 26

Kierkegaard is convinced that established Christendom leads a "Jewish" existence, because the relationship of "the people" to God overshadows that of "the individual." The truly Christian category is "the individual." Politics, the abstract, and the category of the numerical are "Jewish":

"'Judaism - Christianity.'

In Judaism God relates Himself to a 'people.' It was an advance to relate to the individual. Christ, of course, is the Exemplar. Therefore the Jews were offended. But it is also clear that Christianity is related inversely to the numerical, and that advances in general are related inversely to the numerical." 27

Against the background of these late remarks from 1853 and 1854 we can better understand a sharp and bitter diatribe against Denmark which Kierkegaard had written in 1847; this was written, it is true, in the shadow of his fight with The Corsair, but it points beyond that struggle and toward a larger criticism:

"There is a stupidity and an impudence and an impertinence which only thrives in provincial towns. It is this I must endure. And why? Because I live in Denmark, and because Denmark is headed for her dissolution. A little people which imagines that it is embattled with the entire world on behalf of its nationhood, and is at the same time so decayed and undermined by envy and pettiness that it scarcely resembles a people any longer - or rather, it only resembles one people, which is no people: the Jews. Jewish envy against Jews is world famous. Next comes that of the Danes." 28

"Christendom" is "Judaism"

In brief, what Kierkegaard finds insufferable about his Denmark is precisely the fact that it is "Jewish." Danish Christendom is "Judaism." "The only Christianity in Christendom is in fact really Judaism,
because Christianity thought of in repose – as an established order – is Judaism. Christianity in motion is Christianity."29 The principal feature which Kierkegaard finds most despicable in the established Christianity of his times is thus the peace and comfort in which it reposes. In this Kierkegaard is radically at odds with Grundtvig, whose most well-known hymn is "Comfortable, peaceful, Lord, is thy dwelling!" ["Hyggelig, rolig, Gud! er din Bolig"]. In contrast, Kierkegaard would insist that God's dwelling is within us and that it must not be allowed to become either peaceful or comfortable. Kierkegaard maintains that the Church has taken it upon itself to enchant us, to lull us to sleep. But Christianity, true Christianity, can only exist in strife and struggle, in spiritual unrest. Peace is "Jewish."

It was not difficult for Kierkegaard to present Grundtvig and Grundtvigian Christianity as "Jewish":

"Protestantism, Particularly the Grundtvigian Sort"

In every respect we have reached the point that what is now called Christianity is precisely that which Christ came to drive out. This is especially so in Protestantism, particularly among the Grundtvigians.

The Grundtvigians are in fact, and speaking quite strictly, Jews."

Kierkegaard continues by explaining that the Grundtvigians are typically Jewish in their view of marriage and their claim that it is most pleasing to God to have "a flock of children and numerous offspring"; in their fixation upon baptism, in which they mimic the Jewish emphasis upon circumcision; in their "Jewish superstition regarding lineage"; and in their "delusion about being God's chosen people." "This is Jewish optimism, the most dangerous form of Epicureanism, in which enjoyment of this life becomes the worship of God."30 It is therefore clear to Kierkegaard that Grundtvig is a "Jew": his national fervor, his emphasis upon the congregation, his accentuation of the sacraments and of particular rituals, plus what Kierkegaard viewed as Grundtvig's personal "concupiscence" [Brynde] – all this makes Grundtvig markedly "Jewish" in Kierkegaard's eyes.31

And it is also clear to Kierkegaard that even so very different an opponent as Bishop Mynster was also "Jewish." This was so, among other reasons, because of Mynster's "Epicureanism."32 Thus for Kierkegaard, Mynster, like Grundtvig, was a "Jew," because for Kierkegaard "Jew," "Jewish," and "Judaism" are synonymous with a "cling-
ing to this life" and with the externality and calm which typifies the bourgeois Christendom which was dominant in Kierkegaard's day. Christianity, by contrast, is the unrest of inwardness.

Conclusion

Kierkegaard is and remains one of the most important and profound thinkers of modern times, but, however unpleasant, we must look squarely at his statements about Jews and Judaism.

Irony abounds. As we saw at the beginning, Kierkegaard observes that in modern Europe the Jewish "guests" are murdering their European "host" – an observation that has become even more offensive in our own century. At the same time, however, his observations lead him to the conclusion that that which is most "Jewish" is official Christianity itself, and that the murder which is taking place is this Christianity's suicide. Another irony is that Kierkegaard combats the comfortable Christendom of his own time by using the antisemitic rhetoric which was developed by mediaeval Christendom precisely in order to maintain its hold on power. Kierkegaard's dispute with established religion is understandable, but his choice of rhetorical weapons is, to put it mildly, both unfortunate and self-contradictory. A third and final irony can be derived from the two mentioned above, namely that the weapons we use to combat Kierkegaard's anti-Jewish rhetoric are themselves taken from Kierkegaard. That is, it is precisely Kierkegaard's first-rate abilities as a critic and an unmasker of ideology that make us capable of criticizing him when he himself takes refuge in the antisemitic language of mediaeval Christendom. Kierkegaard has taught us well, and in many cases he is his own best critic.

There are many kinds of antisemitism. The most common form found in Kierkegaard's day was "the antisemitism of tolerance," a sort of cloying, liberal antisemitism, which teaches that Jews certainly ought to be tolerated, but with a conscious superiority on the part of the tolerator and with an ill-concealed expectation that the Jews will finally relinquish their errors and admit the truth of Christianity. This attitude – which is often not labelled as antisemitism – can be seen, for example, in B. S. Ingemann (The Old Rabbi [1827]), in Steen Steensen Blicher (The Jews at Hald [1828]), in Mrs.
Gyllembourg (*The Jew* [1836]), and in Hans Christian Andersen (*The Jewish Girl* [1855]), where it is always the most pious and the “best” Jews who finally convert to Christianity. The formula is this: the more pious, the more certain that the Jew will convert. And if there is a pretty Jewish woman (as in Ingemann and Blicher), she will surely marry a Christian man and convert her entire family as a part of the bargain. (In Ingemann’s *The Old Rabbi*, the beautiful young Jewish woman is the occasion for the rabbi’s conversion on his death bed or – the story is deliberately vague – even after death!)

Among those who were more “advanced” or “enlightened,” the hope was not so much that the Jews would convert as that their “Jewishness” would gradually abate at the same tempo that society loses its Christian character. Thus, all religious differences would fade away, and in the words of one of the period’s liberal authors, “the day would come when there was no more difference between a Jew and a Christian than between a dry goods dealer and a grocer.”

That sort of toleration is based upon the trivialization of both Judaism and Christianity, as well as of religion in general. And trivialization can be just as condescending as anything else. The fact that the statement about the dry goods dealer and the grocer was made by Meir Aron Goldschmidt does not change matters one whit. If we move ahead to Henri Nathansen’s *Within the Walls* from 1912, the situation is more or less the same. Furious over his family’s hypocrisy, Jørgen Herming abandons Christianity. He explains to his father that he won’t become a Jew, either, and that the children of his marriage to the Jewish woman Esther will be brought up neither as Jews nor as Christians, but as “people.” And we are led to believe that Esther goes along with this solution by neutralization. (The fact that this “neutral” solution is proposed by various people, including Goldschmidt and Nathansen, who were both Jews, means only that these two Jewish authors – for quite understandable reasons – adopted the view of Jews and Judaism that was dominant in their day and that they therefore shared their times’ failure to acknowledge the existence of genuine and fundamental religious differences.) Like the tolerance whose ultimate goal is conversion, this trivializing eradication of all differences cannot lead to the acceptance of religious differences and of pluralism as such, i.e., to an acceptance of Jews, Christians, and for that matter Muslims and others, as what they are – Jews, Christians, Muslims, etc. This “neutral” solution is neither cold nor hot, and our own century has quite properly spewed it out.
But to demand a pluralistic tolerance – i.e., the sort of tolerance which our times views as genuine, authentic tolerance – is perhaps to demand too much, to demand something anachronistic. In any case Kierkegaard did not share the lukewarm, liberal tolerance of his day, and his statements can be very shocking and repugnant. Perhaps, however, there is some advantage to be found in that repugnance. In contrast to subtle, "tolerant" forms of antisemitism, which each in their own way lead to the disappearance of Jews without anyone taking notice, Kierkegaard’s rhetoric is very provocative. He forces us to take a position. And by taking the situation seriously we learn that, however offensive and objectionable his rhetoric is, it doesn’t really have a great deal to do with Jews and Judaism, but is principally a part of Kierkegaard’s battle against the lukewarm and flimsy Christendom of his times.  

Notes

1 I am very thankful to the Fulbright Commission, the National Endowment for the Humanities, the American Scandinavian Foundation, and the R. Francis Johnson Fund of Connecticut College for support which made possible the writing of this article. The arguments put forward in this piece are more fully developed and documented in my lengthier essay "Kierkegaard, Jødedommen og Jøderne" in Kirkehistoriske Samlinger (1992): 77-107.


4 Pap. I A 181 n.d. (1836, between June 12 and 17); see also Søren Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers, I-VII, Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, eds. and trans. (Bloomington, Indiana: 1968-1978), entry number 737 (hereafter “SKJP” followed by entry number).

5 Ibid., I C 66 (March 28, 1835) [SKJP 2206].

6 Ibid., VI B 40: 33 n.d. (1845, draft of Concluding Unscientific Postscript) [SKJP 5797].

7 Ibid., X2 A 163, pp. 129-31 n.d. (1849, between October 9 and November 9) [SKJP 6523].

8 Ibid., II A 708 n.d. (1838, between February 19 and April 12) [SKJP 1].

9 Ibid., XI2 A 26 n.d. (1854) [SKJP 2985].

10 Ibid., III A 193 n.d. (1841-42) [SKJP 2215].

11 Ibid., VIII B 13, p. 181 n.d. (1846).
It is both ironic and very instructive to learn that when Kierkegaard's brother Peter Christian criticized him severely and publicly at the Roskilde Ecclesiastical Convention on July 5, 1855 — a criticism which led to a complete break between the two brothers, so that even when he lay dying later that year, Søren refused to receive his brother — one of the principal criticisms was that Søren's "absolutist" Christianity was — Jewish! As Peter Christian Kierkegaard puts it, "If I remember correctly, an Anti-Climacus says that Christianity is not what the snivelling pastors would like to make it into, or even say that it is. It is in fact the Absolute, the infinite requirement. ... Christianity quite certainly is the Absolute, but only insofar as it still remains entirely identical with Judaism" (Otto Holmgaard, ed., Exstaticus. Søren Kierkegaards sidste Kamp, derunder hans Forhold til Broderen [Exstaticus: Søren Kierkegaard's Final Struggle, Including His Relationship With His Brother] (Copenhagen: Nyt Nordisk Forlag/Arnold Busck, 1967), pp. 47 and 82-83; cf. pp. 47-49 and 82-84). It seems that the assertion that a particular position was "Jewish" served as an all-purpose accusation: For Søren Kierkegaard, the worldly and familial Christianity of the Grundtvigion was defective because it was "Jewish." For the Grundtvigian theologian Peter Christian Kierkegaard, Søren's demanding portrayal of Christianity as the Absolute was defective because it was also "Jewish."

The argument illustrated here on the basis of Kierkegaard's Papirer can also be made on the basis of his published writings, although in these works some of the more student rhetoric is toned down. In The Concept of Irony (1841), Either/Or (1843), and The Concept of Anxiety (1844), Judaism retains its separate, middle position in Kierkegaard's tripartite schema as outlined in the present article. In Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846) this begins to change, and Judaism begins to lose its separate status. This development reaches completion in the three great collections of discourses from 1847 and 1848 — Edifying Discourses in Various Spirits, Works of Love, and Christian Discourses — where Judaism is merged with paganism in a dualistic schema, with Judaism-paganism constituting a single pole which is straightforwardly opposed to Christianity. This seems momentarily suspended in The Sickness Unto Death (1849), where
Anti-Climacus appears to liberate Judaism from its simple association with paganism and instead to bring it closer to Christianity. This is shortlived, however, and in his next work, *Practice in Christianity* (1850), Anti-Climacus espouses a hostile attitude toward Judaism, describing “Judaism in the time of Christ” as “a self-satisfied and self-deifying established order” (*Søren Kierkegaards Samlede Værker* [The Collected Works of Søren Kierkegaard], I-XIV, A. B. Drachmann, J. L. Heiberg, and H. O. Lange eds., 1st ed. (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1901-06) (hereafter *SV*), vol. XII, p. 84; see *Practice in Christianity*, Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, trans., (volume XX of *Kierkegaard's Writings*) (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 89). This is the beginning of the increasingly strident rhetoric which Kierkegaard will bring to bear upon Christendom during his final years, when he maintains that “the Christianity of the New Testament absolutely does not exist – the little bit of religiosity which is present in the country is at most Judaism” (*SV* XIV 227). For a fuller discussion of these developments in Kierkegaard’s published works, see my essay “Kierkegaard, Jødedommen og Jøderne,” pp. 105-107.