

Bjarne Troelsen

Manden på flydebroen.
En fortælling om Søren Kierkegaard
og det moderne menneskes tilblivelse

[The Man on the Dock. A Story about Søren Kierkegaard
and the Origin of the Modern Person]

Anis, Copenhagen 1997, 236 pp.

The man on the dock is a character, sketched in the *Papers* (Pap. V, A 24), whose odd behavior not only makes him the object of laughter for some of those who observe him in passing, but with his leap into the lake, a lawbreaker as well. The peculiarity of his behavior is grounded in the fact that he leaps into the water to save a ladybug floating on the surface, a creature whose shadow on the bottom of the lake he initially spied indirectly while looking through binoculars.

The story is interesting to Troelsen because it thematizes the dilemma which, according to the author, the aesthete A faces and to some extent Kierkegaard himself faces. In any case, this dilemma is one of the many themes treated in the book, here the dilemma of the freedom of passion versus the restriction of reflection. The problem at issue is whether it is possible for one to imagine an infinite reflection, a passion which is not immediate, and a reflection which is not finite?

Kierkegaard's answer is "yes!," but according to Troelsen, the problem remains unsolved inasmuch as the poetic attempts Kierkegaard makes to isolate the dilemma break down, and he remains within it. The dilemma comes into shape as a "partially poetic representation" of the issue which is supplemented with a kind of commentary (147). Kierkegaard exhibits this tendency in the Antigone sketch in *Either/Or* to which aesthete A adds commentary, and "Guilty – Not Guilty," for which Brother Taciturnis acts as commentator. The narrative about the man on the dock is a similar poetic attempt to capture the dilemma in a character, but remains a mere attempt since the man never makes it out of the fitting room, but remains boxed up as a sketch in the *Papers*. The grotesque dimension of the dilemma resides in the fact that through imagination, a triviality can occupy one absolutely, as shown in the imbalance between the meaninglessness of the ladybug and the passion of the rescue.

According to my understanding of Troelsen's book, including the in-

terpretation of the sketch from the *Papers*, the book's title points a critical finger at Kierkegaard himself, or at least at Kierkegaard's project, which he views as unstable, alternating between states of balance and imbalance.

The figure of the man on the dock is additionally interesting to Troelsen since Kierkegaard here provides a sketch of the modern person who is not able to fulfill the requirements demanded by either the aesthetic or the ethical life. His beautiful intention of saving the ladybug is honored with public laughter, and the police officer rewards his sacrificial efforts by arresting him for "'getting into the water in an area where it is not allowed'. Thus, 'he places himself beyond the rules of society without being able to appeal to a higher universal purpose which could justify such an action. He is thereby beyond 'the ethical'" (150). Troelsen suggests that we ought to understand the man as a martyr since he brings himself to the brink of the law and receives no sympathy from his observers. Troelsen makes further comparisons between the story of Abraham in *Fear and Trembling* and Kierkegaard's own story, specifically noting that Kierkegaard sacrificed his relationship to Regine because of an apparent inner passion or prompting.

In his book, Troelsen offers a series of interpretations of selected texts taken primarily from *The Concept of Irony, Either/Or*, *The Concept of Anxiety*, and *Stages on Life's Way*, interpretations which are commendable since they present the various pseudonymous authors and the various fictional characters in an often accessible new light.

By highlighting the Kierkegaardian figures with observations from sociological, biographical, and historical perspectives, Troelsen is successful at creating a dialogue between the literary work, Kierkegaard, and the age to which he belongs. And while the result of Troelsen's effort is not always especially sophisticated, it is nonetheless very refreshing and intriguing and makes the book a nice introduction to Kierkegaard and his works. Troelsen, for example, considers the form of Pietism which was not an insignificant part of Kierkegaard's religious experience at home, in part to be a consequence of a breakdown from a collective to an individual form of consciousness. This breakdown is compared to the transition from the collective way of life in small rural communities to the more independent way of life on isolated farms, a transition which resembles the sort Kierkegaard's father experienced (36).

As early as the introduction, the author points out the virtue in representing Kierkegaard not as an arbitrary and isolated poet-philosopher,

but as a thinker who has a decisive relationship to his time and context. Therefore, as the subtitle announces, close attention is paid to Søren's father, ex-girlfriend, and his poet-philosopher colleagues. This goes for the local figures – J.L. Heiberg, Poul Møller, H.C. Andersen, and those further away – Kant and Hegel. One might here wonder what Nietzsche is doing in such company.

The subtitle to Troelsen's book sets up a relationship between Kierkegaard and the origin of the modern person, which raises some questions. One might ask how successful Troelsen is at creating a single story from two different ones, namely, Kierkegaard's and the modern person's. Is Kierkegaard's story identical with that of the modern person or is Kierkegaard's project a part of the story of the origin of modernity? It is my opinion that Troelsen assumes and wants to demonstrate the latter. And he is successful at presenting Kierkegaard in such a way that the reader experiences him as a poet in relation to his work, and as a *København*er in the process of becoming a modern. It is among other things this portrayal of Kierkegaard's reluctant relationship to Romanticism – a dependence upon as well as resistance against – which will be very informative for the general reader.

A story [*fortælling*] is a record of a series of events, which among other things attempts to synthesize significant events and historical processes. Troelsen, the historian of ideas and *Gymnasie*-teacher, is able to create such a synthesis in a fashion which is both exciting and instructive, which makes the book absolutely worthy of recommendation for those not intimately familiar with Romanticism and who would like an interesting introduction, or to those who would like an introduction to Kierkegaard's work in general.

Implied above is the idea that Troelsen has written a book for the layperson and that professionals will search in vain for new research conclusions or for a dialogue with Kierkegaard research in general. It is written in a style which makes it interesting and easy as it unfolds, but superficial and presumptuous as a contribution to Kierkegaard research; it would thus be a shame to place it in the research genre since the book has so many other good qualities.

The history of ideas approach is exciting because it draws from so many different disciplines, and offers such a nuanced point of departure. It has the drawback however, that the investigation can quickly become so diluted that the conclusions are hardly as nuanced. Theological ques-

tions, for example, are coupled together with assertions which work as a part of the narrative, but are not persuasive. Among other places, this is the case in Troelsen's reference to "this world" in the chapter on "Temporality" which in my opinion suffers under the broad strokes of his brush. Troelsen writes: "New Testament Christianity rejects without hesitation or modification 'this world' which lies under the power of sin and the devil..." (197f.). The quotation marks around the words "this world" saves his claim, for "the world" in itself is not rejected by Christianity, The New Testament, or Kierkegaard. It is a nuance of this sort which Kierkegaard himself treats with great care, and because it is the tension in such concepts which make them relevant and educational for him, one expects the same in a book about Kierkegaard. The same broad and uneven brush seems to have been used in the last chapter in which Troelsen, with *Point of View for my Work as an Author* in hand, divides the authorship into "the pseudonymous works and the edifying works," and asserts that they "fit together as the law and the gospel in Pauline and Lutheran theology" (235). It is perhaps not quite so simple. In "A Glance at a Contemporary Effort in Danish Literature" in an appendix to *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, one reads, "that which is essential for Christian Religiosity is not found in the edifying discourses..." (SV3 9,227).

Despite the above criticism, I commend Troelsen for his unburdened interpretation which does not ideologize or remold Kierkegaard to fit him into any particular genre or school. There is room for the strange, lopsided, incomprehensible, and ridiculous Søren next to the brilliant, relevant, humorous, and edifying Kierkegaard.

Christian Tholstrup
(Translated by Brian Söderquist)

Charles Le Blanc
Kierkegaard
Collection "Figures du Savoir"

Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1998, 141 pp.

Il faut, de temps à autre, des études qui savent déplier et déraidir un certain nombre de recherches universitaires, c'est-à-dire mesurer et ramener à des proportions acceptables des informations diverses, de plusieurs types

et de différents niveaux. Il faut aussi, de ce fait, raviver ses propres connaissances directes sur un auteur ou une pensée. Par le menu, on apprend ainsi à “se faire la pensée” comme certains tableaux de maître nous apprennent à “se faire l’œil”.

Le *Kierkegaard* de Charles Le Blanc s’inscrit dans ce contexte.

En effet, la publication récente de ce petit livre de présentation nous semble tout à fait justifiée, car Kierkegaard se trouve être particulièrement bien desservi ces derniers temps en pays francophone. Ainsi faut-il constamment en ramener vers nous la compréhension comme une couverture qui nous découvre en cours de nuit et qui a besoin d’être replacée.

Sachons gré à Charles Le Blanc de border un auteur qui nécessite une surveillance régulière afin de nous rassurer, un tant soit peu, sur le coupant des notions qu’il a mis en circulation: péché, angoisse, absurde, foi, néant, paradoxe..., qui en font le penseur de la passion et du drame moderne.

Mais peut-on se sentir rassuré? Est-ce que le chapeau que l’adulte voit dans le dessin du petit prince représentant un boa qui a mangé un éléphant (Saint-Exupéry) serait plus rassurant, plus confortable que le boa qui a mangé un éléphant et qui ressemble à un chapeau. Le chapeau est un concept, une notion... Le péché cache l’angoisse; le néant le rien; le paradoxe le christianisme, etc. Ces concepts exigent un réexamen et sans doute une orientation tenue à jour à partir de l’expérience. En cela, il convient de revoir franchement le tracé d’ombre de ces catégories, ou notions, ou concepts, nommés ici largement “thèmes” par Le Blanc dans sa présentation (p. 79 et suivantes).

À cet égard, qu’on me permette d’apporter quelques nuances. La première concerne ce que Le Blanc nomme, après quelques autres, “la maladie mortelle” (p. 86 et suivantes: 3.2.2) (= *La maladie à mort*, pour respecter le titre danois et la traduction de Tisseau). N’importe quel médecin de campagne vous dira qu’une “maladie mortelle” est une maladie dont on meurt, c’est une condamnation, c’est un verdict de mort que cette maladie-là! Mais tel n’est pas le cas ici. On ne meurt justement pas de cette maladie, on ne meurt pas du désespoir parce qu’il est soudé au moi. Le liatif moi-désespoir est bien tracé par Le Blanc, seulement le rapport au péché ne rebondit que dans ce qu’il nomme “l’andotide: la foi” (3.2.3. p. 88) et laisse tourner le désespoir dans un certain vacuum du moi. Le moi et le désespoir par rapport au péché intéressent la psychologie, cela va de soi. Mais Kierkegaard-Vigilius Haufniensis souligne que le péché doit se placer sous l’égide de la dogmatique.

Ma seconde nuance touche l'ironie (justement analysée à la page 24) et sa différence d'avec l'humour. L'ironie se trouve être liée à la réflexion, elle est déjà impliquée dans un processus actif de position-négation alors que le comique de l'humour serait plutôt global, en surface, à distance, moins pénétré. L'auteur de *Kierkegaard*, qui est germaniste, le sait d'ailleurs fort bien, lui qui s'est attaqué à la traduction des *Fragments* de Friedrich Schlegel (Paris, José Corti, 1996) dont le 42ième dit ceci: "La philosophie est la véritable patrie de l'ironie que l'on aime définir beauté logique: (...)"

Mais je viens de sauter plusieurs pages! je reviens donc vers l'avant.

Le cousu de cette présentation tient bien et se départage comme suit:

Un Kierkegaard en son temps (pp. 11 à 46); un Kierkegaard philosophique (pp. 47 à 76); un Kierkegaard thématiqué (pp. 79 à 118); un Kierkegaard en postérité (pp. 119 à 139); une chronologie, un avant-propos et d'une bibliographie ceignent l'ensemble.

Kierkegaard en son temps est vraiment saisi en son temps... Mais il est aussi de son temps. Comme on le sait, l'exégèse en fait un auteur religieux et de prose réflexive – cela est vrai. Mais n'oublions pas qu'il est un écrivain au sens fort du terme, tout à fait gagné par la nouvelle écriture. En ce sens, de Hegel aux Frères Moraves – tout imprégné de piétisme et de rationalisme positiviste – et à Rousseau (Kierkegaard possédait les *Bekjendelser* (1798) de Rousseau dans sa bibliothèque), il s'écrit en ses personnages, ce qui n'empêche pas un Georg Brandes de remarquer que ces derniers représentent trop des principes et que "des flammes bleues sortent de leurs bouches..."

Il est écrivain et *pédagogue*... Ses efforts pédagogiques transparaissent partout dans son œuvre et, en cela, il est pour ainsi dire soudé à son siècle qui voit un essor prodigieux de l'éducation, considérée plus importante que le reste, y compris l'Église!

Je voudrais terminer par quelques remarques de déplacement interculturel qui apparaîtront aux yeux de certains comme des points de détails. En cela, ils auront parfaitement raison!

Il convient de lire "Sædding" et non "Seading" (p. 19). L'auteur écrit (p. 44): "Il (Kierkegaard) refusa les derniers sacrements..." avant de mourir le 11 novembre 1855. Les "derniers sacrements" n'existent pas comme tels dans l'église luthérienne danoise. C'est plutôt la présence d'un pasteur à son chevet que Kierkegaard refusa.

Un dernier point de détail... Kierkegaard repose au cimetière de l'Assistens de Copenhague, et non au "cimetière de la Frue Kirke (= Notre-Dame) de Copenhague" (p. 45), qui justement n'en a pas!

On trouvera dans ce *Kierkegaard* tout le nécessaire à penser dont on a besoin pour se familiariser avec un auteur qui continue à séduire par son originalité et par sa complexité. Et qui demeure toujours un commencement!

Jacques Caron

Jacques Caron (ed.)
 Kierkegaard aujourd'hui -
 Recherches kierkegaardiennes au Danemark et en France

Actes du Colloque de la Sorbonne, 26 octobre 1996
 Odense University Literary and Cultural Studies No. 7

Odense University Press, 1998, 179 pp.

Les Actes du colloque *Kierkegaard aujourd'hui* proposent une mise en perspective de l'actualité de Kierkegaard et de la recherche kierkegaardienne en langue française. Jacques Caron, professeur à l'université d'Odense au Danemark,¹ rédacteur et éditeur de ce volume fort utile, est parvenu à réunir à la Sorbonne quelques-uns des principaux interprètes de la pensée kierkegaardienne. Ainsi: Darío González, Jacques Message et Jacques Colette, pour le champ philosophique; François Bousquet pour la théologie; Joakim Garff et Régis Boyer pour la littérature; Gretty Mirdal et Chantal Anne pour la psychologie. Une large part est faite à l'étude de la diffusion et à la réception de Kierkegaard en France et dans la francophonie (François Bousquet, Jacques Caron et Jacques Lafarge), étude indispensable pour l'étudiant de langue française qui décide d'attaquer de front l'oeuvre du philosophe danois.

Dans le premier article, Joakim Garff relève de façon originale certaines difficultés philologiques à propos du *Journal* de Kierkegaard, difficultés créées selon lui par Barfod et non par Kierkegaard qui a toujours visé, on le sait, une lecture édifiante de sa vie. Kierkegaard avait, en un sens, organisé et orienté à l'avance la lecture que l'on ferait de sa vie, en laissant planer un doute sur le sens réel de celle-ci dans la mesure où il affirme: "Après moi, on ne trouvera dans mes papiers (c'est là ma consolation) un seul éclaircissement sur ce qui au fond a rempli ma vie" Pap.,IV, A85/J., I,273). De façon audacieuse, Garff met en doute que la clé gé-

nérale de l'interprétation définitive de Kierkegaard ait jamais existé. L'impossibilité, en effet, de retrouver cette clé d'interprétation spéculative devrait plutôt pousser le chercheur à entreprendre un travail "d'interprétation existentielle de l'oeuvre" mettant du coup en question le problème de la pseudonymie kierkegaardienne.

Garff souligne, au contraire de Kierkegaard, l'identité de l'écrivain danois et de ses pseudonymes. C'est à juste titre, selon nous, qu'il insiste sur le caractère paradoxal de cette pseudonymie car "la réalité dans laquelle les pseudonymes valident leur objectivité n'est pas par elle-même réelle, elle est toute aussi fictive que l'est le texte" (p. 27).

Le texte de Régis Boyer quant à lui rappelle certaines évidences concernant l'étude de Kierkegaard. Boyer, qui est professeur et directeur de l'Institut d'études scandinaves de l'Université de Paris-Sorbonne, souligne que l'ignorance de la langue danoise par la grande majorité des chercheurs et philosophes s'étant penchés sur le cas Kierkegaard a engendré des outrances et des interprétations malheureuses sinon déviantes. Il ne faut jamais, en effet, dissocier vie et production lorsque l'on se penche sur Kierkegaard. Il faut surtout tenir compte à ce sujet de quatre éléments essentiels, à savoir que Kierkegaard fut: 1) un bon petit bourgeois du début du dix-neuvième siècle à Copenhague; 2) un membre de la société danoise; 3) un luthérien de stricte observance; 4) un romantique scandinave (p. 36).

Boyer indique enfin comment Kierkegaard participe de cet "esprit d'ordre" caractérisant les Scandinaves. Sous cet angle, il aurait bel et bien planifié son oeuvre, laquelle témoignerait de plus d'esprit géométrique que d'esprit de finesse.

Madame Gretty Mirdal de l'Université de Copenhague survole, quant à elle, les différentes interprétations psychologiques de la personnalité de Kierkegaard en rapport à son oeuvre. Elle recherche dans son *Journal* les indices et le point de vue de l'auteur sur sa propre maladie.

Le texte de Jacques Caron sur la réception française de Kierkegaard (pp.69 à 80) ainsi que les précisions de Jacques Lafarge sur le même sujet (pp.81 à 90) sont indispensables pour avoir une compréhension générale de l'histoire de la critique française sur Kierkegaard. Caron insiste sur les 140 ans de présence de Kierkegaard dans le monde francophone (premier article sur le philosophe de Copenhague, *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1856) et parle d'une *pédagogie de la différence* (p. 70) afin de marquer l'apprentissage de la différence qui transparait nécessairement de toute oeuvre.

vre en traduction, en particulier lorsque la langue traduite est aussi difficile et de circulation aussi restreinte que le danois. Caron fait aussi d'importants développements sur l'histoire de la traduction française de l'oeuvre kierkegaardienne qui permet de comprendre les lacunes, et le retard, de la critique française face à la critique allemande ou italienne.

Lafarge précise que si l'on considère la date de la fin de la publication en langue française de l'oeuvre complète de Kierkegaard, les 140 ans de présence si limitent à douze ans seulement. Lafarge mentionne aussi à juste titre l'importance de la dernière oeuvre du regretté Henri-Bernard Vergotte, *Lectures philosophiques de Søren Kierkegaard*, et le caractère exceptionnel du travail de traducteur de Paul-Henri Tisseau pour l'oeuvre kierkegaardienne.

François Bousquet, de l'Institut Catholique de Paris, donne un article qui pourra aider à orienter la recherche des théologiens intéressés par Kierkegaard, dans la mesure où il analyse les influences de celui-ci sur les théologiens français, qu'il juge somme toute minime, en particulier à cause de la diffusion déficiente de l'oeuvre en langue française. On ne peut que donner raison sur ce point à Monsieur Bousquet, puisque l'acquisition de l'oeuvre complète de Kierkegaard ne reste abordable que pour les riches bibliothèques. Nous sommes encore loin, en français, des éditions de poche économiques que l'on trouve en Allemagne ou en Italie.

À la fin du texte de François Bousquet (p. 117) on retrouve une courte bibliographie des études francophones (hors de France) où le Québec est très bien représenté.

Dario González, assistant de recherche au CONICET (Argentine), étudie le thème de l'oralité, sujet à la mode à présent en littérature, dans un texte difficile, mais très bien documenté, qui doit beaucoup à la sémiotique.

Jacques Message enfin dans son texte *Idéalité, réalité et langage*, résume en trois points le reproche fait par Kierkegaard au langage de la spéculation: 1) il n'est celui d'aucun individu particulier; 2) il n'institue pas de position quant au vrai et au bien; 3) ce n'est que le langage des philosophes (p. 143).

Ce bel ouvrage se termine par un entretien de Jacques Caron avec Else-Marie Jacquet-Tisseau, traductrice de Kierkegaard et fille de Paul-Henri Tisseau, lui-même grand traducteur du philosophe danois. Dans l'intimité d'une discussion que l'on se plaît à imaginer dans le jardin ombragé d'une maison de campagne, le lecteur est introduit dans le projet intellectuel et existentiel inhérent à l'ouvrage de traduction de Kierke-

gaard en français. Madame Jacquet-Tisseau ne manque pas non plus de faire quelques belles réflexions sur le travail de traducteur et sur la traduction, entendue comme entreprise de “corps à corps” avec l’auteur et son texte.

On ne peut, pour conclure, que saluer une édition comme celle de *Kierkegaard aujourd’hui*, qui réussit à combler les curiosités des spécialistes autant qu’à servir de *vade-mecum* pour l’étudiant qui désire se pencher sur la critique et la genèse des principaux thèmes de la pensée kierkegaardienne.

Charles Le Blanc

1. Déjà l’auteur de l’essai *Angoisse et communication chez Søren Kierkegaard*, Odense University Press, Odense, 1992.

Joakim Garff, Tønny Aagaard Olesen, Pia Søltoft (eds.)

Studier i Stadier:

Søren Kierkegaard Selskabets 50-års Jubilæum

[Studies in Stages: The Søren Kierkegaard Society’s 50th Anniversary]

C.A. Reitzel, Copenhagen 1998, 376 pp.

The book, *Studier i Stadier*, consists of three sections. The first section, under the title of Studier i Stadier [“Studies in Stages”], is made up of twelve articles which explore, from a variety of viewpoints, the three Kierkegaardian stages: the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious (pp. 11-191). In the second section, entitled “*Stadier i Studier*” [“Stages in Studies”], the history of the Søren Kierkegaard Society in Denmark is recounted, beginning with the first meetings and publications in 1948 up to the present year, 1998 (pp. 193-337). In the book’s third and final section, a selection of reviews of more recent Kierkegaard literature is presented.

As opposed to the majority of theologians, Kierkegaard refers to two forms of religiosity: A and B. Religiousness A is the human, inward, self-enhancing attempt to find one’s way to the eternal. Religiousness B, on the other hand, is Christian religiosity, which presupposes that one

ought to perform a “qualitative leap” and thereby leave one’s human footing within the immanent and seize upon Christianity: that is to say that one should come to believe, should become a Christian. The underlying presupposition is that the eternal at a particular historical point broke through into time, i.e., as Christ. The result is that a human being receives salvation from the beyond, yet a human being cannot think the divinely absolute together with the temporally relative, and thus is offended. The understanding simply cannot conceive of it.

This is the rather clear, consistent, and classic notion of Kierkegaard’s understanding of the religious as described by Niels Jørgen Cappelørn. Cappelørn also adds that even though a human being attempts to follow Christ, one cannot succeed completely. For a human being is constantly confronted by the possibility of offense, and must therefore possess himself of forgiveness in order to mature in faith: “The believer’s discipleship to Christ – as a manifestation of gratitude for forgiveness – is thus also the highest expression of Christianity” (p. 140).

Anders Kingo, in his article, “*Gives der en teleologisk suspension af alle stadier*” [“Is there a teleological suspension of all the stages?”], understands discipleship more directly than does Cappelørn. This is due to his giving an affirmative answer to that very question. For there is not only a teleological suspension of the ethical as described in *Fear and Trembling*. Everything – not just all the stages – is to be suspended. It takes place by virtue of God. Abraham renounces everything *in concreto*, in order to receive life on God’s terms, in order to be able to hear God’s voice. And this is responsiveness, to be obedient and to be so immediately. This is the “how” of Christianity, and it is the entirety of faith. Kingo concludes: In faith, teleology is suspended.

In “*En mislighed i Efterskriften og dens konsekvenser*” [“An irregularity in the *Postscript* and the consequences thereof”], Leif Bork Hansen explicitly criticizes Kingo for admitting to only the absolute paradox – which destroys all of the stages, inasmuch as these are all dialectical in nature; yet Christian faith, on the other hand, is non-dialectical in nature. According to Bork Hansen, this notion implies that, for Kierkegaard, the God-relationship is bound exclusively to “the God of the Incarnation” (p. 173), and that one can no more differentiate between the God of the Old Testament and the man Jesus, than one can distinguish between a God-relationship before or after the Incarnation. But there is a difference, claims Bork Hansen. In the late Kierke-

gaard, this is exemplified – dialectically! – where Jesus is seen as both prototype and reconciler.

Despite such differences, the fourth contributor, Søren Bruun, presumably espouses all these religious readings, when he – on the basis of various interpretations of Kierkegaard's edifying discourses – unfolds how the will is grounded and demonstrates that the will is always there so that a human being can begin in that of God given beginning.

Kingo notes that there is only one absolute: God! And it is with Him – in Christ – that we should begin, not with ourselves. We are absolutely wrong in comparison with the absolute, and thus the absolute should not be employed in the pursuit of the fundamentally useless: “The absolute being is basically superfluous, purposeless, useless” (Kingo, p. 179). Keeping this in mind, we can thus proceed to the aesthetic, where it is interesting to see that the very word “superfluous” makes a bold appearance in the title of one of the aesthetic articles: Jacob Bøggild's “*Redundansens danser – nogle strøtanker om Kierkegaard's overflødighed*” [“Redundancy's dancer – some aphorisms concerning Kierkegaard's superfluosity”]. Johannes de silentio is an “extra clerk” who really wants to get a hold on the extra, the superfluous. Bøggild shows the peculiar form of continuity and consistency which exists within the whole Kierkegaardian authorship. This implies that everything is new and nothing is new in this article. That is to say that Bøggild manages rather elegantly to get the reader to change his perspective in his interpretation of Kierkegaard.

Joakim Garff recounts the various aspects of the aesthetic to be found in Kierkegaard, thus showing that the aesthete is not simply a self-staged subject and that the aesthete's despair is not in itself a sickness, but rather that it also represents a healthy reaction to the dissolution of modernity. Thus, in a good sense, the aesthete is the authorship's modern voice. What is interesting in this regard is that Garff uses the word “illusion” in a fashion corresponding to the “uselessness” of Kingo and the “superfluosity” of Bøggild. In unison with Climacus, it is said that there is a future for illusions, such that the purpose of both poetic and religious illusion is to carry the individual beyond trivial bourgeois teleology. In this regard, Kierkegaard's texts are not beautiful, they are sublime, because they cause the reader to tremble, and in this sense drive him out of poetry and the aesthetic and into Christianity.

In Jørgen Dehs' article “*Uendeliggørelse af den æstetiske sfære*” [“Infiniteizing of the aesthetic sphere”], the aesthetic is, apparently, a suspicious concept which is in league with a mistaken form of existence. But when

Kierkegaard would “render visible” a reality which eludes language – which, of course, is something that can only be made visible by linguistic means – he takes advantage of that potential for excess which is a part of the aesthetic. What is crucial is that this excess cannot be substantiated in relation to the world of the aesthete, because it is modern and divested of all substance. In this sense, the aesthete is a “travelling SOS” wherever fundamental values are going into dissolution. Dehs’ points out that the aesthetic evolves into a *lebensphilosophie*; that is to say, it becomes something which insults our human dignity as *animal rationale* and teaches us that we are marked by, among other things, passion, egoism, desire, and a will to power. The aesthetic is, in its indistinct and limitless simplicity, the true medium of *lebensphilosophie*. And as such it is edifying without wanting or trying to be.

It says, in Isak Winkel Holm’s article “*Poesiens himmelbrev*” [“Poetry’s heavenly epistle”], as in all the other contributions to the book, that all poetry and all philosophy represent transfiguring explanations of life, but such transfiguring explanations in reality merely explain life away, so that no explanation transfigured by the aesthetic is possible. If this is the case, claims Winkel Holm, then there must be a difference between, on the one hand, a transfiguring explanation as explication or disclosure, that is to say, as something which is clarifying, informing, or elucidating, and, on the other hand, transfiguring explanation as true transfiguration, as revelation or transformative metamorphosis. Every time one would give an explanation of mortal life by illuminating it with an ideal significance, its aesthetic figuring becomes transfigured. Added to this is the fact that images always signify something other, and something more, than whatever was the subject’s intention for them (Adorno). Thus, all such explained images demand an explanation. For this reason, there are always two forms of language, a language which shows (that of images) and a language which says (that of philosophy). This is something which Garff also stresses, noting that Kierkegaard uses both images and ideas, and he adds that Kierkegaard’s works are propelled forward by just such dynamic turnabouts. And the glance usually triumphs over the understanding. Which is as much to say that Kierkegaard is not really an iconoclast, but an iconomaniac.

Of the contributors who treat the notion of the ethical in Kierkegaard, all four are in agreement that the ethical is not merely to be understood as a stage between the aesthetic and the religious. Rather, they view the ethical as that intermediate step which leads from the emptiness

of existence into its the fullness of its perfection or which reduces existence to a kind of transparent Philistinism, claims Begonya Sáez Taja-fuerce (p. 89). And seen in isolation, the ethicist is a caricature of ethics, observes Birgit Bertung (p. 111). As a stage, the ethical has no value in and of itself, for one must needs go further, writes Pia Søltoft (p. 118). And so we do. We move from the *first ethics*, that of Assessor Wilhelm the Ethicist, who, with his concrete life-view believes in, and chooses, the common, and who thus must be dependent upon some metaphysical dimension, on to the *second ethics*, which has something to do with Kierkegaard's conception of Christianity. In Kierkegaard's own words, as cited by Arne Grøn: "The first ethics presuppose metaphysics, the second dogmatics..." (SV3 6, 121: i.e., *The Concept of Anxiety*). Thus, in reality, there is only one second kind of ethics: Christianity.

Grøn's article is entitled, straightforwardly enough, "*Anden' etik*" ["Second ethics"], since he assiduously attempts to pinpoint exactly what the second ethics consists of. It should get a human being to give up everything. It is an ethics based on the conditions of breakdown and collapse presupposed by Kierkegaard's specific understanding of Christianity. In other words, it takes as its measure the immeasurable. It is for precisely this reason that it is an ethics of love, an ethics of gift, an ethics of forgiveness: "The second ethics is thus an ethics based upon that which is beyond morality. Forgiveness cannot be morally grounded. It is an act of love" (p. 86).

In a similar fashion, with the title of her article, "*Det etiske stadium – Kierkegaards etik?*" [The ethical stage – Kierkegaard's ethics?], Bertung hints that it is not Kierkegaard's ethics which is mirrored in the ethical stage, but the basis for ethics can be found, and it is expressed through love, of the religious variety. Obviously, then, the difficulty remains that no rules can be set down for what is demanded in order to become "the loving, [one who loves]" (p. 115).

The title of Søltoft's article "*Den enkelte og den anden*" ["The single one and the other"] suggests that the ethical also includes other people. But an analysis of *The Concept of Irony* shows that to comport oneself ironically is to keep oneself separated both from one's self and others, and that one merely tears down without setting anything new in place. In short, irony is only a "freedom *from*" (p. 124). For this reason, irony is an un-ethical standpoint. And for Søltoft, ethics must also be an extrenal challenge to responsibility, to love. She shows how the demand of love

involves both freedom and necessity, and that we can even learn something from the assessor of *Either/Or*: that freedom lies in that fact that we can ourselves choose what we will be drawn by. Therefore, every human being must express or reveal love by loving another. Necessity lies in the fact that we are drawn and thus can trace our love back to God.

In Sáez Tajafuerce's article, "*Søren Kierkegaard: Den etiske forførelse*" ["Søren Kierkegaard: The ethical seduction"], once again ethics come to the fore as second ethics, but now as seduction. For example, even in a concrete text such as "The Seducer's Diary", the ethical may be found, because a text is simultaneously both a work of *art*, and thus aesthetically defined as a fictional creation of the seducer's life-view, and, as a *work of art*, an object of the author's life, so that the text is therefor ethically defined. The result is a seduction of Cordelia as well as the reader, which carries with it a movement from actuality to fictionality and back again. And innocence, ignorance, and immediacy are all lost on the way back. In return, the text bequeaths a blessing which is also a burden that is difficult to bear: an ethical burden of reflection, consciousness of guilt, and angst. The text acts, and the text makes demands. The text's message is not ethical because it demands the actualization of the ethical, but rather that the message itself actualizes the ethical demand. And it does this by seducing, by being indirectly demanding, by the sheer force of its rhetoric. Through Sáez Tajafuerce's seducing ethics, absence is laid in the hands of language, and from this new studies can spring.

Ole Morsing
(Translated by Stacey Ake)

Børge Andersen

Et vendepunkt i Søren Kierkegaards liv.
Artikler af P.L. Møller og Søren Kierkegaard
[A turning point in Søren Kierkegaard's life.
Articles by P.L. Møller and Søren Kierkegaard]

C.A. Reitzel, Copenhagen 1997, 109 pp.

"Aside from Søren Kierkegaard's fiancée, Regine Olsen, and his father, Michael Pedersen Kierkegaard, the critic Peder Ludvig Møller is the

person who interfered in the most decisive way in Kierkegaard's life and work". Thus declares Børge Andersen in a short preface to his unostentatious book. And though it may seem to be an overstatement and promptly provokes alternative candidates in the reader's mind (Poul Martin Møller, for instance; or what about J.P. Mynster?), P.L. Møller certainly gets the palm of victory in terms of *negative* influence on Kierkegaard.

After a brief biographical sketch the reader is presented with (what is presumably) Møller's anonymous review of *The Concept of Irony*, published in *The Corsair* October 22, 1841, in which he demonstrates his typical rhapsodic, parodic, impertinent and almost deconstructive style. Møller's review is followed by a postscript by Goldschmidt, who tries to tone down Møller's rudeness a bit, but in vain, and thus these lines stand as strange prophecy about disastrous events five years later, when Kierkegaard, in a rancid mixture of intellectual rashness and lack of realism; implored *The Corsair* to abuse him.

The more or less indirect occasion for that disaster is displayed in Møller's long essay entitled "A visit in Sorø" and published in his literary yearbook *Gæa* December 22, 1845. The story takes place in Carsten Hauch's living room, where Møller, at an evening party together with some literary notables, discusses newly published books, among others *Stages on Life's Way*. Not quite groundlessly, Møller interprets the book biographically and zigzags between literary criticism and a critique of Kierkegaard. And unfortunately Møller does both very competently! It is as if he has been reading a passage in Kierkegaard's *Journals and Papers* on the sly and produced a grotesque imitation of their intimate confessions. The itch to write that Kierkegaard himself considered to be a gift of Divine Providence, is exposed as a strained activity, a way to compensate for a number of biologically based defects in his life. And his dialectical ability is interpreted as a sickness in the reflection itself, which leads to female indecisiveness; the woman, Regine, is simply a blameless victim in the hands of a perverse experimenter.

The indirectly communicating Kierkegaard had never before been attacked so directly, and Møller's overkill very soon turned out to be a suicidal experiment. As is well-known, Kierkegaard answered promptly in *The Fatherland* on December 27 under the headline "The Activity of a Travelling Esthetician and How He Nonetheless Came Pay for Dinner". Almost to excess Kierkegaard reveals how cynically clear-sighted he could be in the destruction of his enemies. Precisely like Møller, Kierkegaard

also mastered the art of refining smutty gossip and numerous hints into a masterful rhetorical quivering between the lines. Nonetheless, Kierkegaard had to moderate his aggression considerably while composing his reply; indeed the murder of Møller demanded powerful, religious stimulants: “The article against P.L. Møller was written in much fear and trembling; I composed it during the holidays and in order to create a regulating resistance I did not neglect going to church or reading my sermon”.

This is Kierkegaard at his worst, but the article was effective and Møller was deeply shaken, as one can see in his reply “To Mr. Frater Taciturnus, Chief of Part Three of ‘Stages on Life’s Way’” published in *The Fatherland* on December 29, as well as by Kierkegaard’s reply to Møller, entitled “The Dialectical Result of a Literary Police Action” in *The Fatherland*, January 10, 1846. After this dialogue, the *Corsair Affair* was as unavoidable as it was fatally determinative for Kierkegaard’s future.

And for Møller’s, too. Just as the whole affair was initiated by Møller’s review of *Stages on Life’s Way*, it was closed by another review – likewise by Møller. In the end of March 1846, he reviews *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* in two issues of *Kjøbenhavnsposten*, slightly covered by the pseudonym “Prosper naturalis de molinasky”. It is obvious that Møller knows that he now is a *persona non grata* among the Danish intellectuals and therefore pays no regard to his reputation. The review consists of more or less parodic paraphrases and absurdly linked quotations from the *Postscript*, which Møller misreads and reproduces with a splendid imitative talent. Møller is indeed malicious, but he also is a skilled critic, whose facility at caricature is based on the sensitive reading of a text. And he was one of the first to notice Kierkegaard’s unfortunate tendency to subsume quite different matters under the notion ‘aesthetics’: “The dialectical aspirant to eternal happiness has only to be concerned for himself, has to emancipate himself from all so-called civil and human duties, all private relations of emotions etc., which is nothing but ‘aesthetics’”. Hardly as justified, yet not totally wrong, is Møller’s suspicion that the *Postscript* – given its swarm of chapters, sections, subsections, insertions, exclamations, departures, digressions, revisions, additions, §§’s, footnotes and quite a bit more of the same – in some sense has become an impossible book, because it is too badly “organically organized” and thus is, at best, to be “placed under the heading: chaotic literature”.

P.L. Møller was not as brilliant as Kierkegaard, but he was just as un-

ruly, and thus the present book is a nice contribution to the understanding of a darker side of The Golden Age. After years of biographical animosity one might hope that Kierkegaardian readers would abandon peering at that epoch only through a Kierkegaardian keyhole.

Joakim Garff

Flemming Christian Nielsen
Ind i verdens vrimmel.
Søren Kierkegaards ukendte bror

[Into the crowds of the world. Søren Kierkegaard's unknown brother]

Holkenfeldt 3, 1998, 191 pp.

When a young man reads a short note in the paper of Wednesday August 22, 1832 reporting that captain Isaac S. Gibbs plans to sail from Copenhagen to Boston in North America, suddenly he has no doubt any longer. He wants to get on board, the sooner the better. A week later he boards "Massasoit of Plymouth" and leaves Copenhagen forever, officially because he wants to try his luck, but in fact, as his friend Munthe Brun formulates it, because "he could not bear his family," which treated him as an "outcast".

This outcast was no less than Niels Andreas Kierkegaard, Søren's four-years-elder and Peter Christian's four-years-younger brother, who always played a subordinate part in the Kierkegaard family drama and who, in most biographical literature, has been mentioned only *en passant*. Niels Andreas is another kind of Kierkegaard than his two intellectual brothers, and he refuses to live his life in the shade of the father's curse of God *annodazumal* on the moors of Jutland, crammed shelves and secluded German theology. He seems to have been something nearly as paradoxical as a healthy or even happy Kierkegaard. His childhood consists mainly of blank pages and our knowledge about him amounts to the most basic data. Nonetheless Flemming Christian Nielsen has now written a splendid, vivid and moving biography, based on an impressive piece of research, using the Internet as well as more classical sources such as newspapers and contemporary letters and documents, for which a record is provided in the form of detailed notes in the back of the book.

Into the crowds of the World is rich in historical information about departures and arrivals, characterizations of odd persons, environments and geographical locations, streets, hotels and inns – in short, very concrete, but at the same time held together by a narrative frame. And because the Kierkegaard family is in a double sense observed *from outside*, one indeed perceives the enormous cleavage between the brave, new world and the inflexible merchant milieu at Nytorv 2 as it is reflected in the letters from Peter Christian, friends and relatives, and last but not least from the fabulous Rudelbach sisters, Juliane and Christiane, who, in addition to being teachers at an institute for young girls, are two energetic, spinster scandalmongers of the sort that could write for today's tabloids.

Flemming Christian Nielsen's story is a story of a young man's juvenile and passionate dream about a new life in a country that flows with milk and honey (read: money) far from the cramped air in the father's woollen goods store. And it is a story about all the troubles and disappointments that meet Niels Andreas as he travels back and forth between Boston and New York with his Danish letters of recommendation that no one feels inclined to read, and about his naïve confidence in harassed fortune hunters (not at least the fanciful and unreliable James C. Richmond), who do not keep their word but gladly deceive the youth.

It is, however, also and perhaps foremost a story about a young man's struggle against his ambivalent relationship with his father and his attempt to retrieve his intellectual situation. His unoccupied hours he passes by studying English – and, as he proudly states in a letter to Peter Christian, he is improving, he has already been mistaken for an American (!) – but he is also adopting the business language Spanish he is little by little. Yet he wants to maintain his mother tongue, and so he hopes that he can begin an "intense correspondence" with Peter Christian, who is asked to correct him if he "fails in the language as well as in the style". If Peter Christian can persuade Søren to do the same, he would be very pleased – "he has got brains and has used his abilities better than I until now". Peter Christian expresses his doubts about the usefulness of linguistic studies and displays great hesitation concerning the transatlantic trade plans that Niels Andreas has conceived, but he could have saved his authoritative words. "Lack of letters and a longing for them cause me many unpleasant moments lately," he writes in his diary in July, and after August passes, without any sign of life from Niels Andreas, the elder brother writes a extended letter, in which the tone is brusque and admonishing, but this letter is never answered either.

In October, one gets the explanation: Most of the summer, Niels Andreas has been ill in a hotel room in Paterson, New Jersey, and Peter Christian receives a letter from a pastor in the Anglican church, Ralph Williston, who asks him to prepare his mother for her son's approaching death. A week later the family is told that Niels Andreas died, September 21, 1833, and was buried, the following day, at St. Paul's Cemetery in Sandy Hill. "God give him a delightful resurrection", Peter Christian writes in his diary.

A late letter of condolence arrives from Ralph Williston and addressed to "Mrs. Anna Kierkegaard", who thereby probably for the first time ever receives a letter meant solely for her. In his letter Williston describes how he had sat close to Niels Andreas day and night during the last days, and heard him talk so lovingly about his mother, his sisters and brothers. Williston ends his letter with the following words: "Happy the Son who has such a Mother – and happy the Mother who has such a Son!". The lines are touching, but terrifying too, because Williston seems to have forgotten that Niels Andreas also had a father! Is it an accidental omission, just a misunderstanding, or might it be an act of revenge, a deliberate suppression? Merchant Kierkegaard is tortured by these thoughts, and asks Peter Christian to contact Williston in order to get an explanation. Peter Christian asks Williston to say – "if You can" – why Niels Andreas does not mention his father at all, "to whom this circumstance has given a great deal of trouble and caused many an inquiet night". Apparently Williston never answers, but the Rogers family, Niels Andreas' hosts in Paterson, assures Peter Christian later in the year, that Niels Andreas had never said that his father was dead. Such a fear was absolutely groundless and so was – one must add – the hope that Peter Christian had tried to sustain in his father. Reluctantly, the old Kierkegaard had to realize that the occasion for his son's silence was not a simple misunderstanding, but the horrifying fact that he had been abandoned as a father. And as religious educator: "He gave You, my dear Madam, great credit for his religious education" – as Williston wrote to "Mrs. Anna Kierkegaard". Merciless in all its clarity.

At its best the story resembles the quasi-biographical stories of Henrik Stangerup who, indirectly, inspired Flemming Christian Nielsen to investigate the life of this (hitherto) unknown Kierkegaard. In books of this kind, one tends to get somewhat more *Dichtung* than *Wahrheit*, but given the fact that the alternative is silence, one ought to be delighted.

Niels Andreas Kierkegaard was the first Danish emigrant to America

from the 19th century who described his impression in letters to Denmark. For that reason, too, it would be a fine idea to translate this book.

Joakim Garff

Johannes Sløk
Livets Elendighed. Kierkegaard og Schopenhauer
[The Misery of Life. Kierkegaard and Schopenhauer]

Centrum 1997, 135 pp.

In May 1854, Kierkegaard began a close reading of Arthur Schopenhauer and continued the whole summer with an almost youthful enthusiasm. One might find it somewhat surprising that he had not become acquainted with this congenial German at a far earlier stage, since Poul Martin Møller had mentioned him in his treatise on immortality from 1837, which Kierkegaard studied intensively. But maybe he felt anxious in those days. For Møller refers to Schopenhauer's philosophy as an example of the "nihilistic side of the modern pantheism" and turns up his nose at the unruly thinker, because he, in the "most straightforward expressions, [designates] his philosophy as an anti-Christian and nihilistic one".

Whether it is precisely *for the very same reasons* that Kierkegaard is attracted to Schopenhauer in 1854 is an open question, but it is a fact that he, who had stopped buying books, in almost no time purchased every available piece of literature about Schopenhauer. Detailed analyses and critical remarks in the Journals testify that Kierkegaard read most of this material, but in a cursory and scattered way as usual, concentrating on the principal work from 1844, *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, in which Schopenhauer tries to demonstrate that the inner substance of life is a blind and irrepressible will or instinct that controls man on a much larger scale than he is conscious of. The mind is a slave of the will and therefore provides the will with useful motives, but the mind itself has no influence on the will's decisions.

Despite all the differences, Schopenhauer's pessimistic pathos runs directly into Kierkegaard's pen and intensifies his own criticism. Schopenhauer is a "prominent author", Kierkegaard writes, "and I am amazed

to find, in spite of a total disagreement, an author who touches me so much”. And in fact it must have been peculiar and almost alarming to discover a philosopher who not only displays numerous biographical similarities, but also was just as anti-Hegelian, anti-historical, anti-academic and misogynistic as Kierkegaard himself, over the years, had turned out to be.

Whereas Kierkegaard began reading Schopenhauer late in life, Johannes Sløk began his Schopenhauer studies at the age of 16, almost simultaneously with his first investigations into Kierkegaard and Plato. Immediately possessed by this triumvirate, Sløk has wanted to write about them ever since, but due to a number of arbitrary, biographical circumstances – carefully listed in the opening chapter of the book – he did not, as he formulates it, get the opportunity until his extreme old age (Sløk was born in 1916). The book consists of five chapters – “Comparison”, “What is The Foundation of Everything”, “The Realization”, “The Misery” and “This Miserable World” – and has all the unmistakable Sløkian features: the stylistic elegance, the charming arrogance, irony and sarcasm, the ease with philosophical meaning and digressions, the baroque list of examples and a pedagogical perseverance which sometimes is carried out to such a degree that the reader is excessively infantilized. The rhetorical discourse seems in general to eclipse the factual discourse, which also is revealed in more concrete errors, e.g. that Kierkegaard died in 1854 (p. 8) and that *Repetition* is written after *Stages on Life's Way* (p. 113).

When it comes to the very matter of the book, the comparison between Kierkegaard and Schopenhauer, Sløk, too, remains – Sløk. Thus he states frankly that he does not want to carry out a detailed comparison, because he does not like the tendency, in most monographs, toward presenting research outlines and corrections of previous interpretations. Sløk explains: “I am much more concerned with using him [Schopenhauer] to articulate what I myself want to have stated, even to the extent of distorting his thinking so much that I make him say what I would like him to have said. It is a kind of ventriloquism” (p. 10f.).

If no one can accuse Sløk of concealing his intentions, one correspondingly cannot blame the reader, who might find Schopenhauer and Kierkegaard even more interesting than Sløk, if he or she is quite disappointed with such a ventriloquistic strategy. Being a Kierkegaardian reader one is struck by the fact that Sløk neither quotes nor discusses Kierkegaard's extensive entries about Schopenhauer from 1854, but

merely mentions their existence almost in passing (p. 54). Needless to say, this reduces the scope of the so-called comparison quite considerably and makes a kind of free composition possible.

The hermeneutic focus is an existentialistic one and Sløk circles about such themes as the importance of individual choice, the lack of cultural as well as natural meaning, the actualization of one's self in opposition to bourgeois values, just as he draws parallels to the theatre of the absurd and its staging of profound nonsense. It is against this background that Sløk positions Schopenhauer and Kierkegaard, and by it their respective authorships are drastically reduced, especially the aesthetic spheres. Although Sløk writes about their common predilection for music, he never unfolds the further implications of an aesthetic engagement, and ends up very close to an increasingly pessimistic, if not desperate *Weltanschauung*, which – I suppose – in the Sløkian dialectic is intended to be the only non-naïve, perhaps even edifying, conclusion in and about the world.

Sløk expresses regret, in the beginning of the book, over the fact that no one ever arranged a true confrontation between Schopenhauer and Kierkegaard. After having read his book, one might ask oneself whether that regret has totally lost its topicality.

Joakim Garff

Peter Tschuggnall

Sören Kierkegaards Mozart-Rezeption

Analyse einer philosophisch-literarischen Deutung von Musik
im Kontext des Zusammenspiels der Künste

Europäische Hochschulschriften, Reihe XX, Philosophie, Band 364

Peter Lang, Frankfurt 1992, 171 S.

Kierkegaards Verhältnis zu Mozart (und zur Musik) ist meines Wissens bislang noch nicht in einer Monographie behandelt, auch wenn die Mozartinterpretation Kierkegaards und vor allem seine Auslegung des *Don Giovanni* viele Musiktheoretiker angeregt und herausgefordert hat. Es ist deshalb zu begrüßen, daß nun eine Monographie vorliegt (eine

Innsbrucker Dissertation aus dem Jahre 1991), die Kierkegaards literarisch-ästhetische Deutung der Mozartschen Musik untersucht. Bisher haben sich vor allem Musikwissenschaftler mit diesem Thema beschäftigt. Peter Tschuggnall ist Theologe und ausgewiesener Kierkegaardforscher (mit einer Arbeit über *Furcht und Zittern*) und geht das Thema zunächst sehr allgemein an mit einem ausführlichen Abschnitt über das Verhältnis zwischen Literatur und Musik im Kontext des Zusammenspiels der Künste (S. 15–60). Dieser Abschnitt enthält eine allgemeine Geschichte der Ästhetik sowie allgemeine Überlegungen zum Verhältnis zwischen Literatur und Musik.

Der zweite Abschnitt stellt zunächst Kierkegaard selbst, seine Biographie, sein "Existenzmodell" und das Hauptwerk *Entweder-Oder* vor (S. 63–92), dazu gibt er einige Anmerkungen zu Mozart, vor allem die drei Opern *Figaro*, *Don Giovanni* und die *Zauberflöte*, auf die sich Kierkegaard bekanntlich in seinem Mozart-Essay bezieht (S. 96–120). Erst der letzte Abschnitt (S. 121–144) versucht eine Auslegung von Kierkegaards Mozartessay in einer Analyse der Mozartschen Charaktere "im Spiegel der Existenzsphären Kierkegaards" (S. 121–144). Ein zusammenfassendes Postskript (S. 147–160) und eine ausführliche Bibliographie, die allerdings leider fast ausschließlich deutschsprachige Literatur berücksichtigt (S. 161–171), beschließen die Arbeit.

Die Stärke der Studie von Tschuggnall ist, daß sie Kierkegaards Mozartinterpretation in einen breiten ästhetischen und literaturwissenschaftlichen Kontext einordnet, sie ist nicht nur für Spezialisten geschrieben, sondern versucht Kierkegaards Musikverständnis zu aktualisieren. In der Interpretation des Mozartessays selbst legt der Verf. besonderes Gewicht auf Kierkegaards Interpretation der *Zauberflöte* und die (heute sehr umstrittene) Kritik Kierkegaards an dieser Oper. Kierkegaards Kritik an der *Zauberflöte* müsse, so Tschuggnall, im Kontext von *Entweder Oder* verstanden werden und nicht als allgemeines ästhetisches Urteil (S. 157). Es gehe in *Entweder-Oder* ja primär nicht um allgemeine kunstphilosophische Erörterungen, sondern um das Ästhetische bzw. das Ethische als "Lebensweise" (S. 151), nicht Mozart selbst, sondern die Mozart-"Idee". Wenn das aber richtig ist, Kierkegaard also kein "Kunstphilosoph" war, dann müßte man fragen, ob die breite Einleitung über Begriff und Geschichte der Ästhetik nicht etwas vom Wesentlichen ablenkt.

Es fällt auf, daß diese von einem Theologen geschriebene Untersuchung ganz die Frage des Verhältnisses von Musik und *Religion* ausklammert, eine Frage, zu der Kierkegaard in seinem Essay bekanntlich

auch einige Betrachtungen angestellt hat, wenngleich er sich für Mozarts (und anderer) *religiöse* Musik bekanntlich nicht sehr interessiert hat.

Die Arbeit von Tschuggnall bietet sowohl für den Mozartkenner (und -liebhaber) als auch den Kierkegaardleser wertvolle Anregungen, Materialien und Hinweise. Sie ist mehr eine rezeptionsgeschichtliche als eine eigentlich historische Untersuchung über das Verhältnis Kierkegaards zu Mozart, darin liegt die Stärke – und auch die Begrenzung dieser Arbeit.

Eberhard Harbsmeier

Merold Westphal
History and Truth in Hegel's *Phenomenology*

Indiana University Press, Bloomington, (3rd edition) 1998, 256 pp.

For mediocre students of philosophy and theology, Kierkegaard enters the history of ideas as the man who laid the axe to the root of the Hegelian system, and no more. Those who go on to become Hegel scholars (or who – as is common in Anglo-Saxony – dismiss both Hegel and Kierkegaard), conclude that Kierkegaard can rapidly be shown to the nearest exit. Those who go on to become Kierkegaardians may be tempted to take Kierkegaard's account of Hegel as valid in its own terms and not needing to be tested against Hegel's actual texts. Readers of this journal are, of course, more likely to fall into the latter category, and they should be warned that they ignore Hegel at their peril. For whether Kierkegaard was right about Hegel or not (and whether Kierkegaard's prime target in attacking Hegel was Hegel himself or not), the larger study of Hegel remains an important positioning manoeuvre for any attempt to reckon philosophically with Kierkegaard.

It is no secret that Merold Westphal is a scholar who well knows and well appreciates Kierkegaard's importance for the contemporary philosophy of religion, but who is equally at home throughout that modern philosophical tradition (called, in Britain at least, 'continental philosophy') of which Hegel is one of the founding figures. The fact that this introductory study to one of Hegel's key works, the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, has now entered its third edition demonstrates that his grasp of Hegel is both assured and user-friendly. It completely fulfils its aim of

providing students coming to Hegel for the first time with a clear and extensive exposition of this most knotty of philosophical texts, as Westphal keeps to his promise of avoiding Hegelese and presenting his argument ‘in two different languages, Hegel’s and ours.’ (xx) If half of Westphal’s text is taken up with Hegel’s Preface, Introduction and opening chapter (a quarter of Hegel’s own text), this is nevertheless an effective introduction to the whole work, because these beginnings do in fact set up the questions and methods that will determine the rest of the *Phenomenology*. This is a book that could and should be on all faculty reading lists in the field.

Inevitably, this is no mere exegetical introduction – it is also an interpretation and an evaluation, even if this is effected with elegant understatement. And it is here that I would disagree with Westphal, a disagreement that relates both to the understanding of what Hegel is about, and to horizons that lie beyond the text itself but that frame Westphal’s reading. It is a disagreement that relates to Hegel’s religious significance and therefore also, if indirectly, to the Kierkegaard/Hegel relationship.

This disagreement begins in earnest with Hegel’s definition of Spirit, quoted on p. 129: ‘Spirit is that I which is We and that We which is I’. This, Westphal boldly says, ‘is *the* clue to the *Phenomenology*.’ This does not immediately lead to the conclusion that, as far as religion is concerned, Hegel reduces religion to society – but that is where Westphal eventually leads us, equating Hegel with Durkheim, whose position, Westphal claims, ‘represents so clearly in non-Hegelian language Hegel’s fundamental idea about the relation of religion to society.’ (p. 198) This ‘fundamental idea’ is that humanity, society and God (or the gods) are mutually defining and interdependent and in both Hegel and Durkheim it results in a reductionist reading of religion.

Kierkegaard, of course, already said this (without having read Durkheim), as Westphal notes (cf. p. 218). But was he right? There is not scope here to argue the point in detail, so I shall briefly suggest where we might look for a different view. This is to those early Hegelian ‘theological’ (or, as they are sometimes called ‘anti-theological’) writings and to the sections of the *Phenomenology* that reflect them, where Hegel meditates on the interconnection of love, incarnation, resurrection, eucharist and the coming of the Spirit. What I would like to suggest is that, if these are given due weight, Hegel does not so much emerge as a Durkheim *avant la lettre*, but as offering the first draft of a profoundly Christian philosophy that, for the first time in the history of ideas,

philosophised on the basis of the New Testament narrative, rather than adapting Christian theology to a pre-existing Platonic or Aristotelian scheme. Central to this claim is that Hegel's strategy is aimed precisely at undercutting the kind of 'reductionism' versus 'transcendence' way of setting up the issue, and to exploit the characteristically Christian – and perhaps especially Lutheran ('*communicatio idiomatum*') trope of defining transcendence in terms of immanence, and exaltation in terms of abasement and vice versa. It is in the spirit of such a reading that Hans Küng said of Hegel that he 'believed more than he knew' and that, for modern Christology, there could be no going back behind Hegel.

Having said this, I note that Westphal too insists, versus Marxist interpretations, that love is more fundamental to Hegel than such categories as life or labour. This would seem already to point away from reading Hegel as a mere reductionist, so possibly the gap between Westphal's view and my own is not as great as it might seem. I hope not.

Going, as it were, beyond Hegel, Westphal positions his commentary in relation to an understanding of the historical fate of an Enlightenment programme of 'salvation through post-Christian Christianity'. (p. 206) Whilst acknowledging that variants of this programme continue to re-surface in the life of our culture, Westphal understands Hegel's hope in the advent of such a post-confessional Christianity to have been misplaced, both predictively and conceptually. As Westphal sees it, such a view effectively reduces Christianity to a historical phenomenon and nothing more. (p. 207) In Britain and America, at least, this is, increasingly, how the issue is being seen: *either* the Enlightenment or Christianity. In this context Kierkegaard might seem like a natural ally, Hegel like a natural foe.

But, like the contents of Pandora's box, the spirit of the Enlightenment is not easily called in once it has been let loose in the world. Nor is it just that Christianity must therefore make some kind of historic truce with this spirit, for perhaps the spirit of Enlightenment itself owes something to the spirit of Christianity, as Hegel suggests. In any case, there is a truth in the claims of science, in the culture of democracy, in the principles of tolerance and free enquiry (even within religious communities), in aesthetic expressiveness, and in the pursuit of moral autonomy, that contemporary theological polemics against the Enlightenment worryingly imperil.

What I would like to suggest is that a more generous reading of Hegel's religious dimension, together with a reading of Kierkegaard that

does full justice to his characteristic modernity, might just adumbrate the outlines of a post-confessional Christianity that would provide a better environment for human flourishing than any of the neo-orthodoxies currently so theologically prevalent in the Anglo-Saxon world.

George Pattison

H.C. Wind

Anerkendelse – et tema i Hegels og moderne filosofi

[Anerkennung – Ein Thema in Hegels und der modernen Philosophie]

Aarhus Universitetsforlag, Aarhus 1990, 320 S.

In seinem Buch *Anerkendelse* ist es Dr. teol. H.C. Winds Anliegen, den Hegelschen Gedanken der Anerkennung zu reaktualisieren, als einen wichtigen Beitrag zur modernen Philosophie, Psychologie, Ethik und Politik. Dieses Anliegen und seinen forschungshistorischen Horizont (Kojève, Gadamer, Fukuyama, Honneth, Henrich und Tugendhat) wird in den ersten fünf Kapiteln des Buches vorgestellt. Die Kapitel sechs bis acht diskutieren die vorausgehenden Einsichten bezüglich des Anerkennungsgedanken, indem sie versuchen, diesen Gedanken für die Prämissen unserer Zeit geltend zu machen. Die beiden letzten Kapitel des Buches drehen die Diskussion in eine religionsphilosophische Richtung, da es Winds Wunsch ist, die Bestimmung 'Religionsphilosophie' über seinen fachtheologischen Term dadurch auszudehnen, daß er diesen in seinem ursprünglichen Staus wiedergibt, als eine Disziplin, die Philosophie und Religion verbindet.

Damit keine Mißverständnisse entstehen: Winds Buch ist ein glänzendes Buch. Es ist klar geschrieben, es beleuchtet Hegels Gedanken der Anerkennung aus unterschiedlichsten Gesichtspunkten und es gibt eine solide Einführung in die neuere *internationale*, hauptsächlich deutsche, Rezeption des Hegelschen Anerkennungsgedanken, sowohl aus einer ethischen, politischen, als auch psychologischen Perspektive. Merkwürdig ist, daß diese solide Einführung in die Hegelrezeption auf *nationaler* Ebene keine Geltung bekommen hat.

Wind beteuert (S. 65), und der Verlag wiederholt dies im Klappentext, daß dieses Buch das erste Werk in dänischer Sprache ist, daß über Hegels Anerkennungsgedanken und seinen Interpretationen vorliegt.

Für Wind scheint weiterhin V. Sørenens Wort 'Zu Hegels Schriften gibt es keine Hinweise, da Hegel sowieso nicht gelesen wird' gelten, das für Wind der treffende Ausdruck für die gegenwärtige dänische Intelligenzias Verhältnis zu Hegel ist. (S. 55) Beide Behauptungen möchte ich infragestellen. Mag. art. Jørgen Huggler hat gerade seine Dissertation über die *Phänomenologie des Geistes* veröffentlicht. Außerdem hat Dr. teol. Arne Grøn sich in verschiedenen Artikeln, sowohl introduzierend, als auch kritisch mit Hegels Anerkennungsgedanken auseinandergesetzt. So hielt Grøn seine Antrittsvorlesung an der theologischen Fakultät der Universität Kopenhagen im Jahre 1991 mit dem Titel *Der liebe Tun und die Dialektik der Anerkennung*, wo er Hegels Dialektik der Anerkennung als einen Für und Wider-Partner seiner Kierkegaardinterpretation benützt. (Die Vorlesung ist erschienen in *Dansk Teologisk Tidsskrift* 54. årg. 1991, S. 261-270) Bereits 1983 schrieb Arne Grøn einen Artikel in der Zeitschrift *Fønix* nr. 7, mit dem Titel *Dialektik und Dialog*, in dem er eine Einführung zu Michael Theunissens Hegelverständnis und dem Anerkennungsgedanken gibt. Ferner hat Arne Grøn in seiner Dissertation *Subjektivitet og Negativitet – Kierkegaard* auf die methodische Gleichheit zwischen Kierkegaards *Krankheit zum Tode* und Hegels *Phänomenologie des Geistes* aufmerksam gemacht. Dort stellt er einen Vergleich zwischen Hegels Gedanken der Anerkennung mit Kierkegaards Begriff der Subjektivität an. Dieses letztgenannte Werk, das im Vorwort zu verstehen gibt, daß es der zweite Teil einer Trilogie ist, in der auch Hegel eine außerordentliche Rolle spielt, ist zwar auf Winds Liste angewandter Literatur registriert, merkwürdigerweise wird aber nicht ein einziges mal darauf hingewiesen.

Wenn ein Buch über Hegels Theorie der Anerkennung in einer Kierkegaardzeitschrift besprochen wird, dürfte klar sein, daß das Hauptinteresse des Rezipienten in den zerstreuten Diskussionen liegt, die mit Kierkegaard, der im Buch immer wieder sporadisch auftaucht, geführt werden. Dazu läd allein schon Winds Vorwort ein, das Climacus' Aussagen zu Hegel frei resümiert und Wind zudem betont, daß er in seiner Untersuchung des Anerkennungsgedanken es nicht vergessen hat, sich eingehend mit seinem Verständnis von Kierkegaard zu beschäftigen.

Bereits im ersten Kapitel hält Wind fest, daß "die Anerkennung der Grundbegriff der Intersubjektivität ist, der alle sozialen Relationen zusammenkittet." (S. 38) Der Gedanke der Anerkennung impliziert deshalb eine Sozialontologie. Die Selbstverantwortung wird mit der Verantwortung gegenüber Anderen verbunden, was wiederum die implizite Ethik

der Anerkennung ausmacht. (S. 84) Das Ich wird erst durch die Anerkennung eines Anderen – und umgekehrt – wirklich sich selbst. Die Anerkennung bürgt deshalb für eine gegenseitige Konstitution beider Partner innerhalb eines Anerkennungsverhältnisses. Wind sagt außerdem, daß Hegel seine Theorie der Anerkennung (Jenaer-Schriften) im Gegenzug zu einem modernen Naturrechtsindividualismus mobilisiert. Der Gedanke der Anerkennung wird deshalb als der Versuch angesehen, die Abhängigkeit des sozialen Seins mit dem modernen Gedanken des einzelnen Menschen als einem autonomen Wesen, zu verbinden. Es geht um die Einheit des Allgemeinen und des Einzelnen. (S. 43) Eine Einheit, die nicht ohne einen vorausgehenden Konflikt erreicht wird. So weit so gut, aber gerade an diesem Punkt, hätte Kierkegaard ein höchst interessanter Gesprächspartner sein können; wenn Wind, mit denselben Neues entdeckenden Blicken Kierkegaard gelesen hätte, sowie er auf so ausgezeichnete Weise Hegel gelesen hat.

Wind weist z.B. auf die Gleichheit hin, die zwischen Haufniensis Forumlierungen im *Begriff Angst* und Hegels Definition des Selbst in der *Phänomenologie* bestehen. (S. 44) Beide sprechen über den Konflikt zwischen dem Einzelnen und dem Allgemeinen. Doch laut Wind ist es nur Hegel der diesen Konflikt löst und zwar durch den Gedanken der Anerkennung. Bei Kierkegaards Pseudonymen bleibt dieser Konflikt laut Wind jedoch ungelöst. Mit anderen Worten: Kierkegaard fehlt der Begriff der Anerkennung, der den Widerspruch zwischen dem Einzelnen und dem Allgemeinen, zwischen der Individualität und der Sozialität, versöhnen kann. (S. 46,79) Kierkegaard würde, so Wind, “an keiner Stelle auf eine emphatische d.h. auf eine Hegelsche Weise über das Anerkennen” sprechen. (S. 72)

Wind führt immer wieder die vielen Gemeinsamkeiten an, die zwischen diesen beiden Denker bestehen: Beide betonen die Erfahrung der Negativität und beide unterstreichen den Zusammenhang zwischen Religion und Selbstbewußtsein. (S. 291) Daß Wind der Auffassung sein kann, daß diese “Gemeinsamkeiten” übersehen worden sind, schuldet sich den fehlenden Hinweisen zu Arne Grøn. Im übrigen gilt dies auch für Winds Hinweis, daß Løgstrups Auseinandersetzung mit Kierkegaard verfehlt ist, worauf bereits Arne Grøn in einem Artikel *Kredsen nr. 2* 1994 aufmerksam gemacht hat. Darüberhinaus führt Wind an, daß Kierkegaard “in einem dänischen Zusammenhang immer und eindeutig als der lächerlichmachende Auführer gegen Hegel verstanden wurde.” (S. 74) Um nun nicht nur Hinweise zu Arne Grøn zu geben, könnte

man wenigstens zwei Dissertationen anführen, die in ihrer Beurteilung nicht so eindeutig sind. Bei der ersten handelt es sich um Niels Thulstrups *Kierkegaards Forhold til Hegel* von 1967, bei der zweiten um Carl Henrik Kochs *En Flue på Hegels udødelige næse* von 1990.

Kommt es also zum Gedanken der Anerkennung, und dem Verhältnis zwischen dem Einzelnen und dem Allgemeinen, dann, so Wind, scheiden sich zwischen Hegel und Kierkegaard die Geister. (S. 79) In einer gewissen Weise wiederholt Wind die Kritik Løgstrups, indem er meint, daß das Ethische bei Kierkegaard ausschließlich das Selbstverhältnis und nicht das Verhältnis zu Anderen betrifft. (S. 187, 201) Weil Kierkegaard das versöhnende Element zwischen dem Einzelnen und dem Allgemeinen, zwischen dem Selbst und dem Anderen, fehlt, endet er in einer isolierten Subjektivität, die sehr viel vom Anerkennungsgedanken hätte lernen können. Während bei Kierkegaard ein bleibendes "Abstoßen" zwischen dem Einen und dem Anderen aufrechterhalten wird, ist Hegel imstande den Konflikt im Verhältnis durch seine Theorie der Anerkennung zu versöhnen. Kierkegaard hatte keine Kenntnis des Hegelschen Anerkennungsgedanken, aber hätte er ihn gekannt, dann hätte er sich, laut Wind, nicht um diesen gekümmert. Er würde "die Anerkennung als Ausdruck einer restlosen Ausgeliefertheit jenes Einzelnen an die Sozialität und Allegemeinheit verstanden haben." (S. 292) Ich wäre mir nicht so sicher, ob Kierkegaard dies wirklich getan hätte.

Wind verweist auf *Der Liebe Tun* und meint, daß er Kierkegaards gesamtes Werk unter die berühmte Rede über das Alleine-Stehen – mit Hilfe eines Anderen, subsumieren kann. Das Ganze soll sich anscheinend darum drehen, daß der Andere lernt sich selbst zu helfen. Ganz verkehrt ist dies natürlich nicht, aber ganz richtig ist es auch nicht. Was Wind merkwürdigerweise ausläßt, merkwürdig deshalb, weil er diesen Gedanken eben noch bei Hegel referiert hat, ist die doppelte Bestimmung der Liebe, die die Dialektik des Buches ausmacht. Über Hegel heißt es: "natürliche Liebe ist Identität, Anerkennung ist die Identität der Identität und der Differenz" (S. 206f.). In *Der Liebe Tun* bestimmt Kierkegaard die Liebe als einen mit-geschaffenen Drang im Menschen. Doch dieser Drang kann verwittern. Er kann sich sogar gegen sich selbst richten, insofern nämlich, als der ursprüngliche Drang den Anderen zu lieben in die Angst umschlägt, selbst nicht geliebt zu werden. *Der Liebe Tun* ist auf dem Hintergrund dieses Konfliktes geschrieben worden, einem Konflikt zwischen der 'natürlichen' Liebe und der Nächstenliebe. In der 'natürlichen' Liebe liegt implizit die Gefahr, daß der Eine in seinem

Drang geliebt zu werden, den Anderen verschwinden läßt. Es kann von einem 'Spiegelverhältnis' gesprochen werden, in dem die Beiden ein Selbst werden, eine Identität. Die 'wahre' Liebe, die Nächstenliebe, welche in mancherlei Hinsicht der Liebe der Anerkennung entspricht, behält im Verhältnis beide Partner unversehrt. Es ist eine Liebe zwischen zwei Selbstständigen, zwei "Unterschiedlichen", einem ich und einem du, die innerhalb des Verhältnisses, jeder für sich um die Aufrechterhaltung ihrer eigenen Besonderheit kämpfen müssen. Einem Kampf der nur durch die Liebe glückt (sich versöhnt), welche den Anderen liebt, wie er sich selber liebt, nicht aber liebt, um selbst geliebt zu werden. Das Anerkennungsverhältnis ist hier zwar präsent, doch ist es umgedreht. Es ist der Eine, der den Anderen anerkennt (liebt), aber nicht um selbst anerkannt (geliebt) zu werden. Dadurch, daß der Eine den Anderen auf diese Weise anerkennt, geschieht etwas mit beider Selbstverständnis, aber es geschieht nicht das gleiche. Bei Kierkegaard kann von einem asymmetrischen Verhältnis der Gegenseitigkeit gesprochen werden. Die Anerkennung muß *gegeben* werden, und indem ein Anderer anerkannt wird, geschieht etwas ganz Bestimmtes an sich selbst: nämlich, daß man der *Liebende* wird. Und indem die Anerkennung angenommen werden muß, geschieht etwas ganz Bestimmtes *mit dem Anderen*: man sieht sie oder ihn als den Liebenden.

Ich glaube deshalb nicht, daß Kierkegaard Hegels Theorie der Anerkennung mißverstanden hätte. Er war sich durchaus über den Unterschied bewußt, der zwischen 'den Anderen' besteht, verstanden als Menge, Masse, Publikum und Numerus und 'dem Anderen', in der Bedeutung des Nächsten, als das andere Selbstbewußtsein, dem man gegenübersteht. Bei 'den Anderen' hat man aufzupassen, daß diese einem nicht 'sein eigenes Selbst ablisten', wie es in der *Krankheit zum Tode* heißt. Die Gefahr der sozialen Ausgeliefertheit besteht darin, daß sich die Verantwortung des Einzelnen verflüchtigt. Mit dem Nächsten ist es jedoch eine andere Sache. Ihn *muß* man lieben. Ihm ist man grundlegend ausgeliefert, nicht um seine Anerkennung zu beanspruchen, sondern ihm die seine zu geben. Den Hegelschen Gedanken der Anerkennung hätte Kierkegaard, trotz der behaupteten Gegenseitigkeit, vermutlich wegen einer gewissen Einseitigkeit kritisiert, auf dem er beruht. Eine Einseitigkeit, die den Anderen ausschließlich zu einem beherrschten Moment in des Einen eigener Selbstverwirklichung macht.

Eine solche Kritik, die in Winds ansonsten so aufwendiger Behandlung des Anerkennungsgedanken und seiner verschiedenen Perspektiven

ganz und gar fehlt, wäre ein erfrischender Einschlag gewesen. Selbst wenn Wind sowohl Habermas, als auch Honneths Kritik am späten Hegel referiert, weil dieser den Intersubjektivitätsgedanken zugunsten einer monologischen Bewußtseinsphilosophie verlassen hat (S. 88), so fehlt es doch an einer eigentlichen Kritik am Gedanken der Anerkennung und seinem behaupteten Gegenseitigkeitsprinzip. Eine solche Kritik wird z.B. von Emmanuel Lévinas in *Totalité et Infini* geübt. Da wird hervorgehoben, daß Hegels Anerkennungsgedanke den Anderen unter des Einen Begriff subsummiert. Eine Kritik die präzise eines der Zitate angreift, die Wind anführt. Wind unterstreicht, daß die logische Konsequenz des Anerkennungsgedanken der Gedanke der *Relation* ist, d.h. es kann nicht in einer *isolierten* Form begriffen werden. Im Zusammenhang damit zitiert er aus der *Enzyklopädie* einen Abschnitt der Logik: "(...) das Andersein ist nicht ein Gleichgültiges ausser ihm, sondern sein eigenes Moment." (S. 59) Dadurch aber wird der Andere eine bloße Wiederholung des Selbst und keine selbstständige Andersheit. Die Gegenseitigkeit wird dadurch zu einer Einseitigkeit, sodaß man in Anlehnung an Lévinas' Worte, von einem 'Spiel mit leeren Worten' sprechen kann, welches bedeutet, daß man gerade nicht über die Isolation und Autonomie des Ichs, im Verhältnis zum Anderen, hinauskommt. Diese Kritik impliziert ein Verständnis von Hegels Gedanken der Anerkennung als Machtphilosophie, eine Kritik die im übrigen bereits von Michael Theunissen und Arne Grøn formuliert wurde. Die Analogie, welche Hegel in der Phänomenologie zwischen Begierde und Bewußtsein zieht und Winds darauf sich stützende Konklusion, weisen in dieselbe Richtung: "Das Bewußtsein verschwindet nicht in seinem Objekt, aber in Analogie zur Begierde 'verzehrt' es dieses, und damit wird dieses ein anderes, als es vorher war." (S. 100).

Alles in allem: die angeführten kritischen Einwände sind in keiner Weise als ein Anfechtung von *Anerkennung* zu verstehen, das im wesentlichen ein anerkennungswürdiges Buch ist und eine bereichernde Bekanntschaft bedeutete. Wenngleich es das Buch gut gekleidet hätte, hätte es selbst anerkannt, daß im dänischen Kontext weder Hegel, noch der Anerkennungsgedanke, unbeschriebene Blätter sind.

Pia Søltoft

(Übersetzung: Eberhard Harbsmeier)