

# Hegel's View of Moral Conscience and Kierkegaard's Interpretation of Abraham

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In the history of nineteenth-century thought, Kierkegaard's relation to Hegel is one of the most interesting and most poorly understood topics. Of all the texts in which Kierkegaard mentions Hegel by name, *Fear and Trembling* is one of the most direct in its use of and reference to Hegel's thought. In the Preface to the work, Kierkegaard overtly issues a number of criticisms of the Danish Hegelians. Moreover, in each of the three "Problemata" he sets out a position to be discussed by indicating first how the position is in accordance with Hegel's philosophy and then how it is at variance with it. There are thus three parallel passages at the beginning of each discussion which indicate the importance of Hegel for the particular problem at issue.<sup>1</sup> Hegel thus seems clearly to be used as one of the book's main interlocutors, yet the exact nature of the discussion here has not been explored adequately in the secondary literature.

In this essay, I will examine in particular Kierkegaard's "Problema I," which contains a direct reference to Hegel's account of the moral conscience in the *Philosophy of Right*. I will discuss the relevance of this account in Hegel for the discussion of the requirement for Abraham to disregard the usual ethical duties and obligations. I will also examine briefly the third Problema, which concerns the problem of the commensurability of the divine command to sacrifice Isaac and the problem of justifying an action of this kind to others. I wish to contrast Hegel's conception of the moral conscience and Kierkegaard's account of the teleological suspension of the ethical. I will argue that Kierkegaard's reference to Hegel in this context is out of place since Hegel's goal in the *Philosophy of Right* is wholly different from Kierkegaard's here, or that

seen in the context of Hegel's political philosophy, Kierkegaard's own position ultimately reduces to absurdity.

## I

Before we look at the discussion from *Fear and Trembling*, it will be useful to say a word about Hegel's general conception of ethics and the moral conscience and then to locate his understanding of the role of the individual within that. For Hegel, the key term in this context is "ethical life" (*Sittlichkeit*). By this term he means to refer to the concrete realm of customs, values and mores that are generally accepted in any given society. In the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel underscores the connection between everyday customs and his conception of ethical life:

But when individuals are simply identified with the actual order, ethical life [*das Sittliche*] appears as their general mode of conduct, i.e., as custom [*Sitte*], while the habitual practice of ethical living appears as a second nature which, put in the place of the initial, purely natural will, is the soul of custom permeating it through and through, the significance and the actuality of its existence.<sup>2</sup>

Here one can readily see the etymological connection between *Sittlichkeit* and *Sitte* or custom. The term *Sittlichkeit* refers to the immediate sphere of custom and values that one is born into and that precedes reflectivity, alienation and thus criticism. Hegel's ethics is not prescriptive and thus does not try to establish or ground ethical laws in the usual sense. Instead, his procedure is descriptive. By analyzing the forms of ethical life in concrete historical communities, he attempts to discern the rationality in this realm of established custom. This rational element is then developed as an aspect of the rational state.

For Hegel, the contrasting term to "ethical life" is what he in the *Philosophy of Right* and elsewhere calls "morality" (*Moralität*).<sup>3</sup> While ethical life is immediate and intuitive, morality is abstract and mediated. Hegel tends to associate "morality" with Kant's moral theory, which he criticizes as overly abstract. For Hegel, the conception of ethics as *Moralität* overlooks the realm of custom and value in the everyday life of individuals. He writes,

“Morality” [*Moralität*] and “ethical life” [*Sittlichkeit*], which perhaps usually pass current as synonyms, are taken here in essentially different senses. Yet even commonplace thinking seems to distinguish them; Kant generally prefers to use the word “morality,” and, since the principles of action in his philosophy are always limited to this conception, they make the standpoint of ethical life completely impossible, in fact they explicitly nullify and spurn it.<sup>4</sup>

For Hegel, ethical life is already presupposed in Kant’s ethical theory. One must first have a conception of the immediate sphere of customs and values in order to abstract from it to reach an abstract moral law such as Kant’s categorical imperative.

The section that Kierkegaard refers to from the *Philosophy of Right* is “The Good and Conscience.” This section appears in the “Morality” chapter, and thus the figures treated there belong to the sphere of abstract thought. Kierkegaard mentions this section earlier in his dissertation “*On the Concept of Irony*” where he quotes from it seemingly with approval.<sup>5</sup> It is in this section that Hegel treats different forms of romantic individualism. Hegel is particularly critical of kinds of individualism which posit the arbitrary will of the individual as the absolute criterion of moral judgment. He believes that this necessarily leads to veiling the worst kinds of crime under the cloak of legitimacy. This section is of interest to Kierkegaard since it is precisely the relation of the individual to the universal or to the universal moral law that is at issue in the teleological suspension of the ethical. In the “The Good and Conscience” Hegel defines conscience as “the subject’s absolute inward certainty of himself, that establishes the particular and is the determining and decisive element in him.”<sup>6</sup> This issue of conscience is in many ways the same as the issue presented by Kierkegaard in the story of Abraham and Isaac. Thus, Kierkegaard’s interpretation of Abraham presents a number of parallels with Hegel’s account of the moral conscience. First, for Hegel the forms of subjectivism tend to absolutize the moral conscience; likewise, for Kierkegaard the divine command issued to Abraham is absolute by virtue of the fact that it has its origin in a divine source. Second, for Hegel the very nature of conscience is subjectivity which determines itself. As Hegel says, conscience is “infinite abstract self-certainty, which at the same time is for this very reason the self-certainty of *this* subject.”<sup>7</sup> Likewise, for Kierkegaard, the relation between God and man is by its very nature subjective and private, and thus it cannot be justified or explained to others. Finally, the

forms of subjectivism which Hegel analyzes posit themselves as higher than accepted custom, civil law, etc., just as Abraham, according to Kierkegaard's interpretation, has an absolute calling which puts all other external moral commands and duties into abeyance. In both cases the moral conscience is placed above that of the state, generally accepted custom, familial duty, etc. Its demands alone are regarded as absolute.

For Hegel, proper ethical action is grounded in the rational institutions, duties, mores, etc. of a people. Insofar as what is at issue is the rational element, it is recognizable and explicable by philosophy and science. Moreover, insofar as it is the rational element, it is also the universal. Therefore, moral action, while performed by individuals, is by its very nature universal in character. Hegel writes, "What is right and obligatory is the absolutely rational element in the will's volitions, and therefore it is not in essence the *particular* property of an individual, and its form is not that of feeling or any other private (i.e. sensuous) type of knowing, but essentially that of universals determined by thought, i.e. the form of laws and principles."<sup>8</sup> The problem arises since the moral conscience is essentially particular. As Kierkegaard constantly points out in his discussion, the divine command confronts Abraham as a single individual, and it is he alone who has access to it and who is called upon to act.

This particularity of the moral conscience then brings it into conflict with the universality of the ethical life of the community. Hegel interprets this conflict not as one between the individual and something external, e.g. the state, civil law, accepted custom, etc., but as a self-contradiction inside the individual himself. He writes,

Conscience is therefore subject to the judgment of its truth and falsity, and when it appeals only to itself for a decision, it is directly at variance with what it wishes to be, namely the rule for a mode of conduct which is rational, absolutely valid, and universal.... The ambiguity in connection with conscience lies therefore in this: it is presupposed to mean the *identity* of subjective knowing and willing with the true good, and so is claimed and recognized to be something sacrosanct; and yet at the same time, as the mere subjective reflection of self-consciousness into itself, it still claims for itself the title due solely on the strength of its absolutely valid rational content, to that identity alone.<sup>9</sup>

Hegel's view is that the conflict of conscience with the state or civil law

is only a consequence of the deeper conflict of the moral conscience with itself. At bottom, the moral conscience is irrational in its willing. There is thus a claim, implicit or explicit, for absolute validity on the part of the moral conscience, but yet its content is wholly subjective. As so often, Hegel understands the conflict to be immanent and characterizes it as one between universal and particular.

There might seem to be a disanalogy between Hegel's account of moral conscience and Kierkegaard's account of Abraham in that, as Kierkegaard points out, Abraham makes no claim for the universal validity of his action. He never tries to universalize the maxim of his action or to convince others to act in the same way. Thus, he seems in a sense to recognize the subjectivity of his moral conscience. Yet even though Abraham does not try to universalize his action and does not think that it is discursively justifiable, he nevertheless must think that it is in some sense absolutely correct since otherwise he presumably would not go through the motions of preparing to do something which he does not want to do and which is directly at odds with the moral duties he knows for certain. The absolute validity of his action comes from God Himself. This is the warrant Abraham has that his action is higher than law, custom, etc. It is not his particular action which he universalizes but rather the general principle of acting at all costs as divine command bids. (The issue of one's absolute duty toward God is the subject of "Problema II.") On this point he must feel that he is correct and that anyone who is given a divine command ought to act on it as he does, although he is unable to argue for it or prove it discursively due to the subjective nature of the relation in which God gives the command. Nonetheless the internal contradiction is present. For Hegel, this absolute claim is in conflict with the particular content of the action.

For Hegel, the danger lies in the individual who via the moral or religious conscience elevates his own private will to the status of the universal and thereby runs the risk of acting immorally. It is at this point that he begins his discussion of the potentiality for moral evil:

Once self-consciousness has reduced all otherwise valid duties to emptiness and itself to the sheer inwardness of the will, it has become the potentiality of either making the absolutely universal its principle, or equally well of elevating above the universal the self-will of private particularity, taking that as its principle and realizing it through its actions, i.e. it has become potentially evil.<sup>10</sup>

This is precisely the question raised by the figure of Abraham. Is he the highest embodiment of moral action or is he simply evil? Hegel goes on to categorize in ascending order ever more radical forms of subjective evil<sup>11</sup> which correspond in part to his analyses in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* of "Virtue and the Way of the World" from the "Reason" chapter and "Dissemblance or Duplicity" and "Conscience, the Beautiful Soul, Evil and its Forgiveness" from "Spirit." Commentators have identified some of Hegel's contemporaries as the targets of his criticism here.<sup>12</sup>

Hegel's conclusion to this discussion is twofold. First and foremost, while the state can accept the moral conscience of the individual in some forms, it cannot regard it as its principle: "the state cannot give recognition to conscience in its private form as subjective knowing, any more than science can grant validity to subjective opinion, dogmatism, and the appeal to a subjective opinion."<sup>13</sup> Therefore, and this is the second conclusion, the individual in the state has a right to moral conscience so long as it does not conflict with the universally valid civil law. Yet, this said, Hegel also is willing to allow moral conscience a fair bit of leeway even when it in fact does conflict with the laws of the state. This is clear in any number of the institutions that Hegel outlines in the rational state. For example, he allows for the conscience of the individual to be absolute for that individual in instances of, for example, conscientious objectors to military service.<sup>14</sup> But his point is that this individual conscience cannot be made into a principle of universal morality or civil law without it leading to chaos. Hegel also makes room for matters of religious conscience in the rational state. Here we see that his position is to a certain extent compatible with Kierkegaard's. He is able to acknowledge Abraham, like Kierkegaard, as a knight of faith for following the demands of his moral or religious conscience, but only up to a certain point. Just as with civil law today, so also in Hegel's rational state, the right of the individual moral conscience is limited to a certain sphere and stops as soon as it comes into conflict with the rights and principles protected in the constitution, i.e., if Abraham actually attempts to sacrifice Isaac, then he must be prosecuted by civil law since the state cannot allow the universalization of the individual acts of faith and conscience that encroach on the rights of others. Although Kierkegaard praises Abraham's faith, there is nothing that would prevent him from accepting Hegel's conclusion here since he is primarily interested in the religious implications of the problem and not the political ones.

## II

Let us now turn to Kierkegaard's account in *Fear and Trembling* and see specifically how he makes use of the reference to Hegel. He begins the section by outlining the view of ethics as something universal. He then uses this as a hypothetical statement as follows, "If this is the case, then Hegel is right in 'The Good and Conscience,' where he qualifies man only as a 'moral form of evil' (see especially *The Philosophy of Right*), which must be annulled [*ophævet*] in the teleology of the moral in such a way that the single individual who remains in that stage either sins or is immersed in spiritual trial."<sup>15</sup> If ethics is conceived as having the universal for its benchmark, then Hegel is correct in his negative judgment of arbitrary individualism since it is clear that such individualism contradicts the universal. Of course, in this context, Hegel is not interested in the possibility of this individualism being a manifestation of a "spiritual trial" as Kierkegaard is. Hegel's only point is that radical individualism or the conscience of the individual cannot be made into the sole criterion for morality or civil law. Kierkegaard's criticism lies precisely in the fact that Hegel does not leave open this possibility of a "spiritual trial" or of a teleological suspension of the ethical. He continues, "but Hegel is wrong in speaking about faith; he is wrong in not protesting loudly and clearly against Abraham's enjoying honor and glory as a father of faith when he ought to be sent back to a lower court and shown up as a murderer."<sup>16</sup> Kierkegaard's ambivalent assessment of Hegel's view seems to be something like the following: given a certain conception of ethics, Hegel, in his account of civil law and *Sittlichkeit*, is correct in attributing the good to the universal and in condemning the forms of subjectivity; however, he overlooks the fact that from a different perspective, i.e. a religious one, the same act, which from the perspective of civil law and *Sittlichkeit* is illegal and immoral respectively, can also be a sign of the highest faith. It would thus be a logical consequence of Hegel's view that he criticize Abraham and bring him up on charges of murder. Thus, Hegel is purportedly inconsistent and wrong in not following through on his view of civil law, which would condemn Abraham. Of course, it is clear that Hegel is not interested in Abraham or faith in this analysis.

This assessment is, however, problematic since it is clear that the context of the *Philosophy of Right* is an analysis of civil law and not of religion. Thus, the acts of the moral conscience are in this context ana-

lyzed only from the perspective of civil law; from this perspective, Abraham is a murderer, or a potential one, and nothing more. This is, of course, not to deny that there are other possible perspectives. Indeed, Hegel's philosophy is rightly known for the way in which it examines the same phenomenon or concept from different perspectives and at different levels. Thus, while what Kierkegaard says of Hegel here is in itself true, this cannot be regarded as Hegel's only or final word on the matter. His analysis of religion is far richer than these passages on the moral conscience here in the context of his political philosophy. Hegel also discusses the question of moral conscience in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the *Encyclopaedia* and the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, but Kierkegaard only refers to the account in the *Philosophy of Right*.

Kierkegaard then states the thesis of this section, and indeed of the work as a whole, "faith is namely this paradox that the single individual is higher than the universal – yet, please note, in such a way that the movement repeats itself, so that after having been in the universal he as the single individual isolates himself as higher than the universal."<sup>17</sup> This seems to be the core of Kierkegaard's position which he returns to again and again. It is clear that Kierkegaard does not mean by this that arbitrary individualism is higher than the universal. This is precisely the point of his quick caveat here, and this is precisely the point which he has in common with Hegel. But Kierkegaard's problem is then to distinguish his kind of legitimate "individualism," which is higher than the universal, from the arbitrary kind so often advocated by the romantics. He tries to do this with the example of Abraham, which is interpreted as a divine command which puts the usual rules of social ethics and morality into abeyance at least for a time.

Kierkegaard then continues with his criticism of Hegel by pointing out that there must be some legitimate space between the individual and social morality such that the individual can be allowed to deviate from that universally valid social ethics without being branded evil or arbitrary. He writes,

For if the ethical – that is, social morality – is the highest and if there is in a person no residual incommensurability in some way such that this incommensurability is not evil (i.e. the single individual, who is to be expressed in the universal), then no categories are needed other than what Greek philosophy had or what can be deduced from them by consistent thought. Hegel should



not have concealed this, for after all, he had studied Greek philosophy.<sup>18</sup>

What Kierkegaard understands here by the categories of Greek philosophy is not wholly clear. The point is perhaps that for Hegel there is no incommensurability or mystery, and thus everything can be known and adjudicated; thus Hegel shares with the Greeks the view of transparency and open access to the truth. Kierkegaard tends to contrast this with his interpretation of the Christian view, which involves transcendence and incommensurability, where the truth remains hidden. Thus, Kierkegaard's point in the passage is that Hegel has not gone beyond the standpoint of transparency of Greek philosophy.

But in spite of the numerous misinterpretations of Hegel's social and political philosophy which see him as destroying the individual and deifying the state,<sup>19</sup> his goal is in fact to preserve the sanctity of the individual and to allow room for individuality within the state. This is made quite clear in precisely his criticism of the *Sittlichkeit* of the Greek *polis* which he characterizes as an immediacy which crushes and destroys individuality. By contrast, the modern world, as shaped by the French Revolution and Romanticism, is one in which the ethical life of the community has been splintered into a million pieces and the individuals have become monadic units or atoms in the social sphere. This is the price the modern world must pay for winning its individualism from the ancient world. The goal that Hegel sets for himself in his political philosophy is, on the one hand, to win again the universal spirit of the community that modernity has lost, while, on the other hand, maintaining individuality in the sense of a mediated relation to that social ethics. Thus, one can have a deep and meaningful sense of social community like the Greeks, but in a mediated way that does not destroy the individual.

Kierkegaard's interpretation of the story of Abraham and Isaac turns on the key doctrine of the "teleological suspension of the ethical."<sup>20</sup> Abraham entered into a direct or private relation with the divine.<sup>21</sup> This relation, since it is with God, is absolute and thus is infinitely higher than any finite relation, no matter how great that might be. Therefore, Abraham stands "in an absolute relation to the absolute."<sup>22</sup> This absolute relation to the divine is one of faith or personal revelation which is by its very nature private or subjective. It is precisely alone, *qua* individual, that one enters into this relation with God. From this

arises the paradox or the tension: since the relation is with God, it is absolute and infinitely higher than even the highest universal human moral laws and ethics, yet this relation is only possible for a single individual, one at a time, who is then, *qua* single individual, set above such universal moral laws.

The question then naturally arises about how the individual who has such a revelation or who receives such an absolute command of conscience can be certain of it. Kierkegaard poses just this question and alludes indirectly to Hegel's political philosophy. He writes, "How does the single individual reassure himself that he is legitimate? It is a simple matter to level all existence to the idea of the state or the idea of society. If this is done, it is also simple to mediate, for one never comes to the paradox that the single individual as single individual is higher than the universal."<sup>23</sup> Here Kierkegaard refers to the Hegelian notion of the rational ideal of the state and the issue of mediation and insists that no mediation is possible in this relation of faith.<sup>24</sup> The idea seems to be that while Hegel's philosophy always seeks the third term of mediation between universal and particular, for Kierkegaard there is between Abraham, the individual, and God, the absolute or universal, a direct revelation which is not subject to mediation. Abraham stands before God not as all mankind generally but only as a single individual. This is the very nature of the relation of faith where particular meets universal without mediation. But we must return to the original question of how the individual with the divine revelation can be sure of himself or as Kierkegaard puts it, how can he "reassure himself that he is legitimate?" The upshot of Kierkegaard's analysis is that in fact he cannot. Since there is no mediation, there remains a gap between God and man, universal and particular, a gap which reason and knowledge cannot overcome. This seems to be one of the most important conclusions of Kierkegaard's entire interpretation of the story. Abraham can never be wholly certain in the sense of discursive rationality. Therefore, his belief is not one of certainty or complacency but rather of deep anxiety and tension. He has faith but with fear and trembling. The point of the allusion to Hegel's political philosophy seems to be that it is an easy matter to discursively construct the rational state, but to believe with deep anxiety is infinitely more difficult.

## III

Kierkegaard's position here is, of course, valid insofar as it points to the sanctity of conscience and the need to respect and honor its commands in religion, morality, etc. However, understood in the context of political philosophy, it is deeply problematic for all the reasons Hegel points to. In his account of the forms of subjectivism, Hegel analyzes a position that corresponds quite well to Kierkegaard's interpretation of Abraham. It is the penultimate form of subjectivism analyzed in the long Remark to § 140, according to which personal conviction, be it of a divine command or of the goodness of one's own will, is placed above all other considerations. Here Hegel seems to address Kierkegaard's position directly and to reduce it to absurdity:

But if a good heart, a good intention, a subjective conviction are set forth as the sources from which conduct derives its worth, then there is no longer any hypocrisy or immorality at all; for whatever a man does he can always justify by the reflection on it of good intentions and motives, and by the influence of that conviction it is good. Thus there is no longer anything absolutely vicious or criminal; and instead of the above mentioned frank and free, hardened and unperturbed sinner, we have the man who is conscious of being fully justified by intention and conviction.<sup>25</sup>

If divine revelation or the absolute voice of conscience is a legitimate possibility for everyone and if each time one received such an absolute divine call, one was obliged to teleologically suspend one's usual ethical duties and act as the divine voice commanded, then the result would be a host of terrible crimes all committed in the name of God. Kierkegaard's is in principle the same argument as that of any given fanatical religious terrorist. In short, it is an argument which justifies everything. If conviction or faith is made the sole criterion for action, then the very possibility of a wrongful action is eliminated since that conviction can have any given content whatsoever. Indeed, on this view, it is not the content that is at issue but the strength of conviction.<sup>26</sup> For this reason Hegel believes that ethical views like truth claims must be negotiated in practice in the public forum. One cannot remain secure in the subjectivity of one's own heart, but rather one is obliged to enter into moral life with others in which moral and ethical views are open for critical examination.

Hegel also argues that the way in which this position is set up is internally contradictory from the start. If one thinks that issues can be negotiated and truth can be determined on the basis of good reasons in what Habermas calls communicative action, then one's convictions based on reasons are important and are a necessary part in any communicative exchange. If, on the contrary, one says at the beginning that one cannot know the truth or God and that reasons and arguments play no role whatsoever, then one admits at the same time that one's private convictions about these matters are trivial; indeed, this is precisely the reason why the one insisting on the absolute nature of the moral conscience rejects accepted values, civil law, ethics, etc. as trivial or merely subjective. Hegel points out the contradiction as follows:

At one moment conviction is made the basis of ethics and of man's supreme value, and is thus pronounced the supreme and the sacrosanct; at another, all we have to do with is error, and my conviction is something trivial and causal, in fact something strictly external, which may turn out this way or that. Really, my being convinced is something supremely trivial if I cannot *know* the truth; for then it is a matter of indifference how I think, and all that is left to my thinking is that empty good, the abstraction to which the understanding reduces the good.<sup>27</sup>

By claiming an epistemological agnosticism in order to dismiss or "suspend" accepted practices and values, one simultaneously forfeits the right to make any positive moral claim oneself. One's conviction about this or that is wholly trivial if the matter cannot be discursively negotiated or adjudicated.

It should be noted that it is precisely the subjective nature of the moral conscience which Kierkegaard extols and which Hegel censures; indeed, it is precisely the subjective situation of Abraham which makes the story so interesting for Kierkegaard. His relation to God and the revelation of the divine command are his and his alone. Hegel has no problem with moral or religious conscience *per se*. Indeed, he distinguishes between the legitimate realm of conscience as it appears in *Sittlichkeit* from this account of subjective or formal conscience here in *Moralität*.<sup>28</sup> He analyzes legitimate conscience as one which, unlike the formal conscience, has a determinate content.<sup>29</sup> The problem for him is clearly the subjective nature of conscience which he believes cannot be

given free reign in the context of civil law. If there is no conflict with civil law, then Hegel is perfectly happy to allow the moral conscience any number of excesses. But Kierkegaard makes no attempt to ground the actions of the moral conscience in civil law or to defend it in the face of the established legal institutions. Indeed, he is not much interested in the implications of this doctrine for political philosophy. Thus, the two seem to be at cross purposes since the contexts of their discussions are quite different. If this is the case, then Kierkegaard's reference to the *Philosophy of Right* in this context is highly misleading since it implies that Hegel's discussion of moral conscience in the political sphere is also a discussion of it in the religious sphere. If, by contrast, Kierkegaard is correct in referring to the *Philosophy of Right* here since he, too, is interested in the political implications of his analysis of Abraham, then his position becomes extremely problematic. This can be illustrated by a better understanding of the motivations of Hegel's position.

To this end let us cast a brief glance at the social and political milieu in which Hegel wrote his *Philosophy of Right*.<sup>30</sup> This will be useful since it offers an interesting parallel to Kierkegaard's account of Abraham. Hegel came from Heidelberg to the Royal Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität in Berlin in 1818, giving his inaugural lecture on October 22nd. In that winter semester of 1818-1819, he lectured on his political philosophy. It was at precisely this time that the student movement in the form of the *Burschenschaften* was taking root throughout the German states. The liberal students lobbied for, among other things, pan-German nationalism, political equality, a constitutional monarchy and popular sovereignty. They had consolidated their movement at the Wartburg Festival of October 18th, 1817. The students were encouraged by a number of professors, among them Hegel's lifelong rival Jakob Friedrich Fries.<sup>31</sup> Needless to say, the leaders of Prussia and the German states were alarmed by this development, and in January 1819, the King of Prussia, Friedrich Wilhelm III, ordered professors who encouraged the liberal students dismissed from their posts. This was the atmosphere when Hegel arrived at in Berlin in the fall of 1818.

The situation exploded on March 23, 1819, when a theology student by the name of Karl Ludwig Sand, inspired by the higher calling of German nationalism, murdered the Russian noble August von Kotzebue, a conservative popular writer critical of the student movement and German unification. This action confirmed the authorities' worst fears of what the spirit of youth and freedom was capable of, and they react-

ed with severe measures, imprisoning students and dismissing professors as "demagogues." The "Karlsbad Decrees" were issued in August of 1819 by a council of ministers of the German states and called for a disbanding of the fraternities and political associations, a new censorship and closer governmental control of university appointments. In these actions a number of professors such as Fries in Jena and the theologian Wilhelm De Wette, Hegel's colleague in Berlin, were dismissed from their posts.

Hegel's position in this matter is somewhat difficult to characterize since he does not readily fall into the one camp or the other. On the one hand, he was a lifelong advocate of Napoleon and of constitutionalism, and a consistent critic of the conservative forces of the Restoration. On the other hand, while he sympathized with many of the goals of the students, posting bail for his imprisoned student Asverus and supporting his former Heidelberg student Carové in his application for a position in Berlin,<sup>32</sup> he rejected their extremism and self-righteousness. He thus criticizes Fries for encouraging the worst aspects of youthful enthusiasm at Wartburg. The Preface to the *Philosophy of Right* was written very much with this in mind; there Hegel polemicizes directly against Fries and this tendency. Thus, Hegel cannot be readily fit into the standard political categories of the time since he was neither a Prussian apologist nor an agitator in the student movement.

Hegel's reaction and assessment of the episode of the murder of Kotzebue is interesting and illuminating for our purposes since Sand's action provides an analogue to Kierkegaard's Abraham. Sand, who was condemned and ultimately executed in May of 1820, was regarded by his supporters not as a criminal and a murderer but as a "pious heart," who was justified in his actions. De Wette, in a letter, which, once discovered, led to his dismissal, writes to Sand's mother that her son's error "is excused and to a certain extent abolished by the strength and purity of his conviction, and his passion is sanctified by the good source from which it flows. He was sure of his cause, he considered it right to do what he did, and thus he did right."<sup>33</sup> Like Kierkegaard's Abraham, Sand is regarded as having a higher calling which suspends both civil law and accepted custom. In the final analysis, he is thought to have done what was right by following the call of his heart or his moral conscience. Both De Wette and his sympathizer Schleiermacher were theologians,<sup>34</sup> and De Wette's view was grounded in a theological subjectivity which Hegel rejected. As was mentioned, Sand was also a student of theology. Hegel is critical of the attempt to justify heinous acts, like

that of Sand, under the name of piety, religion or divine calling. He considers this simple fanaticism and self-indulgent arrogance. While Hegel helped De Wette with financial support after his colleague's dismissal, he had nothing but disdain for this kind of view which raises subjectivity above law and custom.<sup>35</sup>

It is clear that Kierkegaard in the final analysis wants to make room for the legitimate place of direct revelation. This is an issue which he wrestles with not only here but also elsewhere in the *corpus*.<sup>36</sup> For Hegel, by contrast, individual self-certainty about a divine revelation or a voice of conscience is not truth. He has no reason to deny the possibility of divine revelation, but with respect to civil law truth must be socially negotiable and defensible in the public sphere of ethics. For Kierkegaard, it can remain forever hidden and concealed in the private sphere. Although Kierkegaard lauds Hegel in *The Concept of Irony* for his criticism of the subjectivism of the romantics, he seems to end up in precisely the same kind of subjectivism with respect to religion. There are two conclusions which can be drawn from this analysis: either Kierkegaard is wrong in referring to Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* in his account of Abraham since the contexts of the two discussions are so different that they do not allow for comparison – Hegel's account being concerned with political theory and Kierkegaard's with revelation and faith; or Kierkegaard is also interested in political thought in his account of Abraham, and the reference to Hegel is appropriate. But if this is the case, then his position reduces to absurdity since it amounts to precisely the same kinds of arguments used by Sand and his supporters to justify the murder of Kotzebue. Thus, in the final analysis, Kierkegaard's view would amount to a justification of the darkest forms of crime and fanaticism in the name of virtue and piety in the same way that Sand was regarded as a knight of faith by some of his contemporaries.

#### IV

In the third and final "Problema," the issue raised is that of Abraham's silence. Kierkegaard formulates the "Problema" thus: "Was it ethically defensible for Abraham to conceal his undertaking from Sarah, from Eliezer, and from Isaac?"<sup>37</sup> The issue here is not just that of Abraham's silence but the problem of discursive justification in general. Given the doctrines of the teleological suspension of the ethical and the absolute

duty towards God, which were examined in the first two *Problemata*, the question now becomes whether or not one can appeal to that absolute duty or divine revelation in order to explain or justify to others one's actions when they are in conflict with accepted ethics and civil law. What is strange here is that Hegel and Kierkegaard in a certain sense come to the same conclusion here, namely, that any appeal of this kind must be regarded as illegitimate. In this section, I want to argue that once again, Kierkegaard and Hegel are at cross purposes, and for this reason Kierkegaard's reference to Hegel is misleading.

Once again it will be useful to look at Hegel's view first in order to compare it with the view Kierkegaard attributes to him. As we have seen, Hegel sees grave dangers in the view which he calls "the law of the heart," i.e., the idea that one can act according to the private convictions of one's own heart without subjecting them to public scrutiny. For Hegel, this simply leads to a mad nihilism that rejects any form of discursive justification. He reduces this position to absurdity by indicating the self-contradiction involved in it: "It follows further, on this principle of justification by conviction, that logic requires me, in dealing with the way others act against my action, to admit that they are quite in the right – so far at any rate as they maintain with faith and conviction that my action is criminal."<sup>38</sup> If personal conviction is made the only standard for law and ethics, then one is obliged to accept the personal convictions of everyone else. Thus, when one is tried, condemned and imprisoned for a murder committed out of the conviction of moral conscience of its obedience to a higher law, then one cannot consistently reproach civil law or those responsible for its execution since this, too, has the status of a personal conviction. Thus, even if one attempts to justify one's actions in this way, this justification or defense is ultimately meaningless since no adjudication is possible.

Let us now turn to Kierkegaard's discussion. In the body of this section, Kierkegaard discusses a number of examples of hiddenness and recognition or revealedness in the sphere of both ethics and aesthetics. He is careful to distinguish the uniqueness of Abraham's situation from that of all the others. The point is that Abraham, even if he wanted to, could not discursively present the divine command and make others understand it. This is the reason for the anxiety of his situation and the reason why he is ultimately so alone. If Abraham were to attempt to explain the revelation discursively, then he would be dishonest. Kierkegaard writes,



Even though I go on talking night and day without interruption, if I cannot make myself understood when I speak, then I am not speaking. This is the case with Abraham. He can say everything, but one thing he cannot say, and if he cannot say that – that is, say it in such a way that the other understands it – then he is not speaking.<sup>39</sup>

The problem at bottom is that the divine command, *qua* revelation, cannot be grasped by reason; moreover, any attempt to do so will only be a distortion. Kierkegaard writes, “Now, Abraham can describe his love for Isaac in the most beautiful words to be found in any language. But this is not what is on his mind; it is something deeper, that he is going to sacrifice him because it is an ordeal. No one can understand the latter, and thus everyone can only misunderstand the former.”<sup>40</sup> The attempt to explain the divine command would only lead to misunderstanding since it in itself is incomprehensible. This is the reason for his repeated question throughout the book, “Abraham, who can understand him?” Ultimately his action cannot be understood since the divine command defies reason. Therefore, no outward justification of Abraham’s actions is possible.

Kierkegaard, however, seems to indicate that an inward justification to oneself is possible, and in this he perceives a distinction between his view and that of Hegel. He sets up the issue here just as in the two previous sections with a reference to Hegel. Kierkegaard writes, “The ethical as such is the universal; as the universal it is in turn the disclosed. The single individual, qualified as immediate, sensate, and psychical, is the hidden. Thus his ethical task is to work himself out of his hiddenness and to become disclosed in the universal.”<sup>41</sup> The universal demands of ethics are available to all in the public sphere. This is the reason they are universal. Kierkegaard’s thesis in this section is that in the case of divine revelation, as in Abraham’s case, silence or hiddenness is appropriate given the nature of the relation. Here Kierkegaard introduces Hegel into the discussion to indicate a contrary position to his thesis:

If there is no hiddenness rooted in the fact that the single individual as the single individual is higher than the universal, then Abraham’s conduct cannot be defended, for he disregarded the intermediary ethical agents... . The Hegelian philosophy assumes no justified hiddenness, no justified incommensurability. It is, then,

consistent for it to demand disclosure, but it is a little bemuddled when it wants to regard Abraham as the father of faith and to speak about faith.<sup>42</sup>

Here Kierkegaard grants that communicability or "disclosure" is a legitimate demand in certain spheres, e.g., the aesthetic, but the main claim is that in the religious sphere this disclosure is inappropriate: "The first immediacy is the aesthetic, and here the Hegelian philosophy certainly may very well be right. But faith is not the aesthetic, or else faith has never existed because it has always existed."<sup>43</sup>

This discussion shows quite clearly that Kierkegaard and Hegel are talking about two different things. In his account of subjectivity and the moral conscience in the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel never purports to talk about faith *per se*. In that context, he is interested in those concepts solely in their relation to political philosophy. In the passage cited above, Kierkegaard grants that Hegel's view has validity in a certain sphere, that which Kierkegaard here calls the aesthetic, but that it loses this validity when it is applied to faith and religion. But in the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel never pretends to apply this analysis to faith and religion. Thus, it seems once again that Kierkegaard is in error in referring to the *Philosophy of Right* in this context in order to determine the final word on Hegel's account of the moral conscience.<sup>44</sup> He thus uses a strawman position as an antipode to his own in order to explicate his own view by contrast to it. Although he mentions Hegel by name, the position he re-presents in the context of faith and religion has nothing to do with Hegel himself.

Therefore, it follows that Abraham cannot in any way attempt to justify his action discursively to others. He is bound to accept in silence the judgment of civil law. As strange as it may seem, on this point Hegel and Kierkegaard are in perfect agreement. They agree that private conviction cannot be used to ground or justify anything. This is an important qualification. But this only shows more clearly the inappropriateness of Kierkegaard's reference to the *Philosophy of Right* since the issue there is one of grounding and justification in terms of rationality. Hegel's whole point is that the private moral conscience cannot be used to justify action which is in conflict with civil law.

## V

It is clear that Kierkegaard uses Hegel in this text for his own purposes. In "Problema I," he alludes to Hegel's account of the moral conscience in the *Philosophy of Right*, an account which is in some ways certainly relevant to Kierkegaard's topic here in *Fear and Trembling*. However, there are significant differences. In each of the references to Hegel in the three Problemata, Kierkegaard grants that Hegel is right in some limited manner or under certain presuppositions, and then he issues his criticism, saying that Hegel is wrong when he talks about Abraham and about faith. It is here where the problem is most obvious since it is clearly Kierkegaard who is interested in talking about Abraham and about faith and not Hegel. Thus, Kierkegaard each time uses Hegel to set up the issue and to form a contrary position to his own, but when we take the issue on Kierkegaard's terms, i.e., as an issue of faith and religion, then the two discussions are so different that they defy comparison since this is clearly not the context of Hegel's analysis. Moreover, as I have tried to point out, when we understand the issue on Hegel's terms, i.e., in the context of political philosophy, then there is in the final analysis no conflict between their positions since Kierkegaard also concedes that the demands of moral conscience cannot be justified discursively and thus used as a defense in civil law.

Although given the differences in the contexts of their respective discussions, Hegel and Kierkegaard are at cross purposes on the question of the moral conscience, there is nevertheless a deeper disagreement which the issue points to. The question regards the status of faith and the revelation of a divine command on Kierkegaard's view. As we have seen, Kierkegaard insists that any claim to have received a divine command cannot be justified by discursive reason. If, on the one hand, we interpret this to mean that there is no claim to truth here, then his position reduces to a relativism, and he cannot make any truth claim for believing in Christ instead of, for example, in the divinity of trees. This is the *reductio* that Hegel uses on the forms of subjectivity. If, on the other hand, we interpret Kierkegaard to mean that in fact Abraham must be right or must know the truth in some sense – since otherwise it would not make sense to designate him as the knight of faith and to laud his action as a sublime expression of faith – then Abraham's claim to truth must be based on reasons which are in principle available to all and thus subject to debate and criticism. But this is precisely what Kierkegaard

denies. Thus, Kierkegaard's position reduces either to a relativism which precludes him from claiming the truth or virtue of Abraham or the contradiction of saying that Abraham is morally correct and virtuous without giving any reasons for why.

Kierkegaard in fact seems to end up with the latter position, and he attempts to escape the contradiction by appealing to the doctrines of the paradox of faith and the absurd. But it is here unclear how he can distinguish his position of the absurd of faith from what is simply absurd.<sup>45</sup> It is along these lines that Hegel argues that the abstract moral conscience cannot be considered the judge of truth. The move from the abstract realm of *Moralität* to the concrete sphere of *Sittlichkeit* in the *Philosophy of Right* is intended specifically to overcome these problems. In order to have the capacity to judge and to determine truth, one needs the fullness of the realm of institutions, customs, values, traditions, etc. Validity claims and truth claims can, for Hegel, only be adjudicated in this sphere. Thus, from Hegel's perspective, Kierkegaard remains in the realm of *Moralität* by abstracting the individual out of this context and regarding him as an atomic unit in relation to his absolute moral duty. There is of course great irony in this since it is precisely Kierkegaard's claim that Hegel with his elaborate system has abstracted the individual out of the existential sphere and has analyzed him only abstractly. Seen from Hegel's perspective, the analysis of the individual ensconced in the realm of *Sittlichkeit* is in fact quite concrete, whereas Kierkegaard's account has abstracted from this entire sphere to focus exclusively on the abstract individual. (Hegel's goal in introducing *Sittlichkeit* as a concept was precisely to overcome the formalism and abstraction of Kant's ethical theory.)

By saying that no discursive justification is possible for Abraham *vis-à-vis* civil law and by appealing to the doctrine of the paradox and the absurd, Kierkegaard retreats a long way in the direction of Hegel's position; indeed, as we have seen, he even ends up with the very same view as Hegel on the key points. However, the split comes when Hegel has reduced the view of the formal conscience to absurdity and abandons it as a settled issue, whereas Kierkegaard follows him to the same point, but instead of rejecting the position as absurd or self-contradictory, he against all reason embraces it.

## Notes

1. Cf. Westphal who sees *Fear and Trembling* as a self-conscious juxtaposition of Christianity and Hegelian rationalism. Westphal, Merold, "Abraham in Hegel," in *Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling: Critical Appraisals*, ed. Robert L. Perkins. Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1981, pp.62-80.
2. Hegel, PR §151; RP p.233. (PR = Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*, translated by T. M. Knox. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952; RP = *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse*. SW vol. 7. SW = *Sämtliche Werke*. Jubiläumsausgabe in 20 Bänden, edited by Hermann Glockner. Stuttgart: Friedrich Frommann Verlag, 1927-1940.)
3. See Elsigan, Alfred, "Zum Begriff der Moralität in Hegels Rechtsphilosophie," *Wiener Jahrbuch für Philosophie*, (5), 1972, p.188. Cf. Kierkegaard, CI p.227; BI p.305. (CI = *The Concept of Irony; Schelling Lecture Notes*, translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989; BI = *Om Begrebet Ironi*. SV, vol. 13. SV = *Samlede Værker*, 14 volumes, edited by A.B. Drachmann, J.L. Heiberg, and H.O. Lange. Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1901-1906.)
4. Hegel, PR §33, Remark; RP p.85. (Translation slightly modified.)
5. Kierkegaard, CI pp.227-228; BI p.305. Cf. also Westphal, Merold, "Abraham in Hegel," in *Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling: Critical Appraisals*, ed. Robert L. Perkins. Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1981, p.67.
6. Hegel, PR §136; RP p.195.
7. Hegel, PR §137; RP p.196.
8. Hegel, PR §137; RP p.197.
9. Hegel, PR §137; RP p.197.
10. Hegel, PR §139; RP p.200.
11. Hegel, PR §140 Remark; RP pp.204-223.
12. See Calvez, J. Y., "L'âge d'or. Essai sur le destin de la 'belle âme' chez Novalis et Hegel," *Études Germaniques*, (9), 1954, pp.112-127. Dahlstrom, D. O., "Die schöne Seele bei Schiller und Hegel," *Hegel-Jahrbuch*, 1991, pp.147-156. Gram, Moltke S., "Moral and Literary Ideals in Hegel's Critique of 'The Moral View of the World'," *Clio*, (7), 1978, pp.375-402. Hirsch, Emanuel, "Die Beisetzung der Romantiker in Hegels *Phänomenologie*. Ein Kommentar zu dem Abschnitte über die Moralität," *Deutsche Vierteljahresschrift für Literaturwissenschaft*, (2), 1924, pp.510-532. Also in *Materialien zu Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes*, edited by Hans Friedrich Fulda and Dieter Henrich. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1973, pp.245-275. Kaan, André, "Le mal et son pardon," in *Hegel-Tage Royaumont 1964: Beiträge zur Deutung der Phänomenologie des Geistes*, edited by Hans-Georg Gadamer. *Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 3. Bonn: Bouvier, 1966, pp.187-194. Labarrière, Pierre-Jean, "Belle âme, mal et pardon," *Concordia*, (1), 1982, pp.11-15. Sax, Benjamin C., "Active Individuality and the Language of Confession: The Figure of the Beautiful Soul in the *Lehrjahre* and the *Phenomenology*," *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, (21), 1983, pp.437-466. Verene, Donald Phillip, "Two Forms of Defective Selfhood: The Spiritual Animal Kingdom and the Beautiful Soul," in his *Hegel's Recollection. A Study of Images in the Phenomenology of Spirit*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985, pp.92-103. Well, Karlheinz, *Die schöne Seele und ihre sittliche Wirklichkeit*. Frankfurt a.M. and Bern: Peter Lang, 1986.
13. Hegel, PR §137; RP p.197.
14. Hegel, PR §270; RP pp.353-354: "A state which is strong because its organization is mature may be all the more liberal in this matter; it may entirely overlook details of religious practice which affect it, and may even tolerate a sect (though, of course, all de-

pend on its numbers) which on religious grounds declines to recognize even its direct duties to the state. The reason for the state's liberal attitude here is that it makes over the members of such sects to civil society and its laws, and is content if they fulfil their direct duties to the state passively, for instance by such means as commutation or the performance of a different service." In a footnote to this passage Hegel mentions precisely the example of exempting citizens from military service who have moral or religious objections.

15. Kierkegaard, FT p.54; FB pp.104-105. (FT = *Fear and Trembling; Repetition*, translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983; FB = *Frygt og Bæven*. SV, vol. 3.)
16. Kierkegaard, FT pp.54-55; FB p.105.
17. Kierkegaard, FT p.55; FB p.105.
18. Kierkegaard, FT p.55; FB p.105.
19. Cf. The standard example of this is of course Karl Popper's account in *The Open Society and Its Enemies*. op. cit., 1952. See also Ryle, Gilbert, "Critical Notice," *Mind*, (55), 1947, p.170 and p.172. Russell, Bertrand, *Philosophy and Politics*. London: Cambridge University Press, 1947. Russell, Bertrand, *Unpopular Essays*. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1950, p.22. Haym, Rudolf, *Hegel und seine Zeit*. Berlin: Gaertner, 1857, reprint Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, pp.357ff. Kiesewetter, Hubert, *Von Hegel zu Hitler: eine Analyse der Hegelschen Machtstaatsideologie und der politischen Wirkungsgeschichte des Rechts-Hegelianismus*. Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe, 1974. Carritt, E.F., "Hegel and Prussianism," *Philosophy*, (15), 1940, pp.190-196, (15), 1940, pp.315-317. Hook, Sidney, "Hegel Rehabilitated" and "Hegel and His Apologist," in Kaufmann, Walter (ed.), *Hegel's Political Philosophy*. New York: Atherton Press, 1970, pp.55ff. and pp.87ff. For a debunking of this myth see Walter A. Kaufmann's "The Hegel Myth and its Method," *The Philosophical Review*, (60), 1951, pp.246-248. Avineri, Schlomo, "Hegel and Nationalism," in Kaufmann, Walter (ed.), *Hegel's Political Philosophy*. op. cit. pp.109-136. Knox, T.M., "Hegel and Prussianism," *Philosophy*, (15), 1940, pp.51-63, (15), 1940, pp.313-314. Lucas, Hans-Christian und Rameil, U., "Furcht vor der Zensur?" *Hegel-Studien*, (15), 1980, pp.63-93. Lucas, Hans-Christian, "Philosophie und Wirklichkeit. Einige Bemerkungen wider die Legende von Hegel als preußischem Staats-philosophen," *Zeitschrift für Didaktik der Philosophie*, (9), 1987, pp.154-161. Ottmann, Henning, "Hegel und die Politik. Zur Kritik der politischen Hegellegenden," *Zeitschrift für Politik*, (26), 1979, pp.235-253. Avineri, Schlomo, *Hegel and the Modern State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972.
20. Kierkegaard, FT p.66; FB p.115.
21. This is implied when Kierkegaard contrasts Abraham with the tragic hero and says: "Here the necessity of a new category for the understanding becomes apparent. Paganism does not know such a relationship to the divine. The tragic hero does not enter into any private relationship to the divine" (FT p.60; FB p.110).
22. Kierkegaard, FT p.56; FB p.106. FT p.62; FB p.111.
23. Kierkegaard, FT p.62; FB pp.112-113.
24. Cf. also FT p.56; FB p.106: "This position cannot be mediated, for all mediation takes place only by virtue of the universal; it is and remains for all eternity a paradox, imperious to thought." FT p.60; FB p.110: "Abraham cannot be mediated."
25. Hegel, PR §140 Remark, (c); RP pp.213-214.
26. Cf. Hegel, PR §140 Remark, (c); RP p.214: "We speak of judging and estimating an action; but on this principle it is only the intention and conviction of the agent, his faith, by which he ought to be judged. Not, however, his faith in the sense in which Christ requires faith in objective truth, so that on one who has a false faith, i.e., a conviction bad in its content, the judgment to be pronounced must be a condemnation, i.e., one in

conformity with this content. On the contrary, faith here means fidelity to conviction, and the question to be asked about action is: 'Has the agent in his acting kept true to his conviction?' Fidelity to formal subjective conviction is thus made the sole measuring rod of duty." Cf. PhS p.637; PhG p.343. (PhS = *Phenomenology of Spirit*, translated by A. V. Miller. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977; PhG = *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, GWe. vol. 9. GWe = *Gesammelte Werke*, edited by the Rheinisch-Westfälische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1968ff.) Hegel's description of this position sounds very much like Kierkegaard's plea for passion in faith, without regard to any determinate content.

27. Hegel, PR §140 Remark, (c); RP p.216.
28. Hegel, PR §137; RP pp.196-198.
29. Hegel, PR §270; RP pp.348-366. Cf. also Enc. §552;
30. Cf. Peperzak, Adriaan Theodoor, *Philosophy and Politics: A Commentary on the Preface to Hegel's Philosophy of Right*. Dordrecht, Boston, Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987, pp.15-31.
31. Cf. van Dooren, Willem, "Hegel und Fries," *Kantstudien*, (61), 1970, pp.217-226.
32. Cf. Althaus, Horst, *Hegel und die heroische Jahre der Philosophie*. Munich, Vienna: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1992, pp.318-320.
33. Quoted from Peperzak, Adriaan Theodoor, *Philosophy and Politics: A Commentary on the Preface to Hegel's Philosophy of Right*. Dordrecht, Boston, Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987, p.20.
34. For an account of Hegel's relation to Schleiermacher during this period, see Althaus. Horst, *Hegel und die heroische Jahre der Philosophie*. Munich, Vienna: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1992, pp.323-326.
35. Cf. Hegel, *Berliner Schriften 1818-1831*, vol. 11 in *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Werke in zwanzig Bänden*. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1970, pp.222-224.
36. E.g. in *The Book on Adler*.
37. Kierkegaard, FT p.82; FB p.130.
38. Hegel, PR §140 Remark (c); RP p.216.
39. Kierkegaard, FT p.113; FB p.159.
40. Kierkegaard, FT p.113; FB p.159.
41. Kierkegaard, FT p.82; FB p.130.
42. Kierkegaard, FT p.82; FB p.130.
43. Kierkegaard, FT p.82; FB p.130.
44. Kierkegaard does not repeat his reference to "The Good and Conscience" here in "Problema III," but it is clear that the context of his discussion here is intended to be continuous with that of "Problema I" in which Hegel's account of the moral conscience in the *Philosophy of Right* is referred to.
45. This is the thesis of Henry E. Allison in his article, "Christianity and Nonsense," *Review of Metaphysics*, (20), 1967, pp.432-460.