

On Occasion of the public Defence  
of the Dissertation:

## Ethics of Dizziness

On the Relationship between Subjectivity  
and Inter-subjectivity in Kierkegaard's Authorship,  
illuminated from the Perspective  
of dialogical Philosophy

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I will begin with a short a introduction summarizing the general line of thought and theses of my dissertation. After this, I will define the phenomenon "dizziness" more closely, which leads to a more conclusive discussion of the method I have employed in the dissertation.

*Ethics of Dizziness* is a dissertation about Kierkegaard's ethics. It builds upon the thesis that in Kierkegaard's authorship, there is a close, specific connection between the relationship to the self and the relationship to the other, between subjectivity and inter-subjectivity. This relationship between the self and the other has often been under-investigated insofar as scholars have attributed to Kierkegaard an individualistic conception of the human person. According to this view, everything depends on choosing, finding, becoming, or taking possession of oneself, all of which are best accomplished alone. Or almost alone, for of course God sits with an omnipotent eye and observes that everything proceeds according to plan.

In my dissertation, I have attempted to show that this is not the case. As I have indicated in the subtitle, I want to illuminate the specific connection between the self and the other from a dialogical-philosophical perspective. Concretely, I proceed in the first section of the dissertation to analyze Martin Buber's *Ich und Du* and Emmanuel Lévinas' *Totalité et*

*infini* respectively. Through these analyses, I develop a conception of subjectivity in which the relation to the other person is implicit. In the case of Buber, it is ontology which binds the *I* and the *thou* together, which is why he speaks of a “being through the other.” With Lévinas, it is the ethical requirement which is written in the face of the other, which is why he speaks of a “being for the other.” With dialogical philosophy as both advocate and antagonist, I have sought to open new perspectives on Kierkegaard’s texts and have thereby tried to avoid an internal reading which views the authorship as a closed and self-referential system. Furthermore, by including Buber and Lévinas, the debate about the inter-subjective dimension of subjectivity can be renewed and made more nuanced, with Kierkegaard as a part of the dialogue.

Through a thematic reading of the authorship, I have shown that Kierkegaard in no way is ignorant of the essential place inter-subjectivity has for subjectivity. Throughout the entire authorship, he attempts to work out and test the relationship, one might say. He experiments throughout the texts with various ways in which the individual person can be oriented toward the other. One sees such an attempt as early as his dissertation, the *Concept of Irony*, in which he is critical of Socrates for positioning himself outside the relationship to the other. In the second part of *Either/Or*, he lets the well-known judge from the city council adopt an ambiguous relationship to the other inasmuch as the relationship is understood ethically-religiously on the one hand, and culturally-ethically on the other. Both in *Repetition* and *Fear and Trembling* he experiments with the possibility that the relationship with the other is a negative concept, while in *Philosophical Fragments* and the *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, the individual’s separation from the other is bound together with a unity between individuals. In *Works of Love*, and in *Sickness unto Death*, this unity is explicitly identified as a meaning-giving element in the true relationship to the self.

This experimental approach – which tries to articulate the meaning of the other for the relationship to the self – is borne by a new conception of the ethical. This new conception is already alluded to in *The Concept of Irony*, and is present like a watermark in all the later works. It merges with what is called “the second ethic” in *The Concept of Anxiety*.

For Kierkegaard, both subjectivity and intersubjectivity are ethical problems for human beings. A person is *required* to accept responsibility for him- or herself (the dimension of the ethic of the personality) and he or she is *required* to act responsibly with regard to the other (the dimen-

sion of the social ethic). But human beings refuse to solve the two-sided ethical task which is assigned them. In order to graft this negative requirement onto his new conception of the ethical, Kierkegaard conceives of subjectivity as dual-natured, and thereby implicates a relationship to the other human being. Subjectivity is understood, therefore, as continual striving between two simultaneous movements.

1. The first movement is characterized by the human being's unwillingness to fulfil the ethical task. Even though a person knows what he or she should do, s/he refuses. The first ethic, according to the *Concept of Anxiety*, is precisely an ethic which presupposes that when a person *knows* the good, they act accordingly. But with the negative presupposition in mind – the unwillingness to act according to the good – the first ethic breaks down. This collapse leads to a movement away from the other person. The individual isolates him- or herself from the other in his or her individuality, but this isolation is not *per se* a negation of the relationship to the other. A relationship is retained even in this separation, namely, a misrelationship, which then leads to an awareness of *sin*. This first movement therefore defines subjectivity as an existence *opposed to the other*.

2. The second movement is a conscious return to the other. Here, the self returns as guilty, but at the same time, a positive condition is added; Christianity is introduced as the only true sign for an ethical rectification between individuals. Christianity calls this human guilt *sin*, but it views this negative condition in light of God's positive proclamation of the forgiveness of *sin*. The ethical now requires that each individual impart to his neighbor this once and for all given forgiveness. The other hereby becomes the genuine object of the ethical requirement, but at the same time, this relationship has an effect on the self, and grants it a continuity which is demanded by the dynamic concept of subjectivity. Thus subjectivity is also characterized as a *being with the other*.

In short, for Kierkegaard the relationship between subjectivity and intersubjectivity can be described as follows: Subjectivity is made aware of its individuality and its responsibility for itself through *being opposed to the other* (the dimension of the personal ethic), but gains its continuity through responsibly *being with the other* (the dimension of the social ethic).

My reading is thus critical of an understanding of the ethical as a "stage." Considered as stages, the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious are all designations for the self-relationship in relation or misrelation to God. The theory of stages is therefore *self-centered* since it does not allow space for the relationship to the other. In the theory of stages, one's

gaze is fixed upon the individual's individuality, while the relationship to the other is viewed as something which comes with some difficulty after one has found and become oneself. Viewed as a stage, the ethical is therefore simply a stop on the way and has no value in and of itself. In my reading, I wish to call this understanding into question since my thematic analysis has shown that a new conceptualization of the ethical, which lies beneath the surface of Kierkegaard's texts, has foundational and constant significance both for the self-relation and the relationship to the other person.

I have chosen to call this new designation of the ethical an *ethics of dizziness*. I have done so because the resistance to the good, sin, upon which the first ethic breaks down, creates a dizzying emptiness in which every determination both of the self-relationship and the relation to the other is ripped away and the human person is left alone to peer into the abyss. In this peering, dizziness arises.

Dizziness is a phenomenon which appears often in Kierkegaard's authorship. In essence, one can say that dizziness, as a negative phenomenon, is bound up with a *gaze down into the abyss*, or *out over empty, open space*. But dizziness is an ambiguous phenomenon inasmuch as it also has a positive dimension. The positive experience of dizziness is always coupled with a look *upward*, a look in which one experiences God as the point which holds all existence fixed and gives it meaning and continuity.

Systematically, one can say that the negative experience of dizziness reveals itself in connection with the following states or conditions: *indifference*, *hopelessness*, *irresoluteness* [*ubestemmelighed*], *dissolution* [*mangfoldighed*]. In "The Crop Rotation," boredom as *indifference* is compared with dizziness: "Boredom rests upon the nothing that interlaces existence, its dizziness is infinite, like that which comes from looking down into a bottomless abyss" (SV3, 2, 268; CI, 291). In *Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses*, dizziness is a product of *hopelessness*: "And the more he stared down at the anarchy [*lovløshed*] into which everything seemed to have disintegrated, the more power it gained over him until it completely bewitched him; his mind reeled [*tanker svimlede*], and he himself fell into it and lost himself in despair." (SV3 4,91; EUD, 94). In *Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions*, melancholy [*Tungsind*] mirrors the dizziness of irresoluteness: "It is a cowardly craving of depression [*Tungsinds feige Lyst*] to want to become dizzy in the emptiness and to seek the final diversion in this dizziness." (SV3, 6, 310; DIO, 87). Dizziness and *dissolution* are linked together.

er in the *Postscript*, where it is emphasized that abstraction and world history are the cause of dizziness (i.e. SV3, 10,19; CUP, 312) and in *Works of Love*, where it is said that “the fanciful dizziness of ‘the others’” brings forth the negative experience of dizziness. (SV3,12,117; WL, 117).

On the other hand, the positive experience of dizziness, as mentioned, is bound to a gaze upward. But this gaze must not lose sight of the relationship to the world in which it is imbedded. If it does, this infinite gaze gives rise to a new and exponentialized form of dizziness which Kierkegaard, in the *Book on Adler* calls the *dizziness of narrow vision* [*jenkeltsynets svimmelhed*]. This arises when one lets the eye rest so firmly on God that everything else loses meaning: In *Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses*, Kierkegaard describes this wrong way of viewing infinity: “Perhaps he chose the guidance of thought, and in order not to owe anyone anything, he let this seed sow itself, and let the one thought evolve out of the ‘other until finally the infinite manifested itself for him, and made him dizzy. The more he stared fixedly at it, the more the eye lost the visual power to find the way back to finitude” (4,223; EUD, 247).

The genuine positive experience of dizziness is tied to the dizzying thought that for God, all things are possible. Faith is thus compared with dizziness, but with faith, the content is positive. In the dizzying thought that for God all things are possible, the relationship to the other – and thereby also the relationship to oneself – is given new meaning, a new ethical normalization. The negative experience of dizziness is the experience that all creation – viewed from a human perspective – is unstable. It arises in the emptiness between creation and atonement which is visible when first ethics breaks down. The positive experience of dizziness, however, is an experience with content. It is found in the belief that for God everything is possible, including the forgiveness of the sins which destroy both the relationship to the self and the relationship to the other. With forgiveness, a new, positive symbol for the ethical relationship between person and person is established. It is here that the ethics of dizziness makes its appearance and demands to be actualized through the individual’s concrete activity, namely, in the relationship to the other – the only real object for the good.

I have mentioned above that dizziness is an ambiguous phenomenon, inasmuch as it has both a positive and a negative side. In this way, dizziness shares a *structure* with a long list of other *dialectical* phenomena in Kierkegaard’s authorship. Not only boredom and melancholy, but also anxiety and despair share a structure with dizziness. But the relationship

is even more nuanced. All these phenomena are directly compared to dizziness, but *none* are identical with it. They are either like dizziness, i.e., dizziness is used metaphorically, or they are expressed in dizziness, i.e., they are identified as symptoms.

That dizziness can be associated with such diverse phenomena is due to the fact that its ambiguity is more inclusive than the dialectic between negative and positive. All the phenomena which dizziness embodies are internally different: boredom is an aesthetic designation, melancholy is more a psychosomatic designation, anxiety an ontological principle, and despair a willed misrelation. How can dizziness be used as a designation for all these different phenomena? The answer is that, considered as a phenomenon, dizziness can appear physically, psychologically, and spiritually.

In the health sciences, dizziness designates the sensation that one's body is arbitrarily displaced in relation to space. In some cases it is as if the ground is rocking beneath one, or that one is falling or sinking backwards. When a dizzy patient walks, the sensation and fear that he or she is about to fall is present as well. His or her gait is uncertain and reeling, like one who is intoxicated. With Kierkegaard, however, dizziness is never the result of a physical ailment. This is exactly why in the *Sickness unto Death*, he makes light of the person who believes that dizziness – which he associates with despair – is a weight that rests upon his head and which therefore can be cured by physically removing the weight. (SV3,15, 74; SUD, 14). But even if Kierkegaard does not conceive of dizziness as a physical malady, he nonetheless plays on its somatic expression.

Somatically conditioned dizziness is usually due to an adverse influence on the semicircular canal in the inner ear or the nerve tracks from the ear to brain. Together, the inner ear and the aural nerve network create the foundation for human *balance* and for the body's ability to orient itself in space. They contribute to the capacity for sight, as well. A dizzy person can therefore be observed to display spasmodic movements in the eyes and sometimes a tendency to double vision. In dizziness, the connection between the eyes and the apparatus for balance is a proven fact, and this becomes an essential point for Kierkegaard when, for example, he writes that anxiety produces a dizziness which is not only due to the abyss, but to the eyes which see as well.

The human balance apparatus is especially sensitive, and thus it takes only a very small change in circumstances to bring about dizziness. Dif-

ferent *physical* changes, therefore, can easily be a cause of dizziness. But *psychological* influences such as stress, anxiety, and intense nervousness can induce it as well. Dizziness has both a physical and a psychological character, which Kierkegaard makes use of and plays on throughout his writings.

Figuratively, dizziness can designate different psychological states. It can designate the feeling of complete fascination, the feeling of letting oneself become enchanted or overwhelmed by something. In this figurative sense, dizziness is often said to correspond to the experience of the sublime. As far as I can see, Kierkegaard does *not* use dizziness in this way, even when he speaks of the positive experience of dizziness in relation to God. For Kierkegaard, the experience of dizziness which originates in an upward gaze is *not* a gaze into an exalted sphere; it is *not* a sublime experience in which the imagination is strained to the breaking point and then founders, so that reason must take over and formulate ideas for infinity which the imagination cannot contain.

In figurative, spiritual meaning, dizziness can also represent an intense ecstatic feeling: the feeling of being outside oneself. Kierkegaard often employs this metaphorical, spiritual meaning to represent the “disposing-of-oneself,” the self-differentiation which is a necessary precondition for the true, authentic relationship to the self. Figuratively, dizziness can also designate a confused and unclear mode of thought, or it can be used as an image for intoxication. In the former case, it is employed in the characterization of Adler, for example, who is described as a [*fortumlet*] confused or dizzy genius.

Kierkegaard uses all the connotations and aspects associated with the phenomenon dizziness precisely because its interpretive flexibility [*mangetydighed*] makes it capable of representing so many different types of conditions. One must remember that the treatment for dizziness is always directed toward the sickness that is its cause, not against dizziness itself. Dizziness is never the sickness, but is the *symptom*.

But symptoms, including dizziness, *have an attribute* which sickness and malady *often* lack: *they can be seen and described*. And that is exactly why dizziness is so centrally positioned. As a symptom, dizziness can make visible the maladjusted, imbalanced condition which is ultimately caused by boredom, melancholy, sin, guilt, anxiety, and despair. Dizziness is visible both physically, psychologically, and spiritually, and as such is of greater importance to an author who wants to describe the most secret corners of the mind with help of a phenomenological method.

Phenomenology, as known, is the science of that which appears or of that is visible for consciousness. In his doctoral *disputats* titled *Subjektivitet og Negativitet* (p. 32–49), Arne Grøn gives an account of Kierkegaard's phenomenological method. Kierkegaard analyzes in his works the movements, patterns, and shapes of consciousness. But even more is taking place, for there is an interplay between that which the analyst observes and that which the analyzed characters say themselves. With regard to dizziness, one could say there is interplay between the dizziness the analyst sees, and the dizziness the person in question observes him- or herself (cf. the influence of dizziness upon vision). In this way, Kierkegaard's method is not only phenomenological, but also dialectical and dialogical. It is dialectical inasmuch as the phenomenon is attributed many, often contradictory, meanings; dialogical insofar as the various characters and the analyst are in fact conversing with each other within the text. To what degree Kierkegaard's authorship can in Bakhtin's sense also can be called dialogical, I will take up below.

Arne Grøn has also pointed out that with Kierkegaard, one can speak of a *depth phenomenology* (p. 332). We speak of phenomena when we observe and describe states of consciousness. But with Kierkegaard, the observation is twofold: 1. Phenomenology asks, in part, *what it is that appears* as we observe. But it asks more. 2. It asks what lies *beneath* the surface. It asks what is it that *presents* the phenomenon we observe. One can say that for the good observer, the phenomenon presents itself inside out. As such, the phenomenon is a sign which must be interpreted, and the task of phenomenology is to decode these signs. And it is precisely for this reason that dizziness, with its declared, expressed ambiguity, is so relevant. It is the type of symptom that points beneath itself to something else, to something that is really wrong. Anxiety, guilt, and despair are therefore phenomena on a completely different plane than dizziness. But dizziness is the phenomenon through which these deep phenomena appear.

Dizziness, thus understood, is a form of expression, a distinct posture or attitude toward oneself and the surrounding world which can be seen and decoded through phenomenological analysis. And this is precisely the method I have made use of in my dissertation. Dizziness has been analyzed as an expression of a misrelation to God, oneself, and the other. Through the analysis of this misrelation, it has been possible to shed light on a new conceptualization of the ethical.

But how then does this phenomenological method relate to a rhetorical, communication-oriented reading, and to Kierkegaard's own theory



of the dialectic of communication? It does so in a rather unique way which I can best illuminate by briefly bringing in the thought Bakhtin, as promised. Bakhtin speaks of the *polyphonic novel* which opens the work in the direction of the reader. A polyphonic author has a host of different authorial voices hidden in a host of different dramatic and literary figures. The polyphonic author never directly presents the truth him- or herself, but allows the text to open itself as a drama in which it is the reader's responsibility to differentiate the different voices.

Such a description applies in no small measure to Kierkegaard's authorship. But it holds in an even broader sense. With Kierkegaard, it is not only the different pseudonyms and literary characters who take form, speak together, assume postures, and take positions. Phenomena as well are given tongue and voice, body and soul, and can, like all the other literary figures in the authorship, take part in the conversation. They speak to each other, but they speak to the reader as well. An inner dialogue is present in the Kierkegaardian texts, a dialogue which often takes place on several different planes, but there is also a dialogue which points beyond the work itself. How often does one stumble across a direct address the reader: "my dear reader," "my dear listener," "you, to whom I am speaking," "you, my listener," "you, who perhaps will object" etc, etc.?

But one could thus argue that this form of address is very *direct*. How is this related then to *indirect* communication? In the never-given lectures on the "dialectic of communication," (VIII2. Afd A p. 143-190) Kierkegaard distinguishes between a communication of knowledge and a communication of activity or ability [*videns og kunnens meddelelse*]. A communication of knowledge is a *direct* communication. A communication of activity is an *indirect* communication. The object in the latter case is not knowledge, but an art or a concrete ability which is applicable to the ethical. In essence, one could say that an indirect communication, with its source in Socratic midwifery, has the task of setting the recipient free since the communicator hides him- or herself so the communicated information cannot simply be mimicked. The communicator of the ethical must hide him- or herself, create a deception, but do so without forgetting that in a certain sense it is not him or her at all, but God who is the real communicator. And the communicator must also remember that because God has sent the message, the ethical requirement applies to him- or herself as well. One finds in these lectures, therefore, talk of "the dizzying and unethical aspect of being so busy with communication, that one forgets to be that which one teaches." (op. cit. 152).

There must of course be something unique that is asserted in the communication of Christianity since in the first place it includes a communication of knowledge, a little world historical footnote. But secondly, the communication of Christianity operates with a recipient who not only *lacks* the truth, but through his own guilt has placed himself directly outside it. The indirect communication of Christianity must therefore draw the receiver's attention not to the truth itself, but to how he himself is *positioned* in relation to the truth. And as such, the indirect communication is closely related to the phenomenological method. Since the polyphonic author allows the various fictional characters and phenomena to engage in dialogue throughout the text – *in casu* about dizziness, which as a phenomenon is generally recognizable – the reader is invited to participate in the dialogue. He is invited to *take the positions and postures* he reads in the text, but for the very reason that the author's own opinion cannot be discerned among them, he is invited to take a position himself. Throughout the reading, he must ask, "who is speaking?" and thus participate in a reflection of both the communicator and message. Through this double reflection, so to speak, the reader *must take his own position with or against the text*. Thus, the phenomenological method does *not* hinder the indirect communication, but makes itself available for it.

As a concluding remark, I would like to draw attention to an objection against the theory of indirect communication which I have touched upon sporadically in the dissertation (314), namely, that such a reading can easily overlook the relationship of exchange between the individual and the other. It is certainly correct that with an indirect communication, a specific influence upon the receiver is imagined, which is why Kierkegaard's own thoughts on practical communication imply a relationship to the other. But what about the communicator? One might possibly fear that an indirect communication becomes a one-sided affair, maybe even a demonstration of power, and one it is therefore justified in asking if there is another way to conceive of the communication of Christianity in the authorship.

If one reads further in the edition of the *Journals and Papers* in which the considerations of the dialectic of communication are found, *edification* shows up as a possible suggestion for another strategy of communication. One can here read that "In relation to edification, the task is exactly that of developing the desire or the need [*Trangen*], which *everyone* should have, more and more deeply." (VIII 2. Afd B p.296). That every-

one has this need which edification should develop implicates both the receiver and the communicator, but at the same time, avoids the ethically “offensive” discussion of being deceived into the truth, a reservation Kierkegaard himself expresses in considerations of indirect communication when he questions “the degree to which a person is allowed to use it, that there is not perhaps something demonic in it.” (VIII 2. Afd A 85,26, p.166). Edification as “communication in practice,” thus has an advantage over indirect communication inasmuch as it accentuates the possibility that the message can give shape to or educate both parties involved in the communication, without deception. “With edification, one can be educated without any other form of education; all other education without edification is, eternally understood, miseducation. For edification – yes, as little as love, which always requires two, will create strife, and as little as the oceans of the world can be divided – as little will edification strengthen the difference between person and person. But like love, edification, if possible, will unite that which is most diverse in the essential truth. (ibid.)

Perhaps some will find it odd that I am concluding a defense of a dissertation on ethics with a note on edification. But if one recalls the introductory words to the *Sickness unto Death*: “The ethical side of Christianity is edification,” it may not seem odd after all. (SV3, 15,67; SUD, 5). And perhaps edification is the only possible way, if one person is to help orient the other’s dizzy gaze in the right direction.

*(Translated by Brian Söderquist)*

# Phenomenology, Communication and Second Ethics

Response to Pia Søltoft

*George Pattison*

In the introduction to her thesis, Pia Søltoft speaks of her approach to Kierkegaard's authorship as 'phenomenological' (p. 3). Clearly this is a term that is used in a variety of ways by a variety of philosophers. Husserl's phenomenology is not quite the same as Heidegger's and both are significantly different from Hegel's and, of course, from Kierkegaard's, insofar as we can assume that he has a 'phenomenology'. However, I do not wish to address the question as to whether Kierkegaard himself is a phenomenological thinker and, if so, in what sense: my question has more to do with what Pia Søltoft understands by the term in relation to her own project. My concern is this: that what I would understand as a 'phenomenological' approach to the phenomenon of 'svimmelhed', as that is represented in Kierkegaard's writings, would come out looking very different from the thesis we have before us. As I see it, the thesis is a fairly straightforward piece of conceptual analysis, developed through a careful reading of a number of key Kierkegaard texts: that is to say, it is primarily conceptual and exegetical, aiming to define the concept of 'svimmelhed' and to show its place in the overall architectonic of Kierkegaard's ethical 'system'. In this context 'svimmelhed' functions primarily as an image or metaphor for the radical discontinuity between self and world that, in Kierkegaard's anthropology (as expounded by Pia Søltoft) precedes their re-connection at a new level, the level of second ethics. But what makes this thesis 'phenomenological'?

As I have said, the term 'phenomenology' covers a variety of approaches. Some phenomenologists of religion, for example, conceive of their task as being to look at religion simply as a phenomenon of human

culture, 'bracketing off' the truth claims made by the adherents of the different religions. On this basis, they claim, they are able to discern common patterns of myth and ritual that are present in a range of doctrinally diverse religions. The 'phenomenon' of religion is, in this sense, not what religionists say it is: indeed what the theologians of the various religions 'say it is' often obscures or leads us away from the phenomenon itself. In contrast to the theologian, who seeks to justify, to attack or to defend a particular interpretation of the phenomenon, the phenomenologist seeks instead to apprehend it in its lived manifestation. This is not to say that phenomenology is 'banned' from engaging with texts, and we have the example of Heidegger to show how phenomenology can go to work as an interpretative, hermeneutical task, 'reading' the texts of a given culture, in such a way as to bring the phenomena themselves before us. However, this is possible for Heidegger precisely on the basis of his singular understanding of language as the site of the primordial opening up or unconcealing of a world in the first instance.

None of this rules out considering Kierkegaard also as a kind of phenomenologist, since, as we know, Kierkegaard is concerned to look beyond the various accounts that the various actors of his pseudonymous authorship (or that his Copenhagen contemporaries) give of themselves, to how they actually comport themselves in their existence, or to that which is revealed in what they say that is not directly given in the conceptual content of their utterances. Thus, whereas a Kant might construe the task of a moral philosopher as being to define the fundamental principles of ethics and morals, and to spell out their systematic interconnection and what they entail (spiced here and there with a choice illustration), a Kierkegaard, though not inattentive to fundamental principles, is more concerned to show us how an ethical life looks when it's being lived: he shows us the *phenomenon* of ethical life as the precondition and ground of conceptual definition. There is, of course, room here to speak of a more and a less. Rather than a complete disjunction, maybe there is a sliding scale running from bare conceptual analysis with the merest admixture of illustration, to a novelistic exemplification of moral existence, apparently devoid of theoretical argumentation yet showing us the readers how moral dilemmas come to pass in life, and what is involved in dealing with them (this, for example, is how Martha Nussbaum sees Henry James operating, i.e., as showing us how Aristotelian moral theory looks in the lived density of actual existence). Phenomenology, I suggest, occupies a particular, if not readily definable, portion of this

spectrum, such that it is, probably, inappropriate to describe either Kant or Henry James as phenomenologists, whereas, for all their differences, a Kierkegaard and a Sartre, for all their other difference, might be so categorised. Each of them is, in his own way and in a varying degree, a mixture of Kant and Henry James, standing between philosophy and literature. As phenomenologists their interest in the conceptual (or, it may be, the ontological) structuring revealed in the phenomenon is focussed on this structure *as revealed in* the phenomenon. Their aim is not to detach or abstract this structure from its phenomenal appearing but to preserve the phenomenon itself in the exposition of its structure.

But if Kierkegaard himself, *may* justly be called a kind of phenomenologist, that doesn't mean that every study of his work is thereby phenomenological, and, as I have suggested, I don't myself experience this thesis as phenomenological in any useful or important sense. (Which is NOT saying that the thesis is neither useful nor, indeed, important: simply that it is useful and important in a different way.)

What, then, would I expect from a phenomenological interpretation of Kierkegaard's phenomenology of 'svimmelhed'? I would, for a start, expect to see a fuller exposition of the phenomenal dimensions of 'svimmelhed'. Included in this exposition I might expect, amongst other things, to see: the images of the vertigo-inducing vortex that plays an important role in 'Shadowgraphs' and the 'Eulogy on Abraham'; the various Kierkegaard characters who succumb to vertigo or to vertigo-like states in which they lose their footing in everyday reality, become uprooted, hover above the earth, become as light as a puff of wind, or are blown hither and thither, states in which their inner being becomes storm-like and chaotic, and their consciousness reduced to a mere shriek from the abyss; aesthetic rapture and intoxication; imagery of height and depth; imagery of the sublime; imagery of anxiety, guilt and boredom; and, although we might think of 'vertigo' as primarily a phenomenon of disturbed spatial relationships, I would also be interested to hear whether we can find in Kierkegaard's works a temporal analogy to vertigo, as the self experiences the radically destabilising effect of temporality (as in the first of the *Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses*, where time, abstracted from eternity, is described in terms of the – spatial – metaphor of the ocean); vertigo as a social phenomenon, instantiated in the whirling, tumultuous life of the modern urban crowd. I would, in short, want to look at all evocations of falling, fainting, sinking, rushing, whirling, revolving, eddying, oscillating, of being overwhelmed, distracted, disorientated, drunken, fevered or ecsta-

tic. I would find material for such descriptions from across the pseudonymous works, from the upbuilding writings and from other signed works. I might, to think of just one book, consider Constantin Constantius' visit to the Königstädter Theatre, where he falls helpless with laughter, like a cast-off swim-suit, overwhelmed by the stream of laughter breaking over him; or his young friend whose life is plunged into a state of indeterminate confusion, such that he no longer knows where he is or what it is to be in the world, and whose obsessions with fever and thunderstorm, and whose concluding resolve to dance into the maelstrom of infinity reveals a man in the grip of 'svimmelhed'. (Of course, Pia Søltøft is attentive to the young man, but in what she writes about him I see conceptual analysis, not phenomenology).

Having laid out the phenomenal field, I would then want to enquire why and how it is that 'svimmelhed' is especially suited to ground its unity and coherence. What, in relation to its phenomenal field, is the meaning of 'svimmelhed' in play here?

Clearly, 'svimmelhed' can, quite legitimately mean a number of different things: if we allow its basic meaning to be that of a somatic condition, defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as 'A disordered condition in which the person affected has a sensation of whirling, either of external objects or of himself, and tends to lose equilibrium and consciousness; swimming in the head; giddiness; dizziness', its use as a metaphor for a range of psychological conditions, which may contain a more or less prominent physiological dimension, is readily justified: the state of mind into which I fall on unexpectedly seeing my beloved in the midst of a crowd; the feeling I experience as I ponder a major life-decision, to marry or not to marry, perhaps; the aesthetic state to which I may be brought by a virtuoso performance of a more than usually complex and profound piece of music, and so on. I may also correlate or exchange the metaphor of vertigo, with metaphors drawn from other dimensions of experience: substitute 'I'm dazzled by' for 'it makes me dizzy' in each of the above. Then again I may use it more loosely as a metaphor, for, e.g., the state of society as a whole, as when I (or Kierkegaard in his letters to Kolderup-Rosenvinge, speaks of 'the whole development in Europe' as a vortex in which 'nothing is really established ... everything is movement. One gets tired, becomes dizzy, yearns for a foothold, a stop.' (*Letters and Documents* [E.tr.], p. 261) Or - and note that in this same passage Kierkegaard uses 'vortex' as a synonym of 'scepti-

cism' – we can take 'svimmelhed' as a metaphor for something still more abstract (such as 'scepticism', 'irony' or 'criticism'). All these extensions of the primary somatic meaning are perfectly legitimate, but note what has happened. Whereas the 'vertigo' I feel when I catch sight of the beloved probably still involves physiological and psychological changes, by the time we get to the political and philosophical applications of the metaphor the physiological 'base' has fallen away entirely. I can be 'sceptical' about the possibility of knowledge of the world or of other minds, without becoming at all giddy or dizzy in a psycho-somatic sense. I might contemplate the chaos of society from the comfort of my London club and derive a not disagreeable sense of my own rectitude, bolstered by brandy and cigars, from bemoaning the vortex-like chaos of society, or I might state my scepticism in calm, balanced periods, and, as an individual I might be perfectly secure in myself and in my place in the world: I might perhaps be David Hume, a most sober and balanced individual. Yet this would not of itself invalidate a commentator (such as Kierkegaard) applying the term 'vertiginous' to my philosophical position, since this is no longer being used as a psycho-somatic term.

So, a further question: how important is the psycho-somatic dimension of 'svimmelhed'; is it at all important that there is a lived experience at the bottom of this metaphor – or is it 'merely' a metaphor, a vivid way of highlighting certain aspects of a particular conceptual domain, namely, that between 'first' and 'second' ethics? According as to how this question is answered, we will be in a better position to know whether or not 'svimmelhed' is being approached in a genuinely phenomenological way or what kind of phenomenology is being pursued here.

My second point is somewhat different. Pia Søltoft develops her view of K's dialogism on the basis of her analysis and exposition of the fundamental concepts of his ethical theory. In order to highlight her point she shows something of the similarities and dissimilarities between Kierkegaard and such representatives of modern dialogism as Buber and Levinas. I find this entirely in order. But, again, I would proceed differently. I too have wanted to argue that Kierkegaard is a profoundly dialogical thinker, but I have sought to argue this in relation to the form of his literary practice and in his theoretical reflections on communication. In other words, for me it is precisely Kierkegaard's fundamental *concern for communication*, that identifies him as a dialogician, and that disarms any attempt to see him as a monological or even an acosmic individual-



ist. This relates not only to Kierkegaard's concern to communicate Christianity to those who spent their lives in the illusions of Christendom, it also relates to his concern to understand, to understand by communicating and through communicating to find an understanding, of the fundamental personal crises of his life. That his writings are communications to his deceased father and 'to her' (and that even the simplest outline of his life cannot be constructed without reference to these two figures) and only so self-expression, means that his works have a dramatic, spaced, dialogical character from the ground up.

The question of communication is, of course, immediately relevant to the question of ethics, for ethical existence is communicative existence and vice versa. The ethical individual is one who does not live for himself alone but 'against' and 'with' the other' as Pia Søtoft puts it, and the tension of this 'against' and 'with' is embodied precisely and pre-eminently in the process of communication, in the ethical individual's existence in communication, symbolic, gestural, verbal.

Perhaps it is as valid to approach the issue from the side of conceptual analysis as it is to do so from the side of communicational form and theory. Perhaps. This indeed is my next question: is there a clear priority here? Is Kierkegaard's engagement with theoretical questions of Christian communication and his choice of a strategy of indirect communication the result of a theoretical commitment to inter-subjectivity – or is the model of subjectivity/intersubjectivity developed in the thesis a reflection of the *practice* of the authorship? In other words, how far does Kierkegaard develop a *theoretical* understanding of the person as dialogical? Or how far does a Kierkegaardian *theory* of dialogical existence only emerge as a result of interpreting Kierkegaard's *practice*? Does Kierkegaard represent or does he *exemplify* the dialogical point of view?

My next point is of a more narrowly theological nature. Sin is repeatedly said to characterize the breach that occurs between first and second ethics. But, in the words of Anselm, 'have you yet considered how grievous the weight of sin is?' I have to admit that I don't hear in the thesis that tone whereby Kierkegaard could come to be regarded as a founding father of dialectical theology. If the breach of sin is as serious as Kierkegaard so often says it is, how can we actually say anything worth saying about second ethics at all? As Kierkegaard says in *Works of Love*, isn't every word and every statement we could possibly make about love equally admissible and equally inadmissible? Doesn't second ethics (or any human con-

dition or practice to be found the far side of sin and forgiveness) partake of the inexplicable transcendence of the God who is infinitely, qualitatively different?

In these terms is second ethics a project we can set ourselves to achieve? Is second ethics a life-option at our disposal? Could I fairly confront a first ethicist with the demand that he should practice second ethics? Or, when I get to the point of break-down, am I left simply to long and pray, and to know my need of God, to wait upon the thunderstorm, or the miracle of faith? Must I tell my first ethicist friend simply to believe, and trust that, if he does, then his second ethics will look after themselves? Is it a matter of by grace alone? – A question that applies both to the mode of transition to second ethics and to its content.

Now I am not, and I don't think Kierkegaard was a Barthian, but I think the Barthian interpretation highlights a question that needs to be asked and that brings to a point some fundamental issues in the kind of interpretative strategy being pursued.

We are here first and foremost to talk about Kierkegaard, but the thesis also discusses two other major thinkers of modern times, Martin Buber and Emmanuel Levinas. I do not know Levinas well enough to comment on her reading here, but there is one small point of Pia Søltøft's Buber interpretation I would like to take up. Several times she refers to Buber's approach as ontological: but is this accurate? Does he himself make such a claim? If not, what is there in his work that would substantiate such a charge (as I take it to be)? *Against* an ontological reading we might, for example, pit Buber's emphasis on grace (cf thesis, p. 29), and his critique of Heidegger (both early and late). And doesn't Buber himself both block off first ethics and offer a glimpse of something akin to second ethics, as in his depiction of the confrontation between the pietism of the Seer of Lublin and the free, Christ-like ethics of the Jehudi in *Gog und Magog (For the Sake of Heaven)*? Isn't Buber perhaps a more faithful reader of Kierkegaard than he is allowed to be here? Hasn't he absorbed enough of the Kierkegaardian negativity to push him beyond the limitations of 'Law'? (And, arising from this, a side question with potentially far-reaching implications: is the juxtaposition of Buber and Levinas on one side and Kierkegaard on the other intended as an implied contrast between Jewish Law and Christian freedom?)

# Kierkegaard's Ethics

## Response to Pia Søltoft

*Anders Moe Rasmussen*

I want to begin by saying that I consider this Ph.D. dissertation by Pia Søltoft to be a scholarly work of the highest quality. The central thesis is clear and well-formulated, and is set forth and developed in an unusually systematic manner. The same holds for the dissertation's methodological dimension. Another essential quality of the thesis is that it explicitly raises and gives rise to a wealth of questions. I have several batches of questions, which for me is a clear indication that the dissertation hits on something central, not only with regard to Kierkegaard, but also with reference to contemporary discussions of ethics and morality. In what follows I shall nonetheless limit my remarks to a few simple questions, as well as some general and specific comments, which, in the spirit of philosophical dialogue, will be an attempt to think along with and carry forward the analyses and claims of the dissertation.

The dissertation's approach to philosophical dialogue is in many ways fruitful and illuminating. New light is shed on Kierkegaard's ethical thought by virtue of the exploration of a third path or possibility in which Kierkegaard's ethics is situated half way between Martin Buber's social ontology and Emmanuel Levinas's ethics of closeness. The perspective in question permits a further development of the conception of intersubjectivity that was cast in the shadows in many earlier Kierkegaard studies, if not entirely neglected. At the same time the chosen method makes it possible to present Kierkegaard's ethics both as an independent ethical theory and as a significant contribution to contemporary debates in this domain. This said, the reader nonetheless may wonder whether these results can be attributed quite so unambiguously to the dialogical approach in question. Looking more closely at Pia Søltoft's detailed analyses of Kierkegaard's ethics, one sees indeed that there are many references to Buber and Levinas, but far more often, the references are to Kant's ethics

of autonomy and to Hegel's views on ethics or *Sittlichkeit*. I would even suggest that Pia Søltoft's essential interest lies in the relation between autonomy and the social. In fact she sets forth Kierkegaard's ethics as a combination of, or intermediary between an ethics of the social and of the person. Against this background, one might have hoped for a more detailed discussion of the historical context. In many ways Pia Søltoft displays a fine grasp of Kant and of the problems and limitations of his ethics of autonomy. The presentation of Hegel's social thought, on the other hand, leaves something to be desired. I shall return to this issue in a moment, but turn first to Kant.

Of all of Pia Søltoft's analyses, I find the discussion of the second half of *Either/Or* especially convincing and thought provoking. Here she has managed to bring forth essential parts of the great conceptual potentials that lie hidden in this central work. Pia Søltoft's success in this regard is due in part to her manner of reading this text in close relation to Kant's ethics. Others have done this before, as is only natural given that Kierkegaard makes much use of Kantian terminology in this text. Yet seldom has anyone managed to give such a precise account of what is Kantian and of what goes well beyond Kant. Pia Søltoft has an eye for Kierkegaard's attempt to bridge Kant's dichotomy between freedom and nature, or in Kierkegaard's terminology, between love as a duty and love as a desire or passion. What Pia Søltoft nonetheless does not attend to in this regard is the concurrent attempt to mediate between duty and nature. Here I have in mind Friedrich Schiller's attempt to escape from the confines of Kant's ethics by means of a reconciliation of duty and feeling. In my view, in his ethical theory Judge William clearly figures amongst those critics of Kant who, without rejecting his ethics of duty, wish to avoid his dualism and rigorism. It would have been both interesting and fertile had Pia Søltoft discussed this figure's ethics in relation to this tradition.

Before I hold my fire for a moment, I shall make an additional comment, which is not motivated simply by the fact that I come from Aarhus. It turns out that there have in fact been some scholars in Aarhus who have occupied themselves quite seriously with the study of Kierkegaard's authorship, and this in quite different ways. Let us for once set Løgstrup aside and draw Sløk forth from the oblivion into which he seems to be in danger of sinking. Sløk put the relationship between love as a claim and love as passion at the very centre of his interpretation of Kierkegaard's work. As is well known, this is the central theme and problem in Sløk's main work on Kierkegaard, namely, *Kierkegaard – humanis-*

*mens tænker* (1978). Since this topic is to a great degree also central to Pia Søltoft's dissertation, it is surprising that she does not square off against Sløk's interpretation. She does not make a single reference to Sløk's book, nor does it even figure in her bibliography.

I turn now to Hegel and to Pia Søltoft's account of his social thought. Of course Pia Søltoft and Kierkegaard make central and telling points in the criticism of Hegel's ethical views, for on the whole she follows Kierkegaard's critique of Hegel quite uncritically. Hegel has a clear tendency to equate ethics and social conventions or institutions, and this tendency finds its culmination point in his philosophy of right. It is simply uncontroversial to note that this tendency is central to Hegel's thought, just as it is well-known that such an identification of ethics, morality, and social institutions is deeply problematical. Yet once this has been said, it is crucial to note as well that Hegel's original vision was quite different from this. There is in many ways quite an interesting congruence between Pia Søltoft's presentation of Kierkegaard's ethics and the young Hegel's critical moral philosophy. In the so-called theological writings of his youth, Hegel sets himself in opposition to a rigid social life based upon a power structure that is destructive of life. His contrasting ideal is a Christian conception of love and the original Christian community. Hegel never renounces these ideals in either his ethical thinking or in his conception of political institutions. The young Hegel is often presented and a critic and revolutionary, while the later Hegel is held to be a reactionary conformist, but such an interpretation is simply untenable. And this is not just a question of Hegel scholarship and commentary. Instead, I have in view here a more general point concerning Pia Søltoft's understanding of ethics. If we accept Kierkegaard's polemics against Hegel uncritically, we narrow ethics to a sphere which is incompatible with political, social, and institutional relations and contexts. It cannot be denied that institutional contexts seem to have their own logic, one that is capable of displacing or even destroying interpersonal closeness and the intimacy that belongs to such relations, yet it is quite a big step to infer from this point that there is an absolute distinction to be drawn between ethics and *Sittlichkeit*, as Pia Søltoft in fact does. In this context there is still something to be learnt from Hegel's vision.

As I have already said, I contend that Pia Søltoft's concept of ethics is too narrow. This, however, is not only a criticism directed against her, but against Kierkegaard as well. Yet when I at the same time claim that Pia Søltoft's understanding of ethics is too broad or too imperialistic, I

think that to some degree I have Kierkegaard on my side. One of the promising aspects of the dissertation is Pia Søltoft's manner of drawing attention to the fundamental position of the conception of subjectivity in Kierkegaard. I see the thesis as a contribution to an elucidation and interpretive development of Kierkegaard's theory of subjectivity, or, to speak more carefully, of his understanding of the subject. By convincingly showing intersubjectivity to be an essential constituent of Kierkegaard's understanding of subjectivity, Pia Søltoft has provided an important corrective to the common impression that Kierkegaard was an isolated and worldless thinker of subjectivity. The problem, though, is that she was not happy with just providing such a corrective, but has instead "gone further", to evoke Kierkegaard's own expression. Kierkegaard's concept of subjectivity is immensely complex and anything but homogeneous. I would have preferred to have seen this complexity expressed more fully in the dissertation. Consider, more specifically, one of Pia Søltoft's theses concerning Kierkegaard's theory of the subject. She quite rightly indicates that the concept of action is constitutive of the latter. Yet this concept receives no proper analysis, but is simply linked to ethically relevant action. In this regard one may well ask whether Kierkegaard truly did not think of action as an act that does not have any immediate ethical meaning. I have in mind of course his thinking about decision-making. It is my opinion that Kierkegaard's conception of decision is both philosophically and theologically quite problematic, but that does not change the fact that it stands at the very centre of his writings. Although this concept is not discussed explicitly in the dissertation, one senses that an effort has been made to interpret his theory of the subject in total isolation from his notion of decision. There are, of course all sorts of reasons for being sympathetic to such an effort. Yet the question remains whether what he has to say about those actions that are intersubjectively and ethically relevant provides a real alternative to the thinking about decision. In other words, one can ask whether Kierkegaard's concept of action is fully caught up in his views on decision and ethically relevant action.

I shall make yet another remark concerning the cluster of problems surrounding Kierkegaard's theory of subjectivity. In the dissertation Pia Søltoft correctly identifies the so-called double movement as a fundamental structure in Kierkegaard's understanding of subjectivity, and one of Pia Søltoft's special contributions is to have pointed to the interpersonal and intersubjective dimensions of this structure. Yet unfortunately

this insistence on the double movement led to a neglect of another basic conceptual figure in Kierkegaard, namely, his idea of synthesis. Is it Pia Søltoft's assumption that the latter is already contained within the concept of the double movement, or does she contend that the double movement is really the predominant figure in his theory of subjectivity? In any case one wonders how the notion of synthesis can play such a small role in a dissertation that explicitly purports to interpret Kierkegaard's conception of subjectivity.

I shall round my criticisms off with a comment concerning the idea of negativity, which is so central in the dissertation and figures even in its title. To put it bluntly, Pia Søltoft takes the negative method that Kierkegaard clearly uses in *The Sickness Unto Death* and presents it as Kierkegaard's overall method. There is no doubt that negativity plays a very central role in his writings, and the emphasis on this point is quite fruitful. Yet what does not fully convince me is the idea that one can derive the author's positive theory and point of view automatically from his concern for negativity. Is it really the case that something positive always corresponds to Kierkegaard's analyses of the negative? To some extent this is so, particularly if one sees that negativity for Kierkegaard was a highly theological notion, which is how Pia Søltoft interprets it. Interpreted this way Kierkegaard appears quite unambiguously as a relatively orthodox Lutheran-Pietist theologian. Yet at the same time Kierkegaard was a radical thinker who clearly inscribed himself with the history of modern nihilism. In other words I postulate that in Kierkegaard it is far from true that negativity always implicitly corresponds to something positive. Such a claim raises the fundamental question of the relationship between orthodoxy and modernity in Kierkegaard's work, but a discussion of that large topic will have to be postponed.

# Rejoinder

*Pia Søtoft*

First of all I wish to thank Dean of King's College, George Pattison and Senior Lecturer, Anders Moe Rasmussen for their careful readings of my thesis and for their profound and richly faceted questions. Also Carsten Pallesen asked me some interesting but far-reaching questions, which had more to do with a critique of Kierkegaard and therefore will be published as an independent article in the next volume of *Kierkegaardiana*.

Most of the questions raised by George Pattison related to the method of phenomenology and to the phenomenon of "svimmelhed", I did answer in my opening paper at the defence. These answers are also printed in this volume of *Kierkegaardiana*, so I won't repeat myself, but just refer to pp. 213-223.

As to the question put forward by Gorge Pattison related to the nature of the phenomenology in my thesis, I think that the briefest answer would be that I see my analysis as an analysis, not of concepts, but of phenomena. The difference lies in the relation to lived daily life and concrete human experiences. Concepts could be the object of an analysis, but never the object of a lived experience, nor a part of the subjective experience itself. Whereas 'Angest' is a concept in the book entitled exactly *The Concept of Anxiety*, it is dealt with as a phenomenon, when described as dizziness (I prefer 'dizziness' to vertigo, as vertigo seems to be to closely connected with heights, whereas dizziness covers the different ways 'svimmelhed' is used by Kierkegaard).

Of course Gerge Pattison is right in observing that the term 'phenomenological' is used in a variety of ways by different philosophers. In Hegel's *Phänomenologie des Geistes* it is stressed that the consciousness restores itself only through the relation to another consciousness. In Husserl's phenomenology consciousness is characteristic of intentionality, as consciousness is always consciousness *of* something. In the phenomenology of Merleau Ponty, he wishes to avoid the traditional duality between



consciousness and body/world, as he states that the body places the consciousness in the world and the experience of the world is already in the consciousness as our body lives. In these three very different attempts to define a phenomenology, one of the similarities lies in the problematic relation to the Other. As different as these attempts may look, Hegel, Husserl and Merleau Ponty see the Other as an alter ego and not as a unique person. What I have tried to do is to call into attention a different way of looking upon the Other. For this purpose I have used both Martin Buber and Emmanuel Lévinas and have tried to show that in Kierkegaard we have to do with a kind of phenomenology that sees the other as an independent person. The subtitle of Sartre's *L'être et le néant* is 'phenomenological ontology'; maybe one could name my attempt in the thesis, and Kierkegaard's in his works, 'ontological phenomenology'.

In continuation hereof I wish to answer George Pattison's other question about the extent to which Kierkegaard develops a *theoretical* understanding of the person as dialogical. I think he does so to a great extent. George Pattison points to Kierkegaard's fundamental concern for *communication*, as what identifies him as dialogical. This is of course true, but without a theoretical foundation, or maybe we should call it an ontological foundation, the dialogical aspect of subjectivity would only be a theory of communication and not a theory of subjectivity/intersubjectivity.

This leads me to George Pattison's question about sin. He asks how we actually can say anything worth saying about second ethics, and if second ethics at all is a life-option at our disposal, if sin is as serious as Kierkegaard states. Well, it is precisely *communication* that makes it possible for the one to edify the Other in that direction, that is in the direction of second ethics. Second ethics is both a matter of grace *and* actions, and the one can help the Other to be conscious of this.

Talking about *actions* I turn to one of Anders Moe Rasmussen's questions. Anders Moe Rasmussen states that the concept of action in the thesis is always linked to the ethically relevant action. He therefore asks whether Kierkegaard truly did not think of action as an act that does not have any immediate ethical meaning? To this I must answer: No! Anders Moe Rasmussen puts forward "decision-making" (afgørelse), but surely also decision-making has an ethical impact. An ethical aspect that may not always involve the Other, but only the personality of the Single One. But also here we have ethical implications. As I have tried to show in the thesis, the ethics of sociality and the ethics of personality are

closely connected in Kierkegaard. I think that what connects decision-making in the personality and in the relation to the Other is that every true decision has the structure of a transition from possibility to reality, from *posse* to *esse*, and this transition is *per se* ethical. Action is an indispensable part of both subjectivity and intersubjectivity and so is decision-making, but this is exactly why both action and decision-making are *always* ethically denominated.

Anders Moe Rasmussen is quite right in pointing out that it would have been fruitful had I used both Friedrich Schiller's attempt to reconcile duty and feeling, and the young Hegel's critical moral philosophy. To this I can only reply that time and the volume of my thesis did not allow such an investigation, but I thank Anders Moe Rasmussen for the information, which I hope to make use of in another study.