Deontic logic is the attempt to apply laws of formal and modal logic to basic ethical concepts – in particular: obligation, permission and prohibition. Instead of directly serving practical reasoning it is primarily concerned with the underlying system of logical rules behind the usage of those concepts. As such it aims, on one hand, at a comprehensive account of their relation to the three ‘alethic’ or modal categories necessity, possibility and impossibility. On the other hand it tackles the basic principles pertaining to the relation between the three deontic concepts themselves.

Now, in what follows I am not going to focus on the pure technical side of a deontic logic thus conceived. Instead, I will address one of its major points at issue, as regards the first of its above-mentioned topics, namely the validity of the so-called "Kantian principle" (Wright 1979 p. 114), according to which ought implies can. I will begin with a detailed account of Kant’s argument for the principle itself (I), and then try to assess it from a Kierkegaardian standpoint (II). My main purpose in doing so is threefold: First and historically speaking I want to illuminate the relation between Kant’s and Kierkegaard’s thought from yet another, albeit restricted perspective.

Secondly and in a more philosophical sense I will try to reconstruct Kierkegaard’s version of the so-called ‘Kantian principle’ and compare it with Kant’s own. Contrary to the latter who holds that moral demands are both necessary and sufficient for their being fulfíable, I will argue that Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms suggest a weaker, yet more sophisticated reading, the upshot of which is that can is sufficient, but not necessary for ought, whereas ought functions as a necessary, but not a sufficient condition of the former. Finally and in terms of a theological revaluation of the former results I will try to defend the claim that it is not the latter, but the former
alone whose account does full justice to its Christian – more exactly: its protestant Christian – implications (III).

I.

1. Let us first take a closer look at Kant’s principle itself – that is, the principle that ought implies can.\(^4\) Kant himself states it in various places throughout both his theoretical and practical philosophy\(^5\), for instance in the following passage from the *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*, where he discusses the postulate of innate corruption of man in relation to a possible restoration. Kant writes:

> [T]he postulate in question is not opposed to the possibility of this restoration itself. For when the moral law commands that we ought ... to be better men, it follows inevitably that we must be able to be better men (R., p. 46).

An alternative version of the same principle is to be found, among other places, in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. Here Kant states: Every man, when confronted with the tempting possibility of transgressing the moral law, "must admit without hesitation that it would be possible for him" (C2, p. 163) to abstain from doing so; he "judges, therefore, that he can do something, because he is aware that he ought to do it" (ibid., pp. 163f; my emphasis). Other than the first, so to speak, ontological formula the second one brings to bear a purely phenomenological point. It does not conclude 'you shall act morally, therefore you can do so', but rather 'you are aware of being addressed by the moral law, therefore you are also aware of being able to fulfill it.' Here, the consciousness of freedom, in other words the consciousness of being able to fulfill the moral law (see C2, p. 164), is genetically derived from the consciousness of the moral law – rather than the moral law itself. The difference between both versions should be kept in mind; together with the question of their mutual relation it will be dealt with later in some greater detail. Meanwhile it may suffice to draw on the basic variant only.

2. Spelled out as a complete deontic syllogism this variant would function as the first premise of a conclusion modo ponente:

\[
\begin{align*}
(a) & \quad \text{Ought implies can}. \\
(b) & \quad \text{Every human being ought to do } p. \\
(c) & \quad \text{Therefore, every human being can do } p.
\end{align*}
\]

I proceed to explain this syllogism by starting with premise number two;
for in Kantian terms any explanation of can (in both the first premise and the conclusion) is dependent on an adequate account of the meaning of ought. Now, it goes without saying that if we follow Kant p (in the second premise) does not and cannot stand for each and every demand possibly being imposed on us. It is tantamount, rather, to the purely formal moral law, manifested in the different versions of the so called categorical imperative. As an expression of morality alone this imperative is and must be categorical, since it has to be both unconditionally valid and known independently of experience. For otherwise, according to Kant, our conduct would possibly conform to moral standards hypothetically or by accident alone, namely under the condition that our duties do not interfere with our particular purposes and inclinations as they are empirically known to us. For similar reasons the imperative must also be purely formal: As such it requires only that the agent’s maxims conform to the lawlike character of morality, that is to its unconditional and universal validity without exception. Any additional ‘material’ element would be due to the agent’s particular purposes, which at the same time render the respective imperative merely hypothetical, dependent in part on subjective inclinations and rooted in empirical knowledge.

Now, the categorical imperative as such springs from the faculty of pure practical reason, which in turn establishes it as both a priori known, valid for all reasonable beings and as such apodictically certain. Thus, practical reason does not only function technically or pragmatically by merely telling us how to realize certain (non-moral) ends by certain means. In its pure variant – manifested in what Kant calls the ‘good will’ (see G, pp. 496) – it also and primarily opens up for us the moral world as the one and only realm of being, where we know about and actualize something as a universal end in itself. However, that there exists such a faculty in man, cannot be known outside and independent of an execution of this faculty itself. In other words: The fact that as reasonable beings we are always and necessarily conscious of the moral law in its unconditional authority can as little be ”reason[ed] ... out from antecedent data of reason” (C2, p. 164) as the irrefutable inner certainty about what it means to follow its rules. This fact, therefore, ”is not an empirical fact but the sole fact of pure [practical] reason” (ibid., p. 165) itself.

3. So much for the meaning of ought. Now, what about the can – in other words: What about the human capability to fulfill the moral law? In any case, one necessary condition of its possibility would be freedom. And since this

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freedom would have to conform to the a priori dimension of ethics, it must again be transcendental. According to Kant, there is only one possible candidate for doing the job, and that is moral freedom or freedom of the (good) will.9 As a manifestation of a purely transcendental idea it has both a negative and a positive side.10 Negatively considered the good will is free by being independent of the causality of nature – more specifically: the causality of factual inclinations as determining the agent’s intention and conduct (see G, p. 94). Kant argues that since the moral law in its purely formal shape must be the object of reason alone and thus cannot be a mere appearance in its correlation to sense perception, the will by being exclusively determined by the conception of that formal law can just as little be subject to the conditions of causality; for these conditions apply only to the sensuous world of appearances. Thus the good will is transcendentally free in the sense of being independent of the causality of nature.11 However, by being both free from prior causal conditions and yet related to some kind of law (namely: morality) the good will does not amount to mere arbitrariness; it rather manifests freedom in the positive sense of moral spontaneity, that is freedom to voluntarily adopt and obey this law. Yet, even this is not the whole story: For any freely willed action in this transcendental sense is not only unconditional by virtue of not being conditioned by nature’s causal chain; it also and primarily deserves this predicate thanks to its autonomy, that is to the – albeit purely noumenal – fact that pure practical reason is itself the necessary and sufficient condition of issuing the very law that it is spontaneously willing to accept as authoritative.12 Thus the moral law does not put any outer constraint on the will, thereby rendering its addressee a stranger to himself; rather, it is to be perceived as coming from the voice of his own autonomous self.13

This ethical as well as transcendental account of freedom has two important implications, one as to its essence and scope, one as to its genesis and experience. On one hand Kant’s concept is strictly univocal: Freedom turns out to be simply coextensive with moral acting, that is a conduct in accordance with the law. Thus, it is not only to be distinguished from any abstract notion of (freedom of) choice, which as such admits of nonmoral objects of choosing; it also differs from a concept of moral freedom as libertas indifferentiae, which as such may also opt against the commands of duty while still being freedom.14 Secondly and on the other hand human beings, according to Kant, would neither know about nor realize freedom in the proper sense without first being confronted with and aware of the moral imperative. Insofar both the genesis and the experience of freedom are
dependent on (the prior conception of) the moral law itself (see C2, pp. 162ff).

Summing up, it is only in the realm of the practical and not within theoretical reason where we find an element of the unconditional in human nature. And although we may never be able to either refute or prove it theoretically, we have good (practical) grounds for the assumption that we are morally accountable human beings and as such transcendently free. Consequently, Kant presents his idea of freedom as one of the three metaphysical postulates of pure reason (see C2, p. 246).

4. Now, given these presuppositions, there is still one question unanswered: Why and in which sense does ought imply can? Here again, we have to turn our attention to the transcendental perspective: As practically rational agents we are, according to Kant, not only free to lay upon ourselves an unconditionally valid imperative and to obey it; furthermore – and precisely because this is the case – we are also free in the sense of principally being able to fulfil it. This is, because here the will is conceived of as being active within a purely transcendental realm, which as shown above is completely independent of the causal constraints ruling over the world of appearances. Thus by postulating transcendental freedom we are most naturally led also to postulate its unrestricted ontological efficaciousness – within a morally interpreted noumenal world, that is. The fact of such a world and its moral implications alone forces upon us the postulate of an untearable unity of willing and achieving. It corresponds to the claim that there is and always remains for human beings an anthropologically as well as ethically fundamental possibility that can never be done away with: the possibility of what Kant calls a "revolution in ... [the] cast of mind" (R, p. 43). By this he means a single (yet repeatable), strictly speaking transtemporal (see ibid., pp. 34f) and as such theoretically inscrutable inner act of decision that enables us "to be better men" (ibid., p. 46; my emphasis; see ibid, 36) by a pure fiat of the will – simply because we are simultaneously aware that "we ought ... to be better men".

5. It goes without saying that this unconditional unity of willing and achieving applies only within the pure noumenal world of freedom as a thing in itself. Since, however, human beings are, according to Kant, always and inevitably citizens of two worlds, the noumenal as well as the sensuous, the unique causality of the will has to be considered from two different points of view:
It may be considered to be intelligible, as regards its action – the action ... which is a thing in itself, and sensuous, as regards its effects – the effects of a phenomenon belonging to the sensuous world” (C1, p. 319).

Thus, by participating in this latter world, the noumenal act of the will is inevitably transformed into a mere link in the untearable chain of natural causes and effects within the world of appearances. Thereby the original unity between willing and achieving is simultaneously suspended or at least rendered fully accidental, to the effect that the success of the agent’s volitions, even his moral ones, is no longer in his power. In this sense, can is at worst nothing but an accidental condition of ought (and vice versa); at best it becomes a postulate of infinite approximation to the complete and highest good.16

6. Summing up the foregoing analysis in terms of its implications for a reconstruction of Kant’s deontic logic, we may keep in view the following points:

(1) The principle that ‘ought implies can’ is expressed by its author in two different forms, one of which may be called ‘ontological’ (= ought implies can), the other ‘phenomenological’ (= the awareness of ought implies the awareness of can).

(2) Both versions presuppose that ought is a sufficient condition of can, whereas the latter is necessary for the former. This means, according to the ontological reading, that if and wherever there is a pure practical law (like the one being manifested in the categorical imperative), we are entitled to infer from it the reality of freedom which in turn is a necessary condition for both the acceptance of duty and the ability to fulfil it. Phenomenologically speaking Kant holds that the consciousness of ought is in fact coextensive with the consciousness of can, so that any instantiation of the former without the latter is simply inconceivable.

(3) Moreover, both versions imply that ought is a necessary condition of can, whereas the latter is sufficient for the former. For if can is tantamount to freedom in the sense of being able to fulfil the moral law, then it seems clear that in terms of the ontological reading the reality of this moral law is itself a necessary condition of such freedom to be possible. On the other hand this law is itself being established as unconditionally authoritative wherever there is freedom in the sense of being able to fulfil it. Phenomenologically considered things are a little different. As Kant indefatigably inculcates upon his readers (see, for
instance, C2, pp. 163f and 267; R, p. 45), no consciousness of freedom can arise without the prior consciousness or conception of the moral law which as such also insinuates that it can be fulfilled. Thus, the latter conception does not in a logical sense function as a necessary presupposition of the former, but only as regards its genesis. Yet, it also and trivially holds true that wherever X is aware of being able to conform to her duties she is simultaneously aware of these duties as such.

(4) With respect to the relation between the phenomenological and the ontological perspective we may note, first of all, that in Kant’s opinion the reality of the moral law is both dependent on and established by its mere conception. In this sense the latter is both necessary and sufficient for the (reality of the) former; for according to Kant the moral law is what it is (and is simultaneously being constituted as real) simply by virtue of being conceived or experienced as such. Yet, if on one hand this law cannot be fulfilled without its prior establishment as such; and if, on the other hand, it cannot be so established unless it is conceived by someone to that effect, then we are entitled to conclude that the consciousness of ought is also a necessary (though not a sufficient) condition of can. In other words: The moral law can only be fulfilled as such.

II.

So far I have stated and explained Kant’s principle as it is put forward and vindicated by himself. In doing so I had to dwell on both the principle and its philosophical context in greater detail: not only, because Kant’s variant obviously serves as a foil for all his successors (Fichte, in particular), but also, because the hub of his argument is more difficult to unpack in comparison to the later versions. This holds true for Kierkegaard also, to whom I will turn now.

1. Without ever explicitly mentioning Kant, Kierkegaard either states the principle of his predecessor or at least alludes to it indirectly in various places throughout both his pseudonymous and non-pseudonymous authorship. Moreover, he and his pseudonyms do so by apparently subscribing to its validity without reservation. At least in the former respect, the most succinct formula may be found in Practice in Christianity. Spelling out the difference between aesthetical admiration and ethical imitation of Christ, Anti-Climacus tells us that the latter has the ‘universally human’ among its necessary presuppositions. By this he means
that which every human being ... is capable of, that which is not linked to
any condition save that which is in everyone's power, ... that is, the ethical,
that which every human being shall and therefore also presumably can do”
(PC, 242; see also Pap. X 1A 430 / JP I, 975).

Thus, according to this strictly speaking fivefold explanation the entity in
question is tantamount to
(a) something *universal*, in that it is bestowed upon every human
being; therefore it is also
(b) *unconditional*, in that it is not dependent on any conditions relative
to human beings in their particularity; furthermore, it is
(c) something that every human being is *capable* of – in other words:
it must be open to being done by everyone; and finally, it is
(d) to be identified with the *ethical*, which in turn amounts to
(e) that which every human being *shall do*.

In short: The universally human is the ethical and as such tantamount to
duty. Now, a number of questions arise at this point: Is it one and the same
duty that, according to Anti-Climacus, every human being is supposed to
do – and, if yes, in which sense? Which capability corresponds to it? And
how is this correspondence between duty and capability, in other words
between *ought* and *can* to be interpreted? Finally, why does Anti-Climacus
who, according to Kierkegaard, "regards himself to be a Christian on an
extraordinarily high level” (Pap. X 1A 517 = JPVI, no. 6433), make this lat-
ter point with a certain reservation, namely by insinuating that the ethical
is something which every human being ‘presumably’ can do?

2. Starting (parallel to Kant) with the meaning of *ought*, it will not come as
a surprise that Kierkegaard’s concept of duty shows unambiguous traces of
the same lawlike universality and unconditional validity, as in his German
predecessor. Or, as Vigilius puts it: "The more ideal ethics is, the better.”
(CA, p. 17; see ibid., pp. 16f) However, Kierkegaard leaves open the ques-
tion as to whether duty as such can and has to be known transcendentally,
viz. independently of experience. Instead, he simply presupposes its knowl-
dge as a fact that, considered from an ethical standpoint, seems both
anthropologically and phenomenologically selfevident, namely as simply
derivable from the prescriptive character of duty itself:
The ethical presupposes that every person knows what the ethical is, and why? Because the ethical demands that every man shall realize it at every moment, but then he surely has to know it (Pap. VIII 2 B 81,10 / JP I, no. 649, p. 271).

Kierkegaard also deviates from Kant in a certain way by substituting the difference between duty itself and its particular expression (see, e.g., FT, p. 70; Pap. III A 202 = JP I, no. 889) or between universal duty and particular task (see, e.g., EO II, p. 270) for the Kantian distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives: The expression of duty may vary according to subjective, cultural and historical circumstances, so that it has only conditional authority at best. On the contrary, duty itself and as such proves unconditionally valid, it remains unchangeable and eternally the same.\(^\text{19}\) The unity of both, that is the synthesis of a particular task and of duty in general, is rooted in what Judge William calls the ‘absolute’, which according to his explanation is manifested in the individual as a self (see EO II, pp. 213f). Precisely as an individual self every human being ”is simultaneously the universal and the particular” (ibid., p. 263; my emphasis).\(^\text{20}\) This, he argues, becomes fully evident in the phenomenon of conscience (see ibid., pp. 255f): For in conscience, and only here, do we find the copresence of good and evil in their absolute dimension, together with their historically conditioned expressions which in turn function as a background of (possibly false: see Pap. III A 202 = JP I, no. 889) framework beliefs that enable the individual who has internalized them to know what to do and what to abstain from in concreto. Now, as a devoted ethicist the judge does not and cannot envisage the disturbing possibility that any expression of duty which has the self, thus conceived, as its ultimate genetic and epistemic source, may be in opposition to God's commandments. For he pretends to have chosen his self absolutely, and that means among other things: he has chosen it as a self which as such has simultaneously been posited by God as its absolute correlate.\(^\text{21}\) Therefore he is fully convinced that when it comes to determining his concrete duties here and now the ethicist will always and unproblematically ”be an autodidact just as he is a theodidact, and vice versa” (EO II, p. 271).

As is well known, this standpoint is suspended by Johannes de Silentio in Fear and Trembling, whose interpretation of Gen 22 suggests at least the possibility of an ”absolute duty to God” (FT, p. 70). Such a duty, which in the Old Testament story is expressed by God's command that Isaac be sacrificed by his father in order to prove the former's obedience, entails that
love to God may bring a person "to give his love to the neighbor ... an expression opposite to that which, ethically speaking, is duty" (ibid.).

Thus, love to one's neighbor (here: Abraham's fatherly love to Isaac) is not simply annulled in favor of love to God (see ibid., 74); rather, the latter leads to a "paradoxical expression" (ibid., 70) of the former, which among other things (see ibid., pp. 68f) suggests both a transformation in the content of individual tasks in relation to duty and in the source of the latter's unconditional authority. Here, then, is an undeniable difference between Kant and Kierkegaard. For we have as little reason to believe that Kant would have ever subscribed to the possibility of such thing as an absolute duty to God, as we have reason to deny that both Kierkegaard himself and his pseudonyms ever ceased to subscribe to it.

3. So much for the meaning, content and source of duty as expressing the ideality of ought. Now, it goes without saying that, parallel to Kant, the can which Anti-Climacus derives from ought in my initial quote from Practice in Christianity refers to a particular moral capability. The point deserves special attention, since Kierkegaard not only distinguishes an aesthetic from a genuinely "ethical capability" (Pap.VIII 2 B 89 = JP I, no. 657, p. 307), but he also and explicitly claims that in the realm of the former, "what counts is: to be able" (Pap. X 1 A 430 = JP I, no. 975). What he has in mind here is, of course, the realm of purely (social and) "natural qualifications" (ibid.) — particular talents, gifts, personal merits etc. — which as such are neither common to all human beings nor present among them to the same extent, but, on the contrary, mark natural and social differences between them. Precisely for this reason it is only the ethical which is "related to the universally human" (ibid.; my emphasis). As seen in this light universality — as opposed to particularity or exclusively private capabilities — is the first criterion of what it means to be capable in a moral sense: A person can only possess such a capability by virtue of sharing it with everybody else or as something shared with everybody else. Aesthetic capabilities are also essentially defined by their reference to the social world — yet, in the sense of private instead of public possession. For instance, someone has an outstanding poetical talent, precisely by virtue of (being conscious of) not sharing it with other people.

This notwithstanding, universality is merely a necessary and not a sufficient condition of such capability. It functions as its 'intersubjective' criterion, so to speak. The second, namely sufficient or 'objective' condition postulates that we are capable in a moral sense only with respect to an act of
willing, the object of which can be willed as something that we are capable of realizing by this very act itself. Now, what does this class of entities comprise such that willing them manifests an untearable unity between their being willed and their being achieved? In full agreement with Kant Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms hold that there can only be one such entity, namely duty or the ethical. In order to explain their view we may again take a quick glance at the aesthetical capability first — for instance a talent: Here the crucial point is that its facticity, more than ever its public recognition are (and are experienced as being) beyond the power of the person who has it. Or, as Judge William’s puts it: Talent amounts to a "condition that is not posited by the individual himself" (EO II, p. 183). Contrary to this, the ethical capability is by definition not only selfsufficient, but also and in phenomenological terms experienced to that effect by the person who possesses and actualizes it. Judge William’s theory of choice and its consequences for the establishment of duty sheds some light on this idea and its justification:

 Warned by Hume against a false conclusion from is to ought (see Hume 1980, pp. 469f) and suspicious against Kant’s doctrine of an alleged ‘fact of reason’ the ethicist claims that the unconditional and universal liability of the moral law can only be established both individually and practically. As such it takes on the form of a ‘pathetical leap’ which in an inevitably circular manner already manifests the fulfilment of the very demand the ethical liability of which is first established by it. That there ‘ought to be ought’ — in other words: that the ethical itself has reality — cannot be true, unless the ethicist chooses himself by way of repenting (see EO II, pp. 216ff and pp. 250f). Repenting, however, is in itself the manifestation of an ethical act which as such already presupposes the reality of ethics. Thus, it is on one hand only by virtue of acting morally that the reality or liability of ethics is established; and yet, on the other hand the belief that the former act is no mere illusion owes its justification to something, the reality of which is first established by this very act itself. As seen in this light it is not only, but also always true that the ethical has reality. For then the absolute choice is ipso facto ontologically efficacious: Freedom and the ethical are real, simply by virtue of deliberately acting, as if they were real or by tacitly implying within this act that this holds true. Since choosing absolutely is tantamount to choosing the ethical, so in turn the ethical itself is first "posited by the absolute choice" (EO II, p. 177). Apart from this ‘constitutional act’ duty would, according to the judge, lack both its ontological and its epistemic foundation — it could neither be established as such nor justified as unconditionally valid.
4. After having discussed both *ought* and *can* separately, it is time now to tackle their mutual relation in terms of Kant’s deontic principle. The foregoing analysis led to the conclusion that ethically conceived we are, so to speak, obliged to be capable of what we are obliged to. More exactly, we are not only *in fact*, but always and *solely* capable of it. Hence, Judge William could certainly invoke Kierkegaard’s notion of freedom, according to which it “means to be capable” (Pap.V B 56,2 = JP II, no. 1249, p. 62; see also CA, p. 44 and p. 49), although he would probably give this formula both a particular ontological, phenomenological and ethical twist: We *are* and we *experience* ourselves to be free (and: to be ourselves), whenever and only if we are capable, in the sense of being able to choose what we are *obliged to.* And yet there seems to be a crucial difference between the ethicist on one hand and Kierkegaard together with his later pseudonyms on the other hand. Surely, all of them agree that *can* implies *ought* – at least, if we interpret this to mean that we *ought* to fulfil the ethical, wherever we *can* do so. In other words: *Can* is sufficient for *ought*, the former necessary for the former. Since we are strictly speaking only capable of what we are obliged to, we are also obliged to *whatever* we are capable of. However, Judge William’s more farreaching (and essentially Kantian) claim that *can* is also *necessary* for *ought*, whereas the latter is *sufficient* for the former, would probably neither meet the later pseudonyms’ nor Kierkegaard’s own approval:

Thus, for instance, both De silentio and Climacus would agree that in terms of what Kierkegaard calls ‘ethical capability’ (see Pap.VIII 2 B 89 = JP I, no.657, p.307) Abraham was ”well able to fulfil the ethical” (CUP I, p.267). And yet, by feeling himself compelled to accept that it was not the *ethical* that he was supposed to fulfil, but something higher (namely the absolute duty to God) he was at the same time *not* capable of, but, on the contrary, ‘prevented’ from fulfilling it. Thus he saw himself confronted with a moral duty (namely to love his son in such a way as to render impossible the idea of killing him), which precluded him from being able to fulfil it. And yet, the particular circumstances of his situation did just as little manifest a *tragic* dilemma, which as such results in unescapable moral wrongdoing; this is, because here one of the dilemma’s horns is not simply a ”higher expression” (FT, p. 78) of duty, and thus still basically moral in nature, but as an absolute duty to God is deemed to be altogether *transmoral* (see ibid.).

Now, in terms of what Kierkegaard labels ”religious capability” (Pap.VIII 2 B 89 = JP I, no. 657, p. 307), Abraham is indeed ‘well able to fulfil the ethical’ again. However, the crucial point is that now we are talking about an
absurd capability, the actualization of which is not in his own power, but instead requires (and is experienced as requiring) divine assistance, mediated through faith (see FT, pp. 56f).

The correlation of faith and divine assistance is of crucial importance in yet another, namely genuinely Christian sense. It comes to the fore with the concept of sin — a concept, which still plays a rather subordinate role in Fear and Trembling (see FT, pp. 61f and 68f; also CUP I, p. 268). What needs to be considered here, first and foremost, is Kierkegaard's idea that the capability, which is constitutive both for the possibility and the actual degree of freedom (see CA, pp. 44 and 49), is to be adjudicated in relation to the truth about whatever this freedom is capable of appropriating as its own opposite or other.32 Now, in terms of Christianity it is not so much fate or guilt, but rather sin which manifests the true opposite of freedom. Therefore, freedom itself coincides with faith (in the actuality of atonement and redemption), which in turn is coextensive with the capability of sin-consciousness. Dogmatically speaking, however, no individual is able” to gain the consciousness of sin by himself” (CUP I, p. 584). For now, as the paradoxical doctrine of hereditary sin has it, the individual, simply "by having come into existence ... has become a sinner" (ibid., p. 583); and this entails that all his anthropologically basic faculties are radically corrupted, so that he is not capable of willing anymore what he is supposed to will.33 However, what he — although in vain — is supposed to will, given he is a sinner, is nothing but himself as a sinner, so that both the actuality of sin itself, the task of a sin-consciousness and the impossibility to fulfil it are brought to bear at the same time. In order to make sense of this idea in psychological and not only in dogmatic terms, we have to presuppose in particular that according to Kierkegaard sin always and inevitably goes along with the sinner's refusal to accept himself as such. In other words: The denial of sin is part and parcel of its own actuality — indeed, a necessary condition of sin itself.34 Secondly, if sin necessarily goes along with its own denial; and if, furthermore, its actuality is "an unwarranted actuality" (CA, p. 111; my emphasis), so that it is supposed to be overcome (or even its possibility supposed to be annulled: see ibid.), then we may conclude that the task of establishing a sin-consciousness is at once posited as such and as impossible to fulfil. Without the impossibility to fulfil it, there would be no such task; wherever it occurs, its fulfilment is simultaneously posited as impossible.35

Anti-Climacus, in particular, gives us hints as to a psychological approximation to the causes of this impossibility and its relation to dogmatics: As he first reminds us in the spirit of Socrates (see SD, pp. 87-96, esp. pp. 94f),
we are not able to fulfil the unconditional ethical demand, because strictly speaking we cannot properly understand it. However, we are not able to understand it, because in a desperate disunion with ourselves and God we do not want to understand it.\textsuperscript{36} Hence we are not able to fulfil the demand, because ultimately we do not want to fulfil it (see ibid., p. 95). And yet, why do we refuse to want to fulfil it? Obviously, because we are not able to want it. Why so? Well, presumably, because we do not want to be able to want to fulfil it. In other words: If and as long as we try to explain sin in purely psychological and/or speculative terms, we are in danger of either getting lost in an infinite regress (which as such explains not willing in terms of not willing) or of falling victim to a vicious circle (by reducing not willing to not understanding and not understanding to not willing). According to Anti-Climacus this twofold aberration is only prevented by Christianity which, as he puts it, "fastens the end by means of the paradox" (SD, p. 93) – that is, by the doctrine of hereditary sin (see CA, p. 19).

The upshot is that in both Abraham’s and in the genuinely Christian case "ethics develops a contradiction, inasmuch as it makes clear both the difficulty and the impossibility" (CA, p. 16) of fulfilling its own demands. The absolute duty to God and the requirement of a sin-consciousness are the two paradigm cases, where can (in terms of the capability to fulfil the moral law in its purely relative expressions) implies ought, but not vice versa.

III.

To sum up the foregoing analysis I would like to recapitulate the following points: First, according to Kierkegaard both the ethicist and the Christian agree with Kant that can – in other words: the capability to fulfil the ethical – is sufficient for ought, that is to say for duty or the moral law in its unrestricted ideality: Wherever we can conform to what we are morally supposed to, we ought to act accordingly. Secondly, the ethicist (other than the Christian) agrees with Kant that can is also necessary for ought: Wherever and only where we can conform to what we are supposed to do, we ought to do it. Finally and again in opposition to both Kant and the ethicist the Christian maintains that ought is necessary, but not sufficient for can: We are capable of doing only, but not of doing whatever we ought to do.\textsuperscript{37}

As seen in this light, Kierkegaard’s authorship contains at least implicit hints as to a substantial critique of Kant’s deontic logic and its basic principle. Now, if we were to assess the availability of this critique in purely philosophical terms, we would be compelled not only to draw on the episte-
mological foundations of Kant’s view (especially their transcendental dimension), but also on Kierkegaard’s account of these foundations. Neither of these two tasks can be accomplished in the context of this paper: not the first, due to time restrictions, and not the second, because Kierkegaard himself hardly ever tackles Kant’s epistemology.\(^{38}\) However, it is not only impossible, but also unnecessary to dwell on this point, since the reasons, why Kierkegaard is at variance with Kant’s deontic principle are not so much epistemological, but rather theological in nature. And here, as I hope to have shown above, it can hardly be denied that the former’s insight into the genuinely Christian prerogatives of assessing ought in relation to can induces both him and his pseudonyms to come up with an analysis of the human predicament, which does not only do full justice to these prerogatives themselves, but also and correspondingly goes way beyond Kant’s account in terms of its overall methodological and conceptual sophistication. Thus, if we wished to determine both the agreement and the fundamental difference between Kant and Kierkegaard as sharply as possible, we might use the latter’s following journal entry as an adequate starting point:

> Have faith and the rest is of no consequence. Every other good is dialectical in such a way that there is always an aber [a but or however] about it, so that seen from another side it perhaps is not a good. Faith is the good which is dialectical in such a way that even if the greatest misfortune were to happen to me, faith would still allow me to regard is as good” (Pap.VIII 1 A 509 / JP I, 957).

This passage is not only and at least implicitly written in a surprisingly authentic Lutheran spirit (see, for instance, Luther 1948, pp. 269ff), but it is also and particularly striking, because it can easily be transformed into a genuine Kantian claim by simply substituting the term ‘good will’ for ‘faith.’ In other words: Faith is for Kierkegaard what the good will is for Kant. Now, if on one hand it is only faith that enables a human being to fulfil the ethical (namely by virtue of deliberately appropriating sin as the true opposite of this ability); and if on the other hand – contrary to the notion of an autonomous will – the facticity of faith is seen and experienced as requiring divine assistance, so that, consequently, this term denotes the crucial difference between a ‘transcendent’ Christian and a purely ‘immanent’ or ethical perspective, then we are entitled to draw two concluding, yet significant consequences from this: First, it is not Kant, but rather
Kierkegaard who deserves the title ‘philosopher of protestantism’ – a term, originally coined for the former by the German theologian Julius Kaftan. Secondly, the overall relation between Kant and Kierkegaard, which has been the subject of much discussion over the past few years, since Ronald M. Green published his major study *Kierkegaard and Kant* in 1992, needs to be reassessed. Although in principal agreement with Green’s claim that Kierkegaard, like Kant, ”believed that we must approach religion through the sphere of practical, not theoretical reason” (Green 1992, 223), I am of the opinion that his more far-reaching assertion, according to which the former is to be seen as the ”genuine heir to the legacy of Kant’s developed religious and ethical thought” (ibid., p. xvi) in the 19th century, cannot be subscribed to without substantial reservations – at least not on the basis of what we might call Kierkegaard’s Christian variant of a deontic logic.
Bibliography:

1. Sources:

1.1 Kant:
   - C1: Critique of Pure Reason.
   - C2: Critique of Practical Reason.
   - G: Groundwork of The Metaphysics of Morals.
   - R: Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone.
   - T: Toward Perpetual Peace.


1.2 Kierkegaard:
   - CA: The Concept of Anxiety [Writings, VIII]
   - CUP: Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments (vol. I and II). [Writings, XII.1/ XII.2]
   - FT: Fear and Trembling. [Writings, VI]
   - Pap.: Papirer.
   - PC: Practice in Christianity. [Writings, XX]
   - PF: Philosophical Fragments. [Writings, VII]
   - SD: The Sickness unto Death. [Writings, IXX]
   - WL: Works of Love. [Writings, XVI]


1.3 Others:

2. Secondary Sources:


Malantschuk, Gregor (1971), Frihedens Problem i Kierkegaards Begrebet Angst, Copenhagen, Rosenkilde and Bagger.


Proudfoot, Wayne (1985), Religious Experience, Berkeley / Los Angeles, UCP.


Notes

2. For instance: To deny A is necessary is to assert not-A is possible. Correspondingly, to deny A is obligatory is to assert not-A is permissible. Or: Whatever is obligatory is possible. In general, Wright 1979 [1963] is deemed the pioneer work in the field.
3. For instance: Nothing can be obligatory and forbidden at once; whatever we are committed to doing what is obligatory is itself obligatory; whatever is obligatory is permissible; what cannot be done without something wrong being done would itself be wrong to do – and vice versa, etc. (See Prior 1972, pp. 509f). As to the problem-cases (esp. the so-called 'good Samaritan paradox'), see Prior 1972, pp. 111f and Honderich 1995, p. 187.
4. Or, in terms of deontic logic: Whatever is obligatory is possible. It should be noted that the principle, thus stated, is stricter than its antique prototype: *ultra posse nemo obligatur* (as to its origin see Bartels 1967, p. 58).
5. See, for instance: C1, p. 458; C2, pp. 163f and 267; R., pp. 36, 40f, 45f; T, p. 338.
6. The following account is particularly indebted to: Bröcker 1970, esp. pp. 145ff.
7. It is defined as an imperative "that, without being based upon and having as its condition any other purpose to be attained by certain conduct, commands this conduct immediately" (G, p. 69). According to Kant such an imperative is to be found within morality alone. Here its basic formula is: "act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law" (ibid., p. 73).
8. As is well known, Kant differentiates between two irreducible ways of reasoning in man: theoretical and practical. Whereas the former, that is the intellect, is defined as the formative power of concepts and as such aims at truth alone, the latter, namely the will, is identified with the power of purposes and as such aims at the good – in the widest sense. Practical reasoning is pure, however, if and only if it causes the will to act without being dependent on any inclinations – that is, if it is but determined by the conception of the lawlike character of morality as such.
9. Kant's refutation of an apparently further, namely psychological notion of freedom, according to which something is called "a free effect, the determining natural ground of which lies within the acting being" (C2, p. 217), can be found in C2, pp. 216ff. Here, Kant tries to prove that such 'freedom', instead of being a proper expression of true (that is transcendental) spontaneity, can and must be reduced to nature's, albeit "psychological instead of mechanical causality" (ibid., p. 217).
10. Both aspects are distinguished and connected in Kant's definition of transcendental freedom as spontaneity, according to which it is "a peculiar kind of causality, operating to produce events in the world – a faculty, that is to say, of originating a state, and consequently a series of consequences from that state" (C1, pp. 271f). For in this case "the causality itself must have an absolute commencement, such, that nothing can precede to determine this action according to unvarying laws" (ibid., p. 272). This definition applies to both the cosmological and the moral world; in the latter case spontaneity becomes autonomy, though – as a particular (namely moral) form of transcendental freedom.
11. See C2, § 5. As to a substantial critique of this argument, see Bröcker 1970, pp. 147f.
12. Compare Kant's definition of autonomy as "the will's property of being a law to itself" (G, p. 94).
13. See, for instance, C2, p. 165 (my emphasis): In order to "avoid misinterpretation regarding this
[moral] law as given, it must be noted carefully that it [sc. pure practical reason] is ... the sole fact of pure reason which, by it, announces itself as originally lawgiving (sic volo, sic jubeo)."

15. R., p. 46. As Kant reminds us by pointing to the old testament story of Adam's fall (see ibid., pp. 36ff), this act corresponds to and simultaneously revokes an equally original and causally inscrutable transition from innocence to guilt, due (except in Adam himself) to a 'propensity to evil in human nature' (see ibid., pp. 23-27).
16. In his second Critique Kant argues both for the existence of a (wise, almighty, benevolent) god and for human immortality by making use of this latter point: Without being immortal human beings cannot become what they are destined to become as rational agents (namely worthy to be happy); and without god there would be no reason for such agents to hope for a proportional correspondence between their worthiness to be happy and their actual happiness – precisely, because this correspondence presupposes the very harmony between the noumenal and the sensuous world, which as such is not within human power (see C2, pp. 238-246). Again, Bröcker offers persuasive objections against Kant's argument: see Bröcker 1970, pp. 149-153.
17. See, for instance: CA, p. 16; WL, p. 41; PC, p. 242; SD, p. 115; Pap.VIII 2B 81,10 = JP I, nr. 649 (esp. p. 271); Pap. X 1A 430 = JP I, nr. 975; Pap. X 3A 104 = JP I, nr. 989; Pap. X 3A 248 = JP I, no. 990; Pap. XI 2A 381 = JP I, nr. 1007. Consequently, a number of Kierkegaard-scholars have observed a deep affinity between Kant and Kierkegaard at this point: see, e.g., Green 1992, pp. 97f; Quinn 1999, pp. 350ff and p. 372; Soltoft 1996, p. 73.
18. Although strictly speaking the final explanation comprises of two elements ('that which every human being shall and therefore also presumably can do'), we may omit its latter part at this point, since it only repeats (a) and (b). Passages that bear witness to the fact that Kierkegaard almost without exception identifies the universal, the ethical and duty are not hard to come by. Following judge William, for instance, we may conclude: (a) "The ethical is the universal" (EO II, p. 254; see also FT, p. 54). (b) "Duty is the universal" (EO II, p. 263). Therefore, (c) the ethical is duty. Besides that Kierkegaard not only identifies the universally human with the ethical, but also vice versa. See, for instance, Pap.VIII 1A 160 = JP IV, pp. 290f (here: p. 291): '[T]he ethical life [det Ethiske] is ... the universally human [det Almene-Mennesselige].'
19. Kierkegaard seems to be of the opinion that it is coextensive with its three dimensions (= expressions??) to love oneself, one's neighbor and God: see, e.g., EO II, pp. 266ff; see also Malantschuk 1978, pp. 35ff.
20. See also Kierkegaard's basic anthropological thesis in CA: Man "is individuum and as such simultaneously himself and the whole race, and in such a way that the whole race participates in the individual and the individual in the whole race" (CA, p. 28).
21. As to the correlation between the absolute as self and as God, see EO II, pp. 213f.
22. As to an analysis of the preconditions for such a situation to arise, where somebody, according to De silentio, might possibly become the addressee of an absolute duty to God, see Schulz 1995, pp. 226ff.
23. See, e.g., Kant's critical allusion to Abraham in R., pp. 81f and p. 175; compare also Green 1992, p. 89 and pp. 202ff. Furthermore, Kant denies the existence of "special duties having reference directly to God" (R., p. 142) within a religion of practical reason like the one he is advocating.
24. See, for instance, Pap. X 2A 396 (= JP I, nr. 188) and Pap. X 2A 519 (= JP II, nr. 2238), where Kierkegaard juxtaposes Kant's principle of human autonomy with the Christian idea of God's constraint. Moreover, by repeatedly inculcating that willing the good means "willing according to his
There is one additional point that deserves to be mentioned here – only in passing, though, because it touches upon what I had to omit as the phenomenological variant of Kant’s principle. In my opinion both Kierkegaard and Kant would agree that in a certain sense ought is also sufficient, maybe even necessary for the impossibility of can (and vice versa). The corresponding deontic principle reads as ‘You ought, therefore you cannot’ or ‘you can, for you shall not’. Although the meaning of can remains unchanged in this case, both the extension and extension of ought are modified; for now the latter is tantamount to the moral law only insofar, as its addressee not only (a) experiences it as such, but also and in particular as (b) ‘necessitating’ (to use the Kantian term: see C2, p.
165). In other words: The moral law can be fulfilled only, if its addressee follows its demands deliberately, that is without the experience of any inner disunion qua despair (Kierkegaard) or qua conflict between reason and sensuousness (Kant). This principal agreement notwithstanding, Kierkegaard would insist on the (dogmatically based, thus strictly speaking 'transcendent') assertion that such a capability requires faith – and thus divine assistance beyond the autonomy of the human subject -, whereas Kant would build his view on the postulate of an 'immanent' possibility to realize the ideal of what he calls the 'holy will' (see C2, pp. 165f).

38. Some of the very few exceptions are: Pap. II A 47 (JP II, no. 2087); Pap. V B 5,3; Pap. VI B 54,16 (JP II, no. 2235); Pap. X 1 A 666 (JP III, no. 3558); Pap. X 2 A 328 (JP I, no. 1057).

39. See also ibid., p. 222, where Green explicitly states that in "the deepest sense" his work "serves to show that what is true for Kant is also true for Kierkegaard."