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Psychological Theorizing as Socioculturally Accurate and Critically Political Transformative Engagement: A Personal Trajectory (with)in- and-(with)out Turkey

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Abstract

This article reflects on the author's half-century of scholarship aimed at constructing a transformative psychology. Centering on three decades of participation in the International Society for Theoretical Psychology (ISTP), it offers both a personal theorizing trajectory and a selective retrospective on the Society's historicity. Building on a transformational model of (post)transdisciplinarity and its (post)metaphysical metatheoretical framework, the work foregrounds sociocultural accuracy and glocally political significance in theoretical psychology. It critiques persistent tendencies toward reductionism, dichotomization, oppositional argumentation, and disciplinary isolation, advocating instead conceptual permeability, dialogical connectivity, and translation across intellectual traditions. Rejecting both unified grand theory and casual eclecticism, the author integrates her psychoanalytic rereadings, Critical social theory, feminist, and postcolonial perspectives. Concepts such as the triopus (a generic self-coordinating system in place of traditional "unit of analysis") and its dynamic mechanisms of transformational trialectics and transformative triangulation (via objectivation, subjectivation, projectivation) are introduced to counter epistemological fragmentation and ontological closure. Case analyses, including the sociopolitical semiotics of women's headscarves in Turkey, illustrate the framework's capacity to address identity politics, oppression, and macro–micro transformations. Ultimately, the article situates theoretical psychology within broader struggles against capitalism, colonialism, authoritarianism, and global brutality, framing scholarly engagement as both intellectual and political praxis.

Keywords: transformative psychology, transformational epistemology, critical ontology, postmetaphysics

Hardly a moment passes without hearing concerned voices exclaim, "The world must be crazy!" Today we face wars, superpower rivalries, ethnic cleansing, brutal violence, extreme inequality, deep poverty, hunger, displacement, discrimination, oppression, racism, misogyny, corruption, climate change, and other ecocultural crises. Meanwhile, even

nominal democracies slide toward global tyranny under autocratic leaders. Around the world, people suffer profound anxiety, hopelessness, and despair in the face of this dystopian reality. Theoretical psychologists have much to reflect on, articulate, and act upon these facts at macro, mezzo, and micro levels. The conference theme, “theorizing as engagement,” is thus acutely relevant.

Yet, if engaged theorizing is long advocated, why has its history in psychology remained so short, weak, or absent? If “theory is the most powerful social practice,” what can theoretical psychology contribute now and in future to conceptualizing and addressing humanity’s damaged present? How can we avoid committing *epistemic violence*, as Spivak described (Gülerce, 2005a; Spivak, 1988, 1990; Teo, 2010, 2011)? or reproducing Psychology’s universalism as serving *cultural imperialism*, per Said (1993)? How can we disrupt the paradoxical entrapments of everyday life in the post-truth era? How do we break the vicious cycles entrapping people in the post-human discourse? Why does Psychology —arguably the most political of disciplines— fail to mobilize its own agencies for social change, while its content continuously is instrumentalized by other social sciences and power?

Responding to these questions, and in keeping with my long-standing habit of engaging conference themes directly, I here invite joint reflection at multiple levels. Given that my career has been shaped by critical engagement, this paper traces that trajectory, focusing on my modest contributions made in the International Society of Theoretical Psychology (ISTP) conferences over the past 30 years of active participation. This necessitates a short summary of the two preceding decades of my intellectual and practical development to contextualize this involvement. That is also because I distinguish between rhetorical and ideological critique by academics and intellectuals, and my proposition for critically transformative praxis via psychological theorizing.

Accordingly, this article has three aims:

1. To offer an “alternative voice from within” shaped by an *insider/outsider subject position*. Reflexivity emerges not from “self-same” insider monologues but through dialogue with the “different-other.”
2. To outline the core tenets of my transformational thinking and transformative psychological knowledge-practice as they address shared dilemmas.
3. To contribute to the historicity of this scholarly community by foregrounding thematic shifts over time, offering prospective insights for theoretical psychologists worldwide.

Personal is sociopolitical / Sociopolitical is personal

It is naive to assume that life trajectories and personal choices have little impact on our intellectual development and academic knowledge/professional practice. Such entanglement between life and work is exemplified by the biographies of figures like Hegel, Wittgenstein, Freud, Heidegger, Russell, and many others. The same holds for less prominent or ordinary scholars today, such as myself. In my case, the connection is akin to Wittgenstein’s (1953) *way of life*. Distinct from the of “professional deformation,” my personal preferences have often preceded, yet later co-constructed, my theoretical orientation. I often lived deliberately in ways that would validate my psychological theorizing and sustain critical commitments.

From a young age, exposure to Dostoevsky, Russian, Turkish, and world classics, as well as to some works by Nietzsche, Freud, Wittgenstein, Marx, Fromm, French structuralists, and existentialists, influenced and deepened my understanding of human life-worlds. Growing up mostly in Turkey—geopolitically at the crossroads of East/West and North/South— with frequent international encounters offered firsthand experience of human diversity and sameness, both at home and abroad. During this early immersion, what intrigued and troubled me most was the denial or ignorance of issues ultimately tied to subjectivity, relativity, and multiplicity. This fostered me to adopt a role of a “simultaneous interpreter” or *go-between* (Gülerce, 2019), “translating” between intelligibilities, intentionalities, and perspectives—a metaphor central to my theorizing. I also view Psychology (with its *as if* type disciplinary identity and a fragmented self) as “borderline” among disciplines. This is analogous to my interpretation of sociopolitical dynamics in certain nation-states situated at geopolitical fault lines—often “developmentally staged” and *in transition* in world political history, including modern Turkey. I will revisit these themes later.

Despite the global standardization and Westernization of Psychology education and institutional norms, our conceptual and professional practices remain deeply embedded in specific psychosociocultural contexts and vary accordingly. After all, one becomes a person before being a psychologist, and this personal formation as a psychologist precedes turning into a “theoretical psychologist.” I expect that critical, philosophical, and historical psychologists must be aware of these ties more than unreflective colleagues, thereby becoming more conscious of their implications. Although it is not customary to openly discuss these connections.

Given this paper’s “personal journeys” frame, I felt compelled to make it more personal and self-referential, limiting the account to a few formative points. Understandably, it may seem demanding, as it is impossible to elaborate on all aspects of the work without readers consulting the original references. For this article, which is to provide an overall perspective, I think, a brief clarification should suffice. Specifically, I aim to explain what I mean by an “insider/outsider subject-position” and how my position as a philosophically critical theoretical psychologist in soci(et)al praxis at the borders was formed.

Although this narration focuses on core tenets and principles, they did not emerge “out of nowhere”. Therefore, I will first provide a brief overview of my educational formation, then summarize the subsequent pre-ISTP decade as an academic and practitioner. After establishing this context, I will demarcate and outline the last three decades affiliated with the ISTP, primarily for organizational clarity. Although each section reflects a ten-year span, they should not be seen as distinct “developmental stages” in my (meta)theory-building process. Instead, various empirical, theoretical, and philosophical threads—often independent or interwoven—were continually revisited and expanded in response to evolving communal concerns, both within and beyond the Society. This also reflects my broader conceptualization of “development” as a non-linear, dynamic, and complex process of intermingling life threads of different kinds. At most, the grouping indicates shifts in focus or emerging areas of interest over time in the foreground.

Toward a transformational epistemology–ontology

Entering university, I was already attuned to significant psychological issues such as individual and collective differences, exclusion and oppression, silenced and omitted voices,

and translation failures across values and hierarchies. This early sensitivity led me to Psychology in search of deeper inquiry, if not solutions. My *introspective knowledge* and *participant observer's* sociopolitical insight and curiosity preceded textbook encounters with concepts like stigma or othering. I completed my undergraduate (with a Sociology minor) and graduate (Clinical Psychology) education in Turkey and the USA. Notably, both curricula and institutional structures reflected a highly Americanized Psychology (Gergen et al., 1996), a pattern still prevalent globally. Despite initial enthusiasm, I was soon disillusioned by conventional approaches in Psychology. Nevertheless, I never contemplated leaving the field. Rather, I became increasingly convinced that rethinking psychology was essential to imagining a more just world. Terms like “engagement” or “critical” are often vague unless relationally grounded. My early commitment emerged from precisely this interrogation—engaged with and critical of what, and why?

My engagement was paradoxical: dissatisfied with psychology’s modernist discipline yet committed to reforming its accuracy and utility by moving beyond scientism. Fascinated by psychoanalysis despite disagreements with its orthodoxies, I was motivated by the belief that alternative perspectives on human affairs are not only possible but necessary. From the outset, my strongest critique concerned Psychology’s narrow and shallow self-definition and the dominant view as the “science of the individual.” Ironically, this seemed even more prevalent among psychologists (than other social scientists’ categorization of the discipline), who unwittingly perpetuate individualism. I committed to linking individual/personal and collective/soci(et)al change, finding in Psychology a profoundly political space—more than in political science. To do so required first addressing the discipline’s epistemological, ontological, and moral problems as primary obstacles and opportunities for transformation. Thus began my deep involvement with methodological, theoretical, philosophical, and practice-oriented issues.

The initial aim was to develop personal guidelines for critical analysis in psychosocial knowledge and practice. However, this required first confronting the epistemological, ontological, and moral challenges within contemporary psychologies—both as sources of limitations and as sites of potential. Though apparently ambitious, this undertaking remained grounded within the modest bounds of my *polylogue* (Kristeva, 1977) and polyphonic dialogue with a wide range of intellectual interlocutors. My educational journey afforded rich opportunities to engage deeply across multiple disciplines—Continental philosophy, all schools of psychoanalysis, Critical theory, social and systems theory, communication and literary theory, life sciences, and cybernetics. These engagements provided “legitimate vocabularies” to articulate (un)familiar ideas and to navigate key debates, especially when working in a nonnative language in all senses of the term.

On that note, “nonnative language” warrants brief clarification, as I do not only mean in the linguistic sense. In its narrow sense, of course, it refers to English hegemonic natural language of the discipline, as opposed to my native Turkish. But in a broader sense, it also denotes the dominant academic discourse of Psychology itself, which often required conceptual translation, negotiation, mediation, appropriation and adaptation. Both forms—linguistic and disciplinary—posed recurring challenges in achieving precision, resonance, and fidelity in meaning, and at times leaving voids and lacks. More significant “translation,” central to this work, however, occur across the three realms of ontology, ontogenesis, and sociogenesis. While I retained a structuralist inclination toward form and substance—and the inseparability of epistemology and ontology—I began with theorizing knowledge. This focus arose partly because my initial frustrations with the discipline were methodological:

its tools rarely matched the richness and complexity of the phenomena studied. More broadly, epistemological concerns dominated not only Psychology but also neighboring social sciences and their critiques in Western thought.

In my view, elusive psychological phenomena—often deemed invisible, marginal, culturally meaningful, linguistically silent, subjective, affective, or irrational—are routinely neglected, or depoliticized. I sought to reclaim space for the often-overlooked subject matters which are nonconscious, liminal, imaginary, phantasmic, anxiety-evoking, and politically omitted. I saw challenging the reduction of Psychology’s subject to mere “object(ive) matter” essential, a necessary engagement, as I was convinced about the “soft stuff” being the vital, generative sources of liberation. It is thus no coincidence that psychoanalysis, as an overarching metatheoretical and transdisciplinary orientation and a historically developmental theory of normalcy and deviancy, became a primary inspiration in this journey. My deliberate reappropriation of certain concepts from its major schools and particular theorists framed psychoanalysis as critical philosophy and a psychosocial theory rather than solely a therapeutic method. In fact, to further this aim of reframing and sophisticating “scientific psychology” via psychoanalytic orientation, I pursued a second doctorate in a scientist-practitioner (Boulder model) program with a Fulbright scholarship in the U.S. I integrated psychodynamic theory, family systems theory, and the ethics, pragmatics, and aesthetics of change into my *transformational epistemology* (Gülerce, 1987).

I chose the metaphor of *transformation* as the most fitting and neutral means to challenge unproductive obsessions with the “dead ends” of the *unknowable* past and future, directing attention instead to the *process* unfolding in the *here-and-now*, where both the absent past and the yet-to-come are present. Psychology, directly or indirectly, shapes and transforms lives. Rather than clinging to a naïve illusion of a utopian, indefinable end-state in some indeterminate future, this intellectual struggle—rooted in social responsibility—becomes a meaningful and motivating process. My *critically realist* stance embraces known limitations and impossibilities as *initial conditions*.

Accordingly, I started with the *a priori* and *a posteriori* epistemological presumptions in the Kantian sense (Gülerce, 1991a), aiming to construct a comprehensive knowledge system and transformative orientation not only for psychology but for the “human sciences” in general as a cohesively relational framework. Equally important, however, was avoiding an all-encompassing *unified theory of knowledge*, which risks becoming yet another totalizing, “closed and predetermined” *grand narrative*, of the sort that flourished in the past century, which I have critiqued, while opening space for ongoing transformative critique and life. I will return to elaborate on key aspects of this transformational thinking in the sections that follow.

Academia, theoria, empiria, and praxis

The second decade of my career began with my full-time professorship at Boğaziçi University in Istanbul. Notably, this position involved an atypically heavy teaching load and demanding administrative duties, far beyond what is typical at Western universities I am aware of. These challenges were compounded by systemic disparities and limited resources, reflecting the global inequalities in Psychology's institutionalization and the production, publication, and application of knowledge. Despite these constraints, I expanded my theoretical work and applied knowledge-practice heuristics, emphasizing the inseparability of theory, research, and practice. For example, I developed the Transformational Family Model, considering family an effective "study unit" for mezzo-level structural and systemic analysis and transformative change in society (Gülerce, 1992b). This was followed by the creation and nationwide study for standardization of a mixed-method evaluation kit for research and practice purposes (namely AYDA: Turkish acronym for Family Structural-systemic Assessment Device) with 4,800 members from 1,600 families) based on that model (Gülerce, 1996b).

On the other hand, I revisited the concept of transitional phenomena, which play a central role in my theorizing as a bridge between the individual and society, the objective and subjective, the personal and political, the internal and external, the conscious and nonconscious, and beyond (Gülerce, 1991b). I conducted both a meta-analysis on the universality and an empirical study among Turkish children on the use of transitional objects (Winnicott). These objects not only reflected the consumerist culture of neoliberal capitalism but also revealed links between ontogenesis and sociogenesis. In another project, I revisited the attachment theory and developed an "alternative parent training model" based on semi-structured, naturalistic video recordings of toddler-mother interactions and interviews conducted in the families' homes. Rather than adopting, or following a prescriptive, expert-driven approach, this model aimed to empower mothers by enhancing their own interpretive skills in understanding their toddlers' behaviors and "intentions" through video replays. Fathers were indirectly involved by engaging in discussions with the mothers in their own times about the insights they gained. Until the mid-1990s, my other empirical and participatory action research focused on women's status, psychologization, lay theories of child development, intelligence, creativity, and public awareness of psychological maladjustment in Turkish society.

Being an academic-practitioner in a so-called "developing society" and a citizen of an internationally stigmatized country posed significant challenges for achieving inclusion in international academic discussions, let alone visibility. While not impossible, it demanded substantial psychological and financial effort. Many colleagues outside the hegemonic academic centers considered critical work irrational or unworthy, often surrendering to conventional traditions rather than challenging the *status quo*. Conversely, those who broke with norms faced rapid marginalization from peers, both within the institution and the field. Moreover, research topics outside the positivist paradigm reinforced the sense of in-betweenness, but also exclusion and isolation from both mainstream and critical circles abroad. This triple marginalization remains a serious yet underacknowledged issue that should concern psychologists who seek radical reconstruction, critical creativity, and solidarity in the field, or in this Society.

Nevertheless, during that decade, I took every opportunity to expand my horizon. Thanks to a research grant by the Jean Piaget Archives, for example, I closely examined Piaget's

genetic epistemology in dialogue with transformational epistemology (Gülerce, 1992a; 1996c). I tried to participate in international associations such as the American Psychological Association (APA), International Union of Psychologists (IUP), International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology (IACCP), International Association for Applied Psychology (IAAP), International Society for Behavioral Development (ISBD), European Federation of Psychologists' Associations (EFPA), International Society for Cultural-historical Activity Theory (ISCAR), International Society for Political Psychology (ISPP), History of Science Society (HSS), Turkish Psychological Association (TPA), Turkish Association for Social Sciences (TASS), Association for Moral Education (AME), the Piaget Society, and others. These engagements and personal friendships provided invaluable exchanges with scholars across Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas. At home, I also organized numerous symposia, and collaborated with colleagues from diverse fields including philosophy, sociology, history, anthropology, critical literature, medicine, molecular biology, theoretical physics, and political science. Additionally, maintaining involvement outside academia through supervising practitioners and volunteers for various NGOs in Turkey was an enormously enriching experience.

These international and cross-disciplinary interactions deepened my awareness of the pervasive academic habits within the larger community, dominated by American and Northern European hegemony. While some recognized psychologists' tendencies toward a "God's eye perspective" and parochialism with universalist overgeneralizations (as discussed by Ingleby, 1990), few seemed concerned with the discipline's epistemological stance, which often appeared historically ignorant, conceptually superficial, methodologically reductionistic, and morally self-righteous. On the other hand, the universalist tendency in Psychology was recognized by cross-cultural psychologists well before the term WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic) became popularized to describe its subject population. This was soon followed by indigenous psychologies. Yet, cross-cultural psychology's traditional designs—treating "culture" merely as an index or independent variable—largely supported the methodological "unification" and universalization of psychology. Meanwhile, the indigenization movement, acting in counter-dependence to the mainstream Westernization, reinforced metatheoretical fragmentation and essentialist interpretations of culture (Gülerce, 1996a; 2003a). In contrast, cultural psychology has been actively seeking its own psychological "culture," engaging with diverse historical roots and innovative methodologies. Cultural psychologists have contributed to disciplinary plurality by working—often ambivalently—across both central hubs and the "central peripheries" of psychological capital (Gülerce, 2003a; 2015b).

During this time, the field also experienced the rapid spread of the *Psy-complex* (Rose, 1996; Parker, 1997) through Foucauldian "technologies of the self" (Martin, et. al., 1988). Added to this were processes of psychologization and its vulgarization by global capitalism's political-economic technologies, embedding psychology in popular culture. The *Psy-complex* has thus functioned as both "the medium" and "the message" (McLuhan, 1967). As a result, Psychology's theoretical content has been simultaneously reduced into the "hardest" neurosciences and AI on one side, and fragmented or even emptied into "soft" hybrid programs like cultural and critical studies on the other. Of course, it is not that nothing has changed within this conservative discipline.

Prolonged philosophical debates dating back to Plato and Aristotle were revitalized by the mid-20th century. Various critical waves of Western modernity and modernism in philosophy, social theory, and literary critique gradually made themselves felt, albeit mostly

at the margins of Psychology—challenging its disciplinary boundaries, conceptions of subjectivity, truth claims, and ideological underpinnings (e.g., Henriques et al., 1984). Lyotard (1984) and Kristeva (1991; 1996) highlighted “narrativity” and innovative research approaches, while Ricoeur (1984) emphasized the interpenetration of time and narrative. These ideas influenced narrative psychology (e.g., Bruner, 1990), discursive psychology (e.g., Potter & Wetherell, 1987), and feminist psychology (e.g., Flax, 1993; Morawski, 1994). Another significant trend was the rise of social constructionism (e.g., Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Gergen, 1985; Shotter, 1993). During a sabbatical in the United States, I had valuable opportunities to discuss these challenging issues with Kenneth J. Gergen and John Shotter, both individually and together. My dialogic deliberations with Gergen were published in the first two issues of *Culture & Psychology* at the kind invitation of Valsiner, who had founded the journal that year (Gülerce, 1995a; 1995b). My conversations with Shotter, which began in person and continued via email, have yet to find an outlet. However, thanks to their encouragement, I joined the Society and proposed a symposium for the upcoming ISTP conference.

From theory to theorizing

That symposium, the plenary evening session of the Ottawa meeting, on “rethinking theory in psychology,” provided an opportunity to highlight key metatheoretical issues and compare Gergen’s and Shotter’s social constructionist perspectives from my own viewpoint. It also allowed me to introduce my perspective on the transformative use of psychological accounts as an alternative to existing theoretical approaches (Gülerce, 1995d; 1995e). Drawing on the Freudian distinction between *symbolism* and the *symbolic*, I proposed differentiating between *theory* and the *theoric*, for instance, favoring the latter as a more flexible, dynamic, and relational mode of theorizing—enabling situated, agentic, and competent psychological practice.

In this context, Meehl’s distinction between *clinical* and *actuarial judgments* (Dawes et al., 1989) appears highly relevant for psychosocial knowledge work. I advocated for theory-building that is both intelligible and interactionally flexible, blending deductive and inductive reasoning, and drawing inspiration from existing theories to support practical theorizing. Theories emphasizing functional significance, comprehensiveness, or transformative potential—rather than mere verifiability—are expected to differ in their related criteria and metatheoretical commitments (Gülerce, 1995d). By confronting the (im)possibilities of available theories, more engaged and transformative practices can become achievable.

The metaphor of a map has often been used to illustrate theory in science. In modernist psychology, whether rooted in empiricism or rationalism, the task of the knower was to produce an adequate representation of the world—the territory. Korzybski (1933) famously noted that “a map is not the territory it represents,” yet argued that if a map is correct, it mirrors the territory’s structure, presupposing an objective reality to which language refers. He proposed *General Semantics* to address mismatches between words and reality, aiming for greater accuracy. Unlike traditional Semantics, he dismissed the search for a positivistic origin of the system as futile. Rejecting the positivistic search for an ultimate origin, he argued—through his concept of structural differentiation—that we can apprehend only the differences between “facts,” never the “facts themselves.” Unsurprisingly, some of his avant-garde propositions were dismissed as pseudoscience at the time. Notwithstanding,

they offer an enduring caution: in rejecting scientism, one must equally avoid drifting toward its opposite extreme of *obstructionism*.

Max Planck, on the other hand, the founder of Quantum Physics, offered a related insight with his well-known dictum: if we change the way we look at things, the things themselves change. This principle applies even when what we observe seems the “same,” but our perspective makes it appear “different”; in such cases, shifting our viewpoint may still be beneficial. Conversely, our habitual ways of seeing may cause us to overlook or omit important elements altogether. The combined suggestion from Korzybski and Planck was clear: As perception is never neutral, and theoretical psychologists, in particular, must continually re-examine and, when necessary, transform the ways they look at both “things” and “non-things.” Postmodern critiques further challenged this representationalist episteme: Baudrillard (1981) claimed the map precedes the territory, becoming a *simulacrum* unmoored from reality. Lyotard (1984) highlighted the collapse of representationalism, marking a shift from a philosophy of consciousness to a philosophy of language. Social constructionism, grounded in this “linguistic turn,” followed from diverse intellectual lineages, including Mead, Kelly (e.g., Gergen), Wittgenstein, Vygotsky, and Bakhtin (e.g., Shotter).

Despite ongoing reflections and adjustments at the general and abstract (meta)theoretical level, I depicted various principles to be the most urgent targets for transformation, as they could drive or reflect secondary and tertiary changes. The central question that intrigued me was how to system(at)ically design a (post)metaphysically alternative psychology—one with a more critical and adequate orientation toward epistemology and ontology—and redefine psychology as a historically and contextually contingent field. This novel field should be historically materialist, relationally symbolic, socially inclusive, politically accurate, and culturally moral. In essence, I treated the entire field of psychological sciences as an intellectual *triopus* —the generic study unit of transformational epistemology, awkwardly moving for a century (Gülerce, 1997a).

It is unnecessary to elaborate here what I refer to as Transformative Psychology—a provisional term used for clarity. Table 1 summarizes its core commitments and ideals, also highlighting its key criteria to “theory as engagement”, contrasting sharply with mainstream (theoretical) Psychology. This table, which is caricatured in a comparative anagram - hence limited by the letters – is a slide in my other paper presentation at the same ISTP meeting (Gülerce, 1995c).

Table 1: How to spell traditional and transformative psychologies

Traditional Psychology	Transformative Psychology
Psyche is intrinsically given in human nature	Psyche is relationally (trans)formed in culture
Science of the individual, mind, or behavior	Study of human’s ecosystemic interdependence
Yardstick scientism and reproduction	Yielding for transformative praxis
Complexities are ignored or reduced	Contextual contingencies are sought
Homogenization in a closed unity	Human diversity as an open dialogue
Ontological essentialism	Ontic/ontological-epistemic-semantic pluralism
Linear and causal determinism	Linguistic and cultural indeterminism
Othering and colonial ethics	One world and ecocultural ethics
Geopolitics, and nation as (global) culture	Glocal systemic thinking and political (dis)order
Yarn is universal and terminable	Yarn is particular and interminable

In later contributions (Gülerce, 1997a; 1997b), I further elaborated how transformational epistemology and ontology address the “anxiety-provoking” challenges faced in theory and practice. Often, theoretical debates—especially those involving sociocultural structures or political-economic and libidinal-economic systems—become entangled in “content” while overlooking “form,” rationality, and types of knowledge (Gülerce, 1999a). Importantly, not all theoretical psychology concerns only an abstract epistemic subject, as in philosophy. Neither are Psychology’s subjects mere constructs, nor reducible to language or statistics (i.e., Danziger, 1990). Research itself is an activity, and knowledge a form of practice. This is true even when not framed as an *intervention* or *participatory action research*.

During this decade, beyond questions of “what is theory?” and “representation”, the ISTP’s main interests focused on issues such as identity (disciplinary, individual, or group), narrativity, affectivity, subjectivity, globalization, and diversity. I addressed these topics by offering radically reconstructive responses drawn from a psychosociodynamically cultivated theoretical perspective. Simply put, *affective–cognitive splitting*, entrenched in the masculine, defensive epistemic culture, especially when followed by preemptive and offensive attacks to some presumed opponent “other”, for example, posed a serious obstacle for what I call “knowledge therapy.” I elaborated my perspective about the theoretical issues mentioned in several occasions, particularly addressing “anxiety-provoking” challenges in theory and practice. In the context of identity formation and politics, for example, I discussed how my transformative view reads and extends some relevant Lacanian and Kleinian concepts (Gülerce, 2001a; 2003c; 2005b).

Ultimately, all psychological activity concerns human (inter)subjectivity. It requires dialogical engagement rather than objectification. Yet, in traditional disciplinary *habitus* (Bourdieu) theory typically precedes research or practice, maintaining a linear, top-down flow. Theory dictates research almost like a blueprint or recipe. Practitioners often find this understanding idealistic, and claim that theory-building tends to be deductive, underappreciating inductive input. Theory is often viewed as irrelevant, utopian, or disconnected from real-life experiences. My decision to title the online journal I founded in 2005, *Social Practice/Psychological Theorizing*, sought to counter this, as a signification of a more dynamic, and engaged stance on the co-constructive relations between the two, resisting the hierarchy. Over time, at least the rhetoric has shifted for some within the ISTP—from “theory” to “theorizing”, as the main theme of the conference echoes.

Expanding the transformational matrix

A key epistemological challenge lies in the tension between worldviews seeking a stable, permanent reality and those embracing an ephemeral, changing one. This longstanding division predates major Western philosophies, tracing back to early metaphysical cosmologies. Plato located stability in *pure ideational forms*, while Aristotle distinguished between *being* and *becoming*. The debate over *permanence* (Parmenides) versus change and *flux* (Heraclitus) has shaped foundational thought, influencing philosophical and scientific judgments about what qualifies as a “thing” and what changes. Deciding which entities exist differs fundamentally from classifying which change. In Max Planck’s proposition, for instance, not all that we “observe” are “things” in the Aristotelian sense of “things-in-themselves.”

Classification systems have long sought to order the universe. Bateson’s (1972, 1979) *Pleroma* versus *Creatura* distinguished the realm of life from non-life, for instance, while Hacking (1994) separated *natural kinds* from *human kinds*. Such categories, often reactive to earlier schemes, rarely capture the psychological complexity of lived realities. Even well-argued “epistemic cuts” (Bateson) or rigid dichotomies inadequately represent “actual people” embedded in hegemonic “self-same” societies, or the diverse *life-worlds* of the “different other.” Reductionist classifications struggle to address the challenges of a historically colonized, unevenly modernized, and neoliberally imperialized world. From this recognition emerged my critical ontological question for the post-truth era: *What kind of human beings must we be to live in a post-truth world?* (Gülerce, 1997b).

Addressing this demands conceptual precision—epistemologically, ontologically, methodologically, morally, and politically—in differentiating *ecology/the historical material*, *society/the societal*, and *culture/the cultural*. These concepts are too often conflated or used interchangeably. Culture, for instance, remains treated as fixed and universal or reduced to geographic clichés, its significance underestimated in both deconstruction and reconstruction. Likewise, distinctions between *body*, *identity*, and *self* are neglected, yet indispensable for a globally liberatory psychosociopolitical praxis capable of dissolving entrenched Cartesian dualisms. In my second decade of ISTP involvement, I expanded the transformational matrix in response to dissatisfaction with both positivist scientism and purely discursive relativism. The former, *context-free scientism* and modeled on the hard sciences, has colonized Psychology; the latter, even in emancipatory late-/post-modernist form, often re-colonizes the humanities through *fixed-context universalism*, constraining creativity. As I have argued, no knowledge system can be emancipatory

without leaving proper space for the indeterminacy of (cultural) meaning and for reflective interpretation (Gülerce, 1997b).

Building on my earlier work, I sought a theoretical psychology attuned to temporality, historicity, relationality, and multiplicity—eschewing closed, totalizing systems while maintaining a coherent metatheoretical orientation. Transformational framework conceives theory, method, and practice as recursively and non-linearly informing one another. Oversimplified Figures 1 and 2 schematically present the *triopus* model’s five-dimensional transformations: The **first leg** constitutes and inhabits the ecosystemic material reality. The **second leg** constructs social systemic structures and resides within the symbolic reality of society. The **third leg** sustains meaning-potentials within the imaginary reality of culture. The vertical, diagonal, and horizontal axes represent, respectively, *discontinuous dialectical negotiations*, *continual paradoxical co-constructions*, and *continuous dialogical conversations* across these realms.




Figure 1: The three embedded and semi-autonomously coordinating realms of the self-(dis)organizing complex ecosystems of transformations in time-space (Vertical cut)





Figure 2: Transformational time-space of a triopus' be(com)ing (Horizontal cut)

As the realms of the *triopus* are differentiated for analytical purposes, I also defined three other concepts -- namely, *transformational trialectics*, *transformative triangulation*, and *reflexive consilience*-- to comprehend their interplay. Tracing Western thought's path from *dichotomic dilemma* (exclusive either/or) to *dialectics* (identity through opposition), I proposed ***transformational trialectics*** to revise entrenched bipolar and hierarchical thinking (Gülerce, 1997b; 2010). Its axioms are:

1. Change may be discontinuous (first realm), continual (second realm), or continuous (third realm).
2. Tension and contradiction are expected, but change need not rely on opposites—rather on interdependent yet differentiated categories of difference.
3. The motive for change lies in the self-reflective coordination of transformations, not in struggle or predetermined balance.

Transformative triangulation occurs between object(ive), subject(ive), and project(ive) realms, akin to a Möbius strip, Kleinian bottle, or knot theory, historically linking the dichotomically parsed reality (such as internal/external, conscious/nonconscious, thing/nonthing, self/other, visible/invisible, verbal/preverbal, and others) in complementary–incompletable domains. Figure 3 outlines its reciprocal mechanisms derived from various modified concepts in Freud (incorporation, somatization displacement, identification), Piaget (adaptation), Vygotsky (internalization, appropriation), Lacan

(foreclosure, jouissance), Klein (splitting, projective identification), Deleuze (desire), Guattari (transversality), Bourdieu (habitus), Merleau-Ponty (embodiment), Nietzsche (power), and Wittgenstein (rule-following).



OS: Subjectivation, SO: Objectivation, PO: (Psycho-)somatization,
 OP: (Somatic-)disposition, SP: Self imagination, PS: Projectivation

Figure 3: Transformative triangulation of the Object (O), Subject (S) and the Project (P)

I also advanced my earlier model of *transformative (post)transdisciplinarity*, responding to various recurrent ISTP themes (Gülerce, 1999b; 2007, 2013). Unlike conventional inter-/cross-disciplinarity/trans-disciplinarity, this type of “boundary-crossing” is open to dialogues between commonsense, cultural traditions, religious beliefs, mythologies, and alternative discourses. This approach systematically reorganizes and connects diverse intelligibilities across metatheory, theory, and practice. Methodologically inspired by Nietzsche and Wittgenstein, I draw conceptual, epistemological, and critical ontological distinctions and employ a five-step process: (1) Deconstruction, (2) Reordering, (3) Condensing/recycling, (4) Reclaiming conceptual space from dichotomized, universalized and totalized representations, and (5) (Re)introducing the “missing” (non)complementary third at multiple levels.

This yields triadic transformative intensities —across (uni)verses, realities, realms, psychological kinds, registers, types, methods, mechanisms, core metaphors, and so forth—enabling ongoing ontic/ontological dialogues across historical contexts. As Habermas (2017) frames transdisciplinarity as postmetaphysics for late modernity, I see transformational (post)transdisciplinarity as postmetaphysics for the postmodern (Lyotard, 1984), posttruth (Virilio, 1986), and posthuman (Braidotti, 2013) condition. It addresses

inter-/intra-disciplinary boundary blurring and resolves ontological dilemmas of *Dasein* in historical time-space (Heidegger, 1957).

Pluralism, long debated in politics, philosophy, and the social sciences, was taken up by some theoretical psychologists, echoing James's (1909, p. 52) reminder that “nothing includes everything, or dominates over everything.” Yet fears of Psychology's “disunity” (e.g., Koch, 1971; Wertheimer, 1973) persisted. Despite the disorderly, short-sighted, and atheoretical character of much inquiry, I have described the field's state as ***fragmented uniformitism***—far from genuine pluralism (Gülerce, 1997a; 2007). I reject the *unity-of-knowledge* thesis in favor of a *perspectival* orientation, focusing on epistemological–ontological–semantic pluralism, convergences/divergences in transformational dialogues, and the *triopus*' (potentially reflexive) self-coordinated choreography (Gülerce, 2005a; 2010; 2012b; 2013).

Postmodernist critiques are often misread—e.g., *deconstruction* (Derrida) mistaken for destruction, *nihilism* (Nietzsche) for meaninglessness— and conflated with the notion that “anything goes.” Such misinterpretations exacerbate anxieties about the unknown, unfamiliar, unpredictable, uncontrollable, or in brief, the “Other” in a disorderly universe (Gülerce, 1997a). They fuel and evoke, the apocalyptic fantasy of “the end of everything”. From a transformational standpoint, “anything” does not “go”: all proceeds within the structural and systemic limits of the *triopus*' co-constructive dialogues in any *historical time-space* (cf. Heidegger). The *triopus* functions as an ontic/ontological transformative *go-between*, “simultaneous translator/interpreter,” in between the “language games of transformation” from various centers and peripheries.

At the metatheoretical level, for instance, I identify three orientations around which theoretical psychologists' work tends to cluster, whether most authors themselves openly are aware or address them, or not: *critical realism* (late-modernist), *social constructionism* (post-modernist), and *cultural hermeneutics* (romantic-idealist). As each leg of this epistemological *triopus* often pulls in different directions (it also appears moving awkwardly, if not in stagnation), I even proposed their *transformative triangulation* for a critically developing Critical theoretical psychology (Gülerce, 2001b). This framework provides a shared conceptual and communicative ground for a sufficiently cohesive *multitude* (Spinoza; Deleuze), treating these discourses as *scientific-theoretical attitudes* (Husserl, 1954) rooted in particular *life-worlds* (*Lebenswelt*) of sociohistorical contexts.

Reflexive consilience refers to the potential *synchronicity* of all three legs of the *triopus*—each moving to its own paradigmatic choreography, tune, and rhythm, yet “jumping together” at certain moments in historical time-space (Gülerce, 2013). This shapes the fifth dimension of *transformative change*, operating as a *deterministically indeterministic/indeterministically determinist* aggregate. Conceived as a *multitude*, the *triopus* avoids both “utopian closure” and “dystopian chaos” through its self-regulatory evaluations. Since each *triopus* is “dressed” by the agentic thinker, researcher, or practitioner, Table 2 compares paradigmatic triads on some evaluative criteria, offering heuristics for “emancipatory and progressive praxis” across domains, scales and layers.

Table 2: Corresponding characteristics of the paradigmatic triads

Realms criteria	Object(ive)	Subject(ive)	Project(ive)
Register	Material	Symbolic	Imaginary
Reality	Natural/physical	Soci(et)al/discursive	Cultural/spiritual
Dialogic function	Constitution	Construction	Cohesion
Dialogical negotiaton	Organism-Ecology	Individual/group-Soci(et)al discourse	Psyche-Culture
Dialogical byproduct	Body (Object)	Social identities (Subject)	Self (Project)
Dialogical mind space	Brain-mind (Embodied)	Social mind (Embedded)	Virtual mind (Expansive)
Timing	Synchronic	Diachronic	Anachronic
Temporality	Linear	Curvilinear	Cyclical
Time-space coordinator	Vertical and unidirectional	Diagonal and bidirectional	Horizontal and multidirectional
Logic/reasoning	Inductive	Deductive	Abductive
Knowledge	Experimental, empirical, descriptive	Verbal, inferential, narrative	Tacit, intuitive, interpretive
(Un)certainty	Deterministic	Uniformative-probabilistic	Indeterministic
Message code	Matter-energy	Information	Meaning-intent
Message mode	Digital	Mixed	Analog
Language	Textual	Contextual	Sub-/non-textual
Linguistics	Stylistics	Syntax	Semantics
Ecosystemic Life-world	Organismic/physical/technological	Literal (semiotic)/Metaphoric (symbolic)	Phantasmic Illusory
Ecosystemic path	Morphostasis	Autopoiesis	Heterostasis
Ecosystemic mission	Survival	Maintanence	Cohesion

Ecosystemic goal	Sustainable reproduction	Disciplinary control	Connective diffusion
Feed-back- and-forth	Deviation-correcting	Paradoxical reinforcement	Deviation-amplifying
Emergent novelty	Error	Compensation	Creativity
Flow	Discontinuous	Continual	Continuous
Cybernetics	First order	Second order	Third order
Bidirectional/ Dialectical Processes	Objectivation Adaptation	Subjectivation Appropriation	Projectivation Individuation

A persistent question arises regarding evaluative criteria and judgement. Psychological theories —past or present— are neither hierarchically aligned at the same conceptual level nor do they exhibit comparable profiles on evaluative dimensions for a “good theory.” Some offer greater scope, whereas others aim parsimony with higher explanatory value. From my engaged perspective, attributes such as social relevance, ecocultural validity, political accuracy, emancipatory potential, and the critically transformative utility are more valuable than conventional scientific criteria. In this regard, I find affinity with “anti-philosophers” and other critical thinkers.

Sociocultural accuracy and critically political transformative engagements

At this juncture, the notions of *sociocultural accuracy* and *critical politics* in the article’s title warrant further reflection. This concern—beyond the cliché rhetoric of social relevance and responsibility—has been central to my last ISTP decade, building on earlier works and connecting with the observations noted in the article’s opening. In contrast to the “controlled crossings” of rigid (sub)disciplinary borders, the internationalization of psychological knowledge—and its ideology of individualism—has spread rapidly without “passport or visa” (Gülerce, 1999b, 2003a, 2009b). Psychologization’s “irregular migration” has accelerated with new “technologies of connection” and “travel itineraries,” linking “politically significant, rhetorically correct, and morally responsible” science with global policy makers. I have therefore underlined the *glocal* challenges facing psychological theorizing (Gülerce, 2006a), including policies such as the UN Millennium Development Goals that impose “developmental objectives” at the cost of silenced subjectivities in the so-called “developing world” (Gülerce, 2008a).

Like late-modern Critical theory (Arendt, 1958; Habermas, 1987), postmodern anti-theory (MacIntyre, 1988; Murdoch, 2001), and postcolonial thought (Spivak, 1990; Bhabha, 1994), critical psychology confronts essentialist identity categories that, when *mystified* (Marx), perpetuate power rather than challenge it. Whether in Western(ized) psychology, indigenization movements, or critiques of mainstream traditions, such categories often reproduce unjust sociopolitical orders. They are *reified* by academics, Gramsci’s “organic

intellectuals,” and the lay public, serving as political instruments of “divide and rule” worldwide (Gülerce, 1996a; 2007). I examined the diffusion of the *Psy-complex* and the history of psychology within Turkey’s alternative modernization and democratization narrative (Gülerce, 2006b; 2011a), and analyzed the “absent presence/present absence” of psychoanalysis as historical *symptom* in a Lacanian sense (Gülerce, 2008b). Yet inclusion of the “Other”—as category or participant—remains insufficient. In my third ISTP decade, against the rise of authoritarian regimes and ethnic-nationalist revivals, I revisited my psychoanalytic theorizing, drawing from Freudian, Lacanian, and Kleinian *object-relational* perspectives, and problematizing the “psychology of the Other” (Gülerce, 2001a; 2015c).

Although both, Freud and Darwin cautioned against *isomorphism* between the individual and society, allegorical uses of psychoanalysis have proliferated as “intellectual entertainment,” deepening the false psychologization of soci(et)al/structural and systemic issues. Outside the clinic, its concepts require careful epistemological-ontological, and theoretical treatments (Frosh, 2010; Gülerce, 2012a, c). My *triopus* model, akin to the *body without organs* (Deleuze), provides a generic analytic linking micro–mezzo–macro levels of structuration of society and/or knowledge through dialogical interplay of multiple engaged *triopodes*.

As any *triopus* initially is stripped from any theoretical content, I redressed one with the women’s headscarf in Turkey. I analyzed *turban*, a particular type, as a *collective transitional object*, symbolizing sociocultural emancipation and democratization struggles, with serious implications for world politics (Gülerce, 2012b). As this object also is a signification of resistance, in response to the Society’s interest in the *resistance, reversal, and revenge* against imperialist hegemony, I draw critical attention to the definitions and practices of resistance which risk reinforcing oppressive power rather than dismantling it when *relationality*—central to Nietzsche—is ignored (Gülerce, 2015a; 2017). Theorizing psychology between micro and macro political analyses is further complicated by *hyperreality* (Baudrillard) and *post-truth* acceleration (Virilio), speed being a political means. I argued that no matter how “mega” a social *symptom* appears, addressing it requires grasping the entire *syndrome*, even for short-term pragmatic solutions (Gülerce, 2019).

During the past decade, entire Psychology as *syndrom* itself is transforming “regressively,” from *borderline condition* toward a *schizoid state*, mirroring its global subject. Still, “progressive” critiques of capitalism, modernism, racism, colonialism, imperialism, and sexism have prompted ideological shifts within theoretical psychology. *Intersectionality*, especially in feminist thought, highlights the interplay of discriminations—gender, race, class, sexuality, religion, and more. Yet, while awareness of marginalization has grown, its deep theoretical incorporation remains limited. The *ethos of splitting*, as its most differential *symptom* is so pervasive even in the critiques and sustains barriers to globally emancipatory praxis. I addressed this in Tokyo (Gülerce, 2017) and later in Copenhagen, deliberating what “Critical psyche-ana-lysis: An oxymoron of objection” might mean in the age of truthiness and objective acceleration (Gülerce, 2019).

Most recently, under compounded pressures of the COVID-19 pandemic, democratic decline, and resurgent authoritarianism, my engagements have turned increasingly to urgent sociopolitical struggles: politicization and manipulation of public opinion, corruption of power, erosion of moral values, and intensifying inequalities. Beyond academic work, this has included public commentary in newspapers and digital journals, historicizing “from within and in the present,” and consulting with social-democratic NGOs on policy making.

(Dis)closure

Writing the historicity of any society “from within and in the present” involves many difficulties and constraints, yet it also offers possibilities that can enable future directions. As this article draws to a closure, and in line with its third objective, I will take the risk of offering a personal and academic disclosure of psychosociopolitical relevance. This is because I had the privilege of hosting the 10th ISTP conference in Istanbul in 2003. It was the first meeting after 9/11, a turning point in the world’s psychosociopolitical history that marked the decline of post-WWII superpower hegemony, intensified xenophobic and Islamophobic anxieties, and reshaped international politics—especially around the Middle East. The period was characterized by the resurgence of “bi-polar” world scenerios (or, regress to *splitting* and *acting out* the destructive phantasy), the revival of Cold War dynamics, the Iraq War, the SARS pandemic, increasing travel restrictions, and numerous other *glocal* constraints.

More significantly, besides having the pleasure organizing such an event, I had the rare opportunity, a luxury rather, to almost independently design the entire scientific program. This is what I wish to “confess” here: I was afforded the extraordinary privilege of prioritizing transformative issues which I considered most urgent at the time, particularly global representation and conceptual inclusivity. I personally invited academic colleagues and contacts—whose work I knew through various societies I had been involved with in the past or present, both within and outside ISTP, and within and outside Turkey. Of course, despite all the soliciting efforts within the limits of my conditions, the true success of the conference ultimately rested on its participants, who made it deeply impactful. In retrospect, and for the sake of ISTP’s institutional historicity and critical reflexivity, I find it important to highlight three “turning points” (though not revolutionary) marked by this gathering, as its proceedings reflect so very little of these special encounters (Gülerce et. al. 2005):

Intradisciplinary interchange: Initially ISTP primarily attracted social psychologists. Yet, the complexity of critically transformative psychology demanded engagement from other major branches of psychology. To foster productive diversity, leading figures across the discipline—including Bayer, Billig, Bradley, Burman, Chaiklin, Cole, Cornejo, de Jong, Deventer, Dreier, the Gergens, Flax, Hedegaard, Hoffmeister, Leontiev, Maiers, Morawski, Osbeck, Parker, Ratner, Shoter, Schraube, Valsiner, among others—participated. Their contributions, rooted in diverse subfields, greatly enriched the conversations and inspired new directions, particularly for emerging scholars. Notably, 10% of participants were practitioners, further broadening perspectives.

Interdisciplinary exchange: Theoretical psychology also requires sustained dialogue with other disciplines. Post-Marxist political theory and discourse analysis—drawing on psychoanalysis and Lacanian thought rooted in German Critical Theory—had already resonated with critical psychologists. To further encourage this dialogue, I organized and moderated a plenary session with Laclau, Mouffe, and Stavrakakis (though Salecl and Žižek canceled last minute) on *Political Identities and the Construction of Subjectivity* (Gülerce, 2003b). Additionally, local scholars from fields such as sociology, political science, anthropology, communication, arts, education, neuroscience, cognitive science, history, and literature also contributed the meeting with vibrant discussions.

International acculturation: Like many associations bearing “international” in their names, ISTP initially reflected a largely North American, Canadian, and Northern European male composition. Engaging with “unfamiliar” contexts was therefore essential. Despite the

difficult global climate and understandable hesitations, participants from 24 countries from all around the world attended—making this the first, and so far only, ISTP meeting held in a country with a 99% Muslim population.

These three focal points were intended as developmental threads for theoretical psychology. Indeed, it is no coincidence that they reflect the principal tasks of transformative psychologists: *vertical transmissions*, *diagonal translations*, and *horizontal transfers*—redressing and restructuring the generic psychological knowledge/practice *triopus* in contextually and historically contingent ways. Although these objectives remain largely unrealized since the Istanbul meeting—despite expanded member interests—I encourage future colleagues to continue attending to them. I remain convinced that reflective, systematic, and conceptually deconstructive-reconstructive reorganization is vital for theoretical psychology. Such work would enhance internal consistency and conceptual validity while identifying commensurable and incommensurable connections among diverse theorizing efforts. By engaging at multiple levels, we can open rigid systems of knowledge and foster transformative dialogues for a better world. Obviously, the Society can only benefit from opening itself up to dialogues with colleagues and works from outside the hegemonic circles.

Therefore, in the hope of motivating engaged theoretical psychologists towards such intellectual activities, I sincerely shared my personal journey, passionate work and ideas of engagement in affiliation with the ISTP, where I found a lovely niche for the past 30 years. Because, it is not that even an individual theoretical psychologist – isolated, voiceless, and invisible inbetween the margins of the divided and detached intellectual territories cannot do much alone. But a community “speaking the same conceptual and valuational language” in solidarity as a collective, of course, can do a lot and achieve a great deal.

Ultimately, my devotion to critical change through (meta)theory-building and my holistic, inclusive conceptual framework function, in many ways, as a personal checklist. They guide my critical reading, trans(sub)disciplinary theorizing, scientific research, ethical practice, and mindful living. While these efforts are personal, they may also suggest new ways of connecting diverse knowledge to foster critical praxis for a better world. Indeed, many colleagues in the ISTP community are already addressing transformative issues, far too many to name within the scope of this article. At the same time, there is growing agreement among ISTP scholars that mainstream psychologists often ignore the (meta)theoretical foundations of their positivist inquiries. Yet, the historicity of concepts and the philosophical underpinnings of theories referred, and their own scientific, ideological or political choices also are often overlooked by the colleagues in this community. My concern is that presentist or insufficiently critical readings, ideological blindness, intellectual rigidity, and pragmatist use of old or recycled theories—when followed uncritically or adopted as intellectual fashions—(un)wittingly risk serving the hegemonic order (in Gramsci’s sense), legitimizing what is in fact deeply ill.

Still, one thing seems clear: both laypeople and theoretical psychologists agree at last that the “world is crazy!” Although small in numbers and slow in pace, some people in both groups are now willing to give up the search for a single and absolute Truth or a predetermined universal order. Others, however, cling more tightly to conspiracy theories in today’s dystopian (dis)order. From its inception, transformative psychology has been concerned with the transformations that occur in between the only two true, but “unknowable”, points that punctuate the life of any *triopus*.

Let me close this atypical article with a Schulz cartoon I recently came across circulating on social media, a rare survivor in a context of AI-generated post-truth/no-truth content:

Charlie Brown: *We only live once, Snoopy!*

Snoopy: Wrong! *We only die once. We live every day!*

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About the author

Professor Gülerce earned her undergraduate and graduate degrees in Psychology from Hacettepe University, followed by a doctorate, also in Clinical Psychology with a Fulbright scholarship at the University of Denver. She completed her internship at the Mount Sinai Psychiatric Services of CUNY and pursued postdoctoral psychoanalytic training and psychotherapy practice at the New York City Postgraduate Center for Mental Health. She has long served at Boğaziçi University, teaching, supervising psychotherapy practitioners, and consulting for various NGOs. Her academic career also includes academic visits to institutions such as the Jean Piaget Archives (Geneva), University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Rutgers, Columbia, New York University, Clark University, Aalborg University, and the University of Oslo.

Her research spans psychodynamic, family systems, critical, cultural, historical, political, (meta)theoretical, and philosophical psychology discourses, addressing intra- and trans-disciplinary issues. Advancing a Transformational epistemology–ontology and (meta)theory-building orientation, she developed a transformative perspective integrating conceptual analysis, empirical research, and social praxis, with emphasis on the interrelations of individual, societal, and cultural transformations. She founded the online journal *Psychological Theorizing/Social Practice* and edited *Re(con)figuring Psychoanalysis: Critical Juxtapositions of the Philosophical, the Sociohistorical and the Political*. Her work has appeared in leading journals, including *American Psychologist*, *New Ideas in Psychology*, *Theory & Psychology*, and *Culture & Psychology*.

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