Fernando Guirao, Frances M.B. Lynch & Sigfrido M. Ramírez Pérez (eds.): Alan S. Milward and a Century of European Change. New York – London 2012, Routledge. 634 p. 160 GBP.

Conceived as a *Festschrift* to celebrate his lifetime academic achievements, this book was only published, sadly, after Alan S. Milward's death. It comprises 23 chapters in all, many of them contributed by Milward's former PhD students. It has the usual flaws of a *Festschrift*. Thus, it includes material previously published in similar form elsewhere or, in some cases, more or less unrelated to Milward's own work. But it is more than the usual assemblage of hastily revised papers or lectures with footnotes added here or there to please the recipient, thanking him or her for successful collaboration or helpful patronage. It actually goes a surprisingly long way towards an initial assessment of Milward's contributions to the study of modern European history. Arguably, the mere fact that this option has been available to the editors, reflects the impressive scope and breadth of Milward's work which extends far beyond the limited field of the history of post-war (western) European integration, which has remained marginal – arguably too much so – to the historiography of contemporary Europe more generally.

Incisive in his historical analysis and combative in his intellectual and personal style, Milward might have been willing and able to summarize his intellectual legacy on 20 pages. In their introductory book length chapter, Frances M.B. Lynch and Fernando Guirao need 130 pages. Nonetheless, they succeed admirably in outlining Milward's academic legacy by discussing some of his key publications in chronological order. Many readers of this journal will know Milward for his two books on post-war western European integration, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-51* (1984) and *The European Rescue of the Nation-State* (1992), and perhaps for his attempt (with four co-authors) to develop a »historical theory« of integration in *The Frontier of National Sovereignty* (1993). Arguably, however, some of his earlier books had a broader impact, especially his various publications on the German war economy. Thus, Milward was the first to highlight how the *Blitzkrieg* strategy, in other words the targeted use of superior military force, allowed the national-socialist regime to provide the German population with sufficient consumer goods well into 1941-2. In this sense, it was the British, not the Germans, who invented »total war« as the concentration of all resources on the war economy. Later on, Milward contributed to the ongoing debate over the German switch to »total war«, which for a long

time had been shaped by Albert Speer's propaganda about his own responsibility for increasing German armaments production in 1942.

In a similar vein, as Guirao and Lynch as well as David W. Ellwood in his chapter elaborate, Milward also made a crucial contribution to the heated debate among economic historians over the contribution of Marshall Plan aid to the reconstruction of Western Europe after 1948. Milward argued that Western Europe had sufficient capital, which was only waiting to be invested in a more secure institutional environment and better economic climate; from this perspective, the financial side of the Marshall Plan was far less relevant than its political symbolism.

Some of the chapters in this book provide fascinating insights based on fresh archival evidence although they do not always chime with Milward's own assumptions about how European integration has been driven by nation-states seeking to Europeanize their socio-economic structures effectively to provide welfare for their citizens under the dramatically changed conditions of post-war Western Europe. Thus, to give but one example, Charles Barthel investigates the renewed creation of a western European steel cartel in 1966. This cartel clearly violated the European Coal and Steel Community treaty and dramatically exposed the High Authority's political weakness. Yet while Milward would have appreciated Barthel's focus on economic integration and his understanding of the continued close industry-government links in this sector, the chapter also inadvertently draws attention to one of the blind spots of the British economic historian: the importance of *transnational* business networks, something that he, like the political scientist Andrew Moravcsik, associated with the cruder versions of neo-functionalist theory, and discarded as a result.

Of all historians of Western European integration of his generation, broadly speaking, Milward was of course the only one (with the partial exception of Wilfried Loth) to engage with integration theory in the social sciences. He did so in his usual combative style, but, as Ben Rosamond gently points out in his chapter, he also largely ignored the state of the art to create what he thought of as an alternative »historical theory« of integration. In fact, Milward's attack on neo-functionalism was based on his reading as a young researcher in the 1960s. By the early 1990s, however, political science research on the EU had shifted dramatically from a conversation between International Relations theories to a comparative politics approach to understanding EU politics. In fact, some of the early neo-functionalists themselves had discarded their theoretical approach in the 1970s, and Milward's arguments only

repeated from a historical perspective what political scientists had already pointed out then.

Rosamond also highlights another crucial flaw in Milward's earlier works on European integration, namely how his analysis of »national interests« was driven by what political scientists would call a rational choice approach to understanding interest formation as the conscious maximization of advantages in an »information-rich« (Moravcsik) decision-making environment where actors such as governments are aware of the interests of others. Bizarrely, Milward as a historian treated such »interests« as historically contingent only to a very limited degree. As Rosamond points out, Milward later replaced the conceptually unreflected use of the term »national interest« with »national strategy« in his book about Britain and European integration. In 2007 he even agreed that the idea of interests as historical constructions could be useful for understanding what motivates different actors in European integration politics, demonstrating quite freely here, as elsewhere, that his strong views did not prevent him from changing his mind, and admitting as much, in the face of new ideas or evidence.

As many of the chapters in this book show Milward had a powerful influence on many of his students, especially during his first stint at the European University Institute and at the London School of Economics. However, after his return to the EUI many of his new students sought to overcome the limits of the Milwardian approach: its state-centrism, its fixation with »national interests« as (apparently) rationally defined by government ministers and bureaucrats, and its nationally comparative, not transnational approach to studying history. But the fallout from the economic and financial crisis in Europe since 2007-8 has perhaps served to highlight the resilience of nationalism and national allegiance, and the crucial importance of economic issues for European integration – a sphere about which too many historians of European integration remain largely ignorant.

At the same time, it is also fascinating to see how few members of the European Union Liaison Committee of Historians, which edits the *Journal of European Integration History* and of which Milward was a member, have contributed to this book, either as a result of the editors' choice or their own. Milward, with his strong views and his sometimes aggressive argumentative style, was an *agent provocateur* in the field of European integration history; a field characterized for a long time by lack of conceptualization and much empirical bean counting, which provoked Milward's intellectual wrath; and also by the politically charged search

for aligned historical narratives of integration contrived in the cosy atmosphere of sumptuous dinners and incoherent edited books. Milward was co-opted into the prevalent power structures in this research field; he failed to transform these structures in a meaningful way and was systematically ignored (to the point of avoiding any reference to his works even in footnotes) by many of the older diplomatic historians, who behind his back had nothing good to say about him just as he had no respect for them. Thus, beyond the fascinating scope and breadth of his work, which compares so favourably with the narrow specialization of many younger »integration historians«, Alan S. Milward and his works also constitute an intriguing starting point for any future study of this research field, its contestation and its evolution over time.

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