

MOGENS PELT: *Tying Greece to the West. U.S.-West-German Relations, 1949-1974*. Lim. publ., Københavns Universitet, 2003.

The University of Copenhagen has a very strong tradition in the study of the ancient Greek and Byzantine worlds. More unusually, it also has a very strong tradition in the study of the modern history of Greece. Dr Pelt's thesis is a worthy example of the continuation of this tradition.

1981 saw the accession to power of the PASOK government, Greece's first, at least nominally, socialist government. During the election campaign, Andreas Papandreou, the founder and leader of PASOK, frequently made use of a characteristically populist slogan: »Greece is rich but the Greeks are poor.«

At the beginning of the 21st century the reverse is true – Greece is poor but the Greeks are rich. Present day Greece is certainly a rich country in world terms and her economy is much the strongest in the Balkans. Greece's membership of the European Union is of inestimable advantage, both economically and politically, and it will be many years before the country's Balkan neighbours will be eligible to join. Likewise Greece's membership of the NATO alliance stands her in good stead, although it has not prevented her from coming to the brink of war with her Turkish neighbour on more than one occasion during the post-war period. Her political institutions are stable and the spectre of military dictatorship that haunted the country in the late 1960s and early 1970s appears to have been permanently exorcised. The fact that the transition from right wing control of government which had prevailed more or less continuously since the end of the civil war to a radical (at least in terms of rhetoric) socialist government in 1981 took place in a smooth and orderly fashion indicated a new stability in a hitherto unstable political system. Political parties are now much less dependent on the charismatic leadership of individual political leaders. The age of the dinosaurs as the Greeks tended, none too fondly, to call their geriatric political leaders, appears to be over. The rate of political, social and economic change in the country over the last half century has been remarkable. Greece has been transformed over the past fifty years from an impoverished Balkan backwater to a regional power, well-placed to exercise influence throughout the peninsula, even if she has not always chosen to exercise that influence in a constructive manner, as during the crisis over the recognition of the independent state of Macedonia during the early 1990s indicates. But if this picture of relative economic prosperity and political stability is the present day reality this was by no means always the case, as is convincingly demonstrated by Dr Pelt in his thesis »Tying

Greece to the West: US-West German-Greek Relations 1949-1974.«.

During the inter-war period the fragility of Greece's political system had been highlighted by the frequency with which the military intervened in the political process. The weakness of parliamentary institutions in Greece and the weakness of civil society were strikingly illustrated by the ease with which General Ioannis Metaxas had been able to establish his quasi-fascist dictatorship in 1936. When the country came under a brutal tripartite German, Italian and Bulgarian occupation during the Second World War, the traditional political class proved wholly incapable of providing political leadership. It was the hitherto insignificant Communist Party of the Greece (KKE) that was to fill the political vacuum that emerged during the harsh years of the occupation and was to result in its becoming the dominant force in the resistance that emerged to the Axis occupation. The country was ravaged by famine as the occupying powers plundered the country, while the economy was further undermined by a vicious and virtually unparalleled inflationary spiral.

The communists were well placed to seize power in Greece on the liberation of their country, as they were able to do in the rest of the Balkan Peninsula. That they did not do so in Greece was due to failures in the leadership of the KKE, to the absence of encouragement by Stalin, and above all to Prime Minister Winston Churchill's determination to prevent a country that was considered a vital British interest from falling under communist control.

This British concern was reflected in the famous, or rather notorious, »Percentages« agreement reached between Churchill and Stalin in Moscow in October 1944. Dr Pelt rightly highlights the significance of the »percentages« agreement, although one might question the wisdom of discussing this critical agreement only on p. 175 of the thesis. Under the terms of this agreement Churchill ceded a preponderance of Soviet influence in Romania and Bulgaria in return for Soviet recognition of a British preponderance in Greece. From Stalin's point of view this was an excellent bargain and Churchill always believed the Soviet leader to have been a man of his word in respect of the »percentages« agreement.

Certainly Stalin gave no support to the communist insurgency of December 1944 in Athens which was forcibly suppressed by the British, a possibly unique occasion during the Second World War when British troops engaged in hostilities with former allies. The precise motives behind this communist insurgency of December 1944 are still unclear – it seems not to have represented an outright bid for power, more an attempt to destabilize the fiercely anti-communist government of George Papandreou which had returned from wartime exile in Cairo.

Nor did Stalin give overt support to the Greek communists when in 1946 they launched an armed bid for power, although he would doubtless have been ready enough to exploit the situation had it succeeded. The »third round«, as the communist attempt to seize power between 1946 and 1949, is sometimes called and which forms the immediate historical context of Dr Pelt's thesis was a crucial catalyst in the emergence of the Cold War. The brutal fashion in which the Soviet Union was installing communist regimes not only in the Balkans but throughout Eastern Europe, coupled with Soviet moves that were seen as threatening towards Persia and Turkey, reinforced the British wish to hold the line in Greece. And when it became clear that Britain's weakened post-war economy would no longer permit her to prop up the beleaguered national government in Athens, the US, as the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, vividly recalled in his memoir, *Present at the Creation*, immediately stepped in to exercise the hegemony that Britain had traditionally exercised over Greek affairs. There was a certain irony in this as the United States administration had been highly critical of British policy towards wartime Greece and had ostentatiously dissociated itself from British actions during the December 1944 insurgency. Be that as it may, the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947, whereby the US undertook to support democratic governments threatened with subversion by armed minorities, and in particular Greece and Turkey, was one of the seminal documents of the incipient Cold War. The impact of the Cold War on Greece's political institutions is one of the major themes of Dr Pelt's thesis. The military and economic aid that flowed into Greece, coupled with the lack of Soviet support for the communist Democratic Army, dissension within the leadership of the Greek communist party, and the split with Tito, hitherto the most determined supporter of the Greek communists, contributed to the defeat of the Democratic Army in the summer of 1949.

Although the communist attempt to seize power between 1946 and 1949 had been defeated, Greece at the end of the civil war was in a parlous state, as is clear from Dr Pelt's thesis. Whereas in the other countries of Europe the process of reconstruction was already well under way, Greece could only begin the process of remedying the ravages of the wartime occupation in 1949, ravages which had been substantially worsened by a viciously fought civil war.

As Dr Pelt demonstrates, in the West, and in the United States in particular, despite the defeat of the communists, serious apprehensions remained as to whether the spectre of communism had been truly exorcised in Greece and as to whether her democratic institutions, always

fragile, and her shattered economy could be rebuilt. These apprehensions increased as the tensions of the Cold War intensified with the outbreak of the Korean war and were heightened by a series of Middle Eastern crises, eg the Suez crisis of 1956, in which Greece followed a policy of benevolent neutrality towards President Nasser of Egypt, and which were perceived as indicating a heightened Soviet influence in the region. If the communists had been defeated, and a large number of members of the communist Democratic Army had been forced into exile in Eastern Europe and the Soviet, the left nonetheless remained a potentially potent force in Greece, or at least was perceived as such. For this reason a number of repressive measures, e.g. the certificates of political reliability that were necessary to obtain many jobs and even to obtain driving licences, introduced during the period of the civil war remained in force as part of a pattern of containing the left. Hence the period between 1949, the end of the civil war, and the imposition of an outright military dictatorship in 1967, the period covered by Dr Pelt's thesis, must be described as a period of qualified democracy. Only after the *metapolitefsi*, the political change resulting from the downfall of the military regime in 1974, did a genuinely pluralistic parliamentary system come into being.

The theme of Dr Pelt's thesis is the way in which the United States, in particular, and the her partners in the NATO alliance in general sought to tie Greece firmly to the West during this critical period between the end of the civil war in 1949 and the collapse in 1974 of the curiously anachronistic military dictatorship that had misruled Greece since 1967. This policy of »tying Greece to the West« entailed trying to counter possible neutralist tendencies in the country. These neutralist tendencies were reinforced when, in the mid-1950s, Britain's refusal to entertain the demand for the enosis of Cyprus with Greece, led a significant number of Greeks to question the rationale of Greece's membership of the NATO alliance, which Greece had joined, along with Turkey, her fellow beneficiary of the Truman doctrine, early in 1952 and which had been the principal means of integrating Greece into the Western alliance. Membership of NATO was followed a year later in 1953 by a treaty establishing US bases in Greece on terms highly advantageous to the United States. The result of the elections of 1958, for instance, aroused concern among Greece's NATO allies that neutralist tendencies were on the increase, tendencies which the Soviet Union and its satellites sought, as Dr Pelt demonstrates, to boost with a trade offensive and, in particular, by a willingness to purchase Greek tobacco. Although the Greek Communist Party (KKE) which had been such a force during the

years of the occupation had been banned in 1947 and was not to be legalised until the 1974 downfall of the military dictatorship, on the ending of the civil war in 1949, the defeated forces of the left had regrouped in the *Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera* (EDA), the Unified Democratic Left. EDA's share of the popular vote in the 1958 election rose to almost 25% and it emerged as the largest opposition party. This, as Dr Pelt shows, set alarm bells ringing among Greece's NATO allies and gave a substantial impetus to the successful negotiation of Greece's 1961 Treaty of Association with EEC.

In my view, the most original part of Dr Pelt's thesis is the way in which the United States sought to share with the Federal Republic of Germany the burden of reconstructing Greece's war shattered economy and to further integrate the country into the western alliance. This was essentially a policy of sub-contracting economic assistance, a policy that, as Dr Pelt shows, was welcomed by Western Germany as part of the process of the country's rehabilitation in the aftermath of the Second World War. It also served the purpose of helping to re-establish German markets in the Balkans, markets that were now seriously truncated by the establishment of communist regimes throughout the region with the exception of Greece. As Dr Pelt demonstrates, Britain had ruled herself out as a major player in Greece's financial reconstruction because of the unresolved question of the payment of British bondholders in the Greek public debt. Dr Pelt examines the way in which key developments during the Cold War such as the outbreak of the Korean war generally, and Middle Eastern crises of 1955-58 more specifically, e.g. Suez, the 1957 Syrian crisis, the 1958 coup in Iraq and the subsequent collapse of the Baghdad Pact, the Aswan High Dam, Lebanon etc. affected this process of integration, which was sealed with the negotiation in 1961 of Greece's Treaty of Association with the European Economic Community. It is clear, as Dr Pelt demonstrates, that, from the perspective of all the parties to it, the political arguments in favour of association outweighed the economic ones, although, of course, once Greece did enter the EEC in 1981 the economic benefits of her membership were very considerable. The 1961 association agreement was seen, like membership of the NATO, as a further means of reinforcing Greece's membership of the western alliance. It was negotiated against the background of growing anti-NATO and neutralist sentiment in Greece occasioned by the increasing bitter conflict occasioned by the struggle for the enosis of unification of the island with Greece. Crises over the Cyprus issue form part of the background to much of Dr Pelt's thesis and it was of course the disastrous effort by the Athens military



regime to topple Archbishop Makarios, the president of Cyprus, in July 1974 that precipitated the downfall of the military regime in Athens, the point at which Dr Pelt's thesis terminates.

The 1960 Cyprus settlement, negotiated between Britain, Greece and Turkey ceded sovereignty in perpetuity over two British sovereign base areas. So we will soon have the extraordinary, and thoroughly anomalous, situation whereby one member of the EU, Britain, exercises sovereignty, indefinitely, over the territory of another member, Cyprus. This is certainly one way of »tying« a country to the West, to use Dr Pelt's expression.

If the US continued to see itself as the ultimate guarantor against internal subversion in Greece and any effort to detach the country from the Western alliance, and continued to act as the principal conduit of military aid to Greece, Washington, as Dr Pelt emphasises, was happy to allow, indeed encourage, Germany to re-establish its traditional commercial preponderance in Greece, as US economic aid diminished, although military assistance was maintained. The success of this policy is demonstrated by the fact that as early as 1950 West Germany was the principal destination for Greek exports while West Germany became the main source of Greek imports by 1957, displacing the United States and Great Britain. One of the principal instruments used to cement Greek-West German relations was the attempt to persuade the Federal Republic to import a substantial proportion of its tobacco crop, at that time the most important of Greece's agricultural exports, constituting approximately two thirds of total agricultural exports, a process in which a million or so people were involved directly or indirectly, roughly a quarter of Greece's farming population. In effect this was an attempt to re-establish what had been a key element in pre-war patterns of trade between the two countries, about which Dr Pelt has written authoritatively in his *Tobacco, arms and politics. Greece and Germany from World Crisis to World War 1929-41* (Copenhagen 1998), a study of the German economic penetration of Greece during the pre-war period. The effort came up against the problem that the years of American occupation in Germany had created a taste for American Virginia tobacco in preference to the stronger flavored Oriental variety grown in Greece. Nonetheless Greek tobacco exports to West Germany increased threefold between 1950 and 1954. In my view, however, in the overall context of his thesis Dr Pelt gives rather too much space to a detailed analysis of the importance of tobacco to Greece's balance of payments, to what he terms the »tobacco nerve« in the Greek economy. Another mechanism in the complex process of »tying« Greece to the

West, as Dr Pelt demonstrates, was the encouragement by the German Federal Republic of a massive influx of Gastarbeiter, amounting at its peak to almost 300,000. Dr Pelt also has interesting things to say about the role in this process of economic reconstruction of the controversial industrialist Bodossakis Athanasiadis and his use of his contacts, dating from the pre-war period, with German industrialists, including the Krupp dynasty. Bodossakis was close to Spyros Markezinis, the then rising politician, who, as Minister of Co-ordination, played an important role in the process of economic reconstruction, and who negotiated with West German Chancellor Erhard the first major post-war agreements on trade and finance.

I found that the fourth section of Dr Pelt's study *The Post-War Political Order under Pressure, 1962-1974* to be in some ways the most interesting part of the dissertation, based as it is on American archival material that has not yet been widely exploited. This section documents the breakdown of parliamentary democracy in Greece, following George Papandreou's attempt, initially, encouraged by the Americans, to liberalise the post-civil-war political regime. These efforts, against the background of renewed tension over Cyprus, brought Papandreou into confrontation with the King and key sections of the army, prompting the conspiracy that resulted in the military coup of April 1967. The thesis contains interesting detail about King Constantine's abortive counter-coup of December 1967. Dr Pelt points out the unwillingness of the US to put pressure on the Colonels in the light of the increased strategic importance of Greece in the aftermath of the Six Day War which more or less coincided with the April 1967 coup in Greece. He emphasizes, too, the urgent need on the part of the United States to secure »home-porting« facilities in Greece in the wake of an increased naval Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean and following the loss in 1970 of naval base facilities in Libya. The details which Dr Pelt provides of King Constantine's contacts with, and willingness to co-operate with, the Greek military regime of 1967 to 1974 to the extent of being willing to return to Greece and work alongside Papadopoulos are eye-opening and potentially explosive if publicized in Greece, cf. Dr Pelt's article in *Historisk Tidsskrift* 2003.

Although this concluding fourth section throws much new light on the period of military rule between 1967 and 1974 it does not sit altogether comfortably with the three earlier sections of the thesis and reads more like a potted history of Greece during the period in question.

The thesis demonstrates a good knowledge of the general international background. It is well written, with only a few minor infelicities in

English. It is supplied with a very comprehensive bibliography in a range of languages. From a stylistic view point I find the author's tendency to write in short paragraphs rather unsatisfactory. The thesis is largely free of factual error but inevitably there are some inaccuracies. For instance, Dr Pelt states that Greece did not recognize the Soviet Union until after the Second World War, whereas Greece afforded *de jure* recognition to the Soviet Union in 1924, and was the first Balkan country to do so.

The thesis could be reduced in length without damage to its overall integrity by removing the lengthy quotations in the original German from the Auswärtiges Amt archives when these are given in English translation or are substantially paraphrased in the body of the thesis. Unless the translation is problematic there is no need for these parallel texts. An example is Konrad Adenauer's letter of 23 December 1960 about the »absolute necessity« of stressing the political importance of the proposed Greece/EEC Association Agreement (p. 301).

Although the thesis is based on very extensive archival research, the author sometimes overlooks material in the public domain which would have sustained his thesis. A case in point is his rather cursory treatment of what he refers to as the »Marten (read Merten) Affair« (p. 330). Greater and more effective use might have been made of this strange and disconcerting affair in sustaining the overall argument of the thesis.

Maximilian (Max) Merten had in civilian life been a lawyer. During the German occupation of Greece he was to play a key role in the military administration of Thessaloniki. During the early months of 1943 he was closely associated with Adolf Eichmann's henchmen Dieter Wisliceny and Alois Brunner in organising the deportation of the city's very large Jewish population, amounting to perhaps twenty per cent of the total population, to Auschwitz. *Inter alia*, Merten issued orders for the confiscation of Jewish property, for the compulsory wearing by Jews of the Star of David, and for the confiscation of Jewish property. He appears to have benefited personally from the disposal of this property. In the immediate post-war period, Merten escaped prosecution as a war criminal, possibly as a result of his wartime contacts with leading Greek politicians. The West German authorities appear not to have considered him to be among the »genuinely guilty« from the Nazi era, to use Konrad Adenauer's expression.

In 1957 Merten had the temerity to visit Greece, whereupon he was arrested and charged with war crimes. He was brought to trial in 1959 and sentenced to 25 years in prison. In the interim Constantine



Karamanlis, the prime minister, had negotiated an economic agreement between Greece and the Federal Republic of Germany, an agreement discussed in considerable detail by Dr Pelt between pages 231 and 240. The negotiation of this agreement reflected German, and Western fears more generally, that the West was losing ground in the Middle East to the Soviet Union, whose profile had been raised by the assistance given to Nasser's Aswan High Dam project, while the bitter conflict in Cyprus placed additional strains on the relationship with Greece and led to feelings of isolation on the part of Greece. The agreement negotiated between Karamanlis and Adenauer provided for a German loan of 200 million D-marks, together with long term credits to German firms exporting to Greece of 100 million D-marks, a much more generous settlement, apparently, than Karamanlis had thought possible. The loan of 200 million marks was apparently twice the amount which the Greeks had originally sought. Germany by this stage was easily Greece's largest trading partner as imports from the US and Britain fell.

This agreement, building on the Erhard-Markezinis agreement of 1953, about which Dr Pelt writes cogently, marked a significant stage in the re-establishment of the economic preponderance that Germany had enjoyed in pre-war Greece. Karamanlis apparently promised in a secret annex to this economic agreement to suspend prosecutions of alleged German war criminals and ensure that Merten was returned to Germany, where there was no possibility of his facing trial. There were limits, however, to Karamanlis' ability to interfere in the Greek judicial system and he was unable to secure the immediate release of Merten and the trial went ahead. Late in 1959, however, legislation was passed which enabled Merten to be released after having served only a few months of his twenty-five-year sentence. He was subsequently apparently compensated by the German government for the time he had spent in jail in Greece. At the time and subsequently there has been speculation that it was Merten's knowledge of the more sordid details of collaborationist activity by Greek politicians that lay behind this rather remarkable act of leniency.

While this of course cannot be ruled out, a more plausible explanation in the light of Dr Pelt's researches would appear to be that the primary motive underlying Karamanlis's behavior was to meet a request from the Federal Republic of Germany for clemency in return for economic favours. By the time that Merten was allowed to return to Germany, negotiations, strongly supported by Germany and to which Karamanlis attached particular importance, for Greece's treaty of association with the EEC were well under way. Dr Pelt (p.257) records

Karamanlis expressing his »heartfelt thanks« to Bonn for its »outstanding support« in playing a leading role in initiating the negotiations that culminated in Greece's 1961 Treaty of Association with the European Economic Community. At the least it can be argued that Karamanlis was unwilling to allow the Merten affair to prejudice German support in the negotiation of the Treaty, just as, as Dr Pelt points out (p. 273), Germany exploited Greece's need for German backing over EEC association by warning Greece not to make excessive demands for reparations for Germany's wartime depredations in Greece, in effect a form of blackmail. Karamanlis, in a successful attempt to secure de Gaulle's support for Greece's Treaty of Association with the European Economic Community, adopted a supportive stance to France over the Algerian question (p. 287), as Dr Pelt point out, despite a tradition of support in the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Arab political causes and although there were clear parallels between the Algerian war of independence and the EOKA campaign for the enosis of Cyprus with Greece. Both were essentially anti-Colonial struggles.

I feel that Dr Pelt might have made more effective use of the Merten affair in sustaining his overall thesis, particularly as he makes reference to a detailed study of the affair by Susanne-Sophia Spiliotis, »An affair of politics, not justice«: the Merten trial (1957-1959) and Greek-German relations' in Mark Mazower, ed., *After the war was over: reconstructing the family, nation, and state in Greece, 1943-1960* (Princeton 2000) pp. 293-302.)

*Richard Clogg*

## II

What we have before us today with Mogens Pelt's thesis, »Tying Greece to the West: U.S.-West German-Greek Relations, 1949-1974«, is remarkable and path-breaking in at least two senses.<sup>1</sup> First, the topic and approach of the thesis is novel and original in a number of ways. This is a point I will get back to in a moment. Second, Mogens Pelt is the first Danish historian ever to write a thesis for the philosophical doctoral degree with its focus on a general, non-Danish topic of the Cold War. Of course, for this reason alone it is only natural that Pelt chose to write it in English. Indeed, a good and correct English, with very few stylistic mishaps.

I would like to state here from the outset that this is indeed a rich and very useful work, scholarship clearly on an international level, which brings us not only substantial new knowledge of the Cold War international relations of Greece, but also important insights into the position of Greece between major Western powers up until the mid-1970s, as well as an increased awareness of the nature and scope of the grand strategy of the United States during the period of the Cold War under scrutiny.

As is apparent, contrary to the tradition of theses accepted for the defence of the Danish doctoral degree (dr. phil.), Mogens Pelt's thesis has not yet been published in book form, but only in the present 'temporary' copied version. As chair of the evaluation committee, I shall offer a word of explanation for this. The main reason is the following: A few months after Mogens Pelt submitted his manuscript for evaluation, a key volume of the edited State Department source publication under the name, »Foreign Relations of the United States«, or FRUS, was finally released, namely the volume on United States policies towards Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey from 1964 to 1968, i.e. the years up until and during the early military Junta rule in Greece. We considered that publication in book form for the international market of Pelt's manu-

<sup>1</sup> The following is a slightly revised and abridged version of my oral opposition as the second official opponent at Mogens Pelt's public defense of his thesis at the University of Copenhagen on June 20, 2003.

script *without* the incorporation of any relevant information from the new FRUS volume would be ill-advised, and, hence, we suggested informally to Mogens Pelt that he postpone the publication of the book version until he had had the opportunity to make the pertinent adjustments of the manuscript - a suggestion which he followed, much to our satisfaction. A secondary reason for the 'temporary' version is - as stated in the report of the evaluation committee - that some editorial alterations should be made before publication, including an abridgement, in the interest of conciseness and readability, of the very detailed chapter on the importance of tobacco to the early post-war Greek economy and exports

Even so, the present preliminary - and original - version of Mogens Pelt's thesis is formally and to its outward appearance largely free of factual errors, as well as of typing and spelling errors (I shall get back to one or two of the exceptions from this later on). The introductory and concluding sections and chapters, as well as the sub-summaries and sub-conclusions along the road, are helpful and rewarding in their lucidity and concise reasoning. Furthermore, the thesis presents itself with all the formal scholarly equipment: extensive research notes and references, a comprehensive list of used primary sources and archives originating from three or four countries, the United States, Great Britain, and Germany - and even a few documents from Danish archives - as well as listings of used secondary sources. The lack of a subject and name index in this version is an obvious liability which of course should be remedied in the final book version.

Unfortunately, due to limits of time, I will not by far be able to cover or discuss all of the many interesting aspects and topics which this thesis raises, and which deserves the attention of all scholars in the field. I intend to discuss four selected themes in the following:

first, the contributions of this thesis to the historiography of the Cold War, and its positioning in the international historiography debate.

second, some questions of definitions, theory and methodology;

third, some general and specific issues concerning United States strategy towards Western Europe in general and the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean in particular;

and fourth, a few general and specific issues on the internal situation in Greece during military rule from 1967 to 1974 and the United States role in this connection.

*Cold War Historiography*

Concerning the first point, it is indeed a truism to state that there is, apparently, no lack of research literature on the history of the Cold War. In particular the early period of the Cold War, the late 1940s and the 1950s, and increasingly the 1960s as well, have been scrutinized by historians to such an extent that the total volume of their published products could easily fill a middle-sized library - monographs, anthologies, articles in periodicals and magazines, source editions and journals more or less devoted to Cold War history. And it continues. The Cold War has been over for more than a decade now - but it is most certainly not over to historians. This situation is not at all surprising; it is only natural and, indeed, healthy.

There are several factors to account for the prolific Cold War historical literature. First of all, the forty-five years of Cold War defined the configurations of international and national power on a global scale, as well as the mental mind-map in many parts of the world, for almost half a century. Secondly, the Cold War period and its outcome is, to a large extent, determining the distribution of power in our post-Cold War world. Thus, it is true that to understand the present, we must know and understand better the Cold War world which brought it about. Thirdly, releases of much important source material from government and institutional archives in the West and, in particular, in the former Communist countries are continuing to refine and add shades to historians' understanding of the mechanisms of the Cold War. Fourthly, new generations of historians have emerged, whose personal memories of the Cold War may be limited to the Reagan-Gorbachev years of the 1980s; naturally, these young or younger scholars tend to view the Cold War as a historical period from new perspectives, in part using new methods and approaches, as well as additional types of primary and secondary sources.

Cold War historiography is therefore, and not surprisingly, a long and complicated affair. Hence one could expect the thesis we discuss today to explain at least briefly where the author positions himself in the general Cold War historiography debate. However, the reader looks in vain for such a positioning here. To be sure, we are told (on p. 15 ff.) about the two »trends of interpretation of the significance of United States involvement in Greece«, namely on the one hand the view that U.S. engagement in Greece since the early Cold War years was »justified as a rational response to real Soviet threats« towards the strategically important Eastern Mediterranean area. The other trend of interpre-



tation, we are told, emphasizes that »Washington's engagement in the Greek domestic strife degenerated into 'colonial control' based on 'neo-imperialist' methods«, and that this intervention had »severe consequences for Greece's internal developments until well into the 1970's«. Correspondingly, we are also told (p. 17) that the scholarly historical literature on the subject can be roughly divided into those works which stress the influence of Greece's own national and political interests and those works which regard Greece as more or less a pawn in Washington's global Cold War strategy.

What is in want here is a somewhat more elaborated discussion of these two trends, as well as some sort an indication of the position of the author himself in this ongoing debate. It is never stated, at least not explicitly, where he stands in the international Cold War historiography debate in general, but also in the more specific context of United States political and economic relations to Western Europe during this period of the Cold War.

#### *Theory, definitions, methodology*

This leads me to the next group of questions that I wish to raise. The first one concerns an important part of the primary sources used in the thesis. The scope of primary multi-archival and multi-national sources upon which this thesis is based, is considerable. The author has, with impressive energy, worked his way through American, German, and British governmental archives as well as some Greek and Danish private papers. Somewhat surprisingly, however, we find very little systematic discussion of the specific nature and quality of the primary sources used. Most importantly, there is no discussion of the value of the published State Department source material in the Foreign Relations of the United States series, FRUS, nor of the corresponding German Foreign Ministry source publication, »Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland«, nor of the dozen volumes of published personal and official papers of Constantin Karamanlis. To what extent are the selections of documents in these official or semi-official source publications representative? Do they contain significant gaps or lacunas, and if so, is there a tendency, or bias, in these gaps?

The second question is about theory. It is apparent that the author has no major theoretical ambitions in this work. We don't find any trendy theories or over-arching attempts to conceptualize the account or to test empirically any fashionable theoretical construction from the political science sub-discipline International Relations. In this sense, the thesis

is traditional in its methodological approach. This is by no means necessarily a drawback - indeed, some of the best examples of archival based historical scholarship on 20th century international relations have no explicit or implicit theoretical underpinnings.

Nevertheless, one might wonder whether the lack of theoretical foundations in this work is the result of a deliberate choice to do without? Does the author believe that International Relations theory simply has no place in an empirically based historical study such as the present one? Since the main focus of the thesis is the small, and comparatively weak and strategically exposed front-line state of Greece during crucial years of Cold War superpower rivalry, one might perhaps have expected that the author had browsed International Relations theories or adaptation policies of small states in a bi-polar international system - if only to reject such theories as useless? For instance, the »abandonment-or-entrapment« model used with some apparent success in historical and political science studies of the foreign and security policies and strategies of the small Scandinavian or Nordic countries<sup>2</sup> - in many respects front-line states in the Cold War similar to Greece. If the author had tried to apply such more or less sketchy theoretical models, or at least taken them as points of departure for his meticulous empirical analyses of his source material, it might also have been possible or natural for him to make potentially stimulating comparisons between the survival strategies of exposed small states in the Balkans and in Northern Europe during the Cold War.

It could also be asked why the author has left out of his research focus the cultural and ideological relations between the United States, Germany, and Greece, including the area of information, propaganda, and psychological warfare. In the 1990s, a wave of historical studies of these socio-cultural aspects of Cold War international relations has refined and widened our understanding of East-West relations as well as West-West relations during the Cold War.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, one might have expected that a study of the scope of this thesis would have at least touch-

<sup>2</sup> See, for instance, Nikolaj Petersen: *Denmark and NATO, 1949-1987* (Forsvarsstudier - Defense Studies, FHFS 2/1987), Oslo 1987; Nikolaj Petersen & Carsten Due-Nielsen (eds.): *Adaptation & Activism: The Foreign Policy of Denmark 1967-1993* (Copenhagen, 1995); Glenn Snyder: »The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics«, in: *World Politics*, Vol. 36:4, July 1984, pp. 461-495.

<sup>3</sup> Examples are Walter Hixson: *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture and the Cold War, 1945-1961* (London, 1997); Gary D. Rawnsley (ed.): *Cold War Propaganda in the 1950s* (London, 1999); Scott Lucas: *Freedom's War: The American Crusade Against the Soviet Union* (London, 1999).

ed upon such issues. Indeed, in the specific case of Greece, much as in the case of Italy, with a strong but beaten Communist Party, with broad sections of poorly educated people, and strong U.S. interests and influence, the ideological propaganda Cold War should be expected to have been often quite fierce in that particular country.

Another concept which I do not find quite satisfactorily explained or defined in its concrete historical context throughout the period is the so-called »right wing state« in Greece. In Part I, on p. 47, a somewhat fragmented definition of this particular state is attempted: Politics and society in post-war Greece, it is maintained, developed in a state which initially was »an expression of the intentions and beliefs [should be 'beliefs', P.V.]) of the victors in the Civil War«; their values and Weltanschauung were formed by anti-Communism, which »played a central role for the coherence of the Right«. In Part IV, p. 363 and p. 376, the concept of the »Right-Wing State« (this time, by the way, typed with capital letters) is referred to again, here especially in the context of the so-called Lambrakis affair, i.e. the assassination in 1963 of a well-known peace activist and professor at Athens University, a misdeed which was linked to high-ranking state officials and to the so-called »shadow state«, or Parakratos, i.e. an ultra right-wing organization often working outside the limits of the law.

What is missing here is a more comprehensive picture of the specific role, if any, of the »Right-Wing State« (typed with capital letters or not) throughout the period, i.e. even before 1967, in the formulation of the foreign policy, and foreign economic policy, of Greece. To which extent did the Greek right wing state apparatus - if this is an appropriate term to use - influence specific Greek foreign policies of, for instance, being opposed to American pro-Israel policies in the Middle East? Here, reference could also be made to the so-called Aspida Affair in 1965, when an alleged left-wing faction in the Greek Army with »Nasserist« leaning was behind a plot for a coup d'état; how does this incident fit into the larger picture? Moreover, it would be interesting to pursue the question about possible international connections of the Parakratos - links to obscure forces in Italy, for instance, and/or possibly even to Western - U.S. - intelligence circles. The thesis is not explicit on these issues.

### *U.S. Grand Strategy and the Eastern Mediterranean*

This brings me to the third section of what I would like to take up here – some questions concerning the United States Grand Strategy during

the early Cold War, and, more specifically, the geo-political and geo-strategic position of Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean as seen from Washington. These issues are covered in brief, at times laconic form through some seven pages in the introductory chapter (pp. 23-31), and again, scattered and rather fragmented, in Part I (pp. 77-79), in Part II (pp. 183-194) and in Part III (esp. pp. 207-211); yet the picture presented here appears to me too sketchy.

United States Grand Strategy towards Western Europe in general in the early and formative phase of the Cold War is identified correctly, of course, as one of containing the perceived Soviet and Communist threat both political-economically - the Marshall Plan, as well as plans for West European integration and liberal trade - and militarily, primarily through defence cooperation via the North Atlantic Treaty. Somewhat surprisingly, however, on p. 27 we read that the so-called National Security document NSC 160/1 dating from August 1953 marked »a major turning point in U.S.-West German relations«, since Washington by now regarded Bonn as a »crucial component in its containment policy«.

This is, I would claim, a somewhat misleading account of the role of West Germany in U.S. strategy during these years. As demonstrated by, for instance, historians Melvyn Leffler and Carolyn Eisenberg, there was no doubt in the minds of Washington players - key foreign policy architect Dean Acheson, among others - at least four or five years earlier, in the late 1940s, that the Western part of Germany was absolutely crucial to U.S. plans for the recovery and the defence of Western Europe.<sup>4</sup>

For instance, if we look at the U.S. preparations for the Foreign Ministers' meeting in Paris in the Spring of 1949, more than a year prior to the outbreak of the Korean War, Washington became convinced that Moscow might be interested in striking a deal, giving up exclusive control of its Eastern German Zone, unifying Germany and ending the division of Europe. Washington analysts knew that Moscow feared the establishment of a West German state, that Moscow was over-extended in Eastern Europe, and that Moscow still wanted to participate in running the economically vital Ruhr District. However, it was evident that Washington's primary security goal was not to unify Germany, and not even to ease tensions in Europe, but rather to harness (western) Germany's economic and military potential for the Atlantic community. In Washington's perspective at this point, an independent unified

<sup>4</sup> Carolyn Eisenberg: *Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-1949* (Cambridge, 1996); Melvyn P. Leffler: *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, 1992).

Germany could associate with the Kremlin, or it could manoeuvre between the superpowers in East and West, thus regaining its independent strength. This was too dangerous, according to Washington. Significantly, when U.S. Senator Vandenberg worried that American policies towards Germany would institutionalize a permanent Cold War, Dean Acheson answered that his intention was not to end the Cold War, but to effect a preponderance of Western strength and power; the Soviets could not be trusted, and a flourishing Western community – with an integrated West Germany – would serve as a magnet to Kremlin's East European satellites. Of course, none of this could be said openly or publicly at this time; but as early as 1949 it was a foregone conclusion to Acheson that Western Germany's re-militarization and full integration into the Western camp was simply a matter of time and circumstance.

Hence, if 1953 could hardly be termed as a turning-point in U.S. policies towards Germany, it is also somewhat difficult to fully accept the picture drawn up in this chapter of the German Federal Republic as more or less the key European power to U.S. policies towards the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean from the early 1950s on. What about the role of Great Britain, and that of France, towards this part of the world around 1950 - the former or present colonial or mandatory powers in the region with extensive political, strategic-military and economic interests in the natural resources of the Middle East, primarily oil?

Phrased in another way: I do accept the main proposition - and the evidence to support it - that the potentials of West German trade and capital were indeed important to U.S. strategy and burden-sharing considerations in the Eastern Mediterranean area; yet, this section of the thesis tends to overstate the relative importance of West Germany to the United States overall regional strategy at this juncture, as compared to that of other European powers, first of all Great Britain, but also France. In particular, British military power in the Middle East region was of great immediate importance to the United States, and military power was, of course, a 'currency' of which West Germany had none at this point.

Similarly, but contrary to the impression one may gain from the introductory chapter and Part II, the military-strategic importance of Turkey to the United States certainly dates back longer than to the early 1950s when Turkey - together with Greece - became members of NATO. Indeed, controversies with Moscow over the international status of the Turkish straits in late 1945 and early 1946 was the very first open Cold War crisis between the United States and the Soviet Union - i.e. more than one year before President Truman, in March 1947, launched



the doctrine that was soon to be named after him in the context of providing U.S. assistance to Greece and Turkey..

In other words, United States basic strategy towards the Eastern Mediterranean region, including Greece and Turkey, was definitely shaped, as Melvyn Leffler and others have demonstrated, during the mid- or late 1940s - before the start of the period under scrutiny here. U.S. strategy was not primarily determined by Soviet actions; in fact, Moscow did little to benefit from developments in Greece, or Turkey for that matter. But should the British depart from Greece and the conservative forces they had bolstered there, Washington feared that the momentum would shift to the political left. And Communist successes in Greece could have serious political and psychological consequences in Italy and France with their large Communist Parties. If these two Mediterranean countries turned Communist, U.S. position in North Africa and the Iberian Peninsular would be in grave danger; non-Communist parties throughout north-western Europe would lose hope.

Even a remote probability of such a bandwagon scenario was enough to alarm Washington officials. If, as a consequence, the Soviets gained a presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, they would have the ability to cut the flow of vital raw materials to West European governments. They lacked sufficient coal to sustain economic recovery, and therefore badly needed access to Middle Eastern oil. If Western Europe was denied petroleum and other vital resources, it would founder and go Communist. And if Western Europe was dominated by pro-Soviet forces, the survival of the United States was in danger.

*These* were the stakes, in Greece and her neighbouring region, according to Washington at this time. Was it a vastly exaggerated threat perception, and at least in part ideologically determined? The vast majority of Cold War historians today would say so. Nevertheless, this was the - admittedly, worst-case - scenario which was very much in the minds of key U.S. officials during the late 1940s, and hence the extraordinary strategic importance to U.S. planners of Greece, as well as of Turkey and of the whole Eastern Mediterranean. As the vice chief of U.S. naval operations said in April 1947, the Mediterranean should be conceived as »a highway« for the projection of military power »deep into the heart of the land mass of Eurasia and Africa«. Indeed, in 1949 both U.S. and British military planners insisted that in case of an emergency war it would be more important to reinforce the defence the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East than to deploy additional troops to

Western Europe.<sup>5</sup> This, evidently, also had much to do with the vital importance of the British air base in Egypt, at the Suez Canal - »the swing door of the British Empire« as Anthony Eden called it, from which long range bombers could reach any target in the Middle East as well as vital Soviet oil fields in the Caucasus and other important targets in the 'soft underbelly' of the Soviet Union.

The strategic importance of the Eastern Mediterranean further increased after 1950, both in view of the Korean War and, not least, because of the fear in Washington that Moscow could exploit emerging nationalist fervour in Egypt and in the Arab world in general, and make sizeable gains. In August 1951, Dean Acheson told the NSC that conditions in the Middle East were explosive. This was the context in which the U.S. pressed hard for the inclusion of Greece and Turkey into the NATO alliance. As U.S. NATO General Collins said, Turkish neutrality »would deny us access to the shortest and most expeditious routes to the nerve centre of the plague that afflicts us.«<sup>6</sup> U.S. Air Force access to Turkish airfields for defensive and offensive operations to protect Middle East (Saudi) oil fields, and as stepping stones for the atomic counteroffensive against the Soviet Union in case of general war, was also considered vital.

Put in the most simple terms, what I would have preferred here is a somewhat more systematic and comprehensive focus on *why* Greece was tied to the West in the first place, than on just *how* it was done; I think this would have been beneficial to the analysis and, indeed, further sustained the propositions of the thesis. More elaboration on the reasons why might also help to explain more fully the persistent means the United States used to integrate co-opt Greece into the West. Moreover, this part of the analysis might have benefited from a more systematic widening of the strategic focus from Greece to the Balkans and Turkey, i.e. to South Eastern Europe, including the Eastern Mediterranean, the Levant, and the Middle East.

#### *Greece during Military Rule, 1967-1974*

The fourth and last point concerns the section about Greece during military rule from 1967 to 1974. As has already been pointed out, there is much novel and interesting, and even some explosive, information contained in this chapter, not least due to the fact that Mogens Pelt, as

<sup>5</sup> Leffler, op.cit., p. 144 and 286 f.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid, p. 425.

one of the first scholars, have been able to use recently declassified United States government archives from the late 1960s and early 1970s. His pioneering research in this context includes even surprising insights into the extent of the willingness of King Constantine to seek an accommodation with the military Junta regime in his desire to return to the Greek throne.

Actually, I have but a few objections to raise against this part of the thesis. First of all, yet another concept is worthwhile discussing at some length. It becomes predominant especially in this last section of the thesis, namely the slippery term of »anti-Americanism«. In connection with the internal political crisis in Greece during the 1960s and early 1970s, we are told, »anti-Americanism« in Greece ran high; »anti-Americanism became a factor of increasing significance in Greek politics.« (p. 364); »passionate anti-Americanism was another hall-mark of this generation«, we read on the following page, meaning the younger, post-Civil War generation. Also, the »opposition to the Junta was linked with anti-Americanism«, which was nurtured by the belief that the regime was the result of the so-called 'American factor', blamed for many evils in Greece, real and imagined.» (p. 466), including the question of U.S. home-coming in Greece in the early 1970s, which, according to the State Department itself, »might provoke rising anti-Americanism« (p. 468). The very pro-Junta American Ambassador in Athens, Tasca, was »another obvious source of anti-Americanism« (p. 470). During the increasing Greek student demonstrations in 1973 against the Junta, »the students were united by anti-Americanism« (p. 485). In early 1975, i.e. even after the fall of the Junta, Henry Kissinger is summarized, in a warning to Karamanlis, to the effect that »the surge of anti-Americanism and its dependence on the Soviet Union made it impossible for the U.S. to play a positive role in the search for peace in the Middle East«; the author, approvingly, adds that U.S. home-coming in Greece »was notoriously known for provoking anti-American sentiments among the Greek public«, feelings that were so strong that »anti-Americanism turned violent« when the Greek terror group '17 November' assassinated the CIA station chief Richard Welsh« (p. 498).

Now, there is no doubt that a political factor which could be termed anti-Americanism was at play in Greece during the 1960s and the 1970s. I would even be prepared to accept that especially in the Greek case, the term may be more accurate in characterizing certain small radical political groups during this particular period than at most other times and places during the Cold War, at least as long as we talk about Western Europe. Nevertheless, I doubt the validity of the concept in a

scholarly analysis; indeed, »anti-Americanism« is not a scholarly concept. Rather, it is a sloppy political concept, or perhaps better, a political term of abuse, a political invective. As an analytical tool it is doubtful, not to say misleading. Unfortunately this thesis, like so many other fine Cold War accounts, uses the concept uncritically, i.e. without any apparent attempt at definition or reflection.

Why is this a problem? First of all, because the term is too indiscriminate. Anti-Americanism is hardly to be compared to, say, anti-Semitism. Anti-Semitism is against Jews in general. Most people who subscribed to so-called anti-Americanism during the Cold War were certainly not opposed to Americans in general, nor to everything American. On the contrary, most of the youngsters who burned »The Stars and Stripes« in front of the American Embassies in West European capitals - including Athens, I suspect - during the late 1960s and the early 1970s wore blue jeans, worshipped and emulated American popular music, enthusiastically watched American movies, and travelled to - or wished to travel to - the United States as tourists or as exchange students. What the »anti-Americanists« did oppose vehemently, however, were specific United States foreign policies and strategies, be it in Indochina, in Greece, in Latin America, etc. A major reason for the strong protests in these cases, it could be argued, was that these specific U.S. foreign policies ran counter to proclaimed American democratic ideals. And a final major point: A considerable portion of the political inspiration and documentation, on which the European youngsters' protests were based, came from none other than like-minded American movements, institutions, and individuals in the United States.<sup>7</sup>

Leaving aside the cultural-conservative anti-Americanism of the political right wing, as well as the dogmatic political anti-Americanism of the extreme left wing, it could be argued that exactly because the vast majority of so-called »anti-Americanists« during the Cold War had ambivalent feelings about the United States - the well-known love-hatred formula applies here - the indiscriminate use of the term anti-Americanism should not be found in scholarly works - not even in works about Cold War Greece.

There are also a few questions concerning the use of sources in this section. On p. 437, the diplomatic exchanges between the American and the French government in 1972 concerning the Greek Junta's pur-

<sup>7</sup> For a further discussion of this point, see for instance Richard Kuisel: *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization* (Berkeley, 1993); Richard Pells: *Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture Since World War II* (New York, 1997).

chase of jet fighters are analyzed. The issue here was whether France would be able to convince the Colonels in Athens to buy Mirage fighters, or whether the Junta would rely on the U.S. Phantom F-4 fighter. In this context, Pelt writes that »France was trying to convince Washington that 'it did not matter whether Greece brought [should be: bought, P.V.] Mirages or F-4s so long as Greece remained on the side of NATO and against Communism'«. Now, who is actually speaking here? The reference foot note (no. 1035, p. 437) is of little help, since the source of the quotation is a telegram from the U.S. Embassy in Athens to the State Department. Is it the French government, or the French ambassador to Athens, who is quoted here? Or is it, rather, the interpretation of the American ambassador to Greece of what he believes to be the position the French government? The reader is left in the dark concerning the answer.

These lines from Part IV of the thesis raise two somewhat more general problems: First, it appears that the author has not tried to use relevant French Foreign Ministry archives, despite the fact that he attempts at reconstructing some of the positions of the French government towards Greece in the 1960s and early 1970s. Instead, he uses U.S. State Department records to reconstruct French policies, sometimes, as in this case, in a somewhat obscure manner.

The second problem here is that this last section of the thesis tends to be written much closer to the primary sources, i.e. predominantly U.S. State Department records, than the previous sections, and with little or no discussion or appraisal of the value or representativity of these very recently - and presumably selectively - released records. Thus, Pelt relies to quite a large extent upon the reports of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) in the State Department. These reports are sometimes cited at length - for example, on p. 461 f. - and are used, apparently, to determine the position of the U.S. government towards the Junta regime. However, we find little or no evidence of how the President or the Secretary of State were influenced by the INR analyses, i.e. the extent to which it is possible to identify the conclusions of the INR concerning the situation in Greece in the early 1970s with the official position of the U.S. government.

Moreover, at times it remains an open question how the diplomatic reports of the U.S. ambassador to Athens, Henry Tasca, in the early 1970s concerning the situation in Greece were actually received in Washington. For example, it remains untold how Secretary of State Rogers reacted to the Tasca recommendations in August 1972, quoted on p. 472 f., (footnote 1121), according to which demands for democra-



cy in Greece should be equated, in public U.S. government presentations, with the Soviet interference in and invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Readers of this part of the thesis might sometimes be reminded of the old saying about what really separates traditionally diplomatic history from international history: »Never mind who said what to whom. Ask rather: What were the stakes?« The overall impression the reader may get from these last 50-100 pages of the thesis is an author under a certain stress of a deadline. The writing style becomes somewhat short of breath; for instance, the author hardly even take his time to explain why the coup against Arch Bishop Makarios occurred at the time it did, in July 1974 (p. 495). The change of gear in this section, as compared to the previous parts, is apparent, and the author should probably consider ways to better integrate these chapters into the rest of the analysis.

### *Factual errors*

I have found very few factual errors or omissions in the thesis as submitted. But since it is my obligation to point out the more conspicuous flaws and oversights which do occur, here are two:

On p. 434, in a sub-chapter on the international criticism levelled at the Junta regime in the late 1960s onwards, we read that »in the following years the Scandinavian countries continued their attacks against the Junta at the biannual meetings of the NATO Council of Ministers.« This is not accurate. Actually, it was only at the NATO Council of Ministers meetings in May and December 1970 that Danish and Norwegian representatives - followed by no other member countries - explicitly raised their voices against the Junta. Due to heavy confidential U.S. pressure outside of the NATO Council as well as Greek obstruction techniques inside the Council, the Scandinavian governments in the years after 1970 chose to level their criticism at the Athens regime only outside of the NATO Council framework, primarily through bilateral talks.

On p. 527, in the summary in Danish, it is claimed inaccurately that Denmark, during the Junta years, demanded Greece to leave organized Western cooperation (»Danmark krævede, at Grækenland forlod det vestlige samarbejde«). Actually, successive Danish (and Norwegian) governments did propose the suspension - but not the exclusion - of Greek membership of the European Council; Copenhagen also called on the Junta regime to withdraw from the European Council (it did not).

But Denmark never considered demanding that Greece leave NATO or other organisations for Western cooperation (such as the OECD).<sup>8</sup>

### *Conclusion*

It has been my professional duty here to focus on some more or less problematic, or debatable, aspects of Mogens Pelt's thesis. But this discussion should certainly not obscure the fact that this is indeed a competent and skilful piece of historical research. It is, therefore, appropriate at this point to read the concluding section of the report of the evaluation committee. It reads:

»In conclusion, despite the above mentioned shortcomings, we wish to state that this is a well-written, well-researched, and very useful work which adds very considerably to our knowledge of the post-war international relations of Greece. The focus on the triangular nature of Greek-U.S.-West German relations between the end of the Civil War and the downfall of the Colonels' regime is an original and fruitful one. The author is able to extract the essence of complicated diplomatic negotiations and to discern between political and economic reasons and motives. He provides novel insights into the modus operandi of important Western players on the international scene during a crucial period of the Cold War. As such, the present work helps significantly in filling a major void in international Cold War historiography, and it is clearly worthy of defence for the philosophical doctorate (Danish 'dr. phil.' degree).«

To these official words I would add, as a person who has known Mogens Pelt as a colleague for more than a decade, that in some ways the thesis reflects its author's personal qualities - thoroughness, generosity, a deep commitment, and contagious enthusiasm. In my judgment the thesis has, in certain aspects, raised the bar for future scholarship of international Cold War history.

<sup>8</sup> See, on both of these points, Thorsten Borring Olesen & Poul Villaume: *I blokopdelingens tegn, 1945-1972. Dansk Udenrigspolitik Historie, bd. 5* (København, 2004).