Male and Female Witnesses' Speech in Swedish Criminal Trials

The present quantitative study focuses on witnesses’ speech in Swedish criminal trials, more speciﬁcally on potential differences between men’s and women’s language styles. Since the 1970s, research on language and gender has been divided into three main approaches towards the relationship between men’s and women’s language use: the deﬁcit approach, the dominance approach and the cultural approach. The present study uses the more recent dynamic approach to show how gender is acted out in each situation taking into account a number of factors, e.g. context. The aim of our work is ﬁrst and foremost to study the possible correlation between the witnesses’ gender and language in the courtroom context and then to investigate if income and/or level of education provide better explanations for possible variation by looking at a broad range of linguistic variables. The results show no statistically signiﬁcant gender or social status differences in the witnesses’ speech. However, when comparing the results of the testifying police ofﬁcers accidentally included in the study with the rest of the witnesses, the differences turned out to be signiﬁcant. This shows that, in this case, factors such as previous courtroom experience and familiarity with the context were probably more inﬂuential on the speech of the informants than gender, income and education, in conformity with the assumptions of the dynamic approach.


Background
For the last three decades, a major topic in sociolinguistics has been the connection, if any, between the structures, vocabularies and ways of using language of men and women and their social roles. Do men and women who use the same language, e.g. English, speak and write it in different ways? If so, why? From the early and mid-1970's, which is generally seen as the starting point for modern research on language and gender, and onwards, these questions have been discussed in a consi derable number of research projects. 2 Many studies have found differences between the genders in terms of the frequency of certain features. Thus, in the foundational work in the fi eld, Lakoff (1975) proposed that there is a "women's language" (WL), characterised by more frequent use of specifi c language forms, and subsequent work has often found that women's speech differs (statistically) from men's in a variety of situations.
Four general approaches to explanation have arisen (Coates 2004:6). The earliest has been called a defi cit approach, in which investi ga tion tended to favour men's language as the norm, seeing women's lan guage as different, unconventional and even incomplete. Lakoff's analysis has been seen as continuing this interpretation, which derives from traditional patriarchal attitudes. The dominance theory holds that linguistic differences mirror the male rule or dominance in society at large. In other words, male power is enacted through language interaction in which both men and women take part resulting in different language styles (Zimmerman and West 1975, Fishman 1983, O'Barr and Atkins 1980. Today, however, the dominance approach has lost some of its credi bility after several studies have been presented showing for instance women using more competitive linguistic strategies and interrupting more than men in certain settings. The cultural approach argues that men and women belong to different sociolinguistic subcultures and there fore have been taught different styles for communication. They have to accept these styles to become fully adequate members of their cul tures (Nordenstam 1987;, Coates 1996, Coates & Cameron 1988. Studies on women's subcultural life often place the emphasis on the private sphere where their speech is found to be more supportive, co-operative and emotionally involved. The most current outlook on gender differences in language use is the dynamic approach. According to this theory, gender is a cultural construc tion, not a predetermined social category (Coates 2004:6-7, Thompson 2002 so that acting and talking like a man or a woman varies over time and between social, ethnic and cultural groups. Gender is accomplished in talk every time we speak. Speakers claim their roles anew in each conversation and the roles, and consequently also the degree of femininity and masculinity, vary depending on context. However, choices are constrained by normative pressures acting on both men and women (Coates 2004:139-143). It is much harder to perform ver sions of masculinity or femininity that challenge the dominant gender norms.

Institutional discourse
A constant theme in the discussions referred to above has been that women's language may be adapted to a private sphere of, for example, friendship, family life, and other personal relations, while men's language is adapted to a public sphere including business meetings, politics, and the law. Many of the contexts in the public sphere require what has been classifi ed as institutional discourse. This has been defi ned (Linell 1990:18-22, Thornborrow 2002 as language: (a) produced in contexts where there are predetermined roles or positions for the partic ipants; (b) having a structurally asymmetrical allocation of turn types between the participants; (c) produced in the interaction between asym metrical parties: professionals (such as prosecutors and lawyers) and lay people (such as defendants and witnesses); and (d) with an orientation towards dealing with a certain matter or solving a specifi c prob lem, which is more or less always the reason for the interaction.

Gender in courtroom language
Courtroom discourse meets these criteria for institutional discourse. Most court proceedings are highly asymmetrical in that some participants have more power over dialogues than others. There are clearly specifi ed roles for the participants that decide their speech performances and their discursive space. The professionals (judges, prosecutors and lawyers) ask questions that the lay people (defendants, plaintiffs and witnesses) are required to answer. The lay people are not allowed to contribute information randomly during the proceedings. They are also to a varying degree personally affected by what dialogues revolve around. This makes them vulnerable compared to the professionals, who are present only as a result of their professional responsibilities. Of course, for someone who is ignorant of the ways court proceedings are conducted, it is usually benefi cial to hand over responsibilities and ini tiatives to professionals.
Court proceedings depend to a great extent on appropriate use of lan guage. It is natural therefore to suspect that the different gender language practices found in other areas of communication will also be mani fested in the courtroom and that this might affect the outcome of the trial. This is clearly an important issue and it has been investigated both in the US and in Scandinavia. O' Barr and Atkins (1980) analysed a total of 150 hours of trials recorded in 1974 in a North Carolina superior criminal court registering all instances of the features described by Lakoff as women's language. The researchers found that although more women than men used women's language features, some male witnesses also used them. O'Barr and Atkins claimed that the factor unit ing people using women's language in the courtroom setting was the fact that they were generally more socially powerless. Their fi ndings can be summarised as follows: Lakoff's term women's language was misleading and they therefore suggested re-naming it "powerless language" (PL). They argued that the tendency for women to use powerless language more than men was due to the greater predisposition for them to be in powerless social positions rather than it being an effect of their gender, thus supporting the dominance position. Erickson et al. (1978) proceeded to test the effects of using powerless language in a simulation. They recorded on tape one of the typical power less testimonies from O'Barr and Atkins' study, acted out fi rst by a woman and then by a man. The powerless testimony was then edited so that the powerless features were omitted producing an example of a power ful testimony, which was also recorded on tape. The four tapes were then played to or read by university students taking the role of jurors. Regardless of the gender of the witness and of the students, the students who heard the recordings of the actors using powerful language thought the witnesses to be more credible, competent, intelligent and trustworthy than those students who listened to the powerless recordings. There were no signifi cant differences in the evaluations between the female and the male actors performing the testimonies. This seems to be convincing evidence for the dominance explanation, but later writers such as Thompson (2002) have questioned whether such labo ratory evidence refl ects actual court processes. Schlyter (1986) performed a case study of the speech of two women and one man before the Swedish Labour Court. The dispute concerned whe ther the man, on the one hand, and the women, on the other, had similar occupational tasks and therefore should have equal pay. Schlyter analysed transcripts of the tape-recorded trial and concluded that the outcome of the trial, which was negative for the women, could have depended on differences in expression between the man and the wo men. The man spoke much more and performed monologues with few questions to keep him going. He used more complex language and was not afraid of promoting himself and his work tasks. The two women spoke less, one of them hardly speaking at all, and there was more of a dialogue between them and the professionals asking the questions. Their language was simpler and they repeatedly down-toned themselves and their work efforts. Schlyter provided a cultural explanation: women learn from the start not to show off, which results in more hesitant and deferen tial language.
Further support for the cultural explanation is evidence that gender is so infl uential as a factor, even in institutional settings, that it outweighs status. West (1998) looked at interruptions using 21 video-recorded encounters between doctors and patients at a local clinic. She found that not only did male physicians interrupt their patients, of either gender, far more often than the reverse, but male patients interrupted women physicians more than the physicians interrupted them. The interruptions were used to gain or assert control and/or dominance. West's fi ndings support those of Woods (1989) who recorded three-party conversations between colleagues of different work status. Occupational role and status infl uenced the speakers' ability to hold the fl oor to a certain extent but it was still the men who dominated regardless of whether they were bosses or subordinates. These rather surprising fi ndings suggest that even when a woman has the role of professional or superordinate in an institutional context, it is her gender and not her institutional role that decides who interrupts whom. Gender amounts to a "master" status and its effects are visible in all situations.

Aim
The studies discussed above give the impression that gender differences in institutional discourse are generally quite easy to spot. In the courtroom context especially, the differences seem very salient and clearcut. Schlyter's material is extremely small, one single case, and still she could detect large differences. O'Barr and Atkins' material is extensive and hence quite convincing for the US situation. Schlyter's case study suggests that similar conditions apply in Sweden. 3 If this is true, it is a serious issue that requires attention by court professionals to ensure equal treatment of the genders.
The aim of this study was to investigate whether men and women do indeed speak differently in Swedish criminal trial processes. We worked from recordings of examinations of witnesses by court professional (prosecutors and lawyers). For those acting as witnesses, the dependent variables were linguistic or discoursal parameters selected from those examined in the studies discussed above. These were examined for possible relationships to the independent variables gender, professional status (restricted to the poles police offi cer/civilian), income and level of education. Court professionals' speech to witnesses was examined in terms of three dependent variables: interruptions, simultaneous speech and supporting utterances. The independent variables here were gender of speaker and gender of addressee.
The study aimed to be exploratory and complementary to Schlyter's case study. We therefore chose to look at a broad range of linguistic variables across a wide variety of speakers, in contrast to Schlyter's detailed examination of a single case. The investigation is strictly quantitative and we do not go into qualitative considerations regarding the individual testimonies.
3 For more research on language use in Swedish trials, see Aronsson, Karin, Jönsson, Linda & Linell, Per 1987

Hypotheses
The overall hypothesis in this study was that O'Barr and Atkins and Schlyter are right to suggest that there are differences between how men and women speak in the courtroom context, but that, as the dyna m ic approach suggests, men may speak using language features tradi tional ly regarded as female and vice versa. Therefore, gender alone is insuffi cient to explain the variations. Other factors, such as income and level of education (broadly, social power), we hypothesised, better explain the differences: people with high education and large income tend to be low in language features traditionally regarded as female and people with little education and low income use more of the female features.
It was hypothesised that the differences would be manifested in the following areas: amount of speech, frequency of interruptions, use of simult aneous speech, use of supporting utterances, use of questions, use of hedges, occurrence of pauses, and use of pause fi llers.
Based on previous research on public and semi-public language, e.g. Almlöv (1995), Gunnarsson (1995) and Einarsson and Hultman (1984), we hypothesised that the male witnesses would be more talkative than the female witnesses. They would speak for a longer time using more words and their utterances would be longer. The women would talk using more but shorter utterances.
Interruptions in informal conversations have been found to be most often used by men as a way of controlling conversations (Zimmerman and West 1975). Almlöv (1995) showed that men also interrupted more than women in an academic seminar setting, which is a formal institutional context similar to the trial setting. We hypothesised that the male witnesses would interrupt more than the female witnesses. Further, we hypothesised that the male professionals would interrupt more than the female professionals, following the general fi ndings of researchers, despite the possibility that the women have adapted to the male con versation norm and over-compensate so that they become more aggressive in their speech style than the men, as seen in the Thelander study of women politicians (1986).
Simultaneous speech is common in everyday private conversations, especially between women (Nordenstam 1987). The literature led us to hypothesise that most simultaneous speech would occur when women court professionals were speaking to women witnesses, although in fact because this is institutional discourse, it seemed likely that there would be relatively few instances of simultaneous speech overall, so that gender differences would not be apparent.
In private settings, women use more supporting utterances than men regard less of whom they speak to (Nordenstam 1987 andFishman 1983). Because of the institutional setting, we did not expect to see such a difference in our material. It seems, however, intuitively likely that power ful speakers in such a context (at least in Scandinavia) may wish to be supportive of (some) less powerful speakers, perhaps particularly female ones. We therefore hypothesised that the professionals would use more supporting utterances than the witnesses because of the power difference, and that the female witnesses would receive more sup porting utterances than the male witnesses.
Questions are regarded by Schlyter (1986), following Lakoff, as among the linguistic characteristics signalling insecurity displayed by wo men attending meetings and seminars. We hypothesised that this is true in a court context as well.
Hedges are defi ned as a group of linguistic devices that supposedly soften utterances by signalling imprecision and non-commitment such as the particles about and sort of and the modal terms possibly and perhaps (Dixon and Foster 1997:90). As noted above, hedges have tra di tional ly been regarded as characteristically female or powerless language features. The importance of giving accurate and exact informa tion in court proceedings is well known and therefore, many witnesses will feel insecure and use vagueness markers to cover themselves against possibly giving false information. We hypothesised that we would fi nd quite a few hedges in the witnesses' speech as a result of the formal and unusual context, and that women and less educated wit nesses would use more hedges. Silent pauses were found by Olevard (1997) to be more frequent and longer in men's speech in post-graduate seminars than in women's speech. We hypothesised that we would fi nd more pauses in the male wit nesses' speech than in the female witnesses' speech.
There is research showing that men use more pause fi llers than women (Olevard 1997, Adelswärd 1999. We hypothesised that this would be the case in our study as well. The men are eager to keep talk ing and therefore fi ll possible gaps in their speech with sounds to make it harder for other speakers to cut in.

Defi nitions
Full defi nitions of all the variables examined are given in Waara (2004). In this paper we focus on amount of speech, hedges, silent pauses, and fi lled pauses, since these were the variables on which our discussion con centrates.

Amount of speech
The variable amount of speech includes fi ve sub-variables: total length of speech in seconds, number of words and utterances, words per utterance and length of utterance. We count as words all lexical and grammatical items.
An utterance is what is said before or after another person begins to speak, which may be one word or one/several sentences (Richards et al. 1985). This defi nition has been extended here to include simultaneous speech, which is also counted as an utterance belonging to the person who produces it. Supporting utterances are also counted as utterances. We make no distinction between cases where a person is interrupted and therefore stops talking leaving the utterance unfi nished and those where the speaker stops because he or she has fi nished the utterance.

Hedges
We have chosen to study the hedges I don't know, I think, maybe and I guess/suppose as described by Lindroth (1996). 4 Most of the time the phrase I don't know is added as a comment in a discussion on a certain topic of which the speaker has some knowledge but is insecure of the details. In such cases, the addition of I don't know signals insecurity and indirectness (Lindroth 1996:10-11) as for instance in the following example. I think and maybe also show insecurity on the part of the speaker but less so compared to I don't know, as is displayed in the extracts below.
Example 2: W: … Danielle fell to the ground and then Kim ran into the house and Monika ran after him / and Danielle she I think she was unconscious because eh she-she had her eyes closed when she was lying on the ground but she opened her eyes after a few seconds so I helped her up and then she was really upset and scared and stuff 6 Example 3: W: He stood a couple-we stood there by the opp-eh opposite the fi tting rooms and / would we were sitting looking at clothes standing there looking at clothes / and he stood next to us maybe two two three meters away / and he was staring at us … 7 I guess/suppose is used frequently in various situations and has general ly been regarded as a confi rmation marker, i.e. a sign that a speaker wants confi rmation from a listener that what he or she is saying is true or correct (Aijmer 1977). This kind of confi rmation-seeking is illustrated by the following example. W: Well when I was questioned by the police I guess I said about / well I'm thinking thumb-it was really diffi cult / but I guess it was // like this on the chin yeah somewhere here 8 I guess/suppose is often used without much thought on the part of a speaker, for example to gain extra time to plan a following utterance or when the speaker simply does not know what to say. Even in such cases, it could be said that I guess/suppose signals insecurity or hesitation, which makes it possible to defi ne it as a hedge (Lindroth 1996:11).

Pauses
Pauses are silent gaps in speech. Pauses are very common and have different functions as described by Olevard (1997) but a very large part of them are "thought pauses", i.e. when a speaker does not know what to say and needs time to think, and "hesitation pauses", i.e. when a speaker knows what to say but not how to say it (Olevard 1997a:23).
In this work we do not distinguish between different kinds of pauses but consider them all as one variable. Silence between two utterances that lasts more than three seconds are not counted as belonging to any speaker (McLaughlin's method in Almlöv 1995:9). Pauses shorter than three seconds are attributed to the last speaker.

Pause fi llers
Pause fi llers are utterances such as eh interjected between words or parts of words in an utterance. Like silent pauses, they are very frequent in speech (Olevard 1997:25). Silent pauses and pause fi llers are both illustrated by the following example. From the content of W's speech it is clear that there is some hesitation as to the exact details of the incident. This leads to W pausing quite a bit and using many types of fi ller. However, fi llers also have other possible functions. Norrby (2004:217) mentions for instance that the use of fi llers can sometimes be interpreted as an attempt to keep and prolong a speaker's turn, especially in public speech.

Primary material and selection
Witness statements in proceedings in Swedish courts are routinely taperecorded and the resulting tapes are generally offi cial documents available to the public. We selected from this bank of data in such a way as to provide a sample as representative of the population of Stock holm as possible, with equal gender representation and maximum geographical and social coverage, as was appropriate for the aim of complementing Schlyter's case study.
We obtained tapes of 19 criminal trials conducted in either 2003 or 2004, selected by court offi cials on an arbitrary basis, and examined 2.5-minute extracts from 31 tape-recorded testimonies, 16 given by wo men and 15 given by men. Some trials provided two or three testimo nies, but none more than three. Equal numbers of female and male testimonies were initially collected from each court: eight men and eight women. At a quite late stage, it turned out that one of the male witnesses had testifi ed twice, in two different cases. His second testimo ny was excluded from the study, resulting in our only having seven male testimonies from Nacka district court.
The tape recordings were obtained from two different district courts, Nacka and Handen, in the province of Stockholm. The province of Stockholm is segregated socially and ethnically, so to avoid the risk of 9 W: Ja de låg ju en hårtuss på köksbänken / eh som hon sa att den kom från henne då hon försökte väl visa den också då på på huvet var exakt den hade suttit men de va ändå svårt å se / eh se exakt var den hade suttit men / det såg ut som den kom från henne och / sen så // hade hon ju en / svullnad på ena be-ena kinden ending up with witness statements from an unrepresentative group of informants, we collected the testimonies from two courts responsible for socially different areas. Nacka district court covers two municipalities with an average income per year of 257,134 kr, which is the second highest of the eight judicial districts of the province of Stockholm 10 , whereas Handen district court covers three municipalities with an average income of 225,739 kr, the third lowest in the province.
We used the fi rst 2.5 minutes of the testimonies starting from the fi rst question posed by either the prosecutor or the defence lawyer depend ing on who called the witness to testify. In total, 1 hour and 17.5 minutes of talk were analysed. The extracts from the testimonies were transcribed according to a transcription key based on Almlöv (1995:77). After listening to and transcribing the 2.5-minutes-long segments of all the testimonies, we noted the number of occurrences of the language features chosen and described above.
Thanks to the openness of the Swedish legal and administrative system, we were able to obtain the addresses of the witnesses (or, if they were police offi cers, the districts in which they worked) and to use this information to obtain their income from employment (mostly for the year 2002, which was the most current available information in the public registers at the time). We could estimate the level of education of the non-police witnesses from public records of student grants and/or loans received. The 12 police offi cers in the study were all assumed to have attended and completed the Police Academy, which is a university level education.
One of the police offi cers could not be found in the records of the personnel offi ce and so he was excluded from the analysis based on income. One of the male witnesses could not be found in the Tax Authority's records. He was therefore excluded from the data relating to income and education.

Selection of method
We chose a quantitative method to get an overview of linguistic interac tion in the given context (Gunnarsson 1995:7), to contrast with Schlyter's close-up case study. The method, comprising counting and analys ing language variables, has revealed interesting differences in lan guage use in earlier studies, for instance in Einarsson and Hultman (1984) and Gunnarsson (1995).

Handling of the material
The witnesses were categorised in four different ways. First, they were grouped based on gender. Second, the information on income was used to rank the witnesses starting with the witness with the highest income and ending with the witness earning least money. The upper half of the group was regarded as belonging to the high income group, the other half as belonging to the low income group. Third, all informants who had studied at university level were regarded as university educated regardless of the length and quality of the studies. The ones without any university-level education were put in the other group. Fourth, all police offi cers formed one group and the rest of the witnesses made up the other group.
For eight of the variables (length, words, utterances, length/utterance, words/utterance, hedges, pauses and fi llers), mean values and stan dard deviations were compared between the two groups for each para meter. Student's t tests were performed comparing scores for each of the eight variables using GraphPad Prism 4 for the two groups across all para meters. Selected data in combination were then tested in each para meter using multivariate tests performed in STATA™ Statistics/ Data Analysis to see if there was any correlation between the variables with in the groups defi ned by each parameter.
There were relatively few instances of the remaining four variables interruptions, simultaneous speech, supporting utterances and questions, so they were only analysed descriptively and are not discussed here. This was also the case for the three variables interruptions, simultaneous speech and supporting utterances relating to the professionals' speech, but in this case a brief description is given.

Witnesses' speech
We start out by presenting the mean values and standard deviations for the witnesses' speech for eight of the 12 variables: length, words, utterances, length/utterance, words/utterance, hedges, pauses and fi llers.
Following this data are the statistical results obtained from applying two kinds of parametric tests, Student's t tests and multivariate tests, on the data. The p-values given in Table 1 derive from a t-test, which determines whether there is a statistically signifi cant difference between two groups of informants. There were no signifi cant differences for any of the three parameters gender, income or education for any of the variables. For the parameter professional status (police-other), the p value for the variable fi llers displays a statistically signifi cant difference. Also, the p values for utterances and silent pauses are fairly close to showing a signifi cant difference (p = 0.14 and p = 0.08).
There is a risk when performing repeated t tests on many variables such as in this case that some results turn out signifi cant by chance (Woods, Fletcher and Hughes 1986:128). To minimise this risk, multivariate tests were also performed in each category. A multivariate test combines several variables in one multidimensional test to see whether there are any signifi cant differences in each category when the variables are tested for together. Here, six variables were tested for in each category: length, words, utterances, hedges, pauses and fi llers. The two proportional variables length/utterance and words/utterance were excluded because they are not independent of the others. Table 2 shows the p values of the multivariate tests for each category of witnesses. As can be seen, the results in the three categories womenmen, high income-low income and university educated-not university educated are nonsignifi cant. In the category police-others however, there is a statistically signifi cant difference (p = 0.04) when all parameters are tested for at the same time.

The court professionals' speech
The court professionals also produced relatively few instances of the variables interruptions, simultaneous speech and supporting utterances. The data were therefore not suitable for statistical analysis, but some of the results are suggestive and are discussed below.

Gender of court professional
All Female Male  Table 3. Instances of various features in the speech of court professionals. Table 3 shows that simultaneous speech and supporting utterances were distributed fairly equally among speakers, but interruptions were mainly produced by male professionals and most of these were interruptions of male witnesses. Simultaneous speech was directed fairly evenly to witnesses of both genders, but supporting utterances were on average twice as frequently directed to witnesses of the professionals' own gender as to those of the opposite gender, as illustrated in Table 4.  6. Discussion

Support for the main hypotheses?
The overall hypothesis made for this study was that there are differences between how men and women speak in the courtroom context but that gender alone is insuffi cient to explain the variations. Other factors, such as income and level of education, we hypothesised, would better explain the differences. The results we have arrived at do not support these hypotheses. None of the p values show any statistically signifi cant differences in the categories women-men, high income-low income and university educated-not university educated. This is not however merely an effect of sample size or method, since signifi cant differences were found between civilian and police witnesses. It is clear that any differences that do exist on the parameters expected are smaller than those due to the police/civilian parameter. The fact that gender differences were not picked up could mean that there were in fact no differences in this specifi c context. Regardless of gender and social background, the witnesses in this study used the same speech style in the courtroom context. There are current studies both supporting (Nohara 1992) and rejecting (Gunnarsson 1995) this idea and the situation is far from clear.
A power-estimate test performed on the data for the women-men category shows that the sample size would have had to be up to 115 times larger to obtain statistically signifi cant results. This points to gender variations being subtle, which results in a need for a large sample size to be able to detect them. 11 The relatively small size of the ma terial in the present study (1 hour and 17.5 minutes) compared to studies showing gender-based language differences, e.g. the O' Barr and Atkins study (1980), could be another reason for the lack of gender differ ences.
Our results tend to suggest that the large gender differences found in the Schlyter study (1986) are not representative. This could be due to the topic of the trial in the Schlyter study, which was gender discrimination. Gender was therefore very much in focus, which could have encouraged the participants to do gender (Coates 2004) rather explicitly. Also, Schlyter performed the study after receiving indications from others that the case was exceptional with regard to the language of the lay people. In other words, she did not choose the case randomly and the results can therefore not be said to be representative of all cases.
Another explanation for the absence of gender-based differences in the current study could be that the differences were materialised in ways not covered by the method. Culpepper and Kytö (2000:82) stressed that even though men and women speak differently in some ways, they speak similarly in many more ways. The research in this fi eld is far from unanimous regarding how differences are represented in speech. Also, variables that have shown frequency differences in one con text might not turn out to vary in another context (Nohara 1992, Dixon andFoster 1990).
It might also be that gender and social status are not very salient in the courtroom context. The specifi c circumstances of giving a witness statement in court might take over so that gender and social status as possible factors infl uencing language use are overshadowed by the requirements and expectations of the specifi c situation. Instead of witnesses speaking in a typically female or male, rich or poor, or educated or uneducated style, they might use a common courtroom style. This was observed by Reid et al. (2003) who found that women used more ten tative language in discussions where gender had been made salient compared to low gender salience discussions where instead student identity was salient. In the latter situations, men and women used about the same amount of tentative language. In this sense our fi ndings are sup portive of a dynamic interpretation of language-and-gender effects.
12 of the 31 witnesses happened to be police offi cers. Police offi cers are generally used to testifying in court and therefore familiar with the context. This could have evened out potential gender differences thereby affecting the results. In retrospect, one solution would have been to exclude the police offi cers from the study and focused strictly on the other witnesses. However, the number of informants would then have been only 19 (seven men and 12 women), which would not have been enough to perform this kind of study.
Finally, the categories used for analysis might have obscured effects. Thus, for example, our undifferentiated simultaneous speech could cover both supportive and aggressive acts which might be differently distributed.
We will now go on to discuss the results for the various parameters in relation to individual experimental variables.

Gender
Amount of speech. We hypothesised that the male witnesses would be more talkative than the female witnesses. The results show no such difference either in the basic data (length, words and utterances) or in the proportional data (length/utterance and words/utterance). There could be many reasons for this.
Questioning witnesses belongs to the examination phase of a trial. During this part of the trial, the professionals pose questions to the lay people who answer them according to the different discursive functions of their institutional roles. In other words, the participants get different kinds of turns with which they are expected to do different things (Thornborrow 2002).
Our material includes the initial 2.5 minutes of each testimony. All 31 witness examinations were initiated roughly in the same way. First, the professionals made sure the witnesses knew what incident was at issue in the trial, for instance as in the extract below.

P: You experienced an incident on the third of January this year on / eh Garden Street W: Yeah that's right= 12
Thereafter the professionals usually continued by asking the witnesses to describe the incident in their own words such as in the example below, which is the continuation of the above extract. 13 P:=Yeah could you tell us what happened W: Yeah I came out of the pizza place I was going to get some tools I was eh / well fi xing some water there … 14 After this initial exchange, the witnesses were usually allowed to give their accounts quite freely without much intervention from the pro-12 W: Du har varit me om en händelse som inträffade den 3:e januari i år på / eh Trädgårdsvägen W: Ja de stämmer= 13 One exception was an expert witness who was instead asked to describe carefully some technical details. 14 P:=Ja kan du berätta va de va som hände W: Ja ja kom ut från pizzerian ja skulle hämta lite verktyg ja skulle eh / ja fi xa nån vatten där … fessionals. In many cases, the witnesses' fi rst utterance lasted more than a minute. This means that the speech we captured was mainly of mono logical character on the part of the witnesses with a few questions insert ed by the professionals here and there to encourage the witnesses to go on or to clarify some facts.
The men and the women responded in a similar way to the pro fessionals' encouragement to give their own accounts of what they had experienced. They talked for almost the same amount of time using practically the same number of words and utterances. In most cases we looked at, the witnesses were impartial bystanders, friends or family of the victims or police offi cers. For the bystanders, friends and family members, the memories of the incidents at trial seemed very much alive and in most cases, they had no problems retelling at length and in detail what they had experienced. Generally speaking, all witnesses fi lled the 2.5 minutes with mainly monological speech without diffi culty.
This means that the language we studied was quite different from the language used in many other studies. Looking back at the studies summar ised above that report gender differences, many of them focused on dia logical or semi-dialogical language, i.e. when two or more people speak as part of an interaction, e.g. Einarsson and Hultman (1984) and Gunnarsson (1995), and not on monological speech. In the legal area, turn-taking rules are strict and do not allow confi dent speakers to seize turns.
Interruptions. We hypothesised that the male witnesses would interrupt more than the female witnesses. Further, we hypothesised that the male professionals would interrupt more than the female professionals, following the general fi ndings of researchers, with the rider that female court professionals might have (over-) adapted to a male norm. Our data show that witnesses very rarely interrupt court professionals, but that it is possible that male professionals do indeed interrupt more than females ones. If true, this is one of the few cases in which gender appears to be a relevant category in court interactions.
Simultaneous speech. The literature led us to hypothesise that most simul tan eous speech would occur when women court professionals were speaking to women witnesses but simultaneous speech was in-frequent and there was no trend. Again, the court situation seems to over-rule possible gender norms.
Hedges. We hypothesised that there would be no differences in the use of hedges between the genders but possibly between people with different levels of education and income as in the O' Barr and Atkins study (1980). The results show no gender differences that were statistical ly signifi cant, which verifi es our hypothesis. The results could be explained by the fact that the witnesses were not under any particular pressure during the parts of the examinations that were included in this study. The witnesses were left alone telling their stories with few interven ing or challenging questions by the professionals. Therefore, the witnesses felt quite secure and had little reason to use tentative language, which ought to be the main function of the hedges we studied.
Supporting utterances. We hypothesised that the professionals would use more supporting utterances than the witnesses and that the female wit nesses would receive more supporting utterances than male witnesses. Unsurprisingly, our data confi rmed that the court power structure meant that support came mainly from the professionals, but interesting ly they also suggested that speakers show some kind of gender solidarity, providing more supporting utterances for their own gender. Since this fi nding has no support in the literature, it may be an artefact or something that needs further investigation.
Questions: Schlyter regarded questions from witnesses as manifesting insecurity and typical of female speakers. In our data they were too infrequent for comment.
Pauses and pause fi llers. Our hypotheses were that the male witnesses would use more silent pauses as well as pause fi llers in their speech based on Olevard's fi ndings (1997a). None of these hypotheses were verifi ed statistically for the category women-men. As with hedges, pauses and fi llers have been interpreted as signs of insecurity. Since the witnesses were not put under very much pressure during the examination phase studied here, there were no signifi cant results regarding the use of either pauses or fi llers.

Income and education
No statistically relevant differences were seen in these two categories. The parameters examined here do not differentiate witnesses by so cial status. This might have been due to one or more of the general explanations mentioned above or conceivably to inaccuracies in the publiclyavail able data. The difference from O'Barr and Atkins' results could also refl ect cultural differences between North Carolina in 1978 and Stockholm in 2002-3. The relatively narrower class differences in Scandi navia may be refl ected in less differentiated speech patterns.

Professional status
The only parameter along which there were any statistically signifi cant dif ferences is professional status (police-others). Three variables tested separately showed signifi cant or near-signifi cant differences and a multivariate test using all six variables showed a signifi cant difference between the speech styles of the police offi cers and the other witnesses.
In our study, the police offi cers (nine men and four women) used fewer silent pauses than the other witnesses. This could be explained by their familiarity with trial proceedings and the courtroom context in general. This factor might have brought a sense of security and facilitated fl uent speech.
On the other hand, the police offi cers used more fi llers than the rest of the witnesses, which has also been interpreted as a sign of insecurity. It could be the case that the police offi cers were in fact just as insecure as the other witnesses with the exception that they chose to use pause fi llers instead of falling silent when hesitating. However, it could also be that fi llers do not function in the same way as silent pauses. When someone falls silent, he or she is more or less inviting another person to take over the turn whether it is fi nished or not (Zimmerman and West 1975). Fillers, on the other hand, do not invite other speakers to cut in to the same degree since the fi rst speaker continues making sounds even when he or she is hesitating or planning a new utterance. Therefore, we suggest that fi llers are not in fact signs of insecurity. On the contrary, use of fi llers shows that a speaker wishes to continue talking even though he or she is in need of a pause, which makes sense in the case of the police offi cers in this study. Despite the formality of the situation, the offi cers felt at ease and were keen on holding the fl oor and testifying without being interrupted. Therefore they used fewer silent pauses and more fi llers on average than the other witnesses. This is confi rmed by the fact that the police offi cers spoke using fewer and therefore also longer utterances than the other witnesses (seven versus ten utterances on average). Owing to the police offi cers' previous knowledge and experience, the professionals less often had to cut in to ask complementing questions, which made the police offi cers' utterances longer. The offi cers used fewer silent pauses, which also prevented the professionals from intervening, thereby further pro longing their utterances.

Conclusion
The aim of this study was to investigate whether men and women speak differently when acting as witnesses in Swedish criminal trials. Can possible differences be adequately explained by gender alone or are other factors, such as income and level of education, also involved? We also investigated the courtroom professionals' speech. Do courtroom professionals speak differently depending on gender? Do they speak differently when addressing male and female witnesses?
The material in this study is small and the information on income and level of education is incomplete. The results are therefore inconclusive. They show no statistically signifi cant language differences based on gender, income or education for the parameters investigated. One of the reasons for the lack of differences could be that gender is not very salient in the courtroom context and possibly also in other highly formalised institutional settings. In these contexts, the institutional roles, in this case the role of witness, are so powerful and standardised and include so many requirements and expectations that they overrule gender roles. Therefore, following Reid et al. (2003), these contexts do not produce any gender-based language differences or at least very subtle ones requir ing a large material to detect them. An infl uential factor therefore in stead becomes whether a witness has previous experience from testifying or otherwise is familiar with the courtroom context, i.e. has been in the witness role before. Thus the only signifi cant differences found were between police offi cers, for whom witnessing is routine, and civilians, for whom it could be a stressful experience. This shows that the method used in the study can in fact detect language differences. It further suggests that previous courtroom experience, familiarity with the courtroom context and possibly also legal knowledge infl uence the way witnesses speak to a greater extent than gender, income and level of education.
In our opinion, what previous studies show, e.g. Nohara (1992) and Cameron (1992), is that men and women are affected differently by different contexts. In some studies gender differences were easy to spot, for example in Gunnarsson (1995) and Olevard (1997a) who inve stigat ed the academic context. In other studies, for instance in the experimental investigations set up by Dixon and Foster (1997), it was not possible to tie differences to gender but rather to differing con textual factors. In other words, it is possible to accept the results of studies supporting gender-based language differences without having to agree to men and women speaking differently in all situations. This means that in the courtroom context, we should move away from the difference approach viewing men and women as two polar opposites using language in different ways and instead focus on how gender is constructed within the context according to the dynamic approach. People do not always speak in a certain way because of their gender, but gender is one of the factors that can be salient in determining how people speak.
The trial courtroom, being one of many enormously important institutional contexts to ensure the legal rights of individuals and to sustain our democracy, has not been investigated satisfactorily in Sweden. There need to be more and larger studies focusing on the speech of all trial participants taking into account a variety of contextual factors. The Culpepper and Kytö study (2000) nicely shows how quantitative data and contextual information must be combined to get a fuller picture of lan guage interaction. Regarding witnesses, this could mean taking into ac count for example whether a witness is testifying for the prosecution or the defence, the witness' dialect or accent, age, ethnic background or sexual orientation. Following the results of this study, one could also ask whether there are any gender differences in the effects on witnesses with previous courtroom experience and familiarity with the context. Another challenge for the future is to investigate how professionals use language in interactions with defendants, how defendants speak and what the consequences are for the evaluation of their blameworthiness and ultimately for the outcomes of cases. Research on language use has an important role to play in pointing to and ultimately eliminating prejudices and discrimination in the future.