Hans Thor Andersen & Christian Wichmann Matthiessen:
Institute of Geography, University of Copenhagen, Øster Voldgade
10, DK-1350 Copenhagen K., Denmark.

Danish Journal of Geography: 71-82, 1995.

This paper presents two mega events as tools in the strategic planning of the Copenhagen area. Due to growing inter-metropolitan competition, increasingly offensive and complex means are applied. This demands strong leadership, stable longterm planning and willingness to accept the costs in order to reach the objectives. Marketing versus strategic planning is discussed. The general position of Copenhagen in the European urban system gives perspective to a potential change on the South Scandinavian urban scene. New instruments of strategic planning in Greater Copenhagen are introduced. The competitive level of Copenhagen is analyzed in relation to Stockholm, Berlin and Hamburg. Two examples of mega events are discussed that represent typical elements in urban competition: cultural events and infrastructure improvements. 1) Copenhagen as 'The cultural City of Europe' in 1996 represents a temporary mega event. 2) The planned bridge between Copenhagen and the south Swedish city of Malmö, combined with Swedish entrance into EU, opens up for development of the first cross-national integrated large-city region outside the European centre. This is an example of a mega event which will alter the scene permanently. Both events are important issues used in developing a growth strategy for Greater Copenhagen. But neither the cultural city nor the bridge may by themselves guarantee any advantages. It depends upon the ability of local actors to develop and promote the quality of their city. The paper represents a continuation and elaboration on earlier papers, see Matthiessen (1990, 1992) and Andersen & Jørgensen (1994).

Keywords: Strategic planning, urban marketing, Copenhagen,
the Öresund region, fixed links, culture.

Urban marketing means to think and act from the point of view of customers (Berg et al, 1990). To be successful, funds, instruments, strategies and activities must be planned and controlled to satisfy the needs of different groups of customers. The traditional entrepreneurial management decision process focusing on product, price, distribution, promotion, staff and policy could in principle be applicable to the urban or regional product. The purpose of such an orientation is to run the town or region in the best interest

of its inhabitants. But company management is much more simple than urban or regional management. First of all the urban product differs from other products by complexity, lack of flexibility and durability. Secondly, most urban units are the core of larger functional regions, and their administrative composition seldom mirrors the appropriate region for marketing. As a marketing or strategical level, the functional urban region would be preferred to the municipality or county. Thirdly, the managers of an urban or regional unit only control parts of the product whereas companies and other organizations could be considered as co- managers. The influence of local government is largely limited to provide infrastructure and services. Fourthly, the responsibility of local government to balance widely different group interests in itself prevents business-like strategies and objectives.

Urban marketing is an unclearly defined process based on a theory developed with other purposes. The object is often considered to be the attraction of new customers to the urban product. The customers are defined as investors or visitors. The overall object is to attract and maintain activity. Strategic planning shares instruments and views with urban marketing, but the objectives are differently defined as the formulation and achievement of a new and better role on the urban scene for the city concerned. The overall object is consequently not only to attract and maintain activity, but also to improve the urban product for example by development of infrastructure and attracting highly skilled expertise.

The original advantages of agglomeration have slowly but constantly been reduced. Today high speed and densely developed networks for telecommunication, person- and goods-transportation dominate. Most locations are accessible to import and export of standardized products and information. Large city regions are under transformation into a post- industrial structure. Qualified large city regions have no comparative advantages for simple industrial production. The real advantages of agglomeration are found in contacts with costumers, in the transferring of knowledge, and in the fabric of decision making.

The process of planning and managing urban units is influenced by the transformation of the urban system. Traditional urban hierarchies based on territorially identified networks change into network societies where hinterlands become of decreasing importance. The dominance of high ranking central places may fall, as positioning in a series of networks gives new opportunities to cities favoured by modal,

multimodal or intermodal characteristics. Internalization, change into a society where information and creativity are of importance, and rising weight of network position alter the risk pattern and thereby create new demands for active urban policy of marketing and strategic planning.

The traditional way of competition, e.g. by selling off cheap land for industrial uses, by keeping wages low etc, does not improve the structural relations of a city, which consequently will be unable to profit from such activities. In order to cope with the changing preconditions, most cities have modernised their activities. Privatization, public/private partnerships, local economic development and infrastructure development are typical ingredients. Only localities that actively fight for their future will have one. Often, this form of urban policy consists of a combination of cooperation and competition with other cities. The European urban scene is in focus and new types of strategies are searched for. Sharpened competition puts stronger demands on leadership and managing.

The European Urban Scene

Europe has around 500 urban agglomerations of more than 100,000 inhabitants (estimate, based on NUREC, 1994). In table 1, the largest European urban agglomerations are presented. They are delimited in the same way all over Europe as functional, consolidated urban areas. All agglomerations have been identified as "greater-" urban units on the basis of detailed topographical maps. The data are the latest available and are estimated on the basis of various statistics. A homogenous method of estimate has been given priority. Eastern European estimates are more uncertain than Western European estimates.

The other type of size indicator listed in table 1 is also an estimate. Estimates of "gross agglomeration product" are based on data on population, gross national and regional products, and on delimitation of the urban units. Compared with the ranking of agglomerations according to population size, East- and South European cities demonstrate lower ranks, North European cities higher.

Air traffic is a highly important link between superior international activities. Besides tourists, important users of the air network are decision- makers, knowledge handlers, administrators, and other advanced personnel. Table 2 presents international passenger traffic measured in terms of embarking and disembarking persons. The urban agglomeration is the unit so if there is more than one airport in a

city (as for instance in London) their figures are totalled. The figures indicate potential accessibility to the very important network of decision making. London has an outstanding lead, with traffic twice the size of "number two". Three cities follow: Paris, Frankfurt and Randstadt. A third level consists of 7 units: Zürich, Copenhagen, Rhein-Ruhr, Rome, Palma, and Manchester. East European centres are almost absent and North Europe is over-represented.

More and more urban activities can be described as being knowledge and information-based. Investment and employment increasingly reflect the transformation of the economy from being capital-intensive to information-intensive (Capello & Nijkamp, 1991). An increasing number of activities are now associated with the production, collection, manipulation, storage, and distribution of information. Innovation is a strategic resource for firms and is closely connected with urban growth. Andersson & Strömquist (1989) have given the label "creativity" to this growing base of wealth production. Creativity is defined as the production and handling of technical, cultural, social, and organizational innovations. Communication capacity, cognitive skill, knowledge availability, and the supply of creative and cultural capacities are development factors. Excellence in all areas is a principal growth factor. Rapid development is favoured by universities and other research facilities, and by advanced and efficient telecommunication networks, other information technology equipment, and fast passenger transport systems. The increasing importance of the creativity sector is associated with the renewal of the economic system in Europe towards dynamic product competition. Andersson and Matthiessen (1993) have presented a new study of the creativity base of large European agglomerations (see table 2). The data are papers from the 3000 most cited refereed scientific periodicals within natural science, medicine and technical science, 1988-91, registered by institutional address of author. London is the European leader followed by Paris, Moscow and Randstadt. The next level consists of Stockholm, Rhein Brussels, Glasgow, Frankfurt, Manchester, Birmingham, Copenhagen, Munich, Berlin, and Cambridge. It is interesting to note that these centres of scientific production are very concentrated to Northwestern Europe. Only Moscow is an exception to this and no other Eastern or Southern European agglomeration produces scientific output proportional to their mass measured as population.

Capital cities have been defined in many ways, and capital
cities are certainly a category in the urban system. Their

status is given by the centrality concerning political functions. They are often large or even primate. But they also display functions which are general for the urban system. Decision power is an important performance of metropolitan cities and especially of capital cities. Decision power is defined as the ability to control spatial- economic development, administrative-political circumstances, and conditions of daily life for persons and firms. The category of capital cities is in itself an interesting object for research. Van der Wüsten (1993) lists an additional set of reasons to look anew at capital cities. He raises the question if capital cities as a category have some advantages or disadvantages in the newly structured environment of direct urban competition.

Many studies of the European urban scene have recently been published. The first in this new sequence was the famous series of maps and conclusions (The European "Banana") presented by Reclus-Datar (Reclus 1989). The grouping of the 154 largest Western European cities is based on comprehensive data ranging from population, jobs, firms, and infrastructure, to research, finance, traffic, culture, meetings and the press. The general ranking synthesizes the many data by adding the different rank-scores. The 154 cities are categorised in 8 classes. London and Paris are the leaders and constitutes class 1. Milan is the only member of class 2. Class 3 comprises 7 cities; Madrid, Munich, Frankfurt, Rome, Brussels, Barcelona and Amsterdam. The fourth class with 11 members includes Manchester, Berlin, Hamburg, Stuttgart, Copenhagen, Athens, Rotterdam, Zurich, Turin, Lyon and Geneva. The French study does not include Finland, Norway, and Sweden, but would probably add Stockholm to class 4 if those countries were included.

The cities could be ranked differently. Palomäki (1991) identifies a hierarchy of Western European decision-making centres on the basis of ranking a series of activities. He finds three leaders, London, Paris and Brussels, followed by a group of 17 important centres, and a number of centres of minor importance. The second group includes from top to bottom Geneva, Randstadt, Stockholm, Frankfurt, Munich, Copenhagen, Rome, Vienna, Moscow, Strasbourg, Zurich, Oslo, Helsinki, Madrid, Luxembourg, Milan and Hamburg.

Cortie (1993) discusses the new urban order based on the global division of labour within networks of urban regions. It is no longer the central location within a region that determines a city's function, but the degree of its participation in the international division of labour. The concentration of power to capitals of strong and centralized nations is counteracted by deconcentration demands from less powerful nations, who want their share of decision units in corporations and organizations. By virtue of advances in technology and transportation many functions have become independent of place. In the new urban order decentralization of political, economic and cultural functions have accelerated. Cortie uses data from the studies by Reclus and Palomäki to analyze the centrality, versus the network position of European capitals. He finds most capital cities to be pre-eminent, national central places. He views the decision-making triangle comprising Brussels, London and Paris as a network with a distinct division of functions. London is the economic point of gravity. Brussels is the centre for all kinds of organizations, and political organizations in particular. Paris has a mixed structure.

There is no general agreement on a formal definition of metropolitan status but many would consent to a definition as the one presented here. Metropolitan functions are: communication node, financial centre, culture, entertainment, top level private services, science, higher education, and economic leadership. Metropolitan units are the focal points of the exchange of communication and the exercise of competition. They have the capacity for innovation and adaption. Metropolitan urban products are of high quality and it is often within these units that person productivity is highest and income is above average. On the basis of this kind of functional definition and on the data listed in tables 1 and 2, it is estimated that 25 European urban units can be characterized as metropoles. Operational definition: urban agglomerations larger than 1 million inhabitants with a combined percentage of total GNP, percentage of international air passengers and percentage of scientific output which gives a rank among the 25 agglomerations ranking highest. The thus defined metropolitan units are indicated on the map in figure 1. Symbol size is proportional with the scores. On the map the European economic centre is also indicated. This centre is delimited according to Reclus (1989) and comprehends 50 percent of all economic activity of the continent.

Within the European centre 13 of Europe's 25 metropolitan units are found. They are interdependent and competing. The labour markets overlap and the urban functions (for instance airports) are often shared between cities. Hinterlands are not clearly delimited. Many large units are strongly specialized and there is a certain amount of divi

sion of labour between cities. There is no clear urban hierarchy. The metropolitan areas are congested, environments are under press, and prices of land are very high. Many disadvantages of agglomeration are obvious.

Outside the central parts of Europe the network of large units with metropolitan status is less dense. To the north and east there are: Glasgow-Edinburgh, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Hamburg, Berlin, Vienna, St. Petersburg and Moscow. To the south there are Madrid, Barcelona, Rome and Athens. Each of these cities dominates large areas and and urban hierarchy is obvious.

The post-1991 European urban scene is a scene of both growth and decline. It is a scene of turbulence and of changing potential. Some of the old patterns of growth location will break down, although the European centre will take on its share of new activity. The disadvantages of agglomeration (congestion, land prices, pollution) are a problem, especially in the European centre. Other growth centres will be identified as promising. This will be the case for metropolitan and capital units with large, rich regions outside the traditional centre. New areas, such as in Eastern Europe, will be given the status of peripheral areas and receive subsidies, while the old peripheral regions of the Atlantic fringe and South-eastern Europe will lag further behind. A possible downturn in the Mediterranean growth might be expected as investors shift their focus

from south to east. A regionalization of Eastern Europe is
a realistic alternative to pre-1991 centralization.

Some of the large units of Europe have the potential to change and experience rapid growth. This is a consequence of new qualities and characteristics, and Berlin is an obvious example as the coming capital of Germany. Lille, as the planned node of the TGV-system, as well as a series of airport towns, becoming the new gateways to Eastern Europe, are other examples of such new characteristics. The capitals of new nations will evolve and take their place in the first line of important centres. Finally then there is Copenhagen with a high potential growth closely connected to a shift in role on the North European scene. This will be discussed later.

Competitors: Copenhagen, Berlin, Hamburg and Stockholm

The principal competitors on the North European urban scene are the four metropoles Berlin, Hamburg, Copenhagen and Stockholm. They also compete with other European metropoles, with the European centre and with cities like Helsinki, Oslo and centres of minor importance. Berlin, Copenhagen and Stockholm are old national capitals with all the advantages it gives, and Hamburg is a non-capital city. Berlin is by far the largest of the four cities, but has just recently become capital of the reunited Germany. Berlin itself is also reunited, a fact that causes many practical as well as social and political problems in the city. In the following the competition levels of these four urban units are discussed.

The four cities are analysed according to three main dimensions (although others such as history and planning traditions clearly are of importance) consisting of firstly the socio-economic basis of the city - its industries, their technological level, the transition from manufacturing to service economy (restructuring of the economic base), composition of the economy, the economic level, infrastructure, labour market, educational structure, social structure and living conditions in general. Secondly, the functional role of a city, i.e. main activities - communications, advanced services, manufacturing, exchange, consumption, research and development, etc - in relation to national and international markets. And thirdly, the political and administrative structures of the city; both internal and external relations have clearly been of importance (Harding et al, 1994). Although the west European cities have been ex

posed more or less to the samme processes of internationalization of the economy, technological innovations, European integration processes etc, they have not responded in the same way to these changes. A crucial variable in this relation is leadership, i.e. the ability or skill with which leaders exploit available resources - both social, economic and politcal ones and their ability to develop advanced strategies for development. A brief overview based on the project "Big city competition in the Baltic Sea region", (Andersen & Jørgensen, 1994) is presented below:

Berlin has a weak industrial base as public services and administration have a dominant position and as most of the private businesses has survived primarily due to substantial subsidies. As a consequence industrial development, with regard to structure, technology and competence, has not kept pace with Western Europe. The special circumstances of the reunification of Berlin have led to an almost total deindustrialization of Eastern Berlin (more than 160.000 jobs have been lost in only 3 years) with an overwhelming increase in unemployment as a result. The infrastructure of the city is problematic due to deficiencies in capacity as well as quality. Improvements are underway, but there is uncertainty about the location of the new airport and high speed trafficlines. The transition from manufacturing to a service economy has in reality been heavily financed by government subsidies.

Berlin has just recently regained its formal position as German capital. But this will only be a minor compensation for the loss of its former position - e.g. as centre of East German banking and insurance, media, national headquarter for a large number of leading firms within manufacturing and trade, research and education etc. In fact, Berlin is in a paradoxical situation, as its functions - despite its size - are mainly of provincial level. Due to the special circumstances of Berlin after 1945, the city has an exceptional international position.

Berlin, with its present borders, was formed in 1920 as a result of annexation of suburban areas in order to guarantee coordinated planning and development. Today urban development has passed these borders, and consequently planners attempt to coordinate the cross-border development. This is a difficult task, since both Berlin and Brandenburg are lander with a high level of autonomy - also with regard to urban and regional planning. In combination with a underdeveloped leadership capacity and a missing or weak strategy this has prevented successful restructuring. Moreover, the reunification of two different political and administrative systems in Berlin itself has further complicated planning and governance.

Copenhagen has passed through the process of deindustrialization and compensated this by successful expansion in advanced services. However, since the mid-1980s this positive trend has been broken and as a result, unemployment has grown remarkably. The economic base is in general broad and of a full international standard. The existing manufacturing industry is dominated by advanced production. Private services have expanded and research and higher education are of international quality. The infrastructure of the city is well developed, but needs modernization and extension. Housing is of high standards, and housing deficit has disappeared recently. Social problems, however, due to the high unemployment in inner city areas have become visible.

Thanks to the broad economic base and the function as national capital, Copenhagen has been able to develop into an important centre for research, finance, culture, international organisations and communications. The city possesses a clear international profile.

The tumult of metropolitan government (Greater Copenhagen Council was abolished 1990) has removed the coordinating and decisive level of government for the whole region. At the same time, the City of Copenhagen has been unable to pursue long-term planning due to internal political struggles. As a consequence Copenhagen has had a underdeveloped leadership capacity and strategic planning has only recently been initiated.

Hamburg is an old merchant republic, whose main focus has been on overseas trade. The city has first-class transport links by sea, road and rail. The airport is of only regional interest, but still growing. There is a steady improvement of infrastructure. The industrial base of the city has always been the port-oriented industries, but Hamburg aimed at restructuring its economy from the mid 1980s by developing a high-tech sector (e.g. production of Airbus). Although its overall welfare level is among the highest in Europe, housing shortage and growing social differences have become widespread.

Until the late 1940s Hamburg was only a city of regional importance (with the exception of sea transport). But the post-war Berlin outmigration of banks, insurance, newspapers, publishers, national headquarters of private firms, etc. turned Hamburg into a more diversified city with research and service functions for Northern Germany. The city has a dominant position in several key sectors in

Germany, but has a surprisingly low level of internationalization.

As a German land, Hamburg has much more autonomy than most other cities. In combination with the narrow borderlines, however, common plans for the metropolitan area are a complicated political- administrative matter. Nevertheless, thanks to a well-developed leadership capacity, the successful reformulation of Hamburg's industrial policy in the 1980s towards high-tech industries, research etc formed the basis for a booming economy in the late 1980s. But the consequences of this strategy was rather limited in time, and from 1993 the city had suffered from new structural problems.

Stockholm is located in the periphery of Europe, but has a high level of economic development. Infrastructure is strongly developed, and further improvements are in progress. The airport has a medium position internationally, but new investments are still large. The city has been able to restructure its economic base with great success in the 1970s and 1980s. Today the economy of Stockholm is dominated by services and has a high level of research, education and technology. The economic recession caused a sharp rise in unemployment from 1990. The housing standard is the highest even on a global scale and there is no shortage.

Like Copenhagen, Stockholm has been national capital for centuries, hence a number of national functions - banking, insurance, administration, research & education, communications - are concentrated in the city. Due to the structure of private business, Stockholm has a number of headquarters for private firms of international importance. Despite the high technical standard of all kinds of communications, the peripheral location gives Stockholm a real and an image problem.

The political & administrative structure fits well with a coordinated planning and development of the city. At present, however, this structure is unsuitable for both the competition between the large cities of Europe and for the handling of the present industrial crisis. This change came first as Stockholm (like the rest of Sweden) went into serious economic problems at the late 1991. Since then both city and counties have tried to improve their leadership capacity by creating new efficient bodies and to develop a strong, local economic policy.

All four cities are now passing through the process of
deindustrialization. The decline in employment has been
completely or partly compensated by an expanding service

sector. While Copenhagen has suffered from structural problems since the mid 80s, and still not solved these, Hamburg and Stockholm have recently met with the same kind of problems. The long 1980s boom of Stockholm ended in 1991 and also Hamburg has recently seen the end of a most successful period for its economic regeneration strategy. The united Berlin has, due to the special circumstances of German reunification, passed through a number of massive problems of restructuring of its economic, social and political structures. But Berlin will gain a most prominent position in the near future, more or less automatically, due to its new function as German capital. This will guarantee a growth in medias, finance, banking and insurance as well as organizations of all kinds. Parts of this growth will take activity from Hamburg, which has not been able to internationalize more functions despite of the promising possibilities in the late 80s. Finally, neither Copenhagen nor Stockholm have increased their international importance during the last few years .

The leadership capacity has only been of importance in Hamburg so far. A complex and broad, coherent strategy for regeneration is absent or weakly formulated in Berlin, Copenhagen and Stockholm. However, the economic difficulties and the metropolitan competition have forced the cities to generate strategies for economic regeneration, political committees and other cross-sectorial bodies. While the federal structure of Germany gives Berlin and Hamburg some advantages, e.g. more autonomy, it also creates barriers for cross-border coordination and cooperation within its functional urban regions. In the case of Copenhagen, the abolition of the metropolitan council left the capital region without coordination, planning and common policy. Moreover, it seems that the Danish parliament primarily considers Copenhagen as a national burden and has weakened the city to the advantage of the provinces. This is in sharp contrast to Stockholm where the national government has supported the restructuring of the city and clearly considers Stockholm as the main locality for economic development.

New instruments of Strategic Planning in Greater Copenhagen

As in many other metropolitan units the leaders of Copenhagen have recently adopted urban marketing and strategic planning. As in most other urban units this has by no means been done wholeheartedly. At best, one can identify

fragments of such activities. Planning and strategy formulation are still in the hands of the 50 municipalities and 5 counties of Greater Copenhagen. But new organizations have been established covering the whole region and given responsibilities and means. This has been done as cooperative operations with municipal, county and national government participation and also with private businesses and organizations as partners. "Wonderful Copenhagen" is a new organization which has the objective of attracting tourists and "Copenhagen Capacity" is a parallel organization focusing on investments. The organizations were established in 1993 with yearly budgets of 2-4 million ECU each, and with larger budgets in forthcoming years.

The establishment of small cooperative private- public partnerships could be forerunners of more whole-hearted policies of urban marketing and strategic planning. Nevertheless, the two mega- events presented in this paper have appeared almost as a gift for the City. But were also initiated without much reference to the Greater Copenhagen and its future. The Danish capital was the 12th and last of the cultural cities of EU, and the decision of a fixed link across the Sound was the consequence of general European transportation problems. The two events have gradually become major instruments under the marketing and strategic planning umbrella. Cultural City-96 has a budget of 150 million ECU and is partly seen as a means to concentrate world attention on Copenhagen cf. Olympic Games. The fixed link between Denmark and Sweden entails large local and regional potential of change and growth. This is seen as a strategic possibility which can alter the European role of Copenhagen. A fusion of Copenhagen and the large Swedish agglomerations of Malmö and Lund is a realistic consequence of the fixed link. A take-off to a much more sizeable and dominant role is an expected consequence.

Temporary Mega-Event: Copenhagen, the Cultural City of Europe 1996

The European City of Culture is an annual EU-event, first realized in Athens, (1985) and followed by Florence (1986) and Amsterdam (1987). In 1990, Glasgow became the European City of Culture. While the former cultural cities had used the position for interesting exhibitions and festivals, the city of Glasgow formulated a total concept for the event covering all aspects for a whole year; a much more ambitious programme than those of previous cities of culture. The cultural event was an integrated part of the urban regeneration strategy of Glasgow. In many respects the Glasgow event has been used as a model for Copenhagen.

Glasgow was severely hit by the process of deindustrialization. An enormous job loss (nearly 100 000 jobs disappeared between 1971 and 1983), high and growing unemployment rate (est. 25%) and very visible decay. The city got a most negative image, e.g. from second city of the empire to cancer of the empire (Boyle & Hughes 1991). This forced the city government to reconstruct the image of Glasgow. The first step was the launch of the Glasgow Miles Better -promotional campaign and the creation of Greater Glasgow Tourist Board. A few years later, this was followed by There's A Lot Glasgowing On In 1990 (Darner 1990). Moreover, the city turned its renewal efforts towards the city centre despite great need in peripheral estates. Some of the more important campaigns are the GEAR-project (Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal) on the fringe of the city, the rehabilitation of Merchant City, once a derelict warehouse area close to the city, and the restoration of several smaller locations along the river Clyde. These projects were further supported by cultural developments, e.g. the Burrell Collection, the Mayfest and proposals for a new concert hall and a new Royal College of Music and Drama. By the establishment of Glasgow Action, the public - private partnership formed around some of the most prominent businessmen of the city, private leadership was injected into the revitalisation. In total, more than 50 million £ was spent for over 3800 cultural activities. The Year of Culture 1990 was a most important platform for the city as it both provided a general frame for the prior regeneration projects and introduced the use of culture and arts as a component of economic planning and development. The massive efforts have brought about results of a more permanent kind - first of all the improved image, which makes attraction of investments possible, but also jobs in tourist- related industries. This development strategy has been strongly attacked by the left opposition, which claim it was more power than culture, a kind of treason against the working class.

The Reclus study (1989) presented the profile of Copenhagen as a city with high scores regarding international dimension, culture and research. The city comes close to cultural primacy on the national Danish scene and concentrates the institutions, of which the nation has only one, for example the Royal Theatre, the Royal Library, the National Museum, the National Museum of Art, and various acade

mies and collections. Copenhagen also contains a wide variety of public and private institutions under the heading of culture, and presents formal as well as informal activities of all kinds ranging from Tivoli Gardens to strange subcultures. Although the concept of 'European Cultural City' indicates a temporary event, local benefit will increase by implementation of long-term initiatives. Thus, the Cultural City of Copenhagen intends to use the occasion to create durable improvements.

The event of Copenhagen as the European Cultural City of 1996 includes a broad, well-prepared programme for culture in general, which also contains local arrangements in different parts of the city, international workshops, seminars and a number of organized, informal meetings with internationally leading artists. Moreover, the infrastructure of culture will be improved with new institutions and expansion or modernization of existing ones. In total, a very ambitious attempt to raise the 'cultural level' of Copenhagen.

Nevertheless, intentions go further. The 1996-event is seen as a support to restructure the economy of Copenhagen from a postindustrial service economy to an economy based on advanced services with creativity, communication, culture and knowledge of high international quality. The great effort that Cultural City '96 represents is part of the positioning among European metropoles.

The Cultural City '96 itself is organized according to three dimensions (Kulturbysekretariatet, 1993). The geographical dimension of the city represents the physical form, character and quality (architecturally and environmentally) of the city, the region and its various parts in a national and international context. The human dimension focuses on the resources of individuals and social groups, their creativity, traditions, values, abilities and habits. The art dimension covers creativity and mediation within all kinds of cultural activity, for example among artists or cultural institutions.

In order to avoid strong resistance from important political groups (like in Glasgow), the organization of Cultural City '96 is open and horizontal in its structure and appeals for participation from citizens. The three dimensions of the event try to bring culture into local areas in corporation with local citizens. Moreover, the whole approach to the '96 -event attempts to incorporate and support alternative activities suggested by local population.

The intentions of the project are first of all related to
cultural activities - e.g. to increase commitment to arts and

culture, to increase the level of Danish culture through internationalization, to make permanent improvements for arts, to focus on international tendencies and to make culture and arts more visible in daily life. Another important objective is to promote metropolitan Copenhagen by focusing on its geographical, historical and physical qualities.

The development of such objectives has clear positive effects on the local economy. The event will change the qualities of Copenhagen in the direction of a creative society, which means a further modernization of infrastructure and a new activity pattern. A successful progress of Cultural City '96 will be important to the regional identity of metropolitan Copenhagen. It demonstrates a practical effort in regional cooperation, and could thus be a forerunner in the ongoing process of establishing some kind of regional government. On the marketing level, presentation of the event will strengthen the image of the city as a major metropole on the Baltic Sea scene, and the event in itself provides a better basis to market the region externally. Exploitation of the potential through tourism, congresses, international exhibitions and the like, presents a real chance for new synergetic growth.

Permanent Mega-Event: the Bridge to Sweden and the Potential Establishment of a Cross-National Integrated Big-City Region

South Scandinavian geography represents a crossroad scene. The straits between the Baltic Sea and the oceans of the world delimit the Danish islands and the peninsulas of Jutland and Scandinavia. The seagoing traffic is intense and is expected to increase when the East European nations catch up in international trade. Three of the Scandinavian straits are considered as missing fixed links. They are the Storebelt link between the islands of Zealand and Funen (Funen is linked to the European continent by bridges), the Sound between Zealand and Sweden, and the Femarbeit between Zealand and the German island of Femår (Femår is linked to the European continent by a bridge). Each of the straits is close to 18 km in width. The missing links present different barriers. Storebelt is a time and price barrier of a magnitude which could be compared to a road distance of about 120 km. The two others also function as national borders, marking linquistic, cultural and economic differences. In addition, the Sound was an EU-border until 1995. It also represents an efficient hindrance to the integration of the Danish capital (Copenhagen, 1.6 million in

habitants) and the Malmö-Lund agglomeration (0.5 million inhabitants) on the Swedish side of the Sound. Building this bridge is a mega-event in itself but using the event as a tool in strategic planning is a challenge.

On the European ranking lists Copenhagen is ranked no. 32 in size of agglomeration population, and the city is no. 16 when size is measured as a gross agglomeration product. When the measure is creativity (knowledge, culture, and communication: innovations) Copenhagen ranks no. 12 in Europe and no. 6 concerning international air-passenger traffic.

By adding figures from the Swedish side of the Sound to the Copenhagen figures, the rank shifts. Altogether, within a radius of 50 kilometres from Copenhagen Airport the towns are one of the five largest agglomerations of Europe as regards creativity. This Danish-Swedish agglomeration also represents one of the largest population concentrations in Northern Europe, no. 20 on the European list. To find larger neighbours you have to go to Rhein-Ruhr, Berlin, Warsaw, or St. Petersburg. In addition, Copenhagen, Maimo, and Lund are high- income cities compared with the European average. The new rank measured as gross agglomeration product is 8. When international passengers departing from the airport of Malmö are added to Copenhagen figures, the total increases, but not enough to change the rank. Adding figures do not create any new role for the South Scandinavian urban region. But it illustrates potentials. Critical masses are overcome without much investments apart from the bridge. New specializations can be initiated. New advantages of agglomeration can be released without large investments apart from the bridge and the related traffical establishments.

To the changes of ranks will further be added the changing potential of growth. In 1994, Copenhagen is the centre of Denmark (5 million inhabitants). At the turn of the century, the new Danish-Swedish agglomeration could be the centre of the whole South-Scandinavian region (8-9 mio. inhb.). The consequence will be a large-scale change of dominance and hinterland on the Copenhagen - Stockholm level, for example when it comes to the use of international airports.

A fusion of Greater Copenhagen and the Malmö-Lund agglomeration gives the two hitherto non- interdependent urban economies access to more specialization and opens up for co-operation not thought of yet. Synergy will be an obvious consequence. To this change in growth potentials effects of new optimism and of rise in world interest due to the event itself will be added. Large-scale engineering and construction are of international interest, and a fusion of two agglomerations, which co-operate very little at present, is a world-class event. In many respects, together with the South Scandinavian centres, Copenhagen are expected to increase economic growth when the missing transportation links between Scandinavia and the European continent are substituted by fixed links and regional organization is integrated.

The South Scandinavian scene represents an area outside the European center where development towards a crossborder regions is obvious. These trends comprehend a capital which is also among the 25 metropolitan units of the continent. In many respects, it's an interesting laboratory of integration and of changes of the major units in the urban system. What can be foreseen is a growth in competitive vitality and a change in hinterland, not a parallel to the development of a network of the kind present in the European center.

What has been presented here is a scenario of integration. This is by no means undisputed. Other scholars point out that the barriers are too strong to be overcome or that the scenario for the future is one of modest cooperation between the Danish and Swedish urban centers (Palludan, 1994).

Conclusions

The transformation of structural conditions, internationalization, technological development, European integration and the reemergence of Eastern Europe on the scene of the international economy, opens a new phase of competition at the upper levels of the urban system of Europe. The transformations form a turbulent phase which allows for sudden and surprising up- and down turns among the metropoles. The turbulence has increased demand for leadership and strategic planning. Ability to develop long- lasting strategic alliances locally, i.e. both within the metropole itself and between the metropole and its hinterland, has become most important.

Two metropoles within the Baltic Sea region seem to have chances to improve their position markedly in the near future; Berlin by becoming German capital and Copenhagen in case of a successful integration with the large agglomeration on the Swedish side of the Sound following establishment of a fixed link. But these 'lucky incidents' do not guarantee the success - they only provide some oppor

tunities. It is up to local governments to exploit these
chances.

In the case of Copenhagen, the contours of a formulated strategy can be seen. A strategy that contains the 'usual elements', but in particular attempts to exploit the specific possibilities of Copenhagen. At present this has resulted in a 'double' approach.

The lessons learned from the strategic mobilization of Glasgow made leaders of Copenhagen focus on growth potentials from culture and related industries. The policy of improving the urban cultural product would have a series of side effects on regional cooperation, local identity and urban marketing. Although being a temporary event, Cultural City '96 will be used to give the capital region a permanent lift.

The bridge between Copenhagen and Malmö gives the region a chance for substantial improvement of the position on the European scene. The infrastructure in itself is only the means, not the purpose. The potential changes in roles on the North European urban scene are illustrated in figure 2 and 3.

Many problems, however still represent barriers to successful
strategic planning, especially a low degree of regional
identity and the lack of regional government.

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