CULTURE AND HISTORY
– STUDENT RESEARCH PAPERS

INDHOLDSFORTEGNELSE

2

FORORD

Dette nummer af *Culture and History* er et omnibusnummer, der kommer vidt omkring - fra henholdsvis sexarbejde og frivilligt arbejde inden for velfærdsstatens rammer, til neoliberalisme, postkolonialisme og miljøpolitik. De fem artikler viser, hvordan humanistiske studier kan tale direkte til tidens store spørgsmål og temaer. Vi er glade for med dette nummer igen at have bidrag fra etnologi, historie og AMIS-centret (Advanced Migration Studies), og håber på at kunne få flere at Saxo-Instituttets fag og centre med i fremtidige numre.

Artiklerne i *Culture and History* udkommer både i temanumre og omnibusnumre, og redigeres af en fast redaktion i samarbejde med gæste- eller temaredaktører, studerende eller undervisere, som i fællesskab tager stilling til indkomne forslag og sørger for mulig fagfællebedømmelse. Tidsskriftet, der almindeligvis publiceres online, udgiver som hovedregel artikler forfattet af studerende og ansatte ved Saxo-Instituttet, Københavns Universitet. Formålet er at give studerende fra instituttets forskellige fagligheder mulighed for at publicere artikler baseret på projekter, opgaver eller specialer og dermed dels formidle deres indsigter, dels prøve kræfter med forskningsartikelgenren.

God fornøjelse med læsningen!

Peter Edelberg, Niels Jul Nielsen, Lea Brinkgaard, Emil Skaarup
Saxo-instituttet

THE APARTNESS OF IDEAL AND REALITY

Anticolonialism, Eurocentrism and Ubuntu Philosophy in the South African Freedom Charter

By:
Max Poole
European Ethnology

ABSTRACT: This article contributes to scholarly debate concerning universalist discourse, as either advantageous or detrimental to addressing inequalities between the West and the Global South. First, I explore the theoretical backdrop of the dispute, positing that differing notions of how multiple modernities interrelate informs divergent conceptualizations of universalist discourse, as either rigidly Eurocentric or contextually adaptable. Secondly, I analyze the South African Freedom Charter from both perspectives, arguing that we should recognize universalist discourse as a powerful tool in formulating political visions of decolonization; and conversely, that we should be cautious when utilizing such discourse due to its inherent Eurocentric capabilities.

KEYWORDS: Decolonization, Universalism, Cultural Relativism, Eurocentrism, Ubuntu.

Introduction

Historically, political visions of alternative futures have been a powerful driving force behind social change. The Enlightenment's confrontation with absolute monarchy has since then conditioned numerous political visions of new social structures and global power relations. However, these visions possess a certain Eurocentrism on account of their origin within the Enlightenment. The question is then, what possibilities and limitations present themselves when Enlightenment thought is implemented in political visions of decolonization in the Global South?

This deliberation is reflective of a scholarly debate within the field of postcolonialism pertaining to *universalism.* In this context, universalism is defined as "discourses that are simultaneously categorical—they posit 'universal' categories such as 'humanity' or 'Man'—as well as conceptual—they elaborate universalizing notions such as 'equality' or 'freedom' on the basis of these categories" (Mangharam 2017: 2). Universalism is thus pluralized in this context. The ongoing debate surrounding this concept can be condensed to the following two propositions:

1. Universalisms are inherently Eurocentric, and therefore problematic when applied to non-Western political contexts.

2. Universalisms are contextually adaptable, and therefore indispensable in tackling global inequality despite its role in colonialism.

This article attempts to navigate and supplement this discussion by drawing upon two analytic approaches that exemplify each of these propositions, and subsequently applying them, in alternation, throughout an analytic discussion of the South African Freedom Charter. Upon its declaration in 1955, the Freedom Charter shook the foundations of South African society by outlining a set of political goals for the anti-apartheid movement. The Freedom Charter is a prime example of a political vision of decolonization. Furthermore, it utilizes universalist discourse whilst addressing issues specific to South African society—such as demanding freedom of movement in

response to the 'Pass Laws' of apartheid.[1] Importantly, this paradoxical presence of universal and culturally relative discourse each present an analytic entry-point, which accommodates two distinct methods of approach to universalism that condition each side of the debate. As an object of study, the Freedom Charter thus allows us to navigate this field of contestation whilst facilitating an analytical discussion where both contentions collide constructively.

In this article, I first explore Dipesh Chakrabarty's (2000) critique of the teleological view of history, and Shmuel Eisenstadt's (2000) corresponding notion of multiple modernities, positing these theorizations as the watershed moment out of which the contestation surrounding universalisms emerged. I argue that differing notions of how multiple modernities interrelate, informs divergent conceptualizations of universalisms as either obstinately Eurocentric or contextually adaptable. Secondly, I extrapolate two distinct analytic frameworks from Ann Laura Stoler's (2016) and Adom Getachew's (2016; 2019) broader theories and repurpose them as analytic approaches that exemplify each side of the debate. Finally, I juxtapose these approaches as counterpoints in an analytical discussion of the Freedom Charter's discourse, arguing that universalisms' contextual adaptability makes them powerful tools in the formulation of political visions of decolonization. At the same time, however, we should utilize universalist discourse cautiously due to its immanent Eurocentric capabilities.

From a Singular History to Multiple Modernities

This article is situated within the inter-disciplinary field of postcolonialism. More specifically, in the field of contention surrounding universalism that emerged in the wake of Dipesh Chakrabarty's canonical work *Provincializing Europe* (2000), Shmuel Eisenstadt's article *Multiple Modernities* (2000), and their respective critiques of the teleological view of history, which came to prominence during the Enlightenment (Carr 2020: 313).

In short, this view of history is grounded in the fundamental Enlightenment principle that Man can master both himself and nature by virtue of his reason (ibid.: 311). Accordingly, this perspective

---

[1] 'Pass Laws' refers to the restrictions imposed on black South Africans' freedom of movement with the implementation of the Natives Act of 1923.

views history as a process of human perfectibility leading inexorably towards the emancipation of Man (ibid.). Moreover, this process is seen as a reasonable affair, as reason not only sets the goal, but also governs its realization (ibid.: 311-312). Crucially, however, 'political modernity'— characterized by state institutions, bureaucracy, and capitalism—is understood as the prerequisite to this historical progression, which, during the Enlightenment, was something exclusive to European polities (Chakrabarty 2000: 4). As such, Europe is implicated as the sole proprietor of reason and the measuring rod of social progress (ibid.: 9).

Thus, this theory puts forth an evolutionary scale in its interpretation of history, where 'the West' occupies the forefront, and 'the rest' occupy what once was. Furthermore, the historical prognosis of humanity's emancipation thereby depends upon the expansion of Enlightenment thought and political modernity, from the European centre towards its distant peripheries (Eisenstadt 2000: 1). Consequently, this view can lead to phenomena such as European hegemonism (by idealizing Europe), colonialism (by legitimizing the expansion of this ideal), and anachronistic exclusion (by justifying the subsequent subjugation of colonized peoples on account of their 'pre-modern' status) (Carr 2020: 316; Chakrabarty 2000: 8). As such, the teleological view of history and its singular conception of 'modernity' has inherent Eurocentric capabilities, insofar as it encapsulates the notion of Europe as a paragon of progress.

This theory of historical progression may appear as a self-fulfilling prophecy, as political modernity is a truly global phenomenon today (Chakrabarty 2000: 4). However, the historical development of how modernity spread throughout the world was not foreseeable: a process wherein political modernity, and the political discourse that corresponds with it, takes different forms in different contexts (Eisenstadt 2000: 1-2). This pluralization of modernity is what is encapsulated in the notion of *multiple modernities*, which understands the history of modernity as a process of "continual constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural programs" (ibid.). According to Eisenstadt, this process is carried forward by various actors within the political sphere—from institutions to activists—who continuously co-constitute unique manifestations of modernity (ibid.: 2). Even though Western modernity might act as a frame of reference in non-Western contexts, modernization and Westernization are not synonymous. However, although modernities vary from

context to context they should not be understood in isolation, as they interrelate and affect each other considerably (ibid.). This dynamic constitutes the watershed out of which the disputation of universalism emerges, as different perspectives on how multiple modernities interrelate, informs differing perceptions of what universalisms communicate.

Discursive Divergence

In order to theorize the interaction between differing and co-existing modernities, I draw upon the work of Ann Laura Stoler and Adom Getachew and showcase how it determines their divergent conceptualizations of universalisms—as rigidly Eurocentric and contextually adaptable, respectively.

Alternative Universalisms

In Getachew's perspective, universalisms are first and foremost understood in relation to their *specificity* (Getachew 2016: 823): "Specificity entails attention to the particular political problems from which [discourses] emerged and highlights how [they] themselves inaugurate ideals rather than merely realizing existing ideals" (ibid.). When we, according to Getachew, decipher universalisms as an innovative response to specific political challenges, a different conceptualization of universalisms emerges, that of *alternative universalisms* (ibid.: 839). In this view the Freedom Charter is thus primarily understood in relation to particular political issues (ibid.: 823). On the basis of this relational understanding, it is highlighted how Enlightenment thought is reinvented in diverse ways in different contexts (ibid.: 839). However, Getachew does not deny the influence of the Enlightenment on alternative universalisms, she simply sees it as subordinate in relation to discourses' specific circumstances (ibid.). Thus, Getachew's conceptualization of universalisms corresponds with a decentering of Europe: a reinterpretation of the power relation between multiple modernities, where the periphery's political specificity overshadows the metropole's political modernity.

However, despite the marginalization of Enlightenment discourse it is not completely voided in Getachew's perspective, because the globalization of European modernity, and its distinct manifestations in colonial societies is precisely what she believes created a corresponding global

counterpoint—an "anticolonial nationalism" (Getachew 2019: 2). Instead of regarding this nationalism as foreclosing internationalism, Getachew rather views it as an international anticolonial modernity (ibid.). According to Getachew, this anticolonial nationalism rethought state sovereignty, idealized global redistribution, and formulated a vision of a reconstitution of the post-war world order (ibid.: 2-3). Hence, Getachew terms this modernity as *worldmaking* (ibid.).

When applied upon the Freedom Charter, this worldmaking modernity overshadows that of the Enlightenment, because it primarily included anglophone colonial societies, such as South Africa, in the post-war era. In addition to understanding the Freedom Charter in relation to specificity, it is thus also understood in reference to worldmaking. For example, the response to particular domestic issues can entail significant implications internationally, such as self-determination which directly confronts the power relation between colony and metropole (ibid.: 4-5). This dialectic between the specific and the universal is exactly that, which constitutes the conceptualization of the Freedom Charter as worldmaking: it not only transforms the Enlightenment's universal language in regard to its specific circumstance, it also formulates a transnational vision by virtue of its relation to worldmaking. Thus, the most significant interrelationship between modernities is one shared between a distinct South African modernity and worldmaking when the Freedom Charter is approached as an alternative universalism.

Postcolonial Universalisms

Stoler's approach to universalism stems from a postcolonial perspective: the convincing prognosis that colonialism is not simply a bygone era, but something which implicitly conditions the demands, priorities, and constraints of contemporary politics (Stoler 2016: 3). According to Stoler, this temporality can be captured in the analytical concept of *duress* (ibid.: 7). Duress designates the manifestation of colonial power relations, which can take numerous forms: "How one chooses to address (…) duress depends (…) on where and among whom it is sought, how it is imagined to manifest [and] the temporalities in which it is lodged" (ibid.). In drawing upon Stoler, I conceptualize duress as Enlightenment thought manifested through concepts and categorizations in the Freedom Charter's discourse. Concepts are not mere tools in Stoler's view, but rather "seductive and powerful agents" that invite appropriation and should be treated as access points to imperial

logics that implicitly impose a relationship of power (ibid.: 8). Thus, concepts are actors in their own right, and accordingly "The challenge is both to discern the work we do with concepts and the work that concepts may explicitly or inadvertently exert on us" (ibid.: 9). This approach is encapsulated in the term *concept-work* (ibid.: 17), which first and foremost entails retaining concepts "both as mobile and as located as they are in the world" (ibid.: 19). As mentioned, the concepts I am concerned with are located in the European Enlightenment, and their presence in the Freedom Charter is testament to their mobility. Simultaneously, it is important to recognize the power relations they are embedded in—such as Eurocentrism (ibid.: 17). In drawing upon Stoler, I thus treat concepts as: "productive touchstones of political contest (…) as occasions rather than obstacles to ask how conceptual claims assert themselves; as entry points of inquiry (…) into the historiography of reason, colony (…) and imperial sovereignty" (ibid.: 21). Accordingly, this approach calls attention to the genealogy of universalisms, which stretches back into the Age of Enlightenment, thereby foregrounding the interrelationship between European and South African modernity. As such, this relational approach and the power relation that thereby is emphasized "opens to what concepts implicitly and often quietly foreclose, as well as what they encourage and condone" (ibid.: 18-19).

In summary, my first approach draws upon Getachew's perspective, and initially examines which particular political challenges are addressed in the Freedom Charter's discourse. Thereafter, I analyze how Enlightenment concepts are reimagined in relation to the document's cultural and political specificity. Finally, I highlight how these innovations constitute worldmaking by rethinking national self-governance, global redistribution, or the world order.

My second approach employs Stoler's terminology, and initially identifies duress in the Freedom Charter's discourse, manifested as universal concepts and categorizations. Subsequently, I trace these concepts' genealogy back to the Enlightenment to emphasize inherent power relations, such as Eurocentrism. Lastly, I analyze how this immanent power relation limits possibilities, disregards alternatives, or overshadows the culturally particular via the Freedom Charter's discourse.

In the following sections I apply these theoretical approaches upon the Freedom Charter's discourse. Three of the central points of the document are examined sequentially, allowing each point to be analyzed from both perspectives in turn.

Counterpointing Counterparts

Elitist Eurocentrism or Cultural Recognition?

> The people shall govern! (ANC 1955).

> Every man and woman shall have the right to vote for and to stand as a candidate for all bodies which make laws; All people shall be entitled to take part in the administration of the country; The rights of the people shall be the same, regardless of race, colour or sex; All bodies of minority rule, advisory boards, councils and authorities shall be replaced by democratic organs of self-government (ibid.).

The first main point in the Freedom Charter presents concepts such as democratic self-governance, universal voting rights as well as the right to stand for election and partake in administrative boards (ibid.). These concepts are closely connected to the Enlightenment, as they refer to an institutional framework that first emerged during this time in Europe. For instance, 'parliament' or 'administration' are institutional concepts that constitute the state. In addition to the fact that these concepts implicate a vision of a democratic state, they are also formulated on the basis of 'the people' (ANC 1955). This indicates an idealization of the nation-state in the document's discourse, as the nation-state and the people are interdependent, as stated in the definition of the former: "a territorially bounded sovereign polity (…) ruled in the name of a community of citizens that identify themselves as a nation" (Encyclopedia Britannica, n.d.). The categorization 'people' is especially significant because it pervades the case's discourse, and continuously acts as the reference-point for the entitlements it expresses. The concept 'people' signifies "the citizens of a given state (…) a linguistic, historical and cultural entity" (Den Store Danske 2020). The notion of a South African 'people' thereby implicates the population as a homogeneity. Additionally, 'the people's' interconnection with 'the nation-state' demands a specific geographical demarcation of South Africa and its peoples.

All of these concepts and categorizations can be interpreted as a manifestation of duress. According to this interpretation, the Freedom Charter puts forth the tacit assumption that a European institutional framework and its associated worldview should be reproduced in South Africa. However, this institutional framework is not simply reproduced in the exact same fashion, because the Freedom Charter expands modernity from something exclusive to the white settler-colonial population to the whole 'people' (Chakrabarty 2000: 5).

Nevertheless, the Freedom Charter's use of Enlightenment terminology can lead to several problematic implications. When South Africa is defined as one nation inhabited by one people, the colonial border demarcation of South Africa is reproduced, thus relegating cultural and ethnic differences to the margins. The problem with this is that the demographics of South Africa are far from homogenous. Rather, 'the people' constitute a composite of numerous ethno-cultural groups that were encapsulated with the establishment of the settler-colonial society. In addition to this homogenization, European modernity is still allocated a hegemonic role when the nation-state is idealized as the basis of equal rights. This supposition also delimits these rights' universality, as they are implicitly limited to those who lie within the demarcation of South Africa. As such, the Freedom Charter does not manage to free itself from the Eurocentrism inherent in its discourse when appropriating the language of the Enlightenment. Rather, a European worldview and state apparatus is reproduced through it.

The passage "The people shall govern!" (ANC 1955) points to an appropriation of the Enlightenment principle of popular sovereignty: "that legitimate rule of a state requires (…) consent by the people" (Encyclopedia Britannica, n.d.). This begs the question of whether the Freedom Charter actually possesses popular sovereignty. In other words, to what extent does this universalism manage to speak on behalf of the broader population it claims to represent? Like many other social movements, the anti-apartheid movement was led by an intellectual vanguard. In most colonial societies knowledge of a European intellectual tradition was usually limited to a Western-educated elite. Considering this, the appropriation of a Western vocabulary in the document's vision for all South Africans can be problematized as elitist. Although the document was created through considerable public participation, the people's demands for freedom are translated into a political

language they themselves do not possess (Mangharam 2017: 220). However, the point here is not to criticize the anti-apartheid movement. Rather, my aim is to show how Enlightenment discourse invites appropriation, excludes non-Western worldviews, and reproduces linguistic hegemony. Thus, although the Freedom Charter possesses an anticolonial discourse it inadvertently reproduces a colonial mindset: it hegemonizes a Western worldview and ascribes it to the uneducated, or rather 'non-Western educated', population.

On the other hand, if we examine the first point of the Charter in relation to specificity, it is first and foremost understood as a response to particular political challenges. Through this lens the abolishment of minority rule can be seen as a direct confrontation with South African apartheid: the right to vote, stand for election, or occupy public office regardless of race and colour explicitly confronts the form of government at the time, where this was exclusive to white South Africans. Although the discourse draws upon racial categorizations, they are radically reinvented in the sense that they no longer act as the basis of non-whites' disempowerment. Additionally, the racial foundation of all apartheid laws is completely dissolved with 'the people's' emancipation (Apartheid Museum, n.d.).

The Freedom Charter's consistent formulation of entitlements in relation to 'the people' is especially notable when considered contextually; as an attempt to create national cohesion in a racially divided society. As mentioned, 'people' signifies a large group of individuals who share a common language, history, and culture. This categorization thus constitutes a collective entity composed of individuals. Despite the concept's collective character, its inherently individualist conceptualization of human beings is reflective of its European origin. However, 'the people' in the Freedom Charter is not simply a reinscribed concept from the Enlightenment when understood in relation to its particular context. Rather, the consistent use of 'people' can be seen as an attempt to translate a distinct South African concept, namely 'ubuntu': "A person is a person through other people" (Eze 2010: 190). In short, ubuntu constitutes an intersubjective conceptualization of 'self', in the sense that 'the other' mirrors 'one's own' subjectivity (ibid.: 190-191). In stark contrast to the concept of 'Man' from the Enlightenment, humanity is not inherent in human beings on an individual basis (ibid.). Humanity is rather conditioned by a mutual dependence between human beings as "Humanity is a quality we

owe each other" (ibid.: 191). To be human depends upon intersubjective mutuality because 'humans' only exist through co-constitution (ibid.). The maintenance of this interpersonal dynamic is therefore essential; if one—so to speak—opts out of this dynamic, one is theoretically no longer a 'human being'. Additionally, this definition of 'the people' is not based on national affiliation, because ubuntu is not contingent upon citizenship or nationality, but rather by continuous intersubjective recognition and social engagement. In this sense anyone can, in principle, become a South African.

The ascription of entitlement on the basis of 'the people' can thus be interpreted as worldmaking, as the document sets forth a transnational vision of self-governance in light of ubuntu. As such, the incorporation of ubuntu elicits an interpretation of the Freedom Charter as an alternative universalism.

Nature and Culture – Synergy or Dichotomy?

> The land shall be shared among those who work it! (ANC 1955).

> Restrictions of land ownership on a racial basis shall be ended, and all the land redivided amongst those who work it, to banish famine and land hunger; The state shall help the peasants with implements, seed, tractors and dams to save the soil and assist the tillers; Freedom of movement shall be guaranteed to all who work on the land; All shall have the right to occupy land wherever they choose; People shall not be robbed of their cattle, and forced labour and farm prisons shall be abolished (ibid.).

This central point emphasizes the concepts of private ownership, land reform and freedom of movement. The word 'ownership' can be traced back to 13th century Europe but is only seldomly used before the Enlightenment, where the word got its contemporary meaning: "Possessions, land or owned goods, things under ownership" (Online Etymology Dictionary, n.d.). John Locke (1632-1704) was one of the first proponents of private ownership. In the spirit of the Enlightenment, Locke criticized the monarchy's monopoly on property rights (West 2018: 21). Instead, Locke believed that humanity possessed a 'natural right' to ownership bestowed by God: "God… has given the Earth to the Children of Men, given it to mankind in common" (ibid.: 22). This mirrors the Enlightenment thought that Man could master nature (Carr 2020: 311). Furthermore, it reflects a

dualistic perception of nature and culture which constitutes a distinctively European view of Man's position in nature (Haila 2000: 1). Other than distinguishing Man from nature, this understanding also places the former on top of the latter in a hierarchical relationship (Byrne, Brockwell, and O'Connor 2013: 1). Despite doing away with apartheid's exclusion of non-whites from property rights, the Freedom Charter thus reproduces a distinctly European dualism between culture and nature. Ideals such as 'ownership' and 'land reform' thereby implicitly exclude culturally specific understandings of nature, where nature and culture are not perceived as diametrical opposites. Additionally, when the document demands "the right to occupy land wherever [one] choose[s]" (ANC 1955), it facilitates a justification of settlement akin to that of colonialism. While it is not reproduced in identical fashion, it still implicitly sets aside various cultural groups that inhabit 'natural areas' and thereby do not share this dichotomous perception of culture and nature.

With Getachew's notion of specificity in mind, the demand of land reform can also be understood as a direct response to South Africa's specific history of settler-colonialism. Moreover, this demand can be perceived as a direct response to the Black Land Act of 1913 which excluded black people from land rights (South African History Online, n.d.). However, this is not simply a demand of inclusion in the right to land, but rather a reinvention of this ideal as something entitled to the peasants who work it. In this case it is the actual physical interaction with the land that forms the basis of 'ownership'. This is in stark contrast to this concept's European origin, where Man's separation from nature legitimizes the right to land and its exploitation for profit (West 2018: 21). Here, land rights are not based on separation, but rather legitimized through unification; by physically inhabiting and working the land. Furthermore, the interrelationship between Man and nature can be interpreted as more symbiotic; one cultivates the land to nourish oneself. This is a radical alternative to the Enlightenment's nature-culture dichotomy and its immanent power relation, where Man exploits nature for his own gain (ibid.).

In addition to this interpretation of land rights, a vision of global redistribution is simultaneously formulated through the call for domestic land reform (Getachew 2019: 3). This demand undermines the metropole's power position and its entitlement to exploit its satellite states' landholdings for

profit. Thereby, land reform in South Africa also has significant external implications, which indicates Getachew's concept of worldmaking as it entails global redistribution of land (ibid.: 4-5).

Acknowledging Autonomy or Disregarding Distinctiveness?

There shall be peace and friendship! (ANC 1955).

South Africa shall strive to maintain world peace and the settlement of all international disputes by negotiation—not war; Peace and friendship amongst all our people shall be secured by upholding the equal rights, opportunities and status of all; The people of the protectorates—Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland—shall be free to decide for themselves their own future; The rights of all the peoples of Africa to independence and self-government shall be recognised, and shall be the basis of close cooperation (ibid.).

The Freedom Charter's final paragraph puts forth a vision of world peace via transnational negotiation and recognizes individual states' right to self-government (ibid.). With Stoler's notion of duress in mind, one of these points is especially notable: "[that] Peace and friendship amongst all our people shall be secured by upholding (…) equal rights" (ibid.). That peace and friendship depends upon equal rights for 'all our people' implies that the Freedom Charter is universally applicable. The rights which were formulated domestically—on the basis of 'the people'—hereby also constitutes the conditions of the ideals externally—for 'all our peoples'. The implication of the discourse's universal applicability is thereby paradoxical, considering its vision of self-determination for "all the peoples of Africa" (ibid.). Although it is claimed that self-government "shall be the basis of close cooperation", South Africa is implicitly assigned a leading role—as the centre from which the ideal should spread (ibid.). In accordance with the teleological view of history, the Freedom Charter's discourse hegemonizes its own vision as a paragon of progress—albeit in an anticolonial sense. Thus, we can see how universalist discourse, despite other intentions, staunchly stands by its inherent teleology. Although the Freedom Charter presents a vision of self-determination, it simultaneously invites appropriation as a 'plan' that should be followed to achieve the ideal.

As mentioned in the first section of this analysis, the Freedom Charter can be seen as an elitist discourse, as it draws upon Enlightenment thought, which was only accessible to a Western-

educated minority. Due to South Africa's settler-colonial history, the country is arguably the most Westernized population in Africa. Consequently, the Freedom Charter can be problematized because its universalist discourse—albeit inadvertently—reproduces a colonial practice: it implies further expansion of a hegemonic Western worldview to parts of Africa, that are not nearly as Westernized as South Africa.

When the notion of specificity is considered, the demand for South Africa's protectorates' self-government is conspicuous, as it exemplifies a direct confrontation with South Africa's history of settler-colonialism and the colonial border demarcation of Africa. This demarcation neglected the areas' ethno-cultural diversity by encapsulating it under one nation. The Freedom Charter thereby confronts a specific South African problem, by demanding the recognition of the protectorates' cultural distinctiveness and self-determination. Although the Freedom Charter attempts to avoid confrontational foreign policy, its confrontation with South Africa's domestic demarcation also has implications externally, as the document demands self-government for "all the peoples of Africa" (ANC 1955). Thus, the document's final point puts forth a transnational vision, which confronts the colonial border demarcation and the encapsulation of numerous African peoples within nation-states. This is testament to Getachew's idea of worldmaking, as the Freedom Charter's vision demands a radical reinvention of national self-government and a sea change in the constellation of African nations.

Conclusion

Considering the first truly global wave of globalization—colonialism—it is evident that universalisms have played a significant role in the justification of imperialism and establishment of Western hegemony in the Global South (Eisenstadt 2000: 14). Universal humanism was propagated, but all the while a demarcation of modernity based on a teleological view of history excluded colonized peoples from it.

Despite this, one cannot ignore universalisms' significant role in overcoming this boundary, as the expansion of modernity towards the metropole's satellite states established multiple modernities; distinct modern institutional frameworks and political conceptualizations, such as anticolonialism.

The discursive tool discussed in this article is exactly that, which has been the premise of anticolonial movements' cohesion—domestically as well as internationally. With the Freedom Charter as a case in point, the critique of colonialism itself inevitably draws upon some form of universalism. It can thus be ascertained that universalisms—despite their role in colonialism—are essential tools in the fight against social injustice in the Global South.

That being said, it is nevertheless important to act cautiously when drawing upon universalist discourse as the traces of colonialism are far from erased, and one can easily end up reproducing Western hegemony when categorizing people and formulating concepts on the basis of Enlightenment thought. Such discourse thereby risks drowning out culturally specific ways of life and homogenizing different worldviews further than they already have been through colonialism. The notion of 'returning' to the precolonial is probably wishful thinking, but this article has shown that universalisms do not necessarily stand in sharp contrast to the non-Western. On the contrary, they can be utilized as effective tools in the dissemination of alternative worldviews, such as ubuntu. As restricted as universalisms are by their entanglement with the Enlightenment, they continue to be powerful tools in the formulation of new visions of a decolonized world.

Bibliography

- Brockwell, Sally., Byrne, Denis and O'Connor, Sue 2013: "Introduction: Engaging culture and nature". Brockwell, Sally., Byrne, Denis and O'Connor, Sue (Eds.): *Transcending the Culture-Nature Divide in Cultural Heritage: Views from the Asia-Pacific region*, vol. 36. ANU Press, p. 1-12.
- Carr, David 2020: "Teleology and the Experience of History". Turner, Aaron (Ed.): *Reconciling Ancient and Modern Philosophies of History*. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter: p. 311-326.
- Chakrabarty, Dipesh 2000: *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*. Princeton University Press.
- Eisenstadt, Shmuel 2000: "Multiple Modernities". *Daedalus,* 129, p. 1-29.
- Eze, Michael Onyebuchi 2010: *Intellectual History in Contemporary South Africa*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Getachew, Adom 2016: "Universalism After the Post-colonial Turn: Interpreting the Haitian Revolution". Political Theory, 44, p. 821-845.
- Getachew, Adom 2019: *Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination*. Princeton University Press.
- Haila, Yrjö 2000: "Beyond the Nature-Culture Dualism". *Biology & Philosophy*, 15, 155-175.

- Mangharam, Mukti Lakhi 2017: *Literatures of Liberation: Non-European Universalisms and Democratic Progress.* Ohio State University Press.
- Stoler, Ann Laura 2016: *Duress: Imperial Durabilities in Our Times.* Duke University Press.
- West, Edwin 2018: "Chapter One. Property Rights in the History of Economic Thought: From Locke to J. S. Mill". Terry Anderson and Fred McChesney (Eds.): *Property Rights: Cooperation, Conflict, and Law.* Princeton University Press, p. 20-42.

Websites

- "Apartheid Legislation 1850s-1970s". *South African History Online.* Obtained 21. November 2021 from: https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/apartheid-legislation-1850s-1970s
- Damsholt, Kirstine 2020, 26. July: "Folk". *Den Store Danske.* Obtained 3. January 2022 from: https://denstoredanske.lex.dk/folk
- "Nation-state". *Encyclopedia Britannica.* Obtained 3. January 2022 from: https://www.britannica.com/topic/nation-state
- "Property". *Online Etymology Dictionary.* Obtained 3. January 2022 from: https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=property
- "Race Classification". *Apartheid Museum.* Obtained 27. December 2021 from: https://www.apartheidmuseum.org/exhibitions/race-classification
- "The Freedom Charter". *African National Congress.* Obtained 10. November 2021 from: https://www.anc1912.org.za/the-freedom-charter-2/

FRIVILLIGHED – VELFÆRDSSTATENS REDNING?

En etnologisk undersøgelse af inddragelsen af frivillige civilsamfundsaktører i

Københavns Kommunes ældrepleje

Af:
Nanna Simone Kristensen
Jon Alexander Mangerel
Rebecca Søegaard

Europæisk Etnologi

ABSTRACT: In this paper, we investigate the collaborative work between three Danish nursing homes and the Copenhagen Municipality's Administration for Health and Caregiving, in involving volunteers in the activities of the residents in the nursing homes. Changes in demographics have led to discussions among authorities and in public debates about alternatives to the historically professionalized welfare services, and to increase the degree of volunteerism as a measure for handling this development. We analyze the collaborations with Susan Leigh Star's concept of invisible work and the ethnological State and Life-mode Theory and Niels Jul Nielsen's notion of civil servant life-mode. We show how the invisible work being done is the prerequisite for the volunteer work, and how further integration of volunteerism in the welfare requires new forms of volunteerism, as volunteers may in practice be handling tasks that are currently being handled by welfare professionals. This turns out to be problematic, as volunteering seems to thrive in the space between *unspokenness* and a formalized framework.

Indledning

Fremtidens velfærdsstat og dens udfordringer kom endnu engang i søgelyset under kommunalvalgkampen i 2021, og debatterne har sidenhen kastet radikale løsningsforslag af sig: borgerpligt for ungdommen (Struck Westersø, TV2 2022) og arbejdspligt for "borgere med integrationsbehov" (Mette Frederiksens nytårstale 1.1.2022). Debatterne omhandlede endvidere, hvorvidt man i højere grad skal benytte sig af frivilligt arbejde på plejehjem, hvor der er udfordringer med at finde tilstrækkelig arbejdskraft. Spørgsmålet er, om frivillighed kan bruges som en bæredygtig løsning på de danske plejehjem.

I vores artikel undersøger vi på baggrund af et feltarbejde i efteråret 2021[1], hvordan civilsamfunds- og kommunale aktører i samarbejde imødegår udfordringerne i omsorgsarbejdet. Udfordringerne er blandt andet opstået som følge af den demografiske udvikling, der i løbet af halvfemserne blev kendt som ældrebyrden. I samme periode har der været tendens til i højere grad at ville inddrage civilsamfundet i den offentlige sektor, men ideen om at dyrke samarbejde mellem offentlige og private aktører er intet nybrud: gennem slutningen af 1800-tallet og særligt den første halvdel af 1900-tallet var det frivillige arbejde i andels- og foreningslivet med til at håndtere et mangefold af samfundsproblematikker i hele Skandinavien (Fehsenfeldt & Ibsen 2020:23; Henriksen et al 2019:7). Forskelligartede tendenser og paradigmer for offentlig forvaltning har præget inddragelsen af

---

[1] Feltarbejdet blev til i forbindelse med kurset Europa i Verden med temaet "*Styringspraksisser i konkurrencestaten*" på kandidatuddannelsen i Europæisk Etnologi, Københavns Universitet

civilsamfundsaktører og senest er samskabelse blevet nøgleord i *New Public Governance*-paradigmet (Torfing & Triantafillou 2017:25).

Vi undersøger i artiklen inddragelsen af frivillige civilsamfundsaktører gennem interviews med medarbejdere fra tre københavnske plejehjem og embedspersoner i Københavns Kommunes Sundheds- og Omsorgsforvaltning. Vi fokuserer på deres samarbejde om at inddrage og anvende frivillighed i forlængelse af og som supplement til de ydelser, som serviceloven påbyder kommunerne gennem driftsenhederne at levere til borgerne (Social- og Ældreministeriet: "Bekendtgørelse af lov om social service" nr. 1114, 30/8-2018). Samarbejdet mellem Københavns Kommune og driftsenhederne består både i generelle aftaler og lovgivning på kommunal og statslig plan, men også i individuelle aftaler mellem dem. Det betyder, at det er udfordrende at udarbejde handlingsplaner for en øget inddragelse, fordi standardiseringer ikke nødvendigvis formår at have blik for den heterogenitet, der netop præger inddragelsen af frivillighed på plejehjemmene, hvor forskelligartede arbejdsopgaver er nødvendige for at drive og støtte frivilligheden.

Relationen mellem kommune, stat og den praksis vi mødte på plejehjemmene, anskuer vi som en slags 'usynligt arbejde': arbejdsopgaver som frivilligheden betinges af, men som ikke nødvendigvis anerkendes. Frivilligheden på plejehjemmene ser vi som forlængelse af og som komplementære til de serviceydelser, som kommunerne er forpligtede til at levere, og vi problematiserer med den etnologiske stats- og livsformsteori og Jul Nielsens begrebsliggørelse af en embedslivsform en yderligere implementering af frivillighed i kommunens omsorgsarbejde ved at spørge, hvad der muliggør inddragelse af frivillighed, og hvad grænserne for frivillighed er.

Metode og forskningsoversigt

Forskere og meningsdannere har gennem årtier forudset samfundets fremtidige problemer i takt med, at de store efterkrigsgenerationer ældes, og velfærdsydelserne kommer under pres, fordi de følgende generationer ikke er store nok til at oppebære et uændret serviceniveau (Jensen & Rostgaard 2015:10). Udgifter til de ældres velfærd og mangel på sundhedsprofessionel arbejdskraft er et presserende emne med stor politisk bevågenhed. Netop feltet mellem gerontologi, frivillighed og styringspraksisser er også etnologisk

interessant, og med blik for både statslige praksisser og hverdagens kompleksitet kan vi åbne for nye kulturanalytiske indsigter.

Vores felt af gerontologi, frivillighed og styringspraksisser er formet af både klassiske begreber, som det foucaultske *governmentality* og danske undersøgelser af forvaltningspraksis og frivillighedens logikker. Vi anskuer i artiklen styring som formet af netværksdannelse og relationer, men også præget af idealer for styring, som former både den offentlige forvaltning og hverdagslivets mangfoldighed. Idealerne for styring fungerer ifølge kommunalforsker Anne Tortzen som en slags 'institutionelle logikker', der baserer sig på forskellige forståelser og idealer for relationen mellem stat, marked og civilsamfund og på den måde fungerer som styringsparadigmer (Tortzen 2016:26). Paradigmerne kan opdeles i idealtypiske, historiske kategorier: *Traditional Public Administration* (TPA), *New Public Management* (NPM) og *New Public Governance* (NPG)*.* TPA beskriver det, gennem det 20. århundrede, dominerende paradigme, hvor bureaukrati sammen med fagekspertise sikrede kvalitet, og at lovene blev overholdt. TPA har siden 1980'erne været udfordret af NPM med en øget vægt på konkurrenceudsætning og privatiseringslogikker (Torfing & Triantafillou 2017:14-18; Tortzen 2016:26). Gennem 2000'erne er der med NPG-regimet kommet fokus på netværksbaseret inddragelse og samskabelse med borgerne, og dermed er interessen for frivillige civilsamfundsaktører blevet forstærket (Fehsenfeld & Ibsen 2020:23).

I *Frivillighedens logik og dens politik* (2014) beskriver sociologen Anders La Cour, hvordan forskningen i frivillighed er præget af enten makroperspektiver og kvantitative analyser, eller mikroanalyser som "forsøger at finde svar på, hvorfor de frivillige vælger at blive frivillige (...) og som stirrer sig blinde på de frivillige". De to tilgange betyder, at det bliver svært at begrebsliggøre den begrænsede formalisering og standardisering, som præger frivilligheden, og som skal ses som et karakteristika ved den, snarere end som en problematik som skal løses. Uvisheden består i involverede aktørers forskellige holdninger til frivilligheden, som sjældent konkretiseres, og La Cour spekulerer retorisk over, om det netop er det, der betinger frivillighedens mangfoldighed (ibid:8).

I arbejdet med kommunernes inddragelse af frivillighed er de demografiske analyser dog væsentlige, fordi de rammesætter det politiske klima og det reformarbejde, som i høj grad er med til at forme plejehjemmenes udfoldelsesmuligheder. Gerontologien og fokus på 'aktiv

aldring' har ligeledes øvet indflydelse på den forståelse, der er af det gode ældreliv og således på de aktiviteter og idealer for frivilligheden, vi udfolder i artiklen. Der har i kommunernes arbejde de senere år været en generel tendens til i højere grad at forsøge at inddrage frivillige aktører. Men selvom New Public Governance-idealer øver større indflydelse end tidligere, så er der i de kommunale styringspraksisser træk fra både TPA, NPM og NPG, såvel som disse anvendes i forskellig udstrækning og på forskellig vis, med forskellige effekter for frivilligheden (Iversen et al. 2020:98).

Teoretisk afsæt

Som dåseåbner for vores analytiske arbejde griber vi til begrebet 'usynligt arbejde' og den etnologiske stats- og livsformsteori med udgangspunkt i og arbejdet med forskellige nødvendige 'dimensioner' af embedsværkets praksis (2022).

Sociologen Susan Leigh Star tager med begrebet 'usynligt arbejde' udgangspunkt i sine egne erfaringer fra hverdagen for at vise den store mængde arbejde, som forskellige aktører påtager sig, for at få forskellige sociale sammenhænge til at fungere. For at få blik for sociale situationers kompleksitet, må vi se på situationernes infrastruktur for at kunne forstå det omfattende organiserings- og koordineringsarbejde, der er involveret (Bowker & Star 1999:35). Som supplement til det usynlige arbejde inddrager vi sociologen Arlene Daniels begreb om 'emotionelt arbejde' til at beskrive forskelle i forståelser af, hvad der bør forstås som 'rigtigt' arbejde. Daniels bruger kvinders arbejde i hjemmet til at vise, hvordan noget arbejde anerkendes, imens andre arbejdsopgaver bliver usynlige og ikke anset som egentligt arbejde (Daniels 1987:407).

Til at analysere forbundetheden mellem de nære hverdagspraksisser i de kommunale plejehjem og idealerne for styring i forvaltningen, og hvordan de mødes og former hinanden, tager vi udgangspunkt i den etnologiske stats- og livsformsteori (se Højrup 1996; 2002). Teorien tilbyder en forståelse af relationen mellem hverdagsliv og statsligt niveau, hvor staten og borgeren betinger hinanden. Med det althusserianske begreb *interpellation* stilles der spørgsmålstegn ved de to kategorier stat og borger, som henholdsvis styrer og styret, ved også at indeholde elementer af modstand nedefra, således at der ikke er tale om en *top down*-styring, men derimod om niveauer som betinger og former hinanden (Jul Nielsen 2022:16). Relationen

mellem staten og borgerne kan forstås ved at specificere statsbegrebet i en embedslivsform (EMLF) i tre dimensioner, der ikke afgrænses til specifikke styringsparadigmer, men er principielt nødvendige dimensioner af embedsværket på tværs af historiske idealer for styring som TPA, NPM og NPG (ibid:17). Den politikudviklende dimension består af den strategiske politikudvikling, der i den moderne stat foretages af embedsværk og politikere med henblik på vedvarende at forme en politisk og

statslig vilje, som tilstrækkelig stærk til at fastholde anerkendelsen fra andre statssubjekter[2], og til at udpege på midlerne til at realisere den. For at politikken er resilient og kan føres ud i praksis må den nødvendigvis regelsættes, og den *operationaliserende* dimension består i at udarbejde guidelines og forskellige både synlige og mindre synlige procedurer. Disse procedurer faciliterer den ligeledes nødvendige *implementerende* dimension på en måde, der former subjekterne som selvstyrende, uden at de forkaster den politiske vilje – i vores tilfælde på plejehjemmene. De tre dimensioner er hverken idealtyper eller empiriske kategorier, men derimod tre nødvendige og overlappende varianter af embedsværkets praksis (ibid). Dimensionerne interagerer i den forstand, at de hver forholder sig til hinandens fokusområde eller praksis: politikudviklingen er nødt til at forholde sig til den praksis en implementerende frivilligkoordinator eller sundhedspersonalet leverer, såvel som de forholder sig til den politik, og operationaliseringen af denne, deres arbejdsopgaver defineres af (ibid:19).

Samskabelsen af det frivillige omsorgsarbejde

Samskabelse har vundet indpas i den offentlige forvaltningspraksis i Danmark, hvor frivillighed figurerer som et aspekt af samskabelsen – et aspekt vi anskuer som middel til at skabe det gode ældreliv, og det omsorgsarbejde der understøtter det (Agger & Tortzen 2015:6).

Blandt vores informanter fra de københavnske plejehjem var der enighed om, at frivilligheden ikke er nogen mirakelkur: De frivillige skal også styres og *nurses*, uden at deres motivation og

---

[2] *Statssubjektet* betegner i Stats- og livsformsteorien stater eller andre samfundsenheder, som ved at mobilisere sine ressourcer, herunder befolkningen, kan udgøre en forsvarsduelig *vilje*, tilstrækkelig modstandsdygtig til at hindre andre tilsvarende enheders viljesudøvelse inden for dens suverænitetsdomæne. For at kunne engagere sin befolkning til at udføre specifikke mål eller opgaver må den interpelleres, et begreb udviklet af filosoffen Louis Althusser, som forudsætter et *stort Subjekt* eller e*n Anden*: det Højrup specificerer som *statssubjektet* (Højrup 1996:135ff)

gejst ødelægges. Informanterne ønsker at bevare en balanceret og dialogisk tilgang til de frivillige, hvor det ikke handler om at regelsætte det frivillige arbejde for meget, netop fordi det er det umiddelbare og impulsive, som er kvaliteten. Det særlige ved frivillighed er, at man udformer en række konkrete retningslinjer, men samtidig må respektere de frivilliges særlige værdi og udgangspunktet for udøvelsen af deres frivillighed, hvad end den er (La Cour 2021:10). Forstanderen på et større københavnsk plejehjem fortæller os, at hun er ved at udarbejde en frivilligkontrakt, og at balancen er essentiel:

> Maria: Man bliver lidt et objekt, i stedet for at man har en almindelig kontakt, så er det sådan et kontraktforhold eller et aftaleforhold, og det bliver sådan lidt unaturligt, men vi har arbejdet med at gøre det naturligt.

Relationen til de frivillige må ikke være 'unaturlig', da Maria ikke ønsker, at den særlige motivation fra de frivillige forsvinder ved at man begynder at udarbejde retningslinjer og kontrakter. Frivilligkoordinatoren Georg, fra et andet københavnsk plejehjem, giver udtryk for samme bekymring og ønsker heller ikke at binde de frivillige med kontrakter og andre foranstaltninger, som han frygter at få politisk påtvunget som led i besparelser og mangel på sundhedsprofessionelt personale. Han understreger vigtigheden i, at det er de rigtige frivillige, som kommer ind: Folk som oprigtigt interesserer sig for ældre mennesker og ikke er frivillige for CV'ets skyld. Det er en balancegang at udruste og rammesætte de frivilliges arbejdsopgaver. Han fortæller at han plejer at opfordre de frivillige til at læse om demens, men er bevidst om, at det ikke kan erstatte en sundhedsfaglig uddannelse.

Hos to af vores informanter i lederstillinger i Sundheds- og Omsorgsforvaltningen i Københavns Kommune er der en forhåbning om, at de kommunale driftsenheder og de frivillige selv kan udvikle en dialogisk og samskabende tilgang til det frivillige arbejde, hvor der er plads til at prøve sig frem så man kan finde ud af hvordan de frivillige kan inddrages og hvad der fungerer bedst. Mellemlederen Pernille fortæller, at Københavns Kommune er i gang med et projekt med otte plejehjem, som har til opgave at ruste driftsenhederne til at håndtere og styre frivillighed med henblik på at udarbejde en model, som efterfølgende kan bredes ud til andre københavnske plejehjem. I en samtale med forstanderen fra et andet stort københavnsk plejehjem, understreger forstanderen, Carina, vigtigheden i at rammesætte styringen af frivilligheden, men at man samtidig må have blik for det organiske, der kendetegner

frivilligheden, og at styringen derfor, udover rammesætningen, også må være dynamisk ved tage højde for de frivilliges forskellighed. Hun havde i mangel af netop en aktivitetsmedarbejder valgt, at de ikke kunne have frivillige på plejehjemmet. Ideen om at udarbejde en idealmodel for frivillige er et potentielt brugbart redskab. Men den går også imod frivillighedens logik som præget af mere uformelle rammer, og det at kunne håndtere de frivillige og deres behov, som de opstår, samtidig med at den er rettet mod at løse konkrete opgaver (La Cour 2021:12). Det dynamiske i at kunne forholde og tilpasse sig beboerne og de frivilliges ønsker uden at give køb på de sundhedsfaglige aspekter af ældreplejen er en vigtig, men ikke altid en anerkendt opgave.

Inddragelsen af frivillige – et usynligt arbejde?

Informanternes dagligdag på de tre plejehjem involverede et væld af nødvendige småopgaver for at støtte op om de frivilliges trivsel og aktiviteterne for de ældre, som de frivillige stod for. Opgaverne bestod af uofficielle og udefinerbare opgaver, der er nødvendige for at få den daglige praksis med de frivillige til at fungere: arbejdsopgaver som ikke altid anerkendes eller ses af udefrakommende som eksempelvis frivillige eller ledende dele af forvaltningen, og som vi anskuer som 'usynligt arbejde', et fænomen der også ofte ses i holdningen til omsorgsarbejdet i sundhedssektoren (se f.eks. Holm-Petersen et al. 2006:36; 131).

> Georg: Jeg snakker altid med de frivillige, når de kommer i huset (…) sørger for kaffe til dem. Ja, altså kaffe og vand. Alt det her, så vi får en hyggestund. Så den frivillige ikke skal stå for det.

Frivilligkoordinatoren Georg ser det som en forudsætning at skabe gode rammer for de frivillige, ikke mindst den gode personlige relation mellem ham og de frivillige. Arlene Daniels forståelse af det usynlige arbejde indebærer også emotionelt arbejde: hun beskriver, hvordan en vært til en fest planlægger, vurderer og evaluerer adfærden hos alle medvirkende i en relation, skaber en behagelig atmosfære gennem munterhed, sympati og kærlig bekymring eller interesse. De mange mindre emotionelle handlinger skal for Daniels også forstås som egentlige arbejdsopgaver (1987:409). Georg udfører således et emotionelt usynligt arbejde ved at kere sig om de frivillige og deres velbefindende: "Jeg [går] altid ud og siger hej. Også selvom jeg er i gang med noget andet". Georg afbryder sine øvrige arbejdsopgaver for gennem det emotionelle arbejde at styrke og opretholde det frivillige engagement. Fordi denne keren ofte tages for givet og blot er en del af hverdagen med de frivillige, bemærkes den sjældent og

anerkendes ikke som en vigtig og uomgængelig funktion i håndteringen af de frivillige. De mange praktiske og emotionelle opgaver har en vigtig rolle i at få frivilligheden til at fungere og er i den forstand ikke blot vilkårlige initiativer, men en nødvendighed for at kunne inddrage og aktivere frivillighed i det hele taget.

Usynligt og emotionelt arbejde er en fremtrædende del af arbejdet med frivillighed hos alle vores informanter, vi har interviewet på plejehjemmene: en pointe som også går igen i bogen *Den frivillige kommune.* Her viser en undersøgelse fra 2018, at selvom pleje- og ældrecentre generelt mener, at samarbejde med frivillige aktører tilfører ressourcer til institutionerne, kræver det samtidig ekstra tid og ressourcer for dem at samarbejde med foreninger og frivillige aktører. Nogle institutioner oplevede sågar, at de frivillige forventede at blive serviceret (Ibsen & Levinsen 2020:81-82). For vores informanter var den servicerende del af arbejdet en nødvendighed for det gode samarbejde mellem dem og de frivillige: de udefinerbare arbejdsopgaver bliver i vid udstrækning usynlige, netop fordi ansvaret for dem ikke altid er forbundet med formaliserede opgaver (Holm-Petersen et al 2006:131). Derimod opstår de i mødet mellem de frivillige og de ansatte som en nødvendig understøttelse af det frivillige arbejde og deraf det omsorgsarbejde, de frivillige bidrager med:

> Maria: Vi har jo stolegymnastik med en forening, som ordner det (...), men vi henter stole og alt det der usynlige. Det er lidt, som når der kommer nogen og siger "vi skal bare lige snakke med beboerne" – "ja det skal I, men tager I dem selv ned der, hvor I sidder?". Nej det gør de jo ikke. Så de synes jo ikke, at der er nogen opgaver til os, men det er bare ikke det, vi synes. Jeg kan godt komme i tanker om nogle funktioner, der er lidt usynlige i det.

Maria udfører ligesom Georg usynlige opgaver, som er nødvendige for det konkrete frivillige arrangement. Hun beskriver, at de frivillige har behov for støtte i deres aktiviteter fra enten hende eller plejehjemmets aktivitetsmedarbejder for at frivilligheden kan fungere på sigt: "I går var aktivitetsmedarbejderne der ikke (...). Og det var min souschef og jeg, der satte lidt i gang. (...) Men hvis det altid var sådan, så kom det ikke til at gå". Det understreger igen, at de usynlige opgaver er en nødvendighed for frivilligheden: opgaver som samtidig kræver tid og ressourcer. Det koordinerings- og planlægningsarbejde som det involverer at skabe plads og rum for de frivillige, betragter vi med inspiration fra Susan Leigh Star som social infrastruktur. Ved at være opmærksom på infrastrukturen, åbnes der op for det usynlige ekstraarbejde, som aktører påtager sig for at få sociale begivenheder såsom samskabelsen med de frivillige om det gode

omsorgsarbejde til at fungere. For at opretholde infrastrukturen kræver det en usynlig præstation, og det usynlige arbejde er således ikke noget, der bare er, men noget der skabes i konkrete praksisser (Bowker & Star 1999:35). Spørgsmålet er, om de beslutningstagende led i forvaltningen er opmærksomme på denne form for praksis.

I vores interview med en højtstående leder i forvaltningen blev det tydeligt, at man i forvaltningen er bevidste om, at inddragelse af frivillige aktører kræver både tid og ressourcer. Men hvor der på den ene side er forståelse for de arbejdsopgaver frivilligheden kræver, så er der ikke nødvendigvis blik for hvor *meget* tid og hvor *mange* ressourcer, der sættes af til de usynlige og emotionelle opgaver for at drive frivilligheden på driftsenhederne. Blandt de mange refleksioner omkring den demografiske udvikling og forskellige løsningsmodeller, heriblandt frivillighed, er der en vis diskrepans mellem den praksis vi møder på plejehjemmene og den forståelse, der er hos vores to informanter fra Københavns Kommunes Sundheds- og Omsorgsforvaltning. De mere praksisnære overvejelser om implementeringen af frivilligheden fylder mindre, og selvom det er forventeligt, at de behandler de mere overordnede strategiske beslutninger, er det nødvendigt at have blik for den praksis, hvori disse skal operationaliseres og implementeres (Jul Nielsen 2022).

I vores feltarbejde ser vi således anslaget til en række samfundsmæssige udfordringer, hvis de frivillige skal løfte flere velfærdsopgaver på længere sigt, og kommunen ikke anerkender omfanget af det usynlige arbejde, som f.eks. Georg og Maria udfører. Hvis de forskellige kommunale aktører, der kan anskues som havende træk af den politikudviklende dimension af embedsværket, ikke har blik for dette, vil arbejdsopgaverne enten forblive usynlige eller henvises til en forventning om, at medarbejderne på driftsenhederne vil kunne udvide kapaciteten af deres arbejdsopgaver for at imødekomme kravet om, at frivilligheden skal løfte flere velfærdsopgaver. En forstander fra et af plejehjemmene kritiserer netop den manglende anerkendelse af det usynlige arbejde, som hun mener er reelt arbejde, der bør understøttes:

> Carina: Vi er jo en kæmpe kommune, og jeg kan simpelthen ikke forstå, hvorfor man ikke har valgt at ansætte nogle folk til at hjælpe os med det (...). Det med at finde plads og ro i en travl drift til at tænke de kloge tanker og faktisk bruge den fornødne tid til at få folk ordentligt ind i det her.

Carina efterspørger anerkendelse af, at der bruges ressourcer og tid til at få de frivillige til at fungere på driftsenhederne, da den tid medarbejderne bruger, tager tid fra andre vigtige opgaver. Daniels argumenterer for, at der eksisterer en idealiseret opfattelse af, hvad et 'rigtigt' arbejde er (Daniels 1987:404). Vores argument er således, at det samme gør sig gældende på frivilligområdet: Det usynlige arbejde opretholder og støtter de synlige og anerkendte aspekter af organiseringen af det frivillige arbejde på plejehjemmene. Vores deltagere føler, at de udfører ekstra arbejde, fordi det ikke anerkendes som deres reelle arbejde: Maria udtrykker også en skepsis over for at italesætte det praktiske og usynlige arbejde overfor en frivillig organisation, af frygt for at fremstå utaknemmelig og skræmme de frivillige væk. De frivillige kan se medarbejderen komme med stolene og kaffen, men fordi det er en del af deres forventning om det at være frivillig på et plejehjem, forbliver det for dem også en arbejdsopgave, der enten ikke er synlig, eller som ikke anses som en egentlig arbejdsopgave.

Det peger på en mere grundlæggende udfordring, hvis frivillighed skal stå for en større del af velfærdsopgaverne. Skal de frivillige dannes til selv at udføre de usynlige opgaver, som Maria og Georg lige nu påtager sig? Eller hvor meget kan der kræves af de frivillige? Hvordan får man i højere grad de usynlige opgaver til at blive anerkendt som værende tids- og ressourcekrævende, og er den danske velfærdsstat villig til at implementere dette i prioriteringen af frivillige på plejehjem? Vi har argumenteret for, at frivillighed ikke blot gøres, men at der udføres usynligt arbejde i opretholdelsen af det bæredygtige frivilligkorps. Det er nødvendigt, at det offentlige anerkender at håndteringen og styringen af det frivillige arbejde i sig selv er en arbejdsopgave, som nødvendigvis må udføres – og spørgsmålet er, hvor den så skal placeres.

Frivillighedens paradoks

Hvis frivillige skal inddrages til at varetage det relationsarbejde, som de plejehjemsansatte udfører, er det nærliggende at se nærmere på, hvorvidt arbejdet i så fald kan forstås som frivilligt, og hvor det efterlader det arbejde, som de ansatte udfører. Til at analysere det usynlige arbejde som forudsætningen for frivilligheden, som vi har beskrevet i foregående afsnit, inddrager vi Niels Jul Nielsens teoretiske begreb om en embedslivsform (EMLF) bestående af de *politikudviklende*, *operationaliserende* og *implementerende* dimensioner. I vores feltarbejde på de tre københavnske plejehjem var det særligt forholdet mellem de praktiske

omsorgsopgaver bestående af forskellige aktiviteter, samt de administrative og usynlige arbejdsopgaver, som fangede vores interesse. Forstanderen Camilla fra et af plejehjemmene fortalte:

> Det er ikke bare lige at få en frivillig ind, og så kører det. Der er også rigtig meget i forhold til at få klædt medarbejderne på, så de forstår, hvad det er de frivillige kommer og skal – og ikke skal.

Som tidligere nævnt fortalte hun også, at hun har valgt ikke at have frivillige på de to plejehjem, som hun bestyrer. Hun begrunder fravalget med, at det kræver meget tid og mange ressourcer at sætte de frivillige ind i, hvordan omsorgsopgaverne udføres på den rette måde:

> Hvis man skal lykkes med at rekruttere og fastholde frivillige, og også sikre sig, at de ting der foregår, det er med afsæt i de mennesker, der bor hers ønsker, så kræver det faktisk rigtig, rigtig meget.

Beboerne på plejehjemmene har specifikke behov, som kræver, at dem der varetager disse behov, forstår og er i stand til at håndtere dem. Det bliver problematisk, hvis man i højere grad vil implementere frivilligheden i det omsorgsarbejde, som de uddannede og fastansatte medarbejdere på plejehjemmene på nuværende tidspunkt udfører. Dels vil det kræve, at de frivillige uddannes til at varetage omsorgsopgaverne - både de relationelle arbejdsopgaver, som kræver, at man er i stand til interagere med beboerne, men også de mere konkrete fysiske opgaver, der sikrer, at beboerne f.eks. er spændt ordentligt fast, når de skal ud at cykle:

> Maria: Hvis vi sætter dig til at hjælpe Åse på 100, så risikerer vi, at hun ligger næsegrus i rendestenen. Du vidste ikke, at hun ikke kunne et eller andet. Selvfølgelig kan vi lære dig det. Måske. Der er alle mulige små opgaver.

På nuværende tidspunkt varetager de frivillige opgaver, som supplerer de ansattes omsorgsarbejde, mens de ansatte både varetager omsorgsarbejde og mere administrative opgaver (ud over det, der knytter sig til håndtering af frivillige). De frivillige er ikke på plejehjemmene dagligt og har derfor ikke nødvendigvis et indgående kendskab til hverken plejehjemmet eller beboernes behov. Derudover kan de mangle den fysik, det kræver at løfte mange stole frem til stolegymnastik eller hjælpe beboere op på en cykel, hvilket er egenskaber,

som de ansatte i højere grad har tilegnet sig gennem erfaring og uddannelse.

De ansattes facilitering af frivilligheden ved f.eks. at stille stole frem eller spænde beboerne ordentlig fast til cykelturen kan – hvis de frivillige står for kontakten til beboerne – anskues som den operationaliserende del af embedsværkets praksis omkring omsorgsarbejdet (Jul Nielsen 2022:12), der er lige så uomgængeligt, som det direkte borgernære relationsarbejde, der ligger i den implementerende dimension, og som normalt opfattes som plejepersonalets primære fokus. Det er værd at bemærke, at dimensionerne ikke refererer til konkrete jobfunktioner eller bestemte personer, men som nødvendige, indbyrdes afhængige træk der skal til for at politiske hensigter (udarbejdet med deltagelse af den politik-udviklende del af embedsværket) bliver ført ud i livet. Imidlertid, grundet dimensionernes indbyrdes modsætningsfuldhed (f.eks. vil frontlinjepersonale, der typisk realiserer den politik-implementerende dimension, ikke sjældent have den opfattelse at nye politiske tiltag udfordrer 'deres' klienter, studerende, elever, brugere, m.v.) vil en konkret person ofte primært være orienteret i – og motiveret af – en af dimensionerne. Her sætter Maria, der som administrativ leder primært realiserer den operationaliserede dimension, ord på den nødvendige sameksistens af (det, vi kan anskue som dimensionerne) operationalisering og implementering og udfordringerne, hvis hun skulle håndtere begge dimensioner:

> Maria: I går var aktivitetsmedarbejderne der ikke, men der foregik alt muligt alligevel. Det var min souschef og jeg, der satte lidt i gang. Og de frivillige klarede den, men hvis det altid var sådan, så kom det ikke til at gå. Så det er noget med at det sagtens kan være, at de kan det i et stykke tid, men på den lange bane kan de ikke, og de kan heller ikke initiere det og sådan noget.

Som Maria beskriver, kan hendes praksis ikke afgrænses til hvad vi kan anskue som enten operationaliserende eller implementerende, selvom hun som udgangspunkt arbejder administrativt (og dermed inden for den operationaliserende dimension) med at facilitere både medarbejdere og frivilliges arbejde. Men hvis medarbejdernes emotionelle arbejde og aktivitetsopgaverne, som Maria beskriver, kan forstås som den implementerende dimension af embedslivsformen og dermed som et nødvendigt aspekt af embedsværket, er det nærliggende at spørge, hvordan vi kan forstå dem i det tilfælde, at det ikke er medarbejdere på plejehjemmene, men frivillige der varetager de samme opgaver. Som Maria beskriver det, kan

de frivillige ikke på sigt varetage de samme arbejdsopgaver som medarbejderne, selv om de gør det i perioder – hvor, må man formode, kvaliteten af deres løsning af opgaverne stadig skal monitoreres.

I den forstand varetager frivillige den nødvendige implementering af nogle af de omsorgs- og velfærdsopgaver, som førhen i højere grad har været varetaget af plejehjemmenes medarbejdere, og spørgsmålet er, hvad det gør ved både frivilligheden og medarbejdernes praksis, hvis der på sigt ønskes at varetage flere omsorgsopgaver med frivillige kræfter på plejehjemmene. Hvis de frivillige i højere grad end medarbejderne skal udføre det omsorgs- og aktivitetsarbejde, som vi har beskrevet, betyder det, at det usynlige arbejde bliver en større del af medarbejdernes praksis. Derved kommer de i højere grad til at arbejde som den operationaliserende del af embedsværkets praksis, og en potentiel udfordring vil så være, om en sådan udvikling vil blive opfattet som en unødig eller uønsket bureaukratisering af det arbejdsliv, som traditionelt har båret præg af det relationsarbejde, som frivillige i så fald skal varetage (Ibid:21). Det kræver nødvendigvis, at man blandt de politikudviklende dele af embedsværket har blik for den forskydning mellem de operationaliserende og implementerende dele, det vil skabe, når store dele af arbejdsstyrken, der varetager velfærdsarbejdet, skal varetage radikalt anderledes funktioner, hvis ikke man vil risikere at stå med en endnu større mangel på arbejdskraft i omsorgsfagene. Spørgsmålet er også, om det er muligt at få de frivillige til selv at varetage det usynlige arbejde, der er frivillighedens forudsætning, eller om det nødvendigvis må udføres af medarbejderne på plejehjemmene.

Vi har argumenteret for, at der eksisterer visse barrierer for de frivilliges varetagelse af de arbejdsopgaver, vi forstår som usynligt arbejde, såsom fysiske barrierer eller manglende uddannelse, men det er ikke nødvendigvis utænkeligt, at der kan findes løsninger til at komme omkring barriererne. Hvis man skal kunne garantere for kvaliteten af det frivillige arbejde og sikre lige standarder på tværs af kommuner og regioner, bliver konsekvensen nødvendigvis også en yderligere formalisering af det frivillige arbejde, under de gældende dokumentationskrav for velfærdsydelser i kommunerne.

Lederen fra Sundheds- og Omsorgsforvaltningen fortæller om fremtidens forhold mellem de kommunale tilbud, herunder frivillige på plejehjemmene og serviceydelser, at: "det kunne

være, at der er lidt færre aktører, som i samlet betragtning leverer kommunale ydelser og pligter (...) og til gengæld fylder civilsamfundet ud". En mulig løsning på de demografiske udfordringer bliver i forvaltningen set som en øget inddragelse af frivillighed på bekostning af de ydelser, som plejehjemmene på nuværende tidspunkt er lovmæssigt forpligtet på at levere. Spørgsmålet er da, hvad det i så fald vil gøre ved frivilligheden. La Cour beskriver frivilligheden som kendetegnet ved paradokset mellem konkrete rammer og en uvished, som både giver mulighed for at de frivillige selv kan præge deres egen frivillighed, men også at det er i uvisheden, at potentialet er for at inddrage civilsamfundet (2014:8; 2021:10). Således er der gemt et paradoks i at ville løse de demografiske udfordringer med en øget inddragelse af frivillighed, fordi man risikerer at ende i en frivillighed, der ikke længere er frivillig, fordi den autonomi der kendetegner den, forsvinder. Det er særligt paradoksalt, når netop denne forståelse af frivillighed optræder både i forskningen på området og empirisk blandt de af vores informanter, som til hverdag arbejder med frivillige.

Sammenfatning

Samarbejdet om inddragelsen af frivillighed mellem Sundheds- og Omsorgsforvaltningen og de tre københavnske plejehjem er i vid udstrækning præget af forståelse og enighed om, at frivillighed bærer en stor værdi for det gode ældreliv. Trods enigheden er der også gnidninger i samarbejdet, og fra forvaltningen er der ikke altid det fulde blik for det usynlige arbejde, der er forudsætningen for at kunne praktisere den gode frivillighed. Men frivillighed er også kendetegnet ved ikke at være formaliseret, og spørgsmålet er, om frivillighedens særpræg og anvendelighed forsvinder, hvis man udvikler for stringente rammer og forventninger. Med begrebet om en embedslivsform belyser vi, hvordan de frivillige arbejdsopgaver overlapper med de ansattes. I en vis forstand overtager de frivillige, hvad der kan ses som den implementerende dimension af embedsværket og overlader en større del af den operationaliserende dimension til plejepersonalet; herunder monitoreringen af kvaliteten af de frivilliges opgavevaretagelse. Alternativt skal de frivillige selv udstyres med mere formelle kompetencer, der kan sikre kvalitet og ensartethed i plejen, som sandsynligvis vil opfattes som krav, der kan gå ud over motivationen. Det udtalte ønske om at implementere frivillighed yderligere i omsorgsarbejdet forudsætter, at vi må revurdere vores forståelse af frivilligheden, såvel som de de der traditionelt har varetaget omsorgen i højere grad tildeles administrative

og operationaliserende opgaver, og dermed opstår det paradoksale: at frivilligheden risikerer ikke længere at være frivillig, idet den mister sit kendetegn – autonomien.

Litteraturliste

- Agger, Annika. Tortzen, Anne. (2015): *Forskningsreview om samskabelse*. https://sagrom.hjoerring.dk/media/6139/forskningsreview-om-co-production_samlet-udgave-at-aa-at07115-2.pdf
- Althusser, Louis. (1983): *Ideologi og ideologiske statsapparater*. Aalborg Universitetsforlag: Grus.
- Bowker, Geoffrey & Leigh Star, Susan. (1999): *Sorting things out: classification and its consequences. Cambrigde*, Mass.
- Daniels, K. Arlene. (1987): "Invisible Work" i *Social Problems* 34 (5). *https://doi.org/10.2307/800538*
- Fehsenfeldt, Michael & Ibsen, Bjarne. (2020): "Den frivillige og den offentlige sektor - historie og italesættelse" s. 22-44 i Ibsen, Bjarne (red.): *Den frivillige kommune. Samspillet mellem den frivillige og den offentlige sektor*: Syddansk Universitetsforlag.
- Højrup, Thomas. (2002): Dannelsens dialektik. Museum Tusculanums Forlag.
- Højrup, Thomas. (1996): Omkring livsformsanalysens udvikling. Museums Tusculanum Forlag.
- Ibsen, Bjarne & Levinsen. (2020): "Kommunale institutioners samarbejde med foreninger og frivillige" s. 66-96 i Ibsen, Bjarne (red.): *Den frivillige kommune. Samspillet mellem den frivillige og den offentlige sektor*. Syddansk Universitetsforlag.
- Holm-Petersen, Christina; Asmussen, Marete; Willeman, Marlene. (2006): "Sygeplejerskers fagidentitet og arbejdsopgaver på medicinske afdelinger" *DSI Rapport 2006.08, DSI Institut for Sundhedsvæsen.* Danske Regioner. *https://pure.vive.dk/ws/files/2057076/dsi-1284.pdf*
- Iversen, Evald B.; Ibsen, Bjarne; Levinsen, Klaus. (2020): "Den kommunale styring og organisering af samspillet med civilsamfundet" s. 97-120 i Ibsen, Bjarne (red.): *Den frivillige kommune. Samspillet mellem den frivillige og den offentlige sektor*. Syddansk Universitetsforlag.
- Jensen, Per H. & Rostgaard, Tine. (2015): *Det aldrende samfund. Udfordringer og nye muligheder.* Frydenlund Academic.
- La Cour, Anders. (2014): *Frivillighedens logik og dens politik. En analyse af den personrettede frivillige sociale indsats og statens frivillighedspolitik*. Nyt fra samfundsvidenskaberne.
- La Cour, Anders. (2021): "Ledelse af frivillige - når regler og værdier brydes" i *Public Governance Research* (6). *https://rauli.cbs.dk/index.php/PGR/article/view/6174*
- Nielsen, J. Niels. (2022): "Governance or Interpellation? An Elaboration of Civil Servant Practice(s)." i *Ethnologia Europaea* 52 (1), s. 1-22. *https://doi.org/10.16995/ee.3004*
- Torfing, Jacob & Triantafillou, Peter. (2017): *New public governance på dansk*. Akademisk Forlag.
- Tortzen, Anne. (2016): *Samskabelse i kommunale rammer. Hvordan kan ledelse understøtte samskabelse?*, Roskilde Universitet.

Hjemmesider

- Frederiksen, Mette (1.1.2022): "Statsminister Mette Frederiksens nytårstale 2022".
  https://www.regeringen.dk/nyheder/2022/statsminister-mette-frederiksens-nytaarstale/, besøgt d. 22/4-22.
- Social- og Ældreministeriet (2018): "Bekendtgørelse om lov om social service. LBK nr. 1114 30.08.2018"
  https://www.retsinformation.dk/eli/lta/2018/1114, besøgt d. 24/4-22.
- Struck Westersøe, Rikke (1.1.2022): "Lars Løkke vil indføre seks måneders borgerpligt for alle unge i Danmark". TV 2
  https://nyheder.tv2.dk/politik/2022-01-13-lars-loekke-vil-indfoere-seks-maaneders-borgerpligt-for-alle-unge-i-danmark, besøgt d. 20/4-22.

DEPORTATION AS RESCUE

How Danish Society Responds to the Figure of the Migrant Sex Worker.

By:

Hannah Tendler

Advanced Migration Studies

ABSTRACT:

This article interrogates the conceptualisation of the figure of the migrant sex worker in Danish society. Reflecting on laws, policies and public attitudes towards sex work in the European context, it considers the tangible impacts on the rights of migrants selling sex. Delving deeper into public political debates on sex work, it finds that within Danish society, the migrant sex worker is rarely conceptualised as a worker. Instead, she is predominantly perceived to be a victim. This keeps the figure of the migrant sex worker in the realm of the exceptional and justifies the use of deportation as 'rescue'.

KEY WORDS: sex work, migration, deportation, prostitution, rescue.

Introduction

The number of individuals migrating to sell sex in Western Europe has continued to grow as mobility has increased (ICRSE 2016: 4). This growth rarely translates into legislative changes to facilitate safer migration or legal options to work in the sex industry (ibid.: 3). On the contrary, the European region has adopted stricter border controls and expanded their capacity for detention and deportation of migrant sex workers (ibid.: 5). Migrants, who are generally in irregular situations, constitute a significant portion of sex workers across Europe (TAMPEP 2009:16). They are deeply affected by repressive migration policies, misdirected responses to human trafficking and increasing trends towards criminalisation of both migration and sex work (ICRSE 2016: 4).

In this article, I interrogate how Danish society conceptualises and responds to the figure of the migrant sex worker. This figure is of great interest as it is a melting pot of societal attitudes towards sex, gender, migration, law enforcement, labour and human rights. Denmark is internationally perceived as liberal, feminist and progressive (Mac & Smith 2018: 141) - especially in regard to workers' rights. However, the figure of the migrant sex worker has the potential to reveal a darker side of Danish society, one that is inherently repressive, misogynistic and xenophobic, whilst providing an insight that can direct sex workers' rights activists towards positive change. Throughout this article, I will interrogate discourses surrounding this figure. This is essential because mainstream discourses are 'powerful in shaping social policy' (Bjønness 2012: 197) and therefore the material conditions faced by migrant sex workers.

Terminology

Sex work: The sale or trade of consensual sexual services for a resource – money or goods (Mac & Smith 2018: 1). Sex work is an umbrella term for many types of work including online, stripping, and full-service sex work (ibid.).

Sex worker: An adult who receives 'money or goods in exchange for the consensual provision of sexual services' (Amnesty International 2016: 6). It is a politicised term, generally used when sex workers and their allies engage in political work (Grant 2014: 125). Within this article, the term sex worker includes individuals who sell consensual sex but might not personally identify with the term. The terms *prostitute* and *prostitution* will be used throughout, in order to be true to the language of the viewpoints discussed or to remain consistent with quotes.

Decriminalisation: A movement for the removal of criminalising measures targeted at or impacting sex workers and their ability to conduct their work safely (Amnesty International 2016: 5). It does not promote the decriminalisation of 'human trafficking, forced labour or any other exploitative practices' (ibid.).

Research Question and Approach

The research question is as follows: How does Danish society conceptualise and respond to the figure of the migrant sex worker?

Throughout this article, Danish society is considered through its prominent institutions, including the governing party, various public ministries and non-governmental organisations (NGO); its policies on sex work, work and migration; its media, including newspaper reports and online discussions; and its fields of academia, including sociological, anthropological and policy-based research. I do not intend to provide an overview of all initiatives associated with sex work in Denmark, or all elements of Danish society, however I strive to represent the key perspectives and significant positions within Danish society on the themes discussed.

This article is informed by a literature review, interviews with and public talks by organisations engaged in the field of sex worker support in Denmark, and my personal

experiences as a volunteer providing a safer workspace for migrant street-based sex workers in Vesterbro, Copenhagen. It is limited by its almost exclusive focus on female migrants, however, the majority of migrants who sell sex in Europe are female (TAMPEP 2009: 14) and information regarding male, transgender and non-binary sex workers is sparse. Generally, I focus on street- and brothel-based sex work. Information regarding EU citizens who participate in intra-European migration to sell sex is limited and often conflicting, therefore this article focuses on migrants from outside the EU and mainly those from outside of Europe.

Sex work in Denmark

When discussing the legality of sex work, it is important to consider that the criminalisation of sex work includes both laws directly targeting sex workers, and those that are used discriminatorily against sex workers to hinder what they do, such as bans on loitering (Amnesty International 2016: 5). Immigration laws that can be applied discriminatorily towards sex workers are also considered key components of the criminalisation of sex work (ibid.). Whilst it is currently legal to buy or sell sex in Denmark, provided that self-employment taxes are paid (Nielsen & Frandsen 2009: 106), the Danish approach to sex work is considered by some to be de-facto criminalised (Løvbjerg Hansen 2021). This is attributed to both the criminalisation of procurement and pimping, and the criminalisation of migration and trafficking. This criminalisation limits the work of Danish citizen sex-workers and has an even greater impact on migrant sex workers.

Academic knowledge about the sex industry is sparse and statistics regarding sex work in Denmark are highly contested (Bjønness & Spanger 2017: 159). The *Danish National Centre for Social Research* estimated that approximately 3,200 individuals worked in sex work in 2010; including 900 as escorts, 600 in clinics and 600 working on the streets (SIO & Gadejuristen 2012: 5). Unfortunately, the methodology for this data has been criticised (ibid.) and these figures have not been updated in recent years.

In 2008, TAMPEP reported that 65% of sex workers in Denmark were migrants (TAMPEP 2009: 22, 14). These workers were almost exclusively female (TAMPEP 2009(1): 14). The largest groups of migrant sex workers in Denmark migrate from outside of Europe, especially from Northeast Thailand and Southern Nigeria (Plambech 2021). It is common practice for migrant sex workers to pay middlemen to bring them to Denmark and to help them get established (Nielsen & Frandsen 2009: 116). In these cases, individuals arrive with significant debts to those who brought them to Denmark, which they have to pay back out of their profits from sex work (ibid.). Many are in Denmark on a tourist visa, meaning they are not connected to the Danish healthcare system and may not be informed about their rights in Denmark

(ibid.: 115). It is generally migrants who engage in sex work in its most visible form – street-based sex work (SIO & Gadejuristen 2012: 7). Discussions about migrant sex workers tend to centre around the so-called *red-light district* near the central station in Copenhagen; however migrant sex workers work across Denmark (Plambech 2021). Some also work indoors in brothels (Kofod et al. 2011).

The situation for migrant sex workers in Denmark must be understood within the wider Danish context. Reporting to the United Nations in 2016, *The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination* expressed concern at:

> reports that persons belonging to minority groups and non-citizens, particularly nonnationals of European Union countries, faced structural discrimination in Denmark regarding access to employment, housing, health services, quality education and access to justice (United Nations 2016: 8).

They also raised concerns about persistent racial profiling and 'the increase in xenophobia, political propaganda targeting non-citizens and racist publications in the media' (ibid.).

Generally, there are two consequences for non-EU migrant sex workers in Denmark if they engage with the authorities; they are criminalised or registered as trafficked. As it is not possible for these workers to attain a work permit, they can easily fall into the category of criminal in the eyes of the Danish state. The consequences of being criminalised come in many forms, for example, if a sex worker is arrested on the streets or in a brothel they may be:

> fined 3,000 kr., charged with illegal work and given a warning to leave the country. This increases their vulnerability, and not only stigmatises and marginalises them, but also means that in order for them to make enough money to leave the country, they have to do more sex work. (Mildwater 2021)

It is also possible for these individuals to have their documents removed, receive a two-year ban from Denmark, and incur more debt from court procedures if they are detained in prison prior to their deportation (ibid.). These issues are even more pressing as the requirements for obtaining Danish citizenship have tightened, so that no one with a conditional or unconditional prison sentence can apply for citizenship, and individuals applying for a Danish passport must have been in recognised employment for at least three and a half years out of the most recent four (Rørsig & Nielsen 2021). Furthermore, these issues have been exacerbated by COVID-19. More individuals are at risk of persecution for overstaying their tourist visa because they have not been able to travel out of the country due to intensified

border controls or a lack of income as a result of limitations on sex work (Mildwater 2021). All of this deters migrant sex workers from reporting crimes to the police.

In some cases, if an individual is caught by the police without legal documentation, then they will be arrested and not allowed to go free; 'the only way that you will be released is if you are defined as trafficked' (ibid.). The process of being identified as trafficked in Denmark is almost always the result of being arrested by the police which 'may result in a potential victim of human trafficking being treated as a criminal and not as a person whose human rights have been violated' (KFUKs Social Arbejde n.d.). Løvbjerg Hansen (2021) argues that 'there is no incentive to be identified as trafficked in Denmark because the end point is always deportation'. However, she also explains that if an undocumented sex worker is arrested, 'the only way to get out of the situation is to go with the trafficking narrative' (ibid.). It is unclear what the incentives are to being identified as a victim of trafficking beyond avoiding certain consequences of criminalisation. Denmark differs from other countries in the EU, because its primary focus for victims of trafficking is on repatriation and immigration control (KFUKs Social Arbejde n.d.). According to the government's *Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings 2019-21*, 'Foreigners who have come to Denmark as victims of human trafficking, and who reside in this country on an illegal basis, must depart from the country' (Udenrigsministeriet 2018: 12). This departure occurs through so-called *prepared repatriation* to their origin country or to the EU Member State where they registered under *The Dublin Regulation* (ibid.).

This repatriation, or deportation, is conceptualised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a way to help victims to 'live a life free of human trafficking' (ibid.: 15). The *departure deadline* for those identified as victims of trafficking is 30 days, within which they should have a *reflection period* to prepare for their journey home and have 'peace of mind to recover from exploitation' (Center mod Menneskehandel 2019). However, KFUKs Social Arbejde (KFUKSA) have observed that 'the reflection period is not attractive to most victims. They want to travel immediately when they are still not offered witness protection or legal residence' (KFUKs Social Arbejde n.d.).

The intimate relationship between strict immigration controls and the situation faced by registered victims of trafficking is clear. The responsibilities of planning *prepared repatriation* fall under the Ministry of Immigration and Integration Affairs (Udenrigsministeriet 2018: 22). It is possible for identified victims of trafficking to apply for asylum in Denmark, however being approved is near impossible. According to KFUKSA, 'very few victims of human trafficking are granted asylum. There were only 8 victims of human trafficking who were granted asylum in Denmark in the period 2007-2012' (KFUKs Social Arbejde n.d.).

The figure of the migrant sex worker

Identifying the figure of the migrant sex worker is not merely an empirical exercise, rather it is a 'process of social construction' (Ham 2016: 9) shaped by understandings of gender, sexuality, migration status, race, work status and class (ibid.).

Gender

It is significant that the figure is commonly conceptualised as cisgender and female. The gendered nature of this conceptualisation may be rooted in historical understandings of sex work as women's work (Agustín 2007: 19). The *International Committee on the Rights of Sex Workers in Europe* (ICRSE) argue that current conceptualisations reinforce 'heteronormative expectations about gender according to which women are 'naturally' sexual objects and victims lacking agency' (ICSRE 2016: 26) rather than travellers, workers and providers (ibid.). Ham argues that:

> Within this terrain of gender, mobility and sexuality, the figure of the 'migrant sex worker' is perhaps the archetypal example of the risks of women's migration, both for the woman herself and the state. (Ham 2016: 9)

This gendered conceptualisation leaves little space to recognise other demographics of sex workers who migrate, which diminishes discussions of their experiences. Whilst migrant sex workers tend to be conceptualised as cisgender females, sex workers still face judgement and stigma for 'being seen to transgress social or sexual norms and/or gender stereotypes on the basis of their participation in sex work' (Amnesty International 2016(1): 2).

Migration and race

The figure is perhaps most prominent in anti-trafficking narratives (Ham 2016: 10). Ham reflects that there are two categories within these narratives: one that represents the weakness and passivity of racialised sex workers as victims of trafficking, the other that consider the 'illegal' migrant as an agentic, foreign, criminalised threat (ibid.: 70). Within these narratives, prostitution tends to be represented as self-evidently irrational, and therefore sex workers and their advocates are placed 'outside the category of rational citizens' (Bjønness 2012: 197).

Stemming from these narratives, Agustín recognises a prolific *rescue industry* within which sex workers are inevitably characterised as victims, whilst social agents, such as NGO employees,

policy makers and social workers, are positioned to save them (Agustín 2007: 5-7). This industry can be viewed through a post- colonial lens, through which modern missions to save prostitutes mirror efforts to adopt a maternalistic tradition designed 'to rescue non-European and poorer women' (ibid.: 7-8). Mac and Smith argue that those in the *rescue industry* can hide punitive measures behind 'seemingly uncomplicated moral outrage' (Mac and Smith 2018: 77). This allows for the justification of so-called *humanitarian return* for individuals who are assumed to have been transported for prostitution against their will (ibid.).

The figure has been shaped by migration and trafficking discourses developed in specific societies, some of whom share a history of colonialism, many of whom are influenced by racist discourses and policies. The application of the figure of the migrant sex worker is not limited to individuals who are, in reality, migrants engaged in sex work. Rather, it can affect racialised individuals in predominantly white societies (Ham 2016: 80). Grant argues that 'laws against prostitution are used to target a class of people as whores whether or not they are selling sex' (Grant 2014: 126-7).

For those who do engage in sex work, most of the public's focus on racialised women in sex work is based on their assumed migration status, founded on considerations of social difference, rather than on their actual migration status (Ham 2016: 73). For example, Ham argues that in the sex industry in Australia and Canada, 'there still remains a strong association or conflation between migration and race' (ibid.). Expanding on this point, she considers that:

> it may be that the sex industry magnifies what immigrants, migrants and racialised persons can experience in other industries or in society generally—that naturalised citizenship and belonging in historically White countries can remain precarious and constantly negotiated achievements. (Ham 2016: 80)

This emphasises the highly politicised nature of the figure of the migrant sex worker (ibid.: 71).

Visibility and work

The figure is also shaped and emphasised by the media. Mainstream media outlets frequently use abusive language when reporting on migrant sex workers, which lay the foundations for hostile public opinions (ICRSE 2016: 24). Agustín argues that amidst the sensationalism of migrants in both right- and left-wing media, migration is decried when it involves working in the sex industry (Agustín 2007: 4). The representation of sex workers in the media tends not to represent the idea that sex work is a form of labour that 'makes sense in the material and

social conditions in which many women live' (Bjønness 2012: 195) rather sex workers are represented as irrational beings. When sex work is not considered to be work, especially not work that one would travel to strive in, then the migrant sex worker is not considered to be a labour migrant with agency. A public decrying of sex work and the urge to prevent migration for sex work is also adopted by 'sober authority figures' (Agustín 2007: 4).

The sensationalism and stigmatisation of sex work has been enhanced by COVID-19, as media attention on sex workers continuing to work throughout the pandemic has increased, and communities perceive sex workers 'as vectors for the spread of COVID-19' (Manuel 2020). This represents a shift in the conceptualisation of the figure to one that is even more precarious, vulnerable and dangerous.

In some instances, the migrant sex worker is ignored altogether. This is a prominent issue in academia, where an increased focus on female migration for service work, such as domestic and care work, has not resulted in a coordinated effort to understand migration for sex work (Agustín 2007: 4). Agustín argues that when those who migrate for sex work are considered in research, they tend not to be presented as multi-dimensional individuals with vast interests and desires (ibid.: 6). Additionally, Agustín recognises that the 'work of migrant women in Europe...is mostly excluded from government regulation and accounts, leaving these workers socially invisible' (ibid.: 8). This invisibility is also prevalent in mainstream feminist discourses. For example, when feminists claim that the *Swedish model* – which criminalises clients – decriminalises those who sell sex, they simply do not count 'the criminalisation or deportation of mostly Black migrant sex workers in Nordic countries' (Mac & Smith 2018: 175).

Within all of this, there is a concern that the conceptualisation of the figure ignores the material conditions faced by migrant sex workers. ICRSE argue that as migrant sex workers are pushed to the margins, especially of the legal labour market, they are increasingly at risk of harassment, violence and discrimination (ICRSE 2016: 14). If they are undocumented, they are also prone to workspace abuse and severe exploitation, and therefore have increased dependence on third parties who facilitate migratory projects (ibid.: 14-5). This dependence furthers their risk of exploitation (ibid.: 15). This invisibility and marginalisation exists in stark contrast with the day-to-day reality for migrant sex workers, who operate under increased surveillance and, for some, who engage in sex work's most visible form by working on the streets.

The figure of the migrant sex worker in Denmark

Victim versus agent

Bjønness and Spanger argue that within the debates on prostitution, the 'Danish national contemporary discourse is based on generalizations and stereotypes, either taking as its reference point the "free, autonomous individual" or the "victim of violence."' (Bjønness & Spanger 2017: 157). In other words, the prostitute is conceptualised as an agent or a victim.

The division between organisations working with sex workers appears equally dichotomous. There is a clear split within the debates regarding prostitution in Danish society, with the participants divided into two fundamentally opposed groups (Nielsen & Frandsen 2009: 95). On one side, there are a few active sex workers' rights organisations who conceptualise sex workers as having agency, and who tend to focus their efforts on gaining recognition of sex work as a 'profession on equal footing with other professions' (ibid.: 96). On the other side, there are the dominant 'feminist' organisations who generally conceptualise prostitution as 'violence against women' (ibid.: 95), and who tend to advocate for a ban on the sale of sex as a way to rescue women (ibid.: 96). The victim narrative remains particularly prevalent in the latter. These debates leave the public and authorities with limited knowledge on the realities of selling sex and individuals' motives to engage in sex work (Bjønness & Spanger 2017: 163).

Sex workers in Denmark have a literal lack of agency because of their very limited influence on the policies that affect their lives, and due to the disproportionate presence of those in the *rescue industry* influencing policy spheres compared to those working for sex workers' rights, or sex workers themselves. Perhaps this is a result of prevalent victimisation. Even within the sex workers' rights movement, sex worker representation and leadership are sparse. For migrant sex workers, the opportunity to represent themselves in any discussions is undermined by their lack of residency status and the potential for their criminalisation. Therefore, within these debates, migrant sex workers must depend on individuals with securer statuses to represent their demands and needs. Ultimately, agency is given to the politicians and organisations who have fought to represent sex workers or who have struggled to establish themselves as best placed to help them (Bjønness & Spanger 2017: 157).

A significant lack of public representation of the different motives, experiences and needs of sex workers allows for 'a hostile and polarized discourse' (Bjønness 2012: 195). The language used by the main governing party, the Social Democratic Party (SDP), paints all sex workers as weak with physical and mental illness, regardless of their citizenship status. For example, Camilla Fabricius, Member of Parliament for the SDP, stated:

"We need to talk about that you get disc herniation from it [sex work]. Because of such forceful thrusts up through your spine when you are taken both vaginally and anally and orally for so many hours every day. You get hip luxation from having your hips spread out so much. When you are being penetrated anally so often - and apparently a lot of men want this - it damages your colon. And when you have intercourse with so many different people, it causes technical damage to your mucous membranes. This means they can no longer break down bacteria and then you become receptive to all sorts of diseases". (Korsgaard 2019)

These claims have been widely criticised (Jørgensen & Stampe 2019), however they continue to reinforce the prominent social conceptualisation of sex workers as victims.

Victimisation encourages approaches that seek to rescue and protect those working in sex work. Bjønness argues that an oppression paradigm, where sex work is regarded as 'an expression of male dominance and female objectification' (Järvinen & Dyrvig Henriksen 2020: 2), permeates policy debates and public discourse around prostitution in Danish society (Bjønness 2012: 192). It does so by 'constructing prostitutes as individual victims' (ibid.), which reproduces the silencing of sex workers in these discourses (ibid.). In the mainstream Danish context, sex workers are seen as 'victims of social or psychological maladjustment, needing protection, help and guidance' (Oliveira et al. 2020: 6). Sex workers are not presented as rational beings and therefore it is easier for them to be dismissed as stakeholders in debates regarding prostitution. Regardless of whether these debates centre around street-based sex work, brothel work, or escorting, 'prostitutes are construed as individual victims of a general social problem' (Kofod 2018: 1). Bjønness argued that the groups attempting to challenge the victim narrative around prostitution are 'either ignored by core institutional actors or are dismissed because its proponents do not have the right capital, who cannot be trusted as the representatives of all prostitutes' (Bjønness 2012: 199). This argument still seems fitting a decade later.

Over time, there has been a 'very dominant focus on trafficking' (Nielsen & Frandsen 2009: 94) within the debates regarding prostitution in Denmark. Anti-trafficking narratives have been used to victimise sex workers and suppress sex workers' rights. A recent example is the ban on advertisements for sex work and massage parlours in newspaper *Ekstra Bladet*, both in print and online. This decision was in response to heavy criticisms that 'behind many of the ads are trafficked women who have been pressured or threatened to sell their bodies' (Prakash & Scheel: 2021) and has been praised by Denmark's oldest women's organisation, NGO *Dansk Kvindesamfund* (ibid.). Within these narratives, migrant sex workers are all too often conflated with victims of human trafficking regardless of their circumstances.

Reflecting on why victimisation remains so prominent in mainstream politics and culture, Løvbjerg Hansen refers to whorephobia. She reminds us that it is:

> so deeply rooted in everybody that this [sex work] is wrong and you have to take that into consideration when thinking about the political arguments, because it's so easy to want to save people. (Løvbjerg Hansen: 2021)

She argues that this culminates in an 'aggressive narrative saying that we need to rescue people' (ibid.). In the Danish context, 'rescue' takes the form of being registered as a victim of human trafficking. The rescue narrative continues to dominate whilst 'sex workers all over the world are asking for rights, not rescue' (ibid.).

Plambech (2021) discusses that migrant sex workers who are 'rescued' by the state tend not to want to be rescued. She explains that:

> we often see that women don't want to stay in the crisis centres. They don't want to be rescued in the sense that they don't want to be taken away from the streets and not have the opportunity to work. (Plambech 2021)

She asserts that these issues will prevail until those with influence decide to understand the motives of those who move to Denmark to sell sex; only then can they begin to assist these women in a meaningful way (ibid.). Therefore, acknowledging some level of agency of migrant sex workers is essential for improving their provisions and reducing stigma. However, the question of agency holds a risk for migrant sex workers. In the current anti-immigrant climate, where migrants are often scapegoated and criminalised, acknowledging that individuals moved to Denmark knowing that they would sell sex without a work permit 'can really quickly be used as an argument to deport them' (Plambech 2021). This link between agency and criminalisation shows that, whilst sex workers are being discussed as agents as opposed to villains, that does not change the reality that undocumented migrant sex workers are villains in the eyes of the Danish state.

Within the Danish context, the difference between being perceived as a victim or being perceived as an agent equates to the difference between being registered as trafficked or being criminalised by the Danish state. I argue that this distinction is not worthy of too much focus, as both outcomes tend to result in detention and forced deportation.

Social problem versus labour

Sex work is continually treated as exceptional by the SDP and as something that cannot, and should not, be normalised. Across the political parties and the trade union movement, there is no clear evidence of a desire to shift towards acknowledging sex work as work, rather it continues to be conceptualised as a social problem (Bjønness 2012: 192). The suggested political solution to this social problem is *exit programmes*, which are, on paper, designed to enable prostitutes to leave the sex industry and to provide them 'with opportunities to pursue a different way of life' (Kofod 2018: 1). However, these programmes have been heavily critised. They tend to be tailored towards street-based sex workers and ignore the heterogeneity of sex worker experiences (ibid.: 2). Accessing these programmes can be limited by a lack of anonymity (Mac & Smith 2018: 155-6). Sex workers have diverse reasons as to why they might avoid being registered on a state-funded programme, for example, they might fear that they will risk losing their child custody or increase their risk of deportation (ibid.). Despite being a core element of policies on prostitution, exit programmes have received limited academic attention (Kofod 2018: 2).

Whilst the Danish government prefers to focus on exit (Krag 2019), the debates as to whether sex work is a profession continue. Mildwater (2021) explains that sex work in Denmark is extremely contradictory:

> it is work and it isn't work. It's work without the status and the protection that regulated work provides. Danish sex workers are obliged to pay taxes on their earnings; however, they do not reap the benefits of being officially recognised as a part of the workforce. If they try to mobilise and organise themselves, they must be vigilant not to be accused of pimping; which is when a third party reaps the benefits of a sex worker. Paradoxically, the considerable revenue harvested by the tax department [from sex workers' work], is permitted by the state. (Mildwater 2021)

Within this framework, the shift from unrecognised work to recognised work in the formal economy would have the potential to significantly improve conditions for Danish sex workers. This is especially the case in a country such as Denmark, which prides itself in its unions and its workers' rights. With the recognition of sex work as work, Danish sex workers could gain access to unions and significant worker protections such as sick pay and pension contributions. This would have an even greater impact in the context of the pandemic, which has pushed sex workers 'to the brink of financial desperation' (Manuel 2020).

However, it is difficult to say that officially acknowledging sex work as work would have any impact on migrant sex workers. The barriers to workers' rights for migrant sex workers are

already evident in places where sex work is recognised as work, such as the Netherlands and New Zealand – the first place to 'fully decriminalise' sex work - where existing sex workers' rights are not accessible for migrants, and deportation remains a risk (ICRSE 2016: 14; NSWP 2018: 6). When considering if progress in labour rights and conditions for Danish sex workers who pay taxes would have an effect on migrant sex workers, Mildwater explained:

> It's a separate issue because the Danish legal system and laws pertaining to sex work are inflexible when it comes to foreign labour. Labour rights for Danish sex workers would still not protect migrant sex workers. This group would still risk being arrested, fined and imprisoned for illegal work. (Mildwater 2021)

Therefore, the issues for migrant sex workers are not linked directly to the status of sex work itself but more widely to labour opportunities and structures within migration systems. This is emphasised by Plambech, who argues that the conditions faced by migrant sex workers are a 'question of labour, documents and migration'. She argues that becoming a sex worker is a question of work opportunities. For example, she has observed that the number of sex workers entering Denmark from Thailand has decreased as the employment situation has improved either in Thailand or the surrounding countries. Plambech highlights that we 'have all of these different categories that this debate or discourse is circulating around and what is often left out is the question of the migrant woman as a worker'.

Criminalisation versus decriminalisation

Within the debates, Danish organisations and political parties generally are not advocating for criminalising the sex worker herself. However, there are organisations advocating for the implementation of the *Swedish model*. This model was not designed to improve conditions for migrant sex workers in the first place; it was designed to deter them (Kulick 2003: 200), and its implementation would have serious implications for their work in Denmark. Løvbjerg Hansen states that there has 'been a lot of talk about criminalising clients, and what we know is that criminalising the client has a lot of the same risks as criminalising sex workers'.

Mildwater is highly critical of the *Swedish model*. She has encountered the argument that Swedish men no longer have a demand to buy sex and finds it laughable, stating that 'there isn't one trafficked woman or migrant sex worker out of the thousands I've interviewed who hasn't fucked a Swede' (Mildwater 2021). She has observed that many Swedish men come to Denmark to buy sex and that many of the sex workers she has interviewed describe how they even travel to Sweden as escorts, through multiple channels including dating sites like Tinder (ibid.). Mildwater believes that criminalising the client pushes sex work underground whilst

further stigmatising sex work and marginalising sex workers. However, it remains unclear whether there is enough pressure on the SDP to push for the criminalisation of clients, especially as current Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen has openly criticised this approach, favouring a focus on encouraging individuals to exit prostitution (Krag 2019).

When considering criminalisation, Mildwater is deeply concerned about the number of trafficked individuals who are criminalised within Denmark's current legal framework. She states that whilst 'hardly any traffickers are prosecuted...the number of potential victims [of trafficking] who are arrested and criminalised is much larger. We're talking about hundreds' (Mildwater 2021). For those who avoid criminalisation by being registered as trafficked, there are still issues. Mildwater has observed that:

> because of the system in Europe, and specifically in Denmark, trafficked people have no interest in being officially identified as trafficked, they see no advantage in being defined as trafficked despite the offer of a voluntary return with financial assistance. People describe to me how they have suffered to get to Europe and risked their lives. The money that they often owe their traffickers is much more than what they would receive from the Danish return agency with a so-called voluntary return. Widespread corruption in law enforcement means they have no faith they will be protected from their traffickers in their country of origin...therefore many of them, after being identified as trafficked, run away from the refugee camp or shelter, because they have no intention of being returned to their country of origin before they have paid their debts. (Mildwater 2021)

This emphasises how, for the migrant sex worker, avoiding criminalisation and adopting a victim narrative centred around human trafficking is not a sufficient solution to escape mistreatment from the state.

There remain some vocal advocates for the full decriminalisation of sex work. However, those acknowledging the agency of sex workers and fighting for their rights and decriminalisation in Denmark are not a cohesive movement, and they hold minimal political influence. Amongst them, there appear to be limited ideas as to how to improve conditions, especially for migrant sex workers, in the caustic Danish context.

Criticising the current migration and asylum systems appears to be the one place where organisations in the rescue industry and those supporting sex workers' rights find solid united ground. In my observations, the focus on documents, borders and deportations does exist across this spectrum of organisations, but perhaps it is dampened by strong anti-immigrant

politics and policies, and a society that prides itself on projecting an image of being near-utopian. Mildwater explains these complex issues as follows:

> Denmark is one of the most restrictive countries for migrants in Europe and has passed dozens of new laws and enforced demands which prevent many asylum seekers and trafficked people from ever receiving residence. Many of these laws successfully exclude non-citizens from family reunion and the work market. Denmark has, however, for years cultivated an image of being a champion for human rights and equality. The reality is that there exists two different worlds for "the haves and the have nots". Migrant sex workers, undocumented migrants, refugees and trafficked sex workers are categorised as aliens, they remain unprotected and are often even criminalised in Denmark. (Mildwater 2021)

When it comes to the laws affecting migrant sex workers, it is clear that the root of the issues is not the laws around sex work as much as it is the laws around migration. It is those laws in which the migrant sex worker is explicitly criminalised. Plambech argues that 'we need to see more focus on migration politics as a feminist issue. We cannot only focus on sex work laws, or whether clients should be criminalised or not'. She emphasises that these policies are very small 'in comparison to the broader structures that are going on in terms of unemployment and migration control that limits women's mobility' (Plambech 2021). Of course, considering the laws around sex work remains important, however it is essential that they are understood in the context of these broader migration structures (Mildwater 2021).

Conclusion

When I began researching the figure of the migrant sex worker, I conceptualised many of the issues regarding the figure to be relatively straightforward. Having volunteered in organisations that aim to improve working conditions for migrant sex workers, I had a certain lens on the issues at hand. I saw that sex work is work, and believed that if sex work itself was decriminalised, then most of the issues for sex workers would be resolved and therefore subsequently the situation for undocumented migrants selling sex would improve. I was under the impression that campaigns for sex workers' rights inevitably included migrants' rights, that anti-trafficking was a codeword for being anti-sex work and anti-immigrant, and that anti-traffickers were, by default, pro-criminalisation. However, this article highlights that these binaries are not of great importance. The concept of work is complex and context orientated. There are sex workers' rights activists who do not engage with issues faced by migrants, whilst there are anti-traffickers who utilise anti-trafficking mechanisms to attempt to reduce the criminalisation of migrant sex workers. Crucially, improvements in the

conditions and rights for domestic sex workers may have no tangible impact on migrant sex workers.

I expected my work to centre around debates as to whether sex work is work, as this was the focus of much literature on sex work and sex workers' rights. However, a key finding is that whether sex work is conceptualised as work is not a central issue for migrant sex workers' rights. Rather, the policies and structures that have the most tangible impact on migrant sex workers are those regarding migration, asylum and citizenship. Therefore, I argue that those advocating for migrant sex workers' rights should focus their efforts on challenging migration systems and campaigning for a fairer asylum system. This provides justification for those campaigning for domestic sex workers' rights and those campaigning for migrant sex workers' rights to see themselves as distinct groups, with different demands and the need for different resources. However, this should not discourage a push towards solidarity and intersectional approaches to form a cohesive sex workers' rights movement in Denmark. Acknowledgement of the extreme issues within the Danish migration and asylum systems is potentially the one unifying force across the chasmic divide between Denmark's sex workers' rights advocates and the dominant 'feminist' rescue organisations, and therefore could be the key to creating a cohesive movement.

This article shows that victimhood dominates the public discourses regarding sex work in Danish society, regardless of the migration status of the sex workers discussed. This is accompanied by prevalent anti-immigrant sentiment, which villainises undocumented migrants – even those seeking asylum in Denmark. Although the Danish public political debates centre around the idea of the sex worker as a victim or an agent, the undocumented migrant continues to be villainised, seemingly regardless of their status as a sex worker. Both the victimisation and villainisation of migrant sex workers ensure that sex workers are kept in the realms of the exceptional. The rhetoric surrounding this detracts attention from the concrete issues faced by sex workers. It is essential that further research casts a light on the specific issues that are causing an increasing cohort of migrant sex workers to face very poor working conditions, fear deportation, and receive no protection or support from the Danish state, especially evident since the outbreak of COVID-19. This research should consider both the root causes of migration and the opportunities available to migrants in the moment that they arrive in Denmark.

Due to the combination of the dominant victimising discourse surrounding sex workers, and Denmark's policies regarding immigration, Danish society's response to migrant sex workers is predominantly one that deports them under the guise of rescue. There exists a national blindness on the issues facing migrant sex workers, as society supports rescue approaches to

prostitution that were never designed to rescue, or even to support, undocumented migrants. This leaves migrants who sell sex in Denmark trapped in a gap in the system, one where both their victimisation and their criminalisation will likely lead to their forced deportation.

Bibliography

- Agustín, Laura M. 2007: *Sex at the Margins: Migration, Labour Markets and the Rescue Industry*. Zed Books Ltd.: London.
- Amnesty International 2016 (1): "Amnesty International Policy on State Obligations to Respect, Protect and Fulfil the Human Rights of Sex Workers". *Amnesty International,* 2016.
- Amnesty International 2016: "The Human Cost of 'Crushing' The Market: Criminalization of Sex Work in Norway.". *Amnesty International,* 2016.
- Bjønness, Jeanett 2012: "Between Emotional Politics and Biased Practices—Prostitution Policies, Social Work, and Women Selling Sexual Services in Denmark.". *Sexuality Research and Social Policy,* 2012:9, s. 192-202.
- Bjønness, Jeanett and Spanger, Marlene 2017: "Denmark". Synnøve Økland Jahnsen and Hendrik Wagenaar (red.): *Assessing Prostitution Policies in Europe*, Routledge: London, s. 153-168.
- Center Mod Menneskehandel 2019: "Refleksions- og restitutionsperiode". *Center Mod Menneskehandel,* 2019.
- Global Network of Sex Work Projects (NSWP) 2018: "Briefing Paper: Migrant Sex Workers.". *NSWP,* 2018.
- Grant, Mellissa G. 2014: *Playing the Whore: The Work of Sex Work*. Verso: London.
- Ham, Julie 2016: "Sex work and the non- migrant 'migrant'" and "Investigating agency in sex work research". Julie Ham: *Sex Work, Immigration and Social Difference,* Routledge: London, s. 9-37, 69-100.
- Järvinen, Margaretha and Dyrvig Henriksen, Theresa 2020: "Controlling intimacy: Sexual scripts among men and women in prostitution." *Current Sociology,* 2020:68, s. 353- 371.
- Jørgensen, Anna S. and Stampe, Camilla 2019: "Detektor: Stomi af analsex og hofteskred? S- ordfører tegner skævt billede af prostitution." *DR,* 2019.
- KFUKs Social Arbejde n.d.: "Menneskhandel". *KFUKs Social Arbejde.* Accessed 4 May 2021.
- Kofod, Jens 2018: "Business Women and Exit Programs.". *SAGE Open* 2018: 8, 4, s. 1-11.

- Kofod, Jens E., Dyrvig, Theresa Frøkjær, Markwardt, Kristoffer, Lagoni, Ninna, Bille, Rebekka, Termansen, Tina, Christiansen, Line, Juul Toldam, Eva and Vilshammer, Magne 2011: "Prostitution i Danmark". *VIVE,* 2011.

- Korsgaard, Kristine 2019: "S vil ikke give prostituerede nye rettigheder: "Det er ikke et almindeligt arbejde, men det er heller ikke ulovligt, og derfor skal man betale skat"". *Altinget,* 2019.

- Krag, Astrid 2019: "Astrid Krag: Prostitution skal ikke normaliseres, kvinder skal hjælpes ud af det brutale erhverv". *Information,* 2019.

- Kulick, Don 2003: "Sex in the New Europe: The Criminalization of Clients and Swedish Fear of Penetration." *Anthropological Theory,* 2003:3, s. 199-218.

- Løvbjerg Hansen, Maja 2021: "Borders and Global Inequality: Has Feminism Turned its Back on Migration, Sex Work, and Trafficking?". *The Red Van,* 2021.

- Mac, Juno and Smith, Molly 2018: *Revolting Prostitutes: The Fight for Sex Workers' Rights.* Verso: London.

- Manuel, Stacey-Leigh 2020: "The Multiplying Threats Facing Sex Workers Today". *Open Society Foundations,* 2020.

- Mildwater, Michelle (Director of *HopeNow*) 2021. In discussion with Hannah Tendler. 5 March 2021.

- Nielsen, Niels J. & Frandsen, Lise A. 2009: *Sex til salg i storbyen. Prostitution sidst i 1800-tallet og i nyere tid.*

- Oliveira, Alexandra, Lemos, Ana, Mota, Mafalda and Pinto, Rita 2020: "Less equal than others: The laws affecting sex work, and advocacy in the European Union." *GUE/NGL group of the European Parliament,* 2020.

- Plambech, Sine 2021: "Borders and Global Inequality: Has Feminism Turned its Back on Migration, Sex Work, and Trafficking?". *The Red Van,* 2021.

- Prakash, Thomas and Scheel, Agnete F 2021: "Ekstra Bladet dropper massageannoncer: Kvindesamfund glæder sig, mens sexarbejdere ærgrer sig". *DR,* 2021.

- Rørsig, Clara M. and Nielsen, Nicolas S: "Strammere krav for at få rødbedefarvet pas: Ingen fængselsdømte skal have dansk statsborgerskab". *DR,* 2021.

- Sexarbejdernes Interesseorganisation (SIO) and Gadejuristen 2012: "Briefing to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the implementation by Denmark of article 6, 7, 8 and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in relation to sex workers including undocumented migrants". *Sexarbejdernes Interesseorganisation,* 2012.

- The European Network for the Promotion of Rights and Health among Migrant Sex Workers (TAMPEP) 2009(1): "Sex Work, Migration, Health: A report on the

intersections of legislations and policies regarding sex work, migration and health in Europe". *TAMPEP International Foundation,* 2009.

- The European Network for the Promotion of Rights and Health among Migrant Sex Workers (TAMPEP) 2009: " Sex Work in Europe: A mapping of the prostitution scene in 25 European countries". *TAMPEP International Foundation,* 2009.

- The International Committee on the Rights of Sex Workers in Europe (ICRSE) 2016: "Surveilled. Exploited. Deported. Rights Violations against Migrant Sex Workers in Europe and Central Asia.". *ICRSE,* 2016.

- Udenrigsministeriet 2018: "Handlingsplan til bekæmpelse af menneskehandel 2019-2021." *Udenrigsministeriet,* 2018.

- United Nations 2016: "Compilation prepared by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with paragraph 15 (b) of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1 and paragraph 5 of the annex to Council resolution 16/21". *United Nations General Assembly,* 2016.

COSMOPOLITANS IN THE EUROPEAN PERIPHERY

The rise of a modern, Norwegian libertarian movement, 1980-2008

By:
Martin van Soest
History

ABSTRACT: While there have been studies, albeit few, treating the rise of neoliberalism in Norway, the parallel rise of a Norwegian libertarian movement, intersecting with the former in many aspects, has received less attention. Through a social network analysis (Plehwe) of this movement and a morphological language analysis (Freeden) of select actors' intellectual output, this article shifts the focus from large-scale structural changes to individual actors. I argue that that the Norwegian Progress Party's youth wing functioned as a hub for young, liberally inclined intellectuals in the 1980s and early 1990s, painting a drastic contrast to the present guise of this party.

KEYWORDS: libertarianism, neoliberalism, Norway, intellectual history

Introduction

'In short, old gods are decaying and "new" ideas have caught the wind.' (Nordbakken 2001 [1980]: 8). With these words, the Norwegian economist and libertarian Lars Peder Nordbakken introduced a new monthly journal in 1980, *Ideer om frihet*. He was referring to the ostensible 'decay' of the social democratic hegemony of the post-war period and the new rise of so-called classical liberalism, or libertarianism – the beginning of what many today would call 'the age of neoliberalism'. Nordbakken wished to create a point of contact for 'freedom-loving people in [Norway].' (ibid.: 7). Twenty-eight years later, he wrote:

> However, we find something else; a variegated, uncoordinated, and dynamic generation of ideas – almost a spontaneous force powered by a plethora of diverse and independent thinkers and public intellectuals, without fixed loyalty to the practical and tactical everyday life of party politics. It is scarcely an exaggeration to claim that it is precisely this intellectual liberalism that, more than anything else, has contributed to rebuild and renew liberalism outside of mainstream politics (Nordbakken 2008: 68-69).

Over these almost thirty years, there had most certainly evolved a network of 'freedom-loving' libertarians in Norway, mirroring developments in many other Western countries, most prominent of which was the United States. Already in 1946, the Foundation for Economic Education (FEE) – the first libertarian think tank in the US – was founded by Leonard Read. The post-war period also saw the rise of such prominent libertarians as Ayn Rand (despite rejecting the label herself), Murray Rothbard and Milton Friedman. In Norway, early post-war liberalism has been associated with such names as Trygve Hoff, a founding member of the Mont Pelerin Society (MPS) and the editor-in-chief of the business magazine *Farmand*, and the liberal information agency Libertas (see Langeteig 2020). However, there was not much room for such sentiments in the social-democratic Norway of the time, and they remained on the fringes of Norwegian society. Over the course of the 1970s, liberalism got new impetus, especially with the establishment of what was to become the Norwegian Progress Party (No. *Fremskrittspartiet*).

I propose that the Progress Party should be seen as the beginning of the modern Norwegian libertarian movement. First through a social network analysis and subsequently a morphological language analysis,

I ask: How did this movement evolve and develop from the early 1980s, when the libertarian youth wing of the Progress Party was gaining momentum, to c. 2008, when it had established itself as a force in Norwegian society and got its present organisational makeup? My assumption is that many of the young libertarians in Norway formed, or at least developed, their worldview in the Progress Party's Youth, of course after having joined the party due to a liberal or libertarian disposition. As such, it makes sense to speak of a Norwegian libertarian diaspora after the split in the Progress Party at the party conference in 1994 and the subsequent ousting of the libertarian wing. This diaspora and their intellectual heirs have been indispensable in the establishment and subsequent functioning of the libertarian think tank Civita and the reinvigoration of the now liberal-conservative magazine Minerva.

Before I flesh out my theoretical framework, I will provide a cursory overview of the most relevant prior research. The modern American libertarian movement has been studied in such works as Brian Doherty's comprehensive *Radicals for capitalism*, in which he shows how the modern American libertarian movement came to be in the middle of the twentieth century and how it has developed since (see also Nash 2006, especially for the American fusion of liberalism and conservatism). It has been, and continues to be, an underground movement that lacks direct influence in society and see itself as an embattled minority trying to educate the public. Doherty shows the diversity of the movement, giving attention to a plethora of names not necessarily familiar to laypeople – e.g., Leonard Read and Henry Hazlitt, author of *Economics in One Lesson*, an influential book among libertarians – but five still stand out because of their intellectual footprints on the movement, namely Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich August von Hayek (Austrian economics), Ayn Rand (objectivism), Milton Friedman (Chicago School of economics), and Murray Rothbard (anarcho-capitalism) (Doherty 2007: 8-15).

Similar studies have not been conducted with regards to a Norwegian libertarian movement, but the concept of neoliberalism has received some attention. In the anthology *Nyliberalisme – ideer og politisk virkelighet*, a number of political scientists attempt to 'operationalise' neoliberalism as an analytical term and through this lens analyse several sections of Norwegian society. They are concerned with the trend towards neoliberal reforms and political change – a kind of new consensus – but not necessarily the explicit followers of such ideas in Norway (Mydske, Claes, and Lie 2007: 11-21), i.e., those that I call libertarians in this article. Norwegian historian Ola Innset criticises the authors for conflating

neoliberalism and laissez-faire liberalism, making the concept less analytically useful (Innset 2020: 18-19). In *Markedsvendingen*, he emphasises the role of the Norwegian Labour Party (No. *Arbeiderpartiet*) in what he describes as 'the turn towards the market' that started at the end of the 1970s. As such, he rejects the idea of a Norwegian Margaret Thatcher or Ronald Reagan (ibid.: 126). He does not necessarily downplay the role of the Conservative governments of the early 1980s, which are understood to have accelerated the process, introducing new neoliberal policies, but seldom as an opposite to the Labour Party. Innset stresses that changes in the world economy made it impossible to maintain the social-democratic regulatory system, and that changes in the field of economics, due especially to the Chicago School, offered solutions to the problems therein (ibid.: 128). 'The turn towards the market' was, in other words, initiated by pragmatic politicians and not ideological neoliberals or libertarians. At the end of the decade, market economy was understood as realism and there was, as such, no alternative (ibid.: 144). Hence, a substantial part of the uniquely Norwegian development of liberal, or libertarian, ideas in the same period falls outside the scope of Innset's narrative, notwithstanding instances where these actors are mentioned.

In particular, the Norwegian Progress Party cultivated libertarian ideas for a period in the 1980s and 1990s. However, studies of the political party tend to focus on its current populist guise, be it the transformation from anti-welfare libertarians to anti-immigrant populists or comparisons with other populist parties in contemporary Europe, but rarely on the actual libertarian period of the party (see Bjørklund 2003 and 2007). Similarly, Innset frames the Progress Party of the 1980s and early 1990s as followers of Milton Friedman's simplified version of neoliberalism, i.e., suspicion of government. However, in his master's thesis, Sindre Lunde Holbek sheds light on the intellectual treatment of '(neo-)liberal' ideas that took place in the libertarian wing of the party in the period 1984–1994. His focus is primarily on the internal politics of the party as it appeared in their official newspaper, *Fremskritt*, and the conflicts between the libertarians and what he calls the 'illiberal' faction (cultural conservatives and populists) of the party (Holbek 2014: 31-32). The Progress Party of the 1980s attracted young, intellectually inclined libertarians who came to dominate the youth wing of the party, and Holbek's emphasis is on the role that the Progress Party's Youth played in the party's policy development (ibid.:

39). He does not, however, necessarily focus on the internal logic of the libertarian faction of the party, as his emphasis is on the conflict.

Theoretical framework and methodology

I treat the movement as a network and will conduct a simple historical social network analysis to make sense of the different actors and the organisations with which they are or have been affiliated, as well as to determine how they are connected and, equally important, not connected. In the introduction to *The Road from Mont Pèlerin*, German historian Dieter Plehwe presents a way to study and trace the development and evolution of neoliberalism through network analysis. Plehwe makes use of the Mont


Figure 1: Simplified presentation of the network of the modern, Norwegian libertarian movement. The thicker the line, the more connections between the actors. The graph was made using the open-source software Gephi.

Pelerin Society (MPS) as well as a network of related neoliberal think tanks as a heuristic starting point to identify relevant actors, organisations, and institutions (Plehwe 2009: 4). Owing to its 'novel structure of intellectual discourse' that '[...] has been designed to advance and integrate various types of specialized knowledge within and across the confines of philosophy, academic research in economics, history, sociology, and applied policy knowledge in its various forms', Plehwe claims that the MPS can '[...] serve

as a directory of organized neoliberalism [...]' (ibid.: 5). Inspired by Plehwe's method, I will make use of historical social network analysis to identify a libertarian network in Norway in which some actors have eventually ended up with connections to the MPS and related think tanks. The network consists mostly of people who had been central to, or had had prominent positions in, *Ideer om frihet,* the Free Democrats, and LIFO/Civita.

A simplified graph like this needs to have a few caveats. In this graph (see fig. 1), a connection is a formal relation between two actors that could entail exchange of ideas, etc., but not necessarily so, which means that their significance can be overstated. For instance, I deem Ellen Christine Christiansen less significant than Lars Peder Nordbakken, as her intellectual output is smaller and less relevant than his, despite her being, seemingly, as well-connected as he is. Moreover, a network like this would constantly be changing, actors making, losing, strengthening, and weakening connections over time. As such, it can only be understood as a heuristic, an overview of actors who have had the opportunity to meet and exchange ideas about the world, help each other financially, etc. A study not taking into consideration the history of the movement, focusing instead on its current guise, would necessarily look different.

Based on this network, I argue that the Progress Party's Youth of the 1980s and early 1990s was central in the making of a modern libertarian movement in Norway, owing especially to the breadth of their involvement in other parts of the network, both during and after the 'libertarian' period. I have been able to select two nodes, or actors, as representatives of the movement that are well-connected, have been a part of it for a long time, and who have published extensively enough to make a diachronic analysis possible. These two are the already mentioned Lars Peder Nordbakken and Jan Arild Snoen. Making use of Michael Freeden's morphological approach to the analysis of ideologies, I attempt to flesh out the development of the movement's ideology through a selection of their publications in the libertarian journal *Ideer om frihet* and from the two think tanks the Progress Party's Research Institute and Civita, spanning three decades.

Freeden's approach takes as its premise the internal structure of ideologies by looking at the relationships between the concepts they contain (Freeden 2003: 51). According to Freeden, all ideologies arrange a set of concepts according to particular patterns, and these patterns determine how the concepts, as well as

the ideologies at large, are to be conceived. He distinguishes between three relative positions that a concept can have in an ideology: cores, adjacencies, and peripheries; although the distinction between the latter two can be difficult to discern with the small amount of material that I make use of in this article. In the core you find the key concepts that are indispensable to the cohesion of the ideology – concepts without which the ideology would cease to be that very ideology, e.g., liberalism without some concept of liberty (ibid.: 61). Adjacent concepts help reducing ambiguity surrounding the core and develop the core concepts in a more concrete direction while the peripheral concepts are more loosely connected and consequently more exposed to variation and change – temporally and geographically. At the same time the peripheral, and to a lesser extent the adjacent, concepts are important in making the ideologies tangible, as the main objective of ideologies is, ultimately, to gather support for some cause (ibid.: 62-63). The following section presents the making of the modern movement.

The making of the movement

There are many organisations and people that could claim to be part of a Norwegian libertarian movement, and the story of this movement could certainly begin much earlier than what I have chosen to do in this article. For instance, both MPS and Libertas was founded already in 1947. The MPS in Switzerland by a group of libertarian scholars, and Libertas by major actors in the Norwegian business community. Libertas was originally meant to be a business organisation but was soon, following a scandal, restructured into a libertarian information agency. The MPS intended for their project of reinventing liberalism to be long-term, potentially spanning several decades (Plehwe 2009: 15), and although Libertas had a shorter-term agenda, the ideas and policies that was advocated by these organisations had marginal influence in the social-democratic Norway of the post-WWII period, notwithstanding a few cases in which Libertas had some influence in Norwegian politics (see Langeteige 2020). As such, it makes more sense to begin the story of the Norwegian libertarian movement in the 1970s when a transformation of the political landscape was under way – not only in Norway but in the whole Western world – in which these ideas were able to gain a foothold among a larger part of the Norwegian public (Sejersted 2011: 333-34).

A few months before the 1973 general election, the political agitator Anders Lange founded *Anders Lange's party for the severe lowering of taxes and duties* (ALP), renamed the Progress Party in 1978. Much to the surprise of the political class, the party received 5 percent of the votes and four seats in parliament. The party was, as the name clearly suggests, founded as an anti-establishment protest party against the paternalistic welfare state (No. *formynderstaten*) (Bjørklund 2003: 130-31). In 1983, the party's new leader Carl I. Hagen declared the party ideologically libertarian, and from 1984, the youth wing of the party came to play a significant role filling this ideological role in the party. The Progress Party's Youth was to become a major arena for young, Norwegian libertarians over the next decade, albeit marked by almost constant conflict with the opposing 'illiberal' faction of the party (Holbek 2014: 32). Despite the size of the 'illiberal' faction, the libertarians enjoyed a strong position in the party, owing to their high intellectual capacity, and were able to set the agenda in the official party newspaper *Fremskritt* (Ibid.: 33-34).

Snoen and Nordbakken were at the time active in the journal *Ideer om frihet,* which was a project initiated by Nordbakken and friends of his in 1979 during their university years at the Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) in Bergen (Knag 2001: 10-11). This journal was to exist until 2000 and featured many young intellectuals, including Hans Chr. Garmann Johnsen and Sigmund Knag. Because Snoen, who did not study at NHH, became a contributor to, and even editor of, *Ideer om frihet,* it is safe to assume that the Progress Party, and especially the youth wing, was an arena were Norwegian libertarians could meet, make connections, and exchange ideas. The journal's significance for the movement is confirmed by Norwegian historian Øystein Sørensen in his 1986 book *Ideer om frihet* (which has nothing to do the with journal as such) in which he recommends the journal for people interested in Norwegian libertarianism (Sørensen 1986: 114).

Together with party leader Hagen, the libertarians founded Norway's first think tank, the Progress Party's Institute for Policy Research[1] (FUI), in 1988 with Snoen as its leader and, until 1990, only staff. FUI only managed to produce and publish a small number of reports and studies before it was closed down in 1994. Most of them were produced by Snoen, but from 1990 other young intellectuals also contributed,

---

[1] This is my own translation of *Fremskrittspartiets Utredningsinstitutt.*

including Johnsen, Knag and Nordbakken – all of whom were, as mentioned, contributors to *Ideer om frihet* as well. The libertarians were allowed to produce material that was uncompromisingly libertarian.

Despite the establishment of FUI, the libertarians' days in the party were now numbered. The libertarian wing of the party had influenced the manifesto a great deal before the 1985 general election, but at the 1989 party conference, many of their positions were indirectly rejected (ibid.: 43). Furthermore, the youth wing was principally for free immigration, which was at odds with the mother party that, starting with some unfortunate racist remarks during the 1985 election, was developing the anti-immigration platform that the party represents today (ibid.: 40). This also shows that it was in value-related questions that the libertarian wing and the 'illiberal' wing of the party, especially represented by the cultural conservatives, had the most disagreements – after all, the party at large still supported economic liberalism.

In 1992, Snoen chose to step down from his position at FUI on the grounds that he could not continue without the necessary trust in and respect for the party leadership (ibid.: 47). His departure severely weakened the libertarians' position in the party; they were, for instance, no longer able to set the agenda in *Fremskritt*, as they had done since 1984 where the cultural conservatives and populists now got more influence over which articles the newspaper chose to print. Finally, after a showdown with Hagen at the 1994 party conference, four libertarian members of the parliamentary group were expelled from the party, including deputy leader Ellen Wibe and Ellen Christine Christiansen, Snoen's wife. This marked the end of the Progress Party's libertarian era (ibid.: 50-53).

The four expelled members, who still had their seats in parliament, founded a libertarian political organisation, the Free Democrats (No. FRIdemokratene), and represented it in parliament until the next general election in 1997; the organisation had no other representatives elected to parliament before it disbanded in 2006 (Christensen 2006). However, despite the lack of direct political success, the organisation was central in organising initiatives for the libertarian movement in Norway, including the online newspaper *Liberaleren* and the libertarian bookshop Bauta Bøker that continued to operate, even after the organisation disbanded. Snoen said to the socialist newspaper *Klassekampen* in 2004 that the Free Democrats were '[...] real, pure 100 percent libertarians. The circle is not big, but it gathers people from the Conservative Party (No. *Høyre*), Progress Party, Liberal Party (No. *Venstre*), and independents.'

(Marsdal 2004). The organisation had eight leaders before it disbanded, including Ellen Christine Christiansen, Heidi Nordby Lunde, Bent Johan Mosfjell and Hans Jørgen Lysglimt Johansen. Snoen was also an active member of the organisation as the quote above shows; in 2004, he also received the organisation's Freedom prize (No. *FRIhetsprisen*). He received the prize for his 'many years of work for a free society', which, according to the Free Democrats, included his work as leader of the first think tank in Norway, i.e., FUI, where he 'established himself as the libertarian chief ideologue' in Norway, as well as his work as a writer, having written articles for numerous publications (Mosfjell 2004). It seems that the Free Democrats, especially after it stopped having members stand for elections, most of all was a place where a variety of libertarians were able to meet like-minded people to discuss everything from day-to-day issues to ideology and libertarian theory. Torbjørn Røe Isaksen, who held several ministerial positions in Erna Solberg's conservative governments from 2013 to 2021, was a member of the Free Democrats at the same time as being leader of the Conservative Party's Youth (Marsdal 2004).

In 2004, the libertarian think tank Civita was established with funds from the Liberal Research Institute (LIFO). LIFO had been established as a successor to Libertas in 1988, with all of Libertas' funds being transferred to the new organisation. Notwithstanding a magazine, *Kulturelt fremskritt*, the organisation has used their funds exclusively to finance other activities that are in keeping with their objective (LIFO n.d.), namely 'to strive for intellectual freedom, freedom of trade and commerce, and political freedom as a basis for a decent standard of living for all' (Nordbakken 2007: 4). Civita is a member of the Atlas Research Network in which a membership, according to Plehwe, is a litmus test to determine whether or not a think tank is neoliberal and has connections to the MPS (Plehwe 2009: 4). For instance, Nordbakken is an active member the of the MPS (Nordbakken 2020). Former Conservative politician and minister Kristin Clemet has been managing the think tank since 2006. Nordbakken has been an active member of the think tank since it was established in 2004 and is also on LIFO's board together with Snoen, Lunde, and others. LIFO also funds the one-time conservative turned liberal-conservative magazine *Minerva* which today shares office space with Civita. Snoen was a co-founder of Civita and is today a regular writer at *Minerva*. Many libertarians of the diaspora from the Progress Party have later joined other liberal right-wing parties such as the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party. Nordbakken is a member of the Liberal Party (Venstre n.d.), Snoen joined the Conservative Party in the late 1990s

but left it again in 2016 (Torgersen, 2016), while Heidi Nordby Lunde has been a member of parliament for the same party since 2013 (Stortinget n.d.).

There are three clusters in the network presented in figure 1: one centred around the Free Democrats; one around LIFO and Civita; and one around *Ideer om frihet*. Jan Arild Snoen is the best-connected actor and is a part of all three clusters, and Nordbakken, despite not being present in all three clusters, is well-connected and has had a significant intellectual output. Most of the central actors mentioned in this article, who were active in the Progress Party's Youth, seem to have left politics after 1994 and are, as such, not visible in figure 1. The only four who can be confirmed, based on Holbek's account of the debates in *Fremskritt*, are Nordbakken, Snoen, Tor Mikkel Wara, and Vegard Martinsen; the latter two actors are only connected to each other and to the former two through the Progress Party's Youth. Wara also left politics in the 1990s, but has been kept in the network, as he re-entered politics in 2006 (Tvedt and Pettersen n.d.). Martinsen has, among other things, been leader both of Foreningen for Studium av Objektivismen, an association dedicated to Ayn Rand's philosophy, and of the Liberal People's Party, but these being minor organisations, he has been isolated from the other libertarians (Garvik n.d.). Of course, there might be, or most certainly are, connections I am not aware of that could alter the network in interesting ways. The following section will explore Norwegian libertarianism from the 1980s to the 2000s through texts written by Nordbakken and Snoen, who I deem the most representative actors of the libertarian network.

Individuals, markets, diversity – Norwegian libertarianism?

In this section, I will analyse a selection of Jan Arild Snoen and Lars Peder Nordbakken's publications. I will treat them separately, starting with Nordbakken, before briefly discussing them together. As briefly touched upon above, Nordbakken wrote a short piece in the first issue of *Ideer om frihet*, named 'La ideene spres' ('Let the ideas spread'), in which he expressed a wish to establish a point of contact between like-minded libertarians in Norway. He advocated for an active dissemination of libertarian ideas, much in the spirit of Hayek and the MPS and the libertarian movement at large. Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that he used the words 'libertarianisme' and 'libertarianistisk' as opposed to the more mainstream 'liberalisme' and 'liberalistisk' (Nordbakken 2001 [1980]). If not simply to be provocative,

by making use of the former pair, Nordbakken brings to mind the USA, and by also referencing libertarian actors either from the USA or associated with the American libertarian movement, such as Hayek, Mises, Friedman, Rothbard, Leonard Read and Israel Kirzner, it is clear where these ideas are to come from. Curiously enough, in many of his later writings, Nordbakken has made use of the latter pair instead.

In 1990, he co-wrote the report *Kultur uten politikk – Kamp for verdier i et fritt samfunn* (*Culture without politics – The struggle for values in a free society*) with Hans Chr. Garmann Johnsen and Sigmund Knag at FUI. In Nordbakken's contribution, he advocated for a liberal perspective on cultural policy, i.e., open, free from political control, voluntary and based on private efforts (Nordbakken 1990: 31). He accused the Norwegian government of pursuing a 'state expansionist cultural policy' in which personal freedom and responsibility were reduced in favour of state control, thus taking away personal engagement and private initiative (ibid.: 33). This limited diversity in the cultural sector (ibid.: 34), as artists were forced to appeal to those who could pay, i.e., the government, instead of the audience they were supposed to serve (ibid.: 36). He rejected the notion that private cultural production in a free society necessarily had to be profit-oriented and suggested giving '[…] control of the cultural sector back to individuals by virtue of their freedom to supply and demand cultural goods as individuals […]' (ibid.: 36-37). As such, Nordbakken suggested that a market for the cultural sector based on consumer choice and voluntary trade would promote tolerance and respect for minorities, which could not be prioritised in a state-controlled system (ibid.: 38).

The year after, in 1991, he wrote an analysis at FUI named *Krisen i norsk økonomi* (*The crisis in the Norwegian economy*) in which he attempted to explain a downturn in growth in the Norwegian economy in the period 1987-1991, a period which saw strong growth in the international economy, and which Nordbakken claimed was the result of '"systemic failure" that for a long time has characterised the economic policies that changing socialist and conservative governments have pursued.' (Nordbakken 1991: 3). It was 'a crisis of interventionism, made possible by political power over the central bank and characterised by strong inflationary monetary and credit policies in the preceding years. In other words, it was by no means a consequence of free market forces or inherent tendencies in a market-economic society (ibid.: 59). His solution, as well as his explanation, was explicitly based on Austrian economics

and included a stable monetary framework, i.e., a monetary system protected from political manipulation, and a vitalised supply side in the economy, by prioritising free markets, free trade, lower taxes, and a smaller public sector as well as liberal reforms that would enable a change in attitudes and values that would promote so-called material and cultural value creation (ibid.: 60).

In *Muligheter for alle* (*Opportunities for everyone*) published at Civita in 2006, Nordbakken discussed potential economic challenges, especially in relation to globalisation, and how future growth would depend on how the Norwegian economy would manage market dynamics, entrepreneurship, and innovation in an increasingly open and dynamic world (Nordbakken 2006: 12). According to Nordbakken, the Norwegian economy was driven by innovation and its productivity, and to achieve economic growth, growth in productivity was needed. This could be achieved through three areas within the framework of a liberal market economy: competition and market dynamics, innovation and productive creativity, and institutions and values (ibid.: 16). These values included '[…] liberality, toleration, independence, civilian courage, and the will to take personal responsibility.' (ibid.: 251). Values was also a recurring topic in Snoen's publications.

In 1989, Snoen published the report *Privatisering av kommunale tjenester* (*Privatisation of municipal services*) at the Progress Party's Research Institute in which he argued that '[...] private management is significantly cheaper than having the public sector do it.' (Snoen 1989: 4). The report was meant to be a general introduction to '[...] the wave of privatisation we are witnessing today and its practical results.' (ibid.: 5). In the report he refers to privatisation as a relatively new term at the time, associated particularly with Margaret Thatcher's policies in the United Kingdom, and based on public choice theory and its study of bureaucracy, invoking such names as Gordon Tullock and James M. Buchanan, but curiously enough not William Niskanen, despite discussing the budget-maximising model (see Niskanen 1973). He argued that through its incentives, the private sector could more efficiently manage municipal services through competition on the market (Snoen 1989a: 8-9). The same year, Snoen also published a report on the privatisation of airports in Norway. In this report, *Privat flyplass* (*Private airport*) his main argument was that building a new main airport would involve significant risk, and by letting private actors handle it, avoid risking the taxpayers' money (Snoen 1989b: 5, 55).

In a 1999 article in *Ideer om frihet*, Snoen attempted to explain the difference and points of intersection between liberalism and conservatism. The article implicitly criticised the current developments in the Progress Party, and, more importantly, justified him joining the Conservative Party, which he described as liberal conservative. The criticism in the article was not aimed at the latter, but rather at the Christian Democrats (No. *Kristelig Folkeparti*), the Centre Party (No. *Senterpartiet*) and of course the Progress Party (Snoen 2001 [1999]: 207-8). By focusing on liberalism versus another ideology, the article clearly fleshed out Snoen's understanding of liberalism. According to Snoen, the fundamental principles of liberalism were the freedom of the individual (both politically and economically), democracy, and the rule of law. Liberalism had a favourable attitude to change (through trial and error and with a lot of diversity), was driven by individual choices and based on meritocracy and not inherited privileges. Liberalism promoted voluntary communities (not an atomised society) that individuals chose to enter themselves. This was in opposition to conservative, involuntary 'automatic communities', e.g., neighbourhood, family, class, nation, and gender, which Snoen described as 'tribalist', and which was the reason for opposition to immigration and immigrants. Furthermore, liberalism and conservatism agreed in their opposition to value pluralism but not on which values that were important. According to Snoen, libertarians supported a few values that made a free society possible, i.e., respect for life, property, and liberal freedoms. Lastly, the market was inherently moral, as it was based on voluntariness (ibid.: 208-12).

Snoen was editor of and main contributor to the 2004 book *Åpen verden: et forsvar for globaliseringen* (*Open world: a defence of globalisation*) at Civita. His motivation for writing it was '[...] to create a counterbalance to the very much one-sidedly negative picture of globalisation that many hold by presenting the best and newest of the extensive research on the topic.' (Snoen 2004: 7). Snoen challenged the fact that the critics of globalisation embraced 'cultural globalisation', i.e., the spread of 'Western' ideas such as democracy, human rights, free speech, environmental protection, and opposition to discrimination based on gender, race, religion, sexual orientation, and so on, but rejected (global) economic integration. Snoen claimed, conversely, that the two were necessarily connected – you could not have the one without the other (ibid.: 162-93). 'There are degrees of globalisation, and nation-states have great freedom in choosing what they wish to take part in, as long as they are willing to pay the price, for example in the form of lower economic growth or reduced opportunity for innovation and

technological development.' (ibid.: 197). A world with less globalisation, i.e., liberal market economy, would be a world in which states got more power at the expense of the individual, a less democratic world, a less diverse world, and more corrupt and perhaps even polluted world (ibid.: 207).

Although these are different types of texts, from practical reports to philosophical and ideological exegeses, albeit always with intentions of advocating or explaining a libertarian perspective, as a basis, they say that the individual was the most important unit in a free society based on an open market in which participation had to be voluntary; these concepts stayed the same throughout their publications, either explicitly or implicitly, and should thus be understood as core concepts. Snoen also posited that democracy and rule of law were fundamental principles of liberalism and must, as such, likewise necessarily be understood as core concepts. Diversity was understood as a positive phenomenon and was, among other things, viewed in connection with globalisation and immigration, but also culture, fostering tolerance and respect for minorities. These more value-based concepts can be understood as adjacent and were clearly understood by Nordbakken and Snoen to foster the necessary culture for a libertarian society. These socially libertarian arguments, if you will, were of course accompanied by economically libertarian arguments, based on competition, innovation, privatisation, property rights, choice, and so on, which also takes an adjacent position. Especially Snoen seems to have advocated for ideas and values that stand in stark contrast to the anti-immigrant sentiment of the current Progress Party, but also Nordbakken, despite his obvious focus on economic issues, focused on such values as toleration and diversity in most of his works. Nordbakken and Snoen represent a Norwegian libertarianism that embraces the economic as well as the social aspects of the ideology and challenges the idea that libertarianism is a right-wing doctrine (van der Vossen 2019). However, as Doherty's book on the American Libertarian movement shows, and my network analysis suggests, the movement is immensely diverse and has gone in many different directions, some progressive, some moderate, and others reactionary and perhaps even dangerous (see Tromp 2018).

Conclusion

In this article I have shed light on the making of the modern, Norwegian libertarian movement. The story of this movement started in 1973 with the establishment of ALP, continued in the Progress Party

and the introduction of the youth wing and its ideological approach to libertarianism. In the Progress Party's Youth, despite constant conflict with the other wings of the party, young libertarians were able to exchange ideas and make connections with other like-minded people. At the same time as the libertarians' hold on the Progress Party was beginning to diminish, the old, infamous stronghold of libertarianism in Norway, Libertas, renewed itself under their new name LIFO. Several actors in the libertarian diaspora from the Progress Party later obtained positions at LIFO and the LIFO-financed libertarian think tank Civita, which has great influence in Norwegian society today and has shaken off the bad reputation that once surrounded Libertas, and the liberal-conservative magazine *Minerva*. Developing a populist, anti-immigrant platform, the Progress Party became uninhabitable for the ideologically pure libertarians. They are today for all intents and purposes independents in the mainstream political landscape but not necessarily on the fringes, influencing politics and policies in other ways.

Bibliography:

- Bjørklund, Tor 2003: 'Fremskrittspartiet gjennom 30 år'. *Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift* 20, no. 2, pp. 129-144.
- ———— 2007: 'Fremskrittspartiets suksess og kulturelle standardisering'. *Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift* 24, no. 2, pp. 151-165.
- Doherty Brian 2006: *Radicals for Capitalism: A Freewheeling History of the Modern American Libertarian Movement*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Freeden, Micheal 2003: *Ideology: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Holbek, Sindre Lunde 2014: '"Det er forskjell på å drive en politisk sekt og et politisk parti": En analyse av Fremskrittspartiets liberalistiske ideologi i perioden 1984-1994'. Master's thesis, University of Oslo.
- Knag, Sigmund 2001: 'Hvordan begynner det?'. Jan Arild Snoen (ed.): *Liberalisme på norsk: Ideer om frihet, 1980-2000*. Oslo: Ideer om frihet.
- Innset, Ola 2020: *Markedsvendingen: Nyliberalismens historie i Norge*. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget.
- Langeteig, Svein 2020: 'Den Norske stiftelsen Libertas: Påvirkning på den politiske utviklingen i Norge i 1947-1960'. Master's thesis, University of Oslo.
- Marsdal, Magnus 2004: 'UH-leder er med i Frp-avlegger'. *Klassekampen*, 14 June.
- Mydske, Per Kristen, Dag Harald Claes, and Amund Lie (eds.) 2007: *Nyliberalisme: ideer og politisk virkelighet*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
- Nash, George H. 2006: *The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America since 1945*. Wilmington, DE: Intercollegiate Studies Institute.

- Niskanen, William 1973: *Bureaucracy: Servant or Master? – Lessons from America*. London: The Institute of Economic Affairs.
- Nordbakken, Lars Peder 1990: 'Om statlig fortregning av privat kulturinnsats: Et liberalt perspektiv på grunnleggende spørsmål i kulturdebatten'. Jan Arild Snoen (ed.): *Kultur uten politikk: Kamp for verdier i et fritt samfunn*. Oslo: Fremskrittspartiets Utredningsinstitutt.
- ———— 1991: *Krisen i norsk økonomi: Et resultat av feilslått økonomisk politikk eller frie markedskrefter?* Oslo: Fremskrittspartiets Utredningsinstitutt.
- ———— 2001: 'La ideen spres'. Jan Arild Snoen (ed.): *Liberalisme på norsk: Ideer om frihet, 1980-2000*. Oslo: Ideer om frihet.
- ———— 2006: *Muligheter for alle: Dynamisk vekst i en liberal markedsøkonomi*. Oslo: Civita.
- ———— (ed.) 2007: *Idégrunnlag*. Oslo: Liberalt forskningsinsitutt (LIFO).
- ———— 2008: 'Nye perspektiver på den evige liberalismen: fra en intellektuell renessanse til en ny samfunnskraft'. *Tre essays om liberalismen*. Oslo: Civita.
- Plehwe, Dieter 2009: 'Introduction'. Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe (eds.): *The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Sejersted, Francis 2011: *The Age of Social Democracy: Norway and Sweden in the Twentieth Century*. Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- Snoen, Jan Aril 1989a: *Privatisering av kommunale tjenester: Teori, praksis og taktikk*. Oslo: Fremskrittspartiets Utredningsinstitutt.
- ———— 1989b: *Privat flyplass: et realistisk alternativ*. Oslo: Fremskrittspartiets Utredningsinstitutt.
- ———— 2001: 'Liberalisme og konservatisme: allierte og rivaler'. Jan Arild Snoen (ed.): *Liberalisme på norsk: Ideer om frihet, 1980-2000*. Oslo: Ideer om frihet.
- ———— 2004: *Åpen verden: Et forsvar for globaliseringen*. Oslo: Civita.
- Sørensen, Øystein 1986: *Ideer om frihet*. Oslo: Cappelen.
- Tromp, Carline 2018: 'Trollene som ikke sprakk: et forsøk på kart og kompass til alt-right'. *Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift* 35, no. 2, pp. 178-189.

Websites:

(I have produced and provided permanent links/snapshots for all webpages visited using the Wayback Machine in case any of them are edited or removed in the future.)

- Christensen, Per Aage Pleym 2006: 'Kollektiv ledelse i FRIdemokratene'. *Liberaleren*, 9 October. Snapshot from 22.11.2021.

https://web.archive.org/web/20211121230120/https://www.liberaleren.no/2006/10/09/kollekti
v-ledelse-i-fridemokratene/.

- Garvik, Olav n.d.: 'Vegard Martinsen'. *Store norske leksikon*. Last modified 13.01.2022/snapshot from
  03.09.2022. https://web.archive.org/web/20220903153728/https://snl.no/Vegard_Martinsen.
- Mosfjell, Bent Johan 2004: 'Snoen tildelt FRIhetsprisen 2004'. *Liberaleren*, 19 June. Snapshot
  from 21.11.2021.
  https://web.archive.org/web/20201206012819/https://www.liberaleren.no/2004/06/19/snoen-
  tildelt-frihetsprisen-2004/.
- Nordbakken, Lars Peder 2020: 'Hvem utfordrer virkeligheten?'. *Morgenbladet*, 2 September.
  Snapshot from 03.09.2022.
  https://web.archive.org/web/20220903153457/https://www.morgenbladet.no/ideer/debatt/20
  20/09/02/hvem-utfordrer-virkeligheten/.
- LIFO n.d: 'Liberalt Forskningsinstitutt – LIFO'. Snpshot from 04.09.2022.
  https://web.archive.org/web/20220904135628/http://www.lifo.no/index.php?sideID=5&ledd
  1=4.
- Stortinget n.d.: 'Lunde, Heidi Nordby (1973-)'. Snapshot from 22.11.2021.
  https://web.archive.org/web/20211104164209/https://stortinget.no/no/Representanter-og-
  komiteer/Representantene/Representant/?perid=HENL.
- Torgersen, Hans O. 2016: 'Snoen har meldt seg ut, men Høyre får fortsatt stemmen hans'.
  Aftenposten, 7 June. Snapshot from 22.11.2021.
  https://web.archive.org/web/20211121233236/https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/OQJVV/sn
  oen-har-meldt-seg-ut-men-hoeyre-faar-fortsatt-stemmen-hans.
- Tvedt, Knut Are and Stig Arild Pettersen n.d.: 'Tor Mikkel Wara'. *Store norske leksikon*. Snapshot from
  22.11.2021/last modified 18.01.2021.
  https://web.archive.org/web/20211121232433/https://snl.no/Tor_Mikkel_Wara.
- Vossen, Bas van der 2019: 'Libertarianism'. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Last modified
  28.01.2019. /snapshot from 22.11.2021.
  https://web.archive.org/web/20211019085638/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/libertarianism
  /.
- Venstre n.d.: 'Lars Peder Nordbakken'. Snapshot from 22.11.2021.
  https://web.archive.org/web/20211121233559/https://www.venstre.no/person/lars-peder-
  nordbakken/.

EN KONSERVATIV KONSERVERING AF KLIMAET?

En undersøgelse af konservatismens diskursive, ideologiske og historiske forhold til menneskeskabte klimaforandringer

Af:
Christian Egholm Hattens
Historie

ABSTRACT: This paper examines the strategy undertaken by the conservative climate sceptic countermovement to counter the scientific consensus on human caused climate change. It focuses on revealing the power of the discursive production of knowledge by conservative actors in spreading misinformation to the media, powerful institutions, and the public. The paper examines the reasons behind this strategy and argues that, apart from economic reasons, both historical and ideological factors within conservatism can help explain this behavior. Lastly, the paper discusses, in a theoretical sense, whether conservatism can ever be reconciled with a conservation of the climate, and, in a practical sense, obstacles, such as climate skeptical discourses, for a conservative pro-climate movement to succeed politically.

NØGLEORD: Climate Change Discourse, Ideological behavior of Conservatism, Power of Corporate America, Conservatism- and Liberalism's relationship to nature.

Indledning

Den 23. juni 1988 præsenterede NASA forskeren James Hanson sine forskningsresultater om globale klimaforandringer til den amerikanske Kongres. Han konkluderede, at jordens temperatur var varmere end nogensinde før, at der var en tydelig kausalsammenhæng til drivhuseffekten, og deraf større sandsynlighed for naturkatastrofer (CENR 1988: 39; Hanson m.fl. 1988). Denne artikel handler ikke om videnskaben bag klimaforandringer, men om modreaktioner til ideen om menneskeskabte klimaforandringer, der dukkede op i 1990'erne. En central modreaktion kom fra et magtfuldt netværk bestående af olieselskaber, konservative tænketanke og politikere, som aktivt modarbejdede klimavidenskaben gennem skabelsen og udbredelsen af klimaskeptiske diskurser. Denne bevægelse, under betegnelsen 'den konservative klimaskeptiske modbevægelse' (KKM)[1], menes blandt andet at have spillet en afgørende rolle i Bush administrationens opposition til CO_2-afgifter og restriktioner på fossile brændstoffer, den republikanske *takeover* af Kongressen i 1994 samt senatets blokering af Kyoto protokollen i 1997 (Dunlap & McCright 2003: 368).

KKM har haft en todelt men samhørig diskursiv strategi: Den har enten benægtet eller nedtonet ideen om menneskeskabte klimaforandringer, og som supplement til dette har bevægelsen selv produceret klimaskeptisk videnskab og stået for udbredelsen af dette i mediebilledet og i den politiske arena. Bevægelsen har haft succes med at skabe tvivl hos omverdenen om menneskeskabte klimaforandringer (Dunlap & Brulle 2015: 301). En kortlægning fra mediet Business Insider viser, at op mod 129 republikanske kongresmedlemmer fra Trump-administrationen er noteret for enten at have afvist eller nedtonet den videnskabelige konsensus om menneskeskabte klimaforandringer (Cranley 2019). Blandt befolkningen er tendensen den samme. En undersøgelse af Pew Research Center fra 2019 peger på, at op imod 45% af konservative republikanske vælgere ikke, eller meget lidt, tror på menneskeskabte klimaforandringer (Funk & Hefferon 2019).

---

[1] Bestående af de klimaskeptiske aktører der har forbindelse til konservative kræfter.

Forskere som Aaron M. McCright, Riley E. Dunlap, Naomi Oreskes, Geoffrey Supran og Robert J. Brulle har analyseret KKMs magtnetværk med fokus på konservative tænketanke og olieselskabers rolle heri. I denne artikel, vil jeg supplere denne forskning gennem en idehistorisk og filosofisk analyse af konservatismen, herunder dets ambivalente forhold til videnskab og natur.

Med afsæt i Michael Freedens teori om konservatisme og John Lockes forståelse af naturen, vil jeg forsøge at danne en forbindelse mellem de diskurser, KKM har været medskaber af, og de historiske og ideologiske aspekter af den amerikanske konservatisme, som har bidraget til modviljen mod klimavidenskaben. Dette vil lede til en diskussion af konservatisme[2] som ideologi, og hvorvidt denne både i et praktisk og ideologisk perspektiv kan forenes med en konservering af klimaet.

Erhvervsamerika og dets diskursive strategi

Jeg vil starte med at knytte et par kommentarer til begrebet 'diskursiv strategi' og 'modbevægelse'. Med diskurser følger jeg Chris Weedons fortolkning af Michel Foucaults diskursbegreb. Diskurser er:

> Ways of constituting knowledge (…). Discourse transmits and produces power; it undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it. (Weedon 1987: 105-108).

Diskurser er således måder at konstituerer viden på, som indebærer evnen til at transmittere og producere magt. Man kan anskue diskurser som medformer til dispositiver, der foreskriver bestemte måder at forstå og agere i verden på (Raffnsøe & Gudmand-Høyer 2004: 9). Samfundet kan her siges at bestå af et, eller flere, sandhedsregime(r), som indbefatter de diskurser, der accepteres som sandhed. Det strategiske element er de specifikke måder, hvorpå aktører forsøger at etablere en bestemt diskurs som sandhed ved at udfordre og udøve magt over andre diskurser. Dette sker f.eks. ved at 'frame', underminere eller benægte den etablerede 'sandhed'. Den diskursive strategi kan derfor forstås som et led i en kamp om sandheden. (Rabinow 1984: 73-74). Dette harmonerer med

---

[2] 'Konservatisme' refererer i artiklen udelukkende til amerikanske varianter.

definitionen af en 'modbevægelse'. Dette er en bevægelse, der opstår som en modreaktion til en anden social bevægelse, og som forsøger at opretholde 'status quo' ved at dominere mediebilledet og modarbejde den anden parts interesser gennem konkurrerende alternative diskurser (Meyer & Staggenbord 1996: 1632; Lo 1982: 119; Brulle 2014: 683). Afsnittet vil her i mindre grad være en egentligt diskursanalyse af de konkrete repræsentationer[3], men i stedet give et kort indblik i den eksisterende forsknings analyser af det magtnetværk, som har anvendt den diskursive strategi. Det er denne strategi, vi i senere afsnit forsøger at forstå i et historisk og ideologisk perspektiv.

En central aktør i dette magtnetværk er de institutioner og industrier, som finansierer bevægelsens aktiviteter. Olieindustrien anses for at have været en central aktør i benægtelsen af klimaforandringer i 1990'erne, blandt andet gennem kampagner og økonomisk støtte af klimaskeptiske forskere, tænketanke og bevægelser (Beder 1999; Dunlap & McCright 2003: 368). Robert J. Brulle har kortlagt det netværk af organisationer og industrier, som har finansieret klimaskeptiske institutioner for perioden 2003-2010 og finder, at både donor og modtager udgør kerneaktører i den større konservative bevægelse (Brulle 2014: 691-692). Nogle af disse donorer var del af olieindustrien, som dog stoppede sin økonomiske støtte af klimaskeptisk forskning efter 2007, som følge af offentlig kritik. Ifølge Brulle er det dog umuligt at vide, om den økonomiske støtte også sker i det skjulte gennem f.eks. *donor trusts*, hvis støtte forøges betydeligt i samme periode (Ibid.: 690). For eksempel påstår Union of Concerned Scientist i deres udregninger, at Exxon Mobil har doneret omtrent 37 millioner dollars til klimaskeptiske organisationer i perioden 1998-2019 (Negin 2018). Med hensyn til økonomisk støtte af lovgivningsprocesser relaterede til klimaforandringer i perioden 2000-2016 udgør den amerikanske fossile brændstofindustri som donor den næststørste sektor (Brulle 2018: 296).

Udover økonomisk støtte er bevægelsen også selv med til at producere og formidle klimaskeptiske diskurser. Oreskes og Supran (2017) har undersøgt netop Exxon Mobils klimakommunikation i perioden 1977-2014. Modarbejdelsen af klimadagsordenen indebar et paradoksalt forhold mellem virksomhedens forskning i klimaforandringer og den dertilhørende formidling af den. Oreskes og

---

[3] For en sådan analyse, se (Dunlap & McCright 2000)

Supran finder, at 83% af Exxon Mobils fagfællebedømte klimaforskning i perioden 1977-2014 anerkendte menneskeskabte klimaforandringer, men omvendt udtrykte 81% af deres reklamer tvivl om dette faktum. (Supran & Oreskes 2017: 8-9). Dette er en selektiv produktion og formidling af viden og et eksempel på hvad KKM's diskursive strategi går ud på.

Både den økonomiske støtte og den diskursive strategi lader til at have været gennemtænkt, hvilket olieindustriens modarbejdelse af ratificeringen af Kyoto-protokollen fra 1997 er en indikation på. I et lækket dokument fra et møde organiseret af American Petroleum Institute (API) i 1998 mellem repræsentanter fra en række fossile virksomheder (herunder Exxon Mobil) og visse '"front groups", beskrives en strategisk plan over måder at fremme klimaskeptisk viden på. Det fremgår, at man vil indføre et såkaldt "National Media Relations Program", hvor man på otte forskellige måder vil påvirke medier og journalister, blandt andet ved at "identificere, rekruttere og træne" et forskerhold. Derudover udtrykkes der et ønske om at påvirke kongressen, politikere, embedsmænd, skolelærer og studerende. Desuden beskriver dokumentet, at "man" først kan erklære sejr, når Kyoto-protokollen officielt er blevet besejret.[4] Denne diskursive strategi er ikke en ny opfindelse, men kan spores til debatten om regulering af tobaksindustrien, som Oreskes og Eric Conway har sammenlignet strategien med (Oreskes & Conway 2012).[5]

Tænketanke – et alternativt akademi

Konservative tænketanke anses for at udgøre en central institution indenfor den konservative bevægelse, blandt andet ved at have indflydelse på amerikansk politik, love, kultur og *framing* af politiske debatter (Dunlap & Jacques 2013: 701). Her så vi med Brulles analyse af økonomisk støtte, at der er et gensidigt forhold mellem nogle tænketanke og olieselskaber, som er forbundet gennem delte interesser. Tænketanke som Competitive Enterprise Institute, the Heartland Institute og the CATO Institute har været ledende institutioner i produktionen og transmittering af klimaskeptisk

---

[4] For kilde se, afsnit 'Kilder og rapporter'
[5] Et memo fra et møde mellem de største tobaksselskaber beskriver en næsten identisk strategisk plan som den præsenteret af API (Chapman 1977).

videnskab (Dunlap & Jacques 2013; Dunlap & McCright 2000). I en undersøgelse af 141 klima-
og miljøskeptiske bøger publiceret i 2005 havde 92% af disse forbindelser til konservative
tænketanke. Tilmed havde omkring 72% af undersøgte klimaskeptiske bøger fra perioden 1980-
2010 forbindelser til konservative tænketanke (Dunlap & Jacques 2013: 707).

Denne udbredelse af klimaskeptisk viden har haft succes med at nå ud til medier, befolkning og
politikere. En undersøgelse af de syv største amerikanske nyhedsaviser viste at klimaskeptikere i
perioden 1995, 1996 og 1997 var citeret som ekspertkilde i flere eller samme antal artikler end som
fem af de mest anerkendte klimavidenskabsforskere (Dunlap & McCright 2003: 365). Det vidner
om den succes, klimaskeptiske aktører har haft i at udnytte den såkaldte fairnessdoktrin, der er en
del af "Communications Act" fra 1949, som siger, at medier skal præsentere kontrasterende
synspunkter om kontroversielle emner. Ifølge forskere er fairnessdoktrinen med til at skabe et såkaldt
dueling scientist scenario, hvor medier etablerer en slags falsk dikotomi om et givent emne, hvor de
mest ekstreme positioner holdes op mod hinanden (ibid.: 366).

KKM har også haft succes i at påvirke politikere. En rapport af tænketanken George C. Marshall
Institute (Jastrow et al. 1991) blev præsenteret for og efterlod et stort indtryk på George H.W. Bush
administrationen. Den bestod af udvalgt ('cherry-picked') data fra en artikel af James Hanson fra
1981, og rapporten påstod fejlagtigt, at solen alene og ikke mennesket, stod bag klimaforandringerne
(Oreskes & Conway 2012: 145-146) Ifølge forfatteren, Jastrow, var Marshall-rapporten årsagen til
Bush-administrationens opposition til CO_2-afgifter. Jastrow mente også, at Marshall Instituttet var
en dominerende indflydelse i Det Hvide Hus (Ibid: 147-149).

Dette illustrerer den status som 'alternativt akademi', som konservative tænketanke har opnået i den
offentlige sfære. Konservative tænketanke har formået at etablere sig selv og klimaskeptiske forskere
som 'ekspertkilder', hvilket illustrerer en konkret diskursiv strategi: skabelsen af troværdighed.
Tænketankene har fungeret som talerør for den konservative fløj (og for olieindustrien) og som
modpol til den egentlige akademiske arena (Dunlap & Jacques 2013: 701; Dunlap & McCright

2000, 2003, 2015). Men hvor kommer denne legitimitet fra, og hvorfor er konservative tænketanke bannerførere for klimaskeptisk videnskab?

En historisk skepsis overfor det etablerede

Udbredelsen af konservative tænketanke og den følgende skepsis til klimavidenskaben skal ses i lyset af en historisk konservativ mistro til uddannelsessystemet og forskellige typer af vidensproduktion. I starten af den amerikanske konservatismes udformning i løbet af 1950- og 60erne var der en udbredt mistro til uddannelsessystemet blandt konservative tænkere. Hos konservative libertarianere såsom E. Merril Root (i værket *Collectivism on the Campus*), Henry Regnery og William Buckley (i værket *God and man at Yale*) var man overbevist om, at der var en politisk *bias* i form af en kollektivistisk/socialistisk ånd i uddannelsessystemet og til dels også i medierne. Også traditionalister såsom Richard Weaver, August Hecksner og John Hallowel kritiserede hver især politologer for at have vildledt studerende i en empirisk og positivistisk ånd og dermed forbigået det transcenderende og det traditionelle (Nash 2006: 54-65 & 212-214).

Som modsvar til denne opfattede videnskabelige *bias* oprettede Buckley og Chodorov Intercollegiate Studies Institute (ISI), der i løbet af 1950'erne blev en af de første vidensproducerende konservative organisationer. Derudover var der overordnet enighed, blandt ovenstående samt Russel Kirk og James Burnham, om, at den kollektivistisk indoktrinering i universiteterne også krævede et konservativt nyhedsmedie. Det blev anledningen til oprettelsen af National Review (Ibid: 213-217).

1950- og 60'erne var altså en periode med skepsis overfor etablerede institutioner, som resulterede i både et akademisk modsvar, i form af ISI, og dannelsen af en modpol til medierne i form af National Review (Ibid: 226). Dele af amerikansk konservativ tænkning har altså udviklet sig som en modbevægelse til magtfulde institutioner, hvor kampen mod politiseret viden var i fokus. Men udover kampen mod *bias* i systemet var der også tale om ideologiske kampe indenfor den amerikanske konservatisme (som for eksempel blev debatteret i National Review), der i store træk handlede om, hvad konservatisme egentligt er.

Hvad er konservatisme?

Debatterne manifesterede sig primært i to konservative retninger, henholdsvis traditionalisterne og libertarianerne. Traditionalister mente, at liberalismen havde negligeret individets og samfundets afhængighed af traditioner, vaner og sociale forhold (Nash 2006: 71-76). Libertarianerne mente derimod, at Amerika var bygget på liberalistiske værdier, og at det netop var disse ideer, man skulle forsøge at bevare. Det mente man ikke, at den Burkeanske traditionalistiske konservatisme havde for øje (Ibid: 203-207).

I et mere teoretisk perspektiv mente politologen Samuel Huntington (som skrev i 1950'erne), at konservatismen er en situationel ideologi, der bliver vækket til live af historiske situationer, hvor etablerede institutioner bliver udfordret (Huntington 1957: 455). Dette stemmer overens med politologen Michael Freedens teori om ideologier. Freeden definerer en ideologi ud fra dens morfologiske sammensætning af kernebegreber, tilstødende begreber og perifere begreber. Ifølge Freeden består den konservative morfologi af to uforanderlige kernebegreber, nemlig ideen om organisk forandring og troen på det ekstra-menneskelige (det naturlige). De to begreber komplimenterer hinanden, hvilket ses i kriterierne for organisk forandring;

1. At forandringen sker inden for et afprøvet *framework*.
2. At forandringen ikke går for hurtigt til, at mennesker kan nå at omstille sig til den.
3. At forandringen ikke ødelægger 'gamle' og eksisterende praksisser og institutioner.
4. At forandringen ikke er institueret af et menneskeligt verdensdesign (Freeden 1996: 333).[6]

Kriterierne er forbundet til konservatismens overordnede projekt: forandring for at bevare. Ifølge Freeden er konservatismen passiv i forhold til søgningen efter nye løsninger til sociale problemer. Konservatismen hviler på nutidige og tidligere løsninger, som er kompatible med kriterierne for

---

[6] Menneskets begrænsede viden må ikke bryde med givne opstillede aksiomer, for eksempel anskuelsen af det frie marked som noget ekstra-menneskeligt (naturligt)

organisk forandring (Ibid.: 335). Konservatismen vågner først op i situationer (meget lig Huntington), hvori den organiske forandring er under pres, og man derved er tvunget til at reagere. Konservatismen opererer som et slags spejlbillede, der udvikler antiteser til truslens progressive ideer, men samtidig indoptages og redefineres truslens koncepter til at passe med organisk forandring (Ibid: 336). Denne 'spejlbillede-strategi' beskriver med andre ord konservatismen som en ideologisk modbevægelse, der skabes og forandres som et resultat af dets refleksivitet og modstand mod progressive ideer. Netop denne strategi er central i forståelsen af, hvordan konservatismen har redefineret klimavidenskaben på en sådan måde, at dens implikationer stemmer overens med konservatismens kerne- og tætteste tilstødende begreber. Men hvilke tilstødende begreber bygger konservatismen så på?

For Huntington var konservatisme forbundet til liberalisme, da det var konservatismens formål at beskytte, herunder at konservere, de etablerede liberale og demokratiske institutioner (Huntington 1957: 455, 472 & 473). Filosoffen Frank S. Meyer forsøgte at danne bro mellem traditionalisterne og libertarianerne ved at fokusere på de overordnede principper, som positionerne delte. Dette teoretiske udgangspunkt blev kendt som 'fusionisme' og etablerede sig i 1960'erne som en overordnet konservativ konsensus (Nash 2006: 275). Denne konsensus udmøntede sig i en række fælles principper: troen på en objektiv moralsk orden, på en begrænsning af staten og på forfatningen, og foragten for en statslig håndhævelse af ideologiske mønstre på individet, for centralisering, og for kommunisme (Meyer 2015: 249-253).

Dette giver os en indikation på nogle af de begreber, som konservatisme udspringer fra. Det er fra principperne hos traditionalisterne og libertarianerne, at andre retninger inden for konservatisme, såsom neokonservatisme, paleokonservatisme og det religiøse højre, opstår. Dette er retninger, der også er at finde inden for KKM. Principperne er dog langt fra definitive elementer for ideologien. Det definitive kan kun tilskrives kernebegreberne organisk forandring og det ekstra-menneskelige, i tråd med Freedens teori. Manifestationen af konservatismen er i stedet forandrende (her afhængig af tid og rum) og vil fremstå som en refleksion af de modideologier eller truende ideer, som den pågældende konservatistiske diskurs forsøger at modsvare, jævnfør spejlbillede-strategien. Artiklens

kommende analyse af konservatismen ift. klimaskepticisme skal derfor forstås med forbeholdet, om at alle retninger ikke nødvendigvis passer ind i fortolkningen.

Det konservative eksistensgrundlag under beskydning

Videnskaben kan forstås som en magt på grund af dens evne til at definere et problem. Den symboliserer på den måde en form for progressivitet, idet videnskabelige opdagelser udpensler ny viden, som kan påvirke eksistensgrundlaget for tidligere viden. Af den grund kan videnskab vise sig at udgøre en trussel for ideologier, herunder især konservatismen, idet dennes eksistensgrundlag bygger på allerede etableret viden. KKM's klimaskeptiske strategi giver derfor god mening ud fra Freedens idé om konservatismen som et spejlbillede. For at løse et problem kræver det først, at man anerkender problemet. I stedet benægtes eller redefineres problemet, så det passer med kriterierne for organisk forandring. KKM kan ikke forholde sig til noget, som ikke eksisterer, og på den måde sikres en opretholdelse af de etablerede praksisser, og KKM undgår derfor, at skulle respondere på klimaforandringerne.

Nogle konkrete begreber inden for konservatismen er kommet under beskydning, for eksempel de liberalistiske ideer om minimalstat og laissez-faire, der er tæt placeret op af den konservative kerne. Begreberne er blevet en etableret institution, som nogle konservative er interesseret i at bevare. Forskere refererer her til institutionaliseringen af neoliberalisme, som etablerede en mere omfattende liberal tankegang indenfor konservatisme end den, libertarianerne kæmpede for i 1960erne. Her blev ideer som *anti-government* (minimalstat) og 'markedsfundamentalisme' (*laissez faire*) promoveret af konservative politikere og tænketanke i 1970'erne, hvis succes især manifesterede sig i Ronald Reagans præsidentperiode i 1980'erne (Antonio & Brulle 2011: 196; Bockman 2013: 14; Harvey 2005; Dunlap & McCright 2015: 304). Nogle observatører mener endda, at amerikansk konservatisme har optaget så meget fra den klassiske liberalisme, at konservatisme egentligt kan forstås som klassisk liberalisme blot i forklædning (Micklethwait & Wooldridge 2004: 17).

Disse ideer er dog kommet under voldsomt pres som følge af klimavidenskaben. For det første antyder menneskeskabte klimaforandringer, at et væsentligt princip bag laissez-faire, den selvregulerende mekanisme i det frie marked, har fejlet. Ideen om den usynlige hånd tager paradoksalt nok ikke højde for netop de 'usynlige' eksternaliteter i form af markedets CO_2-udledning. For det andet, så er nogle af de foreslåede løsninger, som miljøbevægelsen har kæmpet for siden 1960'erne (Dunlap & McCright 2015: 305), nemlig globale og statslige restriktioner på det frie marked, en direkte modsætning til ideen om minimal stat. Reguleringer ville være et udtryk for et initieret menneskeligt design og dermed et brud på et af kriterierne for organisk forandring. En accept af klimavidenskaben ville derfor ikke blot være en erkendelse af det frie markeds fejlbarlighed, men vil samtidig have en selvdestruerende effekt på ideen om minimalstat, givet risikoen for regulerende implikationer. KKM's klimaskeptiske strategi (at afvise eller nedtone videnskaben) giver derfor, i et ideologisk perspektiv, god mening. Erkendelsen af klimavidenskabens berettigelse kunne underminere ideologiens eget eksistensgrundlag.

Frygten for environmentalisme – den nye kommunisme?

KKM har benyttet sig af fjendebilleder til at styrke sin position. Brugen af fjendebilleder er interessant, fordi det illustrerer forbindelsen mellem spejlbillede-strategien og den diskursive strategi, som KKM har benyttet sig af. Et fjendebillede (en diskurs) kan forstås som en fjendtlig/negativ repræsentation af 'den anden' sammenlignet med ens egen repræsentation. Fjendebilleder indeholder derfor serier af sammenstillinger, hvor elementer eller koncepter opvejes mod hinanden. Det er, ifølge Jacques Derrida, en central måde at tilskrive mening og identitet på (Hansen 2013: 17). Denne opvejning og positionering er således den samme mekanisme, som er at finde i spejlbillede-strategien. På den måde bliver fjendebilleder en central måde, hvorpå konservatismen skaber sin egen repræsentation, identitet og legitimitet.

Det er med kommunismen som fjendebillede, at konservatismen har forstærket sin værdisætning af individualisme, det frie marked, national suverænitet og minimalstat, og dermed også sin foragt overfor alt, der kan true disse værdier (Freeden 1996: 403). Med den kolde krigs afslutning

dæmpedes frygten for en reel global kommunistisk orden, men de liberalistiske værdier, som konservatismen havde genereret som modsvar til kommunismen, holdt ved. Fjendebilledet var forsvundet og så alligevel ikke. Miljøbevægelsen havde i 1980'erne ført kampagne mod Reagans forsøg på at fjerne reguleringsmekanismer af især miljølovgivninger, og med Earth Summit-mødet i 1992 manifesterede kampen for miljø og klima sig endnu tydeligere (Dunlap & McCright 2015: 305-6). Nogle vil derfor argumentere for, at 'environmentalismen' på nogle punkter erstatter kommunismen som fjendebillede (Ibid: 306; Jacquest et al 2008: 352; Buell 2003: 20).

De to fjendebilleder ligner hinanden på et centralt punkt. Her tænkes der især på de reguleringer som 'environmentalismen' advokerer for. Dette kan i et kommunistisk *framework* tolkes som en slags '*planning'*. Jean-Daniel Collomb har identificeret denne sammenligning af fjendebilleder hos konservative figurer som George F. Will, Steve Milloy og Charles Krauthammer (Collomb 2014: 6). En række af konservatismens mekanismer og værdier står altså i et spændingsforhold til klimavidenskaben og dens implikationer. På trods af dette viser konservatisme sig dog at være tættere forbundet til natur og miljø end man skulle tro. Jeg vil nu undersøge dette forhold nærmere og argumentere for, at tilblivelsen af konservative-liberale værdier er et resultat af et historisk og ideologisk genereret syn på natur og miljø.

Dominant Social Paradigm, *The American Way of Life*, og *Manifest Destiny*

Flere forskere anser værdier som individualisme, privat ejendomsret, troen på ubegrænset økonomisk og teknologisk vækst, materialisme, og minimalstat som en del af et amerikansk 'Dominant Social Paradigm' (DSP). Dette er en betegnelse for en historisk genereret konstellation af værdier og forståelser af det fysiske og sociale miljø, som er dominerende for et samfunds verdenssyn og kernen af dets kulturelle arv (Dunlap & Van Liere 1984: 1014; Shafer 2006: 121).[7] Et todelt vestligt særpræget syn på natur er identificeret som værende grundlaget for DSP-værdier, heriblandt en tro

---

[7] Begrebet skal forstås i tråd med Foucaults sandhedsregime eller Kuhns paradigmeteori. DSP udfordres af andre værdier og diskurser (fra f.eks. miljøbevægelsen), og er således genstand for forandring.

på ubegrænset menneskelig fremskridt og evnen samt retten til at dominere og kontrollere naturen (Catton & Dunlap 1980; Cotgrove 1982). Sådanne syn er i litteraturen kategoriseret som henholdsvis *growthism* og 'antropocentrisme', hvoraf det første menes at være et produkt af industrialiseringen, kapitalisme, neoliberalisme (Douglas 2007; Antonio 2009), mens det andet kan spores tilbage til biblen og tænkning fra oplysningstiden (Dunlap & McCright 2015: 302).

Nogle forskere antyder, at miljø- og klimaproblemer opstår som følge af, at Amerikas DSP blev udformet under en periode med ekstraordinær overflod, hvilket har medført, at DSP-værdierne nu udgør et problem, idet de ikke er forenelige med en periode med miljømæssige begrænsninger (Dunlap & Van Liere 1984: 1014; Pirages 1977). Rent empirisk er der grundlag for denne betragtning. Flere studier har fundet en negativ relation mellem DSP-værdier (såsom privat ejendomsret, troen på materiel og økonomisk vækst og laissez faire) og miljømæssig bekymring, attitude eller holdning til miljøreguleringer (Dunlap & Van Liere 1984: 1018; Buttel & Flinn 1976, 1978; Shafer 2006; Kilbourne et al. 2002).

Forholdet mellem DSP-værdier (her individualisme og troen på ubegrænset vækst) og natur findes ligeledes i det kulturelle fænomen *the American way of life*. Ifølge Jean-Daniel Collomb kan begrebet defineres som den almindelige amerikaners ubegrænset og evigt udvidende evne og ret til at forbruge materielt (Collomb 2014: 9). George H.W. Bush's talsmand udtalte, at det var præsidentens overbevisning, at det var politikernes ansvar at beskytte 'the American way of life'. Konservative politikere, intellektuelle og tænketanke har, som et gennemgående argument, appelleret til, at klimareguleringer vil fører til et kollaps af *the American way of life* og den økonomiske vækst (Ibid.: 9-10).

Det interessante spørgsmål i denne sammenhæng er, hvordan DSP, herunder *the American way of life*, er blevet skabt. I et historisk perspektiv kan der henvises til USA's vestlige ekspansion i det 17. til 19. århundrede over det nordamerikanske kontinent, der især i det 19. århundrede blev motiveret og legitimeret af den kulturelle tro på en gudsbestemt amerikansk skæbne. Denne diskurs blev i 1845 omtalt af journalisten John O'Sulllivan som *Manifest Destiny* (Brulle 2000: 117). Forskeren

Robert J. Brulle har identificeret en række værdier, som kan siges at udgøre essensen af *Manifest Destiny*-diskursen, herunder at det naturlige miljø får dets værdi igennem menneskets udnyttelse af den, og at mennesket har ret til at udnytte en stor og frugtbar natur. Disse værdier, sammen med de liberalistiske ideer om privat ejendomsret og individets rettigheder, blev i en rapport fra 1936 udarbejdet af The Congressional Great Plains Commitee, identificeret som værende nøglekomponenter i den attitude, man mente var blandt årsagerne til de voldsomme støvstorme i 1930'erne. Brulle mener desuden, at denne diskurs stadig eksisterer i samfundet i dag, og at miljøbevægelsen egentligt kan forstås som en direkte protest mod *Manifest Destiny*-diskursen (Ibid.: 115-119).

Der er tilsyneladende en række fællesnævnere vedrørende natursyn mellem DSP, *American way of life*, *Manifest Destiny*-diskursen og konservative-liberale værdier. Dette åbner op for et ubesvaret og afgørende spørgsmål: Hvor kommer disse ideer fra?

John Locke – Udnyttelsen af naturen som eksistensgrundlag for den private ejendomsret

De fællesprincipper om naturen beskrevet foroven kan spores hos en af de største tænkere inden for politisk filosofi og liberalisme, John Locke.[8] Han er blevet kaldt *the father of the Founding Fathers*, på grund af hans indflydelse på konservatives og libertarianeres forståelse af frihed, forfatningen og privat ejendomsret (Freeden 1996: 371). Jeg anser i den sammenhæng Lockes idéer for at have stor værdi for forståelsen af den ideologiske og kulturelle arv, som KKMs syn på natur kan siges at stamme fra. Et af Lockes mest overbevisende argumenter findes i *Second Treatise of Government* kapitel 5 ('of property'), vedrørende hans forståelse af privat ejendomsret. Den private ejendomsret er for Locke rodfæstet i tre universelle uanfægtelige naturlove, og det er igennem disse love, at Lockes forhold til natur kommer til udtryk. Den første naturlov er defineret således:

---

[8] Dele af afsnittet er fra Hattens, C. E. (2019).

> God, who hath given the world to men in common, hath also given them reason to make use of it to the best advantage of life and convenience. The earth and all that is therein is given to men for the support and comfort of their being (Locke 2002: 30).

Locke anser verden som en gave fra gud til menneskeheden, som indebærer en accept af, at verden er til for menneskets behagelighed. Dette stemmer overens med det, Locke kalder den naturlige fornuft (law of nature), at mennesket har retten til dets eget selvopretholdelse. I den sammenhæng har gud pålagt mennesket at anvende dets fornuft til at drage nytte af naturen. Dette stemmer altså overens med den gudgivne rettighed til at ekspandere på det amerikanske kontinent, som vi ser i *Manifest Destiny*-diskursen. Det antydes også, at verden er et fælleseje, hvilket danner grund for den anden naturlov:

> [Y]et every man has a property in his own person (...) the labour of his body and the work of his hands we may say, are properly his. (…) Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the state that nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own (Locke 2002: 31).

Ejerskab opstår gennem kroppens bearbejdelse af naturen, idet naturen på den måde, hvad end det er et stykke land eller et stykke frugt, frigøres fra den fælles natur. Lockes idé om frihed indbefatter derfor en ret for individet til at bearbejde den fælles natur og gøre det til sit eget. Der etableres altså en idé om ejerskab gennem bearbejdning. Dog begrænser Locke ejendomsretten ved at opstille et spild-begreb, som udgør en tredje naturlov.

> As much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils, so much he may by his labour fix a property in (Ibid: 33).

Lockes introduktion af begrebet 'spild' (*spoil*) åbner op for hans ide om bæredygtighed. Individet har i teorien ikke nogle begrænsninger, så længe det formår at drage nytte af den pågældende tilegnelse. I sammenhæng med dette forklarer Locke;

> [H]e wasted not the common stock, destroyed no part of the portion of goods that belonged to others, so long as nothing perished uselessly in his hands (Ibid: 44).

I denne henseende skal et spild ikke forstås som et spild i forhold til naturen, men et spild i forhold til den spildte nytte, som andre mennesker kunne have draget af samme resurse. Locke har altså en idé om bæredygtighed, introduceret med spild-begrebet, men det er bæredygtighed i forhold til en menneskelig nyttemaksimering og ikke en opretholdelse af naturen. Lockes naturbegreb bliver helt konkret udpenslet i hans værdiansættelse af den;

[N]ature and the earth furnished only the almost worthless materials as in themselves (Ibid: 42).

Naturen er værdiløs uden for menneskets udnyttelse af den. Den antropocentriske forståelse af natur, som vi finder i *Manifest Destiny*, DSP og *the American way of life*, kan altså spores i Lockes forståelse af forholdet mellem ejendomsret, frihed og natur. Fællesnævneren er troen på en ubegrænset natur og retten til at udnytte den. Idéen om privat ejendomsret er derudover et centralt komponent i en lang række liberalistiske begreber så som individualisme, frihed, kapitalisme og laissez-faire. På den måde kan man tale om, at amerikansk konservatisme har et naturligt ambivalent forhold til ideen om menneskeskabte klimaforandringer på grund af rødderne til et begreb(er), der forudsætter en uendelig og føjelig natur.

Præmissen om en uendelig og føjelig natur undermineres af klimaforandringerne. Men betyder dette så, at konservatismen er dømt til at modsætte sig klimavidenskaben? På grund af dets 'spejlbillede-karakter' har konservatismen evnen til at forandre sig, og således er en konservativ konservering af klimaet også mulig. Men kan dette lade sig gøre i praksis?

En forandrende ideologi - Grøn-markedskonservatisme

Med hensyn til anskuelsen af KKM som en modbevægelse, så har dele af den konservative bevægelse også forandret sig som modspil til hinanden. En bevægelse, som jeg kalder, grøn-markedskonservatisme, inkorporerer ideen om at konservere klima og miljø indenfor kriterierne for organisk forandring. Filosoffen Roger Scruton omtaler denne idé i bogen *Green Philosophy* fra 2012. For Scruton er konservering en vigtig del af konservatisme, og ikke blot konservering af institutioner og praksisser, men også af materielle og organiske ressourcer. Han gør opmærksom på, at der i det

amerikanske samfund mangler en forståelse for klodens knaphed og begrænsninger, netop fordi der eksisterer en ide om USA's overflod af land og naturlige ressourcer (Scruton 2012: 9-12). Scruton genkender altså forståelsen af natur, som ses ved DSP og *the American way of life*. Han mener tilmed, at reguleringer ikke vil løse noget, idet det ultimativt er forbrugeren, som er skyld i krisen. Derfor er forbrugerne nødt til at forandre sig. Det skal ske ved hjælp af en decentralisering og en styrkelse af den nationale suverænitet. Dette skal føre til en styrkelse af motivet *oikophilia* (kærlighed til hjemmet), som Scruton mener, er en indøvet del af både konservatisme og den menneskelige psyke. Ideen er, at forbrugeren skal føle sig forpligtet til at beskytte sit lokale territorium, og dermed investere i bæredygtige ressourcer.

Løsningen forudsætter dog stadig en vis marginalisering af klimavidenskaben. Han er for det første ikke overbevist om, at menneskelig aktivitet er det afgørende problem, idet en mindskning af menneskets bidrag til klimaforandringerne, "kun ville ændre ét element, som vi ved bidrager til den globale opvarmning" (Scruton 2012: 60-61). Dette går altså imod den videnskabelige konsensus (Oreskes 2004), men styrker til gengæld en markedsbaseret løsning. Skabelsen af *oikophilia* er nemlig et langtidsprojekt, og som Scruton selv siger;

> [W]e are being invited to extract climate change from the pile of our environmental problems and to exalt it above all the others. The effect is to neutralize our rooted and temperate ways (Scruton 2012: 64).

Scrutons løsning opfylder derved alle de fire kriterier for organiske forandring. Løsningen sker inden for et afprøvet *framework* (1), idet han henviser til andre ændringer i miljøet, hvor lokalsamfundet har formået at tilpasse sig (Ibid: 65). Derudover bryder løsningen ikke med menneskets evne til at tilpasse sig (2), idet mennesket har god tid til at omstille sig, eftersom global opvarmning ikke er første prioritet. Også eksisterende institutioner sikres (3), idet løsningen respekterer det frie og lokale marked og redefinerer organiske ressourcer, altså naturen, som en institution der skal konserveres. Der er heller ikke tale om et menneskeligt verdensdesign (4), men i stedet følger forandringen den naturlige udvikling.

Scrutons grøn-markedskonservatisme kan spores hos en række republikanske politikere, så som John R. Kasich og Matt Gaetz, samt hos et par af de største konservative klimaorganisationer, herunder ConserveAmerica og American Conservation Coalition (ACC), som alle mener, at det er konservatismens opgave at passe på planeten (Dembicki 2019; Kasich 2020). Som en respons til det demokratiske klimaudspil *Green New Deal* har ACC i samspil med en række konservative klimavenlige organisationer, herunder 'ConserveAmerica', udsendt sit eget udspil: *American Climate Contract*. Udspillet ønsker en global 100% reduktion af CO_2-udledninger i 2050, med fokus på markedsorienterede løsninger, færre reguleringer, lovforslag der giver bedre rammer for virksomheder til at investere i bæredygtige løsninger og fokus på støtte af lokale områder (American Climate Contract 2022). Udspillet siger ikke noget om hastigheden af disse forandringer, heriblandt eventuelle delmål for CO_2-reduktion, og der forslås ikke en CO_2-afgift. Dette gavner den markedsbaserede løsning, der er forenelig med grøn-markedskonservatisme.

Der er yderligere tegn på, at konservatismen forandrer sig. Statistikker viser, at den yngre generation af republikanere, i modsætning til den ældre generation, i stigende grad ønsker føderale statslige reguleringer til reduktion af landets CO_2-udledninger (Funk & Hefferon 2019). Også visse republikanske politikere (Baker et al. 2020) og bevægelser, såsom Climate Leadership Council, advokerer for en CO_2-afgift på den fossile brændstofindustri (Climate Leadership Council 2022). En sådan foranstaltning udfordrer den begrænsende rolle, som staten rent historisk og ideologisk har haft i konservatismen. Det er interessant, at Exxon Mobil udviser sin støtte til dette udspil. Flere olieselskaber, såsom BP, Shell og ovenfornævnte, har vist sin støtte til Paris-aftalen, længe før Trump trak sig ud af den, og de har officielt anerkendt problemerne ved klimaforandringerne (Milman 2017).

For olieindustrien er der faktisk sket et skift i den diskursiv strategi fra benægtelse til anerkendelse og et fokus på et skift mod grøn energi. Dette bekræfter et studie af olieselskabers nyere klimakommunikation. Det afslører dog samtidig, at de undersøgte selskabers (herunder BP, Shell og Exxon Mobil) egentlige forretningsmodel stadig baserer sig på fossile brændstoffer. Således

konkluderer forskerne, at omverdens kritik af selskaberne for at udføre *greenwashing* er velbegrundet (Li et al. 2022).

Dette bringer mig til en vurdering af de praktiske muligheder for en konservativ politisk løsning af klimakrisen, og dermed også tilbage til afsnittet om den diskursive strategi. Etableringen af en klimaskeptisk diskurs var og er stadig et succesfuldt middel til at undgå globale klimareguleringer, og udgør derfor en udfordring for klimavenlige bevægelser. Men det er ikke længere en *framing*-konkurrence mellem to modpoler: KKM og miljøbevægelsen. Grøn-markedskonservatismen udgør i sig selv en modbevægelse mod KKM. Denne bevægelse udfordrer- og kan potentielt forandre konservatismens politiske og ideologiske ståsted. Flere konservative tænketanke, der førhen benægtede klimaforandringerne, såsom Cato-instituttet, har ændret retning og anerkender nu menneskeskabte klimaforandringer.

Den klimaskeptiske diskurs er dog langt fra blevet elimineret. Tænketanke som Heartland Institute (2022) og American Enterprise Institute (Wallison & Zycher 2021) udfordrer stadig ideen om menneskeskabte klimaforandringer, og selvom Cato-instituttet anerkender menneskeskabte klimaforandringer, så virker det til, at de undervurderer tidshorisonten for handling. Ifølge tænketanken er der "rigeligt med tid" (Cato Institute 2022). Tid er vigtig i forhold til udviklingen af fremtidige teknologier, og derfor er det heller ikke overraskende, at nogle 'klimavenlige' konservative organisationer (inklusive Scruton) italesætter en længere tidshorisont for handling. Fokusset på fremtidige teknologiske løsninger er dertil foreneligt med troen på det frie marked, og fungerer derfor som en selvforstærkende effekt. IPCC mener også, at teknologier er vigtige, men adresserer samtidig i deres seneste rapport fra 2022, at de næste år er kritiske og at en reduktion for eksempel af den fossile brændstof-sektor er afgørende (IPCC Working Group III 2022). Med dette in mente kræver det derfor en paradoksal dobbelt *framing* for at grøn-markedskonservatisme kan få legitimitet og gennemslagskraft.

På den ene side er det essentielt, at man går imod KKM's traditionelle diskurs og i stedet anerkender videnskaben, idet grøn-markedskonservatismen hviler på en anerkendelse af dette. På den anden

side er det lige så essentielt, at man samtidig går imod IPCC's 'kortere' tidshorisont, idet bevægelsen hviler på langsigtede innovative markeds løsninger.

Modsætningen og ligheden mellem grøn-markedskonservatisme og KKM har dermed demonstreret konservatismens foranderlige karakter. Konservatismen skaber helt naturligt diskurser, på grund af dets 'spejlbillede-strategi', der gør den i stand til at optage og redefinerer truslers koncepter og ideer. I den forstand er det blevet gjort klart, at det frie marked stadig udgør et vigtigt tilstødende begreb, idet begge bevægelser holder fast i den idé. Dog mener flere yngre republikanere, at den føderale regering bør gøre mere, og dermed kunne det tænkes, at den konventionelle rolle som staten har haft i konservatismen, bliver udfordret i fremtiden. I sidste ende er kampen for (eller imod) klimaet en kamp om diskurser og sandhed, en kamp om skabelsen, udvælgelsen og formidlingen af magt og viden(skab), der understøtter ideologiske og politiske mål.

Litteraturliste

- Antonio, Robert J. & Robert J. Brulle 2011: "The Unbearable Lightness of Politics: Climate Change Denial and Political Polarization." *Sociological Inquiry*, 52, s. 195–202.
- Beder, Sharon 1999: "Corporate hijacking of the greenhouse debate". *The Ecologist*, 29(2), s. 119-122
- Brulle, Robert J. 2000: *Agency, democracy, and nature: the U.S. environmental movement from a critical theory perspective*. The MIT Press.
- Brulle, Robert J. 2014: "Institutionalizing delay: foundation funding and the creation of U.S. climate change counter-movement organizations". *Climate Change,* 122(4), s. 681-694
- Brulle, Robert J. 2018: "The climate lobby: a sectoral analysis of lobbying spending
- on climate change in the USA, 2000 to 2016". *Climate Change,* 149, s. 289-303
- Bockman, Johanna 2013: "Neoliberalism". *Contexts,* 12, s. 14–15.
- Buell, Frederick 2003: *From Apocalypse to Way of Life: Environmental Crisis in the American Century.* Taylor & Francis Group.
- Buttel, Frederick H. & William L. Flinn 1976: "Economic Growth versus the Environment: Survey Evidence," *Social Science Quarterly*, 57, s. 410-20.
- Buttel, Frederick H. & William L. Flinn 1978: "The Politics of Environmental Concern: The Impacts of Party Identification and Political Ideology on Environmental Attitudes". *Environment and behavior,* 10, s. 17-36
- Catton, William R. Jr., & Riley E. Dunlap 1980: "A New Ecological Paradigm for Post-Exuberant Sociology." *American Behavioral Scientist,* 24, s. 15–47.

- Chapman, Simon 1997: ""Industry Watch: "Vast Sums of Money... to Keep the Controversy Alive"": The 1988 BAT Memo." *Tobacco Control*, 6(3), s. 236-239.
- Collomb, Jean-Daniel 2014: "The Ideology of Climate Change Denial in the United States". *European journal of American studies*, s. 1-20.
- Cotgrove, Stephen 1982: *Catastrophe or Cornucopia: The Environment, Politics and the Future.* John Wiley & Sons, New York.
- Douglas, Richard 2007: "Growthism and the Green Backlash". *Political Quarterly,* 78, s. 547–555.
- Dunlap, Riley. E., & Aaron M. McCright 2000: "Challenging Global Warming as a Social Problem: An Analysis of the Conservative Movement's Counter-Claims". *Social Problems*, 4(47), s. 499-522.
- Dunlap, Riley. E. & Aaron M. McCright 2003: "Defeating Kyoto: The Conservative Movement's Impact on U.S. Climate Change Policy". *Social Problems*, 3(50), s. 348-373.
- Dunlap, Riley. E & Peter J. Jacques 2013: "Climate Change Denial Books and Conservative Think Tanks: Exploring the Connection." *American Behavioral Scientist*, 6(57), s. 699-731.
- Dunlap, Riley. E., & Kent. D. Van Liere 1984: "Commitment to the Dominant Social Paradigm and Concern for Environmental Quality". *Social science quarterly*, 65(4), s. 1013-1028.
- Dunlap, Riley. E. & Robert J. Brulle 2015: *Climate Change and Society: Sociological Perspectives.* Oxford University Press
- Foucault. Michel 1982: "The Subject and Power." *Critical Inquiry,* 8(4). s. 777-795
- Freeden, Michel 1996: *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach*. Oxford. Oxford University Press.
- Hansen, Lene 2013: *Security as practice: Discourse analysis and the Bosnian war.* Routledge
- Hansen, James, I. Fung, A. Lacis, D. Rind, S. Lebedeff, R. Ruedy, G. Russell, P. Stone 1988: "Global Climate Changes as Forecast by Goddard Institute for Space Studies Three-Dimensional Model." *Journal of Geophysical Research,* 93(8) s. 9341-9364.
- Harvey, David 2005: *A Brief History of Neoliberalism.* Oxford. Oxford University Press.
- Hattens, Christian. E. 2019 [upubliceret universitetsopgave]: "John Lockes Naturbegreb". I Christian. E. Hattens, Mikkel. K. Nielsen, & Mikkel. Winther: *Skriveøvelse i PT1*, Københavns Universitet, s. 3-7
- Huntington, Samuel P. 1957: "Conservatism as an Ideology". *American Political Science Review*, 51(2), s. 454-473.
- Jacques, Peter J., Riley E. Dunlap & Mark Freeman 2008: "The organisation of denial: Conservative think tanks and environmental skepticism." *Environmental Politics*, 17(3) s. 349-385.
- Jastrow, Robert, William Nierenberg & Frederick Seitz 1991: "Global warming: What does the science tell us?" *Energy, Elsevier*, 16(11), s. 1331-1345
- Kehoe, Alice B. 2014: "Manifest Destiny as the Order of Nature". i Philip L. Kohl, Irina Podgorny & Stefanie Gänger: *Nature and Antiquities: The Making of Archaeology in the Americas*, University of Arizona Press
- Kilbourne, William E., Suzanne C. Beckmann & Eva Thelen 2002: "The role of the dominant social paradigm in environmental attitudes: a multinational examination", *Journal of business research,* 55(3), s. 193-204.

- Li, Mei., Gregory Trencher & Jusen Asuka 2022: "The clean energy claims of BP, Chevron, ExxonMobil and Shell: A mismatch between discourse, actions and investments". *PLoS ONE,* 17(2)
- Lo, Clarence Y. H. 1982: "Countermovements and Conservative Movements in the Contemporary U.S.". *Annual Review of Sociology,* 8, s. 107-134.
- Locke, John 2002: *Second Treatise of Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration,* Dover Publications.
- Meyer, David S. & Suzanne Staggenborg 1996: "Movements, Countermovements, and the structure of Political Opportunity". *American Journal of Sociology.* The University of Chicago Press.
- Meyer, Frank S. 2015: *What Is Conservatism?* ISI Books,Wilmington.
- Micklethwait, John & Adrian Wooldridge 2004: *The Right Nation: Conservative Power in America.* Penguin Press, New York.
- Mooney, Chris 2005: *The Republican war on science.* Basic Books, New York.
- Nash, George H. 2006: *The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America since 1945.* ISI Books, Wilmington.
- Oreskes, Naomi 2004: "Beyond the Ivory Tower: The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change" *Science,* 306(5702), s. 1686.
- Oreskes, Naomi & Erik M. Conway 2012: *Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming.* Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, London.
- Pirages, Dennis Clark. 1977: "Introduction: A Social Design for Sustainable Growth:' I D. C. Pirages, ed., *The Sustainable Society* (New York: Praeger): s. 1-13.
- Rabinow, Paul 1984: *The Foucault Reader.* Pantheon, New York.
- Raffnsøe, Sverre., Marius T. Gudmand-Høyer & Morten S. Thaning 2008: *Foucault.* Samfundslitteraturen
- Raffnsøe, Sverre. & Marius. T. Gudmand-Høyer 2004: *Michel Foucaults historiske dispositivanalyse.* Department of Management, Politics and Philosophy, CBS. MPP Working Paper No. 11/2004
- Scruton, Roger 2012: *Green Philosophy - How to think Seriously about the Planet.* Atlantic Books, London.
- Supran, Geoffrey & Naomi Oreskes 2017: "Assessing ExxonMobil's climate change communications (1977-2014)". *Environmental research letters,* s. 1-18.
- Weedon, Chris 1987: *Feminist Practice and Poststructuralist Theory* (2. ed.). Blackwell, Oxford.

Hjemmesider

- American Climate Contract. "What does the American Climate Contract look like in action?". *Climate solutions.* Benyttet 31. august 2022 fra https://www.climatesolution.eco/climate-contract-in-action
- American Climate Contract. "FAQS". *Climate Solutions. Benyttet 30. oktober 2022 fra https://www.climatesolution.eco/faqs*

- Baker, James., George P. Schultz & Ted Halstead 2020, 21. juni. "James Baker, George Shultz, Ted Halstead: Carbon fee needed to combat climate change". *Fox News.* Benyttet 31. august 2022 fra https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/climate-change-james-baker-george-schultz-ted-halstead?utm_content=buffer95b61&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer
- Cato Institute. "Global Warming". *Cato.* Benyttet 31. august 2022 fra https://www.cato.org/research/global-warming
- Climate Leadership Council. "Original Co-Authors". *Climate Leadership Council.* Benyttet 31. august 2022 fra https://clcouncil.org/original-plan-co-authors/
- Climate Leadership Council. "The Four Pillars of the Carbon Dividends Plan". *Climate Leadership Council.* Benyttet 31. august 2022 fra https://clcouncil.org/our-solution/
- Cornwall Alliance. "Evangelical Declaration on Global Warming". *Cornwallalliance.* Benyttet 31. august 2022 fra https://cornwallalliance.org/landmark-documents/evangelical-declaration-on-global-warming-2/
- Cranley, Ellen 2019, 29. april. "These are the 130 current members of Congress who have doubted or denied climate change". *Business Insider.* Benyttet 31. august 2022 fra https://www.businessinsider.com/climate-change-and-republicans-congress-global-warming-2019-2?r=US&IR=T
- Dembicki, Geoff 2019, 25. marts. "DC's Trumpiest Congressman Says the GOP Needs to Get Real on Climate Change". *Vice.* Benyttet 31. august 2022 fra https://www.vice.com/en/article/zma97w/matt-gaetz-congress-loves-donald-trump-climate-change
- Funk, Carry & Meg Hefferson 2019, 25. november. "U.S. Public Views on Climate and Energy". *Pew Research center*. Benyttet 31. august 2022 fra https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2019/11/25/u-s-public-views-on-climate-and-energy/
- The Heartland Institute. "Climate change" *The Heartland Institute*. Benyttet 30 oktober 2022 fra https://www.heartland.org/topics/climate-change/
- The Heartland Institute. "Consensus" *The Heartland Institute*. Benyttet 30 oktober 2022 fra https://www.heartland.org/topics/climate-change/consensus/index.html
- IPCC Working Group III 2022: "The evidence is clear: the time for action is now. We can halve emissions by 2030". *The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.* Benyttet 31. august 2022 fra https://www.ipcc.ch/2022/04/04/ipcc-ar6-wgiii-pressrelease/. Rapport tilgås samme sted.
- Kasich, John R. 2020, 3. august. "It's Time for American Leaders to Wake Up to the Threat of Climate Change for the Good of the Planet and Business". *Time.* Benyttet 31. august 2022 fra https://time.com/5873394/take-climate-change-seriously-business/
- Milman, Oliver 2017, 20. juni. "Exxon, BP and Shell back carbon tax proposal to curb emissions". *The Guardian.* Benyttet 31. august 2022 fra https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/jun/20/exxon-bp-shell-oil-climate-change
- Negin, Elliot 2018, 31. august. "Why is ExxonMobil Still Funding Climate Science Denier Groups?". *Union of Concerned Scientists.* Benyttet 31. august 2022 fra https://blog.ucsusa.org/elliott-negin/exxonmobil-still-funding-climate-science-denier-groups/

- Wallison, Peter J. & Benjamin Zycher 2021, 20. september. "What We Really Know About Climate Change". *American Enterprise Institute.* Benyttet 31. august 2022 fra https://www.aei.org/articles/what-we-really-know-about-climate-change

Kilder og rapporter

- "1998 American Petroleum Institute Global Climate Science Communications Team Action Plan" Memo sendt af *Joe Walker.* Benyttet 31. august 2022 fra https://www.climatefiles.com/trade-group/american-petroleum-institute/1998-global-climate-science-communications-team-action-plan/
- Committee on Energy and Natural Resources (CENR). 1988: "Greenhouse Effect and Global Climate Change: Hearing before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. United States Senate. One Hundredth Congress. First Session on the Greenhouse Effect and Global Climate Change. June 23, 1988. Part 2. US Government Printing Office". *Committee on Energy and Natural Resources*
- Exxon Mobil 2021: "ExxonMobil 2020 Worldwide Contributions and Community Investments". Benyttet 31. august 2022 fra https://corporate.exxonmobil.com/-/media/Global/Files/worldwide-giving/2021-Worldwide-Giving-Report.pdf
- Exxon Mobil 2020: "ExxonMobil 2020 Worldwide Contributions and Community Investments". Benyttet 31. august 2022 fra https://corporate.exxonmobil.com/-/media/Global/Files/worldwide-giving/2020-Worldwide-Giving-Report.pdf
- Exxon Mobil 2019: "ExxonMobil 2019 Worldwide Contributions and Community Investments". Benyttet 31. august 2022 fra https://corporate.exxonmobil.com/-/media/Global/Files/worldwide-giving/2019-Worldwide-Giving-Report.pdf
- Exxon Mobil 2018: "ExxonMobil 2019 Worldwide Contributions and Community Investments". Benyttet 31. august 2022 fra https://corporate.exxonmobil.com/-/media/Global/Files/worldwide-giving/2018-Worldwide-Giving-Report.pdf
- Monmouth University 2018: "National: Climate concerns increase; Most republicans now acknowledge climate change - Americans support government action but few see that as likely*. Monmouth University.* Benyttet 31. august 2022 fra https://www.monmouth.edu/polling-institute/documents/monmouthpoll_us_112918.pdf/