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DISTURBING FLOWERS: THE THREE-DIMENSIONAL COLOURS OF CLAUD. *RAPT. PROS.* 2.90-132

By Beatrice Bersani

Summary: Claudian's colourful images have often been studied for their decorative function and as examples of late-antique fragmentary style. More recent scholarship, instead, has proposed that colouring provides coherence to the text through its symbolic meanings. This article analyses the aesthetic and symbolic significance of colourful imagery by differentiating between the three main dimensions of colour: brightness, saturation and hue. The blossoming meadow of Claud. *Rapt. Pros.* 2.90-132 is an ideal case study: a focus on all three colour components highlights that the formal choices and the symbolic meanings are not opposite or separate, but parallel in their fragmentary coherence, and each important for the interpretation of the text. Both the visual effects and the metaphoric charge of Claudian's colourful flowers undermine the idyllic atmosphere of the meadow and foreshadow Proserpina's abduction.

INTRODUCTION

Accumulations of colour-terms characterize the fully-detailed images of Claudian's poetry, as research has been highlighting since Gualandri 1968, Charlet 1988 and Roberts 1989.[1] The poet privileges clusters of similar hues, of polychromatic imagery and of sharp contrasts between white and black or white and red. Such visual intensity and variety of

* I am grateful to Professor Andrea Balbo and Doctor Aaron D. Pelttari for their constant and precise suggestions on how to improve this paper. I would also like to thank the anonymous reviewer and the editors of *Classica et Mediaevalia* for their valuable comments.

1 See Gualandri 1968, Charlet 1988, 1991, and Roberts 1989 on the style of Claudian and other late antique authors' poetry.

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colours have often been studied for their aesthetic value and taken as examples of a 'jewelled' and fragmentary style. Recently, Coombe's article on *De Raptu Proserpinae* has proposed that colouring possesses, instead, a structuring besides decorative function, and that it provides coherence within an apparently episodic narration.[2] Light effects, in particular, bring cohesion to the narrative plot for their recursive symbolic meanings: interplays of light and darkness signal the mixing of upperworld and underworld thematized by Proserpina's myth, and the staining action of dark shades and pallor on light-filled elements constantly reminds the reader of the irruption of death into life.[3]

Coombe's paper suggests that structuring colours are evident in the colourful ekphrases of vegetation of *Rapt. Pros.* 2.90-130.[4] Focusing on these lines, my article seeks to introduce tools for examining colours which allow for a deeper comprehension of this and other texts. I will argue that, in order to gain a more complete understanding of the text, it is essential that we conceive colour as a composite phenomenon: although previous discussions have centred on effects of brightness and darkness, the full range of chromatic components (brightness, saturation and hue) is employed to create a plot that is fragmented but coherent symbolically.

My focus on all three colour components will highlight that the perspectives adopted by stylistic and hermeneutic studies are parallel and interdependent, rather than separate. The way in which colour-terms are formally organized on the page, indeed, can mirror and suggest emotional responses or symbolic meanings. From a formal and aesthetic point of view, for instance, white and red juxtaposed form a contrast between the most and the least saturated hue. In parallel, this precise juxtaposition recalls a sensation of conflict and hints at the symbology of death. The final section of the paper will draw particular

2 Coombe 2017: 260. The reference is especially to Gualandri 1968 and Roberts 1989, and their comparisons between late Latin poetry and mosaics. Hardie 2019 disapproves of these comparisons and highlights, instead, the coherence of late antique texts.

3 See also Borca 2000 and Mandile 2013 specifically about the Underworld: its lifeless atmosphere is recalled by non-colours (grey, foggy shades), paleness and darkness.

4 Coombe 2017: 253-54, 258.

attention to lines 98-100, a simile between the Etnean flowers and a 'green' rainbow. The three colour components will offer a deeper understanding of this unlikely colourful description and of its underlying symbolic meaning. The symbolism recalled by the colour-terms will be connected to a colourful allusion to *Thebaid* 4, which is critical to the interpretation of the whole passage.

The final purpose of this article is to suggest new potential research perspectives on how colour operates in general in poetry, and in particular in Claudian. Firstly, it will propose a more accurate instrument of analysis (chromatic tridimensionality) that fully highlights the visual sensibility of these texts. Secondly, and as a consequence, it will offer a more precise view of how colours imply metaphoric meanings that also work as factors of coherence. Ultimately, the study of this passage makes it possible to go beyond Roberts' stylistic viewpoint of 'jewelled style' and 'disjoint fragmentation'.[5] The late antique text uses both the aesthetic and symbolic impact of colour to suggest meaningful associations: in doing this, it creates coherent narratives within fragmented visions, and fragmented visions according to a coherent plan.

THE COMPONENTS OF COLOUR AND THEIR USE IN THE FLOWER CATALOGUES

Colour is a complex phenomenon that depends on how the human visual organs and the brain elaborate the physical properties of light. Light is the spectrum of the electro-magnetic radiation with wavelengths between 380 and 760 nanometres. White light is what we perceive when all these wavelengths are mixed together. When we de-compose white light in single beams (for example making it pass through a prism), we obtain a continuous, rainbow-like sequence from violet to red, the visible spectrum: each chromatic sensation that we can detect on the spectrum corresponds to a certain wavelength.[6] Colloquially, we call the portions of this continuum as 'colours'. According to scientific terminology,

5 Roberts 1989.

6 See Tovée 2008: 1-108, Tilley 2011: 1-48 for an introduction on physics of light and colour.

though, we should say 'hue': a 'hue' is the way in which we perceive a specific section of the spectrum with a specific wavelength. 'Colour' is a general term that describes how we sense an item in virtue of its hue and of other two related factors, brightness and saturation. Saturation corresponds to how 'intensely' we sense a certain chromatic radiation: this depends on the percentage of the same (monochromatic) wavelength compared with the percentage of white light contained in such radiation. Brightness is the amount of light perceived in a colour. In fact, every radiation has the same light intensity, but the human eye senses wavelengths around 550nm (yellow-green) as the most intense. As I mentioned, hue, saturation and brightness in connection to each other define the colour of a certain item: blood is red, dark, and very saturated; a brick is red, less dark, and less saturated. Black and white are the two poles of the 'brightness' spectrum; red and white, instead, are respectively the most and the least saturated colours.[7] Claudian's poems contain several visual effects that integrate all these chromatic components in different ways. His texts often juxtapose different hues, degrees of saturation and light effects, and tend to favour chromatic contrasts that exploit the sharpest oppositions within all three parameters (typically, white and red, dark and light, red and black). The scene that I am going to analyse, *Rapt. Pros.* 2.90-132, offers several examples of how Claudian plays with them to generate visual effects with high emotional and symbolic impact.

First of all, I shall introduce the context of the passage. A few lines earlier, Etna had prayed to Zephyrus (the subject of *volat*) asking that he prepare its meadows. Here, Zephyrus has completed his work: Claudian describes the fields made fecund by the wind, where Proserpina and her companions are cheerfully collecting flowers. Mount Etna is portrayed as a *locus amoenus*: the atmosphere is typical of a spring day, winds fertilize the soil, the sides of the volcano are described as gentle hills, and blossoms, fountains and a lake fill the landscape with life.[8] Let us zoom on the description of the flowers, my main point of interest:

7 See above and Smithson 2015: 437-65, Gunther 2019: 325-407, Hemming 2012 on science of colour and colour anthropology.

8 Gruzelier 1993: 186, Onorato 2008: 257. See also Charlet 2019: 23. For a detailed study on the ekphrasis of this *locus amoenus*, see Galand 1987.

Quaque volat vernus sequitur rubor; omnis in herbas
turget humus medioque patent convexa sereno.
sanguineo splendore rosas, vaccinia nigro
imbuit et dulci violas ferrugine pingit.
Parthica quae tantis variantur cingula gemmis
regales vinctura sinus? quae vellera tantum
ditibus Assyrii spumis fucantur aeni?
non tales volucer pandit Iunonius alas,
nec sic innumeros arcu mutante colores
incipiens redimitur hiemps, cum tramite flexo
semita discretis interviret umida nimbis.

And wherever he flies, the redness of spring follows; all the ground brims with grass and the celestial vault is disclosed, cloudless in its centre. He dips the roses in blood-red brilliance, the bilberries in black glow, and stains the violets with soft rust. Which Parthian belts, destined to gird the breasts of kings, are varied by so many gems? Which fleeces are equally dyed in the rich foams of the Assyrian vats? The bird of Juno does not spread such colourful wings, nor is the rising storm thus wreathed by the bow that shifts between countless colours, when its watery path quivers green in its bent stream amidst the parted clouds.[9]

At line 101, the flower catalogue and the related similes are followed by a lengthy description of the hills, the trees and the depths of Lake Pergus. Venus brings the attention back to the flowers at line 119, where she urges Proserpina and the nymphs to take advantage of the blossoming field. The virgins follow her exhortation:

Pratorum spoliatur honos: haec lilia fuscis
intexit violis; hanc mollis amaracus ornat;
haec graditur stellata rosis, haec alba ligustris.
Te quoque, flebilibus maerens Hyacinthe figuris,
Narcissumque metunt, nunc inclita germina veris,

9 Claudian's texts are from Gruzelier 1993; translations are mine.

praestantes olim pueros [...]

> The grace of the meadows is stripped: this one weaves lilies with dark violets; soft marjoram adorns this other one; this one walks forth starred with roses, this one white with privet-flowers. You too they reap, Hyacinthus, lamenting with your mournful shapes, and you, Narcissus, now famous shoots of spring, once outstanding young men.

Read as a whole, these passages picture the scene preceding Proserpina's abduction, which all the main literary transpositions of the myth report.[10] The *Homeric Hymn to Demeter* and Ovid's *Metamorphoses* and *Fasti*, like Claudian, draw great attention to the flowers and their colours: the reasons for this emphasis are that a flower (Narcissus) is responsible for Pluto's break-through, and that picking blossoms is a traditional element in representations of virginal rape.[11] As expected, Claudian's description offers numerous intertexts with the Homeric hymn and Ovid.[12] The structure of the catalogue and the flowers listed are borrowed from the Homeric hymn, although the later text is enriched with more species.[13] Ovid *Met.* 5.385-396 and *Fast.* 4.435-444, instead, influence the fact that Claudian does not present the daffodil as the trigger of the rape: in both passages, vegetation remains a pictorial element in the background. Claudian's debt to *Met.* 5 is also evident in the colouring conveyed by violets and lilies, the presence of Lake Pergus and a similar emphasis on

10 Ryser 2020: 154-80 offers an exhaustive discussion on Claudian's models and his re-elaborations.

11 About the implications and literary connections between Claudian's text and the *topos* of virginal rape, see especially Rosenmeyer 2004: 175-76 and Coombe 2017: 254. I will just recall a few examples: in Theoc. *Id.* 11.30, Galatea is picking flowers when the cyclops falls in love with her; in Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.896-99 Medea is doing the same before meeting Jason; in Moschus' *Europa* the girl is abducted while collecting flowers with her companions.

12 Onorato 2008: 261-62, Gruzelier 1993: 180, 189. Galand 1987 fully examines Claudian's debt to these models.

13 *Hymn. Hom. Dem.* 6-10: "ἄνθεά τ' αἰνυμένην, ῥόδα καὶ κρόκον ἠδ' ἴα καλὰ / λειμῶν' ἂμ μαλακὸν καὶ ἀγαλλίδας ἠδ' ὑάκινθον / νάρκισσόν θ', ὃν φῦσε δόλον καλυκώπιδι κούρῃ / Γαῖα Διὸς βουλῇσι χαριζομένη Πολυδέκτῃ, / θαυμαστὸν γανόωντα."

ver.[14] The author echoes *Fast.* 4 as he parallels the hyacinth at line 439, mentions the rose and the *lilia alba* at lines 441-42, and creates a similar effect of polyptoton and of asyndeton at lines 128-30.[15] At a formal level, one remarkable difference can be detected between *De Raptu Proserpinae* and the other three texts: the late antique poem breaks the unity of the single scene and doubles the flower catalogue. By bringing fragmentation into this structure, Claudian actually intensifies the reader's attention and aesthetic response towards a single (meaningful) detail.

I will now focus on the first part of this broken catalogue as a first example of how the text employs chromatic components and creates repeated emotional-symbolic meanings through them. Previous scholarship has touched on the metaphoric charge of the blossoms and their colouring, but a comprehensive analysis that adopts a composite perspective makes it possible to recognize new shades of meaning.[16]

Lines 90-93 mention red, bright red, purple, and blue-black plants. The variety of these colours recalls the luxurious atmosphere of the *locus amoenus*. At the same time, scholarship has noticed a connection with the erotic and violent charge of Proserpina's story exactly in the choice of these visual effects.[17] Focusing on the purely aesthetic aspect of the passage, we notice that *vernus rubor* at line 90 introduces the general sensation of 'red', the dominating hue of these lines. In accordance with

14 Ov. *Met.* 5.385-96: "haud procul Hennaeis lacus est a moenibus altae, / nomine Pergus, aquae. Non illo plura Caystros / carmina cycnorum labentibus audit in undis. / Silva coronat aquas cingens latus omne, suisque / frondibus ut velo Phoebeos submovet ictus. / Frigora dant rami, tyrios humus umida flores: / perpetuum *ver* est. Quo dum Proserpina luco / ludit et *aut violas aut candida lilia carpit*, / dumque puellari studio calathosque sinumque / implet et aequales certat superare legendo." In this I follow Galand 1987: 93, *pace* Onorato 2008: 261-62.

15 Ov. *Fast.* 4.435-44: "haec implet lento calathos e vimine nexos, / haec gremium, laxos degravat illa sinus: / illa legit calthas, huic sunt violaria curae, / illa papavereas subsecat ungue comas: / has, hyacinthe, tenes; illas, amarante, moraris: / pars thyma, pars rorem, pars meliloton amat. / plurima lecta rosa est, sunt et sine nomine flores; / ipsa crocos tenues liliaque alba legit, / carpendi studio paulatim longius itur, / et dominam casu nulla secuta comes." I refer to the polyptoton *haec / hanc* and the asyndeton at *Rapt. Pros.* 2.128-30.

16 Galand 1987: 94-96 and 111-12, Coombe 2017: 253-54.

17 Coombe 2017: 253-54.

Berlin and Kay's terminology, *rubor* is a basic colour-term, that is a lexeme enclosing the most comprehensive concept of the hue 'red': basic colour terms are, besides their linguistic properties, psychologically salient for the perceiver.[18] Two lines later, this powerful sensation is decomposed in three, more specific colour-terms: *sanguineae* (*rosae*), *ferrugineae* (*violae*), *nigra* (*vaccinia*).[19] *Sanguineus* represents the saturated red of the roses. *Ferrugineus* has to be understood as 'rust-coloured', in reference to the dark (probably purple) colour of the violets.[20] *Vaccinium* is either the blueberry, which is called *niger* for an intensification of its natural blue-purple hue, or the blackberry (or another similar fruit), which looks almost black. In sum, actual reds (roses) are paired with dark 'reddish' hues (violets) and even with purple-black, a note of apparent discontinuity in the colourful canvas.[21] The variety is also suggested by the chiastic sequence of *sanguineus* and *niger*, one at the beginning and one at the end of the verse. In fact, the hue parameter does not vary too much (all these flowers have a certain redness/purpleness), while saturation and brightness do: aesthetically, there is a chromatic sequence, a descending climax, from most saturated to least saturated hue, and from brightest to darkest. *Sanguineo splendore* at line 90 suggests a very bright nuance of red, which is in itself the most saturated colour. The following *vaccinia nigro imbuit* and *violas ferrugine pingit*, instead, diminish the concentration of red hue in favour of a greater darkness, typical of purple-black colours.

I should now analyse how these aesthetic choices affect the emotional and symbolic perception of these lines. To begin with, one should notice *vernus rubor*, the 'blush of spring'. By connecting spring with a colour-term (red), Claudian draws attention upon the seasonal cycle. This is a major theme of Proserpina's myth: according to the ancients, *ver* was linked with her culminating youth and with her presence on earth,

18 Berlin & Kay 1969: 5-7. For an application of Berlin and Kay's theory to Latin, see especially Oniga 2007.

19 Galand 1987: 94, Onorato 2008: 252 and Guipponi-Gineste 2010: 57 have signalled this pattern.

20 On the meaning of *ferrugineus*, see Edgeworth 1978. Jacobson 1998: 315 suggests that *violas ferrugine* (*pingit*) is modelled on the Greek ἴα ἰῷ and does not refer to a particular shade of the violets.

21 See Onorato 2008: 261.

which makes her mother benevolent. *Rubor* at line 90 and the following accumulation of red-related hues, thus, likely symbolize the exploding vitality of Proserpina and of Ceres as symbolic of nature. If the text insists so much on the colourful lush of Mount Etna in spring, though, one should wonder whether it just wants to depict its vitality, or, in fact, to prefigure its vanishing. The analysis of the three flower-colour matches at lines 92-93 leaves no doubt. As mentioned above, the list seems to evoke the prosperity of the *locus amoenus*, also because it recalls the idyllic setting of Verg. *Eclog.* 2.[22] From a symbolic perspective, instead, the choice of the three hues with their different degrees of saturation and brightness anticipate death and rape.[23] The first image is the blood-red rose: the combination between the rose, flower of Venus, and a very saturated, eye-striking colour creates a strong erotic archetype connected with sexual passion and often found in epithalamic contexts.[24] Given Proserpina's 'flourishing' status, the red rose must be a metaphor of her sexual readiness for her soon-to-be husband -and the term *sanguineus* suggests it quite explicitly.[25] Ripe berries and violets, then, create visual and symbolic connections with the husband in question, Pluto. Both fruit and violets share their darkness with the king of the Underworld and with the Underworld itself. *Niger* is the god of death's standard epithet, and his *amictus* in *Rapt. Pros.* 2.275 is said to be precisely *ferrugineus*.[26] One possible reason for this association between *ferrugineus* and the chthonic lands is that this colour-term recalls a process of

22 Guipponi-Gineste 2010: 57. Verg. *Eclog.* 2.18 *alba ligustra cadunt, uaccinia nigra leguntur* and 10.39 *et nigrae uiolae sunt et uaccinia nigra* are the source for *vaccinia nigro* at line 93. For the position of *vaccinia* within the verse, other models might be Verg. *Eclog.* 2.50 *mollia luteola pingit uaccinia caltha* and Ov. *Trist.* 1.1.5 *nec te purpureo uelent uaccinia fuco*. The rose, instead, recalls both the *Hymn to Demeter* and its recasting in *Fasti*.

23 Galand 1987: 111-12 and Coombe 2017: 253-54.

24 Charlet 2000: 189, Guipponi-Gineste 2010: 59, Coombe 2017: 254.

25 Coombe 2017: 254 sees in the 'blood-red' adjective a hint at the breaking of the goddess' hymen. See also Onorato 2008: 260, Guipponi-Gineste 2010: 59 on the symbolic value of the rose and its potential connections with Proserpina's imagery. Wheeler 1995: 124-27, has extensively treated the marriage-death *topos* in relation to Proserpina's abduction.

26 OLD s.v. *niger*; André 1949: 52-8. See also *Rapt. Pros.* 1.79-81: "ipse rudi fultus solio nigraque verendus / maiestate sedet: squalent immania foedo / sceptra situ; sublime caput maestissima nubes."

physical decay, the making of rust from iron. As a king, Pluto is expected to wear a purple cloak, but, as personification of death, this appears rotten into a brownish-red shade. Likewise, the natural purple shade of the violets might be here de-saturated into a rust-like colour to suggest the same sense of decay. Iron itself has connections with the Underworld, for it inhabits the depths of the earth. Indeed, the chthonic context is described as iron-made in *Rapt. Pros*.1.127-128 [...] *Acheron Ditisque severi / ferrea lascivis mollescant corda sagittis* and in *Rapt. Pros.* 3.389-390 [...] *plantisque resultant / Tartara ferratis* [...].[27]

The colourful features of the three plants express a single concept, the present height of vitality and its imminent fading, and the red rose links such fading with the passage from virgin to wife. Each colour fills these lines with the omen that Proserpina's maturity corresponds to her withering: indeed, her marriage to Pluto is literally her death.[28] Considering the general colourful effect, as well, we notice that the descending climax from most saturated to least saturated, brightest to darkest hue visually reproduces the virgin's descent to the dead. This point, though, only appears if careful attention is paid to all chromatic components. As a final consideration, I will mention that this passage confirms the fragmentary aesthetics of variation highlighted by Roberts: *sanguineae rosae*, *ferrugineae violae* and *nigra vaccinia* stand out of each line for their different light and intensity. Nevertheless, they create visual coherence because they share a broader dominion (redness), and because they interact with each other in a coherent pattern of chromatic degradation. Both the single colour-flower associations taken alone and their coherent effects as a whole iterate, and therefore intensify, the same meaning of death.

Lines 90-93 have allowed me to introduce Claudian's way of stimulating visual effects that connect single chromatic details with the main narrative plot (Proserpina's abduction), here producing a divergence between the cheerful look of the picture and its underlying atmosphere. I will now focus on the second section of the flower catalogue at lines 128-32. The author lists, in order of appearance, lilies, violets, marjoram, rose, privet, and finally hyacinth and daffodil. The

27 Guipponi-Gineste 2010: 58, Coombe 2017: 254.

28 Wheeler 1995: 125, Guipponi-Gineste 2010: 60 and Coombe 2017: 254.

hues introduced by these flowers stand out as whites (lily, hyacinth and daffodil) or purple-reds (violet, rose, marjoram). Lines 90-93 have mostly exploited the reddish colour-range. This second ekphrasis, instead, iterates three antitheses based on the contrast of reddish and white hues and on their cognitively-opposed chromatic parameters. Each line contains a couple: at 128 *lilia* and *fuscis*, white and dark, at 129 *violis* and *amaracus*, again purple (dark red) and white, at 130 *rosis* and *alba ligustris*, red and white. Whereas hue remains enclosed in the reddish-white opposition in all three cases, the first two lines emphasize a brightness-darkness contrast, while the third is based on a most remarkable divergence in saturation. Again, the chromatic choices imply a tribute to some literary predecessors. The same hues occur in Ov. *Fast.* 4.442 *ipsa crocos tenues liliaque alba legit*, from which the author borrows the lilies, and *Met.* 5.392 *ludit et aut violas aut candida lilia carpit*, from which he takes the contrast between violets and lilies.[29] The privet continues the tribute to *Eclog.* 2.18 *alba ligustra cadunt, uaccinia nigra leguntur*, already recalled by lines 90-93. In his re-elaboration, though, Claudian creates a double effect of visual *variatio*: on the one hand, he puts reddish and white hues in contrast, on the other, he changes the degree of darkness and saturation in each line.

The contrast of white and red strikes the eye, because it opposes, as mentioned above, the most saturated (red) and the least saturated (white) colour. At an emotional level, this induces a sensation of conflict. Symbolically, these colours and their antithesis conjure images related to Proserpina's rape and confirm the overall negative sensation. To recall the previous discussion, dark violets are reminiscent of the tones of the Underworld, and the rose is an erotic archetype, repeated from line 91. White, instead, is traditionally the colour of innocence, young age and virginity —but also the paleness of death. White flowers, red roses or the two combined suggest love and death throughout Latin poetry. Thomas provides extensive evidence: white lilies represent death in Tib. 3.4.34 *lilia et autumno candida mala rubent*, in Verg. *Aen.* 12.68-9 *lilia multa...alba rosa*, and, juxtaposed to reds, in *Aen.* 7.708-9; violets and lilies have the same function in Ov. *Met.* 10.190-191 (Hyacinth's death) and Prop. 3.13.29-31 (the 'death' of the Golden Age), and so do violets and roses in

29 Onorato 2008: 261-62.

Ov. *Ars.* 2.115-16.[30] Claudian is likely aware of the metaphoric charge of these chromatic effects, and the replacement of *candida* (*lilia*) in *Met.* 5.392 with *fuscae* (violets) in *De Raptu Proserpinae* hints at it: *fuscis violis* is broken in enjambement, so that the sensation of darkness appears twice and prevails over the brightness of the lily (stressed, instead, in Ovid's version). In sum, this passage presents a careful choice of colours and re-elaboration of models which visually and symbolically prefigures the clash and confusion between life and afterlife portrayed by Proserpina's myth. As at lines 90-93, the rose, here in contrast with white marjoram, suggests that this also corresponds to the (violent) passage from a virginal to a sexual state.

The choice of red and its opposition to white, the variation of darkness and saturation for each colour effect, and the role of all these sensations in creating symbolic connections with Proserpina's rape make this passage a reinterpretation, or completion, of the first flower catalogue. As a result, *Rapt. Pros.* 90-130 looks studded with colour-flower associations that suggest the same mournful developments in two points. In perfect 'late antique style', the text fragments the description of the blossoming fields and gives it coherence by repeating similar colours, chromatic changes and symbolic meanings. Precisely this breaking and variation on the theme creates an even stronger and more coherent interpretation of the text.

THE VISUAL AND SYMBOLIC MEANING OF *INTERVIREO* IN THE SIMILE OF THE RAINBOW

Rapt. Pros. 98-100, like the framing flower catalogues at lines 90-93 and 128-30, generates a disturbing sensation of death. The passage compares the variety of the Etnean flowers with the colourfulness of the rainbow: while the simile suggests a sensation of liveliness, the only colour-term used, *interviret* ('is green among' the clouds, referred to the rainbow), fills the text with tension.[31] The reasons why 'green' has a threatening charge are mainly two: because, in association with the rainbow, it signals the

30 Thomas 1979: 312-14.

31 TLL 7.1.2303.84–2304.7, OLD s.v. *intervireo*.

arrival of a storm[32] and because it alludes to Statius' *Thebaid*, where it describes a concerning element of the landscape. This allusion, noticed but not yet analysed in previous scholarship, is decisive for the correct perception and interpretation of the passage.[33] The following paragraph will address its implications, to shed some light on the complex relationships between visual sensations, literary *topoi* and intertexts that Claudian creates through this single colour-word. Once again, my analysis will show how chromatic components are essential for acknowledging and better understanding both the aesthetic and symbolic role of colour.

To start, it is necessary to address the association of the colour green with the rainbow, treated also by Budaragina.[34] Differently from the red rose and the rusty violet, this colour match is unrealistic and thus requires further consideration. One option is that the rainbow is called 'green' with no intention of reproducing real-life phenomena at all, and only to reinforce the simile between the sky and the presumably green meadow. However, there is at least one other monochromatic description of the rainbow where colour looks misplaced to the modern reader, but likely made sense to the ancient one. In his commentary to *De Raptu Proserpinae*, Onorato cites Prop. 3.5.32 *purpureus pluvias cur bibit arcus aquas*, that mentions an awkwardly 'purple' rainbow.[35] Both Edgeworth and Bradley have pointed out that, in this case, the chromatic sensation stressed in the Latin term *purpureus* is not hue, but brightness: compared to modern languages, where colour-terms mainly correspond to different hues, Latin terminology is sensitive to degrees of brightness to a greater level.[36] Since for ancient authors the rainbow carries water

32 Coombe 2017: 257-58 mentions the rainbow as an anticipatory element for Proserpina's abduction.

33 Budaragina 2005 has reported but not investigated in depth the allusion to Statius' text. She has mainly focused on the literal meaning of *intervireo*, in the attempt to solve the incongruence of a green rainbow.

34 Budaragina 2005: 280-84.

35 *Discreti nimbi* in *Rapt. Pros.* 2.100 should be interpreted 'clouds still separated' rather than 'clouds disclosing after the storm'; see Onorato 2008: 253.

36 On *purpureus* as indicator of brightness and not only hue, see Edgeworth 1979 and Bradley 2009: 189-208. Similar discussions on other colour terms, especially *candidus* (as opposed to *albus*), *fulvus*, *flavus*, *rutilus*, *niger* (as opposed to *ater*), can be found in

and often announces storms, the bright 'purple' must suggest a sense of menace.[37] Here we must wonder whether green, like *purpureus* in Propertius, reproduces some visual attribute of the rainbow seen as water-carrier. Indeed, it is not unlikely that *semita discretis* interviret *umida nimbis* aims to represent the visual saturation of a rainbow fraught with rain, or its iridescent, water-like aspect -and not an unexplainable green hue.[38] If a 'green', saturated and vibrant rainbow is one that carries rain, the idyllic atmosphere of the present passage is undermined. In narrative terms, this colour-term plays the same role as the flowers and berries at lines 90-93: both of them represent a climatic point (the rainbow, because it is congested with rain, the vegetation, because it is at its highest level of ripeness) which foreshadows a negative explosion -the 'storm' or the 'withering', which symbolize the rape of Proserpina and which the flower-picking actually triggers.[39]

The tension introduced by the visual effect(s) of *intervireo* is mirrored and enhanced by the intertextual background that this verb involves. Indeed, the only comparable *locus* where *intervireo* is used is Stat. *Theb.* 4.98-100 *exutus* laetisque *minax* interviret herbis */ a miser! agrestum si quis per gramen hianti: / obvius et primo fraudaverit ora veneno*, where it refers to a snake hiding in the grass and threatening a shepherd's safety.[40] It is

André 1949. Bibliography that discusses brightness in Latin colour terminology includes Baran 1982 and Busatta 2014.

37 The rainbow can either be the prelude to a storm or the sign of its end. I agree with Onorato 2008: 253 and Coombe 2017: 257-58 that the first meaning seems more consistent, since both in Tib. 1.4.44 *imbrifer arcus* and in Stat. *Theb.* 10.125 *nimborum fulva creatrix* the rainbow is explicitly qualified as storm-carrier. About the imagery, functions and colours of the rainbow, see Bonadeo 2004, Bradley 2009: 36-55, Grand-Clément 2018.

38 *Viridis* can apply to fog or saturation, see Auson. *Mos.* 15 *viridis caligo*. On the other hand, Plin. *Nat.* 17.74 shows that *viride caelum* is actually a way to say 'fresh, clear sky'. It is uncertain whether such a meaning could be transferred to *viridis arcus* (a rainbow that carries clear skies), but the fact that it forms *umida semita* seems rather to suggest an identification with the greenish and vibrant aspect of dense water. The rainbow which carries rain possesses the same aspect as a watercourse.

39 Besides the mentioned Coombe 2017: 257-58, see also Charlet 2000: 192 and Onorato 2008: 257.

40 This colour-term is actually present also in Sol. 52. 61: "beryllorum genus dividitur in speciem multifariam: eximii intervirente glauci et caeruli temperamento" Both

unlikely that Claudian, for whom Statius is a major model, employs *intervireo* without alluding to him: instead of choosing a better-established chromatic association such as *purpureus arcus*, he selects a less foregone colour-verb only adopted here.[41] In purely visual terms, as well, Statius and Claudian's contexts are highly similar: a rainbow between clouds does resemble a snake in the grass for its shape, its fluidity and, above all, its colours. The snake, indeed, is often called *caeruleus*, iridescent, and I have argued earlier that a 'green' rainbow can suggest exactly a sense of vibrant iridescence -the rainbow is, after all, the iridescent phenomenon *par excellence*.[42] Finally, Statius' snake and Claudian's rainbow are likely related in a symbolic way. Ancient myth and literature show very frequent connections between this phenomenon and the reptile, starting from Hom. *Il.* 11.26, where the dragons sculpted on Agamemnon's armour are precisely compared with rainbows. According to Bonadeo's anthropological and literary study of Iris, snake and rainbow share the same metaphoric nature as 'elements of passage'. [43] Whereas the first makes possible the transition and communication between the human and the divine world, the second connects terrestrial life to chthonic world. Verg. *Aen* 5.84-89 (the description of the *anguis ingens*) is a clear example of how snake and rainbow are related, because here the animal is both intended as a link with the underworld and compared with the celestial phenomenon.[44] The culture-driven, perhaps subconscious association between these two natural elements fully justifies Claudian's reminiscence of *Thebaid* 4.98 at

the genre of the work, a collection of *memorabilia*, and the context of use of *interviret*, though, are completely different from Claudian's text.

41 Budaragina 2005: 280-84. For an overview of Claudian's frequent allusions to Statius in the embroidering of his scenes, see Braden 1979: 210 and Gruzelier 1989. Wheeler 1995: 118-19 has also detected important allusions to Stat. *Theb.* 8.1-83 in the motif of the underworld opening in *De Raptu Proserpinae*.

42 Grand-Clément 2018: 202-07 for the iridescence of the rainbow and its connection with the snake.

43 Bonadeo 2004: 108-12.

44 Verg. *Aen* 5.84-9: "dixerat haec, adytis cum lubricus anguis ab imis / septem ingens gyros, septena volumina traxit, / amplexus placide tumulum lapsusque per aras, / caeruleae cui terga notae, maculosus et auro / squamam incendebat fulgor, ceu nubibus arcus / mille iacit varios adverso sole colores."

lines 98-100. Needless to say, such association loads the text with another negative foreshadowing of Proserpina's passage to a new, chthonic condition: the allusion to Statius' snake joins the peculiar 'green' colouring of the rainbow in revealing the ominous character of the simile. This impression is strengthened by the fact that Statius' reptile is called *minax*, a threat for the shepherd's life. The snake actually mediates between the upper world and those chthonic lands that Proserpina, too, is destined to reach. And since the simile is between the rainbow and flowers, which in fact trigger the abduction in the original myth, the allusion to the mournful snake forecasts Proserpina's transition to the underworld in even more precise terms.

There is another important consideration. As Parkes has observed, the Statian image presents a certain similarity to Eurydice's death in Verg. *Georg.* 4.458-59 *immanem ante pedes hydrum moritura puella / servantem ripas alta non vidit in herba.*[45] Both pictures portray a snake hiding in the grass, and menacing the character's life. In both, the animal cannot be distinguished from the background: *Georg.* 459 reads *non vidit in herba*, *Theb.* 4.98 reports *interviret herbis*. Precisely its invisibility causes the characters' explicit or supposed descent to the chthonic world. In Vergil, the snake plainly appears as Eurydice's killer; indeed, the girl is called *moritura*. In Statius, the suggestion of the shepherd's death is indirectly contained within the apostrophe, but is still present. It is not unreasonable to argue that Claudian, in his use of *intervireo*, is aware of the Vergilian passage on Orpheus and builds a double allusion not previously identified. First of all, the Orphic myth has several connections with that of Ceres and Proserpina. The visions of the cosmic order implied by the Eleusinian and the Orphic traditions are indeed very close, and Proserpina was probably included in later Orphic rituals. Claudian was probably familiar, if not with the Orphic mysteries themselves, with their late antique literary transpositions: the narration of Proserpina's myth reported by these texts likely had some influence on how he has elaborated his subject.[46] Secondly, Eurydice's story in

45 Parkes 2012: 97.

46 See Charlet 2000: 182-84 and above all Ryser 2020: 180-90, which contains a detailed discussion of whether, where and how Claudian could have been influenced by the orphic versions of Persephone's myth.

Georgics recalls perfectly the narrative context of this passage, which is located right before Proserpina's descent to Hell. If this interpretation of text and (hypo-)hypotext is correct, Eurydice's death as described by Vergil would suggest and anticipate Proserpina's descent to the Underworld, as much as a 'stormy' greening rainbow does. While Orpheus' beloved, though, is destined to the afterlife forever because of his failure, the latter will be permitted to go back to the earth thanks to her mother's power.

The passage is handled with great skill. The text progresses from description to simile. The simile then includes a composite visual sensation which loads the whole picture with the prediction of a storm. The storm symbol, in turn, functions as an anticipation of Proserpina's physical passage to a new condition as dead wife. Through this very same chromatic term, Claudian alludes to Statius in what looks like a *Kontrastimitation*: in the hypotext, *intervireo* is inserted in a negative picture (a snake ready to bite), in the text, the context is positive (a rainbow recalling the exuberant colours of the flowers).[47] In fact, the two passages are in alignment, as suggested by the threatening meaning of green and a possible second allusion to Vergil. As a final parallel, the flowers of lines 90-93 and 128-30 will provoke Proserpina's abduction into the chthonic world, as Statius's snake will send the shepherd to the afterlife. Claudian is writing with extreme compositional subtlety and shows great sensibility to multiple layers of communication: visual, emotional, symbolic, allusive. All this is suggested by the simple, yet highly conscious use of one colour-term exploited in all its possibilities.

CONCLUSION

Colourful details in *Rapt. Pros.* 2.90-132 respond to the late antique taste for strong, polychromatic visualisation, and are fully aligned with the depiction of Mount Etna as a *locus amoenus* present in the literary tradition. Nevertheless, both the aesthetic effects and the symbolic charge of such colours suggest a contrast with what superficially appears as an idyllic atmosphere. In the first example discussed, the insistence

47 For a definition of *Kontrastimitation*, Kaufmann 2017: 156-58.

on red hues varied in darkness and saturation, and the fading of reds into dull and dark purples prepare the reader for the erotic and chthonic character of this myth. In the second, contrasts between whites and different types of dark or saturated hues remind of the struggle between life and death, chastity and sexuality, that this poem thematizes. Finally, the use of the verb *intervireo* plays on multiple chromatic dimensions to create an ominous atmosphere, enhanced by an intertextual reference to Statius and Virgil. The rainbow and the allusion to the snake stress the concept of 'bridge' between upper and underworld, and become themselves a 'bridge' between temporal events, an anticipation of Proserpina's death.

The present paper confirms Coombe's statement that Claudian can skilfully bend colour to multiple needs: aesthetic, decorative, emotional and also narrative. To recall her words, cohesion may not be found in *De Raptu Proserpinae*'s rational and chronological presentation of facts, but certainly in the symbolic meanings of its chromatic effects.[48] However, my approach differs both from hers and from previous contributions in two ways. On the one hand, I have considered the formal and aesthetic choices (for example, the degradation of colours in lines 90-93) as neither separate nor in opposition to the symbolic meanings, but parallel -if not necessary- to them and equally important in suggesting the interpretation of the text. On the other, the discussion has introduced a more precise perspective on chromatic dimensions, which has made it possible to bring attention to more than the single colour (hue), or the single light effect. The focus on brightness, saturation and hue has allowed me to offer a more detailed and comprehensive understanding of the effect of colours-terms on the reader's visual perception of the text, emotions and expectations. Not only do variations within brightness anticipate Proserpina's abduction; juxtapositions and contrasts between different degrees of saturation and hue are also essential for Claudian's narration. Finally, it has been highlighted that colour choices engage with multiple literary models at a formal but above all contextual level. Chromatic allusions to previous texts, in particular an undetected parallel with Vergil's *Georgics* and a not-yet-analysed reference to Statius' *Thebaid*, are the key to disclose the genuine

48 Coombe 2017: 242.

character of the ekphrasis and, therefore, become elements of storytelling in their own right.

With my analysis, I wish to suggest that a similar, multi-perspective and complex approach to colour in poetry might open new possibilities for a more complete interpretation of Claudian's work. A viewpoint that encompasses style and meaning can show how late antique colourful descriptions do not have only a decorative function and are not only part of mosaic-like, formally disjoint narrations. Colours suggest that both formal patterns and symbolic meanings can be fragmentary and connected, or coherent even when the single detail is stressed.

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POMPEY'S HEAD AND CAESAR'S TEARS: THE HISTORY OF AN ANECDOTE

By Georgios Vassiliades

Summary: In many sources, Caesar is said to have wept and become indignant at the sight of Pompey's head presented to him as a gift from Ptolemy XIII. Given that Caesar does not mention the episode in *De Bello Ciuili*, this paper attempts, through a chronological survey of later extant sources, to determine their interdependence by observing the stable and fluid elements in each, and then to outline the history of the shaping of this anecdote. The episode might have been included in early accounts of the events surrounding Pompey's death, produced by pro-Caesarian historians in the immediate aftermath of Caesar's death. *Declamatio* not only picked up and reworked this historical anecdote and led to its reinterpretation in an anti-Caesarian way, but also probably played a major role in its broader diffusion.

I. The absence of the scene in Caesar and the question of the "ultimate source"

The aftermath of the battle of Pharsalia is recounted by Caesar at the end of *De Bello Ciuili* (§3.102-112). After his defeat, Cn. Pompeius Magnus (cos. 70, II 55, III 52), a.k.a. Pompey, fled to Egypt, where King Ptolemy XIII, still a minor, was fighting against his sister Cleopatra, who had been deposed from the throne. There, Pompey demanded the protection of the young king, invoking the friendship with his father. Among the king's troops there were many of Pompey's old soldiers, whom in 55 B.C., Aulus Gabinius (cos. 58) had received from Pompey's army in Syria, taken to Alexandria to restore Ptolemy XII to his kingdom, and left there with Ptolemy. Pompey's messengers thus exhorted these troops to assist their former general (*BCiv.* 3.103). Being informed of this, the king's ministers made a secret plan to assassinate Pompey. Caesar thoroughly investigates the reasons of the Egyptians' decision: either they were motivated by fear that Pompey would become master of Egypt; or they despised his low

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condition, as "friends, in bad fortune, often turn enemies" (*BCiv.* 3.104.1). By contrast, the scene of Pompey's execution is briefly recounted:

> *2. Ipsi clam consilio inito Achillam, praefectum regium, singulari hominem audacia, et L. Septimium tribunum militum ad interficiendum Pompeium miserunt. 3. Ab his liberaliter ipse appellatus et quadam notitia Septimi perductus, quod bello praedonum apud eum ordinem duxerat, nauiculam paruulam conscendit cum paucis suis. Ibi ab Achilla et Septimio interficitur.* (Caes. *BCiv.* 3.104)
>
> In secret they formed a plot and sent men to kill Pompey: Achillas, the king's general, a man of remarkable nerve, and Lucius Septimius, a military tribune. Addressed kindly by them and drawn forward by a degree of familiarity with Septimius, since the latter held the rank of centurion under him during the war against the pirates, Pompey boarded the tiny little vessel with a few of his friends. There he was killed by Achillas and Septimius.[1]

Contrary to other sources, Caesar does not mention that Pompey was killed with a sword and very little is related about the circumstances of his assassination.[2] This is not the only interesting omission: Caesar states in a brief phrase that, after arriving in Egypt in pursuit of Pompey, he was informed of Pompey's death, without adding any information on his reaction; he then immediately passes to the tumult aroused upon his arrival:

> ***Alexandriae de Pompei morte cognoscit.*** *Atque ibi primum e naui egrediens clamorem militum audit, quos rex in oppido praesidii causa reliquerat, et concursum ad se fieri uidet, quod fasces anteferrentur. In hoc omnis multitudo maiestatem regiam minui praedicabat.* (Caes. *BCiv.* 3.106.4)

1 Quotations from Caesar's *De Bello Ciuili* are based on the recent edition of C. Damon (OCT 2015). Translations of the same text are from the Loeb edition (Damon 2016).

2 See Plut. *Pomp.* 77-80; App. *B Civ.* 2.84-86; Cass. Dio 42.3-4; Luc. 8.456-711; cf. for a brief account Vell. Pat. 2.53; Flor. 2.13.52; Liv. *Per.* 112; *De vir. ill.* 77.9.

At Alexandria he learned about Pompey's death. Upon disembarking he heard shouts from the soldiers whom the king had left on guard in the city, and saw people converging on him, apparently because he had the *fasces* ahead of him. The whole crowd was shouting that this amounted to a slight on the king's majesty.

Caesar's succinct account is at odds with the detailed narrative of other sources, where Pompey's severed head is presented as a gift from the Egyptians to Caesar, who becomes indignant at the macabre spectacle of a Roman general treated with such cruelty. This famous scene inspired modern art and cinema.[3] It is noteworthy that modern adaptations are based especially on Lucan and Plutarch. Scholars have also repeatedly focused on Lucan and pointed out the symbolic function of Pompey's beheading and its aftermath (8.536-872) and of the presentation of the severed head to Caesar (9.1000-1108) within the poet's narrative[4], but have commented very little on the treatment of the episode in other, namely historiographical, sources.

Caesar's non-inclusion of the scene, which seems curious coming from the alleged protagonist of the episode, has been simply noted but not interpreted.[5] To explain other omissions from Caesar's narrative,

3 See the paintings of Ricci (1659-1734), Battista Tiepolo (1696-1770), Pellegrini (1700-1741) and Lagrenée (1767) and the anonymous painting preserved in the Magnin Museum of Dijon. This scene is also staged in the series *Rome* (2005-2007), the docudrama *Rome: Rise and Fall of an Empire* (2006), and Haendel's *Giulio Cesare in Egitto* (1723).

4 For the metaphorical association between Pompey's and the Gorgon's head (Luc. 9.604-889), see Malamud 2003: 32-39; Jouteur 2005. According to Estèves 2010, Lucan makes decapitation a symbol of horror related to the civil wars. Scholars have recently analysed Pompey's head as a metaphor for the body politic. See Dinter 2012: 20-21, 23, 31, 47-49, 67, 105; Mebane 2016. See also Wick 2004: *ad loc.* and Tschiedel 1985: 12-18, for the significant narrative role of the episode in the *Pharsalia*.

5 Kraner, Hofmann & Meusel 1906: *ad loc.*, complete Caesar's account by referring to other sources, and add that "before landing, Theodotus brought him the head and seal ring of Pompey". Carter 1993: *ad loc.*, just remarks that Caesar's account of events leading to the Alexandrian War is unclear and needs to be completed by other sources. Tschiedel 1985: 4, Wick 2004: 426, and Martin 2005: 160-61, only observe Caesar's omission.

scholars have invoked several reasons: accidents in the textual transmission, political calculations and doubts about historicity.[6] It goes without saying that *argumenta ex silentio*, like those presented by scholars in order to explain Caesar's silences, are hardly compelling: omissions may also be due to incidental reasons such as careless writing, oblivion or underestimation of the importance of an episode evaluated as more important by later writers. Moreover, Caesar's silence on his expressions of emotion, especially toward Pompey, does not only occur in the scene of his mourning over Pompey's head; this omission seems consistent with the general tendency of Caesar the writer to avoid putting on stage the emotional reactions of Caesar the protagonist, which appear for instance in Plutarch.[7] Therefore, Caesar's general restraint could explain to some extent his omission of the anecdote under study. Nevertheless, given that

6 The omission, for instance, of the famous scene of the Rubicon crossing, has been described as "the best strategy to adopt", because Caesar knew that by crossing this limit between Gallia Cisalpina and Italy, he had acted contrary to the *lex Cornelia de maiestate* (Westall 2017: 48-49, 57). Similarly, Caesar chose to discard from his narrative the mutiny against him at Placentia in 49 B.C., which is found in other sources (App. *B Civ.* 2.7.47-48; Cass. Dio 41.26-36; Suet. *Jul.* 69; Luc. 5.237-373; Frontin. *Str.* 4.5.2; Plut. *Caes.* 37), in order not to harm the self-constructed image of a general exercising absolute control over his army (Chrissanthos 2001: 64; Westall 2017: 25 n80). The following episode, also excluded from *De Bello Ciuili*, has received a twofold interpretation: while stationed on the coast of Epirus and desperate for the arrival of reinforcements from Italy, Caesar is said to have attempted to cross back to Italy, unsuccessfully due to unfavourable winds (Val. Max. 9.8.2; Plut. *Caes.* 38; *Apophth. C. Caes.* 9; *De fort. Rom.* 6; Flor. 2.13.37; App. *B Civ.* 2.8.56-57, 21.150; Cass. Dio 41.46). According to Gelzer (1968: 229n1), Caesar "had no reason to report his own unsuccessful attempt. The account of it seems to go back to Asinius Pollio." Others have considered the episode "a malicious invention on the part of a hostile historian" (Friedrich 1954: 23; Westall 2017: 28-29). Finally, the defeat of C. Antonius, brother of the Triumvir, in Illyricum has been considered by Avery 1993: 457-58, a lost episode due to an accident of the textual transmission of *De Bello Ciuili*. See also *ibid.*: 468-69, where Avery discusses the possibility that the revolt at Placentia and the story of Caesar's unsuccessful attempt to return to Italy are also lost episodes due to accidents in textual transmission.

7 Plutarch portrays Caesar's feeling of perplexity and distress at Apollonia because of the delay of the troops from Italy (Plut. *Caes.* 38.1: ἀπορούμενος καὶ περιπαθῶν; 5: ἄχθεται), while Caesar's feelings are much more neutral in *De Bello ciuili* (Caes. *BCiv.* 3.25.3: *quibus rebus permotus Caesar Brundisium ad suos seuerius scripsit*). Whereas this

the *Commentarii de Bello Ciuili* include emotional scenes in other instances, sometimes with Pompey or the Pompeians as protagonists[8], the restrained character of the *Commentarii*, as a genre,[9] opposed to the inclination of the biographer Plutarch to pathetic and tragic elements[10], cannot fully explain the narrator Caesar's general tendency to avoid relating his own emotional reactions. It seems thus impossible to specify with a reasonable degree of certainty the reason why this particular anecdote is not included in the Caesarian narrative, and one can only speculate on this matter.

omission can be explained on the same grounds as that of the whole episode of his rather embarrassing and unsuccessful attempt to cross from Epirus to Italy in Plutarch (see supra, n. 6), other expressions of feelings are more consistent with a positive self-presentation of Caesar. The Roman general is said, for instance, to have gained confidence (Plut. *Caes.* 39.1: θαρρήσας; Cass. Dio 41.49.1: θαρσήσας; cf. Caes. *BCiv.* 3.30) after the arrival of Antonius with his forces from Brundisium; he was also overjoyed (Plut. *Caes.* 44.1: περιχαρής; cf. Caes. *BCiv.* 3.85.3-4) to hear that the enemy were coming down into the plain for battle at Pharsalus, but, after the victory, he groaned (Plut. *Caes.* 46.1: στενάξας) upon entering Pompey's camp and seeing the dead or falling soldiers of his enemy (cf. Caes. *BCiv.* 3.97).

8 See in the same book Caes. *BCiv.* 3.18.3 (Pompey's discussion with Caesar's messenger Vibullius); 3.61.1 (Pompey made the round of his garrisons with the two Allobroges who deserted Caesar's camp and showed them off); 3.71.4 (details on Labienus' severe behaviour towards deserters); 3.91 (the remarkable courage of the *euocatus* Crastinus); 3.105 (list of prodigies). The narrator does not avoid emotions either, when he deals with Pompeians or Pompey himself: Pompey's soldiers who fled to Caesar's camp after the battle of Pharsalus are presented as crying (*flentes*), and Caesar started to console them (*consolatus consurgere*) by citing many examples of his clemency (Caes. *BCiv.* 3.98.2). The narrator, despite including much less detail than Plutarch (cf. Plut. *Pomp.* 73), when recounting Pompey's hasty flight from Pharsalia, also focuses on his feeling of abandonment and betrayal by his followers (Caes. *BCiv.* 3.96.4).

9 Cf. Guillaumin 1985: 743, who explains in this way Caesar's succinct account of the capitulation of Vercingetorix (Caes. *BGall.* 89.4).

10 On the role and function of tragic motifs in Plutarch's *Lives*, see Mossman 2014, and Pelling 2016, who focuses on the role of tragic motifs. See also Chrysanthou 2018: 66-102 (esp. 68-69), on the way the use of emotions engages with the reader in Plutarch's *Lives*.

The absence of this scene from what one would expect to be its ultimate source, whereas it is very common in later sources, raises the legitimate question of the circumstances of its appearance in the written tradition. The very anecdotic nature of the scene under study may, however, provide some relevant insight. According to the definition proposed by the *Oxford English Dictionary*, an anecdote is "the narrative of a detached incident, or of a single event, told as being in itself interesting or striking".[11] Therefore, an anecdote distinguishes itself by its autonomy from the rest of the narrative and by its capacity to impress. Given the anecdotic character of the episode under study, to what extent may Caesar's silence thus be analysed as an "omission", in the same way that one might refer to the omission of a historical fact from a continuous historiographical narrative? In other words, is Caesar the narrator responsible for silencing the emotions of Caesar the protagonist or have later authors, based on earlier accounts, reworked and progressively shaped a relevant tradition, adding and enhancing details, for reasons pertaining to their own intended portrayal of Caesar?

Based on the methodological tools provided by Saller's study[12] on the historical anecdotes of the Principate, the aim of this paper will accordingly be to explore (1) the context in which this anecdote was generated; (2) its alterations through transmission; and (3) its implications as historical evidence. Since, as the scholar noted, an anecdote's full history of transmission is never documented and the stage preceding its appearance in the written tradition cannot be recovered, the only available method for exploring the context of generation of an anecdote and its alterations through transmission is "by comparing the different versions with respect to each element of the anecdote (chronological and physical settings, characters, minor details, and 'punch-line')".[13] The chronological and physical settings of the various versions of the anecdote under study remain practically unchanged; on the contrary, the minor details and to a lesser extent the characters involved are the most fluid elements. The pointed conclusion ("punch-line") drawn from each anecdote

11 *Oxford English Dictionary*, 2nd ed. (1989), vol. I, s.v. anecdote 2.

12 Saller 1980.

13 Saller 1980 : 74.

is most often, according to Saller, the most stable element,[14] but, as the study of relevant sources will show, two pointed conclusions have been shaped in the course of the transmission of this anecdote. Based on these categories of analysis, we will attempt to identify the ultimate source or sources of the episode and outline its possible evolution, by comparing the details of ancient sources reporting it and by focusing on the role it plays in each of them, also depending on their genre or ideological stance.[15]

A brief chronological survey of the sources relating the scene is thus *a priori* necessary, since this will provide the basis for classifying the various sources in different categories according to the stable and fluid elements observed in each of them, following Saller's methodological tools. The aim will then be to explore the extent to which extant sources reworked and reshaped the anecdote and trace the possible history - with reference to its possible earliest stages - of the progressive formation of a tradition on this episode which is associated with Caesar's *memoria*. Through this historiographical study, it will be shown that the anecdote was most likely reported for the first time by pro-Caesarian historians and then reworked, reinterpreted and embellished in the context of historical declamation.

II. Pompey's head presented to Caesar: survey of sources

Special mention should be made, in advance, of the attested presence of the episode in two non-preserved texts, because, if these two testimonies indeed reflect the content of the original texts, the latter chronologically precede any surviving account of the incident. In the last part of this paper, the role of these two texts in the formation of a tradition on this incident will thus be proven to be decisive.

14 Saller 1980: 78-79.

15 See also for a similar methodological approach on a case study Rondholz 2009 on the episode of Caesar's crossing the Rubicon, with the difference that Rondholz mostly focuses on the generic rather than the ideological reasons which motivated the inclusion or addition of different details in each of the relevant sources.

The scene of Pompey's head presented to Caesar is included in Livy's *Periocha* 112. The summaries of the *Ab Vrbe Condita* (*AVC*), made by an unknown author between the second and the fourth century A.D.[16], reproduce, to a debated extent[17], Livy's narrative, conducted during the Augustan period. The *Periocha* 112 seems to reflect a rather pro-Caesarian stance, by referring to Caesar's tears and sorrow: *Caesar post tertium diem insecutus, cum ei Theodotus caput Pompei et anulum obtulisset, infensus est et inlacrimauit*: "The third day thereafter Caesar arrived in pursuit (i.e. of Pompey), and when Theodotus brought him Pompey's head and ring, he was indignant and burst into tears."[18] The genre of the *Periocha* imposes practical limits on our understanding of this mention: did the author draw the episode from Livy or from other sources? If the former is the case, did Livy also promote a rather positive *memoria* of Caesar? These questions will be examined in the last part of this paper. At this stage, it suffices to keep in mind that if the *Periocha* follows Livy's text, the cited text, along with the next passage, are the earliest testimonies of the scene. According to the traditional dating, Livy published the final version of the first five books of his work between 27 and 25 B.C.[19] and wrote 142 books in the course of 40 to 45 years, if one accepts the view that when he died in 12 or 17 A.D. he was still writing or had recently finished his work.[20] The *Periocha* 112, which contains the incident under study, should thus be dated in the Late Augustan period. Furthermore, it is worth noting that despite its conciseness, this testimony is the most in-

16 See Bingham 1978: 475-76; and Jal 1984: XXIII-XVI, with earlier bibliography.

17 See infra on this subject.

18 Transl. by A.C. Schlesinger (LOEB 1987).

19 See on this traditional dating Klotz 1926: 818, and Ogilvie 1965: 94. According to some scholars, the surviving version of Livy's first pentade is a second edition of an earlier one published between 31-27 B.C. See on this theory Bayet 1940: XVI-XXI; Luce 1965, Burton 2000; *id.* 2008; *contra* Syme 1959, 46-50.

20 The date of 17 A.D. is based on Saint Jerome (Hieron., *Chron.* p. 154 & 171 Helm), whose trustworthiness was put into question by Syme 1959: 40-41, who suggested 12 A.D. as date of Livy's death. I addressed the question of Livy's date of death in a forthcoming paper (Vassiliades 2022), where I argue that Livy more probably died in 17 A.D. and that he was still writing his work when he died.

formative as far as the chronological setting (*post tertium diem*) is concerned; it is also the only source, along with Plutarch, to mention the tutor of the young Ptolemy XIII, Theodotus, as one of the protagonists.

In his collection of fictive court cases, known as *Controuersiae*, published some years later, more probably during the rule of Caligula (37-41 A.D.)[21], Seneca the Elder reports that the episode was exploited by two declaimers of the Early Imperial period: Moschus, exiled from Rome and already dead around 25 A.D.[22], eleven years after Augustus' death, and Musa, a rhetorician whose *floruit* is also assumed to be during the Tiberian age[23]. It is difficult to determine the precise date of the *declamatio* under discussion, but one can safely enough assume that it was produced around the late Augustan or early Tiberian period, which brings us to a contemporary or slightly later date than Livy's account of this episode.

The fictional law case was that of a daughter who, during the civil wars, took the side of her husband, although her father and son were on the opposite side; her party lost and her husband was killed; when she returned to her father's house, she was ordered by her father to hang herself and did so; the son accused his father of madness (*dementiae*). Seneca cites excerpts from this case drawn from declaimers defending the son or the father.[24] Moschus and Musa are among those who take the side of the son, and both refer to the *exemplum* of Caesar. Moschus argues as

21 Fairweather 1981: 3 suggests an approximate dating of *Controuersiae* during the rule of Tiberius or Caligula, by arguing that by the time Seneca (born during the decade of fifties B.C.) wrote his work, he had an unusually intimate knowledge of his subject acquired over seventy years or more. Griffin 1972: 4-5, concludes that the *Controuersiae* and the *Suasoriae* were composed between 37 and 40 A.D.

22 See Sen. *Controv.* 2.5.13: he was persecuted and convicted for poisoning and he was defended by Asinius Pollio, the consul of 23 A.D. He then taught and died around 25 A.D. at Massalia, where, following Tacitus (*Ann.* 4.43), he bequeathed his legacy.

23 See Griffin 1972: 8 and Fairweather 1981: 277, who date the *floruit* of this orator around that period, based on the information that Seneca attended his declamations with his sons (Sen. *Controv.* 10 *praef.* 1, 9). Seneca refers to Musa's style, whereas he only criticises Moschus for the excessive use of *figurae* (Sen. *Controv.*10 *praef.* 9-10).

24 See for an analysis of this case Gunderson 2003: 132-35. The critic (*ibid.* 134) also refers to the exploitation of the scene of Pompey's head presented to Caesar, by treating it as a concrete historical *exemplum* used to further the defendants' speeches. See also Van der Poel 2009: 342-43, who analyses these passages as judicial *exempla* used by the declaimers in order to construct convincing arguments.

follows: *Adlatum ad se Caesar Pompei caput fleuit. Hoc ille propter filiam praestitit.* (Sen. *Controv.* 10.3.1): "Caesar wept when the head of Pompey was brought to him; this was the tribute he paid for his daughter's sake".[25] Caesar is presented as weeping for his daughter's sake in front of her husband's head, contrary to the father in the imagined case.

The scene is exploited some paragraphs later by Musa, who also opposes Caesar's sensitivity at the sight of his former son-in-law's head to the father's lack of affection towards his own daughter: *Allato ad se capite Cn. Pompei Caesar auertisse oculos dicitur, quod tu ne in morte filiae quidem fecisti.* (Sen. *Controv.* 10.3.5): "When Pompey's head was brought to him, Caesar is said to have averted his eyes; you didn't do that even at the death of your daughter". The tone is in both cases rather positive for Caesar, although one might discern a slight distancing from the victor of the civil wars in Moschus' remark that Caesar wept for his daughter's sake: this could be taken to imply that Caesar's attitude was not a sign of sensitivity towards Pompey, but the fulfilment of a duty towards his own daughter. Furthermore, the verb *dicitur*, used in Musa's *sententia* without an agent, attributes the cited information to a more or less shared tradition for whose authority or trustworthiness Musa avoids vouching personally.

Beyond the fact that the analysis of these rhetorical texts reveals a rather positive commemoration of Caesar's attitude through the exploitation of the episode as a means of persuasion, and more precisely as a positive *exemplum*, one can further conclude from Seneca's evidence that the anecdote itself was developed via declamatory exercises. These seem to interact with an already established anonymous tradition, which they seem to enrich by adapting it to the particular persuasive goals of each *declamatio*. As one would expect, the orators exploiting this episode betray a lack of interest in the chronological circumstances, the minor protagonists, and the minor details of the episode, since the only thing that seems relevant to their persuasive strategy is the pointed conclusion drawn from Caesar's attitude. The eventually important role of *declamatio* in the diffusion of the episode and its interconnection with other genres in formulating a relevant tradition will, however, be discussed in detail later.

25 Transl. M. Winterbottom (LOEB 1974), as well as all translations of Seneca the Elder.

The fact that Valerius Maximus is the first preserved source to refer to this episode may not be a coincidence, given the close generic interaction between Valerius' work and the widespread practice of *declamatio* in his cultural milieu: Bloomer suggests that Valerius' collection of rhetorical *exempla* not only drew material from what was heard in declamatory exercises, but was even designed to influence these rhetorical exercises, which were the most highly esteemed public art forms in Tiberian Rome.[26] Commenting on the generic identity of Valerius' work, Welch points out that it blends elements of declamation and historiography, since, like the former, it is concerned with turns of phrases and moral dilemmas, and, like the latter, it is concerned with presenting and preserving past events.[27]

The eventual implications of the exploitation of the scene under study both by declaimers of the Early Imperial period and by Valerius, whose cultural interaction with the genre of *declamatio* is generally acknowledged, will be discussed later, in the examination of the role this episode plays in the different ancient sources and in shaping and reshaping a relevant tradition. For the moment, it should be underlined that Valerius Maximus chooses to include in his positive *exempla de humanitate et clementia* a scene commemorating Caesar's *memoria*, which was apt to be used by both historians and declaimers. Following Valerius, when Pompey's head was presented to Caesar, it aroused even the victor's pity (*etiam ipsi uictori miserabile*):

> *ut enim id Caesar aspexit, oblitus hostis soceri uultum induit ac Pompeio cum proprias tum et filiae suae lacrimas reddidit, caput autem plurimis et pretiosissimis odoribus cremandum curauit. Quod si non tam* ***mansuetus animus*** *diuini principis extitisset, paulo ante Romani imperii columen habitum—sic mortalium negotia fortuna uersat—inhumatum iacuisset.* (Val. Max. 5.1.10)
>
> For when Caesar saw it, he forgot the role of enemy and put on the countenance of a father-in-law and gave tears to Pompey, his own and

26 See Bloomer 1992: 3-4, 7-9, 12-13, 17, 47, 60-62, 78, 146, 153-54.

27 See Welch 2013 (esp. 67-68). Langlands 2008: 160-61, also argues that Valerius' work is better understood within the context of the practice of *declamatio*, especially in the aspect of "controversial thinking".

> his daughter's too; and he had the head cremated with an abundance of the costliest perfumes. If the **heart** of the divine leader had not shown itself so **gentle**, he who a little while before had been looked upon as the crown of the Roman empire (so does Fortune turn the affairs of mortals) would have lain unburied. (Transl. Shackleton Bailey - LOEB 2000)

Caesar's attitude is praised as consistent with his roles of father and father-in-law. The phrase *uultum induit* might be taken to allude only to an external (and thus perhaps hypocritical) reaction by Caesar, but the rest of the paragraph allows no doubt on the positive stance towards the leader, who is here meant to function as a positive *exemplum*: if he had not offered Pompey a proper burial, because of his *mansuetus animus*, the body would have been left unburied.[28] The "punch-line" is once again the most important element in this exploitation of the anecdote; the minor details elaborated only in this version of the anecdote, referring to the meticulous care taken by Caesar for the burial of Pompey (*caput autem plurimis et pretiosissimis odoribus cremandum curauit*), appear as a prelude to the moral conclusion of the anecdote regarding the gentle heart of Caesar.

The most elaborate account appears in the epic poem *Pharsalia*, where Seneca the Elder's grandson, Lucan, generally portrays Caesar in unflattering tones.[29] As soon as he arrived in Egypt, an attendant of Ptolemy (*satelles regis*) appeared, carrying Pompey's head as a gift, and tried through a short but solemn speech to value the beheading of Caesar's enemy as a service to him (9.1010-32). The invented speech delivered by Ptolemy's attendant, whose exact identity does not interest the narrator, is cited only here, in order to increase the dramatic tension of the scene. When then describing Caesar's weeping[30], Lucan highlights his hypocrisy, which appears as the moral conclusion of the scene and the reason for its inclusion in the narrative:

28 See Blommer 1992: 211.

29 See Tschiedel 1985: 12-18; Wick 2004: *ad loc.*; Radicke 2004: 478-89; D'Alessandro Behr 2007: 60-70.

30 Cf. Hagen 2017: 212-16, on the scenes of weeping of other heroes in Lucan at the sight of the dead Pompey.

Sic fatus opertum
detexit tenuitque caput. Iam languida morte
effigies habitum noti mutauerat oris.
Non ***primo*** *Caesar damnauit munera uisu*
auertitque oculos; uoltus, dum crederet, haesit;
utque fidem uidit sceleris tutumque putauit
iam bonus esse socer, lacrimas ***non sponte*** *cadentis*
effudit gemitusque expressit pectore ***laeto****,*
non aliter manifesta potens abscondere mentis
gaudia *quam lacrimis, meritumque inmane tyranni*
destruit et generi mauolt lugere reuolsum
quam debere caput. (Luc. 9.1032-43)

With these words he took off the covering from the head, and held it in his hands. By now the features, relaxed by death, had changed the aspect of that familiar face. When Caesar first saw it, he did not condemn the gift nor turn away: his eyes were fixed upon the face till he could be sure. Then, when he saw the proof of the crime, and thought it safe at last to be the loving kinsman, he shed crocodile tears and forced out groans while his heart rejoiced. By tears alone was he able to hide his obvious delight; and thus he belittles the king's horrid service, preferring to mourn the severed head of his kinsman rather than owe obligation for it.[31]

All the details added, including the changed aspect of the mutilated head, the gestures made by Caesar to ensure that Pompey was indeed dead, and the focalisation upon the inner thoughts and feelings of the protagonist, are placed in the service of the pointed moral conclusion of the anecdote: Caesar was cruel and a hypocrite. In a dramatic apostrophe to Caesar, Lucan declares that these tears were not sincere (9.1047-62). The speech then delivered by Caesar (9.1064-104) reveals his selfish motives: he complains that the Egyptians' initiative deprived him of the most important privilege of civil war: the power of granting life to the defeated (9.1066-

31 Translations of Lucan are from the Loeb edition (Duff 1928).

68); he then expresses his anger at Ptolemy's interference in Roman affairs, which contested Caesar's absolute authority (9.1068-78), and stresses that the same reception would have been prepared for him, had he not been the victor (9.1079-88). In the final part of the speech, he orders that Pompey should be given a proper burial and expresses his deep sorrow for his son-in-law's destiny and for a lost opportunity for reconciliation (9.1091-104). Lucan ensures that Caesar's performance will not deceive the readers, by concluding with the onlookers' scepticism. The addition of the onlookers, as minor protagonists of the scene, and the dramatic elaboration of their gestures and inner feelings, which is unique in all extant sources, are there to seal the moral of the story by also increasing dramatic tension:

> *Nec talia fatus*
> *inuenit fletus comitem nec turba querenti* 1105
> *credidit: abscondunt gemitus et pectora laeta*
> *fronte tegunt, hilaresque nefas spectare cruentum,*
> *o bona libertas, cum Caesar lugeat, audent.* (Luc. 9.1104-08)
>
> Thus he spoke, but found none to share his weeping; nor did the hearers believe his complaint; they hid their sorrow and veiled their feelings with a mask of rejoicing; though Caesar mourns, they dare—how gracious the privilege! —to look with cheerful faces at that sight of blood and crime.

Plutarch's account in the *Lives of Pompey* and *Caesar* is much briefer and much more favourable to Caesar. In line with the biographer's overall inclination to the pathetic element, Plutarch places emphasis on the emotions of the general at the sight of Pompey's head:

> Τοῦτο Πομπηΐου τέλος. οὐ πολλῷ δὲ ὕστερον Καῖσαρ ἐλθὼν εἰς Αἴγυπτον ἄγους τοσούτου καταπεπλησμένην τὸν μὲν προσφέροντα τὴν κεφαλὴν ὡς παλαμναῖον ἀπεστράφη, τὴν δὲ σφραγῖδα τοῦ Πομπηΐου δεξάμενος ἐδάκρυσεν· ἦν δὲ γλυφὴ λέων ξιφήρης. Ἀχιλλᾶν δὲ καὶ Ποθεινὸν ἀπέσφαξεν. (Plut. *Pomp.* 80.5)

> This was the end of Pompey. But not long afterwards Caesar came to Egypt, and found it filled with this great deed of abomination. From the man who brought him Pompey's head he turned away with loathing, as from an assassin; and on receiving Pompey's seal-ring, he burst into tears; the device was a lion holding a sword in his paws. But Achillas and Potheinus he put to death. (Transl. Perrin—LOEB 1917)

> εἰς δὲ Ἀλεξάνδρειαν ἐπὶ Πομπηΐῳ τεθνηκότι καταχθεὶς Θεόδοτον μὲν ἀπεστράφη τὴν Πομπηΐου κεφαλὴν προσφέροντα, τὴν δὲ σφραγῖδα δεξάμενος τοῦ ἀνδρὸς κατεδάκρυσεν· [...] τοῖς δὲ φίλοις εἰς Ῥώμην ἔγραφεν ὅτι τῆς νίκης ἀπολαύοι τοῦτο μέγιστον καὶ ἥδιστον, τὸ σῴζειν τινὰς ἀεὶ τῶν πεπολεμηκότων πολιτῶν αὐτῷ. (Plut. *Caes.* 48.2)

> Arriving at Alexandria just after Pompey's death, he turned away in horror from Theodotus as he presented the head of Pompey, but he accepted Pompey's seal-ring, and shed tears over it. [...] And to his friends in Rome he wrote that this was the greatest and sweetest pleasure that he derived from his victory, namely, from time to time to save the lives of fellow citizens who had fought against him. (Transl. Perrin—LOEB 1919)

Commenting on *Caes.* 48.2, Pelling rightly stresses that Plutarch "leaves the impression that the tears are simply of distress for a former friend and relative", although the last phrase (τῆς νίκης ... πολιτῶν αὐτῷ) "may also hint at disappointment at losing a chance to display clemency."[32] This nuancing remark is consistent with the theme of Caesar's pursuit of δόξα, which runs through the whole *Life of Caesar*,[33] but the biographer does not seem to question the frankness of Caesar's horror and sadness at the moment of staring at his adversary's severed head. Plutarch's fa-

32 Pelling 2011: *ad loc*. The cited passages have surprisingly not attracted scholars' attention. On Plutarch's *Caesar*, see Pelling 2002. On Plutarch's *Pompey*, see Beneker 2005b, who examines the rise and fall of Pompey, but without dealing with *Pomp.* 80. Beneker 2005a, focuses on thematic correspondences between Plutarch's *Lives of Caesar, Pompey*, and *Crassus*, but does not mention this episode.

33 See Santangelo 2019: 335-39.

vourable stance towards Caesar in this scene is also reflected in the biographer's choice, in *Pomp.* 80.7, to indirectly associate the murderers' execution with Caesar's indignation by placing the first immediately after the second.[34] As already stressed, Caesar's intervention in Egypt plays out as a normalising factor, since the killers are punished, and the remains of Pompey are then handed over to his wife Cornelia.[35] Plutarch here either follows a pro-Caesarian source, or has no other at his disposal.[36]

The reference to Theodotus and the seal-ring of the defunct, details which also appear in Livy's *Periocha*, may reflect Plutarch's dependence upon Livy or a common source favourable to Caesar. These details, however, should not necessarily be analysed as reflecting Plutarch's interest in historical accuracy. As Saller has argued, anecdotes provided, above all, the biographers with the sort of material they required for the characterisation of their protagonists.[37] The information added by Plutarch about a letter addressed by Caesar to his friends in Rome (*Caes.* 48.2), along with the punishment of the Egyptian murderers, points to the clemency of the protagonist only towards his Roman enemies, as one of his virtues or policies.

This pro-Caesarian conclusion is shared by all sources examined up this point except Lucan. The poet's clear anti-Caesarian stance might point, however, to the existence of a parallel tradition or at least to its creation by the Roman epic poet. Cassius Dio's version of the episode also falls into a tradition hostile to Caesar.

> Ὁ δ' οὖν Καῖσαρ τὴν τοῦ Πομπηίου κεφαλὴν ἰδὼν κατεδάκρυσε καὶ κατωλοφύρατο, πολίτην τε αὐτὸν καὶ γαμβρὸν ὀνομάζων, καὶ πάνθ' ὅσα ποτὲ ἀλλήλοις ἀνθυπουργήκεσαν ἀναριθμούμενος. Τοῖς τε ἀποκτείνασιν αὐτὸν οὐχ ὅπως εὐεργεσίαν τινὰ ὀφείλειν ἔφη, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπεκάλει, καὶ ἐκείνην κοσμῆσαί τε καὶ εὐθετῆσαι καὶ θάψαι τισὶν ἐκέλευσε. 2. Καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν τούτῳ ἔπαινον ἔσχεν, **ἐπὶ δὲ δὴ τῇ προσποιήσει γέλωτα ὠφλίσκανε**· τῆς γὰρ δυναστείας δεινῶς ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἐφιέμενος,

34 The association becomes explicit in App. *B Civ.* 2.13.90: Ποθεινὸν μὲν καὶ Ἀχιλλᾶν ἐκόλασε θανάτῳ τῆς ἐς τὸν Πομπήιον παρανομίας.

35 See Santangelo 2019: 335.

36 Wick 2004: 426.

37 Saller 1980: 72-73.

καὶ ἐκεῖνον καὶ ὡς ἀνταγωνιστὴν καὶ ὡς ἀντίπαλον ἀεί ποτε μισήσας, 3. καὶ τά τε ἄλλα ἐπ' αὐτῷ πάντα πράξας καὶ τὸν πόλεμον τόνδε οὐκ ἐπ' ἄλλο τι παρασκευάσας ἢ ἵνα ἀπολομένου αὐτοῦ πρωτεύσῃ, τότε τε ἐς τὴν Αἴγυπτον οὐ δι' ἄλλο τι ἐπειχθεὶς ἢ ἵνα αὐτόν, εἰ περιείη, προσκατεργάσαιτο, ποθεῖν τε αὐτὸν ἐπλάττετο καὶ ἀγανακτεῖν τῷ ὀλέθρῳ αὐτοῦ ἐσκήπτετο. (Cass. Dio 42.8)

Now Caesar at the sight of Pompey's head wept and lamented bitterly, calling him countryman and son-in-law, and enumerating all the kindnesses they had shown each other. As for the murderers, far from admitting that he owed them any reward, he actually heaped reproaches upon them; and he commanded that the head should be adorned, properly prepared, and buried. 2. For this he received praise, **but for his hypocrisy he incurred ridicule**. He had, of course, from the outset been very eager for dominion; he had always hated Pompey as his antagonist and rival, 3. and besides all his other measures against him he had brought on this war with no other purpose than to secure this rival's ruin and his own supremacy; he had but now been hurrying to Egypt with no other end in view than to overthrow him completely if he should still be alive; yet he feigned to mourn his loss and made a show of vexation over his murder. (Transl. Cary - LOEB 1916)

Cassius Dio places even more emphasis than Lucan on the contradiction between Caesar's merciful attitude on this occasion and the fierce way he had pursued victory over him (cf. Luc. 9.1047-48, 1057-58). Furthermore, he adds an important detail when describing the onlookers' reactions: the Roman general was laughed at for his hypocrisy (cf. Luc. 1106-08, cited above). It is difficult to determine whether this aspect was added by the historian or whether he had drawn it from earlier accounts, now lost. In any case, this detail strengthens the moral "punch-line" of the story in the last part of the cited passage, in a way which is more elaborate and more explicit than in any other version of the anecdote. Dio's anti-Caesarian version is an exception to the general pro-Caesarian tendency of later historiographical sources, including Appian, Eutropius,

Orosius and the unknown author of *De viris illustribus*, who refer to the episode very briefly, by drawing some details from earlier sources.[38]

To sum up, the different exploitation of the various elements (chronological and physical settings, characters, minor details, and "punchline") of the anecdote on Caesar's emotional reaction to the sight of Pompey's mutilated head reflects an ideological stance toward Caesar. The way this episode is commemorated in each source can sometimes be also attributed to its generic particularities or limitations and to its moralising intentions, especially in the cases of the *Periochae*, the declaimers, Valerius Maximus and Plutarch. Nevertheless, it always depends on the particular way each author positions himself toward an ambivalent figure of the civil wars, Caesar, and thus decides to pursue his *memoria*. In this context, two ideological and historical traditions were shaped regarding the scene under study: a clearly or rather pro-Caesarian, which focuses on the leader's emotion at the sight of his dead enemy, and an anti-Caesarian, which stresses Caesar's hypocrisy and selfish motives.[39] The first tradition is most prevalent in the extant tradition, whereas the second is only represented by the epic poet Lucan and the historian Cassius Dio, even though negative nuances may be discernible but not explicit in the declamatory tradition, namely Moschus.

The differences observed in the constitutive elements of the anecdote, and especially the opposing moral conclusions drawn from it, reflect its plasticity depending on the ideological interpretation of the incident by later authors. It should not be overlooked, when exploring the reception of this episode in later sources, that this small case study is inscribed in the larger context of the imperial representation and remembrance (*memoria*) of the republican factual past (*historia*). Gowing has convincingly argued that, in contrast to the modern perception, Romans of the early imperial period did not envisage a sharp distinction

38 App. *B Civ.* 2.13.90: τὴν δὲ κεφαλὴν τοῦ Πομπηίου προσφερομένην οὐχ ὑπέστη, ἀλλὰ προσέταξε ταφῆναι... *De vir. Ill.* 77.9: *qui non continens lacrimas illud plurimis et pretiosissimis odoribus cremandum curauit*. Eutr. 6.21.3: *Quo conspecto Caesar etiam lacrimas fudisse dicitur, tanti uiri intuens caput et generi quondam sui*. Oros. 6.15.29: *Caesar conpositis apud Thessaliam rebus Alexandriam uenit perlatoque ad se ac uiso Pompei capite anuloque fleuit*. See also Zonar. 10.10 (p. 365, 6-10).

39 See on the same point Tschiedel 1985: 5-6.

between *historia* and *memoria*. It was required of any Roman author, as it is to a lesser extent by modern interpreters of the past, to give their proper meaning to the past and decide what to remember and how. *Historia* was any attempt to transmit the past and pursue its memory (*memoria*) regardless of the factual reliability of each source and regardless of the genre (historiography, poetry, epistolography etc.) involved in preserving and handing down the memory of the past. The distinction between "fiction" and "non-fiction" seems mostly a modern concern.[40] These blurred limits also apply to the scene of Caesar's mourning upon Pompey's head, and this is reflected in the different versions of the episode:[41] there is a part emanating from "factual" history and a part which could be attributed to the tendency of ancient authors to pursue the memory of Caesar or the civil wars in a specific way.[42]

It seems, of course, impossible to distinguish between what *in fact* took place and which details may have resulted from continuous later re-adaptations and re-interpretations of the anecdote for reasons pertaining to politics, literature or different sources. In other words, since Caesar himself did not attempt to promote a particular *memoria* of himself through this episode, we should rely on our survey of other extant sources, in order to briefly examine the place of each source in the progressive shaping of a tradition relevant to this episode and thereby to Caesar's *memoria*. We will thus be able to outline the eventual history of

40 See Gowing 2005: 7-15 (esp. 9-12) for this discussion on the relationship between *memoria* and *historia* of the Republican past during the Early Empire. See also Gallia 2012 (esp. 1-11) on the dynamics of *memoria* of the Republic during the Imperial period, especially during the Flavian period. On the representation of late Republican civil wars in the historiography of the Imperial period, see Lange & Vervaet 2019: passim.

41 Cf. Heinen 1966: 72 n2, who defends the episode's historicity, although noting that similar scenes appear in Plut. *Pyrrh.* 34.4; *Ant.* 78.2. Cf. Tschiedel 1985: 4, who points to the difficulty of distinguishing between fiction and historicity when dealing with scenes reproducing the *topos* of the victor weeping over the vanquished dead, the episode under study included. See along the same lines Hagen 2017: 59-61 and Vekselius 2018: 155-66 (esp. 159-61), generally on the scenes of weeping in ancient historiography.

42 See in a similar context Devillers & Sion-Jenkis 2012, where scholars focus on the reception of Caesar's figure in individual authors, mostly of the Augustan period.

this tradition and seek one or more archetypical versions of the episode in sources other than Caesar himself.

III. The shaping of the literary tradition on the episode

The extant sources studied in the third part of this paper can be divided into two major categories according to their genre: a) "historiographical-biographical", which include Livy's *Periocha*, Valerius Maximus, Plutarch, Dio Cassius and the other later historians who only make a brief mention of the scene (Appian, Orosius, Eutropius and Zonaras); and b) "rhetorical-declamatory", which include the two testimonies from Seneca the Elder. Our study of the literary tradition should thus be divided into these two parts. Lucan, who is our most extensive source for the episode, does not belong to either of the two genres, but, as will be pointed out, he draws from both historiographical and declamatory sources and approaches in order to construct his own account. Accordingly, our investigation will bring out the intersection and interaction between the "historiographical" and the "declamatory" branch in the creation, development, enhancement and diffusion of a tradition on Caesar's mourning upon Pompey's head.

1. Historiographical *Quellenkritik*

The investigation of the episode's historiographical tradition is mostly a question of *Quellenkritik* aiming to assess the trustworthiness of extant sources relating it, and secondarily one of *Quellenforschung*, which only permits few certainties. As Saller pertinently notes: "We can rarely determine whether the first author known to us transmitting a particular story invented it, altered it, or was just passing it on. What is more important, most of our ancient sources, especially those living generations or even centuries after the incident, would have been similarly incapable of determining ultimate origins, since notice of original authorship rarely accompanied the anecdote."[43] Therefore, the purpose of both approaches (*Quellenkritik* and *Quellenforschung*) will not only be to determine the historiographical context in which this anecdote was probably

43 Saller 1980: 69-70.

shaped, but also, and more importantly, to understand how it turned into a widespread version of history. Were there one or more common sources of this story?

It is important to clarify in advance that we are not concerned here with the creation of a tradition on Pompey's beheading, but specifically with the scene of Pompey's head presented to Caesar, who becomes indignant at the spectacle. Caesar does not mention Pompey's decapitation, probably, as already stressed, being unwilling to include disturbing details of his adversary's death. However, as Martin pointed out, we know that the victim's beheading after his execution became a common practice in the late Republican civil wars. Even if the horrific details of Pompey's decapitation provided by Lucan (8.663-91) are not necessarily accurate, there are no grounds to challenge the sources' consensus that Pompey was beheaded.[44] It seems, therefore, a reasonable assumption that his severed head would also be preserved in order to be presented to Caesar[45], on the Egyptians' initiative or at Caesar's request. The general's reaction, however, regardless of if there actually was one, has progressively generated a tradition in different and much more numerous sources, whose exact course will be investigated.

Let us then start our investigation from sources closer to the facts. The very first mention of Pompey's death in September 48, was made by Cicero in a letter to Atticus in December 48. He refers to it as to an expected outcome, given Pompey's pitiful situation, but without making any allusion to the method of Pompey's execution or the presentation of Pompey's head to Caesar:

> *3. [...] De Pompei exitu mihi dubium numquam fuit. Tanta enim desperatio rerum eius omnium regum et populorum animos occuparat ut quocumque uenisset hoc putarem futurum. 4. Non possum eius casum non dolere; hominem enim integrum et castum et grauem cognoui.* (Cic. *Att.* 11.6.3-4)

44 See Martin 2005: 151-53.

45 Martin 2005: 153-56, shows that, contrary to the unanimity of sources on the destiny of Pompey's head, two traditions arose regarding Pompey's corpse: one created by Asinius Pollio and another created by Cremutius Cordus. See also *ibid*: 156-60, for a discussion on the embalmment of Pompey's head.

> 3. [...] As to Pompey's end I never had any doubt, for all rulers and peoples had become so thoroughly persuaded of the hopelessness of his case that wherever he went I expected this to happen. 4. I cannot but grieve for his fate. I knew him for a man of good character, clean life, and serious principle. (Transl. D. R. Shackleton Bailey - LOEB 1999).

Cicero's omission of Caesar's reaction might be easily explained: even if Plutarch says that Caesar arrived in Egypt "not long afterwards" (οὐ πολλῷ δὲ ὕστερον), Cicero or his addressee Atticus may not have been informed of that incident. Furthermore, the inclusion of such a detail might seem unnecessary or even risky in a brief letter, in which Cicero, stuck in Brundisium, wishes to justify his decision of quitting the war and Pompey's side after the battle of Pharsalus, and to inform Atticus about his communication with Caesar's partners, Balbus and Oppius, in an attempt to guarantee his own standing (Cic. *Att.* 11.6.1-2). If Cicero had chosen to mention the incident, he would have been forced to interpret it in favour of Caesar or against him, which is something he might prefer to avoid. Cicero's omission does, however, constitute an indication that, in the immediate aftermath of Pompey's death, a tradition relevant to the famous scene of Pompey's head presented to Caesar may not yet have become so widespread that it should be mentioned as a necessary complement to the story of Pompey's death.

As already pointed out, the first accounts to include the anecdote are the *Periochae*, if one considers that they reproduce Livy's text, and Valerius Maximus, composed during Tiberius' reign.[46] The relative proximity to the events of the civil wars cannot be a compelling argument for concluding that the two sources reproduce exactly what happened in factual history, for different reasons in each case. Let us start our *Quellenkritik* with Valerius, since this analysis seems especially valid in his case, whereas some trends found in Valerius' preserved and more elaborate narrative will provide us with hints on the characteristics and purpose of Livy's account of the episode.

The following aspect of Valerius' work should be the first to be taken into account in evaluating the extent to which the author has altered the

46 See Wardle 1998: 1-6.

anecdote: the reconstruction of what actually happened was not always the primary goal of *Facta et dicta memorabilia*. In the preface, Valerius announces that he collected in one single work memorable deeds and words (*facta simul ac dicta memoratu digna*), dispersed in other authors; he clarifies that he pretends neither to exhaustivity, nor to a "more scrupulous accuracy" (*adtentiore cura*) or "more distinguished eloquence" (*praestantiore facundia*)[47] than his predecessors. Valerius' statement might be interpreted as a façade of humbleness[48], but the writer's moralistic agenda, which had an impact on his method of dealing with sources[49], cannot be doubted. Valerius' primary purpose is to provide his audience in general with *exempla*, an aim which may lead him to a reinterpretation or even manipulation of his sources according to his ethical or political agenda.[50] Gowing rightly insists, more precisely, on the political dimension of Valerius' *exempla*, discussing how Valerius tends, through exclusion, inclusion or manipulation of stories, to fashion a memory of the Republic which emphasises how the stability established by Augustus and Tiberius allowed the permanence of Roman Republican values.[51] The episode un-

47 I adopt the translation of Wardle 1998: *ad loc.* See on Valerius' programmatic statements Bloomer 1992: 14-17.

48 Cf. Wardle 1998: *ad loc.*, who denies Valerius such subtlety.

49 On Valerius' method of dealing with sources see Bloomer 1992: 59-146.

50 David 1998: 9-17, 119-30, stresses the rhetorical and exemplary dimension of Valerius' work, which leads him to reinterpret his sources. On the function of Valerius' *exempla* and their questionable trustworthiness, see Lucarelli 2007 (esp. 121-25, 282-92). Wardle 1998: 12-15, concludes that Valerius' work had both a moral and a practical purpose, the latter consisting in providing orators with material for *declamatio*. Bloomer 1992: 1-10, 16-17, analyses Valerius' *exempla* as means of persuasion consistent with Greek and Roman rhetorical theory. In her discussion of the function of *exempla* in Valerius' work, Langlands 2008: 160-64, argues that the arrangement of *exempla* in sequences under ethical categories is designed to enact their readers' moral reasoning skills in a context of controversial thinking, encouraged by the development of *declamatio*. *Idem* 2011 argues, through comparison with Cicero's use of *exempla* in *De officiis*, that Valerius promotes an idea which is central to Roman ethics, namely that when reading *exempla*, one has to bear in mind the principle of situational variability: circumstances are important in judging one behaviour to be correct or not.

51 Gowing 2005: 49-62

der study illustrating Caesar's *mansuetudo* seems ideally suited to this ideological agenda. Furthermore, an *exemplum* need not be historically accurate; Cicero's standpoint that orators are even allowed to lie when they want to illustrate in a more expressive way the *mores* involved in the description of an episode or a person[52] is probably extreme, but it does point to a rather loose connection between exemplarity and accuracy during this era. In the context of the use of anecdotes as *exempla*, whether the characterisations and details of the anecdotes were accurate mattered far less than the didactic purpose of each anecdote, which usually required stereotyping and adaptation of details to the intended moral lesson.[53]

The same analysis cannot be adopted for Livy. The exemplary dimension of the *AVC* is explicitly stated in *praef.* 10.[54] It should not, however, be dismissed that, as opposed to Valerius, Livy stresses his attachment to the principle of *ueritas*: in *praef.* 5, he clarifies that he prefers to relate early Roman history, not because the narration of late Republican Roman history could divert the historian's mind from truth (*etsi non flectere a uero*), but because it might cause him anxiety. Moreover, Livy is a historical source, much closer to the civil wars than the biographer Plutarch and later historians like Appian and Cassius Dio, where the episode is related. It is, certainly, extremely difficult to determine whether the author of *Periocha* 112 drew the episode from Livy or from another source.

There is no consensus regarding the importance of the divergences between the *Periochae* and Livy's text. Did the epitomist copy directly and exclusively from Livy, or from an intermediate *Epitoma Liuiana*? In either case, to what extent did he consult other sources apart from Livy? I am personally more convinced by Jal's analysis, who examined all divergences between Livy's extant books and the corresponding *Periochae* proposed by Bingham and reduced the number of real ones to only a dozen,

52 See Cic. *Brut.* 42; *De or.* 2.241.

53 See on this point Saller 1980: 72.

54 The scholarship on the exemplarity in Livy is extensive. See ex. Moles 1993: 167-68; Kraus & Woodman 1997: 53-56; and esp. Chaplin 2000: 1-5, 50-72, who focus on Liv. *praef.* 10.

in which the author was also inspired by other sources or variants; the theory of existence of an intermediate *Epitoma* should be dismissed.[55]

Could it, however, be still adduced that the author did not derive the episode under study from Book 112, but simply added it as a variant tradition found in other sources? Such additions seem untypical: Bingham's and Jal's comparisons provide no similar instance of the *Periochae* of extant Books containing "novelistic" episodes not related at all in Livy's narrative.[56] Moreover, it has been persuasively pointed out that Lucan's account of the civil war is to a significant extent dependent on Livy's lost books;[57] Bloomer's systematic examination of Valerius' dealing with sources has also revealed the author's preference for Cicero and Livy.[58] The fact that the scene of Pompey's head presented to Caesar appears in Lucan, Valerius and in Livy's *Periochae* can thus hardly be a coincidence: it is impossible to be certain, but it should be admitted that the episode was most probably indeed narrated by Livy.

Livy's alleged "Pompeianism" is another reason one can legitimately assume that he would be particularly interested in including such an anecdote. In Tacitus' *Annales*, the historian Cremutius Cordus, accused of having praised Brutus and Cassius in his work, states that Livy lavished such eulogies on Pompey that Augustus called him *Pompeianus*; yet this did not harm their *amicitia* (Tac. *Ann.* 4.34.4). This statement is put forward as an argument of defence in the mouth of Cordus, who probably exaggerates regarding not only the friendship between Livy and Augustus, but also Livy's praise of Pompey.[59] Tacitus' testimony should not thus

55 See Jal 1984: XXVI-LXVII (esp. XXXIX-XLVII); cf. Bingham 1978 (esp. 444-71); Bessone 1984; *idem* 2015.

56 See Bingham 1978: 88-405 (esp. 389-405); Jal 1984: XXXIX-XLVII.

57 See Narducci 2003; Mineo 2010.

58 Bloomer 1992: 59-146 (esp. 64-70, 75, 78, 104, 138, 146), with earlier bibliography.

59 Mette 1961: 277-78; Walsh 1961a: 28, 32-33; and Badian 1993: 11, among others, have taken this passage as evidence for Livy's attachment to the Republican ideology. Others have emphasised Livy's friendship with the prince. See ex. Burck 1991: 270.

lead to the conclusion that Livy would sketch a negative portrayal of Caesar in the episode under study.[60] In the *Periocha*, it is only stated that Caesar became indignant and wept when they brought him Pompey's head and ring (*cum ei Theodotus caput Pompei et anulum obtulisset, infensus est et inlacrimauit*). If this text reflects Livy's account, the historian may have presented the scene as an anecdote, found in his sources, and illustrating Caesar's *clementia*, a theme pervading the *Periochae* dedicated to the civil wars between Pompey and Caesar (see Liv. *Per.* 110.1, 111.7, 114.8).[61] The episode was probably exploited by Livy, because it was consistent with the historian's ideological and narratological agenda.

The latter factor could explain the omission of the scene under study in authors of the Early Imperial Period, that is to say during a period where the episode was already well attested. They do, however, report Caesar's arrival in Egypt. Strong inferences based on omissions are, of course, difficult to make, given the very different level of detail in the various sources. Nevertheless, the historians' silence needs to be studied, given that they most probably came across this scene in their sources, Livy included.

Velleius Paterculus only stresses the disloyalty of Ptolemy and his court towards Caesar and Pompey (Vell. Pat. 2.54.1), and mentions nothing about the scene, whereas he had not failed to provide details about the circumstances of the general's death (Vell. Pat. 2.52.1-4). When introducing Caesar, he stresses that the general "lays hold upon his pen and compels him, despite his haste, to linger a while upon him" (Vell. Pat. 2.41.1: *qui scribenti manum iniicit et quamlibet festinantem in se morari cogit*); he then paints a positive portrait of the general and includes in his narrative anecdotes illustrating his virtues (Vell. Pat. 2.41-43). The absence of the incident under study seems thus unexpected despite the narrative

60 See along the same lines Tschiedel 1985: 6. See more generally on Livy's probable portrayal of Caesar in his lost books Mineo 2012, who argues that Caesar was presented as an ambivalent figure by Livy, but the historian also insisted on the equal responsibility of both him and the Pompeians for the outbreak of civil wars. Hoyos 2019: 225-27 shows that despite registering merit as the winner of civil wars, Caesar is not an admired Livian figure. Cf. Strasburger 1983 who suggests that Livy's presentation of Caesar was merely negative and consistent with his republican spirit.

61 On the theme of Caesar's *clementia* in Livy's *Periochae* of the civil wars, see Vassiliades 2020: 208-10, with earlier bibliography, and Hoyos 2019: 225-26.

haste characterising an epitomizing work, like Velleius' history. This omission may reflect the historian's general ambivalence when referring to Pompey and Caesar. As Seager pointed out, Velleius' attitude to Pompey, who was personally related to his grandfather, was sometimes eulogistic and sometimes disparaging.[62] As far as Caesar is concerned, Velleius praises his clemency, but does not whitewash him, as he does with Octavian.[63] Therefore, Velleius may have excluded the scene from his narrative in order to avoid an interpretation for or against one of the protagonists.

Nor does Suetonius refer to the incident in his *Life of Caesar*, despite his general interest in anecdotic details and despite the fact that he elaborates other examples illustrating Caesar's *clementia* and *moderatio* (Suet. *Iul.* 75), and also Caesar's *arrogantia* (76).[64] The episode could, at first sight, be exploited in this context and be interpreted in a positive, negative or ambivalent manner for the protagonist. It should be observed, however, that Suetonius does not include in these paragraphs' anecdotic details or emotional reactions of ambiguous interpretation, but only concrete strategic and political decisions by Caesar. The scene of Pompey's head presented to Caesar would not fit as well in his short narrative of the civil wars (Suet. *Iul.* 34-35), at the beginning of which he stresses that he will only make a summary of the events after the crossing of the Rubicon (Suet. *Iul.* 34.1: *summa rerum*). Accordingly, he provides instead a brief account of Caesar's arrival and war in Egypt (Suet. *Iul.* 35.1). The brevity of this narrative has been associated with Suetonius' emphasis on the speed of Caesar's military successes, which seal the view that war and ultimate victory were Caesar's divine destiny.[65]

Although largely dependent on Livy, Florus' narration of the events is also succinct, but more complicated, because it is not certain whether the author merely omits the scene or makes an implicit allusion to it:

62 Seager 2011.

63 See also Cowan 2019: 249-54, on the equally ambivalent characterisation of Caesarians and Pompeians in Velleius Paterculus.

64 For the ambivalent character of Caesar's *clementia* see Lossau 1975. More generally on Caesar's characterisation by Suetonius, see Henderson 2014, who sees an overall negative portrayal of Caesar in Suetonius; cf. Wardle 2019.

65 See on this point Wardle 2019: 398-404.

> *Quippe cum Ptolemaeus, rex Alexandriae, summum ciuilis belli scelus peregisset et foedus amicitiae cum Caesare* ***medio Pompei capite*** *sanxisset, ultionem clarissimi uiri manibus quaerente Fortuna causa non defuit.* (Flor. 2.13.54-55)
>
> Since Ptolemaeus, king of Alexandria, had perpetrated the crowning atrocity of the civil war and had sealed a treaty of friendship with Caesar **by means of Pompeius' murder**, fate called for vengeance for the shade of so illustrious a victim; and an occasion soon presented itself. (Transl. Foster - LOEB 1929)

Pompey's execution, described with horrific details in §2.13.53 (*Septimi desertoris sui gladio trucidatus sub oculis uxoris suae liberorumque moreretur*), is the *summum ciuilis belli scelus*. Nothing was said, however, about Pompey's beheading. Florus states here that Ptolemy had tried to seal a treaty of friendship (*foedus amicitiae sanxisset*)[66] with Caesar by means of Pompey's life (*medio Pompei capite*). The term *caput* may simply designate Pompey's life,[67] but could also refer to Pompey's severed head. One should not lose sight of the fact that Florus only provides a summary of the events of the civil wars, with particular emphasis on the major events and their causes.[68] Various comments in his account show that Florus considers Caesar's and Pompey's *furor* and *dominandi cupido* equally responsible for the civil wars (Flor. 1.47.13; 2.13.3, 12-14). An indirect allusion to an anecdotic episode, already well-established in the previous tradition[69] and

66 Florus does not refer to an actual treaty concluded between Caesar and Ptolemy, since all sources refer to hostilities which began between the two sides upon Caesar's arrival in Alexandria. It seems thus more sensible to assign the subjunctive *sanxisset* a tentative meaning ("he had attempted to seal a treaty"). See Cic. *Sest.* 10.24; Liv. 23.8.11; 25.16.6, where the phrase *foedus sancire* does not refer to an actual treaty but to a gesture aiming to obtain the other part's alliance.

67 See *OLD*, s.v. *caput* 4.

68 See Berge 2019 on the interpretation of civil wars and their causes in Florus.

69 Emberger 2006 shows that Florus had used, for his account of the civil wars between Pompey and Caesar, not only Livy, but also Lucan, who reports this scene in detail.

which would, moreover, demand an ideologically oriented interpretation in favour of Caesar or Pompey, does not thus seem consistent with the overall scope of Florus' narration.

The choice of reproducing an anecdote or not should not thus be attributed to the ignorance of such a tradition; it seems rather associated with the generic particularities and the narrative and ideological purposes of each author of this period's history. The different exploitation by Lucan of the episode of Pompey's head presented to Caesar is of particular interest, because it points exactly to the plasticity of this scene, according to the ideological and generic particularities of each text, and because it offers valuable insight into the parallel influence exercised by declamation upon a historiographical tradition. Despite the fact that Lucan reports the episode as factual, it cannot be overlooked that there is, overall, a large element of invention in his account of the events surrounding Pompey's death and its aftermath: Martin has shown that the poet invents horrific details regarding the actual scene of Pompey's beheading;[70] Caesar's visit to Troy, immediately preceding the scene under study, appears in no other source and is generally considered fictional.[71] The construction of the episode under study also points to the prevalence of the rhetorical and dramatic over the historical aspect: Wick highlights not only the tragic elements pervading Lucan's narrative, but analyses the scene as a whole, including the speeches of Ptolemy's attendant and Caesar, as a "*dramatiesierte* declamatio" debated in the style of a *controuersia*.[72]

The large element of invention in Lucan's narrative is further reflected in the poet's strongly critical stance towards Caesar.[73] If Lucan is indeed the first source to turn the incident against the Roman leader, this reveals his original reinterpretation of sources[74], which is consistent with the rhetorical construction of the episode: as an orator, Lucan chooses a

70 Martin 2005: 151-53.

71 See on this Borgeaud 2009-2010: 344-46; Ambühl 2015: 337.

72 Wick 2004: 424-28.

73 See, among others, Bartsch 2010; Tschiedel 2010; Tzounakas 2013; Sannicandro 2014; on Lucan's generally negative portrayal of Caesar.

74 See on this Tschiedel 1985: 12-15.

frontal attack on Caesar, by turning the hero's tears into crocodile tears.[75] We will discuss in the final paragraphs of this section what Lucan's "declamatory" reinterpretation of the episode could imply in our investigation of the possible sources of this scene.

Cassius Dio's version is important for the same reasons as Lucan's version. Given that he is the only anti-Caesarian source except Lucan, his version may depend on the poet's original treatment.[76] The new information reported in Dio, namely that Caesar was laughed at for his hypocrisy by the attendees, would be in this case his own reinterpretation of Lucan. Such an adaptation would be consistent with the overall emphasis Dio places on the hatred and envy of Caesar's opponents.[77] It cannot, of course, be ruled out that both Lucan and Cassius Dio had at their disposal an earlier source, now lost. Actorius Naso and Tanusius Geminus are the only late Republican historians, for whom evidence can be provided that they had a hostile stance towards Caesar.[78] Nevertheless, information about their work is extremely scattered and their probable use as sources by Lucan or Cassius Dio cannot be demonstrated. No legitimate assumption can be thus formulated regarding their eventual treatment of the episode under study.

Things are somewhat less difficult when attempting to discover a possible pro-Caesarian source upon which Plutarch and Valerius Maximus - and maybe Livy[79] - could be based. Plutarch mentions his sources in the *Lives of Pompey* and *Caesar*, among which are found the names of Asinius Pollio (Plut. *Pomp.* 72.3; *Caes.* 32.7, 46.2-3) and C. Oppius (Plut. *Pomp.* 10.4-

75 See Wick 2004, 427: for this reading.

76 See Tschiedel 1985: 6-8; see also Radicke 2004: 482-89, for a detailed comparison between Lucan and Cassius Dio.

77 See Madsen 2019 for more details on this point.

78 See *FRH*, I, 390-94, with earlier bibliography. Martin 2005: 162, assumes that Lucan's and Cassius Dio's accounts might be dependent from Cremutius Cordus. Nevertheless, Cassius Dio asserts that the historian said nothing against Caesar and Augustus, even if he did not too much praise them (Cass. Dio 57.24.3). Radicke 2004: 482-91, argues that both Lucan and Cassius Dio depended on Livy.

79 It cannot be excluded that Plutarch is based on Livy in his account of the scene under study. Livy is quoted twice as a source (Plut. *Caes.* 47.3-6, 63.9). Plutarch's use of Livy for the history of this period seems, however, limited and not systematic. See Pelling 1979: 88, 95; *idem* 2011: 48-49.

5; *Caes.* 17.7-11). Pollio's attitude to Caesar is unlikely to have been purely favourable: after all, he had to win a readership for his own competing narrative of the civil war, and he criticized that of Caesar for lack of objectivity.[80] It does not follow, however, that this rather critical evaluation of Caesar as a historian would be reflected in an equally negative stance towards Caesar as a general and leader. Opinions vary regarding Asinius' exact attitude towards Caesar:[81] some suggest that he was just an unbiased historian[82], whereas others argue that he wrote a partisan history[83]. An *a priori* hostile standpoint towards Caesar seems, at any case, difficult to assume, even if it has been rightly suggested that Asinius' history rectified some of Caesar's omissions, while expressing more horror at civil war.[84] Besides, Asinius was already among Caesar's friends when the general crossed the Rubicon, and fought alongside him[85]. Therefore, if the scene of Pompey's head presented to Caesar were found in Pollio, there is no concrete reason for us to believe that the historian's interpretation of the event would not be at least neutral, if not positive, and that he would intend instead to denigrate his benefactor through this episode. How probable is it that he indeed included the incident and, if so, to what extent could he be considered a primary source for it?

Pelling has stressed Pollio's influence on Plutarch's account in both *Lives*.[86] The biographer clearly states that his account of the battle of Pharsalia is based on Pollio (Plut. *Pomp.* 72.3; *Caes.* 46.2-3). If Asinius indeed included the scene under study, his autopsy of related events, which seems to have been a major claim of Pollio,[87] raises the possibility that the tradition related to this anecdote was generated by the histo-

80 See Suet. *Iul.* 56.4.

81 See on this point *FRH*, I, 441.

82 See Kornemann 1896; Hose 1994, 263-64.

83 See Bardon 1956, 94; Zecchini 1982, 1284.

84 Osgood 2019: 155.

85 See Plut. *Caes.* 32.7, and *FRH*, I, 431. On Pollio's life and work, see André 1949; Zecchini 1982.

86 Pelling 1979: 84-95; *idem* 2011: 44-47.

87 On the self-construction of Pollio as a trustworthy eyewitness, see Morgan 2000.

rian. An allusion to the episode cannot be excluded, especially if one accepts the view that Asinius narrated Pompey's death.[88] The problem is, however, not only that no mention is made of it in Pollio's fragments, but also, and more importantly, that the historian most probably did not follow Caesar in Egypt, but returned to Rome to hold the tribunate in 47 B.C.[89] Even if the scene of Pompey's head presented to Caesar did appear in Pollio's narrative, the author could not assert first-hand knowledge and could only include it as an anecdote reported by people of Caesar's entourage in Egypt.

The second possibility is C. Oppius, a close friend of Caesar, who wrote a biography or some other sort of memoir on Caesar.[90] Plutarch cites him as a source for anecdotes in which Caesar is depicted in praising tones (*Caes.* 17.7-11) and Pompey is accused of cruelty (*Pomp.* 10.4). The biographer shows his scepticism of Oppius' trustworthiness by stating that one must be cautious about believing him, when he talks about the enemies or friends of Caesar (*Pomp.* 10.5). It has been suspected, however, that Oppius was Plutarch's source for many biographical details, especially about Caesar's early life.[91] Oppius is described by Saller 1980, as one of the rare cases where the ultimate source of anecdotes can be named.[92]

There are also strong indications that in his collection of anecdotes aiming to illustrate Caesar's qualities without much chronological order[93], the author included anecdotes from Caesar's action in Egypt: Suetonius reports that Oppius mentioned in a book that he published that the boy who Cleopatra said was Caesar's son was not his (Suet. *Iul.* 52.2); he also asserts that there was a disagreement in Antiquity as to whether the author of the *Bellum Alexandrinum* was Hirtius or Oppius (*Iul.* 56.1). The latter possibility, unanimously dismissed by modern scholarship[94], may be due to the inclusion of anecdotes from this war in Oppius' work.

88 See Moles 1983: 287-88; Morgan 2000, who analyse Verg. *Aen.* 2.554-558, as an allusion to Pollio's account.

89 See Plut. *Ant.* 9.1-4, with Sumner 1971: 260-61, and *FRH*, I, 431.

90 See *FRH*, I, 381

91 See Townend 1987; Pelling 2011: 49-50, Zecchini 2011: 31-33; *FRH*, I, 382.

92 Saller 1980: 77-79.

93 See Townend 1987 (esp. 340-42); *FRH*, I, 382. On Oppius' idealistic portrayal of Caesar, see also Zecchini 2011: 32-33.

94 See on this point *FRH*, I, 381, with earlier bibliography.

There are thus reasons, but no proof, permitting us to assume that Oppius could be the ultimate historiographical source of the novelistic scene of Pompey's head presented to Caesar. If this assumption is correct, Oppius' partisan tendency, already stressed by Plutarch, is an indication of an ideological reworking of the events related in this episode, especially given that Oppius had no first-hand knowledge of anecdotes related to Caesar's action abroad, being active on his behalf in Rome.[95] This does not suggest that Oppius necessarily invented the episode, but that he picked up an anecdote and reinterpreted it according to his ideological agenda, perhaps adding or adapting relevant details.

Why would Oppius or any other author circulate such an incident? Zecchini stressed that after Caesar's death, many anecdotes on the leader were shaped by his friends, especially Oppius, whose purpose was to establish as a myth an idealised image of Caesar.[96] Regarding the episode under investigation, it can be assumed that, departing from the reality of Pompey's beheading and Ptolemy's political exploitation of it through the possible presentation of the head to Caesar, widespread literary *topoi* could be used to stage Caesar's reaction at the sight of his enemy's head in a way consistent with this general political purpose. Inversely, one could exploit elements from Caesar's historical reaction, either because they fitted these *topoi* or, more probably, to make them fit these *topoi*. The first was the *topos* of the leader crying upon his enemy's defeat: Marcellus is said to have wept for Syracuse[97] and Scipio Aemilianus for Carthage (Polyb. 38.21-22). The closest parallel, however, is an incident reported by Plutarch (*Pyrrh.* 34.4-5), probably drawn from earlier Greek sources: Alcyoneus presented Pyrrhus' head to his father Antigonus, who, angry at his son's impiety, burst into tears; then (like Caesar) he offered his enemy a proper burial. Similarly, when Dercetaeus showed Octavian Marc Antony's sword smeared with blood, Octavian wept for his ex-relative (*Ant.* 78). The opposite behaviour is criticised: Marius' joy and impiety when he saw the severed head of the orator Antonius is classified

95 For a synthesis of testimonies on Oppius' life and action, see *FRH*, I, 380-81.

96 Zecchini 2011: 33-34.

97 See Liv. 25.24.11; Plut. *Marc.* 19.1; with Rossi 2000; Marincola 2005.

among the *exempla de crudelitate* in Valerius Maximus (§9.2.2); the curiosity of Marc Antony staring at the head of Caesetius Rufus is included in the *exempla de superbia* (§9.5.4).[98]

It cannot be proved either that all these anecdotes were merely fictional, or that the author(s) who initiated the tradition about the episode of Pompey's head presented to Caesar had in mind these examples, some of which are later than Caesar's death. It can be asserted, however, that weeping over the dead enemy's head is interpreted as a sign of the leader's sensitivity, and that such scenes form a *topos* exploited for the heroes' characterisation.[99] Regardless of the historicity of each episode involving tears, which can only be checked separately and to a limited extent[100], it may be concluded that authors drawing on this *topos* would be more interested in promoting the qualities or vices of their hero and in adapting the anecdote to their narrative agenda, rather than ensuring that every detail they reported in their version of the facts (*memoria*) entirely corresponded to the factual history (*historia*).[101] The same applies to the scene which has Caesar as a protagonist,[102] even when the anecdote is reproduced by historians like Livy, who stressed their attachment to the principle of *ueritas*.

2. The role of *declamatio*: diffusion and inflation of a historical anecdote?

The degree of the ideological or literary reworking of the anecdote of Caesar's reception of Pompey's death can only be evaluated, if one envis-

98 According to Wick 2004: 424-28, Lucan may have used these accounts as models for the construction of his episode. See also Tschiedel 1985: 3-4, on these *topoi*.

99 For tears as a means of persuasion and characterisation of heroes in imperial historiography, see Hagen 2016; *idem* 2017: 320-27. Vekselius 2018: 164-65, also argues that the Hellenistic motif of the weeping victor can be used apologetically to protect the idealised image of a protagonist, especially in Plutarch.

100 See on this point Hagen 2017: 59-61, 321; Vekselius 2018: 159-61.

101 Similarly, Saller 1980: 77-78, stresses that even when it can be deduced that different sources rely on the same source, they seem unconcerned about following their written sources precisely.

102 Vekselius 2018: 164-65, adds an alternative narrative function of Caesar's tears, suggesting that this tragic motif used in the narration of Caesar's victory foreshadows, as in other cases of weeping generals, the fall of the weeper himself as a result of his victory.

ages the eventually crucial role of *declamatio* in turning this historical anecdote, probably deriving from and circulating among Caesar's "circle", into a mainstream version of history during the Early Imperial period. Besides, we know that more generally, Caesar's reaction to Pompey's murder was a debated topic in declamatory schools, as we learn from Quint. *Inst.* 7.2.6: *quomodo laturus sit Caesar, si Ptolemaeus Pompeium occiderit*. Furthermore, let us recall that in his *Controuersiae*, Seneca the Elder includes more precisely the scene of Pompey's head offered to Caesar and the latter's humane reaction in the arguments used by declaimers of the Tiberian age, namely Moschus and Musa. The biographical information on Moschus renders such a reconstruction more probable: Moschus was, according to Seneca (*Controv.* 2.5.13), an *Apollodoreus*, a pupil of Apollodorus, who was the rhetor chosen by Caesar to take charge of the education of C. Octavius, the future Augustus, in 45 B.C.[103] This detail reveals the proximity of Moschus, and probably of other declaimers, to the Caesarian milieu, which might explain the use of this incident in declamatory exercises. Given the general tendency of *declamatio* to exploit historical anecdotes[104], the possibility cannot be dismissed that Moschus, or any other declaimer, picked a variant of this story from Oppius or someone else in the Caesarian milieu or even Caesar himself (through Apollodorus), to exploit it as a declamatory material, probably accentuating its emotional aspects. In the latter case, the declaimers used well-established declamatory *topoi*.

The element of tears is a variation included in late Augustan declamation, which was keen to present dramatic episodes. This is often reflected in Seneca's *Controuersiae*, where various Augustan declaimers stage family members, especially fathers, weeping at the loss or ill fate of their relatives.[105] Tears offered a number of variant *colores*, the third part of a *declamatio*, used to defend a particular line of argument: through the device

103 See Suet. *Aug.* 89.

104 For the use of historical anecdotes in orators, especially Valerius, who borrows this method from declamation, see Bloomer 1992: 4-5, 8-9.

105 The details of each episode are irrelevant to our argument. The status of the "weeping protagonist" involved in each case is noted in parentheses. See Sen. *Controv.* 1.1.8, 14, 17 (father); 1.5.1 (mother); 1.7.17 (father); 2.3.4 (father); 4 *praef.* 6 (a declaimer father); 7.1.12 (sons); 7.4.5, 9 (wife); 7.6.15 (father); 7.7.8, 16, 17 (father);

of *colores*, declaimers tried to alter the interpretation of facts, in order to intensify or mitigate the blame of the accused; the declaimer could invent and introduce anything he wished to support his case: clever twists, motives, intents, background stories, character traits, events, etc.[106] In the case of the scene under study, Caesar's tears could be introduced or simply reinterpreted, in order to mitigate Caesar's responsibility for Pompey's cruel end.

This is not meant to suggest that any fact used in declamation is merely fictional. I do not intend to thoroughly discuss here the question of the declamation's relationship with reality, but it should be noted that recent scholarship has highlighted the tendency of *declamatio* to (re)construct and refigure reality not to encourage empty rhetoric, but to provide a moral lesson.[107] As Saller points out, aspiring orators were even urged to invent a story, if applicable *exempla* from history were not available:[108] Cicero stresses that historical *exempla* and those with some verisimilitude were the most powerful, but sometimes even an invented story, however unbelievable it may seem, can be apt to touch the audience (*fabula etiam nonnumquam, etsi est incredibilis, tamen commouet* - Cic. *Part. or.* 11.40). Cicero's advice may not represent the usual practice followed in rhetorical exercises, but it does point to their subjective relationship with reality, which also has an impact on the (re)interpretation of historical facts, especially when it comes to historical anecdotes[109] such as that studied in this paper.

More importantly, the *declamatio*'s subjective relationship with events of the past does not stay within the boundaries of this rhetorical genre, but influences historiographical accounts. The anecdotes surrounding Cicero's execution are a telling example of this generic intersection, especially given that some aspects of the story are similar to the scene of

7.8.2 (mother and father); 9.3.5 (father); 9.5.2 (grandfather); 9.6.1, 8, 11, 12, 17 (sister); 10.1.1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 (son).

106 For a more developed discussion of *colores*, see Sussman 1978: 41-43; Fairweather 1981: 166-78; Roller 1997: 113-14; Burkard 2016: 108-32, with updated bibliography.

107 Beard 1993 examines the mythic features of *declamatio*, which he analyses as an important part of Roman mythmaking. See Gunderson 2003: 17-24 for a discussion on the interplay between fiction and reality in Roman declamation.

108 Saller 1980: 71.

109 See on this point Bloomer 1992: 161-63.

Pompey's head presented to Caesar. Seneca deals with Cicero's death in three declamations, in which declaimers turn a historical fact into an opportunity for invention: in *Suasoriae* 6 (*deliberat Cicero an Antonium deprecetur*) and 7 (*deliberat Cicero an scripta sua comburat, promittente Antonio incolumitatem si fecisset*), Cicero is envisaged as wondering, after the announcement of proscriptions, whether he should avoid execution or not, by begging Antony to pardon him (*Suas.* 6) or by burning his writings (*Suas.* 7). In *Controuersia* 7.2, Cicero's killer Popilius is accused *de moribus*, for his ingratitude: Cicero had defended him when accused of parricide and he was acquitted, but when Cicero was proscribed, Popilius was sent by Antony to execute him and brought his head back to Antony.

The scenarios are completely hypothetical and Seneca himself admits that many details are invented by the declaimers: Cicero would not be so stupid (*stultus*) or fearful (*timidus*) even to think of begging Antony (*Suas.* 6.14), which is why only Asinius Pollio reports this information, because his narration is generally malicious against Cicero (*Suas.* 6.24); the charge of parricide against Popilius is also probably a declamatory fabrication (*Controv.* 7.2.8). Based on Seneca's statements and a thorough analysis of his text, Roller and Lentano shed light on the large amount of fabrication in these declamations. Distinguishing himself from Homeyer, who tries to establish the main sources (*Hauptquellen*) of the written tradition on Cicero's death[110], Roller argues that the mostly oral tradition of *declamatio*, on which declamatory invention had a considerable impact, played a major role in the transmission and formation of the historiographical tradition as well.[111] Focusing on the *Controuersia* 7.2, Lentano suggests that the figure of Popilius, presented in the *declamatio* as the ungrateful killer of Cicero, is largely a declamatory fabrication, which should be attributed to Augustus' attempt to manipulate and rewrite recent history through *declamatio*, in order to blame only Antony for Cicero's death.[112]

110 Homeyer 1964. For other accounts of Cicero's death, see Liv. *Per.* 120; Val. Max. 5.3.4; Vell. Pat. 2.66; Plut. *Cic.* 48-49; App. *B Civ.* 4.19-20; Cass. Dio 47.8.3-4, 11.1.

111 Roller 1997.

112 Lentano 2016. See also Roller 1997: 124-28, who suggests that the entire tradition that Cicero defended Popillius, on any charge, and delivered a speech on his behalf, is a declamatory fabrication that originated as a *color*.

The somewhat blurred boundaries between historiography and declamation, whose transgression can be encouraged by the ideological agenda of Augustus, can provide insights for the interpretation of the scene under study. Seneca draws a general distinction between declamation and historiography: in *Suas.* 6.16, he apologises for citing in the next paragraphs historiographical treatments of Cicero's death and promises to return soon to *declamatio*. Nevertheless, as Roller points out, he also effaces that distinction when he presents the historiographical accounts of Cicero's death (*Suas.* 6.16-24). The latter are indeed pervaded by declamatory material, such as ironic *sententiae* and vivid descriptions of Cicero's violent torture.[113]

But there is one further element pertaining to violence and emotions which is found both in the scene of Pompey's head presented to Caesar and in the account of Cicero's death, in *declamatio* and historiography, and which may therefore reveal a similar generic interaction. Seneca reports Antony's and the Roman people's different reactions in front of Cicero's severed head and mutilated body, by claiming as his source both declaimers in the *Controuersia* 7.2 and historians in the *Suasoria* 6. Antony would not believe that Cicero was indeed executed by Popilius, unless he was shown proof (*Controv.* 7.2.3: *signum*), which would be Cicero's head (*Controv.* 7.2: *caput eius ad Antonium retullit*); according to Livy, at the sight of Cicero's head, Antony orders that Cicero's head and hand be displayed on the *rostra*, where Cicero had delivered polemic speeches against him (*Suas.* 6.17); Cremutius Cordus adds that Antony was happy with the spectacle (*Suas.* 6.19: *quibus uisis laetus Antonius*).[114] On the contrary, the Roman people could not conceal their tears at the sight of Cicero's mutilated head and hands, and this is stressed in both *declamatio* (*Controv.* 7.2.5) and historiography, and more precisely in Livy, who states that the Roman citizens could barely watch with their tearful eyes the spectacle of Cicero's severed members (*Suas.* 6.17), in Cremutius Cordus (*Suas.* 6.19) and Bruttedius Niger, who focuses on the audience's thoughts and feelings (*Suas.* 6.20-21). All these emotional reactions, which remind us of the

113 See Roller 1997: 119-24 for a detailed analysis of declamatory elements in these historiographical accounts.

114 Similar accounts of Antony's reaction are preserved in later sources. See Plut. *Cic.* 49.1; App. *B Civ.* 4.20; Cass.Dio 47.8.3-4, 11.1-2.

presentation of Caesar's emotions in front of Pompey's severed head, seem ideally suited to be used as a declamatory *color* by both declaimers and historians, in order to highlight Antony's violent and inhumane character, which turned against the sentiments of the Roman people. Roller convincingly points out that the exercises on Cicero's death were formulated early in the Augustan era or even during the triumviral period, which dating makes the generic interaction between historiography and declamation possible.[115]

Such an interrelation between historiography and declamation should not be considered exceptional, given that rhetorical training had been shaping historiography from the late Republican period onwards. In *De Oratore* and *De Legibus*, Cicero analyses history as an *opus oratorium*, a literary genre which should conform to the norms of rhetoric.[116] Accordingly, scholars, since the late 20th century, have shown that historiography was viewed by ancient historians as an artistic creation based on the norms of rhetoric,[117] and that the rhetorical dimension of historical works assumed progressively greater importance.[118] Furthermore, it is generally admitted that historians received a rhetorical education.[119] Rhetorical exercises, in the form of *declamationes*, were, of course, part of this education.[120] Furthermore, ancient students in Greek and Roman schools of the Late Republican and Early Imperial period were using historical content, including anecdotes, in their rhetorical exercises

115 Roller 1997: 115-19.

116 Cic., *De or.* 2.12.51-15.64; *Leg.* 1.1.5 sq. On the relationship between historiography and rhetoric in Cicero, see Cape 1997.

117 See among others Wiseman 1981; Fornara 1983: 134 sq.; Woodman 1988; Nicolai 1992: 31-176; Kraus, Marincola & Pelling 2010.

118 See on this and generally on the evolution of historiography as a *genre* Ledentu 2004: 33-46, 99-122, 199-248. See also Timpe 1979: 97-119 (esp. 97-105, 116-17); Petzold 1993; Walter 2003.

119 See among others Timpe 1979: 116-17; Wiseman 1981: 388-90; Nicolai 1992: 156-76.

120 For *declamatio* as a part of rhetorical education, see among others Kaster 2001; Stroh 2003: 5-6, 12-13, 19-20, 31-33; Bernstein 2013: 165-70. Cf. Hömke 2007, who shows that *declamationes* were not only used for education but also for entertainment.

(προγυμνάσματα).[121] Gibson pointed out that in Greek rhetorical schools of this period, the exercise in anecdotes encouraged students to attach moral significance to the actions of historical persons, and that they were sometimes expected to add some "historical" details in their elaborations of anecdotes, which could be easily incorporated in histories or biographies.[122]

In Roman contexts, it is noteworthy that Livy, the first attested authority on the scene of Pompey's head exposed to Caesar, is said to have been familiar with this rhetorical method in his history. The historian dealt with the reaction of Antony and the Roman people to the sight of Cicero's severed members following a logic which seems consistent with declamatory *colores*.[123] Blurring the boundaries between historical truth and declamatory reshaping, Livy interpreted a historical event, namely Cicero's death, within a declamatory framework, in order to provide a characterisation of his protagonists through the portrayal of their emotional reactions. Such a manipulation of historical material could have operated in the similar account of Caesar's reaction to the sight of Pompey's severed head. Livy's close relationship with declamatory schools is moreover attested by Seneca the Elder, who mentions that Livy attended the performance of *declamationes*: audiences tolerated his son-in-law's mediocre declamations showing respect for Livy (Sen. *Controv.* 10 *praef.* 2), while the historian also took part in an argument on translating epigrams (*Controv.* 9.1.13-14).[124] Declamatory influence can also be detected in other passages of Livy's *Ab Vrbe Condita*, such as the Alexander digres-

121 See Nicolai 1992 on the relation of προγυμνάσματα with Roman history and historians; Gibson 2004 for the use of προγυμνάσματα with historical content in Greek schools. For the teaching of Roman history in Roman schools see Ferrill 1978.

122 See Gibson 2004. According to Beck 2003, Plutarch used these collections of anecdotes in his works.

123 *Contra* Keeline 2018: 230-40 argues that Livy's treatment, as cited by Seneca, is rather uninfluenced by *declamatio*, on the grounds that declamatory exercises on Cicero's death had not flourished until Livy produced his account.

124 See on the same point Kraus 1994: 3-4, against Syme 1959: 427, who denies Livy's acquaintance with *declamatio*. On Livy's rhetorical education, see Walsh 1961b: 3, 219-44, focusing on the historian's use of rhetorical theory in the construction of his speeches.

sion, dealing with the hypothetical scenario of an expedition of the Macedonian general to the West[125], and the scene of Flamininus executing a Gaulish slave with his sword, in order to please a boy or a prostitute[126], where Livy's vocabulary echoes Seneca's *controuersia* 9.2: in both texts, Flamininus is accused of polluting the dinner table with the blood of an innocent victim for the sake of a prostitute.[127]

It is not only Livy's historiographical treatment of Caesar's reaction to the sight of Pompey's severed head that may be pervaded and inflated by declamatory elements. Without excluding a historiographical source, such as Oppius or Livy, Valerius' and Lucan's accounts were also influenced by *declamatio*. We have seen that Valerius' work was addressed to orators practising *declamatio* and that Valerius, himself an orator, blends historiographical and declamatory elements in his *exempla*. His version of the scene under study, regardless of its eventual historiographical sources and their actual content, could thus be elaborated and reinterpreted following the devices of *declamatio*. The same stands for Lucan, who as a grandson of Seneca the Elder attended declamatory schools and practised *declamatio* himself,[128] and whose treatment of the scene has already been analysed by scholars as a dramatised declamation. Lucan, however, chooses a different *color* to the one used in the extant declamations, which is consistent with his generally negative portrayal of Caesar, by pointing to the general's hypocrisy and by turning the hero's tears into crocodile tears.

It must be underlined that when Livy, Valerius and Lucan, who are the first extant or attested sources, dealt with the episode under study, they

125 See Liv. 9.17-19. On the declamatory form of this digression, see Oakley 2005: 188. See also Sen. *Suasoria* 1, on Alexander's plans to cross the Ocean. Alexander's history provided various subjects for declamations in Greek and Latin. See for a relevant collection Pernot 2013: 133-59. For a discussion on the place and function of Alexander's digression in Livy, see among others Morello 2002; Briquel 2015.

126 According to Livy, he found these two versions in Valerius Antias and Cato (Liv. 39.42.11-43.5).

127 Compare Livy's judgment in Liv. 39.43.4 with Sen. *Controv.* 9.2.4-7. See Van der Poel 2009: 339-42, on Flamininus as *exemplum* in Seneca's *Controuersia* 9.2.

128 See on this matter Bonner 1966, who also discusses the influence of *declamatio* in his *Pharsalia*. See also Rutz 1970; Mancini 2018. See Berti 2015, generally on the systematic generic interaction between poetry and *declamatio*.

probably had at their disposal a much more elaborate form of *declamatio* on this anecdote than the two short *sententiae* of Moschus and Musa, since Seneca the Elder does not report complete declamations, but rather provides a fragmentary *florilegium*.[129] It is thus impossible to evaluate the degree of originality of each author regarding the early historiographical and declamatory tradition developed at the same or a previous time. It can be stated, however, with relative safety, that the historiographical and declamatory traditions contaminated each other in handling the memory of Caesar's sorrow before the severed head of his former son-in-law. The absence of the episode from Caesar's *Bellum Ciuile*, the political and idealistic agenda of probable historiographical early sources, and the additional impact of *declamatio* on the memory of this incident, all provide an outline of the first stages of transmission and inflation of this scene, which was henceforth reshaped and reinterpreted by later sources.

The *declamatio* contributed to, or even boosted, the diffusion and the rhetorical reworking of an anecdote, without being concerned about factual history. It sufficed that this representation of the past (*memoria*) was endowed with moral significance, and it was also apt to promulgate the Augustan version of the civil wars, in which agenda the declamation played a significant role.[130] The version of a humane and emotional Caesar unable to stand the sight of the severed head of his enemy and former relative and political friend, tends to exculpate Augustus' adoptive father from an atrocity committed during the civil wars against a great Roman leader, who, despite his hostility to his father, was still appreciated by Augustus.[131]

129 See on the fragmentary and mutilated character of preserved *declamationes* Roller 1997: 111; Gunderson 2003: 20.

130 See Bloomer 1992: 192-95, on the role of *declamatio* in promulgating the Augustan version of the civil wars. Generally, on the memory of the Republic during Augustus, see Gowing 2005: 17-27.

131 There are several testimonies attesting Augustus' esteem for Pompey. Aug. *Anc.* 20.1: Augustus restored Pompey's theatre without inscribing his own name. Suet. *Aug.* 31.9: instead of destroying Pompey's statue, the *princeps* transported it from the *curia*, where Caesar was assassinated, to Pompey's theatre. Plut. *Cic.* 49.3-4: Pompey's *imago* was present at Augustus' funeral. According to Frisch 1980: 97-98, Pompey was even included among the *summi uiri* of the *forum Augustum*.

IV. Conclusion

The anecdote portraying Caesar weeping over Pompey's head has been used in this paper as a case study to show that the limits between "factual history" (*historia*) and the reworked representation of this "factual history" (*memoria*) are blurred and to a large extent indistinguishable, when it comes to the representation and reception of the Roman civil wars in ancient literature. The brief analysis of the extant narratives of later sources on this incident has revealed the different role it played in each of these sources, which tended to adapt it to their own ideological, moralistic and generic particularities and purposes, or simply to omit it, probably because it was irrelevant to these. This adaptation was most often affected by changing minor details and minor characters, in order to draw a pointed conclusion, favourable or unfavourable to Caesar, in each case. The general was presented respectively either as a clement and humane leader or as a hypocrite responsible for Pompey's fate. Caesar's intended *memoria* was thus a crucial factor in the chosen version of the episode.

This survey on the alterations of the anecdotes has also allowed us to track the possible history of creating and reshaping a literary tradition on this anecdote. The scene in which Pompey's head is exposed to Caesar, who weeps and expresses his indignation, is absent from *De bello ciuili* for reasons which can only be speculated upon. This omission, however, raises the question of the historical and literary context in which this anecdote was generated. Our investigation of sources has led us to the hypothesis that the anecdote was probably introduced to the written tradition by pro-Caesarian historians in the immediate aftermath of Caesar's death. The diffusion of such a scene served to establish an idealised myth of the general. *Declamatio* not only picked up and reworked this historical anecdote, but also probably played a major role in its broader diffusion. The historiographical tradition on this episode was probably influenced in its early stages by declamatory exercises which enriched it with pathetic details. This episode thus provides a telling example of the generic intersection and interaction between historiography, *declamatio* and poetry during the Early Imperial period.

Furthermore, the history of the anecdote brings us to the third question examined by Saller 1980: the implication of the anecdote as historical evidence. A simple separation between what is historically "authentic" and what is "fictional" is not of course possible, especially when dealing with sources of that period, but it is methodologically fragile to suppose confusion between the two in the case of an anecdote like the one under study. The different exploitation of the incident in various sources confirms Saller's point that the purposes of each author and an anonymous tradition lie behind all alterations: "this does not mean that all anecdotes are entirely or even partially fabrications; there may be kernels of truth in them, but there is no method for separating truth from fabrication. [...] Rarely serving as evidence for what actually happened, anecdotes should be evaluated and interpreted according to whether they reflected ideology or beliefs about reality" (Saller 1980: 79, 82). The same conclusion is valid for the anecdote of Pompey's head presented to Caesar, whose history of transmission invites modern historians and scholars of Antiquity to prudence: rather than using the episode as a historical fact for reconstructing and understanding the events of the civil war between Caesar and Pompey, we should rather take it into account as valuable evidence for the reception of the figure of Caesar during the Early Imperial Period.

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RE-EVALUATING THE CHRONOLOGY OF CARACALLA'S REIGN: WHEN WAS CARACALLA IN NICOMEDIA?

By Mads Ortving Lindholmer

Summary: It has become increasingly common to assert that Caracalla wintered in Nicomedia in 213/214 rather than 214/215. This is important because it has led scholars to argue that Caracalla's activities and campaigns in the Balkans are largely invented by ancient historiographers. The present article examines and rejects the evidentiary basis of the new dating and, through an analysis of Caracalla's itinerary and relevant coinage, provides strong support for the theory that Caracalla wintered in Nicomedia in 214/215. This reconstruction significantly influences the wider chronology of Caracalla's reign and restores his activities in the Balkans to the history books.

INTRODUCTION

Caracalla became sole emperor after murdering his brother Geta, probably in December 211, and, after solidifying his hold on power, he then campaigned against the Germans in 213.[1] At some point after this campaign, Caracalla journeyed to the East and never returned to the capital.

1 After Septimius Severus' death on 4 February 211, Caracalla entered Rome in spring, perhaps on his birthday, 4 April: Alföldy 1996: 28, 30; Hekster and Kaizer 2012: 96. Some confusion remains about when Caracalla murdered Geta and became sole ruler: Birley 1988: 189; Vagi 1999, 286-287; Campbell 2005: 16 put Geta's death in December 211 but Hill 1978: 33; Whitby 2007: 133; de Blois 2019: 46 put it in February 212. However, the latter date is based on the Life of Geta in the *Historia Augusta* which is thoroughly unreliable: Rohrbacher 2013: 158. December 211, on the other hand, is based on solid evidence: Cass. Dio 78[77].2.5; Perpetua 7.9, 16.3-4; the Chronography of 354 (under the heading *depositio martyrum*); van Beek 1936: 162. See further Vagi 1999: 287; van Minnen 2016: 212 n. 29 who argue convincingly for December 211. Hereafter, Caracalla campaigned against the Germans and it has sometimes been argued that Caracalla already left Rome in 212 for this purpose: e.g. Rowan 2012: 116;

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On his way, he wintered in Nicomedia and, based on an inscription from the Arval Brethren, scholars have traditionally assumed that Caracalla left Rome in 214 and arrived in Nicomedia towards the end of the year.[2] However, John Scheid broke with this view and, reinterpreting the just mentioned inscription, argued that Caracalla in fact arrived in late 213.[3] This has been widely accepted by the scholars who cite Scheid's work.[4] In Scheid's reconstruction, then, Caracalla left Rome to campaign against the Germans in 212 or 213 and thereafter went directly to Nicomedia with negligible activities along the way.

However, I will argue that Scheid's arguments are problematic: they essentially rest on the assumption that the Arval Brethren did not deviate from tradition in their protocols, but these protocols do in fact exhibit noteworthy inconsistencies. Furthermore, I will show that Scheid's suggestion itself in fact rests on a supposed inconsistency by the Arval Brethren. Importantly, the other existing evidence strongly suggests that Caracalla wintered in Nicomedia in 214/215: firstly, Scheid's reconstruction demands that Caracalla travelled from Mogontiacum to Nicomedia in just over two months, which I will argue is unlikely. Secondly, Caracalla's coinage suggests that he returned to Rome to give a largesse after the Alemannic campaigns of 213 and therefore only set out for Nicomedia in the following year. According to my reconstruction, Caracalla was thus in Rome from spring 211 to spring 214, except for some months

Schöpe 2014: 45. Potter 2004: 141; Davenport 2017: 76 suggest late 212 or early 213. However, an inscription from the Arval Brethren from 11 August 213 shows that Caracalla was just about to cross the *limes* from Raetia at this time (Scheid 1998a: No. 99a, L. 21-23 = CIL VI 2086, 20-22). Furthermore, Caracalla's new title, *Germanicus Maximus*, became common on coins and inscriptions in 214: see e.g. RSC 239, 242 with Southern 2001: 209. This strongly suggests that Caracalla only left Rome in spring or early summer 213. A final important chronological problem of Caracalla's reign is the publication of the *Constitutio Antoniniana*: on this, see recently van Minnen 2016.

2 Inscription: Scheid 1998a: No. 99b2.

3 Scheid 1990: 296-298; 1998a: 288-289; 1998b.

4 See e.g. Letta 1994: 188; Szabó 2003: 139-140: 150; Mráv and Ottományi 2005: 203; Pont 2010: 195; Christol 2012; Hekster and Kaizer 2012: 90; Kovács 2012: 387; Rowan 2012: 132; Christol 2014: 135; Opreanu 2015: 19; Letta 2016: 262; Davenport 2017: 76; Scott 2018: 1; Lafli *et al.* 2019: 144 n. 35. Some scholars still retain the original dating, but they do not mention Scheid's arguments. See e.g. Potter 2004: 143; Peter 2005: 109; de Blois 2019: 48-49.

campaigning against the Germans. The question of when exactly Caracalla wintered in Nicomedia has wide consequences, as I will explore in the last section.

THE ARVAL BRETHREN

So far, the key evidence in the debate regarding Caracalla's stay in Nicomedia has been the protocol of the Arval Brethren, which was inscribed annually in their sanctuary and outlined rituals performed in the previous year by the Arval Brethren. There are two key inscriptions for our purposes and, due to their importance for determining when Caracalla wintered in Nicomedia, I have given them in full. The first inscription (Scheid 1998a, No. 99b1 = CIL VI 2103a)[5] mentions two rituals, performed for unspecified reasons:

[In Capitolio ante cellam Iunonis reginae fratres aruales conuenerunt et immolauerunt per L. Armenium Peregrinum promag(istrum),]
[quod dominus noster Imp(erator) Caes(ar) M. Aurellius] Anto[ninus Pius Felix Aug(ustus) --- Ioui o(ptimo) m(aximo) b(ouem) m(arem) Iunoni reginae b(ouem) f(eminam), Mineruae b(ouem) f(eminam),]
[---, Fe]licit(ati) Aug(ustae) b(ouem) f(eminam), [---. Adfuerunt]
[L. Armenius Peregrinus promag(ister), --- A]grippinus, P. Ael[ius Coeranus iun(ior), ---]
[---. Detulit Primus Co]rnel(ianus) public(us) a comm(entariis) [fratrum arualium.]
[--- in Capitolio ante cellam] Iun(onis) reg(inae) fratr(es) arual(es) [conuenerunt et immolauerunt per L. Armenium Peregrinum promag(istrum),]
[quod dominus noster Imp(erator) Caes(ar) M.] Aurellius Antoninu[s pius felix Aug(ustus) Parth(icus) max(imus)]

5 For the Arval inscriptions, I have used the edition of Scheid 1998a, but for convenience I have provided the number in CIL for the most important references.

[Brit(annicus) max(imus) Germ(anicus) max(imus), p(ontifex) m(aximus), trib(unicia) pot(estate) sexta/septima decima],[6] imp(erator) (tertium), co(n)s(ul) (quartum), proco(n)s(ul), [---]
[--- s]aluus seruatus sit, I[oui o(ptimo) m(aximo) b(ouem) m(arem), Iunoni reginae b(ouem) f(eminam), Mineruae b(ouem) f(eminam),]
[---, Genio Antonini Aug(usti) ta]u ⌜r⌝ (um), Iun(oni) Iuliae Aug(ustae) b(ouem) f(emi[nam), ---.]
[Adfuerunt L. Armenius Peregrinus promag(ister), C. Sulpici]us Pollio, P. Aelius Co[eranus iun(ior), ---]
[---. Detulit Primus Cornelia]nus public(us) a comm(entariis) [fratrum arualium.]

Since Caracalla had been consul four times and imperator three, the inscription dates from either 213 or 214. The second inscription (Scheid 1998a, No. 99b2 = CIL VI 2103b) tells us that, during the consulship of Messalla and Sabinus (ordinary consuls for 214), the Arval Brethren sacrificed in gratitude for Caracalla arriving safely to his winter quarters in Nicomedia. Hereafter, we are told that Caius Sulpicius Pollio (the *promagister*) in place of the *magister* (the leader of the Arval Brethren), Marcus Iulius Gessius Bassianus, sacrificed to various gods, as well as to the *Salus* of the emperor, whereafter the inscription breaks off:

[Mes]salla et Sabino co(n)s(ulibus)
[--- in Capitolio ante cellam Iu]n(onis) reg(inae) [f]ratres aruales conuenerunt ad
[uota soluenda, quod dom]inus n(oster) imp(erator) Caes(ar) M. Aurelius Antoninus pius
[felix Aug(ustus) Parth(icus) max(imus) Brit(annicus) max(imus) Germ(anicus) ma]x(imus), p(ontifex) m(aximus), t(ribunicia) p(otestate) (septima decima), imp(erator) (tertium), co(n)s(ul) (quartum), p(ater) p(atriae), proco(n)s(ul), salu[us
atque incolumis pro securitate prouin]ciar(um) felicissime ad [h]iberna Nicomediae ing[res-]

6 This is from the edition of Scheid 1998a and is meant to indicate that the inscription dates to either 213 (*sexta decima*) or 214 (*septima decima*).

[sus sit, et immolauit C. Sulpicius Polli]o promag(ister) uice M. Iuli Gessi Bassiani mag(istri)
[Ioui o(ptimo) m(aximo) b(ouem) m(arem) a(uratum), Iunoni reg(inae) b(ouem) f(eminam) a(uratam), Mineruae b(ouem)] f(eminam) a(uratam), Saluti Imp(eratoris) Antonini b(ouem) f(eminam) a(uratam), Fort(unae) duci b(ouem)
[f(eminam) a(uratam), --- Lari u]iali (?) t(aurum) a(uratum), Genio Antonini Aug(usti) t(aurum) a(uratum), Iun(oni) Iuliae
[Aug(ustae) b(ouem) f(eminam) a(uratam). Adfuerunt] C. Sulpicius Pollio, P. Aelius Coeranus iun(ior), M. [---]
[---.] (vacat).

Scheid, upon personal inspection of the fragments, has asserted that they fit together, and that CIL VI 2103a therefore should be joined to CIL VI 2103b to form one long inscription.[7] In other words, the latter follows the former chronologically.

In the Severan Age, only ordinary consuls, rather than suffect ones, were used for dating by the Arval Brethren.[8] Therefore, the mention of the ordinary consuls of 214 in the second inscription, and the fact that Caracalla had received the tribunician power seventeen times at this point, has traditionally led scholars to place Caracalla's arrival in Nicomedia in 214.[9] However, there are some difficulties: the annual protocol of the Arval Brethren started with a mention of the new consuls by name in order to provide the year, which was generally followed by an important ritual wishing the emperor health and success on 3 January. Subsequent consular dating normally took the form *isdem consulibus* (under the same consuls) rather than a repetition of the consuls' names.[10] However, in our inscription, the Arval Brethren mention the consuls by name and then move directly to Caracalla's safe arrival in Nicomedia rather than the rituals on 3 January. Wilhelm Henzen, in his foundational edition of the Arval *acta* from 1874, explained this by suggesting that the

7 See especially Scheid 2015.
8 I will discuss this below.
9 See e.g. Halfmann 1986: 224; Kienast 1996: 162.
10 On the Arval Brethren and their praxis, see especially Scheid 1990.

Arval Brethren had simply used the consuls' names again instead of writing *isdem consulibus*, and that the mention of the consuls by name therefore should not be seen as the start of a new annual protocol.[11] This facilitated the traditional view that Caracalla arrived in Nicomedia in 214.

However, Scheid rejected this solution since it contrasted with the Arval Brethren's normal procedure and instead asserted that Caracalla arrived in late 213.[12] He argued that the Arval ceremony thanking the gods for Caracalla's safe arrival in Nicomedia had to postdate 31 December 213, since the new consuls mentioned were inserted on 1 January, but predate the large ceremony on 3 January 214 since this ceremony is not mentioned directly after the consuls as normally. 2 January was a *dies ater* on which no religious ceremonies could take place and Scheid therefore concluded that 1 January was the only option. However, Dio asserts that Caracalla celebrated the Saturnalia (which started on 17 December) in Nicomedia.[13] Scheid therefore suggests that Caracalla arrived just before the Saturnalia and that it hereafter took around two weeks for the news to reach Rome where the Arval Brethren then celebrated Caracalla's safe arrival on 1 January. In Scheid's reconstruction, then, Caracalla was victorious against the Germans in late September and then journeyed immediately to Nicomedia with negligible military activities in the Balkans, arriving at his winter quarters in mid-December.

The scholars who mention Scheid's arguments often treat them as wholly conclusive.[14] However, there seems to be some confusion regarding Scheid's work. The joining of two well-known inscriptions is sometimes presented as new and decisive evidence, supposedly unknown before Scheid: for example, Coriolan Opreanu recently wrote that "the most relevant epigraphic document to our discussion is the new fragment from *Acta Fratrum Arvalium* which attests the presence of Caracalla in his winter headquarters at Nicomedia as early as 17 December 213",[15]

11 Henzen 1874: CIC.

12 Scheid 1990: 296-298; 1998a: 288-289; 1998b.

13 Cass. Dio 79[78].8.4.

14 See footnote 4.

15 Opreanu 2015, 19. See likewise Szabó 2003: 140 who asserts that "eine neulich bekannt gewordene Quelle" shows that Caracalla arrived in Nicomedia in 213 and Kovács 2012: 387 who writes that the "Edition der *neuesten* Fragmente der Fratres Arvales" (my emphasis) is decisive for this question.

and he then refers to Scheid. Furthermore, Scheid himself and his supporters often place great emphasis on the joining of the fragments as key to determining when Caracalla was in Nicomedia.[16] However, this joining of fragments does not, in fact, decisively influence the question of when Caracalla arrived in Nicomedia. Rather, Scheid's argumentation fundamentally rests on his assertion that *Messalla et Sabino consulibus* could not have been a synonym for *isdem consulibus*, as suggested by Henzen, and that the mention of these consuls must have signified the beginning of a new year.[17] This argument is evidently not tied to the joining of the two fragments. If Henzen's suggestion is followed, on the other hand, the second inscription (99b2) simply presents us with a ceremony from some point in 214, regardless of whether it is preceded by the other fragment (99b1), as suggested by Scheid.[18] Thus, Scheid's arguments do not rest on 'new' evidence but essentially on the assumption that the Arval Brethren could not have varied their inscriptional praxis and that their annual records therefore were painstakingly consistent.

The *acta* of the Arval Brethren were indeed often seen as highly monotonous.[19] However, Mary Beard in a lucid article showed that the *acta*

16 See especially Scheid 2015. Supporters: Letta 1994: 188; Christol 2012: 155; 2014: 135; Lafli *et al*. 2019: 144 n. 35.

17 As Scheid 1990: 297 himself points out: "S'il [Henzen] a raison, la question est tranchée, et nous pouvons admettre que les deux cérémonies concernées sont postérieures aux *uota* annuels du 3 janvier."

18 Scheid 1990: 296-298; 1998a: 288-289 are relatively superficial and constitute brief rejections of Henzen's suggestion on the previously mentioned basis that *isdem consulibus* was generally used in the *acta* rather than repeating the names of the consuls. Scheid 1998b is more elaborate and adds new arguments (441-444) which attempt to move the ceremony celebrating Caracalla's arrival in Nicomedia into the Arval protocol of 213, as set out below. Lastly, Scheid 2015 informs us that the joining of the two fragments, which before was only hypothetical, has now been confirmed by personal inspection of the fragments. In this piece, Scheid (2015: 268-269) also argues that the mention of Alpinus as *magister* during a ceremony on 6 October 213 supports his conclusions about the date of Caracalla's stay in Nicomedia. However, this mention of Alpinus belongs to fragment 99a (which is clearly from 213), not to the fragments in question, namely 99b1 and 99b2, and cannot be used to date these. No *magister* is mentioned in 99b1, while Bassianus (*magister* for 214) occupies this role in 99b2.

19 Syme 1980: 1 says that the Arval *acta* are characterised by "repetition and tedium".

also exhibit inconsistencies and change. According to her, "the records of the Arval brethren show striking diversity and variation. The inscribed details of individual ceremonies differed considerably from year to year".[20] Thus, Beard highlighted variation not necessarily in the rituals themselves but in the manner in which they were inscribed. This in itself warns against blindly trusting that the Arval Brethren were always painstakingly consistent. Furthermore, some of the variations are particularly interesting for our purposes: except for the use of *isdem consulibus*, the Arval Brethren generally repeat the names of individuals, such as the *magister*, the *promagister* and the groups of people present at the rites, even when this repetition occurs within a few lines and a form of *idem* would have sufficed. For example, in a largely intact inscription from 38 AD spanning 109 lines, there are 14 instances of *Taurus Statilius Corvinus promagister*, all placed prominently at the beginning of the sentence.[21] However, a few years earlier (33-36 AD, according to Scheid's dating), the expression *idem pró magistro* is used.[22] Here we have the kind of onomastic inconsistency which Henzen suggested and Scheid rejected: generally, the Arval Brethren consistently repeat the name of the *promagister*, but for some reason they deviated from this practice in an inscription from the reign of Tiberius.

This deviation is not unique: for example, in the records of 58, the Arval Brethren present for the ceremony known as the *indictio* are mentioned twice by name, which is the common procedure generally adhered to, but for the same ritual in 59 they are first mentioned by name and hereafter referred to by the phrase: *in conlegio adfuerunt isdem qui supra scripti sunt* (present in the fraternity were the same people who are mentioned above).[23] There are several other examples where the Arval Brethren likewise refer back to a group of individuals without repeating their names.[24] Overall, then, the Arval Brethren almost always repeat the

20 Beard 1985: 127. Scheid 1990: 60-66 notes another form of diversity as he highlights that the length of the Arval records increases drastically in the course of the first century AD.

21 Scheid 1998a: No. 12c.

22 Scheid 1998a: No. 7a, Col. 2, L. 5.

23 Scheid 1998a: No. 27, L. 56.

24 See e.g. Scheid 1998a: No. 100a, L. 16, No. 102, L. 16-17.

names of individuals involved in their ceremonies, but sometimes they deviate from this otherwise consistent praxis. Once it is observed that the Arval Brethren were in fact not painstakingly consistent, it is not impossible that they also occasionally deviated from their normal praxis of writing *isdem consulibus* after mentioning the consuls' names at the start of the annual protocol and simply repeated the names instead.

This suggestion receives support from the fact that the mode of consular dating by the Arval Brethren actually changed significantly during the Severan Age: already in the early part of Tiberius' reign, it is evident that suffect consuls are used by the Arval Brethren to date their various rites.[25] This continues in a strikingly consistent manner all the way until Commodus to the point where the Arval inscriptions are an important source for our knowledge of the holders of suffect consulships. We only have inscriptions for two years during the period 193-213, but it is clear that hereafter the suffect consuls have disappeared from the consular dating in the Arval records.[26] Essentially, then, at some point during either the reign of Septimius Severus or Caracalla, the Arval Brethren instituted a significant change in the way they used the consuls as dating devices in their records, as only the ordinary consuls and not the suffect consuls were now used. If the Arval Brethren could institute such a striking rejection of a tradition that can be traced back to the revival of the priestly college in the early Principate, we cannot completely reject the possibility that other aspects of the traditional procedure surrounding consular dating, such as the use of *isdem consulibus* rather than repeating

25 Scheid 1998a: No. 4, Col. 2, L. 16-17. None of the previous inscriptions entails events that could have been dated by suffect consuls.

26 The only exception is the mention of Elagabalus and Adventus on 14 July 218 (Scheid 1998a: No. 100b, L. 29-30) which, of course, is tied to an anomalous situation: Elagabalus had just become emperor the month before, and the Arval Brethren therefore held the rite that included wishes for the emperor's well-being. This rite normally took place on 3 January and was preceded by a mention of the consuls by name. Deviating from praxis and mentioning the suffect consuls (Elagabalus and his colleague) by name may also have been a way to honour the new emperor, who indeed showed a noteworthy interest in the Arval Brethren as he joined the priestly college: Scheid 1998a: No. 100b, L. 25-29. There is one other possible use of suffect consuls, which Scheid 1998a: 279 tentatively places in 196 but he notes that "les sources ne sont pas claires".

the names of the consuls, could likewise have changed or at least become less consistent in this period.

Indeed, the use of *isdem consulibus* seems to have become significantly less common after Commodus: in one single inscription from the time of Nero, covering around ten months and running to 72 lines, *isdem consulibus* is used 9 times, but in all of the 20 inscriptions after Commodus (mostly dating from the Severan period and several of them lengthy) the expression is only used 3 times.[27] This is even more striking since one would expect a profusion of *isdem consulibus* to replace the names of the suffect consuls which disappeared from the Arval records in this period. With such few instances of *isdem consulibus* during a period in which the use of this expression should increase, and considering the fragmentary state of the evidence, we strictly speaking cannot know whether it remained common praxis during the Severans to use *isdem consulibus* rather than repeating the consuls' names. Importantly, the previous consistency of this praxis cannot be marshalled in support, since another traditional aspect of consular dating in the Arval records, the suffect consuls, demonstrably disappeared under the Severans. Furthermore, the strength of such a praxis often revolves around its frequency, and the scant instances of *isdem consulibus* during the Severans, even if its use was the norm in this period, therefore increases the likelihood that deviations could have taken place.

In sum, the Arval Brethren demonstrably deviated from the well-established pattern of repeating the names of the *promagister* and of the individuals attending the rites and sometimes used a form of *idem* instead; they instituted a significant change in the manner of consular dating at some point in the 190s or 200s, as suffect consuls were no longer used; and the use of *isdem consulibus* decreased drastically in the Severan Age to the point where it is difficult to discern whether its use was normal praxis or not. Against this background, it is possible that *Messalla et Sabino consulibus* was used instead of *isdem consulibus*, as suggested by Henzen. The rejection of this possibility is the foundation for Scheid's arguments and his redating of Caracalla's stay in Nicomedia, and we therefore cannot accept Scheid's conclusions as readily and unquestioningly as some scholars have done so far.

27 Scheid 1998a: No. 27. Scheid 1998a: No. 99a, L. 23-24, No. 102, L. 15, No. 103b, L. 3.

Indeed, once the details are inspected, Scheid's suggestion appears rather improbable and in fact itself relies on an inconsistency from the Arval Brethren: the leader of this religious group, the *magister*, was elected for one year and inserted on 17 December. All ceremonies carried out under a certain *magister* were inscribed in the spring following the end of his term in the sanctuary of the Arval Brethren. Furthermore, each annual protocol was finished by the inscription of so-called *piacula*, which were expiatory rites conducted in the spring in connection with the inscription of the protocol of the preceding year, and the fragment of the Arval protocol which contains the mention of Caracalla entering Nicomedia finishes with such *piacula*.[28] Consequently, if 99b1 dates from 213, as Scheid argues, it entails that both this fragment and 99b2 are inscribed in the Arval record of 213. As Scheid himself notes, this constitutes a problem for his explanation.[29] If the ceremony took place on 1 January 214 as suggested by Scheid, it should be included in the protocol of 214 since the Arval year started on 17 December and the new *magister* for 214, Gessius Bassianus, had been inserted on this date.[30] Scheid attempts to solve this problem by arguing that, since Caracalla had arrived in Nicomedia before the new *magister* took office on 17 December, the Arval ceremony celebrating this event was included in the protocol for 213.[31]

However, this explanation seems rather strained. Gessius Bassianus was clearly *magister* when the ceremony celebrating Caracalla's arrival in Nicomedia took place, and Scheid presents no other instances where a ceremony occurred in one year but was moved to the protocol of the previous year because the event that occasioned the ceremony happened in the latter period.[32] Furthermore, such a praxis would open a pandora's

28 Scheid 1998b: 442-443. On the praxis of the Arval Brethren more broadly, see Scheid 1990.

29 Scheid 1998b: 444 asks: "Comment expliquer cette anomalie?"

30 Bassianus as *magister*: Scheid 1998a: No. 99b2, L. 16.

31 Scheid 1998b: 444-446; 2015: 269-270.

32 Scheid 1998b: 446 points to the *piacula*, which were conducted under one *magister* but inscribed in the records of his predecessor, as a parallel supporting his argument. However, the *piacula* were expiatory rites connected specifically with the inscription of the protocol of the previous year. In other words, it was natural to let the *piacula* accompany the inscription of the previous year's record, since this highlighted that

box of protocol disputes: although the *cursus publicus* was remarkably fast, news from the edges of the Empire could take many weeks to arrive, especially in winter. For example, it took 63 days for Pertinax's accession to be announced in Alexandria and it took around 36 days for the death of Gaius Caesar in Lycia to reach Italy.[33] Consequently, for several weeks and potentially months after a new *magister* had taken over, material would have to be added to the former *magister*'s protocol as rites were performed due to events that had happened before 17 December. Furthermore, an exact date did not necessarily accompany all news, which would have caused disputes within the college regarding which *magister* should be allowed to include the resulting ceremony in his protocol. It makes more sense to assume that ceremonies were included in the protocol of the *magister* under whom they were carried out and, as mentioned, Scheid presents no evidence to the contrary. One could object that the Arval deviated from praxis occasionally and included the ceremony celebrating Caracalla's arrival in Nicomedia in the protocol of 213, despite conducting this ceremony on 1 January 214. However, Scheid's whole argument rests on the assumption that deviations from praxis are not an option.

Lastly, it is also worth noting the unlikely coincidence that Scheid's suggestion entails: Caracalla would have to arrive before the Saturnalia on 17 December and the news of his arrival would then have to be celebrated on exactly 1 January by the Arval Brethren. If the ceremony had taken place one day before, the consuls could not have been mentioned, and it could not have taken place after 1 January since, as mentioned, 2 January was a *dies ater* and 3 January was reserved for the big annual ceremony for the emperor's health. Thus, Scheid's suggestion entails the unlikely coincidence that the ceremony was conducted on exactly 1 January 214 and not one day before or after.

the inscription had been performed correctly. Essentially, then, the *piacula* accompanied the previous year's record due to a ritual connection to this. Furthermore, ending the record of one year with *piacula* was an established praxis. This, of course, is very different from an untraditional, *ad hoc* inclusion of a ceremony in the previous year's record due to a temporal connection, as suggested by Scheid.

33 Ramsay 1925: 69-70, 72. See also Elliot 1955.

Importantly, Henzen's suggestion avoids moving any ceremonies to protocols where they do not chronologically belong. If *Messalla et Sabino consulibus* is simply a synonym for *isdem consulibus*, Caracalla's arrival in Nicomedia and the resulting ceremony are placed sometime in 214. This repetition of the consuls' names would be a less surprising deviation than moving a ceremony into the protocol of the previous year. Furthermore, the presence of *piacula* are easily explained if we follow Henzen, since it simply means that Caracalla arrived late in 214 and that no more ceremonies were celebrated by the Arval Brethren that year. Lastly, Scheid's suggestion that the fragment mentioning Caracalla's entry into Nicomedia and the other fragment of the Arval *acta*, which included two ceremonies regarding Caracalla's health, should be joined also fits well with Henzen's solution. These two ceremonies would then be placed earlier in 214, but after 3 January, and could for example be the result of Caracalla campaigning in the Balkans, just like Caracalla's campaign against the Germans had occasioned two ceremonies in 213.[34]

OTHER EVIDENCE

It should by now be clear that Scheid does not present new evidence or incontestably persuasive arguments that decisively solve the question of when Caracalla wintered in Nicomedia, as some scholars have asserted. Both Scheid's and Henzen's solution involve a deviation from established Arval praxis and, although Henzen's solution appears simpler and less strained, it is therefore imperative to examine other evidence for the timing of Caracalla's stay in Nicomedia. Importantly, this evidence suggests that Caracalla arrived in Nicomedia in late 214.

Travelling to Nicomedia

34 For possible reasons for these ceremonies, see Letta 1994; Scheid 1998b: 440-441. Ceremonies in connection with the German campaigns: Scheid 1998a: No. 99a, L. 20-29.

Firstly, there is a very practical element of importance here, namely the time it would have taken to journey to Nicomedia: given the Arval inscription celebrating Caracalla's victory over the Germans on 6 October 213, he probably won the final battle close to ancient Mogontiacum in late September.[35] Furthermore, we know from an inscription that Caracalla stopped at Sirmium on his way to Nicomedia and both Dio and Herodian assert that Caracalla also went to Pergamum before Nicomedia.[36] According to Orbis, it takes on average 112 days to travel from Mogontiacum to Nicomedia over Sirmium and Pergamum, which is based on an average travel speed of thirty kilometres per day, the normally accepted marching speed of Roman soldiers.[37] It seems highly probable that Caracalla was travelling with at least some infantry contingents and that some of his extensive retinue travelled on foot.[38] Herodian, in fact, asserts that Caracalla himself mostly travelled on foot.[39] Thus, if Caracalla departed in early October and travelled almost four months (112 days), he would have arrived in Nicomedia by late January 214. This is clearly incompatible with Scheid's reconstruction.

However, thirty kilometers per day might be optimistic for an emperor with an extensive retinue and grand receptions in the towns that welcomed him.[40] Helmut Halfmann, for example, has calculated the emperor's average speed to be between twenty and thirty kilometers per day.[41] Furthermore, the timing of Caracalla's potential journey in late autumn and early winter would probably have further lowered this average

35 The location is given as near the river Main in Aur. Vict. *Caes*. 21.2 which flows eastward from Mogontiacum into Germanic territory. The battle must therefore have taken place close to Mogontiacum. According to https://orbis.stanford.edu/, there are 1156 kilometres between Rome and Mogontiacum and the *cursus publicus* travelled about 80 kilometres a day, so it would have taken around two weeks for news of Caracalla's victory to reach Rome. On the speed of the *cursus publicus*, see Riepl 1913: 123-240; Ramsay 1925; Elliot 1955; Duncan-Jones 1990: 7-29; Kolb 2000: 308-332.

36 Cass. 78[77].16.8; Hdn. 4.8.3; IvEph 802.

37 http://orbis.stanford.edu/.

38 The thirty kilometres per day are taken from the fourth-century *De re militari* by Vegetius (1.9) but is generally accepted. See e.g. Benario 1986 or Orbis' assumed average marching speed.

39 Hdn. 4.7.6.

40 As asserted by e.g. Opreanu 2015: 19 n. 57.

41 Halfmann 1986: 86, 190.

due to poor weather conditions. Indeed, Ammianus tells us that the advisors of Valentinian I vehemently opposed his suggestion of marching from Trier to Illyria in winter to assist forces which were being overrun, although this journey was less than half as long as Caracalla's: "They urged that the roads, hardened with frost, where neither any growth of grass would be found for fodder nor anything else fit for the use of the army, could not be penetrated".[42] The average speed used above, which still results in a journey time far too long for Scheid's chronology, is thus probably too high.

Furthermore, the journey-time of four months presupposes four months of constant, effective travelling of thirty kilometers per day with no stops or detours. This is clearly unrealistic: Dio, Herodian and the *Historia Augusta* all mention some sort of military activity centred on Dacia, and Caracalla also found time to reform the military organisation of Pannonia.[43] Likewise, Caracalla created a new army unit mirroring Alexander's Macedonian phalanx, and Herodian vaguely mentions administrative arrangements (ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι διοικήσας)[44] carried out by Caracalla before arriving in Pergamum.[45] Furthermore, both Dio and Herodian assert that Caracalla conducted extensive games and honoured Achilles upon his arrival in Asia and that he stopped to visit Achilles' tomb near the site of ancient Troy.[46] Dio also laments the lavish lodgings that had to be built wherever Caracalla travelled, which does not suggest that this emperor travelled speedily.[47] Furthermore, Caracalla visited the sanctuary of Apollo Grannus, probably the temple near modern Faimingen, and the sanctuary of Asclepius in Pergamum, seemingly because he was

42 Amm. Marc. 30.3.3. See likewise Amm. Marc. 30.5.14.

43 Cass. Dio 78[77].16.7; *Hist. Aug. M. Ant.* 5.4; Hdn. 4.8.1. See also Cass. Dio 79[78].27.5 who mentions hostages taken by Caracalla from the Dacians as part of an alliance. Military reorganisation: although he accepts Scheid's conclusions, Kovács 2012 gives a useful overview of the evidence for Caracalla's activities in Pannonia.

44 Hdn. 4.8.3.

45 Macedonian phalanx: Hdn. 4.8.2-3.

46 Cass. Dio 78[77].16.7-8; Hdn. 4.8.3-5.

47 Cass. Dio 78[77].16.6-7.

gravely sick.[48] Given military engagements and recruitment, games, administrative duties, potentially serious illness and visits to different temples, it is clear that Caracalla would likely have spent even more than four months travelling from Mogontiacum to Nicomedia. If he had started in early October, Caracalla would not have arrived in Nicomedia until well into February at the earliest. Importantly, this is not even close to accommodating Scheid's reconstruction, which demands that Caracalla arrived in Nicomedia before 17 December.[49]

It is here worth asking why Caracalla would have braved the ferocious conditions of travelling in winter to reach Nicomedia. Dio asserts that Caracalla in fact stayed in Nicomedia all the way until his birthday in April, which does not suggest that he was in a hurry to reach the East.[50] Scheid's theory also fits poorly with the chronology of Caracalla's movements after Nicomedia: he first went to Antioch, visiting cities in Asia Minor on the way, and then to Egypt, which was followed by the Parthian campaign of 216 and his death in spring 217.[51] If Caracalla left Nicomedia in 214 already, he would have had to spend a whole year in Antioch with little or no activity since nothing indicates that he stayed in Egypt for long.[52] If Caracalla came to Antioch in 215, on the other hand, he could go to Egypt in late 215 and then launch his campaign against Parthia in 216.[53]

48 Cass. Dio 78[77].15.3-6; *Epit. de Caes.* 21.3; Hdn. 4.8.3; *Hist. Aug. M. Ant.* 5.3; IvEph 802. Faimingen: so Kovács 2012: 390. Potter 2004: 141 suggests that the visit to the sanctuary of Apollo Grannus took place before the campaign against the Germans, but Cass. Dio 78[77].15.2 indicates otherwise by writing that it was the charms of his German enemies that caused Caracalla's illness during the campaign. Rowan 2012: 112-115 suggests that Caracalla's illness may have been exaggerated by ancient writers.

49 Christol 2012: 158-160 likewise notes that Caracalla's route and activities as reported by the sources are a problem for Scheid's reconstruction. However, he still accepts Scheid's conclusions as incontestable. See further in footnote 86.

50 Cass. Dio 78[77].19.3, 79[78].6.5.

51 For the evidence of Caracalla's movements after leaving Nicomedia, see Halfmann 1986: 224-225.

52 Unless we accept Christol 2012. The journey to Antioch likely did not take more than a month or two since Johnston 1983 has shown that the places visited by Caracalla on this journey were far less numerous than suggested by Levick 1969.

53 Another factor related to Caracalla's journey is the so-called *Itinerarium Antonini*: it is a complex source containing various imperial routes for travelling. Some scholars

Coinage

Overall, then, the traveling time from Mogontiacum to Nicomedia militates strongly against the suggestion that Caracalla wintered in Nicomedia in 213/214. Let us now turn our attention to the evidence for Caracalla's movements in 214. The literary sources are not particularly helpful. However, it is worth noting that Dio's narrative, as preserved in Xiphilinus and the *Excerpta Constantiniana*, includes episodes set in Rome after the account of the Alemannic campaigns: we are told that Caracalla burned Vestal Virgins; Caracalla killed adulterers without trial; and Caracalla forced Cornificia to commit suicide. Dio thus quite clearly followed his narrative of the Alemannic campaigns with a description of Caracalla's activities in the capital. When commencing his narrative of a new emperor, Dio often starts with a thematic presentation of the ruler, and then normally returns to a chronological, year-by-year narrative. Consequently, the narrative return to Rome could appear to furnish strong support for the theory that Caracalla returned to the capital.[54] However, caution must be taken due to the highly epitomised nature of Dio's narrative. Furthermore, Dio's account of the Alemannic campaigns underlines that the gods refused to help Caracalla due to his evil deeds, and the following episodes of Caracalla's abominable behaviour in Rome could thus constitute flashbacks intended to drive home this point.[55]

date it to the reign of Caracalla and view an *itinerarium* therein (going from Rome through Milan to Egypt) as the route which Caracalla planned to take: van Berchem 1937: 166-181; 1973: 123-126; Reed 1978: 230-231. This was treated as decisive by Millar 1964 155: n. 6 for proving that Caracalla returned to Rome after his German campaigns. However, Caracalla could of course have deviated from the initially planned route. Furthermore, Arnaud 1992 has questioned the Severan date of the *Itinerarium Antonini*.

54 Dio's imperial narrative structure: Questa 1957: 37; Millar 1962: 124. See also Pelling 1997.

55 The other key historiographical source for Caracalla's reign is Herodian who does not mention a return to Rome after the Alemannic wars. However, the often thematic, rather than chronological, structure of Herodian's narrative, according to which he frequently focuses first on the emperor in Rome and then on his campaigns, means that this absence cannot be used as evidence for Caracalla moving directly from Germany to the Balkans. Indeed, Herodian often demonstrably leaves out imperial stays in the capital if these do not fit his thematic focus: for example,

On the other hand, Caracalla's coinage is more illuminating. Let us first consider the coins for the key year, 214: as in previous years, there are numerous depictions of various deities, but there is a special martial focus given the five different coin types depicting Mars and the three different types depicting Roma with Victory.[56] Furthermore, there is a coin type showing Caracalla in military attire on a platform haranguing his soldiers, and one type depicting him galloping on a horse with a javelin and a prostrate foe.[57] These two coin types, as well as the ones depicting Mars and Roma with Victory, clearly celebrate Caracalla's martial prowess, but they do not tell us much about Caracalla's movements in 214: they could indicate an emperor fighting at the front throughout 214, but they may just as well have been struck in celebration of his return to Rome from the Alemannic campaigns. Indeed, a kneeling German is included on two of the coin types depicting Roma.[58] The coins celebrating Caracalla's martial prowess may even conceivably be a reference to his campaigns in the Balkans in 214.[59]

Aside from these coins with military connotations, and those depicting various deities, there are four other Caracallan coin motifs in the *RIC* that can be securely dated to 214: an elephant; Caracalla togate with a baton and branch; Caracalla sacrificing at Vesta's temple; and Caracalla

both Severus' stay in Rome in 196 after his victory over Niger and Alexander Severus' visit in 233 are absent from Herodian's narrative (for the evidence for these visits, see Halfmann 1986: 217, 232). On Herodian's narrative structure more generally, see especially Hidber 2006: 131-152; 2007 but also Widmer 1967: 61-64; Whittaker 1969: xli-xliii. Regarding the evidence for Caracalla's movements in 214, one may also note *Cod. Iust.* 7.16.2, a Caracallan *constitutio* given "at Rome (*Romae*)" in February 214. Whittaker 1969: 412 viewed it as evidence for Caracalla's presence in Rome in 214. However, such dates in the Codex are often unreliable and *Romae* does not necessitate the emperor's physical presence. E.g., the Caracallan *constitutio Cod. Iust.* 5.50.1 dates to July 215 and is also given "at Rome", but it is highly unlikely that Caracalla was in the capital personally at this point.

56 RIC IV 243, 524, 528-533.

57 RIC IV 525-526.

58 RIC IV 530, 533. See also RIC IV 237, 316 showing Victory and the legend: *VICTORIA GERMANICA*, presumably from 214 as well.

59 This is not impossible as shown by the fact that coins appeared already in 213 celebrating Caracalla's campaigns in Germany: RIC IV 496, 501, 504.

on a platform in the company of Liberalitas.[60] The former two are of little interest for our purposes: the elephant could refer to games given in Rome, which would indicate Caracalla's presence in the capital, but may also simply be a symbol of imperial power.[61] Likewise, the togate Caracalla could imply civic responsibilities in Rome after his victories in Germany (alluded to by the branch of Victory) but this is too vague to function as useful evidence.

The Vesta coins from 214, showing Caracalla sacrificing in military attire in the company of a group of Vestal Virgins at the temple of Vesta in Rome, may be more significant.[62] It was common to depict Vesta's temple on anniversaries of Augustus' death, the bicentenary of which occurred in 214, and Julia Domna had been depicted on the obverse of coins showing the temple of Vesta to commemorate its restoration under Septimius Severus.[63] Caracalla's coins with the Vesta temple may thus be occasioned by these factors.[64] However, it is noteworthy that Caracalla's coins are the only ones showing the emperor himself sacrificing at the temple of Vesta, whereas the emperor is absent from all other imperial coins with an image of this temple.[65] It is thus possible that Caracalla's Vesta coins commemorate an actual sacrifice in Rome after his Alemannic campaign, and Caracalla is indeed shown in military attire.[66] This suggestion may be supported by the fact that the only other Caracallan coin type showing this emperor sacrificing at a temple (that of Asclepius) did in fact commemorate an actual visit and sacrifice performed by Caracalla.[67]

60 RIC IV 246-247, 249-250, 250A, 527.

61 See e.g. RIC III 862 with Manders 2012: 250.

62 RIC IV 249-250.

63 RIC I 61, II 492, 515, 704, IV 585-586, 594 with Grant 1950: 34, 80-81, 91, 135.

64 The Vesta motif could also be connected to Caracalla's execution of Vestal Virgins for being unchaste: Cass. Dio 78[77].16.1; Hdn. 4.6.4. Caracalla's Vesta coins connected to the bicentenary of Augustus' death: Grant 1950: 123. This bicentenary should not tempt us to suggest that the *Liberalitas* coin of Caracalla from this year is connected to this anniversary: such distributions were normally occasioned by more immediately important affairs such as imperial weddings, births or military victories.

65 See e.g. RIC I 61, II 492, 515, 704, IV 585-586.

66 In that case, RIC IV 271-272 from 215, which likewise show Caracalla sacrificing at Vesta's temple, would then commemorate the sacrifice of 214.

67 I will discuss this further below.

However, the most significant coin for our purposes is the one including Liberalitas: Caracalla is seated on a curule chair with the divinity Liberalitas on his right, while a citizen is ascending a flight of stairs to receive his hand-out from this divinity.[68] Underneath is written "LIB AVG VIIII". The coin also includes a mention that Caracalla had received the tribunician power seventeen times, which places the coin between 10 December 213 and 10 December 214. From Hadrian onwards, it became common to commemorate grand imperial largesses on coins and the coin in question continues this tradition by commemorating the ninth largesse by Caracalla.[69] All imperial gifts of money or food could obviously not be commemorated on coins and the number after "LIB AVG" therefore only includes the large-scale distributions on important occasions, such as imperial weddings or the return of an emperor safely from war.[70] Furthermore, the largesses commemorated on coins are consistently performed in Rome rather than in the provinces and the donatives to the soldiers were not included on coins in the manner just described.[71]

It is worth underlining how uncommon it was for emperors to distribute a largesse commemorated on coins while absent from Rome: from 117 when Hadrian took the throne until 235 when Alexander Severus died, only two largesses were commemorated on surviving coins by an emperor while absent from Rome.[72] The first was given out on the occasion of Hadrian's accession, at which point the new emperor was in the

68 RIC IV 527. See also RIC IV 302-303. They are lacking the tribunician year but likewise have LIB AVG VIIII on the reverse and GERM(ANICUS) on the obverse. Consequently, they constitute further evidence for Caracalla distributing his ninth largesse after the Alemannic wars.

69 It had happened occasionally under some previous emperors: see e.g. RIC I 101, II 56, 381. These, however, put *CONGIARIUM*, rather than *LIBERALITAS*, on their coins. On this tradition of commemorating largesses on coins, see especially Royo Martínez 2018 but also Noreña 2001: 160-164; 2011: 88-92.

70 See e.g. RIC III 15 which commemorates Marcus Aurelius' largesse upon his accession or RIC IV 182 which commemorates the largesse due to Septimius Severus' safe return from his Parthian campaigns in 202.

71 As pointed out by Royo Martínez 2018: 64-66.

72 Another possible example comes from the reign of Elagabalus: we have coins from 219 commemorating a second largesse by Elagabalus and he may therefore have minted *Liberalitas* coins commemorating his first largesse in 218 while he was absent from Rome. If so, this can, like Hadrian's first *Liberalitas* coins, be explained by the

East, while the second was distributed in 175 on the occasion of Commodus assuming the *toga virilis*, while Marcus Aurelius was fighting his seven-year long war against the Marcomanni.[73] Thus, the only two exceptions from the general pattern were caused by Hadrian's need to bolster his authority upon his questionable accession and Marcus Aurelius' extraordinarily long Marcomannic Wars. Except for a couple of exceptional cases, then, the emperor was always present in Rome while giving out a largesse commemorated on *Liberalitas* coins. The very limited evidence available suggests that Caracalla followed this established pattern: one largesse was given in 211 with Geta upon their accession and return to Rome from Britain, and another distribution took place in 212 or 213, probably after the claimed assassination attempt on Caracalla's life by Geta.[74] Again, this underlines that large-scale distributions commemorated on coins were performed in Rome due to important events. It is not difficult to understand why: in order to reap the popularity resulting from a largesse, it was important for the emperor to be present in Rome and to be seen as personally giving to the people. In other words, it was central for the people to see the emperor in his role as the great *euergetes*.[75]

Against this background, the Caracallan coin-type from 214 with LIB AVG VIIII is significant: it undermines Scheid's chronology since his reconstruction would entail Caracalla giving out a large-scale distribution

fact that Elagabalus was far from Rome in the East when he took the throne in 218 and he may therefore have attempted to increase his legitimacy and popularity through a largesse and accompanying *Liberalitas* coins. He may also have given out a largesse in 218 but not produced a coin commemorating it, whereafter he commemorated his second largesse on coins in 219.

73 Cass. Dio 72[71].32.1; RIC II.3 162-164, III 318. It was common to issue *Liberalitas* coins upon accession: see e.g. RIC III 15, IV 18, 87.

74 Caracalla performed five largesses with Septimius Severus, and his first largesse as sole emperor is therefore counted as the sixth. Sixth largesse: RIC IV 87. Eighth largesse: RIC IV 219. Curiously, no coins commemorate Caracalla's seventh largesse: Caracalla had traditionally included all largesses of Septimius Severus except the first one and he may have co-opted this first largesse after Geta's death, which would explain why he put LIBERALITAS AVG VIII on coins after his sixth largesse.

75 On this conception of the emperor, see Veyne 1976.

without an occasion while he was in the provinces. This would completely break with tradition, a tradition that Caracalla himself had observed earlier in his reign. On the other hand, it would make perfect sense for Caracalla to showcase his *liberalitas* through a large distribution upon his return from the Germanic campaign in late 213 and commemorate it on his coins of 214. Indeed, the safe return of the emperor from campaign was a common occasion for largesses commemorated on coins.[76] Ultimately, it is not impossible that Caracalla broke with tradition and gave out a major largesse in Rome, commemorated on his coins from 214, while he was in the provinces.[77] However, this is unlikely and the *Liberalitas* coin from 214 instead makes it probable that Caracalla returned to Rome after the Alemannic campaign and distributed a largesse in the capital at some point during his seventeenth tribunician year, that is from 10 December 213 to 10 December 214.[78]

Finally, it is worthwhile briefly considering Caracalla's coins from 215. As set out above, due to illness, Caracalla visited the temple of Asclepius in Pergamum on his way to Nicomedia, and this visit seems to have been commemorated on Caracalla's coins.[79] Asclepius first appears on Caracalla's coins in 214, as one coin-type shows the god standing in a temple.[80] However, in 215, ten different Caracallan coin types with Asclepius sud-

76 See e.g. Cass. Dio 72[71].32.1; RIC III 318, 1205, IV 81, 533-534 with Halfmann 1986: 217.

77 As pointed out by Millar 1964: 155 n. 6.

78 The coin-type thus also militates against Halfmann's brief suggestion (1986: 226) that Caracalla wintered in Sirmium in 213/214 and did not go back to Rome after the Germanic campaign. He indicates that Caracalla may not have had sufficient time to return to Rome given his travels in the Balkans and Asia Minor, but these could have taken place from spring 214 until the close of that year. However, it is an inscription (AE 1973, 437), dedicated in 213 for the health of Caracalla (*pro salute*) by two *praepositi annonae* in Gorsium, that Halfmann views as decisive evidence for Caracalla's presence in Pannonia already in this year. Yet, a dedication to the emperor does not necessitate his presence, as pointed out by Johnston 1983: 58 in relation to Caracalla's route through Asia Minor.

79 Cass. Dio 78[77].15.6, 78[77].16.8; Hdn. 4.8.3.

80 RIC IV 238.

denly appear, and Asclepius coins in fact constitute about 19% of Caracalla's silver coinage in 215.[81] Furthermore, while Asclepius had only appeared on *aurei* in 214, he appears on all the different denominations in 215. Most importantly, however, a coin type from 215 shows Caracalla sacrificing at Asclepius' temple, and this coin-type does not appear before or after this year, which suggests that it commemorated Caracalla's visit to the temple of Asclepius in Pergamum.[82] This, along with the sudden prominence of Asclepius on Caracallan coinage in 215, fits very well with the theory that Caracalla only travelled to Nicomedia in 214, since his visit to Asclepius' temple late in this year would naturally have been reflected on coins in 215.[83] On the other hand, it would be strange for all these coins with Asclepius on to emerge in 215 if Caracalla had already visited Pergamum in 213, as entailed in Scheid's reconstruction. Caracalla's Asclepius coins from 215, combined with the *Liberalitas* coin from 214, thus provide strong support for the theory that Caracalla returned to Rome in 213 and wintered in Nicomedia in 214/215.

CHRONOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The main aim of this article was to clarify whether Caracalla wintered in Nicomedia in 213/214 or in 214/215. Scheid argued for the former date on the assumption that the Arval *acta* were painstakingly consistent and could not have repeated the consuls' names instead of using *isdem consulibus*. The scholars who reference his work treat it as incontestably decisive, which has major consequences for our reconstruction and evaluation of Caracalla's reign. However, Scheid's argumentative basis is prob-

81 RIC IV 251-253, 270, 538-539, 549-550, 553-554 with Rowan 2012: 129-130.

82 RIC IV 270.

83 *Contra* Rowan 2012: 132 who points to the one Asclepius coin from 214 (RIC IV 238) and argues that this suggests 213 as Caracalla's arrival time in Asia Minor. However, only in 215 do Asclepius types become common and include the emperor himself sacrificing at Asclepius' temple. Rowan 2012: 132 also points to an inscription from Pergamum from 214 where Caracalla is called *domino indulgentissimo* as evidence for a visit in 213. This evidence is obviously vague but supports a visit in 214 better than one in 213.

lematic as the Arval *acta* exhibit noteworthy deviations from praxis. Furthermore, his own argument rests on an unlikely deviation from tradition by the Arval Brethren since he supposes that the ceremony celebrating Caracalla's safe arrival in Nicomedia was moved to a protocol where it does not chronologically belong. Consequently, Scheid's arguments cannot be seen as incontestable, and other evidence must be reviewed. On a practical level, it is unlikely that Caracalla could have arrived in Nicomedia before 17 December as entailed in Scheid's reconstruction. Furthermore, the *Liberalitas* coin-type from 214 probably places Caracalla in Rome in this year, and the Asclepius coins of 215 likewise suggest that Caracalla wintered in Nicomedia in 214/215 rather than 213/214. When considering all the evidence, it thus seems likely that Caracalla returned to Rome in late 213 and wintered in Nicomedia in 214/215.

This has significant consequences: in Scheid's reconstruction, Caracalla remained only a short time in Rome at the beginning of his reign before he spent the rest of his life in the provinces. However, in my reconstruction, Caracalla arrived in Rome in spring 211, probably became sole ruler in late 211 and then stayed in the capital all the way to spring 214, except for some months campaigning against the Germans.[84] This, in turn, is important for our wider understanding of Caracalla's reign: for example, Scheid's reconstruction could be used to support the common presentation of Caracalla as an anti-senatorial, militaristic emperor who, quite literally, attempted to distance himself from the senators and purposefully avoided Rome, instead preferring the company of his soldiers on campaign.[85] However, my suggested chronology of Caracalla's reign from 211 to 214 presents a rather different picture, where Caracalla in fact spent a prolonged time in the capital.

Yet, by far the most important result of my reconstruction is its consequences for Caracalla's activities in the Balkans: as a necessary corollary to the backdating of Caracalla's stay in Nicomedia, some scholars now argue that Caracalla's campaigns and other activities in the Balkans

84 See also footnote 1. On the chronology of Caracalla's reign in general, Millar 1964: 150-160 remains helpful. See also Campbell 2005: 15-20.

85 Common presentation of Caracalla: see e.g. Bryant 1999. On Caracalla's relationship with the senators more broadly, see e.g. Davenport 2012; Scott 2015.

are largely invented by ancient historiographers.[86] This is only natural as Scheid's reconstruction would leave no room for anything other than a speedy, direct march to Nicomedia in 213. However, in my reconstruction, Caracalla likely used a large part of 214 marching through the Balkans, which allows plentiful time to engage in various activities there. For example, in my reconstruction, there is no reason to reject the theory that Caracalla visited Pannonia and engaged in military reorganisation there.[87] Likewise, it invites us to accept the sources' assertion that Caracalla conducted some sort of military activities against the Dacians, although their scope is more difficult to ascertain.[88] These examples highlight that we can only attain a thorough understanding of the history of the Balkans under Caracalla if we know when and for how long the emperor visited this region. The question of when Caracalla wintered in Nicomedia thus has wide consequences. It has the power to remove or restore whole wars from the pages of history and significantly influence our understanding of Caracalla's reign.

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86 See especially Szabó 2003; Kovács 2012; Opreanu 2015 but also Letta 1994: 189; Mráv and Ottományi 2005: 203; Letta 2016: 189. Christol 2012 has a different solution where he attempts to reconcile Scheid with the historiographical sources: he views Scheid's arguments as incontestable and accepts that Caracalla arrived in Nicomedia in 213, but suggests that Caracalla then campaigned in Dacia and visited the places in Asia mentioned by Dio and Herodian in 214, before again wintering in Nicomedia in 214/215. Lafli *et al.* 2019: 144 n. 35 accept Christol's suggestion. It is ingenious but unnecessary if Scheid's arguments are not accepted.

87 See footnote 43.

88 Cass. Dio 78[77].16.7, 79[78].27.5; *Hist. Aug. M. Ant.* 5.4; Hdn. 4.8.1.

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SPARTA; MANTINEA AND PARRHASIA; ELIS AND LEPREON: POLITICS AND AUTONOMIA IN 421-418 BC

By James Roy

Summary: Following the end of the Archidamian war Sparta intervened in Parrhasia and at Lepreon. The interventions weakened Mantinea and Elis, two states that caused difficulties for Sparta, but besides Realpolitik there were also questions of law, and the Spartans, though anxious to achieve strategic advantages, were careful to act with proper legal authority. Sparta declared both Parrhasia and Lepreon autonomous, but autonomy did not mean the same status in the two cases. Since knowledge of these incidents comes mainly from Thucydides' Book 5, the argument depends heavily on interpretation of Thucydides' text.

This article is dedicated to the memory of Yanis Pikoulas (1956-2022)

INTRODUCTION

It is commonly acknowledged that the political situation in the Peloponnese at end of the Archidamian War in 421 was difficult for Sparta, since some of Sparta's allies were unhappy about the terms agreed between Sparta and Athens. In addition the thirty-year peace between Argos and Sparta came to an end (Thuc. 5.14.4), and Argos was consequently much freer to form alliances with other states, notably with dissident Spartan allies in the Peloponnese. Spartan authority in the Peloponnese suffered until Sparta's victory at the battle of Mantinea in 418.[1]

1 See e.g. Lendon 2010: 361-67 and Millender 2017: 91-93 on Sparta's problems at the end of the Archidamian War, and, on the situation after the battle of Mantinea in 418, see e.g. Millender 2017: 94-96.

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These affairs are covered in Book 5 of Thucydides' history, but that book poses particular problems, being apparently less finished than other sections of the work.[2] Thucydides offers narrative of the two events examined in this article, but information required to understand them is given in other early passages of Book 5. An attentive reader, or listener, would need to make the necessary connections, whether the need for such cross-referencing is due to the untidiness of a work requiring further revision or to literary artifice.

Mantinea and Elis were less significant states than others that concerned Sparta in those years, like Argos and Corinth. Nonetheless both Mantinea and Elis posed real problems for Sparta, and both left the Spartan alliance to join Argos and Athens. In 418 Athens, Argos, Mantinea, and Elis operated as a military alliance in the Peloponnese before the battle of Mantinea, and, though Elis withdrew from the allied forces before the battle at Mantinea and took its hoplites back home (Thuc. 5.62.1-2), the others opposed the Spartans and their allies in the battle. Eleian troops never in this period faced the Spartans in a major battle, but Eleian forces rejoined their allies after the battle (Thuc. 5.75.5). While treating Mantinea and Elis as minor partners in the anti-Spartan alliance, Thucydides nonetheless says enough about them to allow their role in those years to be understood.

MANTINEA'S HEGEMONIAL ALLIANCE

Thucydides (5.29.1) tells us that in 421 the Mantineans were the first to break with Sparta and ally themselves with the Argives. He explains that the Mantineans were afraid of the Spartans because during the Archidamian War the Mantineans had made some (unspecified) part of Arkadia subject to themselves and thought that the Spartans, now that they had time to deal with the matter, would not overlook this Mantinean domination.

It seems clear that Parrhasia, in the western and southwestern parts of what in the fourth century became the Megalopolis basin, was at least

2 On the problems of Book 5 see Hornblower 2008: 1-4 and 53-57, and note the comments of Rood 1998: 83-108 on literary aspects of Book 5.

part of the territory subdued by the Mantineans during the war, and Thucydides (5.33.1-3) describes the campaign by which the Spartans in summer 421 drove the Mantineans out of Parrhasia.[3] Parrhasia was presumably controlled by Mantinea already in winter 423/2, when the Mantineans and the Tegeans with their respective allies fought an indecisive battle at Laodokeion in Oresthis (Thuc. 4.134.1-2), i.e. in the territory of Oresthasion (a Mainalian polis, see Paus. 8.27.3). Laodokeion was roughly in the middle of the Megalopolis basin: when Megalopolis was built, it was just outside the walls of the city (Paus. 8.44.1). In 423/2, therefore, Mantinea and Tegea had interests extending into the central part of the basin, and it is likely that Mantinea's interest was control of Parrhasia.

Both Mantinea and Tegea had built up hegemonial alliances. The Mantinean alliance obviously included Parrhasia, but it must also have included other areas of Arkadia.[4] At the battle of Mantinea in 418 there were Mainalians fighting, like the Tegeans, on the Spartan side (Thuc. 5.67.1): these were presumably southern Mainalians allied to Tegea (Nielsen 2002: 366-67). On the opposing side were the Mantineans and alongside them Arkadian allies: it is generally recognised that the northern Mainalians were allied to Mantinea.[5] In the agreement between Sparta and Argos made in winter 418/7, after Sparta's victory at Mantinea, it is specified (Thuc. 5.77.1) that the Argives will return "the boys to the Orchomenians and the men to the Mainalians." The boys and men were evidently hostages. The alliance of Argos, Athens, Mantinea, and Elis captured Orchomenos in 418 before the battle at Mantinea (Thuc. 5.61.3-62.1), and the Orchomenian hostages were presumably taken then. Nielsen argues convincingly that the Mainalian hostages will have been taken by the Mantineans from their Mainalian allies to ensure their loyalty, and then entrusted to the Argives.[6] Northern Mainalia lies between Mantinea and Parrhasia, and it is entirely understandable that Mantinea, when building a hegemonial alliance, would have brought it under con-

3 On Parrhasia see Roy 2013.

4 On the Mantinean alliance see Nielsen 2002: 367-72.

5 Nielsen 2002: 367-72, Hornblower 2008: 177.

6 Nielsen 2002: 289-90. Hornblower 2008: 197 supposes, without comment or explanation, that Mantinea will have taken hostages from the pro-Spartan Mainalians.

trol. An important point noted by Pikoulas has subsequently been overlooked:[7] the territory of the Eutresians, in the northern and northeastern areas of the Megalopolis basin, lay between the northern Mainalians and the Parrhasians, and we can assume that the Eutresians also became subordinate allies of the Mantineans.[8] Thucydides (5.29.1) shows clearly that Mantinea expanded its hegemonial alliance during the Archidamian War, but he does not say that Mantinea's entire alliance was constructed during that war, and it will be argued below that northern Mainalia and Eutresia may well have already been allied to Mantinea before the war.[9]

PARRHASIA

Parrhasia was an important region for several reasons. Pausanias (8.27.4) lists eight Parrhasian *poleis* that were to be incorporated in Megalopolis, and to that list can be added Basilis, and possibly Haimoniai, though it has more often been regarded as Mainalian.[10] Evidence for the population is very poor, but the total Parrhasian population was probably well in excess of 5,000.[11] The only certainly Parrhasian settlement that has been thoroughly excavated is near the modern village of Kiparissia, c.15 km northwest of Megalopolis. It was a fifth-century town with streets laid out on a carefully planned grid-pattern, and was fortified with a city-wall and turrets.[12] Karapanagiotou, the excavator, identifies the site as ancient Trapezous, but it could be Basilis (Paus. 8.29.5). The excavator of another settlement near modern Perivolia, a few kilometres southeast of Megalopolis, believes it to be the Mainalian *polis* Oresthasion, though it seems possible, even likely, that it was Haimoniai.[13] In any case, since

7 Pikoulas 1990: 477.

8 On the Eutresians see Paus. 8.27.3 and 8.35.5-9, with the comments of Jost 1998: 219, 243-45, and of Moggi & Osanna 2003: 419, 459-62; also Pikoulas 1999: 282-91 with Map 3.

9 Nielsen 2002: 368 supposed that the entire Mantinean alliance was created in the years 431-424.

10 Roy 2013: 6-9.

11 Roy 2013: 10-13.

12 Karapanagiotou 2020: 16-17 with Fig. 6 (on p. 23).

13 Fritzilas 2018. On Haimoniai see Paus. 8.3.3, 8.44.1-2.

that settlement, dating originally from the late Geometric or early archaic period, was reshaped in the fifth century with a grid-pattern of streets, communities in the Megalopolis basin clearly had an interest in planned urban development well before the creation of Megalopolis. Only further archaeological exploration will reveal whether in the later fifth century the settlement at Kiparissia was exceptional within Parrhasia, or typical of local urban development. Parrhasia also possessed various religious sanctuaries, including notably the ash altar of Zeus Lykaios on the lower summit of Mt. Lykaion and the god's sanctuary a little lower on the mountain. Domination of Parrhasia would have given the Mantineans not only access to the region's manpower, but also some influence over the most important cult in Arkadia and its Lykaian Games.[14] Nielsen suggested that Mantinea may have profited from its domination of Mainalia in the years before 418 to move the bones of Arkas from a site in Mainalia to the city of Mantinea,[15] and the standing of Mantinea among Arkadians could have been promoted also by Mantinean prominence at the Lykaia.

In addition Parrhasia was of strategic importance. The Spartan army, when marching north, often took the relatively easy route up the Eurotas valley and on into the Megalopolis basin, from which an army could proceed without difficulty in several directions.[16] While in control of Parrhasia the Mantineans built a fort at Kypsela near the frontier with Lakonian territory, in other words at the north end of the route up the Eurotas, and installed a garrison (Thuc. 5.33.1). Such a fort could only be hostile to Sparta.

In 421 there was *stasis* in Parrhasia, and some Parrhasians appealed to Sparta (Thuc. 5.33.1). Thucydides does not say why the *stasis* had arisen,

14 On Parrhasian cults see Roy 2013: 23-24 and 29-32: on the current very important excavations both at the ash altar and in the lower sanctuary see Romano & Voyatzis 2014 and 2015, and Karapanagiotou 2020: 15-16.The cult of Despoina at Lykosoura enjoyed considerable prestige from the Hellenistic period, but whether it was already important in the classical period has recently been debated: see Jost & Palamidis 2020.

15 Nielsen 2002: 403-4. On the bones of Arkas see Paus. 8.9.3, 8.36.8.

16 Pikoulas 1988: 109-10. Forsén 2003: 253 with note 34 observes that the Spartan army also used the route north via Sellasia towards Tegea, but recognises the importance of the route via the Megalopolis basin.

but it is commonly, and reasonably, supposed (e.g. Nielsen 2002: 392) that in Parrhasia there were pro-Mantinean and pro-Spartan factions. The appeal gave the Spartans a reason to act in Parrhasia. However Thucydides does not repeat in this context what he had written at 5.16.2-3, namely that after being accused of having accepted a bribe when leading a Spartan army against Athens (Thuc. 1.114.2, 2.21.1) the Spartan king Pleistoanax had gone into exile, and had lived at the sanctuary of Zeus Lykaios in Parrhasia for nineteen years, until he was allowed to return to Sparta and resume his powers and duties as king, probably in 426.[17] Pleistoanax had therefore had ample opportunity to meet leading Parrhasians, and it is entirely likely that such contacts came into play in 421. Pro-Spartan Parrhasians could have contacted Pleistoanax, or he himself might have solicited an appeal from Parrhasian friends. At any rate the appeal from Parrhasians friendly to Sparta gave Sparta an excuse to intervene. Sparta also had good legal justification for intervention: that will be discussed below.

The Spartan intervention was a major military operation. A full levy (*pandemei*) was led into Parrhasia by Pleistoanax (Thuc. 5.33.1-3). The Mantineans entrusted the guarding of their own city to the Argives and marched into Parrhasia, but were unable to hold out against the Spartans and withdrew. The Spartans destroyed the fort at Kypsela, declared the Parrhasians autonomous, and went home.

It is notable that in his account of this campaign Thucydides always refers to the Parrhasians collectively. He mentions "the *poleis* among the Parrhasians" (5.33.2), but never names any particular *polis*. Parrhasian territory is referred to as *Parrhasike* (5.33.1) and "the land of the Parrhasians" (5.33.2). The Spartan campaign is against "the Parrhasians of Arkadia". The constant collective presentation of the Parrhasians brings problems, for there was *stasis* in Parrhasia and there must have been divisions. Thucydides (5.33.2) records that the Spartans ravaged the land of the Parrhasians with no suggestion of discrimination, though the Spartans presumably targeted the land of anti-Spartan Parrhasians and protected the interests of their friends. There is no possibility of deducing from Thucydides' account whether some Parrhasian cities were more

17 On Pleistoanax see also Thuc. 1.114.2, 2.21.1, and on his return Hornblower 1991: 497.

pro-Spartan than others, or whether more or less all were split into supporters and opponents of Sparta. Thucydides certainly does not suggest that the Spartans made any distinction between Parrhasian *poleis* when declaring them autonomous: in fact his wording suggests rather that the whole Parrhasian community collectively enjoyed autonomy.

SPARTA'S LEGAL AUTHORITY TO ACT IN PARRHASIA

Another question is what legal authority Sparta had to take action in Parrhasia. Here again Thucydides does not address the question in his account of the Spartan campaign, but gives two hints elsewhere. One is at 5.29.1 when he says that during the Archidamian War the Mantineans had made some part of Arkadia subject to themselves and were afraid that the Spartans would act against them once free from other concerns. The other is at 5.31.5, where the Eleians, in their dispute with Sparta over Lepreon, cited an agreement that at the end of the Attic war all should have what they had when they entered it. The nature of that agreement has been much discussed but it seems best to interpret it as an agreement among Sparta and Sparta's allies that no member of the alliance should take advantage of the war for territorial or political expansion at another ally's expense.[18] Thus the Mantineans acted "in violation of the agreement between Sparta and her allies".[19] That explains why the Mantineans were afraid that Sparta would act against them, and it also explains what legal authority Sparta had to act. As leader of the alliance Sparta could act against a state that had breached an agreement made by the allies. That Mantinea had left the alliance and allied itself with Argos before Sparta acted (Thuc. 5.29.1) made no difference: Mantinea had breached the agreement while still a member of Sparta's alliance. Moreover it seems that Sparta's action was limited to rectifying the effects of Mantinea's breach. As Thucydides says (5.33.3), the Spartans declared the Parrhasians autonomous, destroyed the fort at Kypsela, and went home. Yet Mantinea had other allies, the northern Mainalians and doubtless also the Eutresians, and Sparta in 421 made no attempt to separate them

18 On this agreement see Lendon 1994: 162-67 and Hornblower 2008: 73-74.
19 Lendon 2010: 364.

from Mantinea: Mantinea's Arkadian allies fought alongside the Mantineans in the battle of Mantinea in 418 (Thuc. 5.67.2). (Mantinea did give up control of "the cities" when it reached an agreement with Sparta after the battle (Thuc. 5.81.1), but circumstances then were radically different.) In 421 it would not have been difficult for the Spartans to drive the Mantineans out of Eutresia as they drove them out of Parrhasia, in other words to drive the Mantineans completely out of the Megalopolis basin, but the Spartans simply expelled them from Parrhasia. There is no evidence of when Mantinea made the alliances with the northern Mainalians and the Eutresians, but, if they dated from before the outbreak of the Archidamian War, then the actions of the Spartans are coherent. Mantinean control of Eutresia and northern Mainalia would not breach the agreement of the Spartan alliance and Sparta would have no legal authority to put an end to it. Given the difficult political situation in the Peloponnese in 421, it was in the Spartans' interest to act with clear legal authority and to avoid a crude use of force.

ELIS, LEPREON, AND SPARTA

In summer 421 Elis was the second Spartan ally, after Mantinea, to break away and make an alliance with Argos. Thucydides explains (5.31.1-2) that Elis was already at odds with Sparta because of a quarrel over Lepreon. At an unspecified time before the Peloponnesian War Lepreon had been at war with some Arkadians (equally unspecified), and was apparently in some difficulty. It sought help from Elis, and formed an alliance on the basis that Lepreon would cede half its territory to Elis but would be allowed to occupy and exploit the ceded territory on condition that it paid one talent annually to Zeus at Olympia.[20] Thus by 431 (possibly well before) Lepreon was a subordinate ally of Elis. It occupied a strategically important territory on the northern bank of the river Neda as the river approached the sea: south of the river lay Messenia.[21] It was the most im-

20 Thuc. 5.31.1-2. Patay-Horváth 2016: 246 gives reasons for believing that an annual payment of one talent was not a heavy economic charge for the land concerned.

21 The strategic importance of Lepreon is well brought out by Falkner 1999.

portant *polis*, with the greatest resources, in the region between the Alpheios and the Neda.[22] Elis' desire to control this valuable territory is easy to understand.

After making the annual payment of a talent until the Peloponnesian War began, Lepreon used the war as a reason for not paying. The Eleians tried to force them to pay and the Lepreates turned to the Spartans for an arbitration: "and they approached the Lakedaimonians" (Thuc.5.31.3, where 'they' is clearly the Lepreates). It was more normal for both parties to a dispute to agree to go to arbitration and to agree to approach a potential arbitrator; but in this case it appears that, even if it was the Lepreates who first approached Sparta, the Eleians agreed that Sparta should act as arbitrator.[23] Clearly, once an arbitration had begun, if the procedure was to succeed neither party to the dispute could subsequently withdraw because the judgment seemed likely to go against it. Consequently, when the Eleians withdrew from the arbitration because they suspected that they would not get a fair hearing, and even ravaged the territory of Lepreon, the Spartans nonetheless went ahead and gave judgment that the Lepreates were autonomous. (The nature of Lepreon's 'autonomy' will be discussed below.) The Spartans also sent a garrison of hoplites to Lepreon to protect it, on the grounds that the Eleians were not abiding by the arbitration. The Eleians, claiming that the Spartans had received a *polis* that had seceded from them, and citing the agreement (discussed above) that states would have at the end of the war what they had on entering it, made the alliance with Argos (Thuc. 5.33.3-5).

It is not clear when the dispute between Sparta and Elis began. Falkner 1999 argued that once the Athenians were established at Pylos in 425 Sparta would be seriously concerned not only over Messenia but also over an adjacent community like Lepreon. She says correctly (1999: 392) that in Thucydides' account the chronology of the dispute between Elis

22 On Lepreon's resources see Hanöffner 2020: 52-54 and Siftar 2020: 86-94.

23 On the process of inter-state arbitration among Greeks see Ager 1996: 3-19, and in particular 10 with n. 20 on the term *epitrepein* and related vocabulary. In the passage describing the arbitration about Lepreon (5.31.3-4) Thucydides uses legal terminology freely: *epitrope* and a form of the verb *epitrepo*, and also *dike* and a form of the verb *dikazo*.

and Sparta is obscure, and she seems to suggest that the Spartan arbitration took place during the Archidamian War. Thucydides does not say when Lepreon stopped making the annual payment to Zeus Olympios, but it was presumably not at the beginning of the war. Equally he does not say how long the Eleians then spent trying to force the Lepreates to pay. The final stages of the dispute certainly followed the end of the war in spring 421; the Spartans sent *Brasideioi* and *neodamodeis* to strengthen the garrison in Lepreon in summer 421 (Thuc. 5.34.1), and then became embroiled in an argument with Elis on whether they had moved troops into Lepreon during the Olympic truce for the Games of 420 (Thuc. 5.49.1-50.4). It is conceivable that the entire dispute followed the end of the war, i.e. that the arbitration by Sparta took place in late spring or early summer 421.[24] It would have been easier for Sparta to commit hoplites to garrison duty in Lepreon after the formal cessation of hostilities.

SPARTAN GARRISON IN LEPREON

Thucydides has three references to movement of Spartan troops into Lepreon: at 5.30.4 he writes of a garrison of hoplites; at 5.34.1 of *Brasideioi* and *neodamodeis*, evidently sent as a reinforcement; and at 5.49.1 of 1,000 hoplites who, according to the Eleians, breached the Olympic truce. On any reckoning, whether three separate bodies of troops were sent or only two, there was a sizeable garrison.[25] It has often been supposed that the *Brasideioi* and *neodamodeis* were given plots of land in Lepreon.[26] However, Cartledge pointed out that there is no reason to believe that such grants of land at Lepreon were made, and Paradiso has developed that argument, suggesting that the garrison at Lepreon was paid a wage, and

24 Nielsen 2005: 62 dates the arbitration to 421.

25 On these contingents, see Paradiso 2008: 27-31 (in Paradiso & Roy 2008), Paradiso 2013, and Hornblower 2008: 80-81.

26 E.g. among many others by Roy 1998: 361: "Sparta had also settled freed helots and *neodamodeis* in Lepreon", written on the assumption that the *Brasideioi* and *neodamodeis* were settlers with plots of land.

showing that *neodamodeis* were paid on other occasions.[27] The assumption that plots of land were provided rests solely on the wording of Thucydides at 5.34.1. (At 5.31.4 and 5.49.1 Thucydides simply says that Sparta sent hoplites to Lepreon, using forms of the verb *espempo*, meaning 'to send to'.) At 5.34.1 Thucydides says "In summer 421 the troops who had fought under Brasidas in Thrace were brought home by Kleandridas. The Lakedaimonians voted that the Helots who had fought with Brasidas be free and live wherever they wished, and not much later they posted them with the *neodamodeis* in Lepreon". The Greek for the last phrase is: καὶ ὕστερον οὐ πολλῷ αὐτοὺς μετὰ τῶν νεοδαμώδων ἐς Λέπρεον κατέστησαν. There is no obvious reason to suppose that the verb κατέστησαν means "settled with plots of land": it is much more straightforward to take it to mean "posted" in the military sense. The wording is analysed in detail by Paradiso,[28] who points out that the Spartans voted that "the Helots who had fought with Brasidas" were to be free and to live wherever they wished, i.e. were not bound to the land of a Spartiate master. That left them as free men, experienced hoplites, who would have to find a living as best they could. Thucydides' text then continues "and not much later": Paradiso stresses that Thucydides makes the connection with 'and' (καὶ), so that sending them to Lepreon in no way clashes with the privileges that they have just received but rather follows on naturally. In fact gainful employment is found for them.[29]

Furthermore, it is not easy to see how Lepreon could have provided land for some hundreds of military settlers.[30] Nonetheless the widespread belief that there were Lakedaimonian military settlers on Lepreate territory has given rise to elaborate but speculative historical reconstructions (e.g. recently by Bourke and Patay-Horváth).[31]

27 Cartledge 1979: 215, repeated in 2002: 215; Paradiso 2008: 69-74 and 2013: 588-91.

28 Paradiso 2008: 70.

29 On the status of the *neodamodeis* (helots freed to fight as hoplites) see Paradiso 2008: 71-74.

30 See Hornblower 2008: 81.

31 Bourke 2018: 137 suggests that many Lepreates might have migrated to Elis, leaving land to be settled in Lepreon, or alternatively that some Lepreates might have been expelled in a revolution occurring before Lepreon stopped making the annual payment to Olympian Zeus; there may well have been political disagreement within Lepreon, but there is no evidence that either of those things happened. Patay-Horváth

At least part of the garrison remained in Lepreon for some years. By 418 Elis, Mantinea, Argos, and Athens had formed an alliance, and carried out military operations in the Peloponnese in the period preceding the battle of Mantinea. After capturing Orchomenos, Mantinea's northern neighbour, they debated their next move (Thuc. 5.62.1-2). Elis proposed that they attack Lepreon, which suggests that it still had a significant Spartan garrison. When the allies instead adopted the Mantineans' suggestion that they move on Tegea, the Eleian troops left their allies and went home. The Eleian suggestion that the allies attack Lepreon has been criticised on strategic grounds (see Hornblower 2008: 163, citing Andrewes), and their suggestion was doubtless motivated by their own interest in recovering Lepreon, but the capture of Lepreon would have opened a route into Messenia.[32] Moreover some of the garrison was removed from Lepreon to strengthen the Spartan army that fought at Mantinea. *Brasideioi* are mentioned three times among the Spartan forces at the battle (Thuc. 5.67.1, 71.3, and 72.3), and at 5.67.1 alone *neodamodeis* are said to be with the *Brasideioi*.[33] The close association of these *Brasideioi* and *neodamodeis* suggests that they all came from the liberated helots, *Brasideioi* and *neodamodeis*, posted to Lepreon.[34] Other hoplites may also have been moved from Lepreon to strengthen the Spartan army: they would simply have joined their normal units in the Spartan army, and Thucydides would have had no reason to mention them specially. The Eleians had mobilised 3,000 hoplites to fight with their allies (5.58.1), and

(2016: 253-54 and 2020: 170-74) suggests that Lepreon controlled the neighbouring Arkadian community Phigalia, that anti-Spartan Lepreates were driven out by their fellow-citizens and left land available for military settlers, and that Lakedaimonian military settlers in Lepreon and possibly also in Phigalia played a major part in the development of the sanctuary at Bassai in Phigalia. Again, these are simply conjectures.

32 As noted by Bourke 2018: 144.

33 Paradiso 2008: 71 suggests that the greater prominence of the *Brasideioi* in those passages may mean that they were more numerous than the *neodamodeis* operating alongside them.

34 Hornblower 2008: 175 and 182 suggests that the *Brasideioi* at the battle of Mantinea included the survivors of the thousand Peloponnesian mercenaries that Brasidas had also taken to Thrace (Thuc. 4.78.1, 80.5), but that seems unlikely, since there is no evidence that the Spartans continued to employ these mercenaries.

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would have had these men available when they returned to Elis; Elis again mobilised 3,000 hoplites after the battle of Mantinea (Thuc. 5.75.5). However, there is nothing in Thucydides' account to suggest that the Eleians made any attempt to attack Lepreon themselves, despite its depleted garrison. It is in fact likely that a Spartan garrison, of whatever strength, was maintained in Lepreon until it returned to Eleian control. However, before considering that development, it is necessary to examine the dispute between Elis and Sparta over an alleged breach of the Olympic truce for the Games of 420.

DISPUTE BETWEEN SPARTA AND ELIS OVER OLYMPIC TRUCE

The Eleians had acted clumsily in first accepting arbitration and then withdrawing and ravaging Lepreate territory, since they gave the Spartans the opportunity not only to give a verdict contrary to Elis' interests but also to garrison Lepreon to maintain that verdict. The Eleians then tried a different approach. As the Olympic Games of 420 approached, the Olympic truce was announced. Thucydides gives a detailed account (5.49.1-50.4) of what then happened.[35] The Eleians accused the Spartans of having attacked a fort at Phyrkos and having during the Olympic truce moved 1,000 hoplites into Lepreon. The two events, presented together in the text, are most naturally taken to be part of the same military action: it is likely that the fort, otherwise unknown, was in the territory of Lepreon, probably on or near the route from Messenia to the town of Lepreon.[36] It may well have been built originally by the Lepreates, but was evidently held by Eleian forces when the Spartans attacked. A hearing took place in a court, probably an Olympic court but certainly one dominated by the Eleians, and a penalty of 2,000 *minai* was imposed on the Spartans for the breach of the truce. (The penalty was fixed by Olym-

35 See Roy 1998, Paradiso & Roy 2008, and Hornblower 2008: 122-35.

36 On access from Messenia to Lepreon see the route via Aulon in Messenia followed by Agis into Elis during the Spartan-Eleian war at the end of the century (Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.25).

pic law at two *minai* per man, allowing the number of hoplites to be calculated.) Thucydides' narrative shows that the Spartans were not present at the hearing, but sent ambassadors to protest when they learnt of the verdict.[37]

The case presented by the Spartan ambassadors (Thuc. 5.49.4) is remarkable for what it does not say. The Spartans began a discussion about dates, when the truce had been announced at Sparta and when the troops had been moved into Lepreon. When the Spartans refused to pay the 2,000 *minai*, the Eleians maintained their position, but suggested other possible courses of action which would, in effect, have obliged the Spartans to admit that they were guilty. No agreement was reached, and, because the Spartans did not pay, the Eleians finally banned them from sacrificing or competing at Olympia. What the Spartan ambassadors did not say was that Lepreon was autonomous. The Eleians clearly supposed that the Olympic truce protected the territories of the *polis* Elis and its subordinate allies, and their condemnation of the Spartans was arguably a fresh attempt to assert that Lepreon belonged to Elis. Yet, although in their arbitration the Spartans had declared Lepreon to be autonomous, the Spartan ambassadors did not say that Lepreon, being autonomous, was no longer subject to Eleian control and therefore not covered by the Olympic truce.

This point has been noted in a recent article by Patay-Horváth 2016, who wrote (at p. 250):

> "In the course of the ensuing quarrel, Sparta seems to have admitted that Lepreon was covered by the sacred truce and thus belonged to Elis: instead of referring to the fact that Lepreon was not under Elean control, Sparta exclusively insisted on temporal aspects of the episode, thus leaving the impression of accepting the Elean claim to the

37 Bourke 2018: 141 suggests that the court hearing at which the Spartans were condemned in their absence was comparable to the Spartans' decision about Lepreon after the Eleians had withdrawn from the arbitration – "they [i.e. the Spartans] were now repaid in kind". However, the Eleians had of their own volition, and contrary to normal practice in arbitration, withdrawn from the arbitration after it had begun, whereas there is no evidence that the Spartans had been given any opportunity to put their case to the court.

> territory of Lepreon. But in the light of the preceding events, this impression cannot be true: the Spartan envoys simply cannot have forgotten at this moment that Sparta had recently (a few years ago at maximum) declared Lepreon's autonomy and that there were several hundreds of Spartan soldiers there in order to keep Elis at bay."

Patay-Horváth (2016: 250-51) seeks to explain the problem by supposing that, while autonomous Lepreon was indeed free of Eleian control and therefore not covered by the truce, to reach Lepreate territory the Spartan forces had crossed purely Eleian territory, possibly the territory on which the fort Phyrkos stood. He offers no evidence that the *polis* Elis claimed territory in southern Triphylia as belonging directly to itself, and indeed there is no such evidence. Thus, while Patay-Horváth has made a valuable observation about Thucydides' text, some other explanation must be found.

SPARTA'S VIEW OF LEPREON'S AUTONOMY

The Spartan ambassadors certainly knew that Elis did not accept the judgment given by the Spartans as arbitrators, but citing the judgment would have allowed them to represent the Eleians as being in the wrong (note ἀδικεῖν Ἠλείους at Thuc. 5.31.4: the Spartans judged "that the Eleians were acting unjustly"). Thucydides might have chosen not to mention a reference by the ambassadors to the arbitration, but that would have been a major omission, and he does choose to record a good deal of discussion that led nowhere, not only the Spartan argument, rejected by the Eleians, about the date of the announcement of the truce at Sparta but also two proposals subsequently made by the Eleians but rejected by the Spartans (5.49.5-50.1).

A different explanation is to suppose that Lepreon's autonomy meant not freedom from Eleian control but something else, namely that Lepreon was free to make its own decision on whether to pay one talent per year to Olympian Zeus. That was the issue that had led to the quarrel between Lepreon and Elis, and that was the issue on which Sparta had been asked to arbitrate. Supposing that Lepreon's autonomy concerned

its freedom to decide about the annual payment and not its dependence on Elis would mean that Sparta had never questioned legally Elis' control of Lepreon as a subordinate ally, but had taken the opportunity to install a garrison to protect Lepreon when Elis not only rejected the process of arbitration but attacked Lepreate territory (5.31.3). No doubt the Spartan attack on the fort at Phyrkos, evidently occupied by Eleian troops in Lepreate territory, could also have been justified as a measure to protect Lepreon and ensure that the verdict of the arbitration was upheld.

Autonomia and related terms have attracted a good deal of scholarly attention, from which it emerges that these terms were used with different meanings in different contexts.[38] Such vocabulary was rare in the fifth century except in the work of Thucydides, who alone provides 48 of the 58 occurrences in surviving fifth-century literature.[39] It is therefore not surprising that Thucydides produces on occasion original applications of the terms.

Clearly alongside legal issues there were questions of Realpolitik, and it is understandable that the Eleians claimed (Thuc. 5.31.5) that the Spartans had received a *polis* that had defected from them. The Spartans, with their garrison in Lepreon, clearly had de facto control of Lepreon. The Spartans had nonetheless legal justification for their action, and had manoeuvred more skilfully than the Eleians. It has been suggested that Thucydides' account of the quarrel between Elis and Sparta was sympathetic to the Eleians, and possibly based on material supplied by Eleian informants.[40] However, a careful reading of the text does not show the Eleians in a very favourable light.

When war between Sparta and Elis broke out at the end of the fifth century Lepreon was once more controlled by Elis (though it broke away

38 There is a large bibliography, although the only monograph is the (fairly brief) treatment by Ostwald 1982. Unsurprisingly *autonomia* attracted attention in the researches of the Copenhagen Polis Centre: see e.g. Hansen 1995 and 2015. Bosworth 1992 showed well how the meaning of *autonomia* and related terms could vary.

39 Lévy 1983: 255, with a list of the Thucydidean passages in n. 51 (extending onto p. 256).

40 E.g. Andrewes 27 (in Gomme, Andrewes & Dover 1970) on 5.31.2: "since he [i.e. Thuc.] chose to present only the Elean side of the case". Falkner 1999: 390 suggested that Thucydides' sympathies were apparently with the Eleians, who were perhaps his informants.

and joined the Spartan side at the earliest opportunity: Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.25). Also, when the Spartans refused to pay the fine imposed by the Eleians in 420 they were banned from sacrificing or competing at Olympia, but an incident involving King Agis shows that the ban was lifted at an unknown date before the Spartan-Eleian war. Xenophon says that, acting on the advice of some other oracle, the Spartans sent King Agis to consult the oracle at Olympia. The Eleians refused to allow him to do so on the grounds that, according to tradition, the oracle was not consulted about war on Greeks.[41] To consult the oracle at Olympia Agis would have needed to sacrifice, and there is no mention in Xenophon, or in Diodorus, of any difficulty for Agis about sacrificing: all concerned apparently assumed that Agis could have consulted the oracle if the object of his consultation had been different. It thus appears that at some time after 418 Elis had regained Lepreon and the ban on Spartans' sacrificing at Olympia had been lifted, but there is no ancient evidence of how or when these things happened.

There have been various modern conjectures. One suggestion is that Elis recovered Lepreon by military action.[42] The main objections to this view are that there is no mention of such action against Spartan control of Lepreon in the accounts of the later Spartan-Eleian war, and also that the proposal does not explain why the ban on Spartans' sacrificing at Olympia was lifted. Bourke (2018: 144-45) suggested that Elis recaptured Lepreon in 418, and that later, possibly early in 417, "concerned for their own security" the Eleians removed the bans imposed on the Spartans "by surrendering their own share of the fine and paying the money due to the god" as they had offered to do in the discussions with the Spartans described by Thucydides (5.49.5-50.1). Again this supposes a military attack not mentioned in the run-up to the later Spartan-Eleian war.

41 Xen. *Hell.*34.2.22: see also D.S. 14.17.4, and on the name of the Spartan king to be read there, see Schepens 2004: 7-18.

42 Proposed by Falkner 1999: 393, Nielsen 2005: 61, and Patay-Horváth: 2016: 251-53.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN SPARTA AND ELIS?

It seems easier to suppose an agreement between Sparta and Elis.[43] It would certainly have occurred after the battle of Mantinea in 418, and possibly before the reference to "Eleian Lepreon" in Aristophanes' *Birds* 149, performed in 414. (The political status of Lepreon was of no importance for Aristophanes' play, but the allusion might have been more interesting if Lepreon had recently been restored by Sparta to Elis.) Sparta's victory at Mantinea put Sparta in a stronger position, and weakened that of Elis; but the Eleians did not fight in the battle and could not be dictated to as a defeated enemy, as was Mantinea (Thuc. 5.81.1).

It is unlikely that any account was taken of the desires of Lepreates, though they doubtless had views on whether subordination to Elis or attachment to Sparta was better: when open warfare broke out between Elis and Sparta in the very different circumstances that followed the end of the Peloponnesian War, the Lepreates took the earliest opportunity to break from Elis and join Sparta (Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.25).

An agreement would have needed to cover various issues.[44] One obviously was the restoration of Lepreon to Elis. If there was still a Spartan garrison in Lepreon, it would have to be withdrawn: that would allow Sparta to use the troops elsewhere. If men in the garrison had been granted land in Lepreon, compensation for their loss of the land would be needed; but it was argued above that there is no reason to believe that such grants had been made. Since Sparta had never denied that Lepreon was a subordinate ally of Elis, there would be no difficulty about allowing that relationship to continue, but Sparta would need to be satisfied that Elis would respect the verdict given in the arbitration, and agreement would be needed on whether Lepreon had to make any payment to Zeus at Olympia. Elis would have to withdraw the penalty imposed on Sparta (the fine of 2,000 *minai*), and remove the bans on sacrificing and competing at Olympia. Sparta might also have wanted some guarantee that Elis would not take any action, or allow any action by others on Eleian territory, that would endanger Spartan control of Messenia. Any such agreement would not necessarily bring friendly relations between Elis and

43 As proposed in Roy 2009: 71-74.

44 In fact more than those discussed by Roy 2009.

Sparta – as is clear from the refusal to let King Agis consult the oracle at Olympia, not to mention the war at the end of the century – but it would solve a number of problems. Elis would recover control of Lepreon, and Sparta would no longer need to commit men to Lepreon, while Spartans would once more be able to sacrifice and to compete at Olympia. It would also mean that the quarrel over Lepreon was settled by negotiation, not by military force. Obviously during the quarrel both Elis and Sparta sought to promote, or at least protect, political and strategic interests, but the Spartans made only very limited use of military force, and preferred to use legal authority. They had deployed troops at Lepreon only when the Eleians, refusing to accept the result of arbitration, used military force against Lepreate territory. Thucydides makes clear (5.50.1-4) the respective outlooks of the Eleians and the Spartans. After banning the Spartans from sacrificing or competing at Olympia, the Eleians saw a military problem: they were afraid that the Spartans would use force to gain access to the Games in 420, and not only mobilised their own younger men to guard the sanctuary but also had troops from their allies Argos, Mantinea, and Athens to help them. "But the Spartans remained at peace."

SPARTAN LEGALITY

Two general issues arise from the arguments presented in this paper. One is that in the difficult years that followed the end of the Archidamian War the Spartans were careful to be seen to act with legal justification. They used military force when it seemed legally justified, and did so on an appropriate scale. The garrison at Lepreon was big enough to deter the Eleians, but not a major force. The campaign in Parrhasia, on the other hand, was conducted with a full levy of the Spartan army. It was clearly necessary to send a force that the Mantineans could not effectively oppose, and such force was justified because the Mantineans had not respected the agreement within the Spartan alliance not to take advantage of the war to seize territory. Even in that case, however, Sparta acted only to redress the Mantinea's breach of the allies' agreement, driving the Mantineans out of Parrhasia and so freeing the Parrhasians

from Mantinean control, but taking no action against the rest of Mantinea's alliance. The freedom of the Parrhasians was expressed as autonomy: "having made the Parrhasians autonomous" (Thuc. 5.33.3).

MEANING(S) OF AUTONOMIA

That, however, raises another general question, about the nature of *autonomia*. In case of Parrhasia autonomy clearly meant freedom from Mantinean domination. Yet, although the Spartans when arbitrating had judged that the Lepreates were autonomous (Thuc. 5.31.4), that autonomy did not mean that the Lepreates were no longer subordinate allies of the Eleians. The Eleians clearly considered that Lepreon was covered by the Olympic truce for the Games of 420, and the Spartans did not challenge that view, choosing instead to argue about when the truce had been announced and whether any movement of Spartan troops in Lepreate territory had occurred after the announcement. It seems then that the nature of autonomy, as conceived by the Spartans and reported by Thucydides, varied according to circumstances. It seems in fact to mean that the community concerned, in some way subordinate to another, had the right to decide for itself about the point at issue. In the case of the Parrhasians the issue was whether or not they should be subject to the Mantineans, and, since the Mantineans had established control over Parrhasia in breach of the agreement within the Spartan alliance, the Spartans declared in effect that the Parrhasians were free to decide whether or not to remain allied to Mantinea. The Spartans, by driving the Mantineans out of Parrhasia, had made it certain that the Parrhasians would decide to be free of Mantinea, but the decision could be represented as a free choice made by the autonomous Parrhasians.

The case of the Lepreates was different. In the quarrel between Elis and Lepreon the point at issue was whether Lepreon should continue to pay one talent annually to Zeus at Olympia. The Lepreates had used the Archidamian War as a reason for stopping the annual payment. Thucydides' report is brief (5.31.3), but the argument of the Lepreates was presumably that they were making a contribution to the war-effort of the Spartan alliance, and that that contribution had a cost. Thucydides does

not report the view of the Eleians, beyond the fact that they insisted that the Lepreates should continue to pay,[45] and equally he does not give the the Spartans' reasons for their verdict in the arbitration. The Spartans may have chosen to regard the support provided by the Lepreates to the Spartan alliance and the cost incurred by Lepreon as a sufficient reason for not paying. If, as seems likely, the arbitration occurred after the end of the Archidamian War, then the Spartans might have regarded the costs already incurred as sufficiently heavy to justify a respite for a time, or they might have reasoned that in the uncertain situation of the Peloponnese further military effort, and further cost, might be needed. Without evidence any explanation of the Spartan verdict can be no more than conjecture, but it seems safe to assume that the Spartans will have found arguments to justify their verdict. The verdict was that the Lepreates were autonomous, and that meant in practice that they were free to choose whether or not to make the annual payment to Olympian Zeus. They decided not to pay.

Autonomia as decreed by the Spartans in the two cases of the Parrhasians and the Lepreates appears to be the freedom of a subordinate community to take its own decision about the point at issue. In each case there was a more powerful state whose interests were concerned. Mantinea could not uphold its interests either legally (because it had breached the agreement of the Spartan alliance, and indeed had left the alliance) or militarily (because it was not strong enough). The Eleians defended their interests as best they could, and had the great advantage of controlling Olympia. The Spartans prevented the Eleians from using force against Lepreon, but were banned from sacrificing and competing at Olympia. Nonetheless the Spartans continued to recognise that Lepreon was a subordinate ally of Elis, and eventually allowed the city to return to Eleian control.

45 On relations between Elis and its allies generally (often referred to as 'perioikoi' of Elis, though there is no evidence that the Eleians used the term) see Roy 1997. We have little information about what obligations Elis imposed on its allies (Roy 1997: 291-98).

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VESPASIAN AND METTIUS POMPUSIANUS

By David Woods

Summary: Several ancient sources agree that the emperor Vespasian did not punish a certain Mettius Pompusianus when he learned that he had received an imperial horoscope, but appointed him as consul. It is argued here that Vespasian intended his appointment of Pompusianus as consul as the fulfilment of this horoscope which was vaguer in its original language than the surviving sources suggest. This saved him from having to punish Pompusianus.

In a section of his biography of the emperor Vespasian describing how that emperor did not harbour grudges against his enemies or those who had insulted him, but was even inclined to be generous in his treatment of them, Suetonius first describes how Vespasian arranged an excellent marriage for the daughter of his former rival Vitellius, and even provided a dowry for her, then how he confined himself to dismissing a former court official of Nero in the same way that that man had once dismissed him, and, finally, how he rewarded a certain Mettius Pompusianus with the consulship despite the fact that he had been warned that he was a potential conspirator against him for the throne.[1] His description of Vespasian's treatment of Pompusianus runs as follows (*Vesp.* 14):

> Nam ut suspicione aliqua vel metu ad perniciem cuiusquam compelleretur tantum afuit ut monentibus amicis cavendum esse Mettium Pompusianum, quod volgo crederetur genesim habere imperatoriam,

1 Nothing more is known for certain about the earlier career or wider family of this man (*PIR*^{2} M 570), although he may have been one of the Mettii from Arles who fell into disfavour under Domitian (*PIR*^{2} M 565-72). See Jones 2000: 86.

David Woods: 'Vespasian and Mettius Pompusianus' *C&M* 71 (2022) 129-138.

> insuper consulem fecerit, spondens quandoque beneficii memorem futurum.[2]
>
> For he was so far from being impelled by any suspicion or fear towards the ruin of anyone that when friends warned him to beware of Mettius Pompusianus, since it was commonly believed that he had an imperial horoscope, he even made him consul, promising that he would at some time be mindful of the favour.

Suetonius' basic account of this incident is supported by two other sources also. Cassius Dio includes a description of it when he describes how the emperor Domitian exiled Pompusianus to Corsica before eventually executing him because he believed that he was aspiring to the throne.[3] His account runs as follows (Dio 67.12.3):

> ἐν δὲ τοῖς τότε τελευτήσασι πολλοῖς οὖσι καὶ Μέττιος Πομπουσιανὸς ἐγένετο, ὃν ὁ μὲν Οὐεσπασιανὸς μαθὼν ἐκ φήμης τινὸς ὅτι μοναρχήσει οὐδὲν κακὸν εἰργάσατο, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐτίμα, λέγων ὅτι "πάντως μου μνημονεύσει καὶ πάντως με ἀντιτιμήσει."[4]
>
> Among the many who perished at this time was Mettius Pompusianus, whom Vespasian had failed to harm after learning from some report that he would one day be sovereign, but on the contrary had shown him honour, declaring: "He will surely remember me and will surely honour me in return."

Finally, the anonymous author of the late-sixth-century *Epitome de Caesaribus* also describes this incident during his brief account of the reign of Vespasian, as follows (*Epit. de Caes.* 9.14):

2 Ed. Kaster 2016: 383. The translation is mine.
3 On the circumstances surrounding his execution, see Arnaud 1983; Geus 2020.
4 Ed. and trans. Cary 1925: 344-45.

> Hic monentibus amicis, ut caveret a Mettio Pomposiano, de quo sermo percrebuerat regnaturum fore, consulem fecit, alludens tali cavillo: "Quandoque memor erit tanti beneficii".[5]
>
> When his friends warned him to beware of Mettius Pomposianus, about whom the rumour had spread that he would rule, he made him a consul, joking in the following way: "When will there ever be a memory of so great a gift?"

The decision by Vespasian to ignore the potential threat to his rule posed by Pompusianus is unusual, but by no means unique. For example, when the emperor Tiberius learned that the young Galba was thought to be destined to become emperor, but only as an old man, he left him unharmed on the basis that his continued life and freedom was no threat to him, or so the story goes.[6] Furthermore, Lucius Vitellius, consul in AD 34, 43, and 47, allegedly did all he could to prevent his son, the future emperor Aulus Vitellius, from being appointed as a provincial governor in an effort to frustrate the fulfilment of a horoscope that had apparently foretold his accession to the throne.[7] If there is any truth to this claim, then such behaviour could only have drawn attention to the existence of this horoscope. Indeed, one must also question whether family gossip about such a shocking horoscope would not have spread news about it beyond the immediate family circle long before the child had reached adulthood. Nevertheless, Aulus Vitellius lived safely through the reigns of five different emperors before his own rise to power. The peculiar point here is not that Vespasian allowed Pompusianus to continue living unharmed despite the potential threat that he seemed to pose, but that

5 Ed. Pichlmayr and Gruendel 1966: 143. On the date of this text, see now Stover 2021.

6 Suet. *Galba* 4.1; Tac. *Ann.* 6.20; Jos. *AJ* 18.216; Dio 57.191.1. Tiberius named both Caligula, his grandson by adoption, and Tiberius Gemellus, his natural grandson, as his heirs, with the eventual result that the elder, Caligula, dispossessed, and then executed his younger rival. His depiction as one unconcerned at the harm that Galba might inflict upon one of his successors is entirely consistent with the general lack of concern that he is supposed to have shown for his heirs.

7 Suet. *Vit.* 3.2.

he also honoured him with the consulship, even if only the suffect consulship rather than the ordinary consulship.[8] At face value, this action seems completely counterintuitive in that the greater the honour that was accorded to Pompusianus, the more distinguished he seemed, and the more acceptable as a potential imperial candidate he became. In fact, it represents the very opposite of the action that Lucius Vitellius allegedly undertook in order to prevent his son from attaining the imperial power promised by his horoscope. So why did Vespasian treat Pompusianus in such a generous manner?

Vespasian's own words as he bestowed the consulship upon Pompusianus should help answer this question, but there are three problems with them. The first is that the three sources for this event do not entirely agree concerning the details of what he said. For example, it is Suetonius alone who preserves the part about how Vespasian expected to be honoured in some way for what he had done for Pompusianus. Neither of the other two sources includes this element in its description of his words, although one could perhaps argue that it is implicit in the very idea that Pompusianus would one day look back upon and remember what Vespasian has done for him as claimed in Cassius Dio's description of Vespasian's words. The second is that the tone of Vespasian's alleged statement is not clear, whether he was being entirely serious or mocking and ironic. Certainly, the author of the *Epitome de Caesaribus* understood that he was joking as he spoke, but there is no evidence that either Suetonius or Cassius Dio understood his tone in the same way. Finally, the third problem is that the significance of Vespasian's words remains ambiguous, even when the three sources do appear to be in general agreement. For example, all three sources agree that Vespasian's words refer to the future memory of the benefit that he has conferred upon Pompusianus. However, while Suetonius and Cassius Dio agree that Vespasian refers to Pompusianus' own future memory of this benefit, the version of his words preserved by the author of the *Epitome de Caesaribus* seems to refer to some general, popular memory of this event instead.

8 There is no other evidence for his consulship so that it can only be vaguely dated to the period c.70-75. For the consulships of the Flavian period, both ordinary and suffect, see Gallivan 1981.

It has sometimes been suggested that Vespasian did not execute Pompusianus because he was confident that the horoscope seeming to promise him the throne was wrong since it contradicted his own horoscope, and those of his family, and other signs that his sons would succeed him and enjoy reasonably lengthy reigns.[9] Hence Mooney claims that 'Vespasian, relying on his own horoscope and those of his family, was confident that his sons would succeed him', Cramer claims that 'one cannot but assume that Vespasian's serenity was based on his firm conviction (obtained from the advice of men like Balbillus, Ptolemy Seleucus, or other court-astrologers) that the astrological predictions, which Mettius Pompusianus had received, were wrong', Jones claims that 'Vespasian preferred to accept the prediction that his sons would succeed him', Pagán claims that 'Vespasian is willing to overlook the horoscope as meaningless', while Wardle claims similarly that 'his faith in the reliability of his own horoscope probably explains why he did not eliminate Mettius Pompusianus'.[10] However, the best way to prove that Pompusianus' horoscope was wrong would have been to order his trial and execution. More importantly, even if Vespasian was absolutely confident that Pompusianus' horoscope was wrong and that he would never rise to the throne, this still does not explain why he honoured him by appointing him as consul.

One possibility is that his appointment of Pompusianus to the consulship was part of some larger joke at his expense intended to mock his alleged horoscope and any imperial aspirations that he might have had as a result of it. After all, Vespasian only appointed him to the suffect consulship rather than the ordinary consulship, and it is not clear for how long he appointed him. He might have appointed him for only a week or even a day. Such an interpretation would be consistent with the characterization by the author of the *Epitome de Caesaribus* of Vespasian's words as he made the appointment as a joke. Certainly, some modern commentators have found this approach attractive. For example,

9 For his confidence in the imperial horoscopes and a dream promising that he and his two sons would reign as long as the period of the reigns of Claudius and Nero taken together, see Suet. *Vesp*. 25.

10 Mooney 1930: 435; Cramer 1954: 138; Jones 2000: 87-88; Pagán 2012: 108; Wardle 2012: 198.

Mooney claims that 'Vespasian is rightly said to be speaking with scoffing irony', while Levick describes Pompusianus as 'a subject of mirth'.[11] Furthermore, Vespasian was known for his sense of humour and his habit of settling matters with a joke.[12] However, it is doubtful whether any emperor could ever have really regarded a horoscope appearing to promise imperial rule to a Roman senator as a laughing matter, even an emperor with as well-developed a sense of humour as Vespasian. In his case, for example, almost all of the alleged examples of his humour consist of brief witticisms about relatively unimportant matters, the correct pronunciation of certain Latin words, the strange physical appearance of an individual, or minor examples of financial corruption.[13] There is no other indication that he found charges of treason a laughing matter.

Another possibility is that his decision to honour Pompusianus with the consulship was an act of bravado intended to prove to any who had heard about his alleged imperial horoscope that he had no faith at all in it and was so far from fearing for either himself or his family because of it that he would even honour Pompusianus in this way. Yet such behaviour would be inconsistent with the character of Vespasian who was naturally cautious and little inclined to indulge in flamboyant gestures or public display.[14]

A third possibility is that he honoured Pompusianus with the consulship in order to place him under obligation to him and to better cement his loyalty.[15] Yet all the most successful assassins or rebels had enjoyed trust and preferment before they had eventually turned on their benefactors. Indeed, one could say that it was the nature of the political game at this period that one could not conduct a successful rebellion or assassination unless one had first enjoyed the trust and preferment of him against whom one was acting. Most recently, for example, the fact that Nero had appointed Galba as governor of Hispania Tarraconensis in AD

11 Mooney 1930: 435; Levick 2017: 102.

12 Suet. *Vesp.* 22-23; Dio 66.11.1-3.

13 One noteworthy exception is his joke at his own expense when, as he lay dying, he declared that he thought that he was becoming a God (Suet. *Vesp.* 23.4), but this was clearly a unique situation.

14 Morgan 2006: 182, characterizes him as 'notoriously cautious and canny'.

15 So Saller 1982: 70 suggests based on Suetonius' description of Vespasian's words to Pompusianus as he appointed him consul.

60 did not prevent Galba from rebelling against him in AD 68. It is unlikely, therefore, that Vespasian could really have believed that his appointment of Pompusianus as consul would guarantee his loyalty in the future.

Finally, there is a fourth possibility that seems to have passed unnoticed heretofore, that the wording of Pompusianus' horoscope was not as precise in its promise of imperial power to him as the surviving sources suggest, so that Vespasian appointed him as consul in order to make it seem that the horoscope had foretold this rather than his accession as emperor. Two points need to be borne in mind here. The first is that the description of Pompusianus' horoscope by authors who wrote after the reign of Domitian has probably been heavily influenced by the fact that Domitian did execute him for aspiring to the throne in the end. Furthermore, even if Pompusianus did continue to hope that his horoscope pointed to his accession as emperor, despite the fact that Vespasian had done his best to fulfil it by other means, and the allegation that, by the time of his execution, he used to carry about a map of the world with him and a collection of speeches of kings and generals from the work of Livy, does seem to point in this direction, this does not mean that this was the only or most obvious interpretation of that element of his horoscope.[16]

The second point is that Romans had long been accustomed to try to manipulate the interpretation of various omens or predictions of the future so that their fulfilment proved far less problematic than it might otherwise have been. For example, just before the battle of Thapsus in Africa in 46 BC, Julius Caesar placed an obscure man called Scipio Sallustio at the front of his troops as if he was their commander because there was an ancient oracle that the family of the Scipios would always conquer in Africa and he wanted to attract the victory from the other side, led by Metellus Scipio, to his own side.[17] Similarly, Suetonius records a tradition that when the empress Messalina went through some

16 There is a contradiction between Suetonius (*Dom.* 10.3), who claims that Pompusianus carried a map on the world on parchment about with him and Dio (67.12.4), who claims that he had a map of the world painted on the walls of his bedroom, but this does not matter here.

17 Plut. *Caes.* 52.2-3.

form of marriage ceremony with her lover Gaius Silius in AD 48, the emperor Claudius himself signed the contract for the dowry because he believed that the marriage was no more than a device intended to divert the danger promised by some omens from himself onto Silius instead.[18] He also records that the astrologer Balbillus advised the emperor Nero that some kings believed that, when the death of a great man was portended by a comet, he could divert the death from himself by killing someone else important instead and that Nero found the perfect pretext for such killings when he discovered two conspiracies against him shortly after the appearance of a comet, probably that of AD 64.[19]

It is my argument, therefore, that Nero appointed Pompusianus as suffect consul in the hope that this would fulfil the promise of supreme office apparently made to him by his horoscope. This was in Vespasian's own interest, and that of his family, in that he hoped by this action to forestall whatever sequence of events might raise Pompusianus to the throne instead, a sequence which had, by its very nature to include either his own deposition, and probable death, or that of one of his sons. However, the fulfilment, or apparent fulfilment, of the horoscope in this way was in Pompusianus' own interest also in that it would help free him from suspicion by any of Vespasian's successors that he was plotting for the throne. Hence when Vespasian promised Pompusianus that he would one day be mindful of the favour that he had done him, the favour to which he referred was not so much his appointment of him as consul, but the manner in which this appointment freed him from potential suspicion by future emperors. A more prudent man than Pompusianus was would have seized upon this unexpected opportunity with gladness and have studiously avoided any subsequent behaviour that could possibly have suggested that he harboured even the slightest hope still of rising to the throne. He certainly would not have carried a map of the world and a collection of regal speeches from the work of Livy around with him in the manner of Pompusianus.

In conclusion, it is arguable that Vespasian's appointment of Pompusianus as a suffect consul was a humane and inventive solution to the problem of what to do in the case of someone who had allegedly received

18 Suet. *Claud*. 29.3.

19 Suet. *Nero* 36.1. For the identification of the comet concerned, see Rogers 1953: 242.

an imperial horoscope. It was entirely in keeping with both his general aversion to executions and his general respect for astrology as a means of divination. He managed to avoid executing, or otherwise punishing, Pompusianus, without seeming to be weak or indecisive, while also preserving his general reputation for restraint and his good relationship with the senate. Unfortunately, however, his son Domitian did not share his humane outlook, and the short successive reigns of both Vespasian and Titus may have encouraged Pompusianus himself, and others also, to wonder whether Vespasian's effort to make his horoscope refer to the consulship rather than to imperial rule had not failed. The result was fatal for Pompusianus, and may have contributed to the loss of the memory of what Vespasian had been trying to achieve by his appointment of him as consul.

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POPULISM AND MASS CLIENTELISTIC POLITICS IN CLASSICAL ATHENS

By Christopher H. Hedetoft

Summary: The potential dangers and uses of populism are as never before at the forefront of discourse on modern democracy. From political scientists to the media, politicians and of course the public, everyone seems to have an opinion in the heated debate about the role of populism in politics. In most cases, contemporary populists are chastised by pundits and academics for undermining democracy and dividing the nation. Yet perhaps we need a new, albeit historical, perspective. Was populism present in a democratic state outside of our own time frame – and if so, how did it work? Using a number of works on populism as a theoretical framework, most importantly Jan-Werner Müller's *What is populism?* (2016), this paper seeks to uncover, analyze and discuss populism, rhetoric, leadership and power relations in the direct democracy of classical Athens (508-323 BCE). Through an in-depth study of Aristophanes' comedy *Knights*, Thucydides' history of the Peloponnesian War, and various forensic orations, I conclude that populism was very much alive and well in ancient Athens, and likely even embedded in the politico-legal structure of their society. Furthermore, I find that the relationship between elite orators and the masses of the Athenian citizenry was primarily an interdependent and mutually reciprocal one.

Modern heads of state such as Brazil's Jair Bolsanaro, former United States President Donald Trump, Britain's Boris Johnson, and Hungary's Viktor Orbán are just some of the powerful figures that the media, political commentators, and researchers now identify or, perhaps, more to the point decry as populists.[1] The surge of populism in today's politics has raised widespread concern, as the rhetoric and decisions of populists, in many people's opinion, pose a serious threat to democracy.[2] In an age of instant access to information and 'fake news' about public affairs and

1 I am grateful to the anonymous peer reviewers for the helpful advice and insightful critique. A preliminary version of the article was published in Danish in the digital academic journal *AIGIS* (Hedetoft 2020).

2 Kyle & Mounk 2018; Petrou 2019.

political controversies, the need to better grasp the relationship between populism and democracy is more important than ever. One approach is to use a historical perspective that can throw our contemporary world into relief. A return to the 'cradle of democracy' might be fitting.

Did populism, as modern theories understand the phenomenon, exist in a pre-industrial democratic state – and if so, what form did it assume? Based on relevant research material and theoretical literature on populism, this article will examine a selection of politically-oriented sources from classical Athens (508-323 BCE) to establish the existence of populism in the *polis* and at the same time conduct an analysis of rhetoric, leadership, and power relations in the direct democracy of Athens.[3] As a point of departure, the analysis will initially concentrate on two derogatory depictions of Cleon, the disputed fifth-century Athenian speaker and general, in Aristophanes' *Knights* and Thucydides, respectively. Cleon's speech in Thucydides will also be contrasted with Diodotus' opposing speech in the context of the Mytilenean Debate. In addition, legal speeches held in front of Athenian jurors will also be included in the analysis to investigate whether and how populism could fit into the political-legal system of Athens. However, before reaching this stage, a proper definition and clarification of the concept of populism is necessary.

What is Populism?

The term 'populist' is often used in the news media about various politicians and public figures, typically with disparaging connotations, but it is often applied carelessly and without an accompanying explanation of the origin or meaning of the term.[4] Etymologically, the word 'populism'

3 All dates henceforth are BCE (Before Common Era), unless otherwise stated or indicated by context.

4 In defence of laypeople's often imprecise usage of the term, researchers have regularly noted the nebulous quality of populism, see Canovan 1999: 3; Weyland 2001: 1; Arato 2013: 156; Herkman 2017: 470. Yet, exactly because of this vagueness, one's applied understanding of and approach to the concept has to be stated unequivocally.

is derived from the Latin *populus*, meaning people or peoples.[5] The people are the essential point of legitimization for populists.[6] The main point is that populism is about mobilizing people against the elite(s). As the construction of a core people is so central to populist thinking, some scholars argue that populism is an inevitable part of democracy.[7] Since 'populism' is a modern term with Latin roots, the word is naturally not extant in classical Greek sources. Despite the absence of a traditional Greek label for the practice and despite the fact that modern phenomena such as nationalism and globalization, being closely linked to populist trends and developments, can hardly be detected in classical Athens, the possibility of the existence of populist discourse and action in a state where any citizen could claim to speak on behalf of the people should not be dismissed out of hand. As Michael Sommer notes on the pluralistic nature of the Athenian society: "Theoretisch gab es so viele maßgebende Meinungen, wie der *demos* Mitglieder hatte."[8] However, in reality, as Sommer is well aware, the art of public speaking came to reign supreme in states like Athens and Rome.[9] Oratorical skills were not distributed evenly among the legally and politically equal Athenian citizens, but ac-

5 The term appears for the first time in the context of modern party politics as the name of the short-lived leftist Populist Party in the United States in the late 1800s. Here, the term carries no negative associations, and 'populist' means people's party, and as such has a democratically affirmative tone.

6 Of course, the general notion that authority flows from the people to (elected) representatives is neither new nor unique to populism. It holds true for much contemporary and historical political thinking, which is not merely confined to the, quite recent, practice of indirect democracy. By way of example, one need look no further than that well-known abbreviation and watchword of the Roman Republic: SPQR. The salient feature of populism is, nonetheless, the peculiar way in which the relation between the people and their leaders is construed and treated in simultaneously inclusive and exclusionary expressions and actions.

7 Canovan 1999: 4; Decker 2003: 47-48; Kielmansegg 2017: 273.

8 Sommer 2017: 25. "In theory, there were as many leading opinions as the demos had members" (my translation).

9 On the importance of eloquence in Athens, see Ober 1989: 43-45; Rhodes 2000: 467-68; Stein-Hölkeskamp 2000: 80, 88-90. In his seminal work *Political Parties*, Robert Michels notes how indispensable oratorical skills were to democratic leadership, Michels 1915: 69-72.

quired and mastered through costly and time-consuming rhetorical education. This meant that the political leaders, what we might today call career politicians, more often than not were recruited from the upper classes.[10]

In his book *What is Populism?* (2016), the German political scientist Jan-Werner Müller seeks to clarify how to identify contemporary political practice and behaviour as populism. According to Müller, a politician must exhibit several traits before one can rightly characterize the person as a populist. First and foremost, the populist is almost always critical of the elite, that is, the economic, political, and intellectual upper classes of a given state. The populist thus operates with a sharp distinction between the people and the elite. In doing so, the populist, as the people's purported guardian, challenges 'the Establishment' and status quo and vows to make 'the People' the true sovereign of the nation, should it vote him or her into key offices.[11] In addition to being anti-elitist, the populist, Müller states, is also anti-pluralist, which means that populist agent portrays himself as the only moral representative of 'the true people'.[12] Anti-pluralism is a (hyper)moralistic mindset that rejects all other political parties as legitimate alternatives and excludes as false and amoral those parts of the population that oppose or do not support the populist party – that is, they are not part of the upright, moral people; or as Müller himself states in a *Juncture* article: "populists consistently and continuously deny the very legitimacy of their opponents (as opposed to just saying that some of their policies are misguided)."[13] By this logic, the populist is not only a representative of the people, but presents himself as a deeply integrated part of the people. Modern anti-pluralism typically finds its expression in a *pars pro toto* outlook, by which the chosen people (the part) stands for the entire polity (the whole), which in consequence necessitates taking out of the national equation those groups and elements

10 Beigel 2017: 41-42. Being a speaker in Athens was, of course, not a profession from which one formally received remuneration, Hansen 1999: 274-76. This is also not to deny that one-off speakers and proposers of decrees took the stage now and again.

11 Müller 2016: 26-27.

12 Ibid. 3-4.

13 Müller 2015: 86.

perceived to be undesirable and illegitimate.[14] Hence, to be a populist, one must exhibit particular speech and behavioural patterns and political methods. Populism as a political ideology and practice is a theoretical and sometimes normative construct, studied and explained over multiple decades by researchers like Müller.[15]

The political scientists Cas Mudde and C.R. Kaltwasser describe populism as a:

> thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic camps, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people.[16]

When Mudde and Kaltwasser identify populism as a 'thin ideology', they mean that its political and social goals are neither comprehensive nor well-defined enough to constitute a fully developed ideology, but that it can easily complement other large ideologies such as socialism (think of Venezuela's Presidents Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro) and national conservatism (Brazil's President Jair Bolsonaro). This concept of thin ideology might be more open-ended than Müller's notion of populism, though the authors agree in the main on the core components of the phenomenon.[17] It should perhaps be noted that Mudde and Kaltwasser's understanding of populism has been met with resistance in recent texts on the subject.[18] Some scholars disagree, among other things, that populism can only be a complementary political practice and worldview to broad ideologies, and instead maintain that populism in some countries (e.g. prime minister Viktor Orbán and his party Fidesz in Hungary) may well be perceived as a fully-fledged ideological complex. Contrary to the

14 Müller 2016: 20; Kielmansegg 2017: 277.

15 For the theoretical shaping and delineation of populism in other works, see Ionescu and Gellner 1969: 1-5; Arditi 2005: 72-98; Mouffe 2005: 50-71; Jansen 2011: 75-96; Mudde & Kaltwasser 2013. It is worth noting that these scholars differ in their understanding of populism as a movement, ideology, style, or discursive logic.

16 Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017: 6. The notion of *volonté générale* and popular sovereignty stems from Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

17 On their theoretical connection, see Ostiguy et al. 2021: 2-3.

18 Ágh 2016; Aslanidis 2016; Kürti 2020.

view of populism as "thin-centered", this approach sees the phenomenon as "hard populism."[19] The point here is not to argue that only one form of populism, either "thin ideology" and "hard populism," manifests itself in the real world. Rather, the recent critique ought to be read as an opportunity to expand and supplement the already existing literature on the topic. More than anything else, these varied discussions reveal that populism is difficult to pin down precisely, perhaps because it is, as Mudde and Kaltwasser assert, an "essentially contested concept" (ECC).[20]

Although it is sometimes claimed that politicians abandon their populist programmes as soon as they come into power, Müller argues to the contrary.[21] In his opinion, populism is rarely just a means to achieve political power and status; it is to a great extent also a real expression of the ideas that the populist intends to implement, however unrealistic they may prove.[22] While Müller does not define populism as a nationalist trend, this link is implied throughout the work, and other scholars also point out the close connection between populism and nationalism.[23] In his discussion, Müller addresses populism normatively, perceiving it as a menacing political current that should be countered in a proper democratic manner: "The danger is populism - a degraded form of democracy that promises to make good on democracy's highest ideals ('Let the People Rule!')."[24]

This value-laden way of viewing populism is not uncommon in other researchers' or commentators' works and articles.[25] I will, however, strive to avoid taking a moral and subjective stance on populism and instead regard the phenomenon as a subcategory of political activity within the democratic system. Therefore, I will not uncritically make use

19 Ágh 2016: 24-25; Antonopoulos 2017. Academically, 'hard populism' is comparatively a fringe concept, which has yet to command the same attention afforded by scholars to Mudde and Kaltwasser's definition.

20 Mudde & Kaltwasser 2014: 376.

21 Müller 2016: 41. For this view, see Kuehl 2017.

22 Müller 2016: 4, 41. See also Albertazzi & McDonnell 2015.

23 Ionescu & Gellner 1969; Torre 2017b; Hedetoft 2020.

24 Müller 2016: 6, see also 75-76.

25 Sandford 2017; Antal 2017; Hansen 2017. Cf., however, Canovan 1999; Mény & Surel 2002: 19; Kielmansegg 2017: 273-75.

of Müller's work, but merely apply his more sober observations on populism in my analysis. For better or for worse, it seems that populism has come to stay. But is populism at all as new and sudden a phenomenon as one might think? I would argue that today's challenges with populism can inspire us to look at the direct democracy in Athens in a new way.

Briefly on the research

It should be pointed out from the outset that there currently is only a limited amount of research proper on populism in ancient Athens.[26] When the term 'populist' or 'populism' appears in scholarly works on classical Athens, it for the most part happens in passing, uncritically, and without any theoretical foundation.[27] Nevertheless, there are a few studies that contribute significantly to the discussion of the subject. In general, the historical works that deal with (political) leadership, rhetoric, power relations, and the so-called demagogues in classical Athens will have the greatest relevance for a study of this character.[28]

Müller notes that the term 'populism' and the original Greek word δημαγωγία (demagogy, leadership of the people) nowadays are used almost interchangeably, routinely as derogatory designations. This can easily lead one to believe that the ancient Athenians actually did have an accurate (and pejorative) term to describe their populist leaders in the demagogic word.[29]

Yet, in the article "The Origins of the Statesman-Demagogue Distinction in and After Ancient Athens" (2012), Melissa Lane takes issue with the prevailing myth that the Greek word for a popular leader, δημαγωγός, in classical times was normally used in a degrading manner

26 However, see Adamidis 2021 for an excellent paper on the populist rhetorical strategies used in the legal arena of Athens. Although not as rigorous in its application of the theory of populism on the subject matter, see also Beigel 2017. For smaller pieces on the subject written for broader consumption, see Riedweg 2019 and Riedweg 2020.

27 See e.g. Strauss 1986: 91-96 Goldhill 2000: 86; Rosenbloom 2004: 80, 84; Forsdyke 2005: 65; Patterson 2005: 272-74; Gottesman 2014: 125; Rhodes 2016: 245, 258-59.

28 Notable works on classical Athenian democracy and political actors include: Finley 1962; Connor 1971; Davies 1981; Ober 1989; Yunis 1996; Hansen 1999.

29 Müller 2016: 11.

by Athenians about their democratic leaders, who, unlike today's professional politicians, were usually not elected.[30] In the words of Lane: "None of the historians, playwrights, and orators of classical Athens relied on a pejorative term for demagogue in developing their analyses of bad political leadership."[31] Lane argues that the word 'demagogue' and its related terms had no direct negative connotations before Plato and Aristotle thematised the figure as the archetypal manipulator and firebrand with which we are well acquainted today.[32]

In addition to the already established populism criteria, Müller also describes mass clientelism as a characteristic feature of populist behaviour: "Populist governance exhibits [...] 'Mass clientelism' (trading material benefits or bureaucratic favors for political support by citizens who become the populists' clients [...].[33] In this connection, Ingvar B. Maehle's article "The Economy of Gratitude in Democratic Athens" (2018) is relevant. In this, he breaks with the widespread notion that the democratic norms in Athens were incompatible with the unbalanced relationship between patrons and clients. Patron-client relations are, in Maehle's view, not a purely Roman phenomenon, and Athenian patrons adopted and moved between different roles as friend, protector, 'the big man' and statesman.[34] But exactly because of the egalitarian Athenian ideology, Maehle reaches the conclusion that the Athenian client, in contrast to his Roman counterpart, actually had the upper hand in the relationship.

30 See also Luciano Canfora's booklet *Demagogia* (1993), in which he traces the history and development of the term 'demagogia' and its related words in regards to its neutral or value-laden usage.

31 Lane 2012: 180. See also Canfora 1993: 9-12; Sommer 2017: 26. Cf. Beigel 2017: 42-43, who, possibly following Finley 1962: 5, erroneously holds that the term 'demagogue' came to be used as a negative descriptor of political leaders after Pericles' death in 429. Finley 1962 is central to the discussion of the Athenian demagogues, and Lane adopts a critical position against his argument that the term 'demagogue' was invented and applied by Athenian authors to describe the emergent cluster of mob leaders of the 420s, who seemingly stood in stark contrast to great statesmen like Pericles.

32 See e.g. Signer 2009.

33 Müller 2016: 4. For the connection between populism and state patronage, see also Sunar 1990; Torre 2017a: 203-6; Türk 2018: 154. Falling 2004; Müller 2006; Barr 2009. Cf. Fukuyama 2014: 206-26 for a contradictory point of view.

34 Maehle 2018: 62.

The result was a kind of modified patron-client system that adapted to democracy and the majority's resolutions.[35] Athenian εὐεργέται (benefactors), however, were rarely left empty-handed, exchanging symbolic capital in the form of political and legal εὔνοια (goodwill) and χάρις (gratitude).[36] According to the logic of gift exchange, a δῶρον (gift) was always given on the condition that it was never free; it indebted the recipient and called for a consideration of equal proportion.[37]

Cleon, the Populist?

In what follows, I have selected two very different classical sources, both of which deal extensively with and discuss democratic rhetoric and leadership, as well as social and political decisions in Athens: Aristophanes' comedy *Knights* and the historian Thucydides' rendition of the Mytilenean Debate. The framework of Aristophanes' plays frequently comprises real-world politics, the crises of the Peloponnesian War, and the scandalous deportment of public figures, and especially in *Knights*, which is really the contest of two opposing *rhētores* (speakers) to win the favour of the people, there is ample opportunity to investigate any occurrences of populism and other democratic leadership methods.

Aristophanes' Cleon – the foul-mouthed tanner

In *Knights*, Agoracritus, a lowly sausage-seller, and the Paphlagonian, a mean tanner, are often at loggerheads and engaged in childish rows, in which they exchange vulgar insults while each of them tries to stand out as the plainest and cheapest person, thereby being most suited to δημαγωγία.[38] Both parties also habitually launch accusations of bribery,

35 Ibid. 83-84, 88.

36 Χάρις refers to the gratitude and appreciation evoked in the recipient of a gift.

37 Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1167b17-25; Bourdieu 1990: 104-6; Mauss 2002; Satlow 2013: 1-11; Hénaff 2013: 12-24.

38 In the context of the narrative, it is heavily implied that δημαγωγία actually means to be the old Demos' majordomo and thus his favourite slave.

draft evasion, and embezzlement at each other.[39] In the culminating debate on the Pnyx, Agoracritus and the Paphlagonian both court the elderly gentleman Demos, the personification of the Athenian people, to secure his favour. With cloying charm, they lavish praise on Demos, instigating a shallow competition to surpass each other through verbal admiration and gift-giving:

> [Ph.]: But you won't beat me! I assure you, Demos, for doing absolutely nothing I'll provide you with a bowl of state pay to lap up.
> [Ag.]: And here's a little jar of ointment from me, to rub into the blisters on your shins.
> [Ph.]: And I'll pluck out your white hairs and make you young.
> [Ag.]: Here, take this bunny tail and dab your darling eyes.
> [Ph.]: Blow your nose, Demos, and wipe your hand on my head.
> [Ag.]: No, on mine.
> [Ph.]: No, on mine![40]

Importantly, embezzlement, corruption, slander, lies, and deception as well as superficial and pandering rhetoric, however negative, are not as such populist marks and traits. These features can be displayed by reference to any politician - populist or not.[41]

In the first scene of the play, Demos' household slaves reveal to the audience the rather unsympathetic nature of the Paphlagonian, and his initial appearance only confirms their portrayal of his character. The Paphlagonian, whose person heavily parodies the historical Cleon, storms out as he hears Demos' slaves discuss their plan to replace him with Agoracritus as Demos' housekeeper. Infuriated, he exclaims, "By the Twelve Gods, you two won't get away with your unending plots against

39 Ar. *Eq.* 427-44, 465-79.

40 Ibid. 904-12. All translations of Aristophanes used here are from J. Henderson's Loeb Classical Library edition.

41 Luce 2017: 50-54; Villadsen & Kock 2022: 1-19. A good example of this is Russia's President Vladimir Putin, who for several years has been accused by outside (and internal) commentators of corruption and abuse of power, but whose style of leadership cannot be characterized as populist, see Netesova & Taussig 2017. On Putin's possibly populist rhetoric, see Burrett 2020. For Putin's corruption scandals, see Wesolowsky & Coalson 2019.

the people!"[42] Although it is clearly exaggerated for the sake of entertainment, this kind of statement can be classified as anti-pluralist, as the speaker (a satirised political adviser) equates himself with the people, even though the target of the slaves' plan is not the aged Demos. Hence, what is implied is that the Paphlagonian is the embodiment of the will and character of the people, which by his populist reasoning means that it would be undemocratically subversive to attempt to replace or oust him. Accordingly, no other representation is needed nor valid.

In a moment of commonplace Aristophanic slapstick humour, he trips over a wine cup and vehemently protests the conspiracy against him, "What's that Chalcidian cup doing here? It can only mean you're inciting the Chalcidians to revolt! You two are goners, done for, you utter scum!"[43] The initial impression that we get of the Paphlagonian is one of an impetuous and paranoid bungler who sees the dangers of treachery and conspiracy everywhere – even in the most unassuming objects. His obsessive fear of a coup d'état is more reminiscent of a monarch's than a citizen-speaker's in an open democracy, revealing the almost absolute influence he exerts on the fickle Demos. As Müller explains, there is a close connection between populism and conspiracy theories.[44] When it finally becomes apparent to Demos how fraudulently and self-indulgently the Paphlagonian has really been acting, he grumbles, "You sneak, how long have you been gouging me like this by short-changing the people?"[45] It is striking that Demos expresses himself in much the same phrases as the Paphlagonian, but it is not necessarily paradoxical. The people, or Demos as the epitome of the people, may well think of, speak to, and deal with in exclusionary, populist terms those who are assumed to oppose the sovereign spirit of the people.[46]

A contemporary example of political anti-pluralism is Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro's statements about the political opposition led

42 Ar. *Eq.* 235-36. On ancient authors' portrayal of Cleon as a boisterous and brash speaker, see Connor 1971: 132-34, 168-75; Stein-Hölkeskamp 2000: 82-85; Rosenbloom 2013: 302-8.

43 Ar. *Eq.* 237-239. For a similar accusation, see also 630.

44 Müller 2016: 44. See also Hellinger 2019.

45 Ar. *Eq.* 858-59.

46 See e.g. Akkerman et al. 2014.

by Juan Guaidó, who contests the legitimacy of Maduro's presidency.[47] Here, Maduro rhetorically delegitimised opponents of his rule by labelling them "a crazed minority" and "a minority of opportunists and cowards" as well as by declaring to his followers, "[w]e are on the right side of history."[48] Whether the opposition is in fact a demented minority of wimps and chancers is irrelevant for the rhetorical purpose. Maduro's discursive strategy is clear: By branding the enemies with these populist buzz-words, he paints them as unpatriotic and power-hungry turncoats that actively sabotage national interests.[49] Even ruling populists tend to portray themselves as a minority and as victims of the so-called anti-popular conspiracies of the global elite. In this way, a populist may present himself to the people as a martyr and political 'underdog', who bravely repels the world's onslaught against the people's rights and the national democracy.[50]

Gift-giving and *euergetism* (benefaction) are pervasive themes in the two street vendors' contest to show their absolute devotion to old man Demos. Shortly after the Paphlagonian's first threatening challenge against Agoracritus and the slaves, the eponymous ἱππεῖς (cavalry) chorus comes to their rescue by surrounding, trampling, and beating the Paphlagonian into submission. He desperately cries out for protection and support among the many jurors in Athens, "Elders of the jury courts, brethren of the three obols, whom I cater to by loud denunciations fair and foul, reinforce me: I'm being roughed up by enemy conspirators!"[51] This line can be read as a reference to the real Cleon's law from c. 425, which raised *dikastikon* (state salary for jurors) from two to three obols a day.[52]

47 At the time of writing, Guaidó is recognised as Venezuela's rightful president by most Western countries, including the United States.

48 BBC Latin America 2019; Al-Jazeera Latin America 2019 (March 5).

49 Müller 2016: 42-43.

50 For people's general proclivity to sympathize with 'underdogs' in politics, see Goldschmied & Vandello 2009: 24-31.

51 Ar. *Eq.* 255-57. Note the returning mention of a plot that threatens to undermine popular sovereignty and state affairs. See also ibid. 905-6, where the Paphlagonian attempts to bribe Demos with jury pay.

52 Ar. *Eq.* 51, 797-800; Schol. Ar. *Vesp.* 88, 300; Schol. *Av.* 1. Scholia (schol.) are interpretive or critical notes of any length on an ancient text, Greek or Latin. Mostly, they

Although this service of the Paphlagonian/Cleon to the people was not paid out of his own pocket, it was not without significance. It can instead be conceived as the people's gift to itself, which Cleon formulated and defended at the People's Assembly in accordance with the reigning democratic spirit. However, one cannot deny that Cleon as the proposer had a considerable responsibility to the people, and one can assume that he personally, through the increase of *dikastikon*, further ingratiated himself with the many politically and judicially active citizens of Athens. It was originally Pericles who introduced the *dikastikon* in the 450s, seemingly to compete with the private charity of the immensely rich Cimon.[53] In this context, Pericles and Cleon can be said to assume the role of the ideal servant-statesman, who is wholly at the people's disposal, taking care of the community and shouldering the broad redistribution of state finances.[54] That the Paphlagonian – albeit in a caricatured and absurd scene – expects that the jurors, out of benevolence towards him, will render him assistance, might indicate that aspiring speakers through a political sponsoring of a public and popular boon or benefaction could secure the support of the majority, though not the entirety of the people. Unlike the performance of liturgies, this entailed no investment of private funds, but instead demanded that the political actor had the talent and courage to advise and offer his administrative expertise to the people in the long run.[55] The Paphlagonian evidently regards many of the citizens as his clients, who now owe him a well-deserved good turn, and

have come to us in marginal, fragmentary form. It is quite often difficult to trace the origin of the initial note, gloss, or commentary because a given scholion may have gone through multiple editions at the discretion of various ancient scribes and medieval copyists. This is why one should always exercise caution when citing scholia. Nonetheless, as Michael Reeve states on notes on Aristophanes in *OCD* (2012, 4th ed.) under the heading "scholia": "[...] at their best scholia are a mine of information, though less in Latin than in Greek. Aristophanes (1) benefits most, because explanation of topical or literary references and allusions began at Alexandria (1) in the heyday of the Library." On jury pay, see Markle 1985: 265. Three obols roughly corresponded to half of a skilled labourer's or an oarsman's daily allowance (one drachma), see Thuc. 6.31.3; Torr 1906: 137; Davies 1971: xxii.

53 Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 27.2-4; Plut. *Per.* 9.2-3; Gygax 2016: 156.

54 On the role of the statesman as benefactor, see Maehle 2018: 62.

55 On the legal standing of Athenian speakers and the risks of political activity, see Ober 1989: 108-12.

thus his behaviour may well be called mass clientelistic. In most modern democracies, mass clientelism borders on bribery and corruption at the state level, but such a societal gift-giving practice in Athens was not only socially acceptable, but even desirable and sanctioned by the people.[56]

In addition to the Paphlagonian's aforementioned lines, there are several examples of mass clientelism in *Knights*. Midway through the play, Agoracritus relates to the chorus his victory over the Paphlagonian before the βουλή (council). Here he defeated the villain of the story by playing just as dirty as he. A quick hint about anchovies at a bargain in the marketplace and a promise of a grand sacrifice to Athena turns the council members against the Paphlagonian. After that, Agoracritus runs ahead and cunningly buys up all the coriander and all leeks available, as these were normally used for the preparation of anchovies. The councillors thus stand without the necessary herbs, and here Agoracritus opportunely donates his goods to them to obtain χάρις (gratitude) by appearing as a merciful and charitable patron.[57] His deliberate acquisition of commodities soon to be in demand surprisingly reflects Andrew Wallace-Hadrill's commentary on the behaviour of Roman patrons, "The secret of the game is the manipulation of scarce resources."[58] Beyond this, mass clientelism is most obvious in the scenes where Agoracritus and the Paphlagonian, through ridiculous gift-giving competitions, compete to win the backing of Demos. The gifts come in the form of clothing, food,

56 However, cf. Hilger 2012; Schaffer & Baker 2015 on the widespread political clientelism in Latin America. One could conceivably make the case that Cleon's weaponisation of the courts to neutralise political adversaries and unsuccessful generals in the 420s constitutes an anti-pluralist behavioural pattern. On this shift in political manoeuvring and tacks, see Ostwald 1986: 202-4. The problem with this reading, however, is that it relies almost solely on Aristophanic allusions to trials, about which we otherwise know frighteningly little. Thus, we cannot confidently argue that his litigious habitus was the product of a populist stance. It was almost assuredly a way of grabbing attention and appearing as the mouthpiece of the people in times of anger and frustration. Yet, an in-depth analysis of Aristophanes' *Wasps* might still yield interesting results in this regard. For a negative interpretation of Cleon's (mis)use of the courts and its deleterious repercussions, see Harris 2013b: 314-17.

57 Ar. *Eq.* 624-82.

58 Wallace-Hadrill 1989: 73. See also Maehle 2018.

and fanciful prophecies about Athenian world domination plus a jury pay of five obols.[59]

Both the Paphlagonian and Agoracritus exhibit populist traits to a certain extent, but one can hardly reasonably deduce the same about the historical Cleon from Aristophanes' text. When using and analysing classical drama – especially comedy – one should always keep in mind that the play is first and foremost entertainment, and as a result Aristophanes is highly likely to exaggerate the truth or turn it upside down for comedic effect. Therefore, it seems probable that Aristophanes helped to construct the populist Cleon, and thus the comedian also contributes to creating the image of the populist as a morally flawed and ultimately selfish character. The characters and their behaviours are exaggerated, but it would be strange if, after all, the Athenians could not laugh in recognition of the extremely self-assertive populist rhetoric. The Athenians did not have a conceptualisation or theoretical formulation about the logic and rhetoric of populism, but nonetheless *Knights* strongly suggests that certain populist practices did prevail in classical Athens.

The Mytilenean Debate – populism and ruthless Realpolitik

Modern scholars often use Thucydides' account of the Athenian debate on the fate of the *polis* Mytilene as a landmark to shed light on the inherent dangers of democratic decision making, communication, and power politics.[60] In this section, I will focus on the rendering of Cleon and Diodotus' speeches in order to assess whether their arguments can be interpreted as expressing populist persuasion strategies.

In 427, four years into the Peloponnesian War, Athenian citizens congregated on the Pnyx to decide the fate of the city of Mytilene following a failed uprising against their overlord, Athens. At the behest of Cleon, among others, the Athenians, in feelings of deep resentment over the re-

59 Clothes: Ar. *Eq*. 779-891; food: 1151-1227; prophecies: 797-800, 973-1110.

60 See e.g. Orwin 1984b; Doyle 1990; Lebow 2007.

bellion, elected to execute all able-bodied male Mytileneans, while carrying out an *andrapodismos* (enslavement) of all women and children.[61] A ship relaying the people's ordinance was promptly despatched to the Athenian navy at Lesbos.[62] Quite extraordinarily, many citizens had pangs of conscience over their grim decision. Therefore, they assembled again the next day to reconsider how to respond most appropriately to the Mytileneans' recalcitrant behaviour.[63] On this occasion, Cleon again advocated the severe and collective punishment of the city's inhabitants, while an otherwise unknown citizen, the orator Diodotus, became a spokesman for a milder, precautionary handling of the matter. Thucydides reproduces these two contrasting speeches in his work.[64]

Cleon, rather strikingly, begins his speech by blaming his fellow democratic citizens for being too equitable and trusting of each other to effectively rule over the vassal states of their empire, which according to him is the tyranny of the strongest over the weak.[65] In Cleon's opinion, the people ought to realise that the Athenian empire is sustained only through fear, coercion, and a swift application of force, and not through munificence and compassion. This reprimand is distinctly non-populist, in that he probably directs it at the large portion of the citizen assembly that wished to resume the debate.[66] Empires can be thematized and exploited for populist purposes, but Cleon relates to Athens' supremacy in

61 That Cleon and his assumed political associates (Thudippus, Cleonymus, Hyperbolus) took a hard, uncompromising line on tardy tribute payers and insubordinate client states is evident here and in decrees about the collection and reassessment of tribute of the Delian League, ML 69; Fornara 133. On the likely friendship between these men, see ML: 194-97; Meiggs, *AE*: 316-18; Ostwald 1986: 204-6.

62 Thuc. 3.35-36.3.

63 Ibid. 3.36.4-6.

64 When referring to Cleon and Diodotus as well as their statements in the context of the speeches, Thucydides' rendition of the actors and the spoken content are implied.

65 Ibid. 3.37.1-2. The chorus in *Knights* also refers to Athens' hegemony over their allies as tyrannical, though, just as here, it is not articulated as reproof: Ar. *Eq*. 1110-1113.

66 Piepenbrink 2015: 78 rightly notes that Thucydides' view of Cleon as a post-Periclean flatterer, quenching his thirst for power and prestige at the expense of indulging the base desires of the people, is inconsistent with his character portrayal in the Mytilenean Debate. See also Tsakmakis & Kostopoulos 2011: 174-82.

purely power-political terms. Moreover, one can wonder at the rhetorical impact of the beginning of his speech: "On many other occasions in the past I have realised that a democracy is incompetent to govern others, but more than ever to-day, when I observe your change of heart concerning the Mytilenaeans."[67] Yet this commentary on the people and similar reprimanding remarks may reveal Cleon's frustration at the people's indecision and his fear of losing face on the political and public stage.[68]

Cleon then laments that the laws and decrees passed by the Assembly no longer seem to be fixed and final, and he accuses overly clever and conceited speakers of giving rise to this development:

> [...] ignorance [ἀμαθία] combined with self-restraint is more serviceable than cleverness [δεξιότης] combined with recklessness; and that simpler people for the most part make better citizens than the more shrewd. The latter always want to show that they are wiser than the laws, and to dominate all public discussions, as if there could never be weightier questions on which to declare their opinions, and as a consequence of such conduct they generally bring their states to ruin; the former, on the contrary, mistrusting their own insight, are content to be less enlightened than the laws and less competent than others to criticise the words of an able speaker, but being impartial judges rather than interested contestants they generally prosper.[69]

67 Ibid. 3.37.1. All translations of Thucydides used here are from C. F. Smith's Loeb Classical Library edition.

68 In this connection, there is something to be said for populists' proclivity to denigrate and cast groundless aspersions on public institutions and political procedures, particularly in cases of electoral or legislative failures, see Müller 2016: 31-32, 38-40, 56-57. The most flagrant example of this is former American President Donald Trump's repeated attempts to overturn the 2020 US presidential election on the unsubstantiated claim that the election was rigged due to a widespread conspiracy fomented by the 'Deep State'. Cleon's comment here, however, is quite different, as he does not shift the blame onto some shadowy cabal or an undemocratic opposition, but rather addresses the people as a whole.

69 Ibid. 3.37.3-4.

The reasoning here is both strongly anti-intellectual and anti-elitist.[70] Cleon utilises an 'us-versus-them' rhetoric, or the *discursive strategy of polarisation*, in which neutrality is not an option, and where you are either a patriot or an enemy collaborator. As the torchbearer of democracy and the ancestral constitution, he aligns himself with the majority, the down-to-earth and unpretentious people, whom he contrasts sharply with the elitist, deceptive, and potentially subversive rhetoricians. The statement is also anti-pluralist in the way in which it disparagingly equates this group of hopelessly pompous orators with those who would challenge Cleon's decree. In the moralizing logic of the quote, these speakers will never serve the interests of the common good, and therefore cannot speak on behalf of the people.

Yet unlike Agoracritus in *Knights*, Thucydides' Cleon does not entirely acquit the people of complicity. He believes that they have irresponsibly provided favourable conditions for so-called oratorical contests and displays of sophistic dexterity, void of real political substance, frequently to take place at Assembly meetings:

> And you are yourselves to blame, for your management of these contests is wrong. It is your wont to be spectators of words and hearers of deeds, forming your judgment of future enterprises according as able speakers represent them to be feasible, but as regards accomplished facts, not counting what has been done more credible, because you have seen it, than what you have heard, you are swayed in judgment by those who have made an eloquent invective [...] In a word, you are in thrall to the pleasures of the ear and are more like men who sit as spectators at exhibitions of sophists [σοφιστῶν] than men who take counsel [βουλευομένοις] for the welfare of the state.[71]

70 For the link between anti-intellectualism and populism, see Shogan 2007; Oliver & Rahn 2016; Motta 2018. Anti-intellectualism should not be understood as being synonymous with anti-reason or anti-intelligence.

71 Thuc. 3.38.4-5; 3.38.7. For a similar sort of rebuke, see Dem. 9.3-4. As to why a democratic speaker would have the temerity to question and challenge the reason and decision-making skills of the sovereign people, Joseph Roisman (2004: 268-72; 2005: 156-62) puts forward the thesis that an ongoing positional and rhetorical power-struggle couched in the language of masculinity took place between the Athenian people and the individual speaker. Cf. Piepenbrink 2015: 13-15, who is right to posit

Yet again, admonitions to the broad citizenry of this nature are almost anti-populist, and remarkably, the excerpt here shares a common characteristic with later anti-democratic passages from Platonic dialogues. Compare, for example, *Gorgias*, in which Socrates in his exchange with the young sophist Callicles associates political rhetoric with the type of superficial ἡδονή (pleasure) and κολακεία (flattery) that typically feature in poetic and dramatic performances. Socrates sees himself as one of the few in Athens who actually tries to practice τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικῇ τέχνῃ (the true art of statesmanship) because his speeches are directed towards attainment of the worthy and βέλτιστον (best).[72] In the *Sophist*, the Eleatic Stranger also distinguishes between πολιτικόν (the statesman) and the δημολογικόν (the public speaker), where the latter is trained to give long, self-glorifying speeches that do not morally edify the listeners.[73]

Perhaps both Plato's Socrates and Thucydides' Cleon cherished a hope of elevating their fellow citizens. This is, however, where the similarities end; the rhetoric is comparable, but the motives underlying the statements are vastly different. Plato was a philosopher and moralist who perceived practically all democratic rhetoric as meaningless blandishment, and he had no intentions of taking part in Athenian politics. Cleon, on the other hand, was one of Athens' foremost speakers, and it would be a serious blunder to read his speech as an anti-democratic tirade. Perhaps one should rather interpret Cleon's behaviour as his attempt to emulate his predecessor Pericles, who according to Thucydides was the actual ruler of Athens, and who by virtue of his influence could fulminate

that the last thing a political adviser to Athens would want was to invite the ire of the masses by coming out on top in a contest of superiority. Rather, they would often connect their reproaches to the people to their opposing orators' dishonest ways. Thus, Roisman may be said to overstate the statesman's desire to stand out from the crowd as a masculine exemplar. For additional examples of the derogatory reception of sophism in classical writings, see also Aeschin. 1.175, 3.16, 202; Alcidamas, *Soph.*; Ar. *Nub*. 130, 445-51; Dem. 19.246-50, 35.40-43; Isoc. 5.13, 10.13, 12.18, 13 *passim*, 15.4-5.

72 Plat. *Gorg*. 521d (tr. Lamb, LCL).

73 Plat. *Soph.* 268b.

against the people when they behaved irrationally or arrogantly.[74] Embedded in Cleon's argumentation probably lies the idea that political actors should speak a language to which the people can relate and which they can understand. Quite ironically, nevertheless, Thucydides' Cleon is himself guilty of delivering the same sort of grandiloquent speech with its complex, hypotactic formulations and knotty rationalisations.[75] Cleon continues his populist discourse about his opponent, declaring:

> [...] I wonder at those who propose to debate again the question of the Mytilenaeans and thus interpose delay, which is in the interest of those who have done the wrong; for thus the edge of the victim's wrath is duller when he proceeds against the offender [...] And I wonder, too, who will answer me and undertake to prove that the wrongdoings of the Mytilenaeans are beneficial to us but that our misfortunes prove injurious to our allies. Manifestly he must either have such confidence in his powers of speech as to undertake to show that what is universally accepted as true has not been established, or else, incited by gain, will by an elaborate display of specious oratory attempt to mislead you.[76]

Cleon employs an extremely populist, anti-pluralist argument here, presenting his own standpoint as the only logical and moral solution to the problem. Speakers who propose otherwise go directly against the will of the people and "what is universally accepted as true." Although this second meeting of the People's Assembly would hardly have taken place, were Cleon speaking the whole truth, he must still have expected this kind of exclusionary and isolating rhetoric to be effective. Cleon argues that those who attempt to counter the collective punishment of the Mytileneans are either stuck-up sophists, who regard every assembly as merely a showground for rhetorical contests, or corrupt and thus treasonous citizens. Consequently, all opposition to Cleon's point of view is dismissed as ridiculous, illegitimate, and socially harmful, and in his thinking, one has to be truly foolhardy to endeavour to disprove Cleon's

74 Thuc. 2.65.8-10.

75 *HCT* 2: 303-4; Macleod 1978: 71; McGlew 1996: 342 with n. 6; Debnar 2000: 163

76 Thuc. 3.38.1-2.

seemingly righteous arguments. Furthermore, Cleon misrepresents the opposition in the form of a straw man fallacy that simplistically depicts his opponents as spokesmen for the Mytilenean uprising.

Although there are significant populist elements in Cleon's speech, his defence of the Assembly's initial resolution consists to a higher degree of pragmatic, and perhaps even pre-Machiavellian, reflections on power that have no direct connection to populist statements. More precisely, Cleon's point of departure can be referred to as *act utilitarian*. This means that the act, namely the mass murder of every man fit for service and the enslavement of women and children in Mytilene, intends to be of the greatest benefit or utility in a strictly Athenian respect.[77] Cleon believes that since a high degree of political leeway to tributary states and the use of milder punitive methods have so far failed to prevent insurgency, Athens should resort to harsher measures and in Mytilene set a deterring example for the other allied *poleis*. Cleon distinguishes between voluntary and externally imposed revolts, and he asserts that the Athenians should show Mytilene no mercy, as they rebelled against Athens of their own volition, not being coerced by the Spartans. As such, Cleon also brings up the theme of retributive justice prompted by an unjust revolt.[78]

Contrary to what some scholars believe, Cleon's speech is not based solely on choleric and passionate appeals, but is, as one can also see, structured by reasoned premises that speak to people's common sense

77 See entry 'Consequentialism' by Sinnott-Armstrong 2003 in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (*SEP*). The view of Diodotus is also utilitarian, even more so than Cleon's argumentation. However, contrary to Cleon, he believes that the massacre goes against the interests of Athens, see Flaig 2013: 319.

78 In this context, Harris 2013a has shown that Cleon in this speech copiously borrows language and tactics from forensic oratory, which emphasise the importance of enforcing laws and upholding justice. To this Diodotus retorts that such argumentation is quite out of place in a deliberative setting, calling to mind the tripartite division of oratory into judicial (*dikanikon*), deliberative (*dēmogorikon/symbouleutikon*), and epideictic speeches, which was later to be codified by Aristotle in *Rhetoric* (1.3.1-7.1358b–59b), and in the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* (1.1.1421b1) usually ascribed to Anaximenes of Lampsacus. On Diodotus' objection to Cleon's judicial speech, see also Harris 2013b: 332-33.

and interest.[79] However, it is an emotional clarion call to action, which plays on the fears of people, when Cleon pleads for the audience to imagine how they would be treated, had the rebels vanquished Athens:

> Do not, then, be traitors to your own cause, but recalling as nearly as possible how you felt when they made you suffer and how you would then have given anything to crush them, now pay them back. Do not become tender-hearted at the sight of their present distress, nor unmindful of the danger that so lately hung over you, but chastise them as they deserve, and give to your other allies plain warning that whoever revolts shall be punished with death.[80]

Before the next speaker, Diodotus, actually gets to the heart of the matter and presents his own proposal, he initially expends a good deal of speaking time on disarming the populist-rhetorical trap set by Cleon for rival speakers. Diodotus argues that it is a serious disadvantage to the overall welfare of the city-state that the *dēmos* repeatedly acts distrustfully against speakers who offer sensible and advantageous advice. The result, he claims, is that "the state [...] is thus robbed of its counsellors through fear."[81] With this remark, he heavily suggests that Cleon, the sower of distrust, can be accused of practicing a feigned form of *parrhēsia* (frank speech) to undermine the credibility of other speakers.[82] As Ryan Balot accurately states, the point of Diodotus' excursus is "that in practice democratic free speech and deliberation do not guarantee reasoned discussion; rather, they tend to promote irrationality and bad faith."[83] Hence, the line between frank speech and flattering rhetoric becomes

79 Correctly pointed out by Harris 2013b: 327. See also Beigel 2017: 47. For an overview of this common reading, see the discussion of prior research in Fulkerson 2008: 116-17.

80 Thuc. 3.40.7.

81 Ibid. 3.42.2. For a corresponding fourth-century complaint by Demosthenes, see Dem. 3.13, 18.

82 *Parrhēsia* is often lauded as a democratic force for good in Attic texts, see e.g. Aeschin. 3.6; Dem. 10.76, 15.1, 60.26; Isoc. 2.3.

83 Balot 2004: 327.

blurred, and that dilemma could leave many citizens in the audience in doubt as to the true motives and aims of each public speaker.[84]

Comparatively, Diodotus' speech consists of considerably fewer instances of rhetoric properly constituting populism. The most clear-cut example occurs when he, in a fashion not wholly dissimilar to Cleon, berates and delegitimises "whoever" [ὅστις] would openly reject the guiding power and principle of the spoken word of their actions as either "dull of wit" (ἀξύνετος) or, worse, that he "has some private interest at stake" (ἰδίᾳ τι αὐτῷ διαφέρει), i.e. is corrupt.[85] Essentially, Diodotus is confronting the sentiment that actions speak louder than words, which might have been especially widespread at this juncture of political emergency. As the sentence is nominally aimed at 'whoever', this could be conceived as an anti-pluralist opinion. However, this notion does not recur as frequently as in Cleon's diatribes, and, more importantly, there is a clue that this comment and other opening statements in his speech are direct intratextual references, in a Thucydidean sense, to Cleon, the previous speaker, and not necessarily levelled at a significant portion of the attending citizens who may vigorously dispute any form of lenience towards the Mytileneans.[86] A bit further on, we are clued in on the likelihood that Diodotus is specifically targeting Cleon's points in the form of a nearly unmistakable rejoinder to one of his preceding utterances: "Most dangerous of all, however, are precisely those who charge a speaker beforehand with being bribed to make a display of rhetoric."[87]

84 On the hazy boundary between *parrhēsia* and rhetoric, see Saxonhouse 2006, 87-88, 94-99. For the drawbacks and dangers of *parrhēsia*, see Eur. *Or.* 902-5; Isoc. 8.14; Plat. *Rep.* 557b–58c. The academic approach to frank speech in Athens has previously been uncritically glorifying, see Momigliano 1973: 259-60; Berti 1978; Henderson 1998: 256-57; Demetriou 1999, 114; Grote 2001: 85; Ober 2001: 177. That tradition seems, however, to have shifted to a more even-handed evaluation of the practice, see Monoson 2000: 51-63; Balot 2004; Saxonhouse 2006.

85 Ibid. 3.42.2-3.

86 Naturally, the statement might still be anti-pluralist, albeit merely in regard to Cleon as a corrupt, slanderous, and deceptive speaker. Diodotus leaves open the possibility that Cleon's position could be a product of sheer stupidity, which, while preferable to deliberate dishonesty (3.42.4-5), is hardly credible in a speech as eloquent and coherently delivered as Cleon's.

87 Ibid. 3.42.3.

Indeed, this is exactly what Cleon does on multiple occasions, but notably there is a discreet touch of hypocrisy and self-contradiction here, since Diodotus commits the same offence as those he criticises for instilling in the public deep-seated misgivings about speakers offering counsel while doing the same.[88] Pertinent here is Ralf Dahrendorf's reminder about populist allegations: "Der Populismus-Vorwurf kann selbst populistisch sein, ein demagogischer Ersatz für Argumente."[89] Diodotus' goal was from the outset to call Cleon's sincerity and reliability into question, thus planting the seeds of doubt in the minds of the listeners, possibly in an attempt to counter Cleon's rhetorical charges of the same type. It was a way of fighting fire with fire.

In the same way as Cleon, Diodotus also morally reproaches the people, given that they never point the finger at or discipline themselves each time a sanctioned resolution fails to produce the expected outcome: "[...] as it is, whenever you meet with a reverse you give way to your first impulse and punish your adviser for his single error of judgment instead of yourselves, the multitude who shared in the error."[90] Diodotus highlights a central issue concerning political responsibility and the question of blame in a direct democracy. The critical comment is repeated elsewhere in the work by both Pericles and Thucydides himself, which could suggest that Diodotus' address to the people may well reflect a real apprehension some would-be speakers experienced at the Assembly.[91] Diodotus opines that the people should completely refrain from punishing their *rhētores*. This they never did, however. The main reason for this was undoubtedly the necessity of preserving democratic legitimacy and sovereignty, which in turn created a societal need for a mechanism through which the collective could be purged of any culpability in the event of political and military failures. Consequently, the community time and again shifted the blame onto the speakers, proposers, and generals.[92]

88 See Cleon's warnings about clever orators, ibid. 3.38.2, 3.40.1, 3.

89 Dahrendorf 2003: 156. "The accusation of populism can itself be populist, a demagogic substitute for arguments" (my translation).

90 Ibid. 3.43.5.

91 Ibid. 2.60.4; 8.1.1. Nonetheless, it is not unthinkable that this is the author's own insertion, as it takes a rather denigrating stance on democratic blame and decision-making.

92 Hansen 1999: 207.

Like Cleon, Diodotus advances both commonsensical and emotional justifications, although he himself claims that he will not be carried away by feelings of pity. In a logical train of thought, he argues against Cleon's decree on the grounds that the eradication of Mytilene will lead to a loss of crucial tribute revenues; that Cleon's unconditional approach will make it impossible for the Athenian empire to mend their fences with repentant parties going forward; and that the death penalty has no deterrent effect on individuals' and states' criminal acts and will only serve to strengthen their resolve in the face of certain death. The latter challenge to traditional methods of punishment stands out as a more or less modern view, and is, at least to my knowledge, singular in ancient thinking.[93] On the other hand, it is undeniably an appeal to the empathy of his compatriots when he declares, "you will be guilty (ἀδικήσετε) of killing your benefactors (εὐεργέτας)" – the democratic faction in Mytilene.[94]

Whereas Cleon attempts to persuade the people by representing his more severe punishment as both expedient and just, Diodotus, in a masterstroke of rhetoric, claims that Athens does not have the luxury of taking the issue of political justice into consideration, and thus should only pay heed to the pragmatic outcomes of their own actions. By excluding what is right and just from the deliberation, he effectively manages to outdo Cleon in political ruthlessness, all the while still representing the more conciliatory view of the two.[95] In this way, he also shrewdly offers the Athenians a cynically argued solution, which allows them to preserve their dignity in light of Cleon's scathing critique of the citizens' allegedly soft and overly trusting administration of the empire. As has been noted

93 On the modern nature of his reasoning, see Lebow 2007: 164.

94 Thuc. 3.47.3. In Ancient Greek terminology, *euergetēs* and all its derivatives are highly value-laden constructs, see Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1124b9-18; *IG* II^2 1191; Boulanger 1923, 25; Veyne 1990: 70-199. Veyne rejects the presence of *euergetism* in classical Athens, see Oswyn Murray's introductory commentary, Veyne 1990: xxi. Cf. Migeotte 1997: 183-85; Gauthier 1985: 7-36. On the role and impact of *euergetism* in classical times, see Gygax 2020: 83-92. Gygax 2016 renders the practice a full-fledged institution of exchanges of gifts, services, and honours between the individual benefactor and *polis*, a noticeably more voluminous definition, which is not, according to the author, "entirely compatible with Veyne's" (4).

95 Winnington-Ingram 1965: 78; Orwin 1984a: 488-90, esp. 488 with n. 4. See also Grote 2001: 538-39.

by others, both speakers admit to the unjust, oppressive nature of their empire in one way or another.[96] This acknowledgment is particularly problematic for Cleon's line of reasoning with its emphasis on just retribution, although it also presents an internal quandary for Diodotus' disquisition, as he describes the rebellion of "a free people that is forced into subjection" as a natural, and almost just, occurrence.[97]

The trouble of discerning truth from trickery in public oratory, lightly touched upon earlier, arose from an emergent art in its own right, the "rhetoric of anti-rhetoric," as Jon Hesk artfully dubs it in *Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens* (2000), whereby a speaker would profess his own amateurism and sincerity while castigating his political adversaries for masking their true intentions behind thick layers of rhetoric, which by its nature was assumed to be deceitful.[98] Diodotus even goes as far as to remonstrate that public trust in the orators has deteriorated to the point where the righteous, well-intentioned speaker has to lie and dissemble to be believed.[99] While some scholars, like Antony Andrewes, find this statement to be excessive and "close to the border of nonsense" due to its inherently paradoxical nature, Hesk conversely argues that, although a paradox, the claim does not necessarily belong squarely in the realm of fantasy.[100] Instead, he holds that Diodotus actually proves his own point by deploying his share of "tricks of argument, slides of premises and sops to the audience," as is pointed out in studies by Macleod and Johnson.[101] In other words, Diodotus makes a diagnosis of the current state of discourse in Athens, plays by the rules of the identified malfunction, but presents no long-term remedy for the problem. Thucydides' re-

96 Macleod 1978: 75-76; Croally 1994: 58-59; Ober 1998: 98-104.

97 Thuc. 3.46.5.

98 On Hesk's application of "rhetoric of anti-rhetoric," see Hesk 2000: 4-5 and passim.

99 Thuc. 3.43.2-3. Here, Diodotus falls prey to the so-called 'Cretan liar paradox' of self-reference. One can summarise it as follows: If the reputation of speakers has come to be known as deceitful and oleaginous, as Diodotus suggests, why should the Athenian people place their trust in him any more than other speakers. It is not clear that Thucydides' Diodotus "willfully embraces the well-known 'Cretan liar' paradox," as Ober 1998: 99 claims.

100 Andrewes 1962: 74 with n. 25. See also *CT* 1: 433.

101 Hesk 2000: 253-54. Macleod 1978: 76-77; Johnson 1991.

production of the speeches was hardly done on a whim. A likelier explanation of Diodotus' paradox than Andrewes' outright dismissal of it as rhetorical nonsense is that the point of including these momentous speeches might precisely be to exemplify the declining quality of democratic deliberation in Athens, even in the early years of the war. Notwithstanding any sympathy the author might feel towards a rival of Cleon, a reader cannot help but feel spurred to ponder who to trust when a certain degree of deception (ἀπάτη) becomes a staple of public speaking.

Diodotus' proposal to reverse the prior decree of extermination narrowly won out by a show of hands. Another ship was then sent off to overtake the first ship carrying the original directive. According to Thucydides, the second ship dramatically arrived in the nick of time, right before the Athenian general Paches was about to discharge Cleon's decision: "By just so much did Mytilene escape its peril."[102] In this context, it is important to keep in mind that Diodotus by no means endorsed a pacifist measure of non-violence or non-retaliation. He does not explicitly contest that the ringleaders of the rebellion, sent to Athens by Paches, should be put death. He does, however, counsel his fellow Athenians to pass judgement on the guilty parties in a calm manner (κρῖναι καθ' ἡσυχίαν).[103] What this entails exactly is open to interpretation. And perhaps that was the point. Egon Flaig persuasively suggests that Diodotus presumably deemed pronouncing sentence on the main culprits of secondary importance to saving the inhabitants of Mytilene. Thus, it is not unlikely that the debate was split up into two votes: one on the fate of Mytilene, and a second vote to deliver judgement on the ringleaders. Diodotus avoids recommending a direct course of action in regard to the second point, as he similarly does not make mention of demolishing the walls or seizing their fleet, which happened at any rate. Clumping the decisions together may well have shattered his narrow majority, since public attitude toward the core instigators was plainly anything but cordial.[104] Someone had to be held accountable. In what can hardly be described as an attempt to adjudge calmly, approximately 1000 ringleaders

102 Thuc. 3.49.4.
103 Ibid. 3.48.1.
104 Flaig 2013: 320-21.

and active insurrectionists were on Cleon's proposal summarily put to death.

Was Cleon a populist? Thucydides' Cleon partially makes use of populist rhetoric in his main line of argument, and in that regard, he is a populist. Nevertheless, one can hardly identify him as a through-and-through, hard-line populist, as he also lays out considerations of a power-political nature, free of any populist overtones. On the other hand, Diodotus' speech contains quantitatively fewer populist comments. Forms of duplicity and internal inconsistencies feature in connection with populist posturing in both speeches. Members of the audience may or may not have caught on to those rhetorical deficiencies in the moment, but upon closer inspection, they prod one to question the underlying motives of each speaker.[105] Gomme's statement that "the quarrel between Diodotos and Kleon is as much about how to conduct debate in the ekklesia as about the fate of Mytilene" still rings poignantly true.[106] Naturally, it is hard to determine which parts of the speeches are Thucydides' impartial, sober account of transpired events, and which are his tendentious construal of imperial politics. One must be careful not to deduce too much about the historical Cleon from the representations of him by Aristophanes and Thucydides, as they were both likely to have had feuds and disagreements with the controversial speaker.[107] Hence, it

105 Yunis 1996: 92-101 draws an intriguing parallel between Agoracritus in *Knights* and Thucydides' Diodotus, which leads him to conclude that Diodotus (Agoracritus), as the political outsider, provides an instructive political template that seeks to combat the superficial flattery of Cleon (the Paphlagonian) and other post-Periclean demagogues. Hesk 2000: 255-58 is less amenable to the idea that the assumed sincerity of the obscure speaker should necessarily be taken at face value. Hesk utilises Yunis' discussion to demonstrate rather convincingly that the methods of Agoracritus are no less suspect and manipulative than those of the Paphlagonian, and thus by way of comparison, Diodotus' motives can scarcely be definitively assessed as well-intentioned.

106 *HCT* 2: 315.

107 Meineck 1998: xiv-xv; Fisher 2015: 208. Most scholars nowadays largely concur that Cleon has received an unfair treatment from Aristophanes and Thucydides due to their personal biases and potential animosity towards him, see e.g. Woodhead 1960; Bowersock 1965: 139; Baldwin 1968: 211-14; Westlake 1968: 60-85; Hunter 1973: 31-41; Lewis 1975: 89; Marshall 1984: 19-23; *CT* I: 346-49, 419-20; Greenwood 2006: 55-56; Wallace 2015: 250. Cf. however *HCT* 2: 315; Gomme 1962: 116-20; Spence

is also important to bear in mind that the two portrayals of Cleon, which we have looked at need not have anything to do with the historical Cleon. All the same, both Aristophanes' and Thucydides' texts indicate that populist rhetoric and action were possible in Athens, and one can advantageously use Thucydides' life-like rendering of the speech as a springboard to better understand the relationship between political realism, populism, rhetoric, and conceptions of justice in democratic Athens – something that may still be relevant today.

Thucydides' historical work is an account of how war and crises betray humanity. As the Peloponnesian War progresses, states and their agents become more and more cynical and calculating. In the case of Mytilene, the Athenians find themselves on the moral precipice, on the verge of completely succumbing to their spiteful impulses. Mytilene was saved, but not all city-states would be so lucky. When it became apparent that Diodotus' initiative was not effective in preventing revolts, the Athenians increasingly began to implement Cleon's advice. Cities such as Scione (421), Melos (416), and Mycalessus (413) were razed to the ground and their male inhabitants killed while the women and children were sold into slavery.[108]

Populism and Justice in Classical Athens

Private and state patronage in Lysias' speeches

In what follows, I have endeavoured, as far as possible, to select sources that illustrate different yet overlapping forms of populism in Athenian

1995: 435-37; Cawkwell 1997: 63-67; Foster 2017: 145. On Cleon's presumed role in the exile of Thucydides, see Grote 2001: 643, basing his argument on the rather dubious foundation of a Roman 6th century source about the *Life of Thucydides* by Marcellinus (Marcellin. 46). With reference to Diodotus, son of Eucrates, even less can be inferred. Although one of the most remarkable and complex speeches in Thucydides' work is attributed to him, he is never mentioned again by the author nor does he resurface in any extant piece of literature or epigraphy. For a brief exploration of the elusive man, see Ostwald 1979, who speculates that he might have held some kind of public office.

108 Ibid. 4.122.6, 5.32.1, 5.116.3-4, 7.29. Cleon proposed the destruction of Scione in 423, one year before his death in Amphipolis.

legal proceedings. Nonetheless, this is clearly not an exhaustive discussion of populism in all legal, or *forensic*, speeches handed down to us.

In Lysias 21, an unnamed speaker defends himself against charges of embezzlement and bribery during his work as *archon* (public official).[109] The speaker leads off with an impressively long record of his liturgical activities in the realms of drama, war, and athletics over the years. The following is just an excerpt:

> For I was declared of legal age when Theopompos was *archon*, and as a *chorēgos* for a tragedy I spent thirty *minae*, and two months later I spent 2,000 *drachmae* on a male chorus that triumphed at the Thargelia [...] In the meantime, I served as a trierarch for seven years and spent six talents.[110]

In eight years (from 411 to 403), the speaker claims to have spent about 63,000 drachmae (10½ talents) on liturgies, an exceptional figure that would have taken an average oarsman in the navy around 172 years to earn.[111] It is the single largest documented individual liturgical sum in all Attic texts, and the speaker was not only affluent, but must have belonged to the super-rich segment of the population. The individual in question and his immense wealth are thus not exactly representative of the typical liturgist, but the quotation nevertheless testifies to the essential symbolic role of gift-giving in public debates, even in the Athenian legal system.[112]

The speaker emphasizes that he has provided all these services voluntarily to demonstrate his εὔνοια (goodwill) and φιλοτιμία (love of honour) to the city-state, and that he would not even have spent a quarter of the total amount if he had simply disbursed the absolutely necessary sum towards the liturgies. Thus, it appears that this can in fact be

109 The speech is dated to c. 403/2.

110 Lys. 21.1-3 (my translation).

111 An oarsman earned about one drachma a day, see fn. 52.

112 Examples of liturgies and mass clientelism in Athenian forensic speeches abound: Andoc. 1.149, 4.42; Antiph. 2.2.12; Dem. 20.151, 25.76-78, 36.41, 38.25, 45.85, 47.48; Is. 4.27-31, 5.35-38; Isoc. 8.53, 15.158; Lys. 3.47, 6.46, 7.30-31, 30.26.

considered a gift rather than a city-state-imposed taxation on the individual, since the speaker has deliberately spent far more than required; most likely in order to curry favour with the people. In addition to the liturgies, he also highlights his outstanding military service. These are all powerful appeals to *ethos* (character), and through them Lysias wants to characterize his accused client as a virtuous and conscientious citizen. Although the following expression does not show up directly in this source, the implied message must have been that this rich person, in a self-sacrificing spirit, has served the people of Athens καὶ τοῖς χρήμασι καὶ τῷ σώματι ("with his money and his body") – he has thus risked purse, life and limb for the public weal.[113]

There is no hint of populist anti-pluralism and only weak traces of hostility against elites in the speech. By contrast, the client's generosity forms a signal part of the defence. The liturgies represent a markedly different form of mass clientelism than, for example, Cleon's proposal to increase the jury pay. Lysias' client does not assume the role of adviser-statesman, but rather acts at the state level as a socially responsible pillar of the community – a genuine καλὸς κἀγαθός (beautiful and noble man).[114] Although the gift here assumes a different form than Cleon's, in the ancient Greek domain of gift-giving there was still a built-in expectation of an exchange of material goods and intangible services. Of course, nowhere in the Athenian constitution was it fixed by law that liturgies should be rewarded with public devotion and the like, but reciprocity in economic and social exchanges was a widespread cultural custom in the Greek world. This logic of exchange was deeply entrenched in the collective consciousness of the Athenians and could therefore be tacitly understood in most contexts.[115] By appearing as a patron of the people, the defendant hopes to gain legal εὔνοια (goodwill) from the jurors, which could be crucial for an acquittal. To be sure, mention of such acts of charity, if one regards them as such, falls entirely short of refuting or proving, in a purely technical or judicial sense, the criminality of the accused, i.e. the speaker could well have used the embezzled money on the

113 For the expression, see Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 29.5; Dem. 10.28, 42.25; Lys. 19.58, 25.4.

114 Adkins 1972: 119-26. See e.g. Lys. 19.59, 25.13 for the expression.

115 Cf. however Lys. 25.13, 20.31, where the speakers openly reveal that their performance of various liturgies was aimed at garnering communal εὔνοια (goodwill).

liturgies (and the bribes) – provided he really did it. At the heart of the matter is the assessment and portrayal of the defendant's moral character and conduct that can either make him out as an unreliable fellow or a trustworthy citizen. This is not completely unlike the use of character evidence in contemporary courts, which strengthens or weakens the import of a given witness or testimonial, or highlights the defendant's moral fibre – or lack thereof.

In Lysias 19, an anonymous brother-in-law to a certain deceased Aristophanes defends himself against allegations of concealing money and valuables from a state-seized property.[116] The property formerly belonged to Aristophanes, but it was confiscated when Aristophanes along with his father were executed due to a failed naval operation in 390. The charges were originally brought against the speaker's father, Aristophanes' father-in-law, but he died in the intervening time and the responsibility thus passed on to the son.[117] According to Lysias' client, the Athenian authorities had grossly overestimated Aristophanes' property value, and so the state felt cheated of substantial revenues.[118] The speaker argues for his father's innocence by stressing his selfless and charitable behaviour in the payment of liturgies and donations to private individuals:

> Now, not once did my father seek office, but he has discharged every duty in the production of dramas, has equipped a warship seven times, and has made numerous large contributions to special levies [εἰσφορὰς] [...] The sum total of them all is nine talents and two thousand drachmae. In addition, he also joined privately in portioning daughters and sisters of certain needy citizens: there were men whom he ransomed from the enemy, and others for whose funerals he provided money. He acted in this way because he conceived it to be the part of a good man to assist his friends, even if nobody was to know [...][119]

116 This Aristophanes is not the famed comic playwright.

117 The speech was delivered around 388/7.

118 The speaker explains the relatively lower private assets based on Aristophanes' patriotic charity.

119 Lys. 19.57, 59 (tr. Lamb, LCL).

Notable here is the speaker's references to both his father's undertaking of the more expensive state liturgies and his smaller, locally-based patronage of families and individuals. Thus, the father has alternated between the roles of state benefactor and protecting patron of clients, perhaps in his deme or phyle. Despite the fact that the local gifts fall outside the sphere of the state and the amounts are most likely lower than in the case of liturgies, one should not be led to believe that the payment for others' dowries, funerals, and ransoms would not be recognised and respected by most citizens. It might even, in certain cases, be considered a more personally involved and humane gift.[120]

By now, we can already sense that populist mass clientelism could also have a significant role to play in Athenian litigation. Military efforts and financial services to the state and locals were both examples of mass clientelism. The mention of these actions was meant to promote the individual as an honourable, public-spirited and – ultimately – innocent citizen.

Demosthenes 21 – an anti-elitist depiction of Meidias

In c. 347, the Athenian speaker Demosthenes took legal action against the rich Meidias after he had been physically assaulted by him at a choral performance.[121] There is an unambiguous streak of anti-elite posturing in much of Demosthenes' charge against Meidias. It can be observed, for example, when Demosthenes quotes Meidias' crassly self-promoting announcements to the people, "[w]e [ἡμεῖς] are the men who perform the public services [οἱ λῃτουργοῦντες]; we are those who advance your [ὑμῖν] tax-money [οἱ προεισφέροντες]; we are the capitalists [οἱ πλούσιοι] [...]"[122] Couched in Meidias' comment, whether true or not, is the expectation of public support and recompense, but the tone is ex-

120 For other private benefactions, see Andoc. 1.147-48, 150; Lys. 16.14.

121 The two were involved in a protracted feud against each other.

122 Dem. 21.153. The translations of Dem. 21 used here are from J. H. Vince's Loeb Classical Library Edition.

ceedingly pompous and almost undemocratically demanding. The problem, therefore, is not that he draws on his liturgies to obtain the χάρις (gratitude) of the people, but rather the way in which he does it. In addition, the contrast between the pronouns "us" [ἡμεῖς] and "your" [ὑμῖν] helps Demosthenes to isolate the haughty and well-off Meidias from the down-to-earth, ordinary folk whose cause Demosthenes presents himself as championing.[123] He does a similar thing when, deeply disturbed, he claims with respect to the power of wealth on judicial decisions, "[f]or, if I may add a word on this subject also, where the rich are concerned, Athenians, the rest of us have no share in our just and equal rights. Indeed we have not."[124] Demosthenes was, of course, himself one of these rich persons, which the people probably knew well, yet the statement exemplifies a significant rhetorical ploy. It is a recurring theme in Attic legal speeches that moneyed men underplay their prosperity and social status and comport themselves as oppressed and even impoverished to win sympathy among the jurors, who were primarily average citizens from the city.[125] As was expected in most Athenian legal competitions between two well-to-do individuals, gift-giving and mass clientelism are brought to the fore. For example, Demosthenes compares his own liturgies with those of Meidias:

123 For other attempts to stage himself as an advocate of the common people, see also 21.133, 140, 207.

124 Dem. 21.112.

125 Markle 1985: 277-81. For similar examples, see Dem. 28.21, 44.3, 28, 44, 45.85, 73, 48.52-58, 57.35, 52; Lys. 24.9. As Mann 2007: 163-64 observes, the comforts of wealth had concomitant dangers. Citizens of the leisure class had to be smart and careful in displaying, deploying, and staging their affluence. On the envy and resentment which success and prosperity could attract, see Ober 1989: 205-8. Another rhetorical fiction that speakers could utilise to evoke the pity of the audience was to present themselves as inexperienced and timid orators, though they had often hired a professional speechwriter [logographer] for the case, see Dem. 55.2, 7, 58.41, 61; Hyp. 1.19-20; Lys. 17.1, 19.2, 31.2, 4; Plat. *Ap.* 17a-d. Ober 1989: 152-55 argues that the Athenian jurors were in the encounter with such paradoxical, yet submissive utterances, used and trained to "suspend their disbelief" (176). However, despite the significance of this form of democratically submissive and symbolically charged rhetoric, Athenians most likely also required something more tangible and practical from the elite.

> This man, men of Athens, is perhaps about fifty years old or a little younger, but he has not performed any more liturgies than I have at age thirty two. In fact, the minute I came of age, I served as trierarch during the period when we served as trierarchs in pairs, paid all the expenses out of our own pockets, and hired crews for the ships by ourselves.[126]

He goes on to call attention to how few, modest, and reluctant Meidias' liturgies have been in comparison to his own numerous, generous, and voluntary public services.[127] For Demosthenes, this antithetical arrangement is a cunning way in which he can inform the jurors of his own gift-giving practices, without it seeming unnecessarily self-glorifying. Furthermore, Demosthenes here weakens the positive impact of Meidias' liturgies, should he choose to speak about them in his defence. Much also suggests that Demosthenes is lying about his age to appear six years younger than he actually was (38 years old) in 347/6.[128] He undoubtedly does this to make the older Meidias' unconvincing generosity and selflessness pale even more in comparison to his own.

Demosthenes also attacks Meidias for his purchase of an opulent mansion, a fine chariot pulled by elegant steeds, and the employment of hired thugs, but it is nevertheless central to emphasize that Demosthenes' criticism of Meidias' private wastefulness is not an attack on the entire Athenian upper class.[129] Wealth and social prestige were by no means ill-regarded or reprehensible in Athens, but the rich had a moral and financial obligation to the state.[130] If one could not, or worse yet, chose not live up to the people's demands for public munificence, that person could easily be denounced as a snooty and disinterested citizen – an outright detriment to society.[131]

126 Dem. 21.154.
127 Ibid. 155-57, 161, 189.
128 Harris 1989: 121-25. Demosthenes was born c. 385/4. See also Dem. 27.4-5.
129 Demosthenes even points out that wealthy horsemen who served with Meidias share a distinct dislike of him, see Dem. 21.197.
130 Ibid. 210; Dem. 14.28; 42.22; Thuc. 6.39.1.
131 Ober 1989: 206-8.

Certain parts of Demosthenes' speech also contain heavily populist, anti-pluralist portrayals of Meidias as an enemy of the people.[132] For example, Demosthenes maintains that Meidias never takes part in public scenes of jubilation when good news arrives in Athens, while he is always the first to exploit an unfortunate situation, casting blame and gloating.[133] According to Demosthenes, therefore, he hardly has the interests of the people in mind; rather, it seems that he is actively opposing them.[134] It is impossible to assess how accurate Demosthenes' description of Meidias' person and conduct is as a public figure, and to the great dismay of historians and philologists, Meidias' own defence speech is not extant – if the case went to trial at all.[135] However, what we can deduce from Demosthenes' moralizing speech is that a populist-like figure (according to modern theory) could feature as an enemy of the people and democracy, whether it was a pure construction or an accurate representation of the opponent.

Demosthenes 18 and Aeschines 3 – the case of the golden crown

In 337, a man named Ctesiphon proposed a decree to bestow a golden crown on Demosthenes for his contributions to the Athenian defence against Macedonia. However, the proposal was immediately halted by Demosthenes' political rival, Aeschines, who objected that such an accolade was both formally and materially *paranomos* (unconstitutional).[136] This γραφὴ παρανόμων (lawsuit against an unconstitutional proposal) was *de jure* brought against Ctesiphon who, as the proposer of the motion, had violated certain legal formalities, but in reality the procedure

132 See also Dem. 21.193-94; 209-10 for anti-pluralist arguments.

133 Ibid. 202-4. The same motif recurs in Demosthenes' speech on the crown against Aeschines, Dem. 18.198.

134 For Meidias' superciliousness, see also Dem. 21.198.

135 There is disagreement as to whether the case was actually carried through or if the parties settled out of court before legal proceedings began. For the settlement, see "Introduction" (ed. Vince, Dem. 21, LCL); Aeschin. 3.52; Plut. *Dem.* 12.2. Boeckh 1871: 153-204; Erbse 1956. For completion of the trial, cf. Harris 1989: 134-36; MacDowell 1990: 28.

136 See Aeschin. 1 and 2.; Dem. 19 for previous legal disputes between the two.

was an attack on the arch-enemy Demosthenes.[137] Both parties' speeches are filled with self-exaltation and diatribes against the counterpart, as well as populist anti-pluralistic accusations of corruption and high treason.[138] An example of this is Demosthenes' antithetical statement about his own and Aeschines' patriotism, "[...] you have ever served our enemies, I have served my country."[139]

In his prosecution, Aeschines repudiates the perhaps general notion that Demosthenes is *dēmotikos* ("a friend of the people") by claiming that Demosthenes, on his mother's side, was not a genuine Athenian citizen.[140] Aeschines sums up his reasoning as follows:

> From his grandfather, therefore, he would inherit enmity toward the people, for you condemned his ancestors to death; and by his mother's blood he would be a Scythian, a Greek-tongued barbarian—so that his knavery, too, is no product of our soil.[141]

The accusation is almost certainly a complete fabrication, but nevertheless the passage indicates that the Athenians had a conception of anti-popular and anti-democratic as well as other insidious views being inherited through the wicked deeds of one's ancestors and one's impure birth.[142] Aeschines' point is that because of birth and nature Demosthenes cannot serve Athenian interests but would sooner challenge and threaten democracy as an oligarch.[143] According to Aeschines, Demosthenes' standpoints are thus illegitimate and un-Athenian, and he should probably be excluded from the community of citizens entirely. In addition to being an example of political mudslinging, the excerpt is a fine

137 For a quick summary of Aeschines' indictments against Ctesiphon's motion, see "Introduction to the De Corona" (ed. Vince & Vince, Dem. 18, LCL).

138 See e.g. Aeschin. 3.58, 69-70, 77-78, 103-4, 125-26, 207-10; Dem. 18.44, 49-52, 127-28, 156, 198, 282.

139 Dem. 18.265 (tr. Vince & Vince, LCL).

140 To be an Athenian citizen, both parents per Pericles' citizenship law of 451 had to be Athenian citizens at conception, see Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 26.3; Plut. *Per.* 37.2.

141 Aeschin. 3.172-73 (tr. Adams, LCL).

142 If the postulate were true, Aeschines could simply bring charges against Demosthenes for lying about his citizenship.

143 See also Aeschin. 3.6, 168-73, 220.

case in point of the hypermoralistic personalisation of politics often practiced by populists.[144] Here personal, intimate, and family-related details and information about politicians can come to occupy the foreground of political debates.[145]

As many other wealthy Athenian citizens do in their court speeches, Demosthenes prides himself on his choral and military liturgies as proof of his civic virtue and patriotism.[146] He also mentions his private benefactions, in a manner reminiscent of the unnamed speaker's outline of his father's charity in Lysias 19:

> In private life, if any of you are not aware that I have been generous and courteous, and helpful to the distressed, I do not mention it. I will never say a word, or tender any evidence about such matters as the captives I have ransomed, or the dowries I have helped to provide, or any such acts of charity. It is a matter of principle with me. My view is that the recipient of a benefit ought to remember it all his life, but that the benefactor ought to put it out of his mind at once [...][147]

It is the well-known formula of theatrical humility that appears here.[148] Demosthenes utilises a form of false modesty – a rhetorical ploy known as *apophasis/paraleipsis* – which, despite the promise of meek concealment and forgetfulness, still manages to remind the jurors of prior donations. Evidently, the wealthy seldom forgot their gifts to the people, and in the latter part of the passage, Demosthenes cautiously conveys to the audience that according to the philosophy of gift-giving they now owe him favours and services.[149]

Although researchers today believe that Demosthenes' coronation was not strictly lawful, he nevertheless won the trial with an overwhelming majority of juror votes, which had serious consequences for

144 Kriesi 2014: 365-66; Bracciale & Martella 2017; Rosanvallon 2018; Hedetoft 2020: 171-84.

145 See also Aeschin. 3.77-78.

146 Dem. 18.257. Aeschines did not have any liturgies to speak of.

147 Ibid. 268-69 (tr. Vince & Vince, LCL).

148 For other examples of feigned silence, see also Aeschin. 3.51; Andoc. 4.42.

149 Demosthenes also emphasizes that he has acted the serving and redoubtable statesman, see e.g. Dem.18.102-7, 169-79.

Aeschines.[150] As Aeschines did not even obtain a fifth of the votes, he was fined one thousand drachmae and was deprived of the right to act as a public prosecutor in the future.[151] He was then either sent into exile because he was unable to pay the damages to the state or voluntarily left Athens as a result of the total political humiliation.[152] The case and its outcome illustrates perhaps better than anything else how closely interwoven politics and law were in classical Athens, and that the Athenian jurors were not professional judges with keen eyes for legal technicalities. On the contrary, they were likely citizens with general interests at heart, who could be influenced, persuaded, and manipulated through political popularity contests, (mass) clientelism and populist grandstanding and character assassinations.

Concluding remarks

The object of this article was initially to observe and then – if it could be documented – investigate populism in classical Athens. The study of various sources shows that populism was an applied and living practice in Athenian democracy. However, populism assumed a somewhat different shape than it does at present. Unlike today, political and financial mass clientelism was widespread and socially commendable in Athens. Josiah Ober nicely summarises the multifaceted interaction between the people and the (elite) speaker as a kind of *do ut des* relationship ('I give that you may give'): "[c]haris bound orator and audience together by reciprocal ties of obligation."[153] Speakers could easily make use of numerous anti-elitist and anti-pluralist arguments, but they could scarcely contend with an alleged subversive global elite or with the supposed disintegration of the sovereignty of nation-states caused by globalisation, as today's populists often do.

150 Rowe 1966; Wolff 1970: 13, 46, 61; Yunis 1988: 365, 375.

151 For this punishment, see Dem. 53.1-2; Hansen 1999: 202.

152 See, respectively, Philost. *Vit. Soph.* 509 (forced exile) and Plut. *Vic. Dem.* 840c-d (voluntary exile).

153 Ober 1989: 335.

I would be remiss if I failed to take Karen Piepenbrink's key article on populism in classical Athens into account here.[154] My views on the presence of populism in Athenian democracy and those of said author are largely at variance.[155] Briefly stated, Piepenbrink does not consider populism a phenomenon or category that transgresses historical epochs beyond the (post)modern.[156] She initially dismisses Aristophanes and Thucydides' representations of Cleon as too slanted by their own personal preconceptions to be of much empirical use for an analysis of populism.[157] Instead, she elects only to investigate speeches from fourth-century Athens. In my view, it is a mistake to disregard pivotal extant literature on this notion, specifically when one could benefit from comparing and contrasting in order to confirm or refute the existence of populist tools and communication in ancient societies. By and large, the author's thesis seems a foregone conclusion early on. As a result, there are no benchmark case studies of the evidence and hardly any engagement with the primary sources at all.[158] Aside from our points of divergence, Piepenbrink also raises points that are hard to dispute. She is right to highlight that segments of the Athenian *demos* are never singled out or excluded as treacherous and illegitimate in surviving texts, the way in which modern populists do to parts of a national citizenry. The homogeneity of the Athenian people and the lack of nationalist sympathies would make that specific populist tactic quite impractical, and likely unrealisable. Nor do we see clear instances of anti-Establishment rhetoric, condemning institutions like the Assembly or the Council.[159] Additionally, Piepenbrink describes the internal "Freund-Feind-Differenzen" ('friend-foe differences') featured in the court speeches, which include attempts to paint "den Kontrahenten entweder als ‚Feind' der Polis oder

154 Piepenbrink 2020. My sincere thanks to the peer reviewers for pointing me in the direction of this text.

155 It is worth noting that our criteria for what constitutes populism do not completely overlap.

156 Indeed, she is not alone in this belief, see Piepenbrink 2020: 54 with n. 9.

157 An exposition of Cleon's political communication in the Mytilenean Debate does appear in the conclusion, but it is much too cursory, ibid. 65-66.

158 Nevertheless, it naturally cannot be expected that the whole body of Attic works be scoured just to deny any instance of populism.

159 Piepenbrink 2020: 57, 60-61.

als persönlichen ‚Feind'[...]," as essentially non-populist expressions, which work within the boundaries of the judicial sphere and in accordance with the competitive logic to secure goodwill and votes from the jurors.[160] There is some truth to this statement, yet it does not allow for the fact that, at least, some legal cases were very much politically motivated, and in this manner, the People's Court could be used as a public stage on which to delegitimise prominent speakers and popular figureheads of opposing political groupings in anti-elitist, anti-pluralist terminology. Nowhere is this more evident than in the long-standing feud between Demosthenes and Aeschines. The purpose of these high-profile cases is, then, not merely to win prestige, approval, and trials detached from the realm of politics, but in equal measure to depict one's political or personal foe as a duplicitous and corrupt leader and member of the community, marking him, in no uncertain terms, as unworthy and morally incapable of speaking for the people. As I have demonstrated, I regard this type of morally super-charged, exclusionary rhetoric as closely resembling the hypermoralistic rationalisations of modern populists seeking to undermine and invalidate the rights of other politicians and parties to represent the nation. Having said that, modern populism, defined in theory and practised in reality, clearly cannot be made to fit ancient contexts and mentalities in a 1:1 ratio. In view of these essential qualifications, the upshot, I would contend, is a modified type of populism.

Moreover, I would argue that you could interpret Athenian populism as more institutionalised than it is nowadays, in the sense that gift-giving, democratic rhetoric, and intra-elite (and anti-elitist) *agonistic* (competitive) struggles for popularity, honour, and influence were deeply rooted in many aspects of public life.[161] Nevertheless, in their respective books on populism, both Jan-Werner Müller and Mogens Herman Hansen maintain that the practice was not an Athenian phenomenon. In *What is Populism?* (2016), Müller is positively wistful about Athens' direct democ-

160 Ibid. 59. "the opponent as either an enemy of the polis or as a personal enemy" (my translation).

161 On δημοσία φιλοτιμία (public-spirited love of honour), see Dem. 18.257; Whitehead 1983: 59-62.

racy, "One has to be rather obtuse not to see the attraction of such a notion of collectively mastering one's fate, and one might be forgiven for melancholy feelings given its loss in practice."[162] He concludes the paragraph on Athens with a clear message, "[...] populism is only thinkable in the context of representative democracy."[163] However, there is evidence that populism was at least as frequent in Athens as in indirect democracies, if not more. Precisely because Athenian speakers had no fixed mandates, it was also imperative to fight for the people's favour and support and to assert themselves at the expense of others.

In the book *Hvordan forvrænger populismen demokratiet?* (*How does populism distort democracy?*), Hansen also addresses Athenian democracy. He argues, "[...] that Athens was a democracy rather than a populist form of government."[164] With "populist form of government," Hansen refers to his previous survey of Plato's and Aristotle's disdainful descriptions of democracy and demagogues. Hansen notes, among other things, that Athens was mainly led by statesmen such as Pericles and Demosthenes and only rarely by populists/demagogues.[165] However, there is no reason to think – as Hansen does – that direct democracy and populism are two mutually exclusive forces. He uses, no doubt deliberately, the ancient normative dichotomy between the good statesman and the bad demagogue, but I would argue that the application in this context is misleading, since the boundary between statesman and populist, in reality, was and is fluid and blurred.[166] If anything, the sources discussed here indicate that nothing prevented the statesman Demosthenes from taking on the role of populist as well. Interestingly, in the Attic legal orations we can essentially catch a glimpse of the more fabricated populist, with whom we are presented in the works of Aristophanes and Thucydides, being realised and articulated in the real world. In the legal arena, however, it is usually the speaker, the protagonist himself, who acts the pop-

162 Müller 2016: 77.

163 Ibid. See also 101.

164 Hansen 2017: 87-88. My translation of the original Danish: "[...] at Athen snarere var et demokrati end en populistisk styreform."

165 Ibid. 88.

166 On the statesman-demagogue dichotomy, see Lane 2012.

ulist, whereas populist behaviour in Aristophanes is used for comic effect, and in both the comedian and Thucydides, the populist is degradingly portrayed as generally manipulative and hypermoralistic.

One can view populism as an implement of power from a larger political toolkit, and contrary to popular belief, one does not have to be an arch-populist to speak and act in a populist fashion now and again. Ancient as well as modern populism can easily be situational, and therefore, a controversial figure from classical times like Cleon may, at some points, bring to mind today's Donald Trump, while in other areas he rather resembles blood-and-iron pragmatic politicians like Otto von Bismarck.[167] Lastly, I hope this paper can stir others to conduct further forays into the links between leadership, rhetoric, and populism in ancient societies.

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167 A recent study has observed that, besides their direct effects, the stauncher, or more hard-core, proponents of modern European populism have over the last couple of decades had the indirect impact of pushing mainstream parties further to the right on the political spectrum and causing them to adopt populist rhetoric and policies in varying degrees. This amalgamation of populism and mainstream politics is what Eatwell & Goodwin 2018: 283-92 label "national populism-lite." Journalists and researchers commonly juxtapose the demagoguery and populist devices of Cleon with those of Donald Trump, see Seewald 2016; Mackie 2016; Olson 2021; Menaldo 2022, 22-35. Rarely do they, however, illustrate a deeper understanding of populism nor furnish an explanation for their use of the term.

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EINE MARIEN-ELEGIE VOM HOF KAISER MAXIMILIANS I.: DER TEXT VON HEINRICH ISAACS MOTETTE „O DECUS ECCLESIAE“

Von Martin Bauer-Zetzmann

Summary: This paper aims to revise and reconstruct the highly corrupt text of Heinrich Isaac's Marianic motet *O decus ecclesiae* by examining the only manuscript source anew. It can be demonstrated that the text is written in elegiac distichs and artfully blends Christian ideas and classicising language. It is therefore highly probable that its author was one of the leading humanist poets at the court of Emperor Maximilian I and that the elegy was commissioned for a representative event.

Die Noten von Heinrich Isaacs vermutlich für Kaiser Maximilian I. komponierter Marienmotette *O decus ecclesiae* sind in mehreren Handschriften überliefert und wurden 1508 von Ottaviani Petrucci in dessen Sammelband *Motetti a cinque* auch gedruckt.[1] Doch fehlt fast allen Quellen die Textunterlegung. Die einzige Ausnahme bildet der sog. *Mensuralcodex des Nikolaus Apel* aus dem Jahr 1504, heute Ms. Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek 1494, in dem der Text der Motette auf den fol. 177v und 213v in kursiver, wenig sorgfältiger und wohl späterer Hand zur Tenorstimme nachgetragen wurde.

Vom Herausgeber Rudolf Gerber wurde der Text folgendermaßen gelesen:[2]

O decus ecclesiae virgo
o gloriosissima mundi salve

1 Für grundlegende Informationen zu dieser Motette siehe Gilbert 2003: 195-202.
2 Gerber 1960: 155-62.

Martin Bauer-Zetzmann: 'Eine Marien-Elegie vom Hof Kaiser Maximilians I.: Der Text von Heinrich Isaacs Motette „O decus ecclesiae“' *C&M* 71 (2022) 193-200.

et cardina gloria magna
chori dive domus magni reverende
et maxima preses summe pates
grata innumeranter manu.
Tu spes care venus
tu marina tu regula in te
virgines que tu
firma columna Dei.

Te laudant omnes
et plaudunt undique turbe,
spargitur et lato nomen in urbe tuum.
Sic habeas quecumque precatus
pura, pura voluntas, voluntas.
Sic vitae ditans det tibi secla deus
ut pya purpurea tingit tua tempora
amictus ambiat et sacrum
sicut dyadema caput. Amen.

Dieser Text ist offensichtlich korrupt; so sehr, dass sich zahlreiche Verse einer Übersetzung nahezu völlig entziehen und andere mit sonderbaren Aussagen wie „Du Hoffnung, lieber [sic!] Venus" in einem Marienhymnus aufwarten. Ein weiterer Textzeuge ist auch außerhalb von Musikhandschriften nicht bekannt; wahrscheinlich wurde der Text speziell für den Anlass der Komposition gedichtet. An Versuchen, den Text zu heilen, existiert bis jetzt meines Wissens nur eine Rekonstruktion *exempli gratia* durch Leofranc Holford-Strevens, die interessante und z.T. auch recht wahrscheinliche Konjekturen enthält, aber nicht auf einer Autopsie der Handschrift gründet.[3]

Ein Konzert im Rahmen der Innsbrucker Festwochen der Alten Musik 2019 gab den Anstoß, die Handschrift – im Digitalisat der Universitätsbibliothek Leipzig – erneut einzusehen und den Text nach Möglichkeit

3 Abgedruckt in Gilbert 2003: 195-202.

zu verbessern.[4] Dabei zeigten sich schnell eine Reihe von Lesefehlern im bisher veröffentlichten Text; einige Stellen sind aber bereits in der Leipziger Handschrift korrupt. Insbesondere bestätigte sich der Verdacht, dass es sich um Verse in elegischen Distichen handelt, die mit großer Wahrscheinlichkeit von einem – nicht näher zu identifizierenden – Dichter am Hof Kaiser Maximilians I. stammen. Die vorliegende Neuedition verfolgt also nicht nur den Zweck, Isaacs Motette endlich mit dem originalen und verständlichen Text singen zu können, sondern vertieft auch unsere Kenntnis der lateinischen Literaturproduktion am Hof Maximilians I.[5]

Eine diplomatische Transkription des im Ms. Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek 1494 überlieferten Textes lautet:

O decus ecclesie, virgo o gloriosissima mundi,
salve, et cardinei gloria magna chori,
que domus indigui reverende sic munera presens,
summe potes grata munerante manu.
Tu spes certe hominis, tu norma et regula vite,
virgineique Deus, firma columna Dey.

Te laudant omnes et plaudunt undique turbe,
spargitur et lato nomen in urbe tuum.
Sic habeas quecumque precatur pura voluntas.

4 Konzert „Motetten für Maximilian“ am 17. August 2019 in der Stiftskirche Wilten. Es sangen das Vokalquintett Cinquecento, das Dufay Ensemble und die Cappella Mariana. Das Digitalisat der Handschrift findet sich unter dem Link https://digital.ub.uni-leipzig.de/object/viewid/0000028575 (eingesehen am 25. 9. 2022).

5 Diese ist in ihrer Gesamtheit leider – trotz grundsätzlich großem Interesse an der Herrschaft Maximilians I. und dem „Maximiliansjahr“ 2019 – immer noch wenig erforscht, da sich die Forschung hauptsächlich auf das deutschsprachige Literaturschaffen am Hof konzentriert. Knappe Überblicksdarstellungen über das Gesamtpanorama geben Schlögl 1969; Füssel 1985; Nocker 1996; Korenjak 2012: 85-93; Zajic 2019. Lediglich der Teilbereich der panegyrischen Großepik über Maximilian I. ist besser erschlossen, dazu siehe z.B. Füssel 1987; Klecker 1995; Klecker 1994/1995; Schubert & Schubert 2002; Klecker 2019; Schaffenrath 2019; Pulina 2022. Für die lateinische Poesie im Umfeld Maximilians relevante Aspekte behandelt auch Müller 1982: bes. 48-79 und 169-79.

Sicut et vitans det tibi secla Deus,
ut pya purpurea tingit tua tempora amictus,
ambat et sacus sicut dyadema caput.
Amen.

CRIT: 3 indigui: *vel* indigni | 10 tibi: *vel* in

Auch dieser Text weist immer noch sprachliche, inhaltliche und metrische Probleme auf. Vielleicht hatte ein Sänger den Text nur als Erinnerungsstütze und nach Gehör ungefähr in seine Stimme eingetragen. In einigen Fällen lassen sich die Probleme durch naheliegende Konjekturen vergleichsweise einfach beheben; manches bleibt allerdings rätselhaft. Eine Rekonstruktion der originalen Elegie in normalisierter Orthographie könnte etwa lauten:

O decus ecclesiae, virgo o clarissima mundi,
salve, et cardinei gloria magna chori,
quae dona indiguis, reverenda, et munera praebens
summa potes grata munificante manu.
Tu spes certa hominis, tu norma et regula vitae,
virgineumque decus, firma columna Dei.
Te laudant omnes et plaudunt undique turbae,
spargitur et lato nomen in orbe tuum.
Sic habeas quaecumque precatur pura voluntas,
sic †ut et vitans† det tibi saecla Deus,
ut pia purpureus cingit tua tempora amictus,
ambit et †sucus sic† ut diadema caput.
Amen.

CRIT: 1 clarissima *scripsi* : clarissime *Holford-Strevens* | 3 dona indiguis, reverenda, et *scripsi* | praebens *scripsi* | 4 summa *scripsi* | munificante *scripsi* | 5 certa *scripsi* | 6 virgineumque decus *scripsi* | 8 orbe *Holford-Strevens* | 10 sic *Korenjak* | †ut et vitans†: pater omnipotens *Korenjak* : vitae ditans *Holford-Strevens* : *fortasse* vitam *scribendum?* | 11 purpureus cingit *scripsi* | 12 ambit *scripsi* : ambiat *Holford-Strevens* | †sucus sic† : sacrum *Holford-Strevens, fortasse recte*

TEST: 1 O decus ecclesiae, virgo: *cf. Verg. Aen. 11.508* O decus Italiae, virgo | o clarissima mundi *Verg. Georg. 1.5* | 2 cardinei gloria chori: *passim in eius temporis carminibus*

| 3 dona indiguis: *cf. Flodoard, De triumphis Christi 5.4 p. 607A* | munera praebens: *Ven. Fort. carm. 4.25; Flodoard, De triumphis Christi 14.18 p. 871B; Rangerius Lucensis, Vita metrica Anselmi 1007* | 5 spes certa: *Auson. 4.22 et passim* | regula vitae: *Orient., carm. app. 3.100*; *Paul. Nol. ep*. 32.3 *(metr.)* | 6 virgineumque decus: *e.g. Flodoard, De triumphis Christi 4.10, p. 663C; Hrotsvit Hag. 1; Basinio da Parma, Cyris 3.70; Bapt. Mant. Parth. 1.812 et passim* | firma columna Dei: *Petrus Damianus serm. 39, p. 716D Migne; cf. Baldricus Burgulianus, carm. 14.17* | 8 spargitur et lato nomen in orbe tuum *cf. Ov. ars 2.740; Ov. Her. 15.28; Mart. 6.61.2* | 9 pura voluntas *Ven. Fort. Mart. 3.408 et passim* | 11 purpureus amictus: *cf. Verg. Aen. 3.405* | cingit tua tempora: *cf. Angelo Poliziano, Epigrammata 1.16.1* | sacrum diadema: *Rangerius Lucensis, Vita metrica Anselmi 2005* | diadema caput: *Theodulfus Aurelianensis, carm. 46.10*

Schmuck der Kirche, ruhmreichste Jungfrau der Welt,
sei gegrüßt, große Ehre des Himmelschores,
die du, Verehrungswürdige, den Bedürftigen Gaben darreichst
und alles vermagst, indem deine gnädige Hand Geschenke bringt.
Du bist die sichere Hoffnung des Menschen, du bist Maßstab und Richtschnur des Lebens,
du bist die Zierde der Jungfrauen, du die starke Säule Gottes.
Dich loben alle, und von allen Seiten jubelt die Menge,
dein Name wird in der weiten Welt verbreitet.
So mögest du alles haben, worum dein reiner Wille bittet.
so möge dir Gott die irdische Welt anvertrauen,
so wahr ein purpurner Mantel deine heiligen Schläfen bekränzt,
so wahr auch ein Diadem dein (heiliges?) Haupt umhüllt.
Amen.

Entgegen Isaacs zweiteiliger Vertonung lässt sich der Hymnentext in drei gleiche Teile zu je vier Versen gliedern, von denen der erste gattungstypisch die Invokation bildet. Es folgt eine *pars media* im Du-Stil und dann der Abschluss mit Bitten – in diesem Fall nicht für die Betenden, sondern für die angerufene Gottesmutter Maria. Das hohe formale Bewusstsein, das sich in dieser Gliederung und in ihrer auffälligen sprachlichen Ausgestaltung durch Anaphern zeigt, mag ebenso wie Heinrich Isaacs aufwändige Vertonung unter Verwendung des symbolträchtigen

Hexachord-Motivs für einen repräsentativen Anlass sprechen.[6] Strukturell und sprachlich lässt sich innerhalb der antiken lateinischen Literatur beispielsweise der Mars-Hymnus der *Appendix Claudianea* vergleichen.[7]

Die Analyse möglicher Parallelstellen ergibt ein interessantes Bild: Der erste Vers ist geradezu ein Vergilcento aus zwei berühmten Passagen der Aeneis und der Georgica, sodass zu Beginn bewusst ein sehr klassizistischer Tonfall angeschlagen wird. Der Rest des Gedichtes besteht allerdings – mit Ausnahme der starken Ovid- und Martial-Reminiszenzen in Vers 8 – hauptsächlich aus Formulierungen und Junkturen, die in christlicher, insbesondere hagiographischer Dichtung der Spätantike und des Mittelalters weit verbreitet sind. Dabei ist unwahrscheinlich, dass der unbekannte Autor unserer Elegie Werke wie Flodoards *De triumphis Christi* (nur in einer einzigen vollständigen Handschrift des Mittelalters erhalten) oder Rangers *Vita metrica Anselmi* (deren *codex unicus* 1835 im Kloster Ripoll verbrannte) überhaupt kennen konnte. Eher griff er wie diese Autoren auf einen allgemeinen religiösen Formelschatz des lateinischen Christentums zurück.

Die Elegie *O decus ecclesiae* verbindet also klassisch-antike Form (Metrum, Hymnenstruktur, Beginn) mit traditionellen christlichen Inhalten. Wenn die Annahme der Musikwissenschaft zutrifft, dass Heinrich Isaac die Motette am Hof Kaiser Maximilians I. komponiert hat,[8] muss mit einiger Wahrscheinlichkeit dort auch der unbekannte Dichter der Elegie zu suchen sein. Zum Vergleich bieten sich die Texte des sog. *Codex Fuchsmagen* (Ms. Innsbruck, Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Cod. 664) an, einer Gedichthandschrift aus dem Umfeld Maximilians I.[9] Freilich überwiegt darin weltliche Literatur (insbesondere Herrscherpanegyrik) ganz klar; der Anteil an geistlicher Dichtung im Stil von *O decus ecclesiae* macht

6 Zur musikalischen Symbolik des Hexachord-*cantus firmus*, den Verbindungen der Motette zu Josquins *Ut Phoebi radiis* und zu Kaiser Maximilian I. sowie zum möglichen Anlass der Komposition siehe Gilbert 2003: 195-202.

7 Claud. *app.* 7; vgl. dazu Bauer 2022.

8 Vgl. Gilbert 2003: 195-202.

9 Zu dieser Handschrift vgl. Ausserlechner 2011. Siehe auch Nocker 1996; Korenjak 2012: 85. Eine Teiledition bietet Zingerle 1880; eine vollständige Edition entsteht gerade im Rahmen des FWF-Projektes „Hidden Roots of Austrian Humanism – Johannes Fuchsmagen between Power and the Arts" (Projektleitung: Martin Wagendorfer; Teilprojektleiter: Gabriela Kompatscher und Martin Korenjak).

lediglich rund 5% aus. Darunter stechen die marianischen Elegien des Triestiner Humanisten, Bischof und kaiserlichen Sekretärs Pietro Bonomo heraus, in denen dieselbe Kombination von typisch christlichen Motiven mit antikisierenden Elementen wie in *O decus ecclesiae* vorliegt.[10] Sprachliche Übereinstimmungen fehlen allerdings; einzelne Ähnlichkeiten zwischen den Gedichten lassen sich auf den gemeinsamen kulturellen und religiösen Hintergrund zurückführen und erlauben daher keine Zuweisung an Bonomo oder einen anderen namentlich bekannten Dichter des Kaiserhofes. Auch wenn ihr Autor also unbekannt bleiben muss, erweitert die nunmehr rekonstruierte Elegie unsere Kenntnis der literarischen Kultur und insbesondere der geistlichen Gelegenheitspoesie am Hof Maximilians I. um ein repräsentatives Beispiel.[11]

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10 Es handelt sich um die *carmina* 50 (fol. 51v), 154 (fol. 124r) und 155 (fol. 124r–v) des *codex Fuchsmagen* (= Nr. 36, 47 und 48 Zingerle; 8, 33 und 34 Di Brazzano). Zu Leben und Werk des Pietro Bonomo siehe jetzt die Monographie von Di Brazzano 2005.

11 Für die kritische Lektüre des Manuskripts und zahlreiche wichtige Hinweise danke ich Gabriela Kompatscher, Martin Korenjak und Magdalena Rufin.

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NOT OUR THUCYDIDES? IDENTIFYING THE *STRATEGOS* AT *HISTORY* 1.117

By Robert D. Luginbill

Summary: The Thucydides mentioned at *History* 1.117 as being one of the three *strategoi* in command of the reinforcement sent to reinforce Pericles' siege of Samos in 439 was most likely the author of the history. No other known likely candidates exist, and the objections to considering the historian are based upon flawed conjectural readings of the internal evidence of the *History*.

> καὶ ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν ὕστερον προσεβοήθησαν τεσσαράκοντα μὲν αἱ μετὰ Θουκυδίδου καὶ Ἄγνωνος καὶ Φορμίωνος νῆες (1.117.2)
>
> Fresh reinforcements afterwards arrived – forty ships from Athens with Thucydides, Hagnon, and Phormio (trans. Crawley).
>
> ἕτερός τις Θουκυδίδης, οὐχὶ ὁ συγγραφεύς (schol. *ad loc.*)
>
> It is a different Thucydides, not the historian.

While the scholiast's judgment about the identification of the first named *strategos* in the group of three above (sent to reinforce Pericles' siege of Samos in 439) has been doubted by some few in the past,[1] it is more than fair to say that most scholars today agree that whoever this Thucydides is, he is not "our Thucydides."[2] Hornblower's comments capture the current consensus:

1 E.g. Schmidt 1879: 197-98 n. 1. The modern consensus to the effect that the scholiast was correct on this point is represented by Gomme 1945: 354; Phillips 1991: 385-95; Hornblower 1991: 191.

2 Alternative identifications include Thucydides the poet (*Acherdousios*): Busolt 1897: 442 n. 1; Thucydides *Gargettios*: Kirchner 1901: 473; Gomme 1945: 354; see also Fornara

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> Unlikely to be the historian, because he insists at V. 26. 5 that he was fully mature at the beginning of the war, perhaps with the implication 'only just', i.e., perhaps 30. Had he served as general ten years earlier, this defensive-sounding claim would be less intelligible.[3]

Hornblower's analysis is typical of modern scholarship in wisely refusing to rely on ancient speculation that might give some clue as to the historian's age at the time of the Samos *strategia*, in preference for the internal evidence of the *History*. For while there are dubious reports about the life of Thucydides to be found outside of the comments he himself makes therein, this external material is without exception of questionable reliability. Scholars have generally found unanimity on the point that all such later information about the historian's life is likely to have been derived from deductions arising from the material in the *History* itself rather than stemming from any independent source.[4]

Notwithstanding the status quo of the scholarship, it seems a fair point to observe that many a casual reader of the *History* has assumed (before looking at notes or commentaries) that the Thucydides here could well be one and the same person as the historian. The main reason for this, of course, is that for those without some depth of exposure to Greek history, "our Thucydides" is likely to be the only one known; before being introduced to other individuals named Thucydides, the name seems unique enough to western ears to invite the identification of "our

1971: 50; Piccirilli 1985: xi ff. The identification of the *strategos* here with Thucydides the son of Melesias is occasionally to be found in earlier scholarship: Thirlwall 1846: v.3, 53 n.1; Croiset 1886: 288; Unger 1886: 158-61; Morris 1891: *in loc.*, but fell out of favor because of the likelihood of his being in exile at the time of the expedition: Gomme 1945: 354. The effort mounted by Krentz 1984: 499-504 to revive this interpretation was effectively refuted by Phillips 1991: 385-95; see also Meyer 1967: 141-54; Carawan 1996: 406 n. 2; thirteen ostraka mentioning Thucydides son of Melesias have been found: Vanderpool 1949: 411.

3 Hornblower 1991: 191.

4 The classic treatment is that of Wilamowitz 1877: 326-67. See also Jacoby 1902: 283; Steup 1919: i-xxv; Luschnat 1970: 1091-95; Piccirilli 1985: xv-xxxiv; Maitland 1996: 539.

Thucydides" with "this Thucydides" of 1.117, absent some instruction to the contrary, and the historian provides no such instruction in the text.

In fact, of course, the name was, as Busolt had remarked, "um diese Zeit in Athen nicht selten."[5] *LGPN* lists the name Thucydides as occurring eighteen times in Attica over the course of the fifth and fourth centuries.[6] And while most of these individuals must be excluded on chronological grounds from being considered as the *strategos* in question, this evidence does show that the name was not particularly unusual in Athens at this time.

But it is an Attic name. The only non-Attic Thucydides occurring in the remainder of the *LGPN* corpus has an explainable Attic connection: an Athenian *proxenos* in Thessaly (known also to us from Thuc. 8.92.8). Having composed his history for future generations (1.22.4), Thucydides was certainly also writing with a Panhellenic audience in mind, not merely an Attic one.[7] For that reason alone, it seems inexplicable that he would not have seen the potential confusing of himself with this *strategos* in the reception of much of his intended readership, especially given that the name might well seem too unusual to be coincidental for non-Athenians.

This argument is, of course, not decisive proof that the *strategos* of 440/439 was our Thucydides, but it does furnish a reasonable point of departure for the question of whether the historian should be removed from consideration altogether. Would that conclusion really have seemed so obviously wrong to contemporaries outside of Attica so as to warrant no further explanation in the text? Or was there such an obvious alternative candidate by the name of Thucydides that the identification could have been considered automatic? We shall take up these questions in reverse order.

In terms of famous Athenian statesmen named Thucydides, other than the author of the *History*, only Pericles' old enemy, Thucydides the son of Melesias, qualifies. Outside of these two, no other contemporary

5 Busolt 1897: 442 n. 1.

6 *LGPN* vol. 2 (1994): s.v. Θουκυδίδης; see also Kirchner 1901: vol. 1, 468-73; Fiehn, *RE* 6.A.1 (1936) s.v. Thukydides no. 2, cols. 625-27; Davies 1971: 230-37. See also now Traill 2000: 311-17.

7 Gomme 1945: 89; Hornblower 1991: 4.

Thucydides whose *floruit* admits him to consideration of being the *strategos* of 1.117 is mentioned in any extant historical writing; that fact alone should serve to cast doubt on the assumption of the existence of some other Thucydides famous enough to invite the automatic recognition necessary to obviate the need for any further identification of the person in our passage as a means of avoiding confusion with the historian.[8]

We do, of course, know of other contemporaries named Thucydides from inscriptions, scholia (Ar. *Vesp.* 947; cf. *Ach.* 703), and later sources (Marcellinus, *Vita* 28-30).[9] In addition to the famous opponent of Pericles, the son of Melesias,[10] Phillips' excellent collection of the evidence produces a list of six possible candidates for our *strategos*,[11] of which one is the historian (see below),[12] leaving us with the son of Melesias, the Acherdousian, the Gargettian, an otherwise unknown casualty of war (PA 7263),[13] and a Pharsalian/Thessalian (for whose potential citizenship Phillips argues).[14] Even if it were possible for this last individual, described by Thucydides as a *proxenos* (8.92.8), to be an Athenian citizen,

8 The other possible known Thucydides (mentioned in *IG* I^2 242.112 [now *IG* I^3 302.28]; 324.25, 34, 35 [now *IG* I^3 369] = *SEG* 10.227) would, in Raubitschek's view (1955: 287 n. 10), have been "of an advanced age" at the time of his assumption of his treasurership in 424, so as to disqualify him for consideration as our *strategos* (though that is not dispositive inasmuch as he could well have been young enough to have held that office fifteen years earlier). Ehrenberg 1945: 119 n. 21 similarly insists that this Thucydides of *Hist.* 1.117 is otherwise unknown.

9 Wilamowitz 1877: 330 n. 7, 349ff. posited that, in addition to sources such as Polemon and Androtion, much of Marcellinus' information stemmed from a later work περὶ ὁμωνύμων, and Schöll 1878: 435-36 thought this to be the work of Demetrius of Magnesia. Corradi 2012: 495 follows Raubitschek 1960: 91 in attributing the list to Ammonius.

10 See Davies 1971: 53-54, 230-37.

11 Phillips 1991: 393f. There is also a Thucydides who proposed an amendment to the decree in honor of Herakleides of Klazomenai ca. 423: *IG* I^3 227.12 (I am indebted to an anonymous referee for this reference).

12 Phillips 1991: 393; compare Krentz 1984: 499.

13 *IG* I^3 1190.4, a grave stele, possibly for those who died in the battle of Cynossema (if so, it would date to ca. 411).

14 Phillips 1991: 392; see Hornblower 1991: 277-78 for reasonable doubts about this thesis, also advanced by Walbank 1978: 385. Phillips thus dubiously conjectures two Thucydides from Gargettos; Raubitschek's conclusion (1955: 287-88) that we are

both he and the Thucydides who fell at Cynossema are documented as active in war and politics in 411, nearly three decades after the Samos campaign, and are for that reason dubious candidates at best for the *strategos* mentioned at 1.117.[15]

However we wish to count these individuals named Thucydides, all of them are problematic as the *strategos* of 440/39. For the son of Melesias, we would have to posit an otherwise unknown recall from exile[16] (see n. 2 *supra*); for the Pharsalian, positing either a second Thucydides from Gargettos or a *proxenos* with citizenship are necessary, as well as allowing for an active role nearly thirty years after the Samos campaign, a problem shared with the individual listed as a casualty from the tribe of *Erechtheis* known to us only from the stele; as for the Acherdousian, while it is not a decisive objection, it is still fair to observe that none of the scanty details of his life give us confidence of a political career significant enough to warrant election as a *strategos*: the *tamiai* were elected by lot, not on account of perceived ability or influence,[17] and while being a poet (according to Androtion: Marcellinus, *Vita* 28) is no disqualification for generalship (we think of Sophocles), it is also no particular recommendation; and finally there is the Gargettian Thucydides – of which we know nothing for certain and certainly nothing of significance.[18] As noted, scholars have picked their favorite candidates for Thucydides the *strategos* of 440/39 (see n. 2 *supra*), but the common thread with all such identifications has been a necessary lack of convincing evidence on the one hand and a conclusion arrived at more by a process of elimination than by convincing argumentation on the other. Modern unanimity has

dealing with a doublet is more convincing; cf. Osborne & Byrne 1996: 311: "... whether he was naturalized as an Athenian like his father is unclear."

15 See Clairmont 1983: 51, for examples of *strategos* and other military titles occurring in Athenian polyandria of this sort.

16 Raubitschek 1960: 89 n. 12; and see n. 2 *supra*; see also Wade-Gery 1932: 240-43 for his ostracism, and 258-60 for his return from exile. Gomme 1945: 354 also dismisses the son of Melesias on these grounds. Wilamowitz 1877: 349 distinguishes between the son of Melesias and the *strategos* of 440/39, but see also n. 33. See also Schmidt 1879: 197-98 n. 1.

17 Samons 2000: 38-39.

18 For a strong critique of the dubious conjectures about him (and other potential Gargettians), see Scheidel 1994: 372-78.

been achieved on only one point: he is not "our Thucydides." In the face of unconvincing alternative candidates, it seems not unreasonable to ask, why not? Though not absolutely uncommon, if the name Thucydides was uncommon enough to defy solution to this problem among those familiar with Attic names and sources, we might give the historian the benefit of the doubt in anticipating this potential problem for his non-Attic readership if he were not speaking of himself – and consider anew the possibility that he was.

The first objection to identifying our Thucydides with the *strategos* is, curiously enough, the lack of any patronymic provided for the *strategos* at 1.117. Despite the fact that the absence of any further identification might easily be taken by a casual reader to mean that this is the historian himself, it is sometimes argued that this is evidence that Thucydides is in fact not referring to himself.[19] One thing is sure, however: if Thucydides had provided a patronymic here we would know for certain to whom he was referring. So why did he not do so?

G.T. Griffith's highly influential and still widely-cited article on Thucydides' habits in introducing characters in the *History* deals mainly with the historian's use of biographical information, but he does treat the issue of patronymics by way of introduction.[20] The bottom-line of Griffith's analysis of Thucydides' use of patronymics is that while his use or omission of them cannot be predicted with any precision or confidence,[21] his employment of a patronymic seems to signal something of significance.[22]

19 See Hornblower 1991: 191, expressing doubts about the "first mention patronymic argument." None of the other *strategoi* mentioned, Hagnon, Phormio, Tlepolemos and Anticles, receive a patronymic here (nor any other identifier).

20 Griffith 1961: 21-33.

21 Griffith finds 38 Athenian generals mentioned with patronymics and 16 without them, "excluding book VIII" where he assumes that Thucydides' editing process was not completed (1961: 21 n. 4). Griffith excludes the Pentekontaetia from his considerations.

22 Griffith 1961: 24. This is the first mention of Hagnon who turns up next during the siege of Potidaea, where he does receive the patronymic "son of Nicias" (2.58; though not, understandably, in the two following mentions in the same paragraph); it is absent later in the same book (2.95); he is again called "son of Nicias" at 4.102.3; but never again (i.e., no patronymic given at 5.11, 5.19, or 6.31). This is the third mention of Phormio who does receive a patronymic, "son of Asopius" on his first appearance

At times, however, that significance is found by Griffith in Thucydides' desire to add some ballast to a description which would otherwise seem bare without the addition.[23] Was the arrival of the Athenian reinforcement something Thucydides would have felt needed to be emphasized? This hardly seems to be the case since Pericles' previous reestablishment of the blockade was merely buttressed by these additional ships. When we add to this the fact that this force is not said to have done anything whatsoever on its own initiative, nor was it the only reinforcement mentioned, it is quite understandable that merely mentioning it and noting its commanders as briefly as possible would have seemed more than sufficient to Thucydides' lights.[24] If that is so, then taking the absence of the patronymic to mean that Thucydides is disqualifying himself thereby seems dubious at best.

Finally, it is also highly possible that Thucydides, if he gave any thought to the matter at all, could have assumed that his contemporaries would have had no issues in his identifying himself as the *strategos* mentioned.[25] In that case, gratuitously including his patronymic alone among all the other generals mentioned could well have seemed a self-aggrandizing gesture, while listing all the other *strategoi* with patronymics

(1.64.2), but never again. This is the only time Thucydides mentions Tlepolemos and Anticles.

23 As in the example of Cleopompus, son of Clinias at 2.26 (Griffith 1961: 22). Griffith 1961: 24 also mentions a category of individuals where the inclusion of the patronymic merely makes it seem that they thus have "a little more right to be there", i.e., in the *History*.

24 This spare method of description is not unprecedented: while military titles are sometimes present in the remains of Athenian polyandria, patronymics never are (even though they do appear in other Attic name lists): Clairmont 1983: 52. As Hammond 1973: 387 n. 1 notes, the large number of *strategoi* participating in this campaign is also not unparalleled.

25 Griffith 1961: 24 theorizes that Thucydides probably removed many patronymics during the process of editing for similar literary reasons. But Thucydides often does provide patronymics for multiple commanders or officials (e.g. 1.29; 1.45; 1.51; 1.91; 2.2; 2.23; 2.33; 2.58; 2.67; 2.70; 2.71, *et passim*).

would have been ponderous, given the footnote-only nature of the discussion.[26] To the extent that the lack of patronymic at 1.117 indicates anything at all, therefore, it suggests that Thucydides is more likely than not speaking about himself (rather than the other way around).[27]

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> Θουκυδίδης Ἀθηναῖος ξυνέγραψε τὸν πόλεμον τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων, ὡς ἐπολέμησαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἀρξάμενος εὐθὺς καθισταμένου καὶ ἐλπίσας μέγαν τε ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἀξιολιγώτατον τῶν προγεγενημένων (1.1.1).
>
> Thucydides, an Athenian, wrote the history of the war between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, beginning at the moment that it broke out, and believing that it would be a great war and more worthy of relation than any that had preceded it (transl. Crawley).
>
> αἰεὶ γὰρ ἔγωγε μέμνημαι, καὶ ἀρχομένου τοῦ πολέμου καὶ μέχρι οὗ ἐτελεύτησε, προφερόμενον ὑπὸ πολλῶν ὅτι τρὶς ἐννέα ἔτη δέοι γενέσθαι αὐτόν. ἐπεβίων δὲ διὰ παντὸς αὐτοῦ αἰσθανόμενός τε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ καὶ προσέχων τὴν γνώμην, ὅπως ἀκριβές τι εἴσομαι· (5.26.4-5).
>
> I certainly all along remember from the beginning to the end of the war its being commonly declared that it would last thrice nine years. I lived through the whole of it, being of an age to comprehend events, and giving my attention to them in order to know the exact truth about them (transl. Crawley).

More than the former one, the later passage (in conjunction with the comments by and about Alcibiades regarding his age potentially making

26 Thucydides does include his own patronymic at 4.104, but of course on the one hand this is the beginning of a lengthy and important account, and on the other it amounts to him taking responsibility for the disaster that ensues (rather than being any sort of self-glorification).

27 As Schmidt 1879: 198 n. 1, commented: "weil andernfalls eine unterscheidende Bezeichnung unerlässlich gewesen wäre."

him unfit to command: 6.12.2; 6.17.1; 6.18.6) is generally adduced as proof that the historian's youthful age at the time of the siege of Samos excludes him from consideration as 'Thucydides the *strategos*' mentioned at 117.2.[28] There are really two aspects to this objection: (1) Was our Thucydides too young by any objective measure to have been a *strategos* in 440/439? (2) Do his statements at 1.1.1. and 5.26.5 prove as much?

The first thing to note is that, apart from the internal evidence of the *History*, we do not possess any reliable external information about Thucydides' date of birth. What does exist consists of educated guesses of the sort still being engaged in with at least equal validity by scholars today. Suggested dates for Thucydides' birth center mostly around the early to mid-450s,[29] but the basis for the conjectures has to do with fitting together three pieces of information, namely, the two passages quoted above and the fact of his documented *strategia* which took place in 424/3. As Canfora notes, the unlikelihood of Thucydides having been elected *strategos* before the age of 30 makes any birth date later than ca. 455 untenable.[30] Davies similarly disputes any possible date after 454.[31]

With this consensus Marcellinus may perhaps agree: "[He is said] to have died with his life brought toward its fiftieth year."[32] What cannot be lost sight of, however, is that all such guesses were based on nothing more than an Apollodorus-like estimation of Thucydides' *floruit*.[33] Pamphilia's report that Thucydides was 40 at the commencement of the Peloponnesian War seems a direct enough confirmation of this procedure, since in this case his assumed *floruit* has been deliberately pegged to the

28 Compare the quote from Hornblower with which we began, and cf. Gomme 1945: 354.

29 Luschnat 1970: 1093: "... he was near thirty when the fighting broke out (431)"; Hanson 1996: x.

30 Canfora 2006: 3.

31 He suggests also receding from this date because "Thucydides' language at v.43.2 and vi.12.2 would have been impossible had he himself been elected general at Alkibiades' age (30) or younger" (Davies 1971: 234).

32 Burns 2010: 19. However, if Dodwell's conjecture (1702) in assuming that π was incorrectly read as *pentekonta* at *Vita* 34.4 is accepted then Marcellinus may also present an older Thucydides; see Piccirilli 1985: 26. For bibliography and assessment of these biographical materials generally see Maitland 1996: 539 n. 13.

33 Diels 1876: 1-54; Morris 1891: 4; Jacoby 1902: 283; Davies 1971: 234; and see especially Mosshammer 1973: 5-13.

beginning of the war rather than to his 424 *strategia*. If this is accepted it would make Thucydides too young for the earlier Samos campaign (twenty-something); but for those assuming an older Thucydides, would age have disqualified him in 424 as being past his prime? If Thucydides were born in the late 470s, he would have been at least forty-something when Amphipolis was lost, and late forties at that.

The safest estimate of the likely earliest age to hold the generalship would seem to be late thirties to early forties, but there may have been exceptions.[34] The criticisms of Alcibiades' relative youth (6.12.2; 6.17.1; 6.18.6) were no doubt prompted in no small part by his character and behavior (whereas a less controversial individual might well avoided similar scrutiny).[35] The first thing to ask in Thucydides' case then is why he might possibly have been chosen for this position if the "older Thucydides" hypothesis is correct. A possible answer may perhaps be found in the special competency Thucydides possessed in regard to Thrace and Thracian affairs on account of his family history and connections (4.104; 4.105.1),[36] a not unprecedented consideration in elections of Athenian *strategoi*.[37]

> I certainly all along remember from the beginning to the end of the war its being commonly declared that it would last thrice nine years. I lived through the whole of it, being of an age (*helikia*) to comprehend

34 For evidence for minimum ages for Athenian officials, see Kennel 2013: 14. What the official minimum age was for election to *strategos* was, is not known (Hornblower 2008: 50); Rhodes 1993: 510 suggests thirty.

35 Romilly 1963: 202 quotes a fragment of Eupolis indicating a general disenchantment with the younger leaders who followed Pericles. There is also a difference between appointing a youngish general to top command of a celebrated expedition on which so much depended in the case of Alcibiades and the (no doubt felt to be at the time of appointment) relatively less critical command in Thrace.

36 Canfora 2006: 11-12.

37 See Fornara 1971: 79-80; Hamel 1998: 15. Hornblower argues that the appointment of Thucydides and Eucles for this command points to the practice already being in place. See also Badian 1992: 242 n. 18.

> events, and giving my attention to them in order to know the exact truth about them (5.26.4-5; transl. Crawley).[38]

Wilamowitz's assessment of this statement in regard to the claim about his age is doubtless correct, namely, that by these words Thucydides claims a "sufficient age to comprehend" from its very beginning, being "am Anfang nicht zu jung, am Ende nicht zu alt."[39] So while some have found this remark to be defensive on Thucydides' part for fear that he might have been thought by some too young,[40] the defensiveness could cut both ways:

> "I have not lived so long, Lacedaemonians, without having had the experience of many wars, and I see those among you of the same age (*helikia*) as myself, who will not fall into the common misfortune of longing for war from inexperience or from a belief in its advantage and its safety" (1.80.1; transl. Crawley).

Since Archidamus had been ruling some four decades by the time he made this statement, we can be sure that in Thucydidean usage *helikia* can refer to old age as well as youth, and that therefore its appearance at 5.26.5 does not rule out a late forty-something or early fifty-something Thucydides at the time of his 424 *strategia*.[41] Moreover, in the previous paragraph, 5.26.4, Thucydides stresses that at time of writing (when seventy-something, positing an older Thucydides), he still "remembered" what had happened. Any defensiveness in these comments should thus be seen as directed towards potential objections about him being too old at the end at least just as much as too young at the beginning. Thucydides' combining of *aisthanomai* with *helikia* strengthens that impression:

38 For Canfora's claim that this was written not by Thucydides but by Xenophon *in persona Thucydidis*, see Bearzot 2017: 147; Lattimore 1984: 267 n.

39 Wilamowitz 1877: 327.

40 Finley 1947: viii; Andrewes 1970: 12-13; in his third volume (Hornblower 2008: 50) he is more circumspect than he had been in the first (Hornblower 1991: 191).

41 Pericles' use of the word at 2.36.3 and 2.44.3-4 likewise refers to maturity rather than youth.

not only did he have sufficient maturity of judgment at the war's commencement; he was also sufficiently in his prime throughout, not having lost his mental abilities because of age.[42] Rather than ruling out the possibility of an earlier *strategia* because of being too young, therefore, the internal evidence can be read at least equally the other way.[43]

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Based on the discussion above, it seems reasonable to conclude that the case for the general mentioned at 1.117 being our Thucydides is at least as good as any brief for the other two known possibilities (the *Acherdousios* and the *Gargettios*) or some otherwise unknown Thucydides. In the funeral oration, Pericles famously censures the human tendency to be skeptical about the heroic deeds of others which are felt to be beyond one's own abilities (2.35.2). Similar skepticism about Thucydides may perhaps be partially to blame for the reluctance to credit him with the 439 *strategia* as well (two generalships and the composition of the *History* seeming a bit too much to accept). What we do not have, however, is sufficient evidence, internal or external, to deny him the earlier *strategia* in spite of skepticism, however intense. That being the case, it is more likely than not that Thucydides was referring to himself, precisely since he gives no indication that he was not doing so – exactly as first-time readers have been likely to assume, both then and now.[44]

42 Compare Pericles' use of the word to express his own mental prowess in forecasting the Athenian indignation at 2.60.1; Gylippus's use of the word at 7.66.1 regarding lack of this critical ability; and Pericles' equating of insufficiency of this quality with a "failure of *gnome*" at 1.33.3. Huart's treatment (1968: 171-73) demonstrates sufficiently the word's association with mature intelligence in the *History*.

43 As Morris 1891: 3 rightly concluded, Thucydides was insisting on his maturity in these passages, not his youth.

44 If he were indeed Phormio's colleague in 439, it might also help to explain Thucydides being so well informed about Phormio's actions in the war. Also, the unusually detailed description of the Samian Revolt (by the standards of the Pentekontaetia) may perhaps be a trace of Thucydides' personal involvement in that event (I owe this observation to one of the anonymous referees and would like to express my gratitude for the many helpful suggestions and additional references provided).

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