

# Beyond the Impasse: Young Voters, Old Candidates, and National Decline

*Cynthia Port*

A twenty-something academic recently startled me with their take on the 2024 US election. They were disinclined to vote, they explained, because both candidates are “old and awful”; at the same time, they expressed hope that Donald Trump will win, because they believe another Trump term will hasten the ongoing erosion of US influence on the global stage (though they declined to engage with the question of what other global forces might step into a power vacuum left by such erosion). I’m not condoning the ageism of their comments, of course, nor suggesting that this is a mainstream position among young voters. But as I was considering this forum on age and the 2024 US election, the conversation left me curious about how other younger voters might be thinking about the two oldest-ever candidates vying—again—to lead the US into the future, and about the gap in age between those potential leaders and themselves. Teasing out where age and generation intersect with political ideology and perceptions of the nation feels urgent—not only in trying to glimpse beyond the repetitious, static impasse of the November election, but also in an effort to acknowledge and confront the many crises, from climate change to war, migration, threats to democracy, and beyond, currently affecting the US and global communities.

Both major contenders for the US Presidency, Joe Biden and Donald Trump, repeatedly invoke a rhetoric of American greatness and exceptionalism—whether in a call to “Make America Great Again” or an assertion that “This is America! There is nothing we can’t do if we work together!” To a proportion of young Americans, however, it seems the US political system registers as weakened, corrupt, ineffectual, and/or damaging. In an April 2024 poll of voters aged 18-30 reported in *Semafor*, 64% agreed with the statement that

“America is in decline,” and 65% affirmed that “nearly all politicians are corrupt, and make money from their political power.” Evan Roth Smith, of the Democratic polling firm that conducted the survey, summed up the opinion shared among a majority of the young Democrats, Republicans, and Independents who participated in the poll: “Young voters do not look at our politics and see any good guys. They see a dying empire led by bad people” (Talcott).

As this consequential election approaches, tensions between competing elements of the American electorate are playing out against the backdrop of a stark decline in American global influence. In *The Future of Decline*, Jed Esty argues for a national narrative that “acknowledges the costs of US supremacy without alienating popular nationalist sentiment altogether.” By reckoning with the inevitable and ongoing loss of hegemonic influence, Esty argues, “the US can move forward while its power wanes” (x). Adapting the national narrative to acknowledge and accommodate the waning of power need not require ceding control to a dangerous autocratic leader. Accepting decline can provide an opportunity to “reinvent the shared meaning of US society” (xii). Coming to politics thoughtfully in the present moment might enable—and be enabled by—careful attention and exchange across age and other dividing categories.

The self-image of the United States as a youthful presence on the world stage is well-ingrained in the American cultural imagination. As Anita Wohlmann points out in her interview with Ashton Applewhite [in this forum](#), being “young,” “new,” and “innocent” have historically been key to American national identity. In the American imaginary, this has also been constructed as a kind of masculine virility. With discourses about the election constantly focused on the advanced age of the two major-party candidates, rhetorics of masculinity are, perhaps inevitably, invoked. In the context of a piece about the depiction of American presidents in musicals, critic Sarah Jae Lieber points out that hypersexualized characterizations of presidents, including Thomas Jefferson and FDR, are popular among American audiences, because “masculine virility has been linked to perceptions of the nation’s health” (*It’s Been a Minute*). As others have noted, Americans more frequently express

concerns about Joe Biden's age over that of Donald Trump. One might wonder whether the reason why the verdict finding Trump guilty of 34 counts in a hush money trial against a porn star hasn't done more damage might be because, although both men are close in age, one is more publicly sexualized. Trump's trial serves as testimony to his active sexuality, despite the unflattering terms with which it has been depicted by Stormy Daniels. Age, youth, masculinity, and the nation are all intersecting in this precarious moment for democracy, its institutions, and America's domestic and global authority.

### **AGE, GENERATION, AND POLITICAL AFFILIATION: ON POLLING AND POLITICAL DISCOURSE**

A common framing of age and political affiliation is to assume that younger people are likely to be more idealistic and progressive, until they have to pay taxes, cover a mortgage, or put their kids through school, when other concerns become secondary to economic self-interest. While the Pew Research Center (2023) acknowledges that life stages can affect political perspectives, Philip Fisher argues that political affiliation is more closely related to generational influences and circumstances than to stage-of-life. Historical events, technological developments, and other collective experience are likely to inform political orientation. "The result," as Fisher explains, "is that different generations have distinct political leanings that they will tend to maintain over their lifetimes." Fisher cites data from the Pew Center for the People and the Press to demonstrate a disproportionate number of Americans who turned 20 during the Clinton, G.W. Bush, Nixon, and Ford administrations tend to identify as Democrats, whereas a similarly disproportionate number of those who turned 20 during the Reagan, George W. H. Bush, and Eisenhower generations are likely to affiliate as Republican. "In 2006," Fisher points out, "the most Democratic age (in terms of partisan identification) was 21, the least Democratic age was 71, the most Republican age was 36, and the least Republican age was 24."

This phenomenon, known as "generational imprinting," is informed by who was serving as president when an individual begins to pay attention to politics,

and by whether or not their presidency is perceived as a success. Gary Jacobson elaborates:

The concept of generational imprinting implies that the present foreshadows the future: events and personalities that shape the political attitudes prevalent among younger cohorts when they enter political life will continue to register in future years as they pass through the life cycle (although not without some potential modification by later political experiences . . .). A political snapshot of age cohorts at any given point in time will thus display both the impact of past “shocks” and bear implications for the future distribution of political identities and attitudes (Jacobson).

Since an age cohort’s early political years are known to be more fluid, those who came of age under later presidents are currently being closely watched and analyzed.

We might, then, think about “political age” as a combination of each of these elements: age cohort, generational imprint, life stage, and period effects. Each of these is likely to contribute to political affiliation as well as to relative optimism on the individual, national, and global spheres. Although Fisher acknowledges that individual voters are not necessarily more likely to be liberal or progressive as a result of imprinting, he argues that, given contemporary polarization and other factors, as a collective, younger voters over the past two decades have been increasingly left-wing and more likely to support Democratic candidates. Over the last year, however, and increasingly, as the 2024 election approaches, polls and political analyses are observing an erosion of support for the Democratic candidate, Joe Biden, which could have significant repercussions for the future of the nation.<sup>1</sup> Parallel trends in Europe are also raising questions: recent European Parliament elections revealed a rightward shift among the younger generation of voters, which has taken many commentators by surprise. Of course, age cohorts don’t vote monolithically in any country, but with political, economic, and environmental stability feeling increasingly precarious across the world, it’s notable that the nationalistic and authoritarian-leaning policies and rhetoric of the right are increasingly attractive

---

<sup>1</sup> Philip Bump analyzes this shift to a more unpredictable and less Democratic-leaning cohort in his *Washington Post* piece, “Uncertainty about young voters stems from the age group’s complexity.”

to younger voters around Europe and, perhaps, in the US.

The concept of “generations” in the context of polling requires some further nuance and clarification. In 2014, the Pew Research Center offered insights into the political leanings of various age cohorts, including this analysis of younger voters:

Looking at the youngest American adults, those ages 18 to 29, nearly one-in-five are what we call Young Outsiders—GOP leaners who favor limited government but are socially liberal. Almost exactly the same percentage are what we’ve termed the Next Generation Left, who tilt more to the Democrats but are wary of social-welfare programs. And many (17%) are Bystanders—not registered to vote, don’t follow politics and generally the least politically engaged. That’s the biggest share among all age brackets, though perhaps not entirely surprising.

By 2023, however, Pew had distanced itself from these generational categories, and released a policy-clarification statement carefully outlining its reversal on generational groupings. In contrast to Fisher, the Pew organization seeks to distinguish generational age cohorts, who collectively went through particular world events that had a specific resonance to them at a given time in their own development, from what they call a “period effect,” that is, an historical event that affected all ages (Pew uses the example of the Watergate hearings and their effect on trust in government); and, further, from being at a particular life-stage (e.g., young parent, retiree, “sandwich generation”). In a policy clarification statement, Pew explains the reasons they now generally distance themselves from imprecise, unscientific terms like “Millennial” and “Gen Z” (a practice I have attempted to emulate here.) The Center’s director concludes, however:

Despite these cautions, we still believe generational thinking can help us understand how societies change over time. The eras in which we come of age can leave a signature of common experiences and perspectives. Events such as terrorist attacks, wars, recessions and pandemics can shape the opportunities and mindsets of those most affected by them. Similarly, historical advances like desegregation, effective birth control, the invention of the internet and the arrival of artificial intelligence can fundamentally change how people live their lives, and the youngest generations are often in the vanguard. At the same time, some events can

affect people *across* generations, moving everyone in one direction or another. (Dimock)

Surely, events like the Covid pandemic, the implications of global warming, and evident global instability are similarly affecting political inclinations.

It's worth noting, however, that—of course—generational experience and generational imprinting does not affect everyone equally. After all, Joe Biden was not a participant in the counterculture of his youth, and the policy differences between Biden and Bernie Sanders at this late point in their careers, which will be considered below, further reinforce the understanding that “age,” “generation,” and “imprinting” are inexact, large-scale tendencies. Although Biden and Sanders were born only a year apart, differences in policies and priorities between Biden's relative centrism, moderation, political investments, and commitment to the institutions of Washington, and those of the Democratic Socialist Sanders and his progressive supporters are often *read or interpreted* as generational differences. By working closely with Joe Biden during his current term in office, Bernie Sanders has been able to contribute significantly to the implementation of at least some of what might be called the generational priorities of his young constituents. As we'll see, however, Joe Biden, whose administration can be credited with efforts toward—and some successes in—advances in environmental protection, student loan relief, and other “generational” priorities of young voters, seems not to be accruing generational appreciation and ongoing support that he might have expected and certainly hoped for.

### **QUANTIFYING THE YOUTH VOTE IN PRECARIOUS TIMES**

In a recent CBS News poll of registered voters under 30, when asked about the legacy left to them by older generations, over 50% of respondents cited environmental crisis, fewer opportunities, and a more dangerous world. Approximately  $\frac{3}{4}$  of those polled believe that it's harder for them than for previous generations to buy a home, raise a family, or get a good job. When asked about the major party candidates' ages, approximately half asserted that their advanced age makes them out of touch and that “neither candidate



understands younger people,” which, the CBS reporters point out, leaves these registered voters disinclined to vote altogether (Salvanto, Backus, and De Pinto). As with general populations of poll respondents, a higher percentage had concerns about Biden’s age (68%) than Trump’s (54%). A large group of participants (48%) responded that neither major party candidate understands the needs and concerns of younger people, while others believe that either Biden (26%), Trump (20%), or both (5%) do. Still, despite acknowledging that they will “inherit a more challenging world,” a significant majority (62%) of this selection of “young voters” report that they expect to succeed in “reaching the American Dream,” demonstrating greater optimism than other age cohorts. This personal optimism, in the face of acknowledged national and structural challenges, seems, simultaneously, both heartening and sobering. It calls to mind Lauren Berlant’s notion of “cruel optimism”—a recognition that our attachments and desires can constrain us and impede our liberties, disguising structural inequities as personal failings if the “dream” remains unachieved. Berlant acknowledges that sexuality, gender, nation, and power all interact to produce and maintain these defining attachments. An acknowledged era of national decline could, potentially, enable a corrective that disrupts the “cruel” optimism Berlant outlines and makes possible new configurations of intergenerational and interdependent sustenance or mutuality.

The CBS poll is the most recent of a rapidly intensifying flurry of polls and analyses focusing, as the election approaches, on the all-important category of “young voters”—and its apparent loss of confidence in President Biden.<sup>2</sup> Headlines like “Biden’s Young Voter Problem Keeps Getting Worse” (*CNN*) and “The Oldest President Is in Big Trouble with the Youngest Voters” (*New*

---

<sup>2</sup> Polling research into age categories offers valuable insights into the electorate, but also raises interesting challenges. Among the most notable in this context, perhaps, is that the media has an interest in highlighting and sensationalizing divisions between generations. Pew Research Center’s tip sheet for working with generational data includes the following: “Discussions about generation often focus on differences instead of similarities. Conflict tends to get more attention than consensus. So watch out for news stories or research articles that assume or exaggerate intergenerational divides that may actually be quite small. “OK Boomer” became a cultural meme, but it probably overstates the divide between younger and older generations. After all, most of us have some combination of parents, grandparents, kids and grandkids we love, making our family lives interconnected” (Dimock).

*York Times*) have been ubiquitous in recent months. CNN reports: “Asked whether they view Biden’s presidency as a success or a failure, 68% of younger Americans said it’s a failure, more than other age groups—and despite his high-profile efforts to address other issues of importance to young voters, including student debt relief” (Wolf). Another recent poll reported that only 24% of those 18-29 approve of the job Biden is doing, whereas 62% have an unfavorable opinion of him; meanwhile, “Trump gets a net-positive rating—49% to 42%. That’s the highest favorability rating for Trump of any of the age groups” (Montanaro, NPR).<sup>3</sup>

Commentators note a significant gender divide among younger voters.<sup>4</sup> For example:

While women have turned to the left for answers to their problems, men are finding support on the right. Trump helped redefine conservatism as a distinctly masculine ideology, stoking grievances and directing young men’s frustration toward liberals and feminists. There are signs the message is resonating: Republican affiliation among white men aged 18 to 24 jumped from 28 percent in 2019 to 41 percent in 2023, according to a [Harvard Youth Poll](#). (Cox)

Some persuasive ways to explain the gender divide in Biden’s popularity have been proposed. Jean Twenge has suggested that, since women are more likely to pursue higher education, and since college has become an ideological dividing line between red and blue politics, it makes sense that men have been faster to drop away from the Democratic party. Other scholars propose that the critique of masculinity that has been prominent on the left, particularly in the wake of the MeToo movement, might have contributed to more men seeking affiliation elsewhere (Edsell).

For all ages of voters, the advanced age of the candidate is often cited as a

---

<sup>3</sup> Some (at least partially) account for Trump’s popularity with younger people by diagnosing “Trupnesia”: The youngest voters in 2024 are not likely to remember the more outrageous and offensive things Trump said and did as candidate the first time, or as president.

<sup>4</sup> A dramatic reversal from 2020 levels of younger people’s support for Biden is even more notable among younger Black and Latino voters, who supported Biden at higher levels than younger White voters did in 2020 (GenForward). However, as the *Washington Post* points out, “we often talk about President Biden’s weak polling with young voters and his weak polling with non-White voters as separate things. But they are related, given that young voters are more likely to be non-White” (Bump, “Uncertainty”).



contributing factor for dissatisfaction with Joe Biden, even though Biden and Trump are only three years apart. It's worth noting that, although the leading third-party candidate, Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. (born 1954), is often positioned as a somewhat younger alternative to the two unusually old candidates, when younger voters were asked to select from among a list of descriptive words, "old" was the one most frequently chosen to describe this seventy-year-old politician (Talcott).<sup>5</sup>

Attributing the frustration, disconnection, or alienation of younger voters primarily to the ages of available candidates seems rather problematic, however. After all, in the presidential election of 2020, younger people voted at their highest rates in history, notwithstanding that the two major party candidates competing in the election were both in their seventies.<sup>67</sup> Approximately 60% of voters under 30 voted for Joe Biden, a higher percentage than among any other age cohort. In the battleground states of Pennsylvania, Arizona, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Georgia, in particular, younger voters supported Biden by 20 points, making a crucial intervention in the election (Della Volpe). By summer 2022, however, the polling analysis site *FiveThirtyEight* was already seeking to explain "How Biden Lost the Support of Young Americans" (Skelley). While Biden's advanced age is often cited as a contributing factor in this loss of appeal, the turnout for Biden among younger people in 2020 suggests that, at least initially, older age was not a primary cause of disapproval among younger voters.

After all, the American politician who has gained the most enthusiastic and committed support among young voters in recent years has been Bernie Sanders—who, at 82, is a year older than Joe Biden, and who competed for the Democratic nomination in 2016 and 2020. In May 2024, Sanders, an Independent who caucuses with the Democrats, launched his campaign for a

---

<sup>5</sup> Still, in an April CNN poll, more than one-fifth of registered voters 18-34 said they supported Robert F. Kennedy Jr. in his independent bid for the Presidential office, whereas older voters responding to the poll were less likely to support Kennedy (Wolf).

<sup>6</sup> According to the biannual Harvard Youth Poll, from 1996 and 2020, the number of voters under 30 nearly doubled.

<sup>7</sup> That said, they were below the "cliff" of 80, which [Kathleen Woodward](#) invokes in her contribution to this forum—and then rejects—as a dividing line between the "too crude and strangely numerical" categories of third and fourth ages.

fourth 6-year Senate term, and he remains a popular figure among many who constitute the “youth vote.” “An animated, progressive firebrand with a strong appeal to young voters,” is how one news outlet recently described him (*Courier Journal*). Indeed, Sanders was highly instrumental in securing the support of younger, progressive voters for Biden in 2020 by stumping for the president and by working with the Biden team on task forces to help elevate progressive causes and perspectives within Biden’s platform.

There are multiple aspects to Bernie Sanders’ persona and his approach to politics that might contribute to his popularity among younger, progressive voters, advanced age notwithstanding. While some point out that, physically, Sanders is less halting and less stiff than Biden, his dedication to seeking justice in the face of entrenched interests might be more relevant, endearing him to progressives of all ages. Moreover, his status as a third-party affiliate might protect him from some young radicals’ disdain for political institutions.<sup>8</sup> Other strategies that seem relevant to his success with younger people include the process of convening task forces to incorporate a range of diverse voices, including those of younger people, who might otherwise be considered too “inexperienced” to be included. Having set up those intergenerational exchanges, he is known for genuinely listening to others, including younger voices, and incorporating their ideas. Biden, on the other hand, has been called out for excluding from his social media gatherings younger influencers who have been critical of him (*Offline*). Although they were previously rivals, Biden and Sanders have worked together to craft policy proposals that bridged Democratic divides: “That helped Biden appeal to young voters who were key to his 2020 win” (Moore).

Sanders is aiming to support Biden in similar ways in 2024, and has been circulating in person and through the media, making the case for Biden’s reelection. It is clear, however, that the task is more challenging this time around (Moore, “Bernie Sanders”). According to Sanders, “there has been ‘a real failure on the part of Democratic Party leadership’ when it comes to speaking to young people. ‘They are the future of America, and it does not make me feel good that

---

<sup>8</sup> Voters under 30 are more likely than other age categories to identify as Independent, like Sanders, rather than affiliating with an established party (Bump, “Uncertainty”).

large numbers of young people are turning away from the political process, or really feel there is no difference between the Democratic and Republican parties” (Sanders, quoted in Goodwin). As a surrogate for Biden, Liz Goodwin of *The Washington Post* points out, Sanders might be especially helpful, because “he is also an octogenarian seeking reelection and has made a forceful case for his own fitness for the job.” Whenever Sanders, who will be nearing 90 at the end of another Senate term, is asked about his age, he is quick to point out that, aside from “a quick bout of Covid,” he hadn’t missed a single day of work because of illness in the past three years. “I would not have run if I didn’t think I had the energy,” Sanders adds. “And I think, you know, it is appropriate to look at age as a factor, but it is only one factor. What’s most important, I think, is what somebody stands for, what their views are and their ability to fight for those views” (Goodwin).

It is, indeed, some of Biden’s views and his ability to fight for his views that seem to be raising concerns among younger American voters. Sanders himself has been forthright about where he sees Biden alienating younger voters: “His view on Gaza distresses me,” Sanders explains. “And the political implications are you’re going to have a lot of young people, a lot of energy that might not go into the campaign, which could make all the difference” (Sanders, quoted in Goodwin). Given their centrality to his success in 2020, losing or fracturing the vote of younger people could be devastating to Biden’s chances of reelection.

Approaches to Israel and to the war in Gaza exemplify an issue that seems to have a strong generational component. Commentator Ezra Klein posits that generational attitudes toward Israel are often informed by the shifting conditions in the Middle East: whereas when Biden was younger, Israel was a new country whose survival was seen as plucky and even “miraculous,” for those Americans who have only known Israel under the leadership of Benjamin Netanyahu, the dynamics of power and domination might well look very different. Once again, however, individual perspectives can certainly transcend generational affiliations, as evidenced by Sanders’s and Biden’s sharply differing views, despite their similar ages.

## TOWARD INTERGENERATIONAL INTERVENTION

Two weeks ago, I was talking to my 81-year-old neighbor about my work on this essay. “It’s interesting that you say that young people are dissatisfied with the choices,” she mused. “I was just telling my daughter that—although I’ve never missed a presidential election in my life. . . . At this point I feel like I just don’t even want to vote.” This shocked me, coming from one of the few people in my South Carolina neighborhood I could count on to visit the Democratic field office with me to pick up lawn signs. I was also surprised because older people are often said to be among the most likely to vote. But she described a sense of helplessness verging on despair in the face of the challenges faced within the US and around the world, and no confidence in our current leaders to be able to guide us through.

I would like to put the colleague I mentioned at the start of this essay into conversation with my neighbor. Perhaps this moment of despair and paralysis can offer an opening out of political impasse. As a start, I would propose talking to each other across age and generation, finding ways to collaborate and to resist division in this moment of acknowledged decline. Like Bernie Sanders’s task forces, including voices from across political ages might offer a foundation from which to imagine new, alternative models for justice in the future, as we move through this election season and beyond.<sup>9</sup>

## WORKS CITED

Berlant, Lauren. *Cruel Optimism*. Duke UP, 2011.

Bump, Philip. “The deep, generational skepticism that’s influencing the 2024 race.” *The Washington Post*. 25 June 2024.

\_\_\_\_\_. “Uncertainty about young voters stems from the age group’s complexity.” *The Washington Post*. 29 May 2024.

Desilver, Drew. “The Politics of American Generations: How Age Affects Attitudes and Voting Behavior.” *Pew Research Center*. 9 July 2014.

<https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2014/07/09/the-politics-of-american-generations-how-age-affects-attitudes-and-voting-behavior/>

Dimock, Michael. “Five things to keep in mind when you hear about Gen Z, Millennials,

---

<sup>9</sup> Many thanks to Angela Becher for helpful feedback on a draft of this essay.

- Boomers and other generations.” Short Reads. *Pew Research Center*. 22 May 2023.
- Edsall, Thomas. “A Huge Gender Gap Is Emerging Among Young Voters” GUEST ESSAY *New York Times*. 1 May 2024.  
<https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/01/opinion/biden-younger-voters-gender.html>
- Esty, Jed. *The Future of Decline: Anglo-American Culture at Its Limits*. Stanford Briefs: 2022.
- Flegenheimer, Matt, and Katie Glueck. “Joe Biden’s Non-Radical 1960s.” *The New York Times*, 18 October 2020.
- Fisher, Patrick. “Is There an Emerging Age Gap in US Politics?” *Society* 45 (6), 2008: 504-11.
- Goodwin, Liz. “Bernie Sanders seeks to boost Biden, ‘the Squad’ in 2024.” *Washington Post*. 13 May 2024.
- Harvard Youth Poll. Institute of Politics. Harvard Kennedy School. 47: Spring 2024.  
<https://iop.harvard.edu/youth-poll/47th-edition-spring-2024>
- Jacobson, Gary C. “Party Identification II: Generational Imprinting.” *Presidents and Parties in the Public Mind*. U of Chicago P, 2019.
- Lieber, Sarah Jae. Interview. “It’s Been a Minute.” *NPR*. 14 June 2024.
- Moore, Elena. “After backing him in 2020, a new poll shows some young voters are Biden’s to lose.” Morning Edition. *NPR*. 5 June 2024.  
<https://www.npr.org/2024/06/05/nx-s1-4987296/young-voters-biden-gaza-inflation-abortion-trump-genforward-poll>.
- \_\_\_\_\_. “Bernie Sanders helped Biden get young voters in 2020. What will happen this election?” All Things Considered. *NPR*. 11 April 2024.  
<https://www.npr.org/2024/04/11/1244237353/bernie-sanders-helped-biden-get-young-voters-in-2020-what-will-happen-this-elect>
- Montanaro, Domenico, “Biden’s problems with younger voters are glaring, poll finds.” *NPR*. 30 May, 2024. <https://www.npr.org/2024/05/30/nx-s1-4984972/poll-biden-younger-voters-trump>
- Parker, Kim. “How Pew Research Center will report on generations moving forward.” *Pew Research Center*. 22 May 2023
- Phillips, J. Affective Polarization: Over Time, Through the Generations, and During the Lifespan. *Political Behavior* 44, 1483–1508 (2022). <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-022-09784-4>
- Salvanto, Anthony, Fred Backus, and Jennifer De Pinto. “America’s new generation gap: Young voters say they’ll inherit a more challenging world. But will they vote in it?” *CBS News*. 24 June 2024.
- Sarlin, Benjy. “Pollsters diagnose young voters with ‘Trumpnesia.’” *Semafor*. 23 May 2024.
- Skelley, Geoffrey. “How Biden Lost the Support of Young Americans.” *FiveThirtyEight*. 27 July, 2022. <https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-biden-lost-the-support-of-young-americans/>
- Talcott, Shelby. “‘A dying empire led by bad people’: Poll finds young voters despairing over US politics.” *Semafor*. 29 May 2024.

<https://www.semafor.com/article/05/28/2024/a-dying-empire-led-by-bad-people-poll-finds-young-voters-despairing-over-us-politics>.

Wohlmann, Anita, and Ashton Applewhite. "Ashton Applewhite in Conversation with Anita Wohlmann." *Age, Culture, Humanities: An Interdisciplinary Journal*, vol. 8, 2024, doi:10.7146/ageculturehumanities.v8i.144780.

Wolf, Zachary B. "Biden's Young Voter Problem Keeps Getting Worse." What Matters. *CNN*. 29 April 2024. <https://www.cnn.com/2024/04/29/politics/biden-young-voters-what-matters/index.html>

Woodward, Kathleen. "When Does Old Become Too Old?" *Age, Culture, Humanities: An Interdisciplinary Journal*, vol. 8, 2024. doi:10.7146/ageculturehumanities.v8i.144464.

---

**Cynthia Port** is Associate Professor of English at Coastal Carolina University, where she teaches modern and contemporary British and Anglophone literature. Her research centers on critical approaches to aging and time, and she previously served as a founding coeditor of *Age, Culture, Humanities*. She can be reached at [cport@coastal.edu](mailto:cport@coastal.edu).