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EDITORIAL

Academic Exchange and Internationality in East European Social Science

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Like any intellectual pursuit, social science is dependent on the international circulation of thought and thinkers in order to yield its promise of enlightening the understanding of the societies they study. The four articles in this special issue of *Serendipities* deal with various aspects of the international embeddedness of East European social sciences during the socialist period. While social sciences are typically strongly context-bound or "indexical" (Fleck et al. 2018)—meaning they refer to particular historical situations, the analysis of which does not always travel easily across time and cultures—knowledge of a multiplicity of social realities appears to be a precondition for imaginative social thought. This, it seems, places all social sciences in the context of a global history of thinking about the human condition.

What kinds of global connections—ideational, institutional, personal, etc.—shape the social sciences in a particular situation is, of course, itself historically determined by many factors. Long-standing intellectual traditions matter as much as changing political power structures. Eastern Europe during the 20th century—here referring to the countries that were part of the socialist hemisphere for several decades after 1945—is an arena where the interplay of various historical forces can be studied exceptionally well. While several of these countries were integral parts, albeit to various degrees, of the intellectual movements that pioneered modern social science in the early 20th century, the Cold War significantly complicated international relations in the intellectual realm. Though the Iron Curtain was not nearly as insurmountable as the metaphor suggests (Boldyrev & Kirtchik 2016), there were indeed at times severe constraints to international travel and exchange of ideas, in particular (but not only) crossing the symbolic and material divide between capitalist and socialist societies. Oftentimes, the permeability of people and ideas in East European social science followed the political developments quite closely, as the timing and success of exchange programs such as the one by the US-American Ford Foundation exemplifies (Duller 2021).

That being said, the political context that enabled and restricted international contacts to take place between the blocs certainly did not determine the experiences of the scholars who traveled in either direction. It provided the common framework in which administrators, officials, and intellectuals negotiated and justified their endeavors. From the perspective of the actors involved (including many officials), their motivations might at times have been infused only minimally with world politics and to a much larger degree with personal curiosity.

The following articles reflect an awareness of the significant impact of Cold War politics as an enabler of not only the international circulation of people and ideas but also the limited permeation of the personal experiences of those involved. All four treat the theme of international exchange of persons and ideas as an element in the broader intellectual situation of the social sciences in the respective countries and are thus able to carve out the significance of internationality in each historical situation. Such attention to local contexts also allows the authors to tackle the question of how structural conditions affected the content of social science research and writing, which is arguably the crucial, if not the most challenging, task of any work in the sociology and history of the social sciences.

In the first article, Adela Hîncu discusses the changing role of academic mobility for three generations of sociologists in socialist Romania. While the dominant generation during the early socialist period could maintain their international contacts made in the interwar years (most often with France) to a limited degree, it was only the second generation, educated under socialism, that benefitted from long-term travel through various fellowship programs during a rather short period of liberalization in the 1960s and 1970s, before Ceaușescu's escalating despotism stopped many of the most fruitful international connections. Hîncu's article presents both the general features of historical change across these generations as well as biographical sketches of exemplary scholars to highlight the personal and intellectual effects of international encounters on Romanian sociology.

Secondly, Victor Karády undertakes a comprehensive view on the development of the Hungarian social sciences from the perspective of international relations in a longer historical timeframe. His study, based on both his broad knowledge of the historical complexities in Hungarian social sciences and a number of well-chosen statistical indicators, portrays the changing international orientations of Hungarian social sciences from its beginning in the early 20th century into the present times. Among other things, Karády's analysis shows the dramatic impact of Stalinization on Hungarian social science. On the other hand, his data suggest that during the gradual liberalization after 1956, older intellectual traditions quickly regained importance and new ties with the West were allowed to take roots. Commendably, Karády extends his analysis beyond the end of the Cold War into the most recent setbacks under Viktor Orbán's government.

In the third article, Jarosław Kilias takes up the issue of the Ford Foundation's social science program in Poland, which was the first major fellowship program for social scientists from a socialist country to visit "the West" during the Cold War. While this program has already been the subject of a few major publications, not least by Kilias himself (2017), this article undertakes the worthwhile effort to look at the often overlooked inverse direction: American scholars traveling to Poland, as well as the effects of material and infrastructural support from the Ford Foundation on the institutional and intellectual developments of Polish sociology. Kilias presents rich empirical materials that highlight the importance of long-lasting personal relations and mutual interest in transnational knowledge transfer as well as infrastructural efforts that accompanied the scholar exchanges.

Finally, Tomasz Zarycki presents the richly researched intellectual biography of Antoni Kukliński, one of the leading figures in Polish social geography during the socialist period and much of the so-called transition period after 1990. Again, international travel and research appear here as major elements in Kukliński's intellectual career and are both related to high professional gains as well as the difficulties of transferring that prestige back to the local Polish context. Zaricky's careful historical-sociological analysis of the social structure of the Polish intellectual field makes Kukliński's case not only the subject of an individual's remarkable (though by no means linear) career, but also a reflection of larger social change in Polish society over several decades.

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ARTICLE

Academic Mobility and Epistemological Change in State Socialist Romania

Three Generations of Sociologists, Western Social Science, and Quality of Life Research

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Abstract

This article explores the connection between academic mobility, epistemological change, and generational belonging in state socialist Romania. Drawing on insights from intellectual history and recent literature on the use of generation as an analytical concept for the study of state socialism, it addresses academic mobility both as a generation-defining experience and a source of epistemological change. On the issue of generations, it reviews the types of academic mobility available and their roles in the careers of social scientists trained before 1945, in the early 1950s, and after the re-institutionalization of sociology in 1966. Across these three generations, this article analyzes how academic mobility was reflected in the knowledge produced on one theme in particular: quality of life. Empirical and theoretical research on quality of life in Romania was carried out under the umbrella of futurology (early 1970s), socialist modes of living/lifestyle studies (late 1970s–early 1980s), and finally demography and migration studies (1980s).

Keywords

Marxist sociology; academic mobility; quality of life research; Socialist Romania

In the immediate post-1989 period, the history of Romanian sociology underwent two important re-conceptualizations. On the one hand, the interest in interwar sociology dominated the search for a "usable past" for the discipline. The state socialist period was described as one of almost complete rupture, even though starting in the 1960s the cultural politics of partial "re-valorization" of the intellectual heritage previously marginalized as "bourgeois" had made possible discussions about interwar sociology.[1] On the other hand, new histories of sociology described scholarship stemming

[1] While there is a rich literature on interwar sociology and its reception during state socialism (among others, by Zoltán Rostás, Ştefan Bosomitu, and Călin Cotoi), its place in the restructuring of the discipline after 1989 is much less discussed. For an attempt at a long-term social history of Romanian sociology, see Zamfir 2015.

from the state socialist period as heavily limited by ideological constraints and severely lagging behind the development of the discipline in the West (Costea 1998; Larionescu 2007). The lack of access to Western literature, methods, and computational infrastructure in sociology, and consequently, the perceived backwardness of Romanian sociology during and after state socialism are recurring topics in oral history interviews with sociologists trained under state socialism, one of which I discuss in detail in the last section of this paper. These two approaches—the drive to establish a continuity with the severed tradition of interwar sociology and the interpretation of sociology under state socialism as either overly ideologized or backward—have marginalized questions about the production of sociological knowledge locally and the circulation of sociological knowledge transnationally during state socialism. In this context, academic mobility was interpreted in post-socialist public discourse either as a privilege that required political compliance or as proof of scholarly merit beyond necessary ideological compromises.

This paper sets out to explore the connection between academic mobility, epistemological change, and generational belonging in state socialist Romania. It reviews the role of academic mobility broadly defined in the careers of several sociologists and in the elaboration of one research topic in particular. Academic mobility could take the form of participating in international conferences, conducting collaborative research within regional working groups that involved regular meetings over almost a decade, exchange periods spent abroad, and internal mobility—the latter being a form of academic mobility taking place within the local branches of international organizations. Drawing on insights from intellectual history and on recent literature on the use of generation as an analytical concept for the study of state socialism, I approach academic mobility both as a source for epistemological change and as a generation-defining experience.

Based on my intellectual history analysis of social thought and sociological knowledge in state socialist Romania (Hîncu 2019), I identify three approaches to the study of social reality after de-Stalinization: 1) the revisionist Marxism of the second half of the 1950s and early 1960s, stemming from the critical engagement with historical materialism by social scientists trained in the interwar or immediate postwar period, and leading to either so-called "concrete sociological research" or Marxist humanism; 2) what I term the "everyday Marxism-Leninism" and the Marxist sociology of the 1960s–1970s, developed at the research institutes belonging to the Academy of Social and Political Sciences and at the university, respectively, which sought to develop social theory and carried out empirical research on issues laid down in party directives, such as "social homogenization," urbanization, or the "multilaterally developed socialist society"; and 3) the social engineering of the 1970s–1980s, an eclectic intellectual mix of interwar monographic research, French and American sociology from the 1950s and 1960s, and critical Marxist theory (e.g., Gramsci, the Frankfurt School, Praxis), in which the cohorts of students graduating from sociology under state socialism were trained.

The observation that these different styles of sociological reasoning correspond to different generations of social scientists rests on what Anna Artwińska and Agnieszka Mrozik described as a sociological approach to the issue of generation, which aims to "accentuate the alleged shared fate and experiences of certain groups of people, born more or less in the same period of time and bound by 'common' life events of ideological or historical nature" (Artwińska and Mrozik 2020: 10). The boundaries between generations were never clear-cut. Cross-generational continuities and contestation happened in a shifting political, institutional, and intellectual landscape, in which social scientists formed and re-formed alliances based on temporary networks of patronage, mentorship, or shared intellectual curiosity. To this, one should add the ways in which the history of social thought under state socialism is remembered in the post-socialist period by social scientists themselves in

memoirs, autobiographies, and oral history interviews. As remarked by James Mark, these sources reveal "the range of acceptable stories available to individuals in the post-socialist period, [...] highlighting the clashes between past experiences and new ideas of what is politically and morally appropriate" (Mark 2010: xxv). Along the lines drawn by Artwińska and Mrozik, this opens up for analysis the constructed nature of generation, intricately tied to the memory politics of the post-socialist period (Artwińska and Mrozik 2020: 11). Importantly, it also raises the question of the extent to which, as an analytical concept and a form of self-identification, intellectual generation is to a large degree gendered male, corresponding to the typical personal and professional paths of male academics under state socialism.

How does academic mobility fit into this account of generations? Social scientists did not just have different formative experiences as communist activists and intellectuals, but also different opportunities for transnational encounters. For the generation of social scientists trained during the interwar period, I show how continued participation in international conferences during the 1960s allowed them to push for the de-Stalinization of Marxist social science at home. For the generation of social scientists trained during the immediate postwar period, who had the opportunity for long-term scholarships abroad in the 1960s and 1970s, I explore how these experiences resulted in epistemological change not through the simple transfer of knowledge or research instruments, but from a position critical of both Western and socialist social science. Finally, for the generation of sociologists trained beginning in the second half of the 1960s, for whom the options for international mobility had by then dwindled, I discuss the importance of international research centers set up in Bucharest for "internal academic mobility"—the experience of being embedded in a different academic culture and benefiting from its resources without leaving Romania. Finally, whereas in this paper I explore how academic mobility was tied to epistemological and generational change, the question remains to what extent in the post-socialist period the common experience of academic mobility served as a basis to restructure the sociological profession that cut across generational divides.

In the following sections, I discuss different types of academic mobility most common for social scientists belonging to the three generations outlined in this introduction. These often depended on the scholars' institutional affiliations and on informal networks. For example, being a researcher of the Academy made exchanges within the network of social scientists from state socialist countries more likely, while sociologists from the interwar period could facilitate exchanges through their pre-existing scholarly networks. In order to address the issue of epistemological change, I analyze in more detail how academic mobility was reflected in the knowledge produced on one theme in particular: quality of life. Empirical and theoretical research on quality of life in Romania was carried out under the umbrella of futurology (early 1970s), socialist modes of living/lifestyle studies (late 1970s–early 1980s), and finally demography and migration studies (1980s). Other research topics registered generational change and the impact of academic mobility at different rhythms, complicating the usual periodization of knowledge production in state socialist Romania according to the chronology of political change—e.g., Sovietization, thaw, "neo-Stalinism" (Tismăneanu 2003).

FIRST GENERATION: FROM HISTORICAL MATERIALISM TO CONCRETE SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH

The emergence of new ideas and practices of observing, analyzing, and intervening in the social realities of socialist society in Romania was initially made possible by the development of revisionist Marxist and Marxist humanist thought in the early 1960s. As elsewhere in the Eastern bloc (Voise

2012), debates over the relationship between the main disciplines of Marxism-Leninism (historical materialism, scientific socialism, and Marxist sociology) in the early 1960s opened up space for empirical approaches to social reality, or so-called "concrete sociological research." In the Romanian case, the move was emancipatory not just for the re-emerging discipline of sociology (institutionalized only in the second half of the 1960s), but also for Marxist social thought. This led to the theoretical reworking in the 1970s of the relationship between the individual and society in socialism, and to decentering the collectivist ethos characteristic of Stalinist Marxism-Leninist philosophy in the 1950s.

The main actors in this shift were professors of historical materialism from the main university centers throughout the country. Many of them were of Jewish descent, had experienced discrimination, genocide, and displacement in one of the territories belonging to or annexed by Romania during the Second World War, or had survived the Holocaust following the deportations of the Jewish population from Transylvania by the Horthy administration. Their commitment to the communist cause had been closely bound to anti-fascist activism and postwar reconstruction, including the establishment of the Stalinist canon of Marxist-Leninist social science. Yet by the mid-1950s, initial attempts at de-Stalinization were stifled in Romania in the wake of Khrushchev's "secret speech" and especially the 1956 Hungarian revolution. Philosophers defended historical materialism against encroachment from scientific socialism (perceived as the most dogmatic, anti-intellectual discipline) in order to secure their fragile institutional arrangements in the unpredictable context of de-Stalinization. The issue of expertise and especially access to non-socialist literature and intellectual networks became a crucial point of contention.

The generation of social scientists trained during the interwar period could still rely on institutional and personal connections forged before the Second World War. The most notable case was that of Henri H. Stahl, one of the prominent members of the Bucharest School of Sociology formed in the 1920s around the sociologist Dimitrie Gusti. Stahl remained connected to the French sociological and anthropological milieu and could continue his work as well as the intellectual dialogue on issues of rural studies and uneven development throughout the state socialist period (Guga 2015). Younger social scientists, who had been trained in philosophy in the 1950s but became interested in concrete sociological research, could also access these pre-existing networks through the mediation of the sociologists trained in the interwar period. These connections could be made either directly by travelling to France or Germany for short periods of time, or indirectly by going back to the sociological literature published by these sociologists before the Second World War.

For most social scientists of the first generation, however, academic mobility took the form of participation in international conferences and membership (at times leadership) of international associations. Initially prompted by the regime's interest in representation, as suggested by the case of the National Sociological Committee established in 1959 without any sociologist members, engagement in international forums gradually became less of a pretext to emphasize the differences between bourgeois and socialist science, and more of an opportunity for dialogue (Bosomitu 2017). The paradigmatic case here is that of Miron Constantinescu, a sociologist trained in the late 1930s who had held high ranking positions in the party and as a member of the Central Committee had attempted de-Stalinization following Khrushchev's secret speech, but was subsequently marginalized and only rehabilitated in the mid-1960s. Constantinescu was the main force behind the re-institutionalization of sociology at the University of Bucharest in 1965. He became the "patron" of the discipline until his death in 1974, initiating large-scale studies of urbanization as well as experimental programs for the scientific management of planning activities locally. As the head of the newly established Academy

of Social and Political Science (1970–72), Constantinescu was the most important Romanian representative in the International Sociological Association, and subsequently was also elected as a member of the organizing committee of the 1974 World Congress (Bosomitu 2014). From this position, he articulated the role of Romanian sociology as a mediator between bourgeois and socialist sociologies.

The field of future studies offers one final example of the role of academic mobility for the first generation of social scientists under state socialism. As head of the Romanian Futurological Committee, chair of the organizing committee for the Third World Future Studies Conference held in Bucharest in 1974, and member of the World Future Studies Federation, the philosopher-turned-Marxist futurologist Pavel Apostol worked towards carving common ground between Marxist and non-Marxist perspectives on the future. In an article translated into Italian, German, and English, Apostol argued that the work of Marx, and in particular his vision of social development, had been simplified by dogmatic Marxism as well as superficial bourgeois criticism to the point of postulating a deterministic, linear view of historical change. In the context of sustained discussions about the Global South in the 1970s, Apostol maintained that a clarification of the Marxist structure of the future was made all the more necessary by the "unstable equilibrium" of what he called "the three great partial systems of our contemporary world": the capitalist, the socialist, and the developing systems. It was their interdependence that future studies would need to account for moving forward, rather than speaking only to the interest of one's own system (Apostol 1972: 203). In the second half of the 1970s, Apostol elaborated a comprehensive approach to the future that synthesized the anthropological assumptions of Marxist humanism, a dialectical methodology for the study of the future, and a critical approach to global modeling (Apostol 1977: 319).

Apostol's experience of "academic mobility" in the field of futurology is also reflected in his approach to the issue of quality of life. In a series of colloquia for social scientists organized by the Sociological Laboratory at the University of Bucharest, he reported on the ongoing discussions about the use of objective and subjective indicators in the operationalization of "quality of life" within the World Futures Federation and by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (for a history of the social indicators movement starting in the 1960s, see Land and Michalos 2018). The latter's expert commission, he explained, refused to include subjective indicators because that would have meant accounting for "the element of class judgement." Meanwhile, the working group on the quality of life which met at the Fourth World Future Studies Conference in Rome had almost unanimously accepted the proposal put forward by Apostol and the physics Nobel Laureate Dennis Gabor to also include subjective quality of life indicators in models of social prognosis (Dezbaterea 1973: 23–24). Apostol argued that while planning for the quality of life should be the main aim of social development, it should not be limited to projecting into the future the existing structure of social indicators; it should ensure the future freedom to choose and prioritize indicators for the people themselves. Echoing his analysis of the Marxist structure of the future, Apostol maintained that the study of quality of life should in fact be a study of the structure that could guarantee such freedom for members of a future society (Apostol 1975: 197–203). Drawing on the work of social scientists from state socialist countries and the Global South who challenged the global developmental models elaborated in the 1970s, and especially The Limits to Growth (Botkin, Elmandja, and Maliţa 1979), he projected the central role of "education for the future" in enabling both individuals and communities "to master the social technology of creating and governing free societies, free people who have the social minimum necessary guaranteed for the non-manipulated satisfaction of their fundamental needs and the free choice of their quality of life" (Apostol 1977: 319).

In her work on futurology under state socialism, Jenny Andersson argued that futurology "was shaped on a plane between the two poles of tight regime control and dissent." Whereas in the international networks in which they were embedded the work of socialist futurologists "could be anchored in a long historical humanistic heritage," Andersson contended, "in their own contexts, socialist future research existed in a space squarely defined by Marxism Leninism and its prescription of the future as a singular and law-driven entity" (Andersson 2018: 126). The case of Pavel Apostol illustrates that this tension was in fact actively negotiated, resulting in the formulation of a Marxist humanist approach to the future that sought to integrate global and local approaches to social development in the 1970s and redefine quality of life as a measure of people's freedom. His work illustrates the globalization of the field of future studies in the 1970s, "shifting its perspective from a West–East and technology-driven slant towards a global and human-centered one" (Seefried 2017: 40).

SECOND GENERATION: "EVERYDAY MARXISM-LENINISM" / MARXIST SOCIOLOGY

For the second generation of social scientists under state socialism—that is, those who received their degrees, usually in philosophy, in the 1950s and early 1960s—opportunities for academic mobility to the West opened up in the second half of the 1960s. This was the generation most likely to access long-term research fellowships in Western Europe and the United States, through exchange programs for Romanian scholars managed by UNESCO, the Ford Foundation starting in 1962 (Ban 2016: 120), and IREX starting in 1968 (Capodilupo 1984; Faure 2018). The average age of Romanian IREX fellows in the social sciences and humanities at the start of their fellowship was 37. Of the 61 fellowships awarded for SSH disciplines in the 1968–78 period, 12 were in the field of sociology, ethnology, and political science (which in practice were very similar in the Romanian case). Only history and archival science (15) and economics (13) counted more fellows at the time.[2] To illustrate the alternative mobility and career paths of IREX fellowship recipients, and especially how the experience of a longer period of study abroad was integrated into the project of "everyday Marxism-Leninism" or Marxist sociology, in what follows I detail the case of two sociologists from the second generation: Oscar Hoffman and Mihail Cernea.

Oscar Hoffman's career is exemplary for what I identify as the theoretical engagement with "everyday Marxism-Leninism." Hoffman studied at the Philosophy Faculty of the University of Bucharest from 1949 to 1953, at the height of the Stalinist period. After several years of teaching at the university, he lost his position when he refused to appear in court at a series of trials organized against students in 1958. In 1968, he became a researcher at the recently established Center for Sociological Research of the Romanian Academy (later the Academy of Social and Political Sciences), a position which he kept through several institutional reorganizations and a revolution, until his retirement in 2007.

In October 1971, Hoffman travelled to the Soviet Union for an exchange in the field of industrial sociology,[3] and from September 1972 until January 1973 he was an IREX fellow in the United States, where he studied social structure research. Hoffman met with sociologists from several universities,

[2] Based on the "International Research and Exchanges Board Records: A Finding Aid to the Collection in the Library of Congress," Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., 2011, https://www.loc.gov/rr/mss/f-aids/IREX.pdf.

[3] Arhivele Naţionale ale României, Bucureşti, Fund Academia de Ştiinţe Sociale şi Politice, Secţia Sociologie [henceforth ANR, ASSP—Sociologie], file 6/1971, "Schimburi de experienţă, vizite de informare şi documentare ştiinţifică" [Exchanges, scientific research and documentation visits], 50.

most notably Columbia, Harvard, Boston, Northern Illinois, University of Chicago, University of Pennsylvania, and University of California, Berkeley. Upon his return, he reported to the Academy that in the field of social structure research, American sociologists were increasingly interested in macro-sociological theoretical analyses of social classes, social mobility, and stratification, instead of just conducting descriptive empirical studies. According to Hoffman, they showed a more critical bent and an interest in Marxist theory than before, but studied Marx mostly through secondary literature and refused to accept the political consequences of the Marxist analysis of class relations.[4] This evaluation of American sociology reflected Hoffman's institutional and intellectual position as a researcher of the Academy. As principal investigator at the Center for Sociological Research, he was heavily embedded in the regional networks of scholarly exchange and collaboration set up among the academies of the Soviet Union and the other state socialist countries. For the rest of the 1970s and into the 1980s, Hoffman was regularly involved in academic exchanges within this network, investing intellectually in the project of a socialist theory of social structure (Hîncu 2018).

One's experience of academic mobility through IREX also depended on the choice of university, which in the absence of prior contacts was largely a matter of chance. Moreover, upon their return, those who spent time abroad could find themselves treated with caution, suspicion, or even hostility. Such was the case of Mihail Cernea, criticized for applying American sociological theories to Romanian experiences—specifically, the theory of organizations to the analysis of the agricultural cooperative, an approach he developed while on a fellowship at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford University, in 1970–71 (Cernea 1974b). Cernea had joined the Philosophy Institute of the Romanian Academy in 1959 and in the early 1960s was one of the first promotors of concrete sociological research, first on the topic of socialist consciousness and then on issues of rural sociology, travelling for a short study trip to Paris through the mediation of Henri H. Stahl.

Cernea's time at Stanford was exceptionally productive, and after returning he published a volume of interviews he conducted with prominent American sociologists (Reuben Hill, Stanton Wheeler, John Kunkel, Alvin Bertrand, Elliot Aronson, and Immanuel Wallerstein), which offered Romanian readers an overview of the cutting-edge American sociology at the time. In the book's final chapter, Cernea described the increasing radicalization of the American sociological field since the end of the 1960s, and argued that the interest in research on social inequality, social indicators, and social problems stemmed from this contestation of the conservatism of academic sociology by radical sociologists. In effect, he was describing a similar situation as Hoffman, yet the implications of his account of radical sociologists in America for the Romanian context are striking:

> They analyzed and "unmasked" the conditions in which the American sociologist works for a particular political elite, a power elite; the conditions in which he is subservient to the state hierarchy or academic hierarchy; the conditions in which he is subdued through the system of contracts and through the organization of the process of research, and is not free; the conditions in which sociology cannot fully realize its vocation to pursue the truth. (Cernea 1974a: 227)

While he was abroad for the 8th ISA Congress of Sociology in Toronto in 1974, Cernea was recruited by the World Bank, and he chose not to return to Romania but rather emigrate to the United States. At the World Bank, he mobilized his background in the sociology of socialist development for a career

[4] ANR, ASSP—Sociologie, file 3/1973, "Informare asupra activităţii de documentare desfăşurate în SUA în perioada 28 septembrie 1972–28 ianuarie 1973" [Report on the documentation carried out in the United States, 28 September 1972–28 January 1973], 77.

in the development strategies of the Global South. Cernea's trajectory was almost the opposite to that of Hoffman, for whom the constraints of "everyday Marxism-Leninism" worsened throughout the 1970s, eventually leading to an almost complete abandonment of empirical research in the 1980s. Whereas for Cernea academic mobility also led to professional and social mobility, for Hoffman academic mobility merely put into perspective the unequal distribution of resources and epistemic power across the East–West divide. This only left Hoffman the opportunity to be embedded in the transnational network of Eastern bloc research in the social sciences, originally seen as a possible counter-balance to everyday Marxism-Leninism at home. However, participation in the network and travelling to its meetings came with the obligation to reproduce Romania's semi-independent geopolitical position at the level of knowledge production, against the potentially emancipatory project for a "socialist sociology" promoted by the Soviet Union and, to various degrees, the Eastern bloc countries.

A third example of academic mobility among the second generation of social scientists raises the complex issue of the legacy of academic mobility in the "West" and the "East" during the post-socialist period. One of the main figures in quality of life research in the late 1970s and 1980s was Cătălin Zamfir. He obtained his PhD in Philosophy in the second half of the 1960s and, after a short stint in research, joined the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Bucharest. Zamfir received a Ford scholarship to specialize in the field of industrial sociology at the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, during the 1973–74 academic year. There he became familiar with the latest research in the field of social indicators, especially methodologies developed at the institute for measuring people's satisfaction.

Following the adoption of a "Program for the increase in living standards and the quality of life" for the 1981–1985 five-year plan at the 12th Party Congress in 1979, sociological work on quality of life in Romania followed a thin line between legitimization and subversion of the development strategy set out by the party. Zamfir first co-edited a volume of translations from state socialist, South American, and contemporary American sociology on the topic of quality of life, published for a closed circuit of experts at the "Ştefan Gheorghiu" Academy (informally known as the "Party Academy"). This defined quality of life as "the value of one's life for oneself," thus placing the issue of human subjectivity at its core and echoing the Marxist humanism of the 1970s (Zamfir and Lotreanu 1980: v–viii). Around the same time, Zamfir was coopted by a researcher at the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy for Social and Political Sciences to participate in the meetings in Prague, Warsaw, and East Berlin of a working group on the "socialist way of life" within the same network of state socialist academies of sciences in which Oscar Hoffman was involved. The result was an edited volume on the theory of a socialist way of life that attempted to reinterpret the concept in a logic similar to that of sociological research on "everyday Marxism-Leninism" (Rebedeu and Zamfir 1982, 1989). Despite the intellectual inspiration from scholars such as the Pole Andrzej Siciński and his qualitative sociology of lifestyles and way of life (Sicinski 1980), Zamfir maintained that academic mobility within the state socialist network had been largely inconsequential, both in his autobiography and in an oral history interview that I conducted in May 2016 (Zamfir 2009: 125–126). His evaluation is in line with the almost complete de-legitimization of Marxism-Leninism and Marxist sociology in the postsocialist period in Romania. The legacy of sociological knowledge produced during state socialism that was drawing on Western sources was quite different.

In 1980, Zamfir coordinated a small group of researchers from the Institute of Philosophy and the Center for Sociological Research who elaborated a comprehensive set of indicators for measuring the subjective quality of life, adapting the methodology developed at the Institute of Social Research at

the University of Michigan. Unlike the research on the socialist way of life pursued at the time in state socialist countries, this model did not focus on social processes (how people organized their lives within the structural determinants of their society, class, or social group), but rather on people's subjective perception of quality of life and status inequality. Knowledge of the latter also informed governance (Popescu et al. 1984: 54), in so far as the goal of the socialist state at the particular stage of development could not yet be equality but, according to the authors, "moderate inequality regarding the relative quality of life" (Popescu et al. 1984: 57). By defining quality of life both in terms of objective conditions and "subjective perception," the model had a subversive potential, later developed in theoretical work on lifestyles as alternatives to mainstream socialist society (Zamfir 1989). At the same time, the model made subjectivity and individual behavior the target of social engineering.

Reflecting on his career as a sociologist under state socialism, Zamfir argued in his autobiography that quality of life, way of life, and lifestyle research in the 1980s "offered the possibility to exercise political and social pressure to give more attention to people and their needs" (Zamfir 2009: 122). He maintained that social reform topics integrated by the regime from "the West" temporarily offered opportunities for "technocratic," modernizing initiatives, yet were inevitably hollowed out of their original intentions. Nevertheless, they produced a "perverse effect" for the system, in that they "gave substance to the crystallization of an alternative culture to Ceauşescu's ideology," and also allowed sociologists to develop skills that they would be able to apply after the regime change (Zamfir 2009: 126). In perhaps the most successful example of such repurposing of Western sociological expertise in the post-socialist period, Zamfir established an Institute for Quality of Life Research in 1990. The system of indicators that his team developed became a "scientific instrument" of transition, despite calls from Zamfir and others that quality of life should be a pursued political goal rather than just measured as a supposedly spontaneous result of socio-political development (Zamfir 1990).

THIRD GENERATION: SOCIAL ENGINEERING

The opportunities for academic mobility significantly dwindled for the generation of sociologists trained under state socialism. Many of the professors teaching at the University of Bucharest beginning in 1966, when a separate sociology department was first established, belonged to the second generation of social scientists and had the chance to study abroad for short periods of time so as to specialize in various branches of sociology for which no local expertise existed. Sociology graduates from the early 1970s consider Henri H. Stahl, who taught several years at the university before retirement, as the main proponent of sociology as a science of "social engineering." This has come to stand, in memoirs and oral history accounts from the post-socialist period, as the opposite of ideology (that is, Marxism-Leninism), a scientific approach to the management of society with intellectual roots in the interwar period.

Yet whereas this perspective fits well the experience of the first two cohorts of graduates in sociology, who could be integrated into teaching and research positions, it does not fully represent the experience of those who started university in the late 1960s, driven by political engagement and an explicit interest in critical Marxism in the wake of the 1968 wave of student protests. Their aspirations were stifled not just by the state policies that barred graduates from teaching and research jobs immediately after graduation for several years of mandatory "work in production," but also by the eclectic mix of Marxist sociology, structural functionalism, and interwar empirical research that the department offered. Finally, students who started their studies during the second half of the 1970s experi-

enced the disbandment of the sociology department in 1977 and were consequently employed as history or philosophy teachers in high schools in the provinces (the large cities had been closed to new inhabitants). They remember this as a missed opportunity for the proper implementation of social engineering, and as a failure of the technocratic ethos of the 1970s.

In terms of academic mobility, what stands out in the case of the generation trained under state socialism is the internal mobility facilitated by short research trips occasioned by foreign visiting professors and especially by international training centers who employed foreign specialists. Such were the UN-funded Center for the Training of Enterprise Cadres (CEPECA) and the Centre démographique ONU-Roumanie (CEDOR). To illustrate the epistemological impact of internal academic mobility as well as the complex generational dynamic of the late 1970s and 1980s, I will reconstruct in more detail the case of sociologist Dumitru Sandu, whom I interviewed in Bucharest in June 2018.

Sandu joined the sociology department at the University of Bucharest in 1967. During his studies he participated in the summer fieldwork teams coordinated by Henri H. Stahl, whom he considered his mentor. Stahl was his PhD supervisor between 1972 and 1979, when Sandu wrote a dissertation on "The analysis of social differentiation in rural communities." Like all graduates, Sandu's job placement was decided through the centrally planned system of job allocation. In 1971, he started at the Center for Sociological Research of the Academy of Social and Political Sciences, and published on the role of the sociologist in studying, guiding, and mobilizing local participation, understood as an activity of "social engineering" or "community work" (Sandu 1977).

Fired from the Center for Sociological Research in 1975, Sandu worked as a researcher at the Institute of Agricultural Economics until 1977, when he transferred to the Laboratory of Urban Sociology (later the Sociology Laboratory of the Design Institute for Typified Buildings). He was employed there as a researcher until 1992, when he became professor of sociology at the University of Bucharest. Sandu described the laboratory as "an oasis of professionalism," where he had the opportunity to learn statistical techniques and even developed the first computer program for statistical analysis. Overall, Sandu thematized his career, in spite of all the professional discontinuities, in terms of "luck under adverse condition," setting the tone for an account of the ways in which the epistemic and institutional limitations of sociological research under state socialism could be creatively mitigated.

Over the course of the interview, Sandu systematically mapped the intellectual sources available to the generation of sociologists trained under state socialism, from professors (in his case, Stahl) to contacts with "foreign" literature (both Western literature and literature from the interwar period, but also contacts with visiting sociologists, especially from France) to one's personal frustration with the possibilities of sociology in Romania at the time. "Communism was a superb school for creativity under conditions of poverty," he argued tongue in cheek. Having made the point that sociologists trained in the 1970s had not been formed "by communism alone," he nevertheless explained his own trajectory and that of sociology more generally as "a fight for intellectual survival" against party ideology and the ways it was imposed on sociologists, be it through censorship, the planning of scientific research, or institutional practices.

Sandu discussed at length two types of "strategies of survival." At the level of methodology, he argued that the use of statistical methods and technical language was an efficient way to avoid censorship: "Censorship was everywhere, but it didn't know about regression," he commented, later adding that "if you didn't know well a standardized method, you were much easier prey to any kind of ideological approach." Sandu was finally able to travel to the United States in 1986 on an IREX scholarship,

shortly after he had joined the Communist Party (he came to understand party membership as a precondition for travelling abroad). During this visit he chose to specialize in statistical methods at UCLA and George Washington University.

At the level of theory, he was inspired by Stahl, on the one hand by choosing thematic areas that were farther apart from ideological control and on the other hand by focusing on operationalization. "We were formed with the idea that concepts need to be operationalized because otherwise you do ideology," Sandu explained in reply to my question regarding the idiosyncratic conceptual choices—group structure instead of social structure, differentiation rather than homogenization—in his PhD dissertation. By ideology he identified the mainstream literature on social structure and social homogenization, themes which he perceived as stemming directly from party documents.

Sandu's dissertation was, inevitably, formulated with reference to the analytical framework of "social homogenization," one of the main catchwords of "everyday Marxism-Leninism" in the Romanian version. In the interview, he described his dissertation as an attempt "to get as close as possible to the differentiation I was interested in—I didn't say inequality because it would have been too much." He bypassed the issue of social structure by focusing on "group structures" (inspired by Pitirim Sorokin, whose work he had read in English and French) and their modernization at the level of rural communities. He defined this process as the combined result of homogenization in terms of vertical social hierarchies and horizontal differentiation as a consequence of the rationalization of social activities. This was, in effect, a study of social engineering drawing upon the research on systematization conducted at the Center for Sociological Research, which operated the conceptual shift (what Sandu called "conversion") from homogenization to differentiation within the theoretical framework of social structure research.

To arrive at differentiation, Sandu focused on the issue of regional migration. Statistical data on migration had been made available for the first time in 1974, in the second (and last) Demographic Yearbook published by the Central Statistical Office under state socialism, which had most probably been occasioned by the World Population Conference, held in Bucharest the same year. It was also in the wake of the conference that the Centre démographique ONU-Roumanie (CEDOR) was established, which would become a hub for specialization in the field of demography with access to foreign literature and professors invited from abroad.

If research was the result of a dialogue between theory, data, methods, and intuition, as Sandu formulated it in the oral history interview, then it was at CEDOR, where he completed a specialization course in 1981, that he reworked his dissertation into a theoretical and methodological study of migration:

> And then I shifted from the idea of differentiation to the idea of migration. And I said: If the person leaves, that means he is dissatisfied, etc. etc., I had the theory. Simply I converted the idea of social differentiation into the idea of consequences of social differentiation and inequality. And that's how I arrived at migration, and a good part of my PhD dissertation became the first draft of my analysis about migration.

In the final research report he submitted to CEDOR, Sandu drew in particular on neoclassical theories of migration, which explained the change of residence through economic advantages and the rationality of the migrant. He identified two variables in particular that explained migration: the quality of life and communication between people from different communities (Sandu 1981). Reflecting on the book that resulted from this research (Sandu 1984), Sandu conceded that there was "very little agency" in it, which he explained as a consequence of the theoretical framework of neoclassical

studies on migration, which privileged economic rationality. He saw the book's main achievements at the level of conceptual innovation, especially the very use of the term "migration." "There were topics which were clearly—to put it academically—dissonant with the official ideology," he explained. "Inequalities, disparities, migration. People never left from one place to another because they were satisfied."

Sandu defined quality of life as "the degree to which the values (embodied in goods, services, or social relations) available to the members of a social group adequately satisfy their needs" (Sandu 1984: 32). In his analysis, he focused on the "objective components" of quality of life, understood nevertheless as theoretically constructed and empirically measurable. He thus distinguished himself from the strand of research pursued in Marxist sociology that I discussed in the previous section (and the interest in subjective perception in particular), as well as from the Marxist humanism of the first generation of sociologists (and more broadly, from what he called "ideology"). Sandu's case illustrates how epistemological change was occasioned by the confluence of meaningful mentorship by a sociologist from the first generation of social scientists under state socialism, intellectual confrontation with the perceived limitations of the theoretical and methodological approaches of the second generation, and finally internal academic mobility via an international research institution set up in Romania.

CONCLUSION

This paper approached academic mobility as an entry point into the complexities of epistemological change across generations, illustrating the interplay between structural constraints to knowledge production, the dynamic of intellectual continuities and confrontation, and the engagement with and perception of Western literature. For the first generation of social scientists under state socialism, academic mobility was based on existing or newly established intellectual networks, and required an explicit positioning on the issue of socialist and non-socialist approaches to the study of social realities. This determined both the institutional and intellectual framework for the second generation of sociologists under state socialism, who was the most likely to have access to long-term research scholarships abroad. This experience could be integrated into theoretical and empirical research as well as individual career paths in radically different ways, leading to the repurposing of the emancipatory, critical Marxism of the previous generation or to its reification as "everyday Marxism-Leninism" in the context of transnational collaboration. For the third generation of sociologists trained under state socialism, opportunities for academic mobility had significantly narrowed, yet as oral history accounts testify, epistemological change was nevertheless catalyzed by a variety of sources: from close ties to the first generation of sociologists (through formal or informal mentoring), to confronting the status quo of the second generation of sociologists, to drawing on theoretical and methodological insights obtained through "internal mobility" or the rare occasions to study for longer periods of time abroad.

As shown in the case of quality of life, a research topic which I followed across the three different generations, input from the international networks in which the social scientists were embedded, the way they understood their epistemic position within these networks, and how they related to the work of previous generations resulted in different conceptual, methodological, and political approaches. Pavel Apostol's Marxist humanist take on quality of life was articulated within the increasingly globalized field of futurology. Cătălin Zamfir drew both on research conducted within the net-

work of state socialist academies of sciences and on his academic exchange in the US, but these experiences had very different legacies in the post-socialist period. Dumitru Sandu's work was articulated differently from both the Marxist humanism of the first generation and as the "Marxist-Leninist sociology" of the second, drawing on sources of "internal mobility" and emulating the ethos of an "objective" science of social engineering espoused by an older generation of sociologists formed in the interwar period. The sheer variety of academic mobility under state socialism complicates existing accounts of unidirectional transfers and opens the discussion of epistemological change to multicausal explanations, in which the role of Western literature and foreign exchanges is intertwined with complex generational and genealogical dynamics.

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ARTICLE

The social sciences in Hungary during the Cold War and after

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Abstract

Based on various types of recently explored empirical evidence, this study attempts to account for the complex and ever-changing relationship the social sciences in Hungary have entertained with their foreign counterparts, both institutionally and through their intellectual references since their birth in the early 20th century. Historically, up until Communist times, Hungary was a German intellectual colony of sorts while remaining receptive mostly to French and other influences as well. This changed fundamentally after 1948 with the process of Sovietization. This implied the outright institutional suppression of several social disciplines (sociology, demography, political science, and psychoanalysis) and the forceful intellectual realignment of others along Marxist lines. Contacts with the West were also suspended and the exclusive orientation to Soviet social science enforced throughout the long 1950s. A thaw period after this attempt at Russian cultural colonization followed the years after the 1956 anti-Bolshevik uprising. From 1963 on, the Hungarian social sciences saw the reestablishment and state-supported promotion of disciplines that were suppressed earlier, the softening of the ascendancy of official Marxism, and the opening of channels of exchange with the West. In spite of the continuation of political censorship, ideological surveillance, and occasional expulsion of politically dissident scholars until 1989, Hungarian social scientists could benefit more often and intensively from Western sponsorship (such as study grants from the Ford foundation) and collaborations. After the fall of Communism, the expansion and reorientation of the social sciences to the West, dominated by Anglo-Saxon contacts, are demonstrated by various indices, such as data on the book market of the social sciences and books purchased by libraries, translated, or cited in major reviews.

Keywords

Sovietization, cultural colonization, Westernization, Social sciences, socialist Hungary

Hungary had been a German cultural colony proper during the nation building process in pre-socialist times (up until 1945). The academic system and the set-up of schooling equipment were constructed on the Prussian-German model via Austrian imperial mediation. Most of the intellectual exchanges among students and scholars took place with institutions of Germanic civilizational areas.

German was the only mandatory language taught in classical secondary education, followed at a distance (but only in *Realschulen*) by French. The fundamental German orientation of the elites did not change in the decades before 1945. This is indirectly reflected in the data on linguistic competencies of the population in the interwar years. According to the 1941 census of the post-Trianon "rump state" population, 11.3% declared that they spoke German (21% in Budapest), compared to only 0.6% French (3.2 % in Budapest) and 0.4% English (2.4% in Budapest). We can get closer to this colonial-type German orientation in Table 1, hereafter containing more detailed information of the linguistic skills of major categories of intellectual professions in the capital city.

Table 1: Declared knowledge of foreign languages by the main professional clusters with higher education in Budapest, 1930. (percentages)

		% with declared knowledge of				
	% with no such skills	German	French	English	Italian	numbers
lawyers	8.5	87.9	23.0	16.1	2.9	2136
medics	5.8	93.5	29.6	33.3	6.6	2697
engineers	5.5	90.9	24.6	34.0	4.1	3658
students	41.8	52.4	18.7	10.3	3.2	8022
SUM	23.6	72.2	22.3	20.1	3.9	16513

Source: Illyefalvi 1935, *passim*

As the table shows, the knowledge of German was a quasi must for established professionals, except for students, some of whom were as yet too young to achieve a commonly recognized level of German or, as mediocre pupils, had neglected the eight years of German classes during their studies leading to their *Matura*. 46% of male and 27% of female students started their higher education with a pass degree, or no degree at all (Illyefalvi 1935: 1062), in spite of the 1920 proto-Nazi *numerus clausus* law, which had claimed to alleviate the overcrowding of universities by reserving their benches for the best secondary school graduates, besides non-Jews.) The second language known by a significant minority, close to one quarter of the members of the Budapest intellectual professions, was French, except for medical doctors and engineers whose competence in English exceeded that in French. In the interwar years, French authors in history and the social sciences were still cited prominently together with their German counterparts in the Hungarian press (Karady 2019). However exceptional this may seem, the arrival of English on the horizon of interest among some important clusters of educated elites signals an important change. In some neighboring countries, equally under German cultural domination, the "English turn" much preceded that in Hungary. In both Poland and Czechoslovakia, English publications already served as the most frequent linguistic-national cluster of references in major journals of sociology during the interwar years (Kilias 2018: 190). Yet the heavy influence of German is clear in these data, as well as in Hungarian sociology of that time. In foreign references found in the only sociological journal at the time, *Társadalomtudomány* [Social Science], the number of citations of English authors grew closer to the frequency of German ones only in the immediate pre-war and wartime years (Karády and Nagy 2019: 52).

The persistent predominance of the German language was of course affected by the existence of a significant proportion of ethnic Germans in the country, though much less than in pre-1919 Hungary.

Those with German as their mother tongue were particularly frequent among the Swabian (Catholic German) peasantry and the Lutherans of Transylvania, as well as in the Western and Eastern Slovakian parts of the old kingdom, amounting to over 10% of the population. However, their size shrunk to half that proportion in the interwar rump state,[1] so that the dominant position of German had by that time much more to do with established transnational scholarly and otherwise intellectual ties (such as the overwhelming role of Germanic universities in students' study abroad trips before and after 1919[2]), inherited values, etc., than it had to do with the still heavily German or German-Jewish background of the professional intelligentsia.[3] The position of French appeared to be much more modest, but far from insignificant. French, like English or Italian, was a language that had to be specially studied, since there were no indigenous groups of people liable to speak it as a home language (*von Haus aus*).

The disastrous collapse of the Old Regime in 1945 brought about a new situation in this field as well. The regime change was accompanied, among other destructions, by tragic human losses—amounting to close to ten percent of the population, especially among males. War casualties, mass atrocities committed by local Nazi thugs in Budapest against Jews, the deportation to death camps of provincial Jewry and many from Budapest as well, high death rates in Soviet work camps and those of prisoners of war, political emigration of staff members attached to the former regime (both civil and military officialdom), the partial exodus or non-return of many surviving victims of the Shoah, the judiciary or (by administrative internment) extra-judiciary blacklisting of Nazi acolytes, the politically biased "change of the guard" in civil service, academe, and all other leading elite spheres to the benefit of communist newcomers—all of this contributed to considerable positional shifts and transformations within the educated middle class. The transition to communism (1945–1948) was marked by a limited political democracy, controlled as it was by the occupying Red Army and its local allies (cf. Valuch 2001: 17f.). But it also raised immense hopes not only for liberal intellectuals cherishing the prospect of a Western-type democracy after the Nazi nightmare, but also for their leftist counterparts, the latter developing a blind and quasi-religious trust in Stalinist socialism. Some well-trained and successful intellectuals actually returned from the West or the East (when they survived the Stalinist purges), such as Jewish refugees from the *numerus clausus* or political emigrants under the Horthy regime, among them a number of doctors, psychoanalysts, engineers, and other professionals.

The 1945–1947 transition period was thus favorable for the rebirth of modern Hungarian social sciences and their opening to the West. Most of the previous taboos were abolished together with the earlier censorship of the press. New academic positions were created (like a restructured chair of sociology in the University of Budapest). The rearguard of the conservative-clerical academia was purged due to its collusion with the previous political establishment or/and the process of Nazifica-

[1] The number of residents with a German mother tongue was 5.5% in 1930 and 5.1% in 1941, while the knowledge of German was declared by 15.1 % of the population in 1930 and 16 % in 1941. *Magyar statisztikai évkönyv 1943-46,* Budapest, KSH, 1949, 22.

[2] See the collection of prosopographies published by László Szögi and his disciples. Out of the 13 volumes printed before 2015 on Hungarian students abroad in 1789-1918, only 3 address fully and 2 in part (Switzerland) non-Germanic countries. In a recent study based on Szögi's materials, I estimate that over 94% of student trips from Hungary in the long 19th century were directed to German, Swiss-German, or Austrian-German institutions of higher education. See Karady 2018: 263.

[3] On the overwhelmingly German or Jewish background of modern professional elites and most clusters of students and graduates of higher education in "Dualist" Hungary, see my prosopographically grounded statistical synthesis in Karady 2012.

tion. A number of new journals were published in various specialties and some "generalist" intellectual reviews gathered a country-wide readership by major new publications. The seminal study by the political scientist István Bibó on "The Jewish question since 1945" appeared in the last issue of the critical review *Válasz* [Response], just before the journal's prohibition.[4]

Indeed, the transition years ended soon with the communist takeover during the 1948 "Year of the Turn" (as remembered in communist historical recollections), which introduced a Stalinist-type Bolshevik dictatorship in Hungary. Its final aim and result for scholarly activities can be summarized as follows: Independent institutions of knowledge production and distribution—including the entire school system on all levels—were nationalized and subjected to severe ideological surveillance.

Academic staff were exposed to drastic politically motivated purges. The incumbent of the Budapest Chair of Sociology Sándor Szalai, despite being known as a "leftist socialist" close to the communists, suffered a cruel prison term in 1950-1956 without even a show trial. Indeed, for some social and human sciences, which were liable to constitute non-communist or anti-Bolshevik ideological assets, the consequences of Sovietization proved to be even more dramatic than for other branches of study. Some disciplines – such as sociology, psychoanalysis, political science, and demography – were promptly outlawed as "bourgeois sciences." These study branches were regarded as more dangerous than others for the new executives in power, since they could serve as competitors to the prevailing Marxist-Leninist basis of indoctrination under various denominations ("historical materialism," "scientific socialism"). Access to Western scholarly literature was either ended (often relegated in libraries to "closed stacks") or strictly controlled. The library of the Academy of Sciences, among the richest collections of publications in the social sciences in the country, was properly raided as early as January 1947 with the help of Red Army units in order to remove some 3800 volumes taxed to be "politically incorrect" (Péteri 1998: 65). The closure applied even more to personal contacts and any form of cooperation with representatives of the West. The Iron Curtain, identified by Churchill in his Fulton speech (March 1946), entered fully in force by the end of the decade in Hungarian intellectual life as well.

The ideological *Gleichschaltung* of the remaining academic system involved a state organized effort at Russification proper. This was not unknown, historically, in Russia, since the late nineteenth century when the then imperial government arbitrarily decreed the Russification of all non-Russian universities in the Western margins of the Empire, like Warsaw or Tartu. In Hungary the Soviet occupants did not go that far, but they took measures to similar ends. Russian replaced German in secondary school curricula and became a mandatory subject in all sectors of higher education. In scholarly publications, references to Russian sources—together with the ritual invocation of messages from the classics of Marxism-Leninism (preferably the works of Stalin himself) —became an inescapable practice. Special secondary schools were set up with fully Russian tuition, following the model of German, English or Italian gymnasiums that were suppressed by that time, founded under the Horthy regime. This "Eastern turn," an aggressive attempt of Russian cultural colonization, was accompanied and to some extent compensated by the provision of scholarships in Soviet universities and a systematic, though strictly controlled, sponsorship and promotion of exchanges with Soviet partners. Henceforth, in every walk of academic life, lip service had to be paid to Soviet, and particularly to Russian, accomplishments. In historical reports on scholarly disciplines the alleged Russian temporal priority of major inventions and discoveries ("protochronism") was enforced, often taking the dimension of colonial subservience.

[4] See numbers 10-11 of *Válasz*, 1948.

It is true that Sovietization also included considerable public investments in the development of schooling with a policy of forced democratization of enrollments in higher education, based on a scheme of administrative counter-discrimination of sorts. This was carried out via a rigid quota system to the detriment of the former middle class' offspring and in favor of lower class children. Women were equally admitted since 1945 to all study branches, notably to law and engineering, study tracks that had previously remained closed to them. The rapid feminization of intellectual staff had a healthy impact on academia as well. The role of the Academy of Sciences was strengthened with new entitlements to award scholarly degrees (like "candidature" or "academic doctorate") and host professional research centers of its own, including some in classic social studies, like economics or law. The former was regarded as a useful study branch, all the more since it could benefit the program of forced industrialization. Economics was gratified with a full-scale university in Budapest (1948) and an unprecedented amount of resources for ideologically guided research. On the contrary, the formerly dominant position of jurists (still one third of the graduates of higher education in 1941) disappeared to the benefit of those in education, engineering, or economics.

The quarantine in which the burgeoning, newly institutionalized human and social studies (sociology, political science, demography, psychoanalysis, and most psychological specializations) were closed via prohibitions and/or forced ideological alignment started to be lifted already in the so-called "thaw period" after Stalin's death in 1953. This political turn did loosen restrictions for some of the disciplines. Others, like sociology, could only be pursued under disguises (notably in the Central Statistical Office). Western contacts of all sorts continued to be tabooed or even repressed. The coming of the 1956 uprising made this situation evolve by softening the censorship on public debates (on the press, history, philosophy, etc.) arranged under the auspices of the famous pre-revolutionary Petőfi Circle, a public forum tolerated as an informal gathering of reform communist and other intellectuals critical of the Stalinist state of affairs.

The first anti-communist revolution in October 1956 contributed to the changing environment more or less in the same sense. It was followed by a severe political repression, to be sure, with hundreds of executions and thousands of heavy prison sentences dealt out to participants who did not flee westward. But, on the other hand, the "thaw" was immediately felt with regard to contact with the West, and the earlier severe censorship over Western cultural products started to be cautiously but significantly alleviated. The Western social sciences and humanities (SSH) were no longer systematically regarded as "hostile to socialism," and various arrangements were publicly sought for the accommodation of empirical research in the earlier ostracized social and human disciplines developed in the West. In the meanwhile, officially, the fiction of ideological supremacy of Marxism-Leninism was maintained and regularly stressed. The rhetorical solution was either to regard the study branch in question as an acceptable ideological partner of official Marxism, or to qualify the suspected disciplines as plainly "Marxist" (like "Marxist sociology")—which was no longer regarded as a blasphemous oxymoron. This happened sometimes against all evidence, as in the presentation of the new *Sociological Review* (1973) (Karady and Nagy 2019: 96). The qualification was accepted by Western observers as well (Kiss 1971), some of whom—more importantly—realized the novelty of the scholarly production of their Hungarian partners. As early as 1974 the products of the reborn sociological profession in Hungary earned a publication in German in four volumes (Balla 1974).

After the amnesty pronounced in 1963 of those condemned in the aftermath of 1956—this concerned above all Jewish intellectuals, since those in the "populist" camp were largely spared from the anti-revolutionary backlash—a number of institutional initiatives were made for the readmission of earlier banned empirical social research. This can be observed all over the "Eastern Camp" following

Soviet initiatives during the Khrushchev era, but much less liberally outside Hungary and perhaps Poland. Unoccupied positions were abundant in academe anyway, thanks to the mass emigration of scholars to the West after the October 1956 uprising. Some of the posts were reserved for the compromised and disbanded Stalinist leadership, who could thus organize their intellectual reconversion and self-promotion in the domain of social studies. A research group in sociology was founded under András Hegedüs (1963), the former young *Strohmann* of Party boss Rákosi as the Bolshevik prime minister. He had accomplished in the meantime a rather exceptional moral and ideological U-turn. Demography was also recognized as a legitimate discipline, with a specialized research group first in the Statistical Office (1958) and later as an institute of the Academy of Sciences. This was a pragmatic response to the sharp decrease in birth rates after 1956, following first the softening and later the elimination of the formerly drastically applied prohibition of abortions. Social statistics resumed to be published (even if not combined with the earlier variables such as religion and ethnicity, one of the flagships and sign of refinement of Hungarian statistical investigations). The surviving ethnological research group, sponsored by influential communist fellow travelers, was also developed into an institute of the Academy of Science. In the last decade of communist rule, even research in Western-style empirical political science (with a special institute for opinion polls) was reinstated. Recruitment policies of academic staff and university personnel were significantly softened, so that descendants of the ruling elites of the pre-socialist period who were previously excluded could henceforth hope for a career in academe. After 1964, even the social quota system for student enrollments in higher education was abolished, and children of the "old middle class" could pursue higher studies without particular difficulties or humiliating discrimination.

This development continued with ups and downs, but by and large improved throughout the rest of the socialist period up until 1989. It equaled, on the whole, a more or less progressive process of liberalization of the working conditions in the social and human sciences, but without granting them full professional autonomy or self-regularization. This was part of the "Kádárist deal" with the intelligentsia ensuing after the bloody and massive retaliation against actors in the 1956 October Revolution. This process was temporarily suspended in the post-1968 years, when "economic reform" including the introduction of market mechanisms, which was much hoped for and capitalized upon by the Kádárist leadership, had to be abandoned under attacks from the conservative wing of the Party. However, the liberalization process was not interrupted for good, as it was the case in neighboring socialist countries. The Communist Party, forced to align with Moscow's foreign policy, turned against intellectuals protesting after the military repression of the "Prague Spring" by the troops of the "Warsaw Pact," dismissing several from their positions (such as András Hegedüs, head of the Sociological Research Group), but not necessarily depriving them of Party membership. This happened later in 1973: Following a high-ranked party order against intellectual dissidence, Hegedüs and three other leading scholars were removed from the Sociological Institute, while four fellows of the Philosophy Institute of the Academy of Sciences also lost their academic jobs. This led several years later to a wave of forced emigration to the West among leading sociologists and philosophers such as István Kemény and Iván Szelényi or several "offspring of Georg Lukács," among them Ágnes Heller.

Even contact with émigrés, if they were not considered to be active political enemies proper, was no longer stigmatized and penalized as before. Iván Szelényi could return for research (if not for publishing) in the country, and the journal *Szociológia* could even bring out an interview with him in 1982, just a few years after his expulsion, while he was still pursuing a brilliant international career (Berényi 2018: 254). The anti-communist sociologist Oszkár Jászi, founder of the first major sociological workshop of the country before 1918, turned into one of the most cited "foreign" authors of

his craft by the 1980s in the highly influential review *Valóság* [Reality] — outnumbered only by references to Marx and Max Weber (Karády and Nagy 2019: 123-124). This applied even more to Western professional literature. *Szociológia*, founded in 1972, was particularly open to "international" studies related mostly (up to three quarters of all such articles) to Western intellectual products (Berényi 2018: 257). Even more significantly, ideologically grounded criticism of Western scholarship, a must in Stalinist times, tended to weaken and by the late 1970s almost disappear in a discipline like philosophy, which was at the forefront of the "ideological war" against the West throughout the Cold War period. In the official *Hungarian Philosophical Review* during the years 1957–1961, a large third (35%) of Western studies reviewed were negatively evaluated, another third (35%) were just "liked a bit," while the rest (30%) were disapproved and rejected. For the 1974–1979 period, one can observe a clear U-turn in these areas. The large majority (58%) of the reviews of Western authors by that time were positive, over a third (37%) were "liked a bit," and a mere 5% were critically discarded (Szűcs 2018: 284).

If censorship—which was always implicit or indirect in Hungary and in charge of journal editors and directors of publishing houses—was not suspended, the recourse to Western scholarship and cognitive importations as well as cooperation with Western authors was no longer proscribed. This policy of "opening to the West" had political and diplomatic as well financial counterparts (since 1973 the state started to borrow a growing amount of credits from major capitalist banks). For social scientists, this entailed a progressive change improving their career prospects in several concrete terms. According to rumors, by the 1980s the bargaining power of Hungarian state financiers could be strengthened in business negotiations by concessions to let intellectual dissidents obtain study grants in the West.

Indeed, as early as 1964, the Ford Foundation started to distribute, following an agreement with the government, substantial grants for study and research stays in the West (usually for one year at an academic institution in the United States). Up until 1968, at least 145 such grants were offered to Hungarian applicants selected by the Foundation (Duller forthcoming). In the same period, official contracts of the Hungarian Academy of Science with Western state organizations of academic exchange (like the French CNRS or the West German DAAD) allowed more and more Hungarians further study or research trips across the Iron Curtain. The author of this article received many of his Hungarian colleagues in the Parisian *Maison des Sciences de l'Homme* and, starting in 1972, he himself could count on a monthly (sometime bi-monthly) study trip to Budapest every year. The *EHESS* university in Paris, the *Wissenschaftskolleg* in Berlin, the UNESCO-founded European Centre of Comparative Research in the Social Sciences (1963) in Vienna became important scholarly hubs to host Hungarian and other East European scholars in Western academia. In 1978 Hungarian academics became eligible in the Fulbright international scholarship program with the negotiated consent of the Kádárist government. Finally, during the late Kadar era (in 1984), the Open Society Foundation of George Soros began its operations in Budapest as a joint enterprise with the Hungarian Academy of Science. Its program proposed support for different forms of intellectual creativity, publications, and exchange for academics, artists, freelance intellectuals, and research institutions. Over 3200 Hungarians could benefit from Open Society scholarships for research stays in the West at large, including Western Europe. This was by far the most comprehensive scheme to support transnational intellectual mobility in the country. Thanks to a systematically respected policy of politically neutral selections of beneficiaries, the grants were awarded to members of the anti-regime opposition as well as to other students, graduates, and academics, including many members of the present government (as of 2020). In this way, the Soros Foundation contributed to both

the fall of Communism in Hungary and the modernist opening of the scientific horizon to productive intellectuals in the country.

By the 1980s this process of readmission, promotion, and controlled Westernization of the Hungarian social sciences attained a level close to what could be considered normal in a truly open society. Disregarding certain topical taboos—such as the ties with the Soviet Union, the qualification of the 1956 uprising, or the state of political democracy in the country—social scientists could almost as freely choose their research topics, study partners (including Western ones), and methods of investigation as their Western counterparts. The level of Westernization, achieved gradually by social scientists since the early 1960s, can be equated with an intellectual revolution of sorts under communism. The social disciplines in Hungary were able to accomplish a nearly full conversion from "mimicry institutions" (Koleva 2018: 120), typical of the Soviet Union and some other "people's democracies," into Western-type scholarly establishments. The official "Soviet Sociological Association" for "concrete research," (Keen and Mucha 2003: 10) put up from nil already in 1958 to send delegates to the world conference of the ISA (International Sociological Association) in Stresa (1959), appears to have been mostly in charge of an "ideological offensive on the field of international science." (Voříšek 2008: 89) While several other similar agencies in Sovietized countries acted under full Party command in support of the Soviet camp in the ideological war waged against Western capitalism (Batygin and Deviatko 1994: 17), their Hungarian counterpart obtained considerable funding and a large degree of (even if not complete) professional autonomy. Though the Party hierarchy, flexibly represented by György Aczél, who was in charge of cultural matters in the Central Committee of the Communist Party, did not abstain from setting preferences and sometimes even privileged targets for research, this was accompanied by rather generous subsidies and funding schemes. The latter, by the 1980s (with the "OTKA program" since 1986), followed almost avowedly Western patterns of project-based support for research.

Still, the stress here must be laid on "almost." The surveillance of intellectuals of all standings and levels never ceased before 1989 via informers of the political police. Hungarian scholars invited to the West (or only meeting or corresponding with Western visitors) had to report on their contacts to their superiors. Marxism-Leninism continued to be taught in mandatory courses in every study track of higher education. Russian was the first language (mostly the only one) in the curriculum of secondary education. In the final years of communism, this led to a quasi-generalization of "double talk," typical in the party hierarchy, within circles of the social sciences and beyond. In written and any other public discourse, the official Party line on political, ideological and intellectual matters was formally kept up or at least paid lip service. In personal interactions, on the contrary, officials did their best to display their openness to the West, telling anti-regime jokes and affording to be ironic about local affairs or those in other "socialist" states. The rigid observance of the Soviet Party line in "Democratic Germany" (GDR) – in sharp contrast to Hungarian habits – or the Romanian misery under "the Genius of the Carpathians" were particularly targeted in political jokes or lived experiences narrated in Hungary in late socialist times.

In 1989 Hungary achieved a "negotiated revolution" of sorts and a smooth transition to Western-style democracy. The space is lacking here to give a detailed report on the further development of the SSH in the last quarter of a century, marked by two major turning points. First in 2004, the country joined the European Union. By this time, its scholarly establishment was eligible to benefit from European research support schemes. The Hungarian human and social sciences, like all other intellectual, economic, and other activity sectors of the country, appeared to be re-anchored to the Western hemisphere. Second, since 2010, the new government under Viktor Orbán embarked on a self-

proclaimed "illiberal" and nationalist (in many senses, truly "reactionary") science policy, recalling interwar and communist practices. Among other things, political discrimination in academic appointments and in the distribution of research funds has progressively been reintroduced, much as it had been in earlier authoritarian regimes. Recently this policy has culminated in open attacks against independent civil society institutions supported by Western sponsors. This is a way to put at risk their continued operation and even challenge the survival of the Central European University (CEU), well known worldwide. The CEU, which was founded and generously endowed in 1991 by George Soros, has been forced as of 2019/2020 to expatriate to Vienna the majority of its teaching programs, all those accredited in the United States. Via a new academic law, the Academy of Science has also been deprived of its network of research institutions, taken over by a special state agency in 2019. At the same time, gender studies was forbidden to be taught in Hungarian higher education. Such assaults on academic freedom have already aroused countrywide and international protests. Indeed, the CEU has become the leading academic center for teaching and research in social studies in the entire post-Soviet area, hosting among other assets the best international library in social disciplines in a formerly communist country.

STATISTICAL INDICATORS

Following this historical overview of the intellectual "ferryboat" between East and West, as Hungary was described in the early twentieth century by the visionary poet Endre Ady, let us now turn to a concise set of quantified data illustrating the changing impact of foreign scholarship in the Hungarian field of human and social studies. This concerns sensitive issues of the Bolshevik attempt at Russian intellectual colonization, the attenuation of dogmatic Stalinist repression and the progressive Westernization under constraint in communist times, followed by the sudden and unforeseen emancipation from heterodox (extra-scientific) coercions after 1989 as well as new forms of state-imposed curbs since 2010.

The set of indices mobilized herewith are grounded on bibliographical data related to a representative sample of publications from the collections of the Budapest Municipal Library, one of the largest in the country and in charge of the bibliography of the human and social sciences since early communist times. This serial indicator of the intellectual relationship with the West and the East covers the long period of 1945–2013 and serves as a proxy, illustrating indirectly an essential aspect of the international orientation of disciplines in social matters in the country. The proxy here consists of the "national" categorization of publications (by original languages) either published in Hungarian translation or received from abroad. Translations appear to be the best approach for illustrating the changing impact of "foreign policies" on the intellectual orientation of social disciplines at large. These publications required heavy investments due to translation costs, hence involving enhanced financial risks in addition to the usual criteria of editorial decisions.

The dynamics of translations clearly illustrate the fate of Western contacts in the social sciences over time, especially over the three (or four) more or less radical turns in the cultural policies of the political regimes observed. In the transition period before 1949, there were very few translations to start with, and their distribution responded to a pattern established during the interwar years with a relative bias toward the German orientation. English and French books appeared in the second rank, with one fifth of all translations, before the modest share (less than one tenth each) of all other categories, including Russian and East European. It can be remarked that translations from French had by that time lost their expected prominence, compared to those from English, as suggested by

the distribution of linguistic competence in the 1941 census mentioned above. This is the reflection of an all-European trend. The advancement of English in intellectual markets was generally observed almost immediately after the victory of the Anglo-Saxon Allies over Nazi Germany.

Table 2: Social science books translated into Hungarian from various languages as received in the Municipal Library of Budapest, selected periods - 1946–2013 (percentages)

	East European	Russian	English	French	German	other	all	N	yearly average (rounded)
1945-1948	9.7	9.7	19.4	19.4	32.3	9.7	100	31	8
1949-1955	14.8	40.6	8.4	5.8	14.8	15.5	100	155	22
1956-1960	17.1	17.1	18.4	15.8	20.3	11.4	100	158	32
1961-1975	17.1	20.5	17.0	10.9	21.3	13.1	100	1978	132
1976-1989	16.1	20.5	19.6	8.6	21.5	13.7	100	2144	153
1990-2005	3.8	1.5	47.6	9.0	22.0	16.2	100	9241	616
2006-2013	4.1	0.8	53.8	6.8	19.0	15.5	100	4738	625

Source: Nagy and Karady 2018, 322.

This situation was turned upside down in the next six years covering the Stalinist rule in Hungary. During this period, the number of translations increased significantly and the absolute majority of translations were made of “socialist” languages. This was the obvious manifestation of the Soviet-Russian effort at cultural colonization, since the growth of translations from other “people’s democracies” lagged behind. Interestingly, translations from German still exceeded those from French or English. However, the latter two were restricted to a minimum, even when compared to those from other languages (mostly Italian and Spanish). This relative prominence of German may be attributed at least in part to East German “socialist” publications. It was actually maintained throughout the entire socialist period and even beyond, to some extent (if compared to translations from French).

The post-1956 period presented a quite different pattern following the progressive but always limited liberalization of cultural exchanges with the West. There was first a real explosion (a multiplication by more than four times) of the yearly number of translations. Second, the proportion of translations from Russian and from other socialist countries decreased considerably – to slightly over one third of all translations. But this proportion was systematically maintained and unchanged until 1989. Otherwise, there were no major changes in the share of other translations, except for the continued loss of weight among French works. The increase in translations from English was visible but also markedly restricted before 1989. It did not attain the share of German works, hinting at the efficient containment by communist editorial decision makers of the ever increasing Anglo-Saxon cultural hegemony, observable elsewhere outside the Sovietized world.

A new situation emerged after the fall of communism in 1989. There is indeed a sharp division between the “before” and “after” periods. Above all, there was an unprecedented increase in the yearly numbers of translations (multiplication by four times), a good illustration of the liberation of publication markets from communist constraints. Even more interestingly, the share of “Eastern” translations collapses at a stretch. Before 1989, one out of four or five of all books dealt with here was

globally translated from Russian, and one sixth or one seventh were translated from other socialist countries, besides those (not distinguished in the data) coming from East Germany. Afterwards these proportions approached nil. Conversely, the share of translations from English expanded suddenly after 1989, so as to reach a proportion close to the majority. The fact that this growth was still not proportionally overwhelming points clearly to the absolute domination achieved by Anglo-Saxon scholarship: Indeed, translations from English were by that time actually much less needed among the targeted readership than translations from other languages, given the multiplication of social science professionals and rank-and-file public officials conversant with English. Other languages were by that time much less practiced by SSH scholars. As stated earlier, German maintained its strong second position over time, while French continues to lose weight gradually. This is a fair reflection of the evolution of intellectual power relations between the two historically major Western civilizations besides the Anglo-Saxons. At the same time, the share of translations from other languages—Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese—has been maintained. This is probably the other side of the coin of English domination and the persistence of a strong German impact via contacts with the vast Germanic intellectual market (including neighboring Austria and Switzerland). Since translations signal the opening of Hungarian social sciences to the West, translations were more and more demanded from hitherto marginal scholarly languages of big Western societies, representing fast expanding intellectual markets, especially in Southern Europe and South America.

In order to specify and counterbalance the previous picture emerging from data on social science books translated into Hungarian, it is worth resorting to another indicator, the "national" references to foreign authors and publications in one of the few "oecumenic" organs of the social sciences, the Hungarian statistical review (*Magyar statisztikai szemle*). This journal displays the additional and quasi-unique characteristic of having almost full continuity in publications since its start in 1923 (except for six months at the end of the Second World War). Unlike the rest of professional journals dating from the pre-socialist regime, this journal escaped closure and blackout, even at the height of the Bolshevik mania of secrecy related to all public information in the 1950s (Péteri 1998: 135-137).

Table 3: National references in the *Hungarian statistical review* at various historical junctures (*percentages*)[5]

	Soviet, Russian, Ukrainian	other East and Central European*	Anglo-American	French	Austrian	German	Italian, Spanish	all	N
1930-39	8.8	31.2	20.0	9.6	7.1	14.4	8.9	100	6085
1940-49	15.3	29.5	18.2	9.1	2.9	16.1	8.9	100	2411
1950-59	32.9	22.7	17.8	6.5	3.0	14.3	2.8	100	2635
1960-69	17.5	27.8	20.6	7.4	4.1	19.0	3.7	100	4327
1970-79	16.0	26.5	18.8	9.4	5.1	20.7	3.5	100	3491
1980-89	14.1	23.5	16.5	9.8	8.4	23.5	4.3	100	3641
1990-90	9.5	25.3	19.5	10.3	9.6	19.6	6.1	100	3171

*Czech, Czechoslovak, Polish, Romanian, Slovakian, Yugoslav.

[5] Self-generating data on "national references" (languages, countries, states) from the digitalized version of the *Review* are available online.

Interestingly enough, when compared to book translations, and even to the language of publications reviewed in the *Statisztikai Szemle* or registered at the library of the Central Statistical Office,[6] the international referential network of the *Szemle* appears to be much more balanced, displaying more continuity in time and much less politically generated biases typical of the different historical periods. It is true, though, that the number of Soviet and associated references reach their apogee in the Stalinist 1950s, while they appear markedly less frequently after the fall of communism. The 1950s represent a low ebb of all other "national" references outside the Soviet realm proper, most likely a sign of the relative self-closure practiced by administrative authorities against anything foreign, except for what emanated from the Soviet center. In this data set there is no sign of Anglo-Saxon domination whatsoever. Curiously, in the 1930s there are many more mentions of Anglo-Saxon statistics than in later decades. References to French remain at the same level throughout (less or around one half of references to Anglo-Saxon matters), while those to German topical areas tend to grow or stagnate at a high level from the 1960s onwards. On the whole, neighboring countries (which became "people's democracies" except Austria) attracted the maximum level of interest from Hungarian statisticians in the journal since (and especially during) the interwar years. The *Szemle*'s policies, as that of an official state publication of the Central Statistical Office subject to strict governmental control, were not aimed at catching up with the latest scholarly innovations (coming mostly from the West), but rather at reporting on data sets produced in or concerning countries with which Hungary was most closely involved economically, politically and culturally, especially with its neighbors and mostly its political allies.

CONCLUSIONS

Given the limited range of this study, its conclusion points to only a few major findings. Following the Stalinist interlude (1948–1956), the Hungarian social sciences saw a self-contained but more or less regular growth in the reception of Western scholarly products—a real move towards restrained "Europeanization." 1989 also constituted a break in this respect. Henceforth, "Westernization" has increasingly meant the dominance of Anglo-Saxon scholarship, besides strong Germanic and weakening French influence. In contrast, Russian and socialist scholarship had a rather restricted impact in Hungary throughout the period, as compared to the effective membership of Hungary in the Soviet political camp. Even under Stalinism, in spite of official endeavors, there are no signs of a Russian intellectual domination comparable to the English one starting after 1989 following various indications. Apparently, the Soviet system represented a weak cultural power, incapable of the intellectual colonization it actually aspired for. The prominence of "Soviet science" was paid lip service to, as an enforced obligation under political duress. It never attained a similar degree of intellectual legitimacy and scholarly strength it had claimed to possess.

[6] Karady 2012, table 1.4.3. Among publications received and discussed in the *Szemle,* books in English represent the largest "national" cluster from the 1960s onwards, only to constitute the absolute majority after 2000.

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Author biography

Victor Karady (1936) is emeritus research director of the French CNRS and distinguished research associate at the Central European University (Vienna-Budapest). He has made a dual career of historical sociologist at the Parisian EHESS and at the CEU with a bibliography of over 360 publications. Among the most recent ones see (with Péter Tibor Nagy), *Sociology in Hungary. A Social, Political and Institutional History*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.

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ARTICLE

Not only scholarships

The Ford Foundation, its material support, and the rise of social research in Poland

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Abstract

This paper deals with the Ford Foundation's support for sociology in Poland, especially with its influence on the development of the social research in this country. It is based on materials from both American and local archives—sources which have never before been combined. The role of the Ford scholarships for Polish scholars is relatively well known, but this paper covers two less known aspects of the Foundation's activity—funding American sociologists' visits to Poland and the material support for local libraries and statistical laboratories. The American visitors were neither numerous, nor was their role particularly significant, except one: Herbert Menzel, who spent almost a year in Poland, helping to spread the know-how of quantitative social research. The Ford Foundation also supported libraries and helped to equip the statistical research lab of the Institute of Sociology of the Polish Academy of Science, tripling the technical base of quantitative social research in this country. Although Polish empirical sociology was successful and Poland became the center of empirical research in Eastern Europe for a while, Poles were hardly able to spread it all over the region on their own, as they were dependent on Western support.

Keywords

Ford Foundation, Cold War, Polish sociology, academic exchange

INTRODUCTION

This paper deals with the Ford Foundation's support for sociology in Poland, especially its influence on the development of quantitative social research in this country. It is based on materials from both the Ford Foundation Archive, available at the Rockefeller Archive Center, as well as local archives—sources which have never been combined or confronted before. The role of the Ford Foundation as an institution, which offered Polish scholars a chance to visit the USA, has already been discussed in a few papers and a book (Sułek 2011; Czernecki 2013; Kilias 2017: 70-94). Here I would like to deal with a lesser known aspect of the Foundation's activity: visits of American sociologists in Poland and the material support that played quite a substantial role in the development of Polish social research.

The Ford Foundation started its Polish activity shortly after the anti-Stalinist political thaw of the 1956 in the country became visible. Besides humanitarian motives, political reasons of this act were rather obvious. An independent foundation (at least nominally) was an excellent instrument to add some carrot to the stick—up to that day a sole instrument of American politics towards Communist countries. Academic exchange could also help the new style of propaganda, which relied more on exhibiting the quality of everyday American life, rather than on ideological principles (Reid 2010). In the interwar period, the idée fixe of the Rockefeller Foundation was spreading (American) empirical social science in Europe (Fleck 2011: 39-110). After the Second World War that goal remained important, although it lost some of its prominence and became a new ideological shade, with empirical research serving as a supposed antidote to dogmatic Marxism.

Although the scale of the Ford Foundation's Polish program was limited, compared even to its relatively modest European activities (cf. Sutton 1998), it was one of the two largest Polish-American academic exchange schemes of the period. The second one, the scholarships offered by the Rockefeller Foundation, focused primarily on medicine and agriculture and had no impact on social science and humanities.[1] The Ford Foundation program, which started in 1957, consisted of four grants used mostly to finance the academic travels of Polish scholars who wished to visit Western academic institutions. It dealt not only with the United States, but also with Great Britain, France, Germany, and a few other countries. Sociologists participated only in the first three, although a few political scientists went to Germany. Overall, the Polish-American exchange was the largest and the most important one.

The Foundation chose eligible candidates by sending selection teams to Poland. Candidates were nominated by the Ford Foundation's experts and informants (including emigrated and local-based Polish scholars and intellectuals, particularly alumni) and the Polish Ministry of Higher Education. The final selection was made by the Ford Foundation. The New York-based Institute of International Education (IIE) handled the logistics of the exchange program by managing the visas and making travel arrangements. Most importantly, the IIE arranged the academic programs of the visits, suggesting (or selecting) host institutions for the incoming fellows.

The relationship between Polish government officials and the Ford Foundation officers was by no means an easy one. Already in 1959 the Polish authorities started to express their dissatisfaction with the selection procedure and demanded more influence on the selection of candidates. Furthermore, they insisted that the program have a strictly academic orientation, which also included people from fields such as literature or journalism. In addition, Polish officials insisted on more travel opportunities for natural scientists and engineers, whom they considered more important than the social scientists. That disagreement was declared as an official reason for the Ford Foundation freezing the scholarships and ceasing to send selection missions starting in 1962. Still, this was probably not the only (or the real) reason for this decision. At the same time, much to the Poles' surprise, the Rockefeller Foundation also stopped offering its scholarships, even though its cooperation with Polish officials was free of tension, at least in the perspective of their Polish counterparts.[2] The fact that the end of the project correlated with the deterioration of American-Polish political relations, including the introduction of limited economic sanctions (Jasiński 2003: 172), along with certain statements of the Ford Foundation staff members, suggest that it was

[1] Summary of the State Department's List of Exchanges with Poland, November 10, 1960, RAC: FF, Log File 57-477, L-33.

[2] Notes on the cooperation with the Rockefeller Foundation, August 1, 1963 and September 1961, CAMR: MHE; Note on the international exchange, July, 1960, CAMR: CK PUWR.

closed due to its role as an element of a carrot-and-stick policy—the role it had obviously played from the very beginning.[3] This did not stop the visits of already selected scholars, who were not able (or were not allowed by the authorities) to travel to the United States earlier. Moreover, the program was revived, albeit on a more limited scale, in 1967.

ACADEMIC EXCHANGE AND THE RISE OF POLISH SOCIOLOGY

The Ford Foundation's involvement in Poland coincided with an important stage in the development of Polish sociology. This social science branch survived the Stalinist period in a better condition than most of the social sciences in other Socialist countries (Voříšek 2012). Although sociology was officially ousted from academic institutions, most sociologists stayed at universities and were even able to continue their scholarly activities. Still, in the early 1950s the country had been culturally isolated, and most institutional relations with the international social science had been curtailed. After 1956 the reconstruction began almost immediately. Sociology returned to universities, among which Warsaw and Łódź were the most important ones, and an entirely new research institution, the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology at the Polish Academy of Sciences (IFiS PAN), was created. In 1957 a national sociological association was formed, which was immediately allowed to join the International Sociological Association (to which Poland belonged since its founding in 1949). Polish social sciences of the post-Stalinist period were formed on a pluralistic base, including younger Marxists and older non-Marxists as well (in fact, some belonged to the same generation as their Communist counterparts), working together and forced to cooperate rather than compete at the same academic institutions (Kraśko 1996: 151–231; Bucholc 2016). Unfortunately, enthusiasm and a widened range of academic freedom coexisted with economic limitations and bureaucratic obstacles, impeding building and maintaining international relations, which resulted from extreme centralization of the academic system (Pleskot 2010; more in: Kilias 2017: 61–69).

The Ford Foundation played an important role in the revival of Polish sociology, enabling most leading scholars to go West, take a look around, and establish international contacts. Although sociology was a core element of the postwar American "empirical social research" package (e.g. Thue 2006), no explicit emphasis seemed to be placed on that social science branch.[4] It seems that the prominent position of sociology was the result of a few personal contacts, especially those of Stanisław Ossowski, a sociology professor at the Faculty of Philosophy, Warsaw University. Not only did he participate in the establishment of the International Sociological Association and was elected its Executive Committee member in 1949, but he had also been able to maintain at least some contacts with the West.[5] Later on, Julian Hochfeld, also a sociology professor at Warsaw University and a leading figure of Polish Marxist sociology, became another respected partner and informant of Shepard Stone, the architect of the Ford Foundation's Polish program. Sociologists were so overrepresented among the first echelons of Ford fellows that the selection mission sent to

[3] Waldemar A. Nielsen, in his note to Shepard Stone from September 27, 1961, mentioned the Cuban and Berlin crises, suggesting that the Ford Foundation should not give the illusion that the duplicit politics of Gomułka and Tito would go unpunished and that an attempt to join a possible aggression against the West (sic) would go unpunished (RAC: FF, unpublished report 010738, pp. 3-4).

[4] Shepard Stone, report of the recruitment team visit, June 9, 1957, RAC: FF: Log File 57-477, L-32.

[5] Letters from Stanisław Ossowski to Erik Rinde and Tom Bottomore, Executive Secretaries of the ISA, 1952, 1955-1956, IISH: ISA, File 392.

Poland in 1960 was suggested to give priority to other branches: "There is an impression that most of the capable sociologists (especially those in the sociology of law) have been selected, and therefore no stress is needed."[6]

In theory, the Ford Foundation financed academic exchange in both directions, but the interest of Americans in visiting Poland was limited, and the total number of visiting scholars did not exceed 25.[7] Among them were three sociologists, a ratio that more or less corresponded with the proportion of sociologists in the group of Polish scholars traveling abroad. The first American sociologist who visited Poland on behalf of the Ford Foundation was Paul F. Lazarsfeld, one of the most active proponents of a new survey-based American sociology in Europe (Thue 2006: 251–294). He came there as a research consultant invited by the Polish Academy of Sciences. His stay was a part of a short Central-East European trip, which started in Paris and included Warsaw and Vienna. Lazarsfeld came to Warsaw on January 25, 1958 and left on February 15, spending most of that time on casual conversations with Polish scholars, although he also gave a lecture on American sociological schools at the Polish Sociological Association.[8] In fact, it was just the first of his countless visits to Poland, and the second was already at a UNESCO seminar in September that year.[9] Lazarsfeld not only wrote a detailed report on the Polish social science, but also continued to be involved in the Ford Foundation's Polish program, helping to organize personal and material assistance for empirical social research in Poland.

Another American sociologist spent a bit more time in Poland, although his stay was less working task-oriented and he did not collaborate with the Ford Foundation any closer. That visitor was Seymour M. Lipset from the University of California, Berkeley. Arranging his visit took an exceptionally long time. In 1958 he received an invitation from Nina Assorodobraj-Kula, the dean of the Philosophical Faculty at Warsaw University, which included a suggestion that he should turn to the Ford Foundation for financial support. Lipset did so by writing to Francis X. Sutton, whom he knew personally. Sutton, in turn, forwarded his request to respective Ford officials. Lipset's request was also backed by another influential Warsaw sociologist, Ossowski. In June 1958, Stanley T. Gordon, who was responsible for the Foundation's Polish program, informed Lipset about their positive decision, suggesting that he contacts the Institute of International Education, which was organizing all American scholarships financed by the Ford Foundation. Lipset corresponded with Jane Addams from the Institute for some time, mostly discussing the compensation of his earnings, which would be lost due to the reduced salary he would receive while being absent during his travels. The message that the Foundation was ready to cover his costs did not seem to reach him in time. As a result, in the fall of 1959 Shepard Stone received disappointed letters from Ossowski and Hochfeld, who had both hoped that the American would visit Poland immediately after the 1959 International Sociological Congress in Milan and Stresa. Lipset finally arrived in Poland in the

[6] Background and Guidelines for 1961 Team, February 9, 1961, p. 7, RAC: FF: grant 57-322, reel 2518.

[7] Attractiveness of Poland as a destination among American scholars seemed rather limited, as shown by the reasons of their rejection of travel proposals. Clyde Klukhohn explained the cancellation of his travel in the fall of 1960 with the need to speak out before the Federal Court on behalf of the Navajo Indians, while Hanan Selvin explained his rejection of a four-month stay proposal by pointing to his plan to undergo psychotherapy. (Memorandum of Anita McGrath, IIE, May 19, 1960 with a copy of the Clyde Kluckohn's letter, RAC: FF, grant 57-322, reel 2521; Hanan Selvin's letter to Stanley T. Gordon, April 19, 1959, RAC: FF, grant 58-103, reel 0536).

[8] Minutes from the General Board PSA, November 6, 1958; travel record and report *Social Research in Poland* RAC: FF, grant 57-322, reel 2521.

[9] A few French scholars, including Jean Stoetzel, also took a part in the seminar (Sobczak 1999: 67).

spring of 1961 and spent two months there, giving lectures at the Polish Sociological Association meetings in Warsaw and Łódź, the two main sociological centers of 1960s Poland.[10]

The third sociologist and the most consequential Ford Fellow who visited Poland was Herbert Menzel, a former student and an associate of Paul Lazarsfeld from the Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University. The very idea of sending someone to Poland for a long-term visit came from Lazarsfeld, who felt the need to carry on his support for Polish social research and persuaded Gordon to take up this idea. As he wrote: "It might very well be that a younger American resident would be a great moral help to the Polish sociologist. For quite a while, as you know, it was my opinion that such a move might be more important than shorter visits of older dignitaries."[11] Initially the idea of sending Bernard Rosenberg was discussed, but at the turn of 1959 two final candidates emerged: Hanan C. Selvin and Herbert Menzel. Both were former students of Lazarsfeld. The latter was considered the best candidate, as he had a broader international outlook and spoke not only German, but also Czech, a Slavonic language closest to Polish, due to his Bohemian origin. Moreover, he was determined to learn Polish. His former teacher noticed an additional asset: "Incidentally, Menzel's wife Rose is also a trained research technician. As you know, quite a number of Polish women work in this field and a female advisor might be a social asset."[12]

For some time both candidates were in play, but in the summer of 1960 the Ford Foundation, the Institute of International Education, and the fellow-to-be started to negotiate. After they settled the terms and conditions of his stay, Menzel was granted the fellowship. Stefan Nowak, a younger generation Polish scholar who was just becoming one of the leading figures of Polish social research and who knew Menzel from the time of his stay in New York, helped him to obtain two formal invitation letters. One came from Ossowski and the second from Anna Pawełczyńska, deputy director of the Center for Public Opinion Research (OBOP), a research institute affiliated at that time with the State Committee for Broadcast and Television. The latter expected him to serve as a consultant to her research teams. Further preparations went smoothly and Menzel arrived in Poland in February 1961. He not only worked at the OBOP, but also held a seminar on the relation between social theory and social research at Warsaw University. His stay turned out to be a great success.

Although it had been planned for only one semester, Menzel asked the Ford Foundation for an extension in April 1961. In May, Stone and Gordon started to receive letters from various Polish scholars and authorities who asked for the continuation of Menzel's stay. One was written in the name of all sociology professors of the Warsaw University's Faculty of Philosophy and signed by Hochfeld, another by Pawełczyńska from OBOP, and one even by Bohdan Bednarski of the Society for Conscious Maternity, a non-government organization that promoted birth control and sex education. Andrzej Siciński, deputy director of the OBOP, declared his readiness to pay Menzel a

[10] Correspondence of Seymour M. Lipset, Stanisław Ossowski and Julian Hochfeld, FF and IIE officers on Lipset's travel to Warsaw, 1958-1961, RAC: FF, grant 57-322, reel 2521; Annual Report of the General Board of the Polish Sociological Association for the year 1961, pp. 4 and 6, PSA. Initially the American scholar had also planned to visit Yugoslavia, but due to his wife's bad health he had to shorten his trip.

[11] Letter to Stanley T. Gordon from January 19, 1960, RAC: FF, grant 57-322, reel 2521.

[12] Ibidem; Roslyn Menzel had to leave her part-time job and was not receiving any salary in Poland. It is worth noting that the Warsaw stay ended with the Menzels' divorce, due to his romantic affair with a Polish sociologist, Janina Markiewicz-Lagneau.

regular salary, which was unusual for Polish academic and research institutions of the period.[13] On May 11, Gordon sent Menzel a positive answer, and after the summer holidays the scholar came back to work at OBOP and Warsaw University, staying in Warsaw until January. To do so, he supposedly had to reject a profitable proposal from the National Science Foundation. As usual, he had a lecture at the Polish Sociological Association's meeting, this time only at its Łódź regional branch. Or maybe he had lived in Warsaw so long that his presence was perceived as routine and did not even need to be documented.[14]

The one-year stay of Herbert Menzel was an exceptional episode in the history of Polish sociology, as he was the only Western scholar who stayed there that long and was involved in routine University teaching and consulting for Polish researchers. Although he was a less prominent figure than other academic travelers who visited Poland, he actually offered practical know-how in social research, so that his influence was probably greater than expected. Information on Menzel even reached the highest Party authorities. In his July 1963 speech before the XIII Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the ruling Polish United Workers' Party Meeting, First Secretary Władysław Gomułka considered Menzel's employment an (additional) reason for criticizing the OBOP and Party scholars for their lack of attentiveness (Sobczak 1999: 67). Menzel himself hoped that his familiarity with Polish affairs could be useful to the Ford Foundation's Polish scholarship program. Unfortunately, factors beyond his control prevented the use of his expertise to advance American-Polish relations in sociology. Still, the scholar resorted to the Foundation's financial support once again in 1970, when they covered the cost of his travel from Oslo, where he was serving as a visiting professor, to Warsaw, where he arrived at the invitation of the Polish Sociological Association.[15]

Other forms of financial and material support

The Ford Foundation's Polish program consisted not only of the academic exchange. The Foundation's grants were also used to sponsor, usually with relatively small amounts, various cultural and academic projects (and to cover the costs of individuals visiting from the participating countries). The most important one was the Polish-American Round Table Conference on international politics in Jabłonna, a Polish Academy of Sciences resort, in 1962. The event organized exclusively by the Ford Foundation cost slightly less than 16,000 USD.[16]

[13] The main obstacles to maintaining the Polish institutions' international relations with Western partners were administrative and economic ones. Apart from the fact that the Polish currency was not convertible, there was a chronic lack of financial means, especially of convertible currency, which was always in short supply. The official answer for this problem was a thorough bureaucratic centralization and an official "free rider" policy, which relied on the financial support of Western partners. As it was officially forbidden to cover any foreign visitors' expenses, one needed a special exception granted by the Deputy Prime Minister to even pay for a foreign scholar invited to a conference in Poland (see: Kilias 2017: 61-69)!

[14] Correspondence regarding Herbert Menzel 1960-1962, RAC: FF, grant 57-322, reel 2521; Annual Report of the General Board of the Polish Sociological Association for the year 1961, p. 6, PSA.

[15] They did so not without hesitation. On the one hand, the cost – plane tickets only – was negligible. On the other hand, Stanley T. Gordon, who was obviously not familiar enough with Polish conditions despite his previous experience, believed that the Poles would be ready to cover it. Furthermore, Menzel would go to Poland even at his own expense (memorandum for Howard Swearer from October 24, 1969, RAC: FF, grant 57-322, reel 2521).

[16] IIE report from June 1962 brings up the cost of 22,000 dollars, but later documents declare the amount mentioned in the text above (RAC: FF, grant 57-322, reel 2517).

Apart from scholarships and additional projects, a special grant was provided for material assistance. It first covered the support for Polish academic libraries. As an operator, Ford officers selected a humanitarian organization CARE (the meaning of the acronym changed over time, and at the turn of 1950s, it was Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere) as an experienced and flexible organizer of such international missions. CARE was to purchase scholarly books, mainly from the humanities (especially English studies) and social sciences, and possibly also research equipment. The support for libraries started in the spring of 1958 and lasted until the end of 1960. Polish libraries received books worth 48,900 dollars. A substantial part, about 15–17%, was delivered to academic institutions involved in social research and teaching sociology. Among those who received the most substantial support were the Chair of General Ethnography and Sociology at Jagiellonian University in Cracow (for publications that totaled 2,300 dollars) and sociology chairs of the Łódź University (for books and journals with a total cost of nearly 1,700 dollars). Other beneficiaries were sociological libraries of the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań, as well as the Universities of Wrocław and Warsaw and the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences (IFiS PAN).[17] The eventual number of publications received is hard to assess. The first shipment of books for Polish universities, which arrived in March 1958, supposedly contained about 1,200 books.[18] Only 37 items are mentioned in a list describing the publications received by the Philosophical Faculty at Warsaw University in March 1958, which had an estimated value of 510 USD. Another undated, and probably incomplete, list of publications received by the IFiS PAN includes 97 book and journal items.[19]

Apart from books, the material support grant provided main academic libraries with microfilm cameras, microfilm viewers, and a laminator. Two pieces of research equipment were considered: a psychometric test set for the Psychometric Laboratory of the Polish Academy of Sciences, led by Mieczysław Choynacki, and equipment for statistical analysis for the IFiS PAN. It seems that only the second one was actually purchased. The staff of the IFiS PAN's Sociological Research Section most likely came up with the idea to ask the Ford Foundation for material support in the spring of 1957. Their request to buy the equipment for statistical analysis obviously did not reach the American addressees or did not stir their interest.[20] Meanwhile, IFiS PAN acquired a keypunch and a sorter, thanks to financial aid from UNESCO, which by no means satisfied their needs. In November 1958 Jan Szczepański, deputy director of the Institute, once again turned to the Ford Foundation, writing a letter to Shepard Stone and asking him to fund a second keypunch and punched card

[17] Data are from CARE reports from January and December 1960, which do not relate to the publications expedited to libraries, but only to the CARE costs, including administrative fees of the 9% value of the books (RAC: FF, grant 58-103, reel 0536). On this basis I have estimated the value of the literature provided. The problematical aspects of these estimates is the terminology used and numerous mistakes in the names of Polish academic institutions. The reports used such terms as "Institute" or "Department of Sociology," although no such units existed in the university structures of the period. The January report mentioned "Warsaw University, Philosophical Faculty," "Warsaw University, Department of Sociology," and "Warsaw University" twice, without any further specification. The first of the abovementioned institutions is without a doubt the Faculty of Philosophy, Warsaw University (List 206, WUA: BIR 54), but the second, and probably the others, refers to IFiS PAN, which also received the books purchased by CARE with the means provided by the Ford Foundation (lists 206J, 206L i 206M, which were not specified in the list of donations available at the Warsaw University archive).

[18] Alfons Klafkowski, rector of the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań, letter to Stanisław Turski, rector of the Warsaw University from March 18, 1958 (WUA: BIR 54).

[19] WUA: BIR 54; PANA: IFiS PAN 100.

[20] Adam Sarapata, letter to Witold Leszczyński from May 25, 1957 (PANA: IFiS PAN 100).

checker, which would ease the work of the Łódź-based scholars.[21] In the spring of 1959, the issue was taken up by Paul Lazarsfeld, who suggested that Stefan Nowak, at that time a Ford Foundation fellow at Columbia University, prepare a financially feasible request for processing and analyzing statistical data equipment. Nowak presented a memorandum, which became a starting point for the next steps of the Foundation. He proposed to establish a computing center for the Sociology Chair, Faculty of Philosophy, Warsaw University, which would also serve all other researchers. Equipping the center with the IBM 101 computer would be ideal, but considering its 24,000 dollar price tag, the bare minimum would be two numerical keypunches, two fast counting sorters, and two desk calculators. The set should also include a copier to enable printing smaller questionnaires.

The Ford Foundation officers provisionally accepted Nowak's minimum proposal, and the task to purchase, deliver, and install was once again assigned to CARE. At that time Stanley T. Gordon had two concerns. The first one was the selection, arrangement of the purchase, and installation of the equipment set, which would be the least expensive, but could satisfy the Polish needs. The second one was overcoming the particularisms of its future users. Not only were there two sociology chairs at the Warsaw University's Faculty of Philosophy, one held by Marxist Julian Hochfeld and the second one by non-Marxist Ossowski, but there was also the IFiS PAN with its Vice Director Jan Szczepański, a non-Marxist yet an influential public figure and a personal friend of a few high-ranking Party functionaries (cf. his personal diary: Szczepański 2013). Szczepański not only acted on behalf of his own institute, which ran large research programs, but also insisted on additional material support for Łódź University, at that time the second most important sociological center in the country. Yet the Americans were not willing to support all individual research units. Consequently, Gordon tried to cope with the institutional particularisms (and possibly personal dislike) of the Poles by writing two identical letters, in which he informed Szczepański and Ossowski about the issue and his decision. Both accepted the proposal, and the former repeated his request for an additional set for the Łódź center.

As both Polish scholars informed Gordon, they were not able to meet and set up an agreement, first due to Szczepański's travel to Yugoslavia and later due to another, unknown reason. Consequently, Gordon had to ask Nowak, who was soon to leave for Poland, to organize their meeting. The Polish sociologist hoped to arrange it at the coming International Sociological Congress in Milan and Stresa.[22] Having consulted IBM employees, Nowak also specified the required equipment, once again presenting two variants, with and without the IBM 101. According to his estimates, the equipment would respectively cost 39,800 dollars or less than 22,800 dollars.[23]

When informed about the possibility of receiving new equipment, the Secretary Office of the Polish Academy of Sciences obliged itself to provide locum and trained personnel in January 1959.[24] On

[21] RAC: FF, grant 58-103, reel 0536. Computing equipment at the time used mechanical data recording in the form of holes in punched cards, which were sorted according the data values recorded and counted in electromechanical counters. The question of UNESCO's role in the purchase of statistical data processing equipment remains somewhat unclear: In 1959 (i.e. *after* the letter Szczepański wrote to the Ford Foundation), the organization provided IFiS PAN a four thousand dollar loan (which would not have been enough to procure a keypunch and a sorter) to buy equipment (PANA: IFiS PAN 100).

[22] In January, Gordon was still asking Ossowski in his letters whether all three had indeed met (memoranda and correspondence of Stanley T. Gordon with Jan Szczepański, Stanisław Ossowski, Stefan Nowak, Paul Lazarsfeld, Howard Powell from CARE and with Jane Addams, November 1958 – January 1959, RAC: FF, grant 58-103, reel 0536).

[23] Stefan Nowak, memorandum from August 15, 1959, RAC: FF, grant 58-103, reel 0536.

[24] Adam Schaff, letter to Stanley T. Gordon from January 29, 1960, RAC: FF, grant 58-103, reel 0536.

the other side of the Atlantic, a discussion continued regarding the equipment to be purchased. At Hanan Selvin's suggestion, some equipment that were, in his opinion, useless were left out while the keypunch selected by Nowak was replaced with a more advanced, albeit more expensive, one. The consultant also pointed out the need to have a card reproducer, without which the research work would have been highly complicated. In his opinion, the proposed set that did not include the IBM 101, without which Polish scholars "could get along for some time" and which in the future could eventually replace one of the sorters, was "close to the workable minimum." It would enable all statistical calculations, although the more complicated calculations would be slower.[25] The final combination included two fast sorters IBM 83, two counters (the total catalogue price of sorters with counters was 13,100 dollars), printing keypunch IBM 26 (3,200 dollars), reproducing punch IBM 514 (which could be also used as a collator—a machine that compares two card decks—at 6,000 dollars) and two electromechanical Friden desk calculators (of an unspecified model, with a total cost of 1,700 dollars). Furthermore, spare parts delivery and funding for personnel training were provided. On behalf of the IFiS PAN, Nowak and Szczepański were responsible for the installation of the equipment in Warsaw.

From that moment on, CARE personnel was responsible for arranging the purchase and installing the equipment, though their work was not without further complications and delays. For the entire month of August 1960, Frank Thomas, the Warsaw representative of the organization, tried in vain to meet with Nowak and Szczepański, even though he was able to meet with the IFiS PAN director Adam Schaff and to inspect the site in which the equipment was to be installed. CARE authorities turned to the American IBM representatives, who suggested that purchasing and transporting the equipment from Europe, where it was produced by IBM's European branches or other companies on contract, would be more practical than the delivery from the United States. The main reason for this change was technical: The European apparatus worked on 220 Volt voltage, while the American one worked on 110 Volt and would therefore require modification or special power suppliers. Another reason was IBM's reluctance to deal with a contractor from behind the Iron Curtain. Although it was not prohibited to export the equipment to Eastern Europe, the company was unwilling to send it there, as it had already lost large amounts of equipment that were confiscated there. Furthermore, the company's official policy forbade sending its employees to Communist countries. Therefore, the German IBM branch was selected to be responsible for the training of Polish personnel; the nearest service center was located there as well. In April the equipment was finally ready, but it turned out that the Poles could not find competent operators. Despite Thomas's proposal to postpone the delivery until Polish personnel were trained, Shepard Stone and Robert J. Cowan, section manager of the purchase department at the New York CARE center, decided on April 20, 1961 to deliver it immediately and store it under the supervision of the Warsaw CARE representative until Polish personnel were trained.[26]

From its installation in 1961 until March 1962, the apparatus purchased by the Ford Foundation was used to analyze data from 45 research projects, often working on two shifts and processing information from approximately 116,000 punched cards. Its computing power was used by the IFiS PAN, sociology chairs at the Warsaw and Łódź Universities, the OBOP, and a few other academic and research institutes. Unfortunately, it turned out that in a given configuration the machinery

[25] Hanan Selvin, letter to Stanley T. Gordon from April 19, 1959, p. 2 (RAC: FF, grant 58-103, reel 0536).

[26] Adam Schaff, letter to Frank Thomas, March 19, 1962; Memoranda and correspondence of Robert J. Cowan, Stanley T. Gordon, Stanisław Ossowski, Adam Schaff and Shepard Stone, May 1960 - March 1963, RAC: FF: grant 58-103, reel 0536.

did not work effectively enough. Due to their imprecise technical specifications, the counters were too slow. For that reason, Adam Schaff asked the CARE representative to purchase new ones, costing 2,000 dollars each, which would work better with fast IBM 83 sorters. The Americans did so, despite the barely concealed irritation of Stanley T. Gordon, who told the IFiS PAN director that he "hoped perhaps the Polish Government might be able to make a small investment rather than request an additional grant from The Ford Foundation." Nonetheless, Schaff's wish came true, and at the beginning of 1963, new counters arrived in Warsaw.[27]

VISITING SCHOLARS, MATERIAL SUPPORT, AND SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH IN POLAND: A PROVISIONAL ASSESSMENT

The overall influence of the Ford Foundation's activities on Polish science, art, and humanities is hard to assess, but its considerable effect on the development of sociology seems evident. As for their best-known program, scholarships for local sociologists, the Ford Foundation sent 19 scholars to the United States and six scholars to Western Europe at the turn of the 1950s to the early 1960s. The numbers do not seem impressive, but one should remember the small scale of Polish sociology at the time and the concentration of sociologists' travels in the first two years of the program. According to the ministerial data, among the 15 sociologists employed at universities (i.e., except those who worked at the Academy of Sciences) who benefited from long-term scholarships abroad, 11 were Ford Foundation fellows, two received stipends from the French government, and only one scholar's trip was financed by the Ministry.[28] In such circumstances, the impact of scholarships must have been significant. This was also a critical moment in the development of this social science branch in Poland, when international contacts were most needed and their impact most noticeable. The elite (and elite-to-be) of Polish sociology had a chance to catch up with modern, mostly American social science. Especially in the case of the generation educated during the 1950s in the isolated country, the knowledge of Western social science could only be indirect and superficial. Thanks to unlimited access to literature in well-equipped academic libraries and direct contacts with leading American scholars, the Ford stipends gave at least some of them access to firsthand, up-to-date knowledge. Their visits also enabled them to build networks of international connections, mostly with American scholars who were interested in Polish social science. The existence of such networks turned out to be extremely useful after the cancellation of the exchange program, giving Polish scholars access to information about other scholarships, conferences, and congresses, which they were able to use themselves or pass on to their students. Some had a chance to teach at Western universities, which was highly attractive not only due to the purely scholarly value of working abroad, but also due to high black-market value of exchangeable currencies and access to goods that were unavailable in Communist Poland.

To illustrate the impact of the Ford scholarships, one may look at the members of the Polish sociological elite of the 1960s. Among seven authors who published at least 10 papers in Polish sociological flagship journals, *Studia Socjologiczne* and *Kultura i Społeczeństwo*, during the 1959–1970 period, there were four Ford fellows. Among 26 members of the General Board of the Polish

[27] Stanley T. Gordon, a note from March 22, 1962 and letter to Frank Thomas from March 1, 1963 (both in: RAC: FF, grant 58-103, reel 0536).

[28] List of persons who attended long-term scholarships abroad in 1958-1960, CAMR, MHE 2738 and 2739 and WUA, BIC 17.

Sociological Association between 1959 and 1970, there were 14 scholars who had travelled abroad thanks to the Ford scholarships.[29] It is irrelevant whether the Americans selected the most talented scholars whose excellence was enhanced by the visits abroad, or whether the Ford scholarships simply helped the fellows gain recognition from the local scholarly community. Whatever the reason, the data confirm that the Ford program had a noticeable influence on the Polish sociological elite.

As I noted previously, the variety of reasons that motivated the Ford Foundation officials to start the academic exchange with Poland included the idea of spreading truly empirical social research, which had already inspired the American support of European social science in the interwar period. This idea possibly played a less important role than before, but after the Second World War the Americans had an empirical research technique, methodology, and theoretical background of their own: survey research coupled with neopositivist methodology and social psychology as the main explanatory device. The survey research was neither an exclusive nor even a dominant interest of the Polish scholars visiting the United States, but most of them were impressed by the enormous progress of American social research. Possibly the greatest enthusiast and promoter of empirical social research was a scholar from the older generation, Jan Szczepański, who was to become a leader of several large research programs in the 1960s and 1970s. A few influential individuals indeed focused on the methodology of survey research. One of them was Stefan Nowak, the godfather of the Warsaw school of survey research, who spent eight months working at the Colombia University, partly together with his wife, Irena Nowak. Another expert in survey methodology was Jan Lutyński from Łódź University, who spent six months in the United States, although in his case the host institution was not Lazarsfeld's Columbia University, but rather the University of Chicago.

The role of the American visitors is harder to assess. The number of Ford fellows among sociological visitors of the period was less impressive, not to say marginal.[30] Furthermore, the guests from abroad were academic tourists rather than full-fledged visiting professors. Of course, their visits helped to establish an international network of scholars interested in Polish affairs and local social science and might have helped to boost the self-confidence of Poles as members of the international academic community. Yet their influence on the level of local research or teaching was marginal, compared to the role played by numerous Polish intermediaries who had visited the West, met Western scholars, and read Western literature—and who transmitted the knowledge they had gathered to less internationalized Polish scholars and sociology students. A few of the visitors did influence local social science one way or another, as Paul Lazarsfeld obviously did. He became a frequent visitor who helped to organize research networks from which Polish sociology would profit in later years. There was only one, but highly important, exception to this rule: Herbert Menzel. He was the only visiting professor involved in routine university teaching and the transfer of practical know-how of survey research at an important research institute, the OBOP, working together with and coaching the Polish personnel. His influence was possibly connected to the fact that the Menzels made many friends in Warsaw, and their home became a center of social life within the

[29] Those authors were Jerzy J. Wiatr, Jan Szczepański, Zygmunt Bauman, Aleksander Matejko, Andrzej Siciński, Adam Podgórecki, and Anna Pawełczyńska. The following Ford fellows belonged to the General Board of the Polish Sociological Association: Zygmunt Bauman, Józef Chałasiński, Julian Hochfeld, Antonina Kłoskowska, Jan Lutyński, Stefan Nowak, Stefan Nowakowski, Maria Ossowska, Stanisław Ossowski, Adam Podgórecki, Jan Strzelecki, Jan Szczepański, Włodzimierz Wesołowski, and Janusz Ziółkowski. Jan Turowski was awarded a scholarship, but was not allowed to travel, while Michał Pohoski received his scholarship after 1968.

[30] The influential Polish Sociological Association organized only 16 lectures with Western scholars who visited Poland during the 1957-1961 period, Annual reports of the General Board to the General Assembly 1959–1961, PSA.

local academic community. His involvement in their research training was possibly as important as the transfer of strictly academic knowledge gathered by Polish sociological Ford fellows.

The argument that the Ford Foundation supported a critical stage of development in Polish sociology applies not only to the scholarships, but also to the material support it provided. At first sight, the value of sociological books and journals delivered to Poland does not seem impressive, even when considering the change in purchasing power of the American dollar. In fact, they came shortly after a nearly 20-year period when procurement of Western books had been stopped (or almost stopped)—first because of the war, then because of postwar poverty, and finally due to Stalinist isolationism. Furthermore, science and liberal arts were never a priority of local political elites, which continues to be reflected in the rather pathetic condition of local libraries. Therefore, access to literature has never been an asset of Polish scholars. Although the situation slightly improved in the 1960s and 1970s, it has never been satisfactory, and limited library resources still remain a problem for scholars in this country. No wonder Stefan Nowak declared book donations possibly the most important element of American aid to local social science in Poland.

In terms of quantity, the endowment of the statistical analysis equipment appears to be the Foundation's most fundamental contribution to the development of empirical social research in Poland. Before the American apparatus arrived, Polish researchers had only one sorter (and probably some paraphernalia) in their possession. The instruments provided by CARE and the Ford Foundation enabled them to triple the material base of Polish social research, which was useful for the OBOP, IFiS PAN, and Warsaw and Łódź Universities. The challenge of finding a qualified operator suggests that the American support was the first step toward providing qualified personnel for the equipment (and possibly also with spare parts and technical support). The very fact that all the inventory was purchased with Western aid—a relatively modest help of UNESCO and a more substantial one of the Ford Foundation—suggests that Polish authorities were by no means ready to provide the social scientists with any equipment.

All in all, at the beginning of the 1960s, the Ford Foundation officials believed that Poland was becoming a center from which modern, Western (i.e., American) social research could spread out to the entire region: "It is clear from a number of outside contacts that Poland is becoming a center of objective sociological research for the Eastern Bloc and is now 'exporting' sociological research. Schaff and Szczepański are both pleased about this development, as you might expect."[31] But would it have been possible for a social science so dependent on Western support to actually exert any substantial influence? The supposed center of the nominally Marxist, Eastern European sociology was, of course, the Soviet Union, but it was in fact dispersed and lacked instruments of international coordination comparable to the International Sociological Association (or American foundations). Even though the Soviet center lagged behind the Polish periphery, the vast amount of material resources available to their great rival annoyed social scientists in Poland.[32] Even a cursory look at the material base of Polish social research shows that its leadership did not rest on actual potential, not to mention a political will, which would have been necessary to actually spread the know-how (not to say: hardware) of modern empirical sociology to other Eastern European regions. No wonder that Polish social scientists never developed any systematic activity aiming at that goal, and that Czechoslovakia remained their most important, if not their sole, follower (Kilias 2018, more on: Kilias 2017).

[31] Stanley T. Gordon, note from March 22, 1962, RAC: FF, grant 58-103, reel 0536.

[32] E.g. (Szczepański 2013: 141); Minutes from the General Board PSA, November 11, 1966, p. 5.

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ARTICLE

Why Geography in Poland Has Never Radicalized

Political and International Entanglements of Polish Geography Seen Through the Prism of Antoni Kukliński's Professional Trajectory

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Abstract

This paper deals with the role of social sciences, and more specifically of geography and regional planning, in the legitimization of European integration and neo-liberal economic and social reforms introduced since 1989 in Poland and, more broadly, in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe. Using the example of an intellectual biography of Antoni Kukliński, one of the most prominent Polish geographers, the role of the old intelligentsia elite and its American professional experiences in the evolution of the Polish academia is also analyzed, as well as its involvement in the first non-communist government. The paper also discusses the absence of critical schools within the field of Polish geography as well as other disciplines of social sciences. This is done though the reconstruction of the basic structure of the given academic field and its evolution over time from late communist period to present days. This specific structure of the field of Polish geography, which as it is argued is similar to other fields of social sciences and humanities in Poland, also helps to better contextualize the trajectory of Kukliński.

Keywords

Poland, geography, post-communist social sciences, regional planning, intelligentsia

INTRODUCTION

While this paper will centrally focus on the biography of one eminent Polish geographer, its aim is to also explain the almost complete absence of a "critical" sector (which is inspired by the so-called social theory) in the field of Polish social geography. This will be done by reconstructing the basic structure of the field of geography in postwar Poland and relating it to other parts of the social sciences. This paper will also reconstruct the relation of the given academic field to the broader political and social context. This should allow for interpreting the roots of a specific configuration of the broadly understood social geography in Poland as an academic field. What interests me in this context is the weakness of its autonomous pole, to use Pierre Bourdieu's notion. As a reminder, Bourdieu argued that most social fields, in particular those of the academic disciplines, can be

divided into what he called autonomous and heteronomous parts. They respectively refer to, on the one hand, the sectors which are distanced from the demands of external actors, in particular from politics and economy or more generally the field of power, and on the other hand, the sector which is oriented towards servicing the field of power. This division is reflected in most fields of the social sciences in the form of opposition, which may be framed as the opposition between the "applied" and "critical" schools of respective disciplines (Burawoy 2005). In this paper, I will focus on the autonomous sector of geography, one which in most of the Western countries of the postwar era was first of all represented by the broadly understood human geography (Johnston and Sidaway 2016). Among its more uncompromising and politically engaged currents, one should mention the so-called "critical" and "radical" schools, which crystallized in the late 1960s (Peake and Sheppard 2014). Their main fora included *Antipode: A Journal of Radical Geography,* which was initiated in 1969, and the critical geography journal *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space,* established in 1983. David Harvey can probably be considered the most broadly known critical geographer, and his intellectual trajectory also involved the assumption of politically radical positions at the turn of the 1960s and 1970s (Harvey 2001). What is one of the crucial puzzles of this paper is that such a critical school that is distanced from dominant economic and political interests never fully developed in Poland. Moreover, one can also argue that a similar tendency is characteristic of most of the other social science branches in Poland. None of them developed a fully-fledged counterpart of the "critical" schools that emerged in Western countries since at least the late 1960s. In this paper, I will offer an explanation of that specific development in Polish social geography.

This paper utilizes the Bourdieusian assumption of homology between the fields of the social sciences and humanities and the field of power, and it will argue that this perspective could be applied to the cases of communist and early post-communist Poland as well (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1993). It is based on the case study of an eminent Polish professor of regional economy, the late Antoni Kukliński, who can be considered a representative for the mainstream elite of the field of geography in Poland at the turn of century. Kukliński was born in 1927 in Bydgoszcz in North-Western Poland. In his late years, he was best known as the founding director of the University of Warsaw's European Institute for Regional and Local Development (EUROREG), which was established in 1991. He retired in 1996 but remained very active intellectually, in the institute and beyond, until his death in 2015. Kukliński's biography seems to be a good illustration of the role of the intelligentsia, or the Polish cultural elite (Gella 1976), as the core of the Polish academic elite. As one of the most prominent Polish geographers and at the same time an intelligentsia member involved in the first non-communist government in Poland, his professional trajectory illustrates some of the more general tendencies in the evolution of the Polish field of social sciences, particularly in relation to what can be called, in Bourdieu's terms, the field of power. It also shows the role of the intelligentsia and its changing engagement in the legitimization of the political and economic order. This paper will rely mostly on the published sources on the history of Polish economic and regional geography as well as on the late Antoni Kukliński's career, including some of his unpublished papers, documents, and short unpublished memoirs (Kukliński 2007a and 2007b).

SOCIAL GEOGRAPHY AND THE FIELD OF POWER IN POLAND

Social geography as defined in this paper is a broad field, often known as socio-economic or economic geography, which should be defined in opposition to the other major sector of geography as such, that is, physical or physiography. Socio-economic geography has a complex relationship with several other related academic fields, in particular with economics. Regional science is one major field that

could be seen as an interface of both, originally proposed by Walter Isard in the 1950s. Spatial and regional planning is another one, as it is related to both geography and economics as well as urban planning. In many cases, including the biographies of researchers such as Kukliński, clear disciplinary distinctions are difficult to make, as career trajectories often cross formal institutional borders, and institutional assignments vary across countries and periods. What is important in this context is that these sectors (regional science and regional planning) of the broadly understood field of geography and its adjacent disciplines should be considered its heteronomous sectors. For that reason, although they are currently not the most visible publicly, they constitute an interesting lens for observing the emerging process of the current ideology legitimizing post-communist neo-liberal reforms. Geography as a discipline, rather than playing an essential role in the geopolitical reorientation of the region after the fall of communism, has been marginalized partly as a result of that very reorientation, as it seems. Of course, that marginalization of geography can be linked to a broader argument about the global institutional crisis of the discipline. It was most evident in the United States, where several departments of geography closed down in the 1970s and 1980s (Haigh and Freeman 1982). That trend can also be linked to the neo-liberal turn involving, among others, the gradual weakening of spatial and urban planning and a more general retreat from the statist paradigms, which until the 1960s justified the central role of the state in economic planning (Leszczyński 2017). But the same period witnessed an emergence or consolidation of the more autonomous, often critical currents within social geography, particularly human geography, in several Western countries. In this paper, I will attempt to explain why Poland, while it also witnessed the general decline in the status of geography as such, it did not see the consolidation of its more autonomous or critically oriented sector. This study is thus envisioned, first of all, as a contribution to a wider effort at reconstructing the evolution of social sciences in communist and post-communist Central Europe – in this case, in Poland.

Let me now draw a picture of the configuration of the field of politics as well as the broader field of power in communist and post-communist Poland. I will superimpose it on the configuration of the field of social sciences in given periods to eventually relate it to Kuliński's trajectory. The communist power, which had been established in Poland in 1944/1945, was firmly consolidated in 1948. A symbolic moment in that respect was the unification of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) and the Polish Workers Party (PPR), which merged to become the Polish United Workers Party (PZPR), which was the Polish equivalent of communist parties in other countries of the Soviet bloc. This moment can be considered as the beginning of Stalinism in Poland that lasted until the so-called thaw, which began in 1956. In the academic field, the respective symbolic moments of consolidation of the communist grip on Polish academia took place in 1951, when the First Congress of Polish Science took place, which was followed by the establishment of the Polish Academy of Sciences (PAN). During that period, the political scene was dominated by hardline Stalinists, while academic institutions were controlled by party loyalists. The conservative (that is, non-communists, right wingers) politicians and activists were persecuted, some of them even imprisoned and killed. Those who were not fully loyal to the Communist Party were in rather marginalized positions, with some of them losing their jobs.

This situation changed dramatically around 1956, when the communist regime in Poland liberalized radically, which was quite in opposition to the trajectory of Hungary at the very same time. In effect, what can be called the "enlightened" communist elite ruled the country until 1968. Numerous liberal leftist intelligentsia members rose to the top party positions, often becoming key players in the academic field at the same time. Among them were figures such as philosopher Adam Schaff (1913–2006) and literary scholar Stefan Żółkiewski (1911–1991), who were both members of the central committee of the Communist Party (PZPR) and heads of institutes at the Polish Academy of Sciences.

Stanisław Leszczycki (1907–1996) enjoyed a similarly privileged position in geography. Several scholars were already prominent during the Stalinist period, just as Leszczycki was, but the 1960s appeared to be their truly "golden years." This was a period of relative intellectual freedom and considerable openness of Poland towards Western and, more generally, global contacts. Previously marginalized academics and intellectuals – if they were not publicly challenging the rule of the Communist Party, what was called "socialist values," and Poland's membership in the Soviet bloc – were now allowed to pursue their intellectual passions and often travel abroad. In other words, the period between 1956 and 1968 was a period of relatively intense engagement of the intelligentsia, which included many representatives of its old elite, in the mainstream state-controlled fields of economy, academia, and culture. At the same time, former Stalinists who did not have enough cultural capital to profit from that period moved into the internal and informal opposition within the field of power. This started to change during the second part of the 1960s, when that internal opposition within the Communist Party, mostly centered around officials with weaker intelligentsia credentials, started to challenge the status quo. The tension erupted in March 1968, which can be seen as a crucial turning point in the history of Poland's communist period (Osęka 2019). At that moment, the so-called hardline communists, the faction of the party relying on political rather than on cultural capital and legitimizing itself using the overtly nationalistic discourse, took over. The liberals (both those who were members of the party and its leadership, as well as those who were only benefiting from the liberal climate) were marginalized within, or even pushed outside, the field of power. Some of them were exiled, some moved to internal exile (opposition), and others were relegated to less prominent positions. The sociologist Zygmunt Bauman (1925–2017) is probably the best known of those who were sent into exile in 1968. Adam Michnik (b.1946), who was a student at that time, is the most prominent of those who were forced into internal exile. The fate of Antoni Kukliński, as it will be shown below, can probably be interpreted in terms of marginalization.

In more general terms, the clash of 1968 implied a considerable reconfiguration of the field of power. It was now structured by the opposition between, on the one hand, the hardliners or orthodox communists allied with the so-called "technocrats" or younger, newly educated pragmatists (Eyal, Szelényi, and Townsley 1998), and on the other hand, former communist "liberals," many of whom gradually assumed so-called anti-system or anti-communist stances especially since the mid-1970s and entered a coalition with the Catholic Church and anti-communists conservatives. This division was reinforced during the emergence of the independent "Solidarity" trade union in 1980 and the introduction of the so-called martial law in 1981. An important aspect of the formation of this structure within the field of power was that the anti-communist side, which included a major part of the 1960s liberals, rejected its former left affiliation. This included the renouncement of any references to Marxist theory and criticism of capitalism. Instead, Western market capitalism and its liberal democratic system become an ideal for them to emulate. After the fall of communism, this central cleavage assumed the form of confrontation between the so-called post-communists and the radical liberal reformers (Zarycki 2011).

In a similar, or more precisely, homological way, the field of the social sciences and humanities was structured during the communist period. On the one hand, we could find more "conservative" scholars, who usually displayed stronger loyalty to the Communist Party and at least rhetorical reliance on Marxist ideology. They had, on average, lower cultural capital and tended to be party members. On the other hand, there were the "liberal" scholars who held more distance from the communist ideology and displayed higher levels of openness towards ideas coming from the West. They were quite often intelligentsia members, including those from families with several generations of intelligentsia traditions. In some fields, and in some periods, particularly the 1980s, the most radical

representatives of the "liberal" pole could even assume an anti-communist stance – that is, a openly oppositional political stance. This was, for example, the case of sociology (Bucholc 2016) and history in late communist Poland, although most of the overtly anti-regime historical works were published outside the formal academic system, in the so-called *samizdat* (underground publishing system), or *tamizdat*, the Western-based diaspora-run publishing houses (Behr 2017). This opposition was much less visible in the case of the political sciences, a field that was much less autonomous in relation to the Communist Party and dominated by its loyalists (Warczok and Zarycki 2018). Geography, particularly social and economic geography (which also includes so-called regional planning in the Polish case), was a case in between. Its "liberal" pole was much weaker and less radical if compared to the liberal poles of the fields of sociology or history. Yet the field of geography still enjoyed much more autonomy from the ruling Communist Party in comparison to political sciences, which mostly played an overtly legitimizing function. Thus, it developed the above-mentioned essential opposition in a clear manner, even if not the most radical or strongly politicized.

As several authors have already pointed out, the original intention of the communists when they came to power in 1945 was to radically reform or even partly reinvent higher education and research institutions in Poland (e.g., Connelly 2000, Behr 2017, Zysiak 2016). The new model of academia was supposed to educate a new intellectual elite for the communist country along the lines of Marxist versions of all academic disciplines. At least in Poland, this project proved difficult to implement, first of all given the hegemony of the old intelligentsia elite, which could not be eliminated completely as it was in neighboring countries. The communists attempted to hire and promote mostly those declaring left or communist positions, but even among these academics who were mostly educated in pre-war Poland, class identities proved stronger than political views. In effect, most of the disciplines of the social sciences proved to be dominated, at least intellectually, by representatives of the old intelligentsia families, who were known for generations for their assets of cultural capital. Even young students with non-elite, peasant or working class backgrounds were usually socialized during their university education with this traditional viewpoint and worldviews of the intelligentsia elite. These partly new elites with old identities had respected the rules of the game imposed by the ruling Communist Party. However, many of them used any opportunity to turn towards the West in search of inspiration and new ideas, which was particularly the case after 1956. Thus, the fields of research, development, and planning as well as culture not only gained relative intellectual autonomy after 1956, but also become relatively (according to the standards of the Soviet bloc) internationalized, which allowed many intellectual elites to gain foreign experience. Many of them already had considerable assets of cultural capital inherited from their families, in particular good knowledge of foreign languages and manners, which appeared useful in making friendships with Western scholars.

The 1960s could be thus seen as a period of pronounced intelligentsia domination, at least in the fields of arts, academia, and education. This happened despite the propagation of socialist slogans of the official party ideology and relatively egalitarian policies of the communist state. Nevertheless, a considerable segment of the intelligentsia elite could be seen as dominating the field of power and enjoying numerous privileges. Many members of the party elite, not only its dominant members (e.g., the academic or artistic elite), were in fact of intelligentsia origin. After the war, numerous representatives of the intelligentsia, particularly those with sympathies for the political left, had already joined the new state elites during the first period of their formation, starting in 1944. During the communist period, different factions of the intelligentsia were engaged in politics, academia, or culture with changing intensity. Many got disillusioned with communism sooner (in the mid-1950s) or later (in the late 1970s), and by the mid-1980s, most of their representatives were rather critical of the communist government. Once communism collapsed, these very elites acquired dominant

positions in their respective fields, which could be seen as an aspect of a broader process of consolidation and full institutionalization of what I have called earlier "the intelligentsia hegemony" (Zarycki 2009; Zarycki, Smoczyński, Warczok 2017). At its core is a thesis that the intelligentsia, as the elite of cultural capital, had already become the dominant elite of the newly restored Polish state in 1918. This was the moment when the Polish economic elite lost a large portion of its assets, which were dependent on the economic and legal system of the fallen Russian Empire. The so-called old intelligentsia families were historically often of noble or petty noble, bourgeois origin, although the bourgeoisie were always less numerous in Poland than the nobility (Gella 1976). Unlike in the Soviet Union, when one faction of revolutionary intelligentsia elite transformed itself into what was later called nomenklatura or the political-capital elite, interwar Poland had a social hierarchy with the cultural elite at its top. A part of the very same elite who survived the Second World War formed the backbone of the elite in communist Poland. Even if the Stalinist period saw an attempt to create the Polish equivalent of the nomenklatura, the project appeared to be futile in the long term. This was also the group that was able to take the most advantage of opportunities to participate in academic exchange programs to the West, which started around 1956 (Czernecki 2013, Kilias 2017, Sułek 2010).

These exchanges had some specific, common ideological effects on the academic visitors from Poland. Some studies point to encounters with what could be called early neo-liberal ideology, which were experienced by some of the young economists from Central Europe. This argument was developed by Johanna Bockman and Gil Eyal (Bockman and Eyal 2002), who pointed to the crucial role of the Ford Foundation in that process. As they argued, American involvement in the training of young East Europeans, particularly Polish and Hungarian social scientists, involved an internal Western—or rather, an internal American—confrontation between two camps of social scientists: state interventionists and Keynesians on the one hand; and on the other, free-market, neo-liberally oriented scholars who eventually gained the upper hand. In that process, young scholars from communist countries appeared as useful allies and suppliers of empirical evidence supporting the thesis about the inefficiency of central planning. The visits to the U.S. by several generations of the Polish intelligentsia elite also allowed the Polish academics to shape their idealized image of the West. I am, however, not trying to generalize about specific political effects; rather, I would posit that most of the alumni of these exchanges were strongly impressed by the Westerns standards of living and the academic excellence of the universities they visited. In effect, they gradually saw the West as the only source of the "true modernization." One can speculate that their experiences in exchange programs made them more likely to adopt mainstream theoretical approaches dominant in specific disciplines in the given periods. At the same time, they were much less attracted to sectors of their disciplines that could be identified as belonging to critical schools in social sciences (e.g., critical sociology or critical geography) or labeled as more autonomous, to use Bourdieu's language. In any case, the way they later used their knowledge acquired in the West was rarely critical towards the post-communist transformation processes or the West itself.

Let me point again to a homological effect between the structure of the field of power and most academic fields of social sciences. In particular, I am focusing on the period of the 1970s and 1980s: Most scholars with lower levels of cultural, academic, and family social capital, especially those who relied primarily on their political capital, their loyalty to the Communist Party, or the state in general, tended to lean towards the "heteronomous" pole in their respective disciplines towards the Communist Party (PZPR) and the Soviet Union. In the early communist period, that pole was overtly politicized, while later increasingly "neutral," characterized rather by a strong reliance on conventional, often "outdated" approaches in given disciplines, weak internationalization, and avoidance of

politically controversial questions. On the other side were Western-oriented and cultural capital-equipped scholars who were increasingly distancing themselves both from the Communist Party as well as everything that could be identified with communist ideology. That pole of the respective academic disciplines could be called autonomous from the Communist Party, but it was increasingly heteronomous towards what can be called an imagined West and the global capitalist system. Since the late 1980s, major parts of these sectors of the respective academic disciplines were slowly engaged in the so-called transformation of post-communist Poland and the introduction of market economic relations and democratization.

This structural configuration can explain the role of the Polish social sciences in the transformation, and in particular, the legitimization of neo-liberal reforms introduced after the fall of communism. Specifically, the increasingly dominant (especially since the late 80s) liberal faction saw its vocation as challenging its opponents labeled as "communist" or "post-communist" as both morally and professionally inferior. Since these opponents often still referred to Marxist approaches (usually in a rather superficial, rhetorical way) or had a history of using Marxist language, the identity of the liberal camps was built in opposition to Marxism, communism, and other approaches related with the left. The liberal camp, which became dominant after 1989, did not necessarily openly identify itself as anti-communist. Yet it was clearly distancing itself, first from the Marxist orthodoxy in the late 1950s and 1960s and later from the left altogether. Participation in international exchanges, which was experienced by many members of the camp in the 1960s and 1970s, seemed to provide valuable assets of a different kind, particularly after 1989. At the moment of the fall of communism, representatives of the liberal (non-Marxist, Western-oriented) camps in most disciplines of the social sciences were in positions to take on leading roles. In many cases, it happened much earlier. Western experiences gave those who were fortunate to take part in the academic exchanges additional credentials and self-confidence stemming from, among other factors, personal relations with global academic celebrities. After the fall of communism, the basic message of the social sciences in Poland and other countries of the region was that the generalized West represented an ideal social model to follow, and the local academic elite was the most competent teacher of the Western standards (Böröcz 2006). At the same time, this increasingly dominant liberal pole in most of the social sciences and humanities fields in Poland – not only sociology, economics, history, and legal studies, but also geography, psychology, and linguistics – started to provide the field of power with both crucial ideological legitimization of the new order as well as fresh cadres, in terms of members of the first post-communist government and state administration. A large number of the old intelligentsia members, who should not be confused with the intellectuals, joined the ranks for the first post-communist government and the parliament in 1989 and 1990,[1] or in fact, a transitory political establishment. This could be seen as a return to power of the old intelligentsia, who later partly retreated from the most visible political roles. They did, however, remain the country's dominant intellectual elite, which also shapes national ideology, including the meaning of Europeanization (Zarycki 2009).

KUKLIŃSKI'S SOCIAL ORIGIN AND HIS EARLY INTELLECTUAL TRAJECTORY IN POLAND AND THE U.S.

The first part of Kukliński's intellectual trajectory took place within the broader context of postwar transformations and the evolution of the field of geography as described above. One could classify

[1] Marek Jerzy Minakowski, a genealogist, has estimated that the first postwar, non-communist parliament elected in partly free elections in 1989 had a spectacularly high number of descendants of noble and old intelligentsia families, comparable only to the prewar Polish parliaments (Minakowski 2014).

Kukliński as a typical representative of the old intelligentsia families, even if his father should be seen as closer to the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie, just as the landowners, were gradually losing their economic and political position since the early twentieth century, through the entire interwar period, to being completely eliminated as social classes by the communists in the late 1940s (Zarycki, Smoczyński, and Warczok 2017). Those who retained higher social status joined the ranks of the intelligentsia, mostly by converting their remaining economic capital into cultural capital, or simply relying in the new system on their earlier cultural capital, which often included knowledge of foreign languages and sometimes an education from good European universities. The Kukliński family seems to illustrate this process very well. His father was representative of the local bourgeoisie as a director and co-owner of a large brick factory in Bydgoszcz who suffered both under the German occupation and the early years of communist Poland. Young Kukliński was, however, able to obtain his M.A. in political economy in 1950 and another one in law in 1951, both from the University of Poznań (today Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań). After completing brief postgraduate studies in Poznań, he moved to Warsaw in 1953 to work at the University of Warsaw, where he defended his Ph.D. in economic geography in 1958. He received his habilitation degree in 1962 from the Institute of Geography of the Polish Academy of Sciences and later served at various prestigious academic and state posts, which will be discussed below.

This context is important for understanding Kukliński's deep involvement in the development of a distinct Polish school of spatial planning, which emerged during the second part of 1950s in Poland with Władysław Gomułka's democratization and de-Stalinization of the Polish model of economic development. That school received recognition in the West and became an object of Polish export to developing countries. Kukliński was one of the leaders of the generation that obtained their degrees in the Stalinist period, and was able to take full advantage of the ensuing liberalization. The dominant actors in the field at the time were pragmatically oriented geographers who made their careers just after the war but managed to adapt to the post-Stalinist context, in particular Stanisław Leszczycki (1907–1996) and Kazimierz Dziewoński (1910–1994). Leszczycki served in 1945–1950 as a deputy foreign minister representing first the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) and later the PZPR (he remained a member of the party until its dissolution in 1990). Leszczycki led the introduction of the Soviet-inspired reform of the field of geography in Poland since the early 1950s. However, soon after the so-called thaw in 1956, he adapted to new liberal climate and appeared as the most influential figure in the field during next several decades. He was trying to act as its arbiter and was relatively supportive of the early career of Kukliński, who after 1956 emerged as one of the young leaders of the liberal, non-Marxist, and Western-oriented camp (Kukliński 2007a). Dziewoński was best known as an urban and economic geographer who promoted his "balanced model" of spatial organization, one which would reach equilibrium between excessive concentration and efficiency. Both Leszczycki and Dziewoński aspired to maintain a central or neutral position in the field. With time and the rising dynamic of the liberal pole, however, they were pushed towards the more "orthodox" (or the more heteronomous in relation to the Communist Party) pole of the field. Kukliński's most important peers included Zbyszko Chojnicki (1928–2015) and Ryszard Domański (b. 1928), both quantitatively oriented economic geographers. None of them, however, was able to play any visible roles beyond their discipline, so over time they were overshadowed by Kukliński (Kortus, Kulikowski, and Domański 2008).

American experiences appear as crucial for Kukliński's early academic career. He was awarded a Ford Foundation fellowship for the 1958-59 academic year, which meant that he was part of the early

contingent of Polish social scientists visiting American universities.[2] He spent that period at several locations, including Clark University and Harvard University. He also visited "Resources for the Future" in D.C., a think tank founded in 1952 at the initiative of President Truman with an initial grant from the Ford Foundation. This think tank conducts research into environmental, energy, and natural resource issues, primarily via economics and other social sciences. At Harvard, Kukliński attended seminars of rural economist John Kenneth Galbraith, regional economist Edgar M. Hoover, and the founder of input-output analysis in economics, Wassily Leontief. The latter, as Johanna Bockman suggests, was one of the key figures in the organization of the East-West exchanges and meetings during that period (Bockman 2011). In 1963, Kukliński was also a visiting professor at the geography departments of the University of Washington in Seattle and the University of Minnesota.

Besides Kukliński, a couple of other economic geographers of the same generation took part in the exchanges. Most notable were Zbyszko Chojnicki and Andrzej Wróbel (1928–1999) (Parysek 2014). Wróbel's trajectory seems most similar to Kukliński's. As a Ford scholar he visited the University of Wisconsin, University of Pennsylvania, and University of Chicago in 1959–60, and later, in 1964–65, the University of Washington and University of Minnesota. Just as Kukliński, Wróbel joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1990 to become the head of its Department of Planning and Analyses. Unlike Kukliński, who returned to academia in 1992, Wróbel later became the ambassador of Poland in Chile, where he had worked as an advisor to the government under Salvador Allende between 1970 and 1972 (Parysek 2014). Zbyszko Chojnicki in turn was a Ford Fellow at the University of Washington in Seattle, the New York-branch State University of New York (SUNY), and the University of Michigan (Parysek and Stryjakiewicz, 2008). All of these scholars adopted the mainstream quantitative paradigms of the American economic geography, trying to combine them at home with modernized versions of socialist central planning. However, even if following this path after the fall of communism, they presented themselves as opposing the "outdated" and "normative" Soviet doctrines of spatial planning (Chojnicki and Kukliński 2000).

Kukliński's American experiences undoubtedly helped him in his later career, which accelerated in the years after 1960. He served as an executive secretary of the Committee for Space Economy and Regional Planning (KPZK) at the Polish Academy of Sciences from 1958 until 1967, and as the head of the Department for Space Economy and Regional Planning at the Institute of Geography of the Polish Academy of Sciences between 1962 and 1967. In these years his truly international career began. In 1965–66 he served as a consultant for the Economic Commission for Europe at the United Nations in Geneva. He was tasked with a study on the criteria for the location of industrial plants in Poland, which allowed him to build upon his earlier academic work on industrial locations. From 1967 until 1971 Kukliński served as the Program Director of Regional Development at the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) in Geneva, where he worked on a new model of global studies on regional development. As he later recalled (Kukliński 2007a), the model was a compromise between his fascination with the American quantitative school of regional science and the European social approach of relying mostly on micro-scale, regional-level monographs. One of the aims of the program was to "assess the role of growth poles and growth centres in regional development" (Komorowski 1985: 292).

In 1971 Kukliński returned to Poland but regularly commuted to Geneva in the period 1971–74 where he served as the editor of the UNRISD-Mouton Regional Planning Series (Komorowski 1985). It was an academic book series published by Mouton de Gruyter (currently known as De Gruyter) based in

[2] The Ford and Rockefeller Foundations began exchange programs in Poland in 1957 (Richmond 2003). Between 1956 and 1960, the USA was visited by a total of 132 Ford scholars and 167 Rockefeller fellows from Poland (Berghahn 2001).

The Hague. Kukliński held this position formally until 1984. During that period, he was able to oversee the publication of 17 volumes, several of them under his personal editorial leadership. These volumes were dedicated to issues such as regional planning (Kukliński 1971), growth poles (Kukliński 1972), or regional information systems (Kukliński 1974). These books, according to international citation databases such as the Web of Knowledge, are still today the most often cited works by Kukliński. In many respects, the period from 1966 until 1974 can be seen as the zenith of Kukliński's career. The book series was supported by Resources for the Future, which was very actively involved in the early stages of the program, probably due to Kukliński's earlier contact with the institution. His older colleague Stanisław M. Komorowski noted that both the works of the UNRID Institute and the book series revolved around the concept of growth poles. That notion was proposed by the French regional economist François Perroux and later developed by Jacques Boudeville and other French scholars (Kukliński and Petrella 1972). This rather vague concept, which abstractly defined space, emphasized the role of concentration (agglomeration) of industries as a condition for growth and innovation. It could be seen as theoretical legitimation for geographical polarization, which was expected to bring a general benefit with the so-called "trickling down" or "spread" effects. Interestingly, Komorowski noted a change in attitude between the time when the series was established in 1967 and when it ended in 1984:

> The period of time when this approach was enthusiastically welcomed and regarded as fashionable is now over. It did not yield all what was expected, those who did use it became disappointed. And thus the opinion f[e]ll from one extreme to the other, from enthusiasm to several and through criticism [...] Thus the circle has been closed. From the belief in available knowledge as reflected in the effort to assess the state-of-the art – through its critical evaluation which lead to incertitude – to arrive finally to the conviction that we are in the need for a new paradigm of the social system." (Komorowski 1985: 293)

Komorowski noted quite a broad international network was built around the book series by Kukliński. The French interest was mainly, although not exclusively, focused on the concept of development poles and growth centers, given its French origin. Considerable interest in the UNRIDS series was shown in the developing countries, especially in Latin America, hence the Spanish translations. Moreover, Soviets published large and detailed critical reviews both on the activities and publications, even if Komorowski argued that the notion of growth poles "was and still is irrelevant for planned economies" and "it was indeed doubtful whether it is relevant for developing countries, which independently of their socio-political set-up, must rely upon planning for development and which cannot depend on the free play of forces which is at the base of the growth poles and centers concept" (Komorowski 1985: 293). The increasingly controversial nature of the growth pole doctrine was reflected in a critique of Kukliński put forward in the late 1970s by John Friedmann and Clyde Weaver. They argued that Kukliński as a head of UNRISD "had much to do with the worldwide spread of the evolving growth centers doctrine. Despite their superficial appeal, there was little evidence that growth centers actually helped to diffuse economic growth. Indeed, there was mounting evidence to the contrary" (Friedmann and Weaver 1979: 128). However, Kukliński remained close to the schools of thinking in regional science that considered increasing concentration, even at the cost of growing inequalities, as a price worth paying for an increase in economic efficiency.

Kukliński became marginalized in the early 1970s, which can be probably interpreted in the context of the above-mentioned changing configuration of the field of power. After his return to Poland from Geneva, he was not offered any positions that would reflect his leadership ambitions and unique international experience, besides a regular university professorship. Between 1974 and 1976, he joined the African Institute at the University of Warsaw and became a full professor only in 1982. However, unlike many of his peers, Kukliński did not join the anti-communist opposition, which

started to consolidate during the second part of the 1970s. As it seems, he assumed a middle ground between the two emerging political camps (communist government and the opposition led by the Solidarity trade union), having some highly placed connections in both of them. In the context of his not highly politicized academic field, however, this already implied a clear positioning in its liberal, pro-Western sector.

In the 1980s, the configuration of the field of Polish geography included two main camps: on the one hand, there was a "conservative majority" dominant in a large academic department, relying on traditionally oriented services to state institutions, including the standard education of new cadres and legitimation of the political order of the time. On the other hand, there was the "progressive" camp of Kukliński, using his strong international links and trying to push the state institutions in the direction of technocratic "rationalization" of regional policies and spatial planning. He had some success in this respect. In 1975 he returned to the Committee for Space Economy and Regional Planning (KPZK) of the Polish Academy of Sciences in the capacity of its deputy chairman and the head of the publishing arm of the Committee where, during the political crisis in 1980 when the Communist Party position was considerably weakened, the Planning Committee entrusted him with preparing a diagnosis of the state of the spatial economy in Poland. The document was critical of the earlier regional policies and proposed several reforms. In Kukliński's words, it was "the most critical document related to the evaluation of the Polish Space Economy in the conditions of real socialism" (Kukliński 2008). In December 1983, it was officially rejected by state officials and several members of the academic establishment who joined criticism of Kukliński's team. Among them was Stanisław Leszczycki, the most powerful representative of the old generation of geographers. The document's language was subsequently softened in a consecutive version prepared by a new expert group, while Kukliński left the Executive Board of the Committee in 1984. Kukliński remembered that moment as one of the most traumatic in his professional career (Kukliński 2007a; 2007b), a clear defeat that made him perceive himself as a dominated actor in the field.

KUKLIŃSKI, THE POLISH SCHOOL OF REGIONAL PLANNING, AND THE ABSENCE OF A CRITICAL SCHOOL IN THE FIELD OF POLISH GEOGRAPHY SINCE THE 1970S

Kukliński's biography seems to reflect a broader trajectory of Polish social sciences, and geography, including regional planning, in particular. Polish geographers have developed a relatively distinct school of regional planning, which could be seen as a fruit of post-Stalinist democratization. They were able to successfully integrate what was called "socialist values" and ideals of central planning with some elements of sustainable development, ecological values, and a participatory approach (Secomski 1974). Polish regional science also integrated popular new ideas and methodologies of Western social sciences, which became fashionable in 1960s, to which Poland was relatively open. This ability to mix Western theoretical approaches, Marxist-inspired concepts, and indigenous intellectual ideas was a landmark of the Polish school of social planning, which gave it some global visibility and ability to influence other communist countries. In this way, Polish geographers contributed in an important way to the international development of regional planning (Mazurkiewicz 1992). They were also among those in Polish social sciences who established contact with Western academia relatively early, beginning in 1956.

The emerging picture of the development of geography and related social sciences, including economics in which prominent figures such as Michał Kalecki and Oskar Lange were active, during the 1960s in Poland resonates with the complex image of Hungarian geography in the same period

drawn by Zoltán Ginelli. He criticized the simplistic thesis of "Sovietization" and "colonization" of the field, asking for the reconstruction of hybridity and ambivalences characteristic of the Hungarian social sciences during the communist period (Ginelli 2017). Kukliński saw himself as "deeply involved in the successful paradigmatic revolution in Polish economic geography which took place in the years 1954–58 in the political and intellectual climate of Polish October [1956]." (Kukliński 2007a). As he recounted at the end of his career, "this splendid achievement was the result of an alliance linking the old and young generation of Polish economic geographers. My hope that this alliance will function again in the climate of Polish August of the years 1979–81 ended in a grand disillusion. Contrary to my expectation the eighties were not a time of accelerated paradigmatic change in Polish geography" (Kukliński 2008). In fact, in the 1980s Kukliński already saw himself as one of the leaders of the "progressive" camp in Polish geography. This camp was not so much interested in any Marxist or leftist inspiration, but open to new ideas coming from the West and supportive, although usually not directly, of gradual democratic and market-oriented reforms.

By the end of 1970s, the native Polish schools of thought were losing their dynamics and attractiveness. This was not only the case of the Polish school of planning, but also the Polish school of social stratification research in sociology (e.g., Ossowski 1963 or Wesołowski 1979) or the field of Polish economic history, which flourished in the 1960s and strongly relied on dependency theory and even played a role in the development of the world system theory, as Anna Sosnowska has shown (Sosnowska 2018). All of these schools abandoned their critical edge and interest in economic processes in the 1980s and turned to culturalist approaches. This was probably part of a wider global tendency but was very visible in Poland given the political transformation of the entire generation of liberal intelligentsia, which gradually moved from a dominated to dominant position in, or in relation to, the field of power. The turning point of this process in Poland took place in 1989, placing a major part of the intellectual elite, who in most Western countries would remain within "the dominant sector of the dominating class," at the highest level of the social hierarchy. This tendency also involved a transformation of thinking about the future of the country, from one focused on the systematic and long-term planning of its social and economic development, to one focused on flexible and spontaneous processes directed by market demand. The latter focused on "catching up with the West," first of all in "cultural" and "psychological" dimensions, and then in following new intellectual trends such as globalization. This trend was most visible in disciplines such as economics, sociology, and psychology, but also noticeable in geography. Such transformation in the dominant modes of thinking eliminated any traces of dependency theories, both in the early Latin American form and the later incarnation of the world system theory, in Polish social sciences. It also eliminated notions such as "exploitation" or "political economy," which were now seen as terms of the non-scientific Marxist newspeak. These changes prepared a perfect intellectual ground for Poland's integration with the Western core, which was now perceived as the "essence of goodness," to use József Böröcz's words (Böröcz 2006).

The attempts by Polish scholars to develop original variants of critical social theory—inspired by both creatively interpreted Marxist tradition and other sources of inspiration, including new Western intellectual trends—seemed innovative and attracted interest from all over the world in the 1960s. By the beginning of the 1980s, these efforts started to be abandoned and increasingly forgotten. All those referring to Marxists were increasingly perceived as backward and intolerably politicized. Kukliński always distanced himself from leftist and Marxist inspiration, so it is not surprising that the "liberals" who were forming around him saw those still relying on Marxist approaches, or central planning doctrines, as opponents. The increasing weakness of that traditional Marxist-inspired camp, as well as its strong relationship with the state and the Communist Party through the

role of central planning, implied that it was also not attractive to new generations of scholars aspiring to develop critical approaches. This was, in particular, manifested by a group of younger geographers, which started to form in the late 1970s around Zbigniew Rykiel (b.1949). Most of them recently defended their Ph.D. and were interested in British and American human geography, including its critical threads, which they found more inspiring than any local school of thought. At the same time, they perceived Kukliński's school of thought as a representative of the positivist establishment.

These views are reflected in critiques presented by Zbigniew Rykiel, who discussed Kukliński's role at the 1983 conference of Polish geographers held in Rydzyna near Leszno in Poland (Rykiel 2012). For Rykiel, Kukliński at that moment was already a representative of the "old guard" who rejected an attempt by a younger generation of Polish geographers to adapt to the new wave of human geography in Poland, particularly the school of critical geography inspired by the work of Derek Gregory (Gregory 1978). The dispute between Rykiel and Kukliński, who both emerged as leaders of their respective camps, entered the global debate on the state of human geography. In particular, Rykiel published a critique of Kukliński in the journal *Progress in Human Geography* (Rykiel 1988). Interestingly Rykiel's account accused Kukliński of "enlightened dogmatism" and being "more likely to arrive at a compromise with the establishment." Rykiel identified himself with a younger generation of "angry young geographers" or "anarchistic," "structuralist/Marxist challengers," who in November 1981 established the Working Group of the Radical Geographers.[3] This was a clear attempt at inscribing their revolt on the revolutionary activities of the anti-communist Solidarity movement, which celebrated its greatest triumphs around the same time. However, the attempt appeared futile on several levels. One was probably related to the fact that the Solidarity movement, even while having a trade union at its center and being supported by numerous left wingers from the West, was not accepting any clear identification with the left. Later, in the late 1980s, Solidarity leaders entered an alliance with free market-oriented neo-liberal reformers (Ost 2005). An attempt to revive the Polish Socialist Party in 1988 failed, and for many years the only visible political force identifying with the left on the Polish political scene was the post-communist Alliance of the Democratic Left (SLD), which took an active role in the introduction of the neoliberal reforms in 1990s. These developments had important homological effects for most fields of the social sciences, where no camps critical of restoring neo-liberal capitalism emerged. In any case, Rykiel argued that in the early 1960s "many junior scientists interested in economic geography, including the original economists who had looked for asylum in geography in the 1950s, were given the opportunity to join fellowships in the United States. The new contracts revealed the sterility of the pragmatic, ideologically fixed economistic geography, lacking a grand theory" (Rykiel 1988: 400), which seems to be an attack on the technocratic and positivist nature of Kukliński's camp. Kukliński in turn complained about the Rykiel group's "shyness in formulating critical assessments of the state of Polish geography" (Rykiel 1998: 403).

Therefore, at that moment in the early 1980s, both Kukliński and the representatives of younger generations born after the war were dreaming about a "new revolution" in Polish geography, assuming the first one took place in 1956. However, the ways in which these two groups understood new global—that is, Western—trends were quite different. As mentioned above, the Rykiel group was attracted by the new wave of critical geographers. For Kukliński, the second revolution would imply a

[3] One of the founders of the Working Group of the Radical Geographers was Norwegian scholar Roger Bivand, who obtained his Ph.D. at the London School of Economics in London 1975 and was a postdoctoral student in Poland, where he defended his habilitation at the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań in 1982. Bivand later returned to Norway and, paradoxically, became a highly specialized, quantitatively oriented, GIS expert.

stronger reliance on "geographical information systems" and other new technologies such as satellite imagery, a greater focus on the role of knowledge, and innovations as the drivers of progress (Zarycki 2008). In other words, while Rykiel and his colleagues were attracted to critical approaches and qualitative methodologies coming from Western academia, Kukliński saw this revolution as a leap toward a technocratic modernization project, one based on the "rationalization" of the communist system and reliance on modern methodology, including information and computer technologies (Kukliński 1984a). Both of them saw themselves as leaders of a progressive camp representing "youth," at least symbolically, in terms of the freshness of ideas and implied political direction change that they advocated. They differed in how they defined their opponents, even if they both confronted what they saw as the "mainstream," or the backward majority of the communist era geographers with few international contacts. However, Rykiel saw Kukliński as part of that mainstream, a representative of the older generation who idealized the idea of service to the state. Rykiel could have adopted Bourdieu's terminology and called his opponent Kukliński the leader of a heteronomous camp.

Neither were able to achieve their goals, and no major transformation occurred in Polish geography, at least until the end of 1980s. But it was the generation of Kukliński which clearly emerged as the winner of this confrontation. His group was able to take advantage of the fall of communism, which was specially facilitated by the accumulated institutional, social, and cultural assets. In contrast, the group of Rykiel remained marginal and disintegrated by the early 1990s. Rykiel was unable to obtain any tangible resources for the implementation of his program. In particular, he remained an assistant professor until 1994, when he finally obtained his habilitation at the Institute of Geography of the Polish Academy of Sciences. Other members of the potential camp of critical geographers (such as Konrad Dramowicz) emigrated to the West in the late 1980s. Some left for the private sector after the fall of communism. This was, for example, the case of Piotr Szeliga (b. 1953), who worked at the Institute of Geography of the Polish Academy of Sciences on "international economic dependency," using inspiration from the world system theory (Szeliga 1991). In 1990 he joined the newly established Stock Exchange in Warsaw to soon become one of the members of its board. Most importantly, no major school of critical geography emerged in Poland. In particular, the question of inequalities, with the key issues of urban inequalities, did not become the focus of systematic studies by Polish geographers as well as a wider group of scholars. In addition, if these questions were addressed in other branches of Polish social sciences such as sociology, they were usually analyzed by individual scholars with no major institutional resources.

Let me now return to the analysis of Kukliński's professional trajectory. Despite the above-mentioned problems he encountered in the early 1980s, his institutional position remained strong. His opposition to government officials who were uninterested in any radical changes in the regional planning policies and paradigms became more apparent, but he was able to soon find new allies. In the meantime, he changed his focus and moved away from regional-level planning to the so-called "local Poland," which included mostly questions of self-government, lower levels of spatial organization, or self-organization. This so-called "discovery of local Poland" or provincial Poland, symbolized by Kukliński's article entitled "Local Poland – a dormant potential" (Kukliński 1984b), may be seen as part of a retreat from spatial planning and the beginning of a new rhetoric of bottom-up development, one largely independent from the central state institutions. Soon after, he celebrated an important institutional success. In 1985 he was awarded, together with sociologist Bohdan Jałowiecki (1934–2020) and economist Grzegorz Gorzelak (b. 1949), a large government grant within the framework of a centralized research scheme in late communist Poland called "Central Programs of Fundamental Research" (CPBP 09.8). The generously founded six-year project was named "Regional Development, Local Development, Territorial Self-Government," and was implemented in

collaboration with an impressive network of academic institutions from several cities in Poland. The program resulted in a rich publication output dealing with, among other topics, regional heritage, identities, and traditions of self-government. As Kukliński later put it, "the programme was able to anticipate indirectly the great structural change after 1990" (Kukliński 2008). It provided a useful intellectual background for the renowned reform or successful introduction of local government in Poland already enacted in 1990, and later the reform of Poland's administrative system in 1999 (in particular involving the change of the 49 regional units into 16 larger regions known as voivodships).

Given the strictly centralized nature of the distribution research funds at the time and an impressive budget of the above-mentioned program, one could speculate that the award involved some kind of patronage for Kukliński from members of the field of power, or more precisely, the establishment of the Communist Party. Among its high-ranking members, whom Kukliński perceived as his loyal supporters, and who could also have been involved in decision to fund this project, was Kazimierz Secomski (1910–2002), deputy prime minister from 1976–1980 and a member of the State Council from 1980–1989 (Kukliński 2007a). Kukliński's position as head of the project allowed him to consolidate his power and domination over the "progressive" camp of Polish geography. He was able to offer interesting research contracts to a high number of scholars from all over Poland, and Zbigniew Rykiel was among them.

KUKLIŃSKI'S CAREER AFTER THE FALL OF COMMUNISM: TOWARDS THE LEGITIMIZATION OF NEW SPATIAL HIERARCHIES

Even if Kukliński was not a public intellectual or politician, although he attempted to act in the fields of politics and public debate[4] from September 1990 to mid-1991, he joined the first non-communist government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki—not in a position related to regional or local issues, but as an undersecretary of state at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski. Kukliński's brief period of service for the Mazowiecki's government included, among other activities, representing Poland at the general assembly of the United Nations in New York (Kukliński 2007a). The abrupt ending of his career as an undersecretary of state is related to his disappointment with Poland's declining global ambitions after 1989. Kukliński, according to his memoirs, parted with Skubiszewski because of the minister's lack of support for Kukliński's ambitious project to establish a highly internationalized diplomatic academy in Warsaw (Kukliński 2007a). Instead, a much more modest project of a diplomatic school was implemented, which could be seen as an internal ministry training center. This was the defeat of one of Kukliński's many visionary ideas that were inspired by the earlier period of active Polish involvement in international organizations that Kukliński was part of as an academic.

[4] Kukliński published several articles in the press (e.g., Kukliński 1984b). He also had a least one political episode in his life, in particular an attempt at establishing the "Club of Modern Liberalism." It is documented in a letter signed by the coordinator of the Warsaw office of the German Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung dated September 27, 1993 (FNSt 631/93), addressed to all those invited to the conference "Liberalism today" (*Liberalizm dzisiaj*) to be held at the University of Warsaw on October 21, 1993 (letter from the archives of the EUROREG Institute at the University of Warsaw). The conference's program included a keynote speech by Kukliński as the representative (presumably president) of the "Club of the Modern Liberalism." Among discussants, well-known political figures were present such as Donald Tusk, Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, and Janusz Lewandowski, leaders of what was then the Liberal-Democratic Congress (KLD) party. Bielecki was at that time a former prime minister, while Tusk was a future prime minister. Both in 2010 and 2015, Kukliński was a member of the honorary committee in support of Bronisław Komorowski as a liberal candidate for the president of Poland.

After he resigned from the post at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kukliński became an undersecretary of state at the State Committee for Scientific Research (KBN), a new institution that was modeled after the American National Science Foundation. His stint at KBN, however, lasted only one year, and in 1991 Kukliński returned to academia. His institutional and informal position (one of the leading scholars in the field of geography, former deputy minister of foreign affairs and vice-chairman of KBN) allowed him to gain autonomy for his institute, which until then was part of the Department of Geography at the University of Warsaw and known as the Institute of Spatial Economy. It was renamed as the European Institute of Regional and Local Development, or EUROREG in short, and became an independent unit of the university[5].

After returning to academia, Kukliński become involved in active research and policy work. In particular, he produced numerous commissioned reports for Western public institutions and foundations. Among them was an extensive study of the state of economy and society in the Visegrad group for the European Commission DG XII Science, Research, and Technology (Gorzelak et al. 1994, Polish version 1995) which focused on an estimation of the "potential for transformation" in the region. Other funders of his team's work in the 1990s included the Vienna Institute for Human Sciences and German foundations such as the Friedrich Ebert Foundation or the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. This was a typical career path for the elite of the liberal intelligentsia in Poland after 1989, who benefitted from Western and state-sponsored expert work related to the Europeanization of Poland and its EU accession in particular. The main orientation of this work was towards the assessment of the "potential for transformation," "measuring readiness for integration," openness to privatization and inflow of foreign capital, etc.—that is, an adaptation of Poland to Western European standards, seen as an ideal reality.

Kukliński's biography reflects this specific intellectual and ideological role played by an entire generation of the liberal intelligentsia elite. This group relied on uses of Western intellectual models and funds, which allowed them to legitimize the neo-liberal reforms introduced after the fall of communism. However, and typically for the Polish intelligentsia elite, Kukliński was also able to secure relatively large grants from Polish state institutions. He received funding from the above-mentioned State Committee for Scientific Research (KBN) as well as several ministries, including the Ministry of Regional Development that financed, mostly using EU funds, his numerous edited volumes in the last two decades of his life. Kukliński was also able to secure funds for his publication from private, primary Western companies, like the Skandia insurance company,[6] which financed a volume dedicated to his scholarship (Gąsior-Niemiec and Niżnik 2008).

During the late years of his intellectual activity, Kukliński's primary fields of interest were related to a "neo-liberal modernization" of Poland based on a classic catch-up model, one relying on mainstream Western intellectual models that he had helped import in earlier years. These models included a new generation of science policy, knowledge-based economy and global and strategic studies in their recent Western forms. Kukliński promoted, for example, Michael Gibbons' concept of a "new production of knowledge" known as "mode 2" (Gibbons 1994). Kukliński's publications during

[5] The institute is known today as the Center for European Regional Studies (EUROREG) at the University of Warsaw (http://www.euroreg.uw.edu.pl/en/about-us).

[6] The contact with the specific company was based on Kukliński's personal link to the Polish subsidiary president. But from a broader perspective, such a subsidy can be seen as a part of a strategy of Western companies to legitimize their presence in Poland through the support of social science research, particularly one promoting Poland's integration with Western economic and political structures.

that period usually contained general discussions of developmental challenges for Poland laid out in mostly non-spatial terms of a general modernization approach.

However, Kukliński was far from uncritical praise of neoliberalism and often revealed his awareness of the ambiguities within the so-called transformation process. In a programmatic paper entitled "The Geography of New Europe," he argued as early as in 1993 that "the ideological and political climate in Central and Eastern Europe is a mixture of two ideologies – the ideology of populism and the ideology of the 19th-century laissez-faire approaches" (Kukliński 1993: 456). This framing, which suggests the existence of two extremes, implied an act of distancing from the most radical proponents of neo-liberal reforms such as Leszek Balcerowicz. However, from time to time, Kukliński would complain about the absence of large-scale and effective regional planning in post-communist Poland during his improvised and often emotional talks and conferences. He would also grumble about the chaotic expansion of Polish cities and development dominated by unrestrained market forces. He was complaining about insufficient large-scale strategic thinking in Western Europe and North America, particularly in relation to the region of Central Europe. Despite these critical remarks, Kukliński never engaged in a more systematic attempt at a critical interpretation of the post-communist transformation. As the above section shows, this was conditioned by both his own biographical trajectory and structural conditions. Being deeply and personally involved in the legitimization of neo-liberal reforms, Kukliński was probably unable to look at it from a further distance. The structure of the field, at the same time, permanently placed him in the "progressive," "pro-Western" camp, one which was expected by the field of power to provide expertise and guidance for efficient economic reforms and integration into the global economic system.

As the liberal ideology of the post-communist period assumed, inequalities in economic development and wealth might appear in the process of integrating the country into the EU, but they would principally be the side effects of the market's uncontrollable natural forces, like globalization or "metropolization." The notion of "metropolization," which has been developed at EUROREG by Kukliński and his colleagues Bohdan Jałowiecki (e.g. Jałowiecki 2005) and Grzegorz Gorzelak (e.g., Gorzelak 2009) since the late 1990s, implied that the growing concentration of wealth, power, and prestige in global metropolises was a "natural" and inevitable aspect of globalization. What they implied was that Poland had to adapt to that model and try to apply some of the policies of global metropolises to the largest Polish cities. This inevitably meant the acceptance of both growing social inequalities and regional disparities, presented as the only way of "catching up" with the West and increasing the efficiency of the national economy. Kukliński has noted that his early American experience stimulated his fascination with the doctrine of growth poles, which can be seen as an early inspiration for his later "metropolization" model (Kukliński 2008).

Metropolization was one of Kukliński's favorite notions at the turn of the 1990s and the 2000s. Importantly, it assumed that the rise of metropolises was an important aspect of post-communist modernization. This concept may be seen as a normative reinterpretation of different threads of Western studies on the rise of mega-cities. The resulting synthesis worked out by Kukliński and his colleagues may be an example of a broader tendency in the post-communist social sciences, especially in sociology: namely the redefinition of notions and theories imported from Western academia, which originally had a critical or at least descriptive nature, into prescriptive, normative models to be followed in order to reach the ideal Western social order (Warczok and Zarycki 2014). Thus, in the context of Central and Eastern Europe, Western metropolises became ideals to imitate in terms of concentration of wealth, intellectual and technical innovation, or embeddedness in the network of global cities based on information and transportation infrastructure. At the same time, the largest

cities in the post-communist space, as future members of a global metropolitan network, were supposed to be the first to join the European standards of economic development and average living standards. Such celebration of metropolises, seen as islands of growth and lighthouses of ideological progress, was an aspect of the emerging neo-liberal and individualistic paradigm of social transformation, which accepts the increase in spatial and other inequalities as a necessary condition for economic growth. In this framework, metropolises are spatial concentrations of the "transformation's winners" and in contrast to peripheral areas, which are populated by the "transformation's losers." Just as in the original scheme of "winners vs. losers," which is a popular notion of post-communist social sciences vocabulary (Buchowski 2006; Danilova 2014), the opposition between metropolises and the remaining parts of the country (in fact "peripheries," even if this concept is usually avoided) implies that the misfortunes of peripheral regions should mostly be blamed on their inhabitants.

Even with his relatively nuanced approach to radical free-market reforms, Kukliński was one of the crucial actors introducing key notions into the Polish social sciences, which later helped to naturalize processes of economic and social polarization of inequalities implied by the so-called post-communist transformation. One can note that the above-mentioned notion of "metropolization" was later instrumental in the development of the official spatial doctrine of Donald Tusk's liberal government, presented first in 2009, namely the "polarization-and-diffusion model" (*model polaryzacyjno-dyfuzyjny*). This doctrine included incentives for the development of metropolises as engines of growth for the entire country, even at the cost of economic decline in peripheral regions, which had to wait some time to profit from the economic stimuli coming from the growth centers. Criticism of this doctrine, in particular the negligence of the development of peripheral areas in Poland, was later a prominent theme of the successful electoral campaign of the conservative Law and Justice (PiS) Party in 2015.

Kukliński also promoted other concepts that later appeared useful in the legitimization of polarized development of post-communist Poland. The notions of "innovative regions," "adaptive regions" and "lagging regions" were all introduced in his paper on "the geography of new Europe" (Kukliński 1993). These concepts were important for developing a new paradigm of regional development in which regions became actors and entered a competitive game for capital, talents, and markets. All these ideas have been very prominent in Kukliński works since the late 1980s and early 1990s, and they have become central concepts to policy-oriented work done at the institute he directed. One of the synthetic concepts developed in EUROREG and popularized in Poland by Grzegorz Gorzelak, Kukliński's successor at the institute, was the notion of the "competitiveness of regions" (Gorzelak and Jałowiecki 2000).

CONCLUSION

This paper has presented the intellectual trajectory of Antoni Kukliński against the structure of the field of Polish social and economic geography. As I have argued, this structure strongly conditioned not only Kukliński's career, but also the broader role that he played in the development of Polish geography and legitimization of the post-communist transformation. Moreover, the specific structure of the fields of social sciences in Poland may explain why a large number of Polish academics, especially those with upper family status and international experiences during the communist period, engaged so strongly in the legitimization of the post-communist transformation, while no stronger critical schools of social thought emerged after Marxism lost its attractiveness in the 1970s. The biography of Antoni Kukliński also illustrates how that broad faction of the intelligentsia

provided crucial expertise for implementing the liberalization of Poland's economy and reconstruction of public administration along Western, mostly neoliberal lines. This was possible due to the competence and social status of these scholars, including their family cultural capital and experiences accumulated during their careers in communist Poland, which often included long periods of international (in particular American) fellowships from the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations. In this way, the social sciences have also helped to legitimize and naturalize such effects of the transformation and European integration as a growing dependency on the Western core, rising inequalities, and, last but not least, the hegemonic position of the intelligentsia as the dominant social strata in Poland. In the case of the field of geography, it included the legitimization of spatial polarization as an aspect of broader social inequalities.

The trajectory of the field of Polish geography, as presented above, is of crucial importance for understanding this outcome. In particular, a clear rift emerged in the field of geography over the course of the 1970s and 1980s. It was mostly homological to the structure of the field of power, which was divided along the continuum between radical party hardliners on the one hand and the anti-communist opposition on the other, with progressive/liberal technocrats remaining loyal to the Communist Party in the middle. As I have mentioned earlier, most fields of the social sciences and humanities developed similar structures, although they differed in the intensity of their politicization and their location between the two poles. In some fields, the non/anti-communist pole was stronger (e.g., history), while in others it was very weak (e.g., political sciences). In most cases, those who had a history of participation in exchange programs with the U.S. and other Western countries found themselves attracted to parts of the field that were somewhat closer to the "progressive," non- or anti-communist, or at least "reformist" pole. Very few of the participants in these international exchanges embraced more radical variants of critical social sciences, while the majority became enthusiastically involved in the post-communist transformation process, often taking on important roles outside of academia, which the trajectory of Antoni Kukliński illustrates well. At the same time, this configuration made the emergence of critical poles in most of the social sciences structurally impossible. This effect is particularly evident in the field of Polish geography: No equivalent of a critical sector—one questioning the dominant images and legitimations of the spatial order and denouncing increasing inequalities as a result of neoliberal policies—ever emerged in the field of Polish geography, as it has in the case of most Western academic context with the French geography as one of the clearest cases in point. One can also point to the roles of public intellectuals played by critical geographers in France, such as Christophe Guilluy, whose works "La France périphérique" (2014) and "No society: La fin de la classe moyenne occidentale" (2018) had wide social resonance. As mentioned above, the lack of a critical sector in the Polish field of geography and other social sciences and humanities can also be seen as a homological effect of the lack of a stronger left presence in the Polish political scene.

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Serendipities
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BOOK REVIEW

Bessner: Democracy in Exile

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Bessner, Daniel (2018) Democracy in Exile: Hans Speier and the Rise of the Defense Intellectual. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
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The book under review is a considerably revised version of a PhD dissertation at Duke University's Department of History that was successfully defended in 2013 ("The Night Watchman: Hans Speier and the Making of the American National Security State"). It relates the biography of Hans Speier (1905–1990), a German social scientists who immigrated to the United States after the Nazi seizure of power and became a widely recognized and respected policy advisor, analyst, and institution-builder in his new home. *Democracy in Exile* describes Speier's intellectual development across the variety of contexts in which he was active.

To all those interested in the history of the social science-foreign policy nexus during and after the Second World War, Speier is a figure sufficiently central to warrant interest in his biography. Born in Berlin as a single child to middle class parents, Speier studied sociology in Heidelberg, where his supervisors included Emil Lederer, Karl Mannheim, and Karl Jaspers. Upon completing his studies, he returned to Berlin, worked in various positions related to the Social Democratic Party (SPD), wrote articles for party outlets, and taught at the Hochschule für Politik, a higher education school that offered academic evening courses to members of the working class. When the political situation worsened, he accepted an offer by Alvin Johnson to join the New School for Social Research in New York City, where he became the youngest member of faculty at the "University in Exile." During the Second World War, he entered government service and rose to fame within the agencies for his abilities in analyzing Nazi propaganda, a line of research he had begun earlier together with émigré psychoanalyst Ernst Kris. After the end of the war, Hans Speier felt that he could not return to academic life. He became the inaugurating director of the Social Science Division of the RAND Corporation, a think tank with headquarters in Santa Monica, CA. Soon after its opening, RAND became a central player in the science-foreign policy networks that created the strategy of the United States during the Cold War.

While Speier's career in itself would deserve a biography, Bessner takes it a step further. Speier's intellectual career, Bessner argues, reveals some important lessons with regard to the history of political and strategic thought more generally. The most important of these lessons is that in alleged contrast to the claims of other historians, Speier's case shows that the global political situation of a two-side confrontation that emerged in the 1950s was only one source informing the core beliefs of U.S. defense intellectuals. Beyond that, their thinking was shaped fundamentally by ideas, debates,

and events that had taken place in Europe twenty years earlier. The ideology of the U.S. National Security State, Bessner suggests, can be fully understood only if the collapse of the Weimar republic, the ensuing Nazi takeover, and the repercussions of these events for social scientists and intellectuals enter the picture. Fear of repetition was a fundamental emotion among many exiles who, by serving as analysts in the war effort and by remaining in the policy-oriented research and analysis networks after the end of the war, played a considerable role in shaping U.S. foreign policy. Whereas historians have hitherto emphasized the discontinuities in strategic thought that were brought about by the atomic bomb, Bessner claims that, provided one broadens the view to include the European history and traditions of thought, there are crucial continuities to be found.

The book's introduction—"Democracy, Expertise, and U.S. Foreign Policy"—describes the main puzzle in Speier's intellectual biography: his conviction that while democratic values were important, democracies were weak. In times of crisis, then, the responsibility of intellectuals was to directly offer advice to the decision makers. If intellectuals wanted to contribute to avoiding authoritarian disasters, their audience had to be the elite, not the demos. For democracy's own sake, democratic ideals had to be put in exile—hence the title.

Chapter 1—"Masses and Marxism in Weimar Germany"—follows Speier's childhood in Berlin, his studies in Berlin and, from 1926 on, in Heidelberg, and his return to Berlin two years later, upon receiving his PhD summa cum laude with a thesis on "The Philosophy of History of Ferdinand Lasalle." Two intellectuals were influential for Speier during this period. One was Karl Mannheim (1893–1947), whose project of a sociology of knowledge attracted Speier and informed his decision to pursue a PhD in Heidelberg. Mannheim's works were intensively discussed in a circle in Heidelberg that, besides Speier, included intellectuals and scholars who would later rise to prominence, such as Norbert Elias, Werner Falk, Hans Gerth, Ruth Neuberg, and Svend Riemer (cf. p. 21).

The second person was the Heidelberg economist Emil Lederer (1882–1939), who offered Speier an assistantship that allowed him to cover the expenses of his studies (his father refused to do so). Upon completion of his studies, Lederer connected him to the Federal Ministry of Finance in Berlin, then led by socialist Rudolf Hilferding, where Speier landed a job as analyst.

While these two persons certainly exerted considerable influence on the development of Speier's own thinking, as Bessner shows, more important than these were the political events happening in these years, and most crucially the collapse of the Weimar republic. This downfall of a democratic order, Bessner argues, and the ensuing triumph of the Nazi party convinced Speier of a series of ideas that he held throughout his life and that also informed the "logic of governance he helped institutionalize in the Cold War United States" (p. 17). The lessons that Speier drew from the political events were: 1) Democracy is a weak form of governance and can quickly be destroyed in confrontation with radical movements. 2) Intellectuals were partly responsible for the Weimar collapse, because they stuck to the naïve idea that the masses could be educated to make thoughtful political decisions. 3) Marxism was just another set of radical ideas threatening democracy. And finally, 4) while Speier had developed quite a deep understanding of democracy—as an idea fostering economic, cultural, and political equality— in his youth, the term to him did not refer to much more than procedural equality. Everything that was not authoritarianism could qualify as democracy.

Speier's convictions consolidated over the coming years in Berlin, which saw him, besides his job as ministry analyst, working as an editor for the Ullstein publishing house, as assistant to Lederer when the latter moved from Heidelberg to the University of Berlin, and as a part-time teacher at the

Hochschule für Politik, a college funded by the social democrats to provide education, mostly in evening courses, to the Berlin's working strata. These views were further fortified when, after the Nazi takeover in 1933, Speier on the recommendation of Lederer became the intermediary for Alvin S. Johnson's (1874–1971) attempt to invite renowned European scholars to join the "University in Exile," which Johnson planned to set up as part of his New School for Social Research in New York City (Krohn 1987). Chapter 2—"The Social Role of the Intellectual Exile"—covers Speier's last years in Berlin, his decision to go to the United States and join the "University in Exile," and the people he met upon his arrival as well as the thoughts he wrote down during this period.

Chapter 3—"Public Opinion, Propaganda, and Democracy in Crisis"—then covers Speier's most important scientific project during the war years: the Research Project on Totalitarian Communication that he co-led with the Austrian psychoanalyst and art historian Ernst Kris (1900–1957). The project resulted in a book called *German Radio Propaganda* written by Kris and Speier, which became a heavily used point of reference for the propaganda studies undertaken by various U.S. wartime institutions such as the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) or the Office of War Information (OWI), as chapter 4—"Psychological Warfare in Theory and Practice"—relates. The book also led to Speier being selected to head the German Desk of OWI, where he became responsible for developing the guidelines for the propaganda materials that were to be distributed in Germany. As most social science and humanities scholars involved in the U.S. war effort, Speier moved repeatedly and easily between various organizations. After the end of the war, he was also sent to Germany on behalf of the OWI "to counsel those who are concerned with information activities with respect to Germany" (as the Executive Order by President Harry S. Truman read, cited on pp. 121–2).

After his wartime experiences, Speier realized that he was unwilling to return to the New School, which had put him on leave for his government service. He did return for some months, but felt like "a fish out of water" (autobiographic interview, cited on p. 139). Thus, he was quite interested in listening to what the RAND Corporation, a newly established think tank funded mainly by the U.S. Air Force and Douglas Aircraft Company, had to offer: the position of director of the yet to be established Social Science Division. After some negotiations, Speier accepted the position and joined RAND in 1948. The history of this think tank has been narrated quite a few times (e.g., in Smith 1966; Kaplan 1983; Collins 2002; Ghamari-Tabrizi 2005), and Chapter 5—"The Making of a Defense Intellectual"—sums up the literature quite elegantly and with a focus on the Social Science Division.

As this chapter and the ensuing chapter 6—"The Adviser"—aptly show, Speier was convinced that the addressees of social scientific policy advice were the deciding elites, not the people. As Bessner puts it, "For Speier, democratic foreign policy was not by the people, of the people, and for the people, but was for the people, by the intellectual, who had finally assumed his or her proper place within the "shadow" American state" (p. 155). To make this point, Bessner describes a series of research and analytical works that Speier carried out in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The most prominent—and arguably the most influential—among them was Project Troy, a large interdisciplinary research project funded by the Ford Foundation with the intent to identify and provide solutions for the main problems—theoretical, cultural, and technological—faced by anti-communist propaganda (cf. Nedell 1998; Schwoch 2009).

Apart from the intellectual consequences of Project Troy, it also led to a series of organizational innovations, and Speier played an active role in two of these. Already before Project Troy began, Speier had close relations with a few officials of the Ford Foundation. His participation in the project only served to strengthen these ties. Chapter 7—"The Institution-Builder"—explores how the networks that had brought Project Troy to life also created (or helped create) the Center for Advanced

Study in the Behavioral Sciences (CASBS) at Stanford University and the Research Program in International Communication at MIT's Center for International Studies (CIS). On all these occasions, Speier succeeded in getting some of his ideas to materialize, although, as Bessner shows, not all of them.

Chapter 8—"Social Science and Its Discontents"—takes the reader back to the RAND Corporation and discusses the role of the social sciences at this organization that valued numerical analysis higher than qualitative or interpretive scholarly approaches. Consequently, and in stark contrast to the self-proclaimed culture of "interdisciplinarity" at RAND, the Social Science Division struggled to get the recognition within RAND that it deemed adequate. In this context, Bessner discusses the development of political gaming, a qualitative technique of crisis simulation, as a reaction towards the perceived expectations of other RAND divisions and as an attempt to anchor social scientific perspectives more broadly in RAND's research agenda. A brief conclusion—"Speier, Expertise, and Democracy after 1960"—describes Speier's move from RAND to the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, one year prior to his obligatory retirement date, and the last years of his life.

Bessner's book is a masterful exemplar of an intellectual biography—densely written without getting dry, engaged without losing the distance. The two large theses of the book—that there are considerable continuities between the lessons from the collapse of the Weimar republic and the emerging U.S. national security state, and that the elitist view on the science-democracy nexus promoted by Speier was one of these continuities—are well developed and corroborated by the presented materials. Beyond that, in light of some recent publications, the intervention also seems timely.

Clearly, an intellectual biography has to emphasize some ideas as more important than others. It must do so in order to not lose its narrative in a marsh of complexities. However, this has inevitable repercussions. Regardless of how central they might have been to his life, the four convictions of Speier described above focus on the social and political role of social scientific policy recommendations. They do not, however, reveal much about how Speier understood the epistemological nature of the social sciences. What was scientific about social science, in his view? What did make it a science? The theme appears in several places throughout the book (and therefore Speier's life)—for instance, when Speier claimed that Marxism would have to "shake off the positivist calcification of its method" (p. 32); when he criticized the New School for failing to provide proper training in empirical research methods and statistics (p. 138); when Speier figures as a consultant to one of the key promotors of the "Behavioral Sciences" (chapter 7); or when he defended the qualitative-historical approach of his Social Science Division at RAND (chapter 8). The fact that Speier's teacher, Karl Mannheim, had developed a very influential epistemological view of the social sciences, which lies at odds with some of the standards of the Behavioral Sciences that grew in the 1950s, gives particular urgency to the question of why this perspective did not receive more sustained treatment in this book.

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BOOK REVIEW

Wagner: Bauman

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Wagner, Izabela (2020) *Bauman: A Biography*. Cambridge: Polity Press
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Historians have come to be uneasy about using the word "fact" and many historians do not accept that a value-free or neutral historical account is either possible or desirable. It is simply not possible to root out bias and subjectivity when doing history. The past can never be seen as a collection of acts and ideas that the historian simply has to find. Similarly, "doing biography" is never an objective activity. Instead of collecting facts about what happened to Zygmunt Bauman in his past, Izabela Wagner's book Bauman: A Biography (Polity, 2020) has selectively drawn upon the historical record to present a positive evaluation of Zygmunt Bauman's biography. Wagner explains that her approach is based upon selecting data to fit her assumptions about Bauman's past, and her purpose in writing the book was to "defend [Bauman] from misunderstandings and erroneous accusations, and to expose the impact of xenophobia, nationalism and anti-Semitism" (p. 404)—prejudicial ideas and practices that helped to shape Bauman's life course and that was central to Bauman's perceived master status.

Wagner draws upon Everett Hughes' approach to biography that focuses on the individual's feeling of identity (Who am I?) and master status (How do others see me?). Hughes was interested in the status and perception of Black American doctors in the 1950s. At that time race was defined by Hughes as a master status-determining trait. The dilemma, for white Americans who came into contact with a Black doctor, was do they choose to treat the Black doctor as a member of a racial group or as a member of a professional group? The favoured [SP1] way of avoiding this dilemma was to limit contact with Black professionals. One of the central themes of Wagner's argument is that Bauman's life was overshadowed by the tensions between his Polishness and his Jewishness.

The book draws upon an interview with Zygmunt Bauman, interviews with his family, friends, and colleagues, and unpublished autobiographical material, including a seventy-page letter to his children and grandchildren entitled "The Poles, The Jews, and I: An Investigation into Whatever Made Me What I Am," Janina Bauman's autobiographical publications, and selective use of the Polish archives. Wagner is clear that her focus is on Bauman's life, not his work. As she explains to her reader: "I should reveal that I was not a 'Baumanist' at the outset of this work" (p. 403). Despite the limited engagement with Bauman's body of work, the book has received wide critical acclaim from Bauman scholars.

The first 11 chapters reflect Bauman's childhood, his education, his early wartime experiences, military experiences, entry into academic life, and the exclusion from Poland in 1968. There is a lot of information contained within these pages that I was unfamiliar with, such as Zygmunt's weight problems and that Janina had been engaged to be married before she met Zygmunt.

Several interesting issues are not discussed by Wagner. The circumstances around Bauman's invitation to become Professor of Sociology at Leeds, for example, was glossed over by Wagner. Former Conservative minister and newly appointed Vice-Chancellor Edward Boyle was keen to close the Warwick files issue that had dogged his predecessor. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, students had discovered that several universities were keeping records on individual students' political views and activities. Best (2013) argues that Boyle's motivation for appointing well-known Marxists such as Bauman and Ralph Miliband was to demonstrate Boyle's willingness to embrace political diversity within the university.

Wagner outlines Bauman's passion for photography, a passion that he had for several years and then abruptly stopped. On page 357, Wagner mentions in passing that Bauman hired some female models and did a series of nude photographs. Wagner does not explain that Bauman had an exhibition of his work in the Brotherton Library. The series of nudes was not well received by visitors, described by many as soft porn, especially one photograph with the title "Woman making an exhibition of herself." A number of the photographs were vandalized by visitors. The Bauman Institute did have a photo montage video of Bauman's photography, including some nude models; however, the Institute has since taken the montage off their website.

One of the many strengths of the book is Wagner's detailed account of the relationship between Keith Tester and Bauman. Wagner outlines Tester's account of Bauman's distinctive approach to PhD supervision, which Bauman viewed as a vocation rather than training, the interest that Bauman took in Tester's family life, Bauman's lack of engagement with Tester's book (2004) about Bauman's social thought, the love they shared for film, and how Bauman influenced Tester's view of the world. In Wagner's interview with Tester, he described Bauman as his friend, mentor, and spiritual father. Despite this, Tester confessed to Wagner that he did not think he knew Zygmunt because: "I don't think there was a Zygmunt to know" (Wagner, 2020: 333).

However, I would have liked to have read more about the intellectual tensions within the Sociology Department, especially between Richard Kilminster and Bauman. Norbert Elias had taught Richard Kilminster at Leicester on the MA programme, which was a turning point in Kilminster's academic life. Kilminster went on to become an influential commentator and promoter of the work of Norbert Elias. Bauman was Kilminster's PhD supervisor at Leeds. Bauman took exception to the underpinning argument presented by Elias in The Germans (1997) that stands in opposition to the argument presented by Bauman in Modernity and the Holocaust. The status and validity of Elias's arguments was a bone of contention between Kilminster and Bauman and shaped the tensions between the two men. Wagner (p. 330) quotes Tester as saying that Bauman was not enthusiastic about Elias's work.

My understanding is that Kilminster and Bauman were often on friendly terms. As a student in Kilminister's classes, I got the impression that Kilminster appreciated the vibrant intellectual atmosphere that Bauman helped to create in the Department at Leeds, and he co-edited a book in honour of Bauman's work (1996). On the other hand, Kilminster could be critical of Bauman, suggesting that beneath his skilful use of metaphor his work often seemed like many other Marxist critiques of "bourgeois sociology." Also, there is a rumour, shared with me by Keith Tester, that

Bauman was confronted by Kilminster over the shortlisting for a vacant teaching post in the Department. The story goes that Bauman intentionally hid Ali Rattansi's application from the panel because Bauman disliked how Rattansi engaged with Althusser's work. I have, of course, no idea about the truth of this account.

Nevertheless, I had many interesting conversations with Tester about the Kilminister/Bauman relationship. In particular, we discussed Kilminster's attempt to develop a post-philosophical sociology, in contrast to the Bauman approach that often drew upon support from philosophical texts. The lack of any engagement with Richard Kilminster is a serious omission from Wagner's account of Bauman at Leeds.

I am very surprised that Wagner does not discuss why Bauman moved away from his sociology of postmodernity to the sociology of liquid modernity. Bauman's approach reminds me of what Osrecki (2015) describes as "retrospective realism": a way of building an argument that involves the construction of a "historical juxtaposition," counterpoint, or comparison that first reduces the past to a narrow set of abstract characteristics, the role of which is to act as a background of the present. Secondly, this approach presents a very abstract, ideal type of solid modernity as a real empirical description of reality that neatly forms the opposite of the newly emerging societal epoch. In the 1980s Bauman was regarded by many—including Peter Beilharz (2002), one of his leading commentators—as the most interesting and consistent of postmodern sociologists. Is liquid modernity an even newer kind of modernity, a newer post-postmodern, and even more extraordinary and unparalleled period of human history that departs in fundamental ways from the previous solid and post modernities? Tony Blackshaw (2005) and Matt Dawson (2013) both argue that the underpinning arguments and assumptions within Bauman's sociology of postmodernity and sociology of liquid modernity are the same. The transition from the postmodern to liquid modern is not a movement from one type of society to another. There is no transition from postmodernity to liquid modernity in Bauman's work, but there is one in terms of his conceptual reasoning. One view explored by Best (2013), which Wagner does not engage with, is that Bauman's redefinition of modernity in a liquid form is rebranding for commercial purposes rather than an attempt to make a new contribution to knowledge.

The intellectual friendship and mutual admiration between Bauman and Henry Giroux is also not discussed by Wagner. Giroux described Bauman as "the great sociologist" (Giroux, 2006: 255) and came to the latter's defence after a paper was published on Academia.edu by Peter Walsh and David Lehmann, "Problematic Elements in the Scholarship of Zygmunt Bauman" (2015). In the paper, Walsh and Lehmann accused and presented evidence that Bauman had engaged in "self-plagiarism," recycling ideas and arguments previously presented in earlier publications. Giroux and his co-author Brad Evans (2015) described Walsh and Lehmann's article as a form of "character assassination"; a "neoliberal assault on global academia"; a "reactionary ideological critique"; and a form of "public shaming … tantamount to a Stasi witch hunt" by the "academic police squad." In contrast, Evans and Giroux celebrated Bauman's style of writing and described his reproduction of previously published ideas and arguments as "strategic repetition" with the caveat: "We are not suggesting here that the demands for previously unpublished originality are unimportant in certain contexts. There is a clear appreciation that academic journals demand this consideration. Bauman is actually exemplary in this regard" (Evans and Giroux, 2015).

Bauman is not exemplary in this regard. There are sections of his article "Education in the Liquid – Modern Setting" (published 1 January 2009) reproduced verbatim in "Education in the World of Diasporas" (published 1 January 2010). For example:

"What matters most for the young is the retention of the ability to reshape 'identity and the 'network' whenever a need to reshape arrives or is suspected to have arrived. The ancestors' worry about identification is increasingly elbowed out by the worry of re-identification. Identities must be disposable; an unsatisfying or not-sufficiently-satisfying identity, or an identity betraying its advanced age, needs to be easy to abandon; perhaps biodegradability would be the ideal attribute of the identity most strongly desired" (Bauman, 2009: 165; and Bauman, 2010: 406).

Walsh and Lehmann (2015) were not the first people to identify repetition in Bauman's work. In his review of Liquid Modernity, Nicholas Gane pointed out that Bauman was in the habit of reproducing earlier texts in his writing (2001: 271). Keith Tester (2018) has written an interesting response to Walsh and Lehmann (2015). Tester does readily acknowledge that there is repetition in Bauman's work, with sections of text appearing in more than one book and journal articles later reappearing as book chapters. However, for Tester, when the same text reappears in the book, it does so in a changed context, and the changed context changes the meaning.

The most contentious chapter of Wagner's book is Chapter 5, which addresses Bauman's involvement with the KBW (Korpusu Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego), the Polish secret service. In the latter part of his life, Bauman was caught up in the process of lustration, which was part of the process of truth and reconciliation in Poland following the end of Communist rule (1944–1990). Lustration is the process of collecting and publishing previously secret archives from the postwar period in Poland, making the names and records of agents and collaborators available to the public, and investigating "crimes against the Polish nation" carried out by former wartime Nazi collaborators and Communists during the postwar Stalinist period. With the end of the Stalinist regime in Poland, the Polish people engaged in the act of disassembling the heritage of totalitarian systems and structures inherited from the previous regime. Many Polish people were concerned that in the immediate post-communist period former Communists attempted to reinvent themselves as democrats and claim a share of the responsibility for bringing about democracy in Poland. The Institute of National Remembrance (IPN) is a governmental institution that has been responsible for, amongst other things, the process of lustration since 2007. The IPN is a founding member of the Platform of European Memory and Conscience, a European Union educational project that is focused on raising awareness and promoting educational initiatives about the crimes of totalitarian regimes.

The lustration process impacted Bauman both professionally and personally following the release of official state documents about his career in the military from 1945 to 1953. In 2006 Piotr Gontarczyk published an account in the Polish magazine Biuletyn of Bauman's activities from the end of the Second World War until his removal from the army in 1953. In 2007 the story was taken up by Polish historian Bogdan Musial, who also published an account of Bauman's activities from the end of the Second World War until he departed from the army in 1953. Drawing upon previously secret files that had been made available by the Polish IPN, Gontarczyk explained that Bauman had had a successful career in the KWB. Wagner accepts that the transition from the military to the secret service was smooth, but that was imposed upon Bauman and the soldiers under his command. Bauman was recruited into the security services by Anatol Fejgin, who in 1945 became the commander of the secret police in the Polish Ministry of Public Security. Like Bauman, Fejgin had escaped the Nazi invasion of Poland by fleeing to the Soviet Union in May 1943. At the end of the Stalinist period, Fejgin was put on trial for human rights abuses and sent to prison for twelve years.

The KWB was given the task of managing internal and foreign intelligence, engaging in counterintelligence, monitoring governmental and civilian communications, and keeping in check

all anti-state activity. The KWB also had a role to play in border control and the management of prisons and concentration camps for political prisoners and opponents of the state. As Bauman (2004: 17) explains, at the outbreak of the Second World War Poland was a multi-ethnic society containing a mixture of religious faiths, languages, and customs. At the end of the war, the Polish government attempted to unify the nation through a process of Polinization, the forced assimilation and conversion of non-Poles into the Polish language, customs, and traditions. Those people who were deemed unsuitable for assimilation and conversion were forced out of the country. This process of assimilation and forced migration was not universally accepted by the Polish population.

The KBW was part of the Ministry of Public Security and its role was to suppress anti-communist resistance in Poland, including the remaining members of the Armia Krajowa (Polish Home Army) who were the main armed resistance to the occupying Nazi forces during the war. The Polish Home Army had organized the 1944 Warsaw Uprising and other attacks against German forces, sabotaging German road and rail transport, assassinated well-known Nazi collaborators and Gestapo officials and supplied intelligence to the Allies. After the war, the Home Army remained loyal to the Polish Government-in-Exile and refused to hand over their weapons to the newly formed Communist regime. Stalin viewed the Polish Home Army as terrorists and an obstacle to the successful Soviet takeover of Poland. According to Dudek and Paczkowski (2005), 32,477 people were arrested for "crimes against the state" between 1946 and 1948, and 8,000 death sentences were passed in 1945–1946.

By simply dismissing Bauman's critics as right-wing anti-Semites and the role of lustration as propaganda, Wagner concludes that: "In short, there is nothing in the available documents that indicates Zygmunt Bauman was a communist criminal" (Wagner, 2020: 132). She draws upon the historical record to criticize the IPN as a body "essentially geared to distributing pro-government, nationalist propaganda." She also accuses the IPN of a "smear campaign" against Bauman by selectively releasing documents about his past, which led to "the construction of an erroneous picture of Bauman's complicity in the construction of communism in Poland" (p. 113). She is critical of the process of lustration as having an underpinning logic that is the same as 1968: to purge society (p. 378–379). She also accepts the legitimate role of the KBW as "protecting the peace in the liberated territories" by tracing "anyone opposed to the revolutionary changes" (p. 118) and Bauman's account of their activities as "a necessary step in the construction of the new Poland" (p. 19). For Wagner, Bauman's engagement in the KBW gave him "agency" or the aspiration to build a political system that would bring about social justice: "He was among those who thought they would change the country with a new system that supported a society not divided into religious or ethnic groups" (p. 110).

Although Wagner presents a selective reading on events that "lends credence to the records of the security services" (p. 121) and Bauman's role in how the events unfolded, there are many interesting insights that she presents. She gives a detailed account of why the Red Army, including the 4th Polish Division in which Bauman was an officer, did not cross the Vistula River and support the Polish Home Army and other Poles involved in the Warsaw Rising. As Wagner explains: "The advance stopped on the east bank of the Vistula River. The armies merely looked on while as many as 200,000 Polish fighters and civilians were crushed by the Germans on the other side of the river … Polish soldiers, immobilized by Stalin's decision, passively watched the massacre of the Warsaw population" (p. 96–97). Wagner explains that the 4th Polish Division used their time on the riverbank "cooking and enjoying meals," studying rules and manuals, and doing cleaning work (p. 90–91).

In April 2007 Bauman gave an interview to Aida Edemariam which was published in The Guardian. In the interview, Bauman spoke about his participation in organizations that were involved in the Stalinization of postwar Poland. He started by explaining what attracted him to Communism. Bauman explained that when Germany was defeated in 1945, he became a member of the Polish "internal army," which he described as a "force" charged with "suppressing terrorism inside the country – the equivalent of that fashionable phrase now, 'the war against terrorism'. This is public knowledge – everybody knew that. I never hid it." He wrote political pamphlets for soldiers: "My job there was very dull, in fact." He described his role as one of "counter-espionage. Every good citizen should participate in counter-espionage." Bauman was asked by Edemariam if his counter-espionage role involved informing on people who were fighting against the communist project. Bauman's response was: "That's what would be expected from me, but I don't remember doing [anything like that]. I had nothing to do – I was sitting in my office and writing – it was hardly a field in which you could collect interesting information."

In Modernity and the Holocaust, the excluded are placed behind a wall of indifference that Bauman refers to as a "neighbourless position." Bureaucratic rationality and the specialization that accompanies it allowed actions leading to genocide to be viewed and performed as morally unproblematic and outside the area of cognition, such a digging coal or driving trains—actions that made the suffering of others "invisible" and "inaudible." Bauman's comment about his actions and experiences in the KBW reflect a moral indifference towards people he continued to label as terrorists, towards individuals who suffered at the hands of the organization he worked for and towards himself.

In an interview with Julija Tuleikytė (2013), Bauman discussed his use of the concept of adiaphoria. Bauman explained that bureaucracy was the factory of adiaphoria, irrespective of your personal feelings of morality. Your only moral obligation is an obligation to achieve the bureaucratic objectives that have been set for you:

"[C]ourt of law is interested whether your behaviour, step you have taken, transgressed some written letter of the law, or whether there is no such paragraph which makes you guilty. And if there is no such paragraph, you may feel personally tremendously guilty, but you will be declared innocent by the court of law. But your conscience won't declare you innocent – that's the difference. Court of conscience is far more demanding than these artificial introductions which were introduced by society" (Bauman, 2013: 224).

Bauman continued to believe that he was innocent both in the court of law and in the court of conscience.

When Bauman spoke about his time in the security forces following the Second World War, he "defaces" the Home Army as terrorists and does so without any attempt at re-humanizing the victims of the Stalinist terror in Poland. At best, Bauman is presented by Wagner as the unconcerned, unthinking bystander who witnessed the persecution of others with indifference and passivity. Bauman simply did not question how or why the "internal army" chose to define an issue as a security issue; an act of defining also becomes the act of allocating guilt. This provides the moral justification for acts of organized aggression against the Other who is defined as a threat to the community. The Polish Home Army refused to accept Stalinist rule post-1945, an act which was defined by Stalin as terrorism—ideologically, politically motivated amoral acts. From an Arendt perspective, Bauman was "thoughtless": his lack of thinking, doubting, and questioning was what underpinned his actions

rather than wickedness at heart. Arendt would no doubt suggest that Bauman's immoral motivation is found in habit rather than passion.

In the last analysis, it is simply not possible to root out bias and subjectivity when doing history, and "doing biography" is never an objective activity. Wagner aimed to present a positive evaluation of Bauman's biography and to defend Bauman from his critics. In that respect, her project was successful on its own terms. The book adopts the stance of the Bauman Institute and, as is the case with almost all Bauman scholars, Wagner does not engage with the work of people who are critical of Bauman's work and his life. The Leeds University Library holds several of my books but not the three books about Bauman. Similarly, the library has many books by Ali Rattansi but not his critical appraisal of Bauman's work. There is an alternative story to be told. If Bauman scholars did engage with critiques of his work, they may move closer to the position Bauman outlined in his introduction to sociology, Thinking Sociologically (1990), where he explained that thinking sociologically may encourage us to re-think our experiences and challenge the prejudice and stereotypes of common sense.

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BOOK REVIEW

Vannier: La sociologie en toutes lettres

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Vannier, Patricia (Ed.) (2019) *La sociologie en toutes lettres: L'histoire de la discipline à travers les correspondances*. Toulouse: Presses Universitaires du Midi
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Private correspondence has largely been ignored by sociologists and historians alike as research material, with the exception of Thomas and Znaniecki's *Polish Peasant In Europe and America*, which drew extensively on this source material. This book offers to deal with this issue and brings new insights and methodological tools to sociologists and more specifically to historians of the discipline.

The book (whose title translates into English as "*Sociology in full letters: the history of the discipline through correspondences*") stems from a conference in 2014 organised by Prof. Patricia Vannier, from the University of Toulouse, and is published by Presses Universitaires du Midi. It is divided into 13 chapters. Let me state first of all that this book is a solid contribution to the field: Most of the chapters use original material and, at times, new methodology. There are minor aspects which could have been improved, which I will discuss below with but above all this book gives us food for thought regarding:

1) the problems that occur when historians of sociology use correspondences;

2) the added value of letters to "debunk"' myths concerning prominent sociological figures;

3) the usefulness of letters to help write about the real, concrete working conditions of sociologists "in the field";

4) the novelty of emails that poses a threat to the "traditional" letter use by historians of "classical" sociology.

All of these dimensions make it a useful and stimulating book that will be a trailblazer in the methodological aspects of the history of sociology, a subgenre that has rarely attracted attention before.

The book is an intelligent mix of various research currently happening within the field of the history of sociology in France and in French-speaking countries. The initial conference was organised under the aegis of the '*Association Internationale des Sociologues de Langue Française*' (AISLF), the international association of French-speaking sociologists, which is the ISA counterpart and comprises 1500 members spread across 59 countries.

It is thus interesting to note that many chapters are not France-oriented and that some of the contributors are from abroad. This gives the book a rather balanced content: You can find your usual chapter on Durkheim (Chap. 7 by Matthieu Béra) or on the Durkheimian school (Chap. 5 by Sébastien Mosbah-Natanson), but also some on less well-known figures such as Georges Vacher de Lapouge, a eugenicist, in Toulouse (Chap. 8 by Jean-Paul Laurens), René Lourau, the founder of "counter-sociology" in the 1970s (Chap 9 by Antoine Savoye), and Raymond Ledrut, President of the AISLF in the early 1980s (Chap. 4 by Patricia Vannier). More surprisingly, Sylvain Wagnon (Chap. 2) tells us the story of Belgian sociologist Emile Waxweiler and his "*Institut Solvay*" while Frédéric Parent (Chap. 6) gives us a proud example of the underexplored French-speaking Canadian sociology with Léon Gérin in the late 19th century. Finally, a chunk of the book is dedicated to the inevitable American sociologists, either seen through French eyes (Georges Gurvitch in Chap. 10 by Suzie Guth and Michel Crozier in Chap. 11 by Gwenaële Rot) or documented through American archives (two articles deal with Robert Merton: Chap. 3 by Michel Dubois and Chap. 13 by Arnaud Saint-Martin), which show how rich the archival material on the subject remains.

The book is more an attempt to derive precise methodological rules when using letters through a selection of historical figures than a volume in the history of sociology that would bring more and more "facts" to the fore. The book's scope as initially presented by Patricia Vannier in the introduction is theoretical. This does not prevent it from shedding new light on some little-known parts of the private histories of sociologists. For instance, we learn about Durkheim's student experience in Bordeaux (Matthieu Béra), René Lourau's correspondence with Antoine Savoye, who married his sister-in-law in the 1970s, or Michel Crozier's initial experience as a sociologist-traveller in the U.S. when he was 26 in 1948 (Gwenaëlle Rot) before he found the French sociology of organizations.

Patricia Vannier (Introduction), Jean-Michel Chapoulie (Chap. 1), and Alexandre Gofman (Chap. 12) put forward methodological rules about correspondence and explain that they are "private documents that are not initially intended to be published" (Vannier, p. 18), that they are "seldom cited in research reports on the history of the social sciences" (Chapoulie, p. 32), or that they "often perform not only a communication function but tend to keep a secret limited to its intended recipient" (Gofman, p. 234).

The most interesting aspects of the book is that, through case studies of well-known figures in the history of sociology, they teach us much more theory than these theoretical *exposés* themselves. It is not only stimulating to read about the private lives of these public figures, but we can also easily derive implicit methodological rules from the way their authors deal with the material and write the chapter. It is thus an endearing dive into the background of "official" histories of sociology, especially classical sociology.

Despite this, the book still contains details that could hinder the reader from getting the most of the publication.

First of all, footnotes and references are questionably inserted into the text. The book uses the Chicago style within footnotes (e.g. Note 1: Bourdieu, 1989) and ultimately does not include a comprehensive bibliography but rather offers single ones by chapters, which makes the citations hard to follow. Since we are dealing with history, it would have been easier to stick with the Chicago style with a full bibliography at the end or to use Modern historical research footnotes, which state the source directly and in full at the bottom of the page.

Secondly, this book was admittedly published after a conference by the AISLF organised by French-speaking authors; so why are French translations not provided systematically when quoting English letters (Dubois' chapter is full of these kinds of examples, especially p. 70), or English words used in French as such ("*possiblement*", p. 94; "*séminal*", p. 102; "serendipity", p. 246)? French readers definitely deserve better, and so do AISLF members.

More importantly, most of the chapters use "traditional" methodologies and theories in their treatment of correspondence. The book thus somewhat smacks (perhaps too much) of "classical sociology" to be fully enticing to non-historians of sociology. Parent (on Léon Gérin), Dubois (on Merton) and Wagnon (on Waxweiler) nonetheless provide new techniques (lexicometry, network analysis) or theories (an ethnography of the practice of scholars) that open new horizons to the dusty field of the history of classical sociology.

However, what adds to this impression is that not one of the sociological figures tackled in the book are women. There is almost nothing in terms of gender perspective, except an occasional footnote that recalls that women did play a role in the birth of these theories because "they deal concretely with social relations, while men think these same relations theoretically" (Parent, p. 133); meanwhile "one still waits for a light thrown on the role of Louise Durkheim in the work of her husband [Emile Durkheim]" (Savoye, p. 190).

Ultimately, there are aspects that the contributors recognise are still invisible despite the centrality and role of private correspondence in their work. Some decisions are made orally, without documentation which prevents the authors from reconstituting the past (Vannier, p. 5); sociologists' students and the public at the university are sidelined nearly all the time, although they played a great role in the rise of popularity of these figures (Béra, p. 135); the institutional supports which could account for their eventual success in history (Laurens, p. 161) or writing practices and what they mean for creating the content (Saint-Martin, p. 254) are largely ignored.

The purpose of the book, as mentioned earlier, is theoretical: It tries to draw conclusions regarding the use of correspondence among historians of sociology to write the history of big figures. Therefore, it poses several problems that are tackled in the chapters.

First of all, there seems to be general agreement that letters can (surprisingly) be an obstacle, not an asset, to the historian. Vannier (p. 18) explains in the introduction that correspondences are "private and are not meant to be published" not least because "their publication may transform the meaning and the scope of the written material". Letters offer a different outlook on figures of sociology because they usually are private documents and do not necessarily provide information in the way one expects (or wishes): Private correspondence can lead researchers in unexpected directions in the history of sociology. And that is a good thing.

Nonetheless that fear is voiced on several occasions: Wagnon (p. 38) explains that Waxweiler's correspondence is "very partial in its elements and his multiple activities", Vannier reiterates that "facing the profusion and richness of the archives [...] the sociologist is always convinced he is going to unveil secrets, revelations [...] but this is unfortunately not reality" (p. 78) and Chapoulie (p. 32) specifies that "correspondence is sometimes not often cited' but 'stays in the background" of research reports because it is far from the concepts and theories that these great figures are known for or because they deal with "tiny details". Several of these authors therefore seem biased into thinking that the material is "dubious" because it is "private", "rich" or "partial" when it should be taken as more exciting. Indeed, because letters question the "official histories" and draw us far away from the

classical History (with a capital H) of concepts, they are all the more useful. What we can discover from them will be all the more "secret" or held secret in the process of the elaboration of science, and thus valuable.

Vannier suggests that there is another bias in the study of correspondence in the history of sociology. Indeed, she writes that "the popularity and the centrality of the sociologist (a founder, the leader of a school, the representative of a particular theoretical branch) may constitute a sufficient criterion for analysing or merely publishing their correspondence" (p. 12), thus indicating that the average sociologist would not see their letters used in the history of the field. "Only winners write history", and so it is in the history of sociology. More work is needed from sociologists to use everyday material from ordinary sociologists, or even personal documents (Savoye uses his own correspondence with René Lourau to shed light on the "counter sociology" movement in France in the 1970s) to explain in more details the history of the discipline.

In spite of this selection of correspondence from more prominent figures, they still represent an advancement in the process of "debunking" the surrounding myths. As Wagnon maintains, "the study of their correspondences, even if scattered, is a possible entry into this history" of sociology which "tends to mythify them and which forbids one to understand their characteristics and specificities" (p. 51). The use of private letters allows one to make these figures (Durkheim, Gurvitch, Merton, etc.) more human and to put a finger on the real conditions of their work and on the constraints of their research. These show through their correspondence and reveal that they are not "wants" or "obstacles" that letters put in the way of science; they are everyday sociology put into practice.

In his chapter on the Kuhn-Merton controversy, Dubois specifically explains that the "opposition between Kuhn and Merton" appears to be a fiction thanks to their correspondence because "none of them really participated in it" (p. 55). What seemed like a "mystery" (Wagnon, p. 36) or "enigmatic" (Dubois, p. 68) in the history of sociology is now enlightened by the study of the correspondence between Emile Waxweiler and Robert Merton. However, Dubois underlines one caveat when studying their correspondence (p. 56). He writes: "The material must be crossed with other kinds" because "the acting sociologist is not [always] sincere in a personal document". Indeed, letters are social objects: As Gofman (p. 235) reminds us, correspondences have a "communication function" as well as a "secret one". When a famous sociologist such as Robert Merton wrote a letter to a colleague or a student, he was acting and staging himself in a role, implicitly hoping or assuming that other people would read the letter. One must remain careful of what is intended, personally or socially, in the correspondence to interpret it. Letters are supposed to be private objects unveiling "a hidden reality" (however inglorious it may be), whereas they often were simple social acts drawing attention to the actor rather than the persona.

Through the use of these correspondences, these contributors strive to achieve two goals: First, they try to write a story which is "closer to [historical] ethnography than to the exclusively internal study of ideas", to "make 'an ethnography of the practices of scholars'" (Parent, p. 116-117). This means that they are starting to take into account new dimensions of the scientific activity such as "family, economics, politics, religion, etc." (Parent, p. 117), as well as gender relations which render this "masculine" activity possible in history.

Second, they mean to show that "sociology does not only result from a scientific or professional work in specific institutions, on the fringes of social life, but supposes on the contrary a complete social organisation, especially 'private' or domestic, that it is possible to reconstruct, partially at least, by resorting to correspondences and in particular family letters" (Parent, p. 117). Therefore, historians

of sociology become sociologists in the truest sense of the word when they want to show that "analyzing a disciplinary past moves to analysing the general state of social relationships not exclusively professional in a particular society and period". (Parent, pp. 117-118)

There is no other way to study these private aspects of sociologists' lives than to resort to this private material. Without this, "the space of sociology" appeared as if it were "withdrawn from social life [...] as if sociological theories were built in a non-place" (Parent, p. 115). Studying correspondences means giving back life to sociological research, such as teaching activities, as Béra underlines. He writes that "posterity remembers the writings of scholars to the detriment of the teachings of the lecturers that they also were" (p. 135). Crozier's letters to his parents in 1948 from the US also unearth the "concrete conditions of work on [his thesis] [which otherwise] entails a rather poor representation of it really" (Rot, p. 220).

Historians of sociology therefore deal with the past when using these letters. But what can the future foretell for us? Indeed, one dimension that is sidelined in the book is that letters are (and will increasingly be) used less and less as a medium, replaced by fax, emails, texts messages, etc. which will make our job as historians more and more difficult. To what extent does the volume address this topic?

Gofman (p. 233) first mentions the fact that, if "the author [according to Roland Barthes] is dead", writers and readers of letters are not, and therefore "thanks to the present diffusion of emails, turn them rather quickly into 'users'", because they are able to communicate reciprocally through emails. This phenomenon completely alters the relationship of Merton, for example, to his letters and writings, which he used to consider works of art (Saint-Martin, p. 255). Now, writing an email is almost meaningless: Sociologists, and everyone for that matter, write more and more to say less and less. The future generations of historians of sociology will probably have to dig up piles of spam emails from broken hard disks before they find anything interesting to write about. This change in the quality and quantity of exchanges is not specifically dealt with, but calls into question our "traditional" way of dealing with the archival material: Future methodologies will, in all probability, mean more lexicometry and network analysis.

However, the use of emails does not prevent specific items from being used, which reveals relationships of power between readers and writers. For instance; Merton wrote 475 boxes or letters, and Dubois and Saint-Martin complain about this fact. Vannier suggests that, somehow, "the medium is the message" (to quote Marshall McLuhan). Thus, the medium and formulae used in the letters can tell us a lot about who is speaking and to whom (for instance, Raymond Ledrut increasingly uses typing instead of manuscript letters, even with his friends, which seems to induce that he is more and more "taken" into the job of President of the AISLF and gives less importance to personal links, as Vannier suggests, p. 81).

Vannier concludes on the future use of letters that "habits change with media, style changes one does not write today as we used to over the past century. The next project will be to put our efforts on conserving and accessing this private correspondence" (p. 19). The switch from letters to emails will probably mean more work for historians of sociology as well as a call for new skills in increasingly using computing facilities.

La sociologie en toutes lettres (Sociology in full letters) is a stimulating contribution to the history of sociology, offering practitioners interesting tools and promising methodology for using

correspondence in the course of our research. The case studies of well-known sociological figures are almost more enlightening than the theoretical chapters themselves, which can be abstract at times.

But if the reader is trying to learn more about the private lives of sociological figures, the reader might be disappointed because this is an essay *on* correspondence rather than a full study *of* correspondences. There are good studies of the private correspondences of Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, and Georges Gurvitch. This book could be a first step towards discovering the "hidden face" of classical sociology.

As for historians of sociology, the next step could be to look at these personal documents that prove so helpful in advancing the course of their discipline, to think about collecting personal data (such as emails), and to attend a course on lexicometry or social network analysis.