Serendipities
Journal for the Sociology and History of the Social Sciences

ARTICLE

Mobilising Transnational Expertise in National Construction: Exiled Academics and the Transformation of Interwar Turkey

Aykiz Dogan

aykizdo@gmail.com

Abstract

This article examines transnational expertise in state formation, focusing on early Republican Turkey's strategic mobilisation of foreign specialists, particularly European academics fleeing Nazism. These exiled scientists were invited with high aspirations for international expertise, unburdened by foreign influence, and provided with arrangements to act as modernising agents. This study analyses their contributions to Turkey's development, the challenges of their integration, and the political choices that empowered or marginalised scientists. It reveals how efforts to avoid reliance on a single foreign model inadvertently fostered new dependencies. The article highlights the unequal dynamics of North-South scientific circulations and challenges assumptions about the novelty and neutrality of science-driven governance.

Keywords

Expertise; transnational experts; nation-building; interwar Turkey; exiled academics

INTRODUCTION

This article examines the role of transnational expertise in state formation and reform, focusing on the early years of the Republic of Turkey. It explores how international experts, particularly those willing to migrate and settle, were strategically employed across multiple sectors to contribute to Turkey's nation-building and development during the interwar period.

Emerging from a war of independence against Allied occupation and the Sevres Treaty following the Ottoman Empire's defeat in WWI, Turkey secured international recognition with the Treaty of Lausanne in July 1923 and proclaimed the Republic in October. After decades of war and financial dependence, the new state invested its limited resources into a wide-scale reform and reconstruction programme, importing international expertise and inviting transnational professionals. While Turkey's imperial legacies and geopolitical position were specific, its case provides a valuable lens for understanding how transnational expertise shaped 20th-century state-building in contexts marked by asymmetrical global hierarchies.

This study draws on the historical sociology of globalisation, particularly Dezalay's (2004; Dezalay and Garth 2011; Dezalay and Nay 2015) analysis on the global markets of expertise and the institutions and elites that (re)produce hegemonic relations. Like the late Ottoman Empire, Turkey continued to import expertise, creating openings for Western interference through soft power strategies aligned with political and economic interests. The Kemalist leadership sought expertise detached from imperialist agendas and found it in scientists and professionals forced into exile under Nazism. Through the mediation of transnational experts and activists, the Turkish government strategically employed these exiled academics to reshape not only the country's educational infrastructure but the broader state-building and modernisation process.

Exiled academics were invited with high expectations and found in Turkey a rare context where they were empowered as modernising experts, supported institutionally, and entrusted with prominent roles in public service and academia. This contrasted with the downward mobility experienced by many exiles in other contexts,[1] as highlighted in studies on recent waves of academic exile from Turkey to Europe and North America, where exiles were assigned non-agent roles as victims (Sertdemir Özdemir 2021; Vatansever 2020). The reverse migration of high skilled exiles to 1930s Turkey highlights the asymmetries of global circulations and the contextuality of subalternity and agency.

Despite their favourable reception, integrating transnational expertise in nation-building involved controversies and conflicts. The "émigré experts" – as they were called in Turkey – faced difficulties, some common to the exile experience (Tuori 2022) and others specific to the Turkish context. Their professional recognition within Turkey contrasted with diminished visibility in the international scientific community, due to Turkey's peripheral status. They also encountered cultural differences, language barriers, material and infrastructural limitations, the negative consequences of geopolitical tensions, and local resistance. We explore these challenges and the tensions between exiles, local elites, and Nazi experts. We show that despite challenges, these transnational elites received support from Turkish authorities and were able to contribute to Turkey's economic and social development extensively, informing and implementing public policy, and shaping national institutions. They contributed to state-building in diverse ways, from linguistic policies to arts and humanities, shaping a new national identity in dialogue with global modernity.

The study also challenges simplistic notions of knowledge transfer. As Edwards (2020) argues, mainstream diffusion approaches often overlook the agency of peripheral actors and simplify the multidimensional effects of imperialism to claim and explain the global diffusion of Western norms, templates and knowledge either by imitation (as in world polity theory) or economic/political pressure (coercive theory). Drawing on a sociology of expertise (Eyal 2013), this article emphasises the agency of Turkish actors who provided the exiles with material, institutional and individual arrangements within a broad network extending from academia to other public institutions, allowing them to operate as practitioners of legitimate expertise and agents of change.

The study draws on diverse historical sources, including state archives, press articles, expert reports, memoirs and biographical documentation. This multilevel archival approach seeks to capture the institutional mechanisms, personal experiences and national-international entanglements that structured transnational expertise in early Republican Turkey (Dogan 2024). The article first

1 Tuori (2022: 176) draws a parallel between scholars under Nazism and recent academic refugees, both subject to institutionalised downward mobility (cf. Vatansever 2020).

introduces the historical context of employing transnational scientists and professionals in public policy during the transition from empire to nation-state, then focuses on the role of scientific migration in Turkey's transformation.

TRANSNATIONAL EXPERTISE FROM EMPIRE TO NATION-STATE

To navigate a world divided by colonial hierarchies distinguishing "civilised" (Western) nations from the "uncivilised" (or "Oriental")[2] other, Turkey's ruling elites have, since the Ottoman period, developed strategies to enhance the state's global competitiveness. These include sending students abroad, establishing European-style schools, bringing in transnational experts, and other means of translating dominant expertise and models (Dogan 2021). Despite a relatively extensive Turkish academic literature on foreign experts' involvement in public policy,[3] the transformative role of transnational expertise in (re)constructing a sovereign nation-state remains underexplored (Dogan 2022).

State archives and expert reports published by ministries document the activities of *mütehassıs*, *uzman* and *eksper*[4] (terms for "expert" or "specialist") as well as foreign *müşavir* (advisor) and *profesör* (professor, academic). In these historical documents, "expert" denotes not just a title but an institutional position substantiated by a contract, often reserved for Western professionals. These bureaucratic procedures, though not uniformly documented, offer glimpses into the role of transnational elites in translating Western knowledge and models into the Turkish context.

Turkey's Ottoman heritage challenges Eurocentric narratives portraying expert involvement in decision-making and governance as a recent Western phenomenon that diffused to the Global South only through postwar development programmes. The Ottoman governance model, which evolved over six centuries, featured a regulated and structured scholarly body (*ulema)*, similar to their counterparts in the Islamic world and the "scholar-officials" in Chinese history.[5] With responsibilities ranging from education to the judiciary, these scholars were represented in the state governing divans, and influenced decision-making by advising state leaders, proposing reform projects, examining policy implementation, reporting on social conditions, defining problems and proposing solutions. Alongside the *ulema,* Ottoman rulers also used the expertise of local professionals and foreign advisors – often political exiles – in decision-making and policy formulation (Dogan 2021). The Ottoman state, favourable to migration, promoted knowledge and technology transfer by employing migrant professionals as early as the 15th century (Karpat 2002; Shaw 1993: 1-3).

This institutional framework underpinned the increasing recruitment of Western professionals in the Ottoman public service during the 19th century, a period of intensive state reforms. As the polycentric world shifted to a core-periphery order (Buzan and Lawson 2015), the growing

2 See Edward Said's (1979) analysis of Orientalism as a discourse that emerged within European colonial imperialism, simultaneously constructing the "West" and its "Oriental" other through a derogatory essentialisation of the latter.

3 These experts are often analysed by sector, and occasionally by nationality (e.g., Yıldırım 2012).

4 Uzman, mütehassıs, and the less commonly used eksper are interchangeable terms, with roots in Turkish, Arabic, and French respectively (Nişanyan 2002-2024).

5 While comparable to Chinese "scholar-officials" (Li 2018), Ottoman ulema were directly rooted in the Islamic scholarly tradition (Gilliot et al., 2012). Derived from the Arabic plural of âlim (scholar) and ilm (knowledge, science), the ulema comprised the ilmiye, a key institutional pillar of the Ottoman state organisation (Ipsirli 2004).

involvement of Western experts in Ottoman state affairs aligned with global trends that some scholars describe as a new form of imperialism (Buchanan 1986; Mitchell 1988).

The influx of Western elites into Ottoman administrations arose from a dual dynamic: Ottoman rulers sought expertise to acquire techniques and technologies from rival powers threatening their sovereignty and territorial integrity, while transnational elites simultaneously leveraged these opportunities to enhance their international and symbolic capital as experts, promoting hegemonic models. These circulations were backed by Western powers investing in exporting expertise as a soft power strategy alongside aggressive interference policies (Dogan 2021, 2022; see also Dezalay 2004). Germany, for instance, seconded officials to Ottoman administrations to promote its geopolitical and economic interests. This trend, which Ortaylı (1981) have termed "neocolonial", persisted until the empire's fall.

In the Republican era, concerns over foreign interference continued as Turkey sought to maintain sovereignty while embracing Western knowledge and models. To mitigate such risks, the government diversified its sources of expertise, enlisting specialists from small, neutral, or non-hegemonic states that did not threaten Turkish sovereignty.[6] This also meant diversifying policy models. Turkey did not rely solely on experts from Europe and the United States, but also looked to the Soviet Union, which represented an alternative economic and sociopolitical model. After supporting Turkish independence during the independence war and peace negotiations, the USSR provided financial and technical support to Turkey's state-led development and industrialisation, even though the government's anti-communist stance limited a full-fledged alliance (Dogan 2022; Gökay 2012; Tekeli and Ilkin 2009).

The rise of Nazism and Fascism in 1930s Europe offered Turkey a unique opportunity to import international expertise detached from imperialist interests. Nazi persecutions against the non-Nazi intelligentsia created a surplus supply of highly qualified professionals and scientists, which Turkey partially absorbed by inviting specialists across sectors.[7] The following sections explore how the Turkish government strategically employed these exiles to reshape both the country's scientific infrastructure and its broader development policy.

University Reform and the Strategic Role of Education

Among the many sectors transformed by transnational expertise, education stood out as a central pillar of Turkey's reconstruction. This sector warrants attention not only for its extensive integration of transnational expertise but also for its role as a driving force behind national construction serving both ideological and practical purposes: producing and disseminating legitimate knowledge, redefining state-society relations distinct from the Ottoman multicultural legacy, cultivating national identity and a skilled workforce.

In this context, the role of transnational scholars in Ottoman and Republican education has garnered considerable scholarly attention, with recent studies, like Sarmis (2019) on the "transnational construction of the Turkish education system", highlighting continuities between the two eras. Existing scholarship often interprets this transnationalism through the lens of "Westernisation", reflecting asymmetries in circulations and exchanges. Since the late Ottoman period, Turkey has

6 See, for example, why the statistical reform was entrusted to a Belgian expert (Dogan 2023a, 2023b).

7 While other categories of exiles fleeing Nazism came to Turkey during the 1930s (Neumark 1980: 23-7; Shaw 1993), this study only focuses on officially recruited experts and scientific personnel.

been a unidirectional importer of European expertise, which shaped its educational field through competing models, expertise, and languages.

French influence dominated the cultural field from the 18th century onward (Ergün 1990), with French becoming the privileged language of higher education by the 19th century (Ergin 1977). French institutions like the (still active) Lycée de Galatasaray (a joint Ottoman-French project established in 1868) trained elites in French culture and served as educational models (Georgeon 1994; Gürtunca 2017). French dominance was challenged with increasing German influence, as seen in schools like the Alman Lisesi (1868-), which became bastions of German culture (Kılıç 2005; Ortaylı 1981; Widmann 2000). By the end of the century, American colleges such as Roberts College, alongside British, Italian, Russian, and Greek schools, also proliferated. As part of missionary activities, supported by capitulations granting extra-territorial rights and privileges to Western powers, foreign and minority schools reinforced "Westernisation" but also ethnic segregation of the empire (Göçek 1993; Kılıç 2005; Sezer 1999).

Concurrently, Ottoman reformers invested in education as a lever for social change and survival in a threatening geopolitical environment. They financed overseas studies, and invited foreign scholars to establish European-style schools, military academies, and *grandes écoles*.[8] These policies cultivated "state nobility"[9] – a generation of intellectuals, officers, and professionals trained in Western knowledge – who later built the Republic.

The Republican government similarly instrumentalised education for social change and, drawing on European nation-state models,[10] cultivated a skilled workforce and fostered an homogeneous national culture, in line with earlier "turkification" efforts (Ülker 2005), which often included aggressive policies toward minorities. The 1924 Constitution mandated compulsory, free, primary education. The Ministry of Education secularised and centralised all educational institutions, revised curricula, and closed religious schools (*mektep* and *medrese*).[11] Most foreign schools did not survive this centralisation and unification.[12] Following the 1927 census, which revealed an 11 percent literacy rate, the Kemalist reforms defined Turkish as the national language and replaced the Arabic script with Latin in 1928 (Dogan 2022, 2023a).

Education reform drew upon diverse international models, including those of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Japan, and Sweden (Ergün 1990), alongside cooperation with the Soviet Union (Aslan 2020). Western experts were invited to assess the education system and advise on policy. Most expert reports were published by the Ministry in 1939, including those by American sociologists John Dewey (1939) and Beryl Parker (1939); the Hines-Kemmerer committee;

8 The French model of grandes écoles was created during 18th century as higher education institutions operating outside the traditional university structure to train elites as future state officials, selecting their students through a highly competitive process.

9 Bourdieu's (2002) concept of the "state nobility" draws an analogy between ancien régime nobility and graduates of the grandes écoles serving as senior civil servants in contemporary France. Similarly, Ottoman policies, modelled on the French education system, established grandes écoles to (re)produce state elites with shared knowledge and values. See Berkes (1998: 59-65, 173-95) and Ergin (1977) on the creation of military academies for engineering and medicine, as well as grandes écoles for civil servants during the 19th century.

10 Turkey's education policies constitute an example for the constructionist theories of nationalism, with scholars like Gellner (1990) and Hobsbawm (1992).

11 After the abolition of the Sultanate (November 1, 1922) and the proclamation of the Republic (October 29, 1923), the Law on the Unification of Education (March 3, 1924) centralised all educational institutions under the Education Ministry.

12 See Ergin (1977: 2078-2091) on measures regarding foreign schools which survived the transition to nation-state.

Weimar German officer Alfred Kühne (1939); Belgian expert Omer Buyse (1939); and Swiss expert Albert Malche. These studies constituted "series-B" in a collection guiding education policy, second only to "series-A", containing guidelines from President Atatürk and Prime Minister Ismet Inönü. The collection also included "series-C" (Ministry of Education expert reports), "series-D" (reports on foreign education systems), and "series-E" (feedback and recommendations from other ministries).[13]

Malche's report on university reform holds particular significance. Malche (1876-1956), a public administrator and external lecturer at the University of Geneva,[14] was invited in 1932 to assess and advise on higher education, especially for reforming Darülfünun, Turkey's oldest university.[15] From January to May, he conducted site observations, multi-actor surveys, and interviews with political leaders, faculty, and students, submitting his report in June, as agreed with the Turkish ambassador in Bern, who had recruited him (Malche 1939).

Although Malche (1939: 1, 3) claimed to conduct his study "objectively and without prejudice" and, as a foreigner, to have no preconceptions about Turkish higher education, his benchmarks were European and US universities, which by then had already become global benchmarks. He noted that Darülfünun operated "under harsher conditions than its counterparts in Europe" and was incapable of training future professors, who were instead educated abroad (Malche 1939: 4, 14-5, 18).

Malche's observations echoed issues highlighted in other experts' reports, such as material deficiencies, outdated teaching methods, low salaries and poor student living conditions. However, he attributed Darülfünun's "underperformance" not only to material and technical shortcomings but also incorrect policy choices.

Darülfünun was an experimental university founded in the late 19th century and reformed in the early 20th century, inspired by European models (İhsanoğlu 1993). Of all the European academics teaching at the university, the German scholars were the most numerous, numbering at least twenty during WWI. Despite their influence on new institutes and curricula, they were unable to replace the dominant French influence entirely or to determine higher education policy (Dölen 2008: 30-33; Widmann 2000: 61-5). Before their departure in 1918, they recommended reorganising the university in line with the German model, with all powers centralised in the Education Ministry, which would govern the university through an intermediary officer, leaving only symbolic authority to the university president and directors. This recommendation was never implemented (Dölen 2008: 36-38). On the contrary, the regulations enacted between 1919 and 1924 secured the

13 This collection of reports was published upon the initiative of Hasan Ali Yücel (1897-1961), the Minister of Education between 1938 and 1946.

14 A graduate in literature, Malche was secretary general of the Department of Public Instruction (DIP) in the canton of Geneva before being appointed as director of primary education. In 1927, he was elected to the Geneva Council of State with responsibility for the DIP, and in 1931 to the Council of States (the upper chamber of the Swiss Federal Assembly), where he remained until 1951. See his biography at the University of Geneva, where he occasionally lectured (UNIGE 2011).

15 Despite not holding university status, Istanbul had military and civil academies, while Ankara housed a Higher Agricultural School (founded in 1930, it became a university-equivalent Institute in 1933), a Law School (founded in 1925) and other higher education institutions, later incorporated into Ankara University upon its official founding in 1946. The Republic's inherited Ottoman academies functioned as faculties and were gradually annexed by universities. The Ottoman medreses, focused on Islamic theology, were all closed by the 1924 law.

university's financial, administrative and academic autonomy,[16] only to be abandoned by Malche's advice (until 1946[17]).

Criticising Darülfünun's autonomy for turning the university into an insular, introverted institution disconnected from society, Malche (1939) urged governmental oversight. The Ministry of Education was to impose an academic programme to integrate the university within the reform agenda and vice versa, and take over recruitment and faculty decisions to mitigate favouritism and cronyism (Malche 1939: 5, 9-10). The rector, as "a faithful translator and representative of the Ministry", should be assisted by a competent senior civil servant, capable of dialoguing with both foreign and local academics (Malche 1939: 8, 23-4). Criticising lectures as outdated, he recommended restructuring curricula and revising teaching methods and assessments to emphasise practical aspects and applications of courses. Noting that students were not "polyglots" and did not master foreign languages, he advised introducing French and German language courses earlier, during secondary school (Malche 1939: 11, 24-30). He further recommended addressing the lack of scientific literature in Turkish, by investing in translations and original works, and reorganising libraries. His recommendations also encompassed defining recruitment and promotion criteria and restructuring the university's administrative organisation according to Western models (Malche 1939: 30-55).

Malche (1939: 21) concluded, as if he were analysing factory productivity, that "Darülfünun is a large establishment with low output"; and therefore it was necessary to "simplify the machine, condense its operation and provide the best means to the machine operators to avoid any energy loss". He recommended reviewing and reducing the number of faculty members who were overly numerous and lectured only as a secondary occupation due to low academic salaries. Finally, he posited that the university's role was "to disseminate a scientific spirit" urging that it become "an instrument of civilisation", critical to "the intellectual, moral and even social future of Turkey" (Malche 1939: 58).

The Turkish government adopted Malche's recommendations but went even further with reform. In 1933, it replaced Darülfünun with a new institution, appointing Malche to participate more directly in the higher education reform through a new contract.[18] As an expert adviser to the Ministry of Education, vested with extensive authority, Malche served as the principal mediator in the recruitment of exiled academics from Nazi Germany into Turkish civil service and academia, supporting the establishment of the new University of Istanbul and other higher education institutions in the new capital, Ankara.

EMPLOYING EXILED ACADEMICS AS NON-HEGEMONIC EXPERTISE

The Nazi regime's 1933 "Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service" forced many Jewish and politically dissident scholars out of their positions. Despite the efforts by victims and humanitarian organisations, these persecutions were not recognised as an international problem, unlike the refugee waves they triggered, as highlighted by the resignation letter of the American diplomat James G. McDonald, who served as the League of Nations' "High Commissioner for

16 Following the Allied occupation towards the end of WWI, Darülfünun nearly ceased operations. Occupied by British forces, some faculty were arrested and exiled, while most students joined the armed liberation struggle. After the conflict, the 1922 regulation defined Darülfünun as an autonomous public institution, and ended the separation of male and female students (Dölen 2008: 28-9; 41-2).

17 One of the émigré experts, Hirsch (2012) played an important role in the postwar policy re-attributing autonomy to the university.

18 This new contract was signed in 1933 for an additional year. BCA 30-18-1-2_34-16-7 (13.03.1933)

Refugees from Germany". Submitted in late 1935 as an alarming appeal to the international community, his letter warned of "the pauperisation or exile of hundreds of thousands", deprived of "the means of livelihood":

> Government officials, doctors, lawyers, educators, renowned artists and celebrated scientists… The astronomer, the mathematician, the engineer, the chemist, the physicist, the musician, the painter, have not been spared (McDonald 1935: v, 10-11).

Turkey absorbed a segment of this displaced elite. Between 1933 and WWII, dozens of exiled academics – mainly from Germany and Austria – were integrated into Turkish institutions, particularly Istanbul University and new faculties in Ankara. These immigrants brought cutting-edge research, expertise, and know-how, leaving an indelible mark not only on Turkish education reform but also the broader reconstruction of the nascent state. Their contributions are well documented in a rich literature, drawing on Widmann's (2000) doctoral thesis on Turkey's university reform, the detailed research of Reisman (2006) (himself exiled in Soviet Russia), as well as autobiographies and memoirs by exiles like Fritz Neumark (1982), Ernst Hirsch (2012 [1997]), and Philipp Schwartz (2003).

Schwartz (1894-1977), a Hungarian neuropathologist expelled from the University of Frankfurt, had organised in Switzerland an emergency association "Notgemeinschaft" for German scholars in exile.[19] Through Albert Malche's mediation, Schwartz was invited to Ankara, where, in July 1933, he met the Foreign Minister, the Minister of Education and ministry officials. Schwartz and Malche responded to their specific demands, proposing candidates for Turkey's academic vacancies. The resulting five-year contract for thirty-three scholars served as a template for later hires. Schwartz and Malche continued to connect German-speaking academics with opportunities in Turkey.[20] Schwartz returned to Turkey in August 1933, accompanied by the surgeon Prof. Rudolph Nissen, to help organise the new Istanbul University (Schwartz 2003; Widmann 2000: 94-5).

Reisman (2006: 9) estimates that contracts eventually covered 300 academics and 50 technicians, with over a thousand exiles including assistants and accompanying families. He attributes this influx to restrictive immigration policies and anti-Semitism in university and hospital recruitments in Western countries.[21] Most exiles were German and Austrian Jews. A smaller portion comprised anti-Nazi opponents from diverse backgrounds, including liberals, socialists, communists, Catholics or protestants, as well as several academics from Italy and occupied countries like Czechoslovakia and Poland. A few had prior professional experience in Turkey as experts or advisors on the eve of or during WWI.[22]

Neumark (1982) notes that the Turkish government sought to recruit scientists based on Western criteria – primarily academic qualifications – while relying mostly on emigrants' recommendations. Professional and scholarly networks hence played a decisive role in recruitments. Though most hires were men, women also found work in Turkey, albeit mostly among the "little people", technicians,

19 Notgemeinschaft deutscher Wissenschaftler im Ausland (Emergency Association for Exiled German Scholars).

20 Malche, authorised by the Turkish government to negotiate contracts abroad (particularly in Switzerland), facilitated recruitments. The Turkish Ministry of Education predetermined the general contract framework with Malche, Schwartz, and later Nissen. See Neumark's (1982: 10) observations.

21 Reisman (2006: xxiii) testifies this risk himself and through his acquaintances, noting, for example, his shock on reading Albert Einstein's letter in 1936, stating that "he was told explicitly that they did not want to hire Jews at Princeton".

22 For examples, see Neumark (1982: 9).

assistants, nurses and other staff accompanying the "big names" (Erichsen 2005). In a departure from Ottoman tradition, the Republican government had begun to recruit female experts, whose numbers increased with the exiles, although they remained highly disproportionate to male experts in the Turkish civil service. Aligned with the feminist gains in Turkey, such as equal rights and full suffrage (1924-1934), the hiring of women experts in a variety of fields (humanities, education, architecture, medicine, chemistry, etc.) made Turkey's proportion of women academics competitive with that of Western institutions at the time.[23]

Among women experts who acquired international recognition was Hilda Geiringer, a pioneering mathematician in genetics, who joined Istanbul University in 1934 as a professor. She was one member of a distinguished group of mathematicians, which included Richard von Mises and Hans Reichenbach from the "Berlin Circle" and the "Vienna Circle" (Eden and Irzik 2012). This group emigrated from Turkey to the USA in the late 1930s, but Geiringer struggled to secure a satisfactory position due to sexism in university recruitments (Erichsen 2005: 341-2).

Gender specific challenges limiting women exiles' access to employment, with reported discrimination from other host countries (Tuori 2022) were also observed in Turkey, where institutions displayed a similar "patriarchal structure" (Erichsen 2005). The case of Erna Eckstein, who unlike her husband did not receive a work permit in Turkey despite her expertise as a paediatrician, exemplifies gender inequalities in this exile context. Maksudyan (2024a) examines Erna Eckstein's informal contributions to Turkey's development, particularly regarding children's health and welfare through volunteer work and contributions to her husband Albert Eckstein's activities, while raising their three children.

Like Erna Eckstein, women who accompanied their husbands into exile in Turkey played a central role in forging a community of German-speaking, mostly Jewish, emigrants in Istanbul and Ankara. This community sustained their solidarity through regular social and sporting activities, clubs, and excursions, creating a supportive network that likely eased their integration into Turkish society despite the significant challenges.[24]

CHALLENGES OF INTEGRATING FOREIGN EXPERTISE INTO TURKISH PUBLIC SERVICE

The integration of immigrant experts into Turkish public service faced multifaceted challenges stemming from material constraints, cultural differences, and geopolitical tensions. These issues were compounded by the gap between reform ambitions and the realities of implementing such wide-scale transformations.

The reform began with high-profile consultations. Nobel laureate physicists James Franck and Max Born, along with mathematician Richard Courant – former heads of Göttingen University's institutes – joined Philipp Schwartz in assessing the new Istanbul University.[25] All three were affected by the

23 According to Erichsen (2005: 339), the proportion of women academics and professionals hired by the Turkish government mirrored the situation in Germany. Of the estimated 1000 exiles who emigrated to Turkey, including academics, specialists and support staff and their families, approximately 300 were women, primarily working in chemistry, biology and various medical fields (Erichsen 2005: 339-40).

24 See also Hirsch's (2012) and Neumark's (1982) accounts of the exile community in Istanbul.

25 For more background information, see Georgiadou (2004) and Eden & Irzik (2012).

Nazi Civil Service Law. Born, actively engaged in the Notgemeinschaft, connected Schwartz with Courant and Franck in Zurich.

Upon receiving the offer relayed by Schwartz to lead Istanbul University's new mathematics institute, Courant sought advice from Constantin Carathéodory, a Greek mathematician whose father had served as an Ottoman diplomat. In his July 1933 letter, Courant inquired about the salary (500 Turkish lire/month), living conditions, and the feasibility of the reform project, expressing his preference to conduct negotiations "in accordance with the German authorities and [...] Germany's interests".[26] His visit to Istanbul a few months later confirmed his decision to decline the offer.

At the end of their visit, Courant and Franck reported their observations in October 1933 to the Rockefeller Foundation, which followed the process closely. Their report emphasised the Turkish government's aspiration "to create a promising scientific centre in Istanbul, which should contribute to the development of higher education in Turkey". However, it also highlighted the "miserable" condition "of the so-called university" deeming it inadequate to emulate European standards in the near future. The report noted significant hurdles, including language barriers, insufficient institutes, equipment, apparatus, and library resources, which would demand considerable organisational efforts from the professors involved. It observed that students and assistants were "not yet sufficiently trained for a true cultivation of the sciences". Courant and Franck added their "impression that out of a certain ignorance the Turks underestimate these problems and are of the opinion that merely adding a line-up of recognised scholars, would be sufficient to start up a real university".[27]

During this period, Schwartz (2003) also contacted the Rockefeller Foundation's European office seeking financial assistance for the integration of exiles in Turkey. However, the Foundation's annual reports do not indicate any funding other than a limited contribution to the Ankara Central Institute of Hygiene, which had been granted previously in 1929 for four years.[28] The exiles' transnational scholarly network helped reinforce ties with this influential American foundation, which was engaged in extending and consolidating US hegemony globally (see Parmar 2014). Its philanthropic activities, especially in health and education, grew over the coming years, becoming a major stronghold of US intellectual and political influence in Turkey (Erken 2020).

While Turkey later received Western military and economic aid during and after WWII, external funding during the early Republican period was minimal, with the exception of Soviet development aid for Turkey's first industrial plan in the early 1930s (Dogan 2022; Ilkin and Tekeli 2009). Allocating resources to scientific institutions required substantial sacrifice in the context of financial difficulties exacerbated by the Great Depression and sovereign debt obligations.

The material deficiencies of Turkish institutions and infrastructural problems were a recurring issue highlighted in expert reports and exiled academics' memoirs. These scholars faced the daunting task of building facilities, libraries, and laboratories from scratch, training local staff and developing

26 According to Georgiadou (2004: 283-4), Courant either refused to recognise the dramatic political change, believing that the Nazis would not remain in power for long, or perhaps was only trying to avoid the tax imposed on those fleeing Germany (Reichsfluchtsteuer), by attempting to acquire official authorisation. See a copy of Courant's letter to Carathéodory in Georgiadou (2004: 282-3).

27 This report (October 25, 1933) is quoted and analysed by Reisman (2007a: 268-70).

28 The Foundation's annual reports from 1929 to 1935, along with Erken (2020: 20-3) and Erdem and Rose (2000), detail the Rockefeller Foundation's interest and activity in Turkey, which almost exclusively focused on public health before 1940.

teaching materials.[29] Their achievements ranged from simple arrangements for importing basic equipment to establishing Turkey's first observatories, zoos, and botanical gardens. Yet the lack of resources, including qualified personnel, remained a challenge.

Liselotte Dieckmann (1964: 124), who taught foreign languages at Istanbul University (1935-1937), described "tragicomic stories" about the lack of infrastructure and qualified support staff. Similarly, Erich Auerbach, Chair of Western Languages and Literatures (1936-1947), noted in a personal letter:

> We have certainly achieved a lot at the university, but not nearly as much as would have been possible; the uncertain and often amateurish policies of the administration make work very difficult, although it must be admitted that it is not easy for them; I have learned here how difficult it is to Europeanise a non-European country in a short time.[30]

This Eurocentric framing aligned with their assigned role: identifying and bridging the gaps between Turkey and Europe. The challenges had a distinct anthropological dimension as Auerbach wrote to his close friend Walter Benjamin:

> The enormous amount of difficulties, trouble, obstructionism and mismanagement on the part of the local authorities and from the local circumstances, which is driving some colleagues to despair, is not unpleasant for me, because it is far more interesting as an object of observation than the possible goal of my work.[31]

Erika Bruck, a young doctor who later became a paediatrics professor in New York, likewise found her Turkish experience deepened her understanding of public health and medical practice despite resource constraints:

> I learned […] how to achieve goals […] without using tools that are considered indispensable in Central Europe. Through contact with Turkish students, patients and – during trips to Anatolia […] – ordinary Turks in small towns and villages, I learned a lot about the influence of school education, public hygiene, the environment, etc. on the health of individuals and the population as a whole (cited by Erichsen 2005: 346).

Contracts (typically 3-5 years) required scholars to make substantial investments in their roles, including developing curricula and textbooks, preparing expert reports upon request, and learning Turkish. Until proficiency, they taught with translators, often Turkish assistants assigned to work alongside and learn from them. This clause was a new policy agreed upon with Notgemeinschaft representatives and Malche, whose 1932 report (1939) highlighted that, apart from a minority of

29 The paediatrician Erika Bruck exemplifies these efforts: "we built a pretty good laboratory from nothing. We made urease for determining urea in blood ourselves, if I remember correctly, from soybeans. Among other things, there were no trained laboratory technicians in Turkey other than the Germans, no distilled water, which we had to produce ourselves for years, no apparatus or glassware" (cited by Erichsen 2005: 345).

30 Letter of 22.6.[19]46 to Dr. Martin Hellweg. We Refugees. Erich Auerbach: "Everything is provisional". https://en.we-refugees-archive.org/archive/erich-auerbach-everything-is-provisional/

31 Erich Auerbach (1892-1957) is considered the founder of the discipline of comparative literature. See a copy of the letter in online archives of We Refugees. Erich Auerbach to Walter Benjamin: Istanbul – Paris 1937. https://en.we-refugees-archive.org/archive/erich-auerbach-to-walter-benjamin-istanbul-paris-1937/

students trained in European languages in elite secondary schools, the overwhelming majority of students did not understand European languages.[32]

As in other host countries (Tuori 2022), the language barrier posed the greatest difficulty for integration, and was a motivating factor for returning home after the war, as reported by immigrant scholars (Hirsch 2012; Neumark 1982). Some, like Hirsch (2012: 216-7), were convinced of the necessity to learn and teach in Turkish without translators. Hirsch noted that Turkish translators (scholars, assistants and students) struggled with technical and discipline-specific terminology, a challenge compounded by the evolving terminology. Initiated just months before the negotiations with Schwartz and Malche in 1933, the linguistic reform had destabilised Turkish grammar and vocabulary. Hirsch (2012: 218-9) complained that Ottoman terms learned by foreign academics between 1933 and 1936 were soon replaced – a result of both linguistic reform and broader state transformation. For instance, social scientists and jurists like Hirsch (2012: 218) studied Islamic legal terminology, only to find it obsolete after the legal reforms and secularisation.

While contributing to Turkey's national construction, their ambiguous status as foreigners in local institutions presented challenges for Turkish authorities. The government grappled with balancing foreign and national staff, avoiding potential interference, and managing the financial burden of employing esteemed scientists amid severely constrained budgetary resources. These difficulties are partly reflected in Prime Minister Ismet Pasha's reply to Albert Einstein's appeal in September 1933. Einstein, writing "in his capacity as Honorary President of the Union des Sociétés OSE", a Paris-based humanitarian organisation, requested Ismet Pasha "to allow forty professors and doctors from Germany to continue their scientific and medical work in Turkey", offering to work without pay for a year.[33] The plea, delivered by Samy Gunzberg, a Jewish dentist in Istanbul, included a Turkish translation and an explanatory note, highlighting the credentials of these professors from elite German universities and young doctors trained by leading experts. Gunzberg emphasised that while he had recommended they submit an official application to the Turkish embassies, the request came from "this community", to forward the letter of "the famous Professor Alber Aynişitayin" (Einstein) from the "Jewish Health Society known as OSE".[34]

Handwritten notes in Turkish on Einstein's letter indicates that the Ministry of Education deemed the proposal "incompatible with regulations", particularly regarding unpaid work, and "the prevailing conditions". Ismet Pasha's response explained that his government had already contracted over forty professors and doctors with similar qualities and "political situation", working "in accordance with existing laws and regulations". He declined Einstein's request, citing concerns about maintaining internal balances: "We are currently working to ensure the smooth running of the delicate mechanism constituted by an organism containing members of very different origins, cultures and languages".[35]

Despite this refusal, Turkey continued recruiting exiled scientists and professionals in public service. This policy, in its early stages during the correspondence with Einstein, expanded considerably in the following years. The government's preference for structured collaborations (e.g., with

32 Archive files indicate that neither foreign recruitments during the Ottoman era (including German professors hired at Darülfünun during WWI) nor those of the early Republican period before the massive recruitment of exiles from 1933 onward imposed such an obligation.

33 The original letter is in English. BCA 30-10-0-0_116-810-3 (14.11.1933).

34 The original note is in Turkish. Loc. cit.

35 Original letter is in French. Loc. cit.

Notgemeinschaft) over ad hoc humanitarian appeals was not only because the former responded to their expectations and requirements. It is also possible that the government refrained from engaging with a transnational organisation affiliated with a local ethno-religious minority community, viewing any form of international humanitarianism as potentially imperialist (Liebisch-Gümüş 2020) due to earlier experiences of foreign interference through local Christian communities in the Ottoman era (Rodogno 2012).

With its history of state violence against minorities and turkification policies adapted to the ethno-national state model prevalent in the global community (Liebisch-Gümüş 2020), 1930s Turkey was far from an inclusive society. Exiles fleeing Nazism faced a precarious situation, worsened by rising global xenophobia and antisemitism, especially for German-speaking immigrants as international tensions escalated toward WWII (Reisman 2006: 259-291; Tomenendal et al., 2010). While Turkey struggled to maintain neutrality amid geopolitical threats, its "small state diplomacy" (Weisband 1973) – involving compromises with Nazi Germany – affected exile's living conditions. Germany actively pursued propaganda activities in Turkey, especially in cultural and educational fields (Glasneck 1966), and monitored émigrés,[36] even revoking their citizenship. Contrary to its expectations, Turkey did not expel denationalised individuals, even though statelessness created administrative hurdles. In fact, there are no known cases of involuntary return from Turkey to Nazi territories (Erichsen 2005: 343). When Turkey joined the Allies late in WWII, German citizens faced internment in Anatolian cities for months, though most émigré scholars were exempted.[37]

For many exiles, Turkey was a temporary refuge. Its peripheral position in global fields limited scholars' international visibility and recognition, symbolic resources that were essential for establishing scholarly identities. For example, Hilda Geiringer's innovative work went unrecognised in the 1930s, according to Reisman (2006: 216), mainly because she conducted her research and published in Turkey. Reisman notes that such symbolic barriers drove top scientists to leave for US institutions when possible.

In conclusion, Turkey's integration of transnational expertise was marked by a mix of achievements and challenges. The contributions of these elites to science and development were substantial. However, the difficulties they encountered stemming from language barriers, resource constraints, geopolitical tensions, symbolic dynamics and local resistance – as we explore in the next section – reflected broader tensions between official ambitions and practical realities.

DISCONTENT AMONG TURKISH SCHOLARS AND ANTI-REFORMIST TENDENCIES

The position of exiles as a sizable minority supported by government policies was both strong and fragile. Managing diversity and multiculturalism – characteristic features of the previous Ottoman state – posed challenges for the nationalist regime as potential sources of inner conflict and instability. Balancing foreign and national staff in public institutions became a major concern as migrant scholars grew in number and faced resistance from locals.

36 The German embassy collected information on émigrés in Turkey, even directly contacting them with a questionnaire that inquired about their non-Aryan origins or relatives. A copy of this questionnaire is archived online at We Refugees. "Questionnaire from the German Consulate General in Istanbul to Fritz Neumark, May 1938" https://en.we-refugees-archive.org/archive/questionnaire-from-the-german-consulate-general-in-istanbul-to-fritz-neumark-may-1938/#.

37 For an analysis on the internment experience of a scientist in exile, indologist Walter Ruben, see Maksudyan (2024b).

The situation at Istanbul University was emblematic. From 1933 to 1934, foreign academics and technicians, mostly German immigrants, comprised over a quarter of the staff.[38] During the following nine years, German-speaking émigrés filled 80 percent of faculty chairs (Erichsen 2005: 340). Despite their contributions to the development of the new university and faculties, they reportedly encountered resistance, and in some cases, open hostility from Turkish academics.[39]

This resistance stemmed partly from fears of replacement. In fact, this is exactly what happened when the Law No. 2252 (31 May 1933) abolished Darülfünun and established Istanbul University overnight on the same campus, dismissing nearly two-thirds of the staff (Dölen 2010; İhsanoğlu 1993).

While dismissed scholars protested to the authorities and in the press, state authorities publicly defended the reform. Press articles like "We will Occidentalize also in science" ("İlimde de garplılaşacağız" 1933) quoted Education Minister Reşit Galip, framing the new university as a rupture with Darülfünun's alleged indifference to the ongoing "revolutionary" policies transforming Turkey. The reform committee also briefed the press on the criteria for faculty selection, based on academic background, experience, age, and potential for future contributions ("Universite kadrosu" 1933; "Üniversite ıslahat heyetine hücumlar" 1933.) The committee, led by Malche, consisted of expert panels for each faculty that decided who would remain or leave, favouring younger scholars educated in Western universities with active, internationally recognised publications.[40] Over 100 foreign professors were contracted within just two months, to staff the university for the 1933–1934 academic year.[41] Both Ankara and Istanbul institutions continued recruiting foreign academics in subsequent years.

For Turkish academics who retained their positions, the changes were dramatic. German-speaking scholars dominated not only in numbers, but also in positions of power. Many were granted the exceptional status of "Ordinarius", as a highest possible rank. Occupying institute, faculty and department chairs, émigrés exerted extensive authority over administrative decisions, including hiring, promotions and awarding degrees.

These power asymmetries were also reflected in remuneration disparities. Reisman (2006: 522, 2007a: 261-3) notes that an Ordinarius earned 600 Turkish liras per month – 100 liras more than the Prime Minister's salary. Neumark (1982: 11) emphasises that Turkish colleagues typically earned

38 According to Widmann's (2000: 107-9, 118) data, Istanbul University already had 42 (23 percent) foreigners alongside 138 Turkish academics in 1933. Including assistants and technicians, the total staff in 1933-1934 was approximately 323, with 85 (26 percent) being foreign. There were more exiled academics in medicine and science, and fewer in law and literature. Besides Germans, British, French, and other European (Hungarian, Swiss, etc.) professors also taught at Turkish higher education institutions (Dölen 2010).

39 Hirsch (2012: 212-4) and Neumark (1982: 9), among others, emphasise this resistance at first hand. See also Reisman (2007b) who reveals testimonies in exiles' correspondences.

40 Malche administered a questionnaire to gather information on Darülfünun scholars' qualifications, publications and foreign languages. Following interviews, he selected three scholars for each faculty expert committee and collaborated with them to determine the academic staff ("Universite kadrosu" 1933). For more information, see Dölen (2010).

41 The expert committee member highlighted in his press declaration that this was a very short time period to enrol foreign scholars, sharing an anecdote by Malche who apparently struggled for many years just to invite one scholar from Suede when he was working for the Swiss Education Ministry. He explained also that the conditions required for these recruitments were rather difficult as besides scientific excellence they sought for the capacity of "scientific adaptation" especially the obligation of learning Turkish just in three years ("Universite kadrosu" 1933).

less than half, or even a quarter, of émigré salaries.[42] Archives reveal even starker gaps: foreign academics could receive around 1000 liras, approximately 12 times more than a Turkish professor.[43] These disparities mirrored Ottoman-era pay gaps between European experts and locals.[44]

Such inequalities were glaring, especially given Turkey's financial difficulties and substantial debt, which initially raised doubts among invited experts regarding the government's capacity to honour its promises (Neumark 1982: 11-3). The privileges granted to foreign staff – including free housing, tax exemptions, and personal assistants – further fuelled discontent among local scholars. This resentment – or "jealousy", as émigrés described it (Hirsch 2012: 213; Neumark 1982: 12) – likely contributed to stigma and discrimination. Hirsch (2012: 212-4) notes the émigrés' own role in this dynamic: many displayed cultural superiority, constantly comparing local culture and conditions unfavourably to their homeland while maintaining parallel lifestyles and resisting adaptation. Their "individualist" approach and "arrogant", even "contemptuous" attitudes hindered both integration into Turkish society and solidarity within the immigrant community, which might otherwise have led to collective action or resistance against their Turkish colleagues. Instead, most viewed themselves as a "special" Western elite (Hirsch 2012: 213). This perception of superiority was reinforced by the recognition they received from the Turkish authorities as agents of European-oriented modernisation.

Turkish scholars expressed their discontent in various ways, including anti-reformist tendencies (Neumark 1982; Hirsch 2012). The hostile environment drove some émigrés to leave, like Herbert and Liselotte Dieckmann, who departed for the USA in 1938 after teaching languages at Istanbul University for three years. Liselotte explained this with bitterness:

> Atatürk had indeed consulted his government when he invited the German academics, but not his Turkish professors. The foreigners were simply placed before them one day and they reacted accordingly [...] Before the war, there were probably never any arrests or punishments among the foreigners – only the Turkish professors were ruthlessly dismissed or disciplined in other ways. But there was an atmosphere of mutual mistrust that made any cooperation almost impossible [...] And so, one by one, we left a country that had so much beauty and interest to offer, but that could not absorb us. Most of us went to America before the war, where, adapting after the Turkish experience was child's play (Dieckmann 1964: 125-6).

The ideological underpinnings of this resistance were complex. Not all intellectuals were in favour of all the far-reaching reforms that were transforming Turkey at an unprecedented pace, but even those who supported this social change were not necessarily convinced of the central role assigned to

42 Neumark notes that their untaxed wages varied between 500 and 600 lire and had a fairly high purchasing power.

43 According to the 1933 budget of Istanbul University, Turkish professors earned around 80-90 liras and assistant professors 50-60 liras. BCA 30-10-0-0_141-12-1 (16.11.1933). The salaries of "ecnebi" (foreign) Ordinarius are left blank in this table. However, according to other archival documents and the press ("Universite kadrosu" 1933), the salaries offered to foreign academics ranged from 500 liras for regulars to 800 and 1000 liras for distinguished professors such as Nobel laureates.

44 See Dölen (2008: 33-4) on the contracts of German scholars who worked at Darülfünun between 1915 and 1918. Their monthly salary, which was, in most cases, either 750 or 1000 liras, was multiple times higher than the salary of local professors.

foreign experts in the process. As Auerbach summarised in a letter, they were distrusted as foreigners.[45]

At the same time, however, Widmann (2000: 109-13) highlights the considerable support for the reforms and migrant experts among Turkish academics, students, and the general public, particularly due to German doctors' visible impact in university hospitals. The government communicated regularly with them, taking their advice on measures to facilitate their work, whether through new legislation or even the replacement of the university rector and administrators. The new rector met regularly with professors and informed the Prime Minister of the positive feedback from foreign academics on the university reform, quoting the German physicist Friedrich Dessauer's remark that it had "achieved in one year what Western universities could do in ten years".[46]

Neumark (1982: 11-2) notes that the government treated foreign experts' living and working conditions as a matter of "national prestige". Despite the numerous challenges of exile, these transnational actors integrated as a protected minority elite, endowed with financial, social and political privileges. This support fostered what Reisman (2006: 258-9) describes as an "esprit de corps" commitment to Turkey's modernisation.

The cooperation of governmental and other local actors, including colleagues, students and patients, hence proved as crucial as institutional arrangements in empowering them as modernising experts. Their extensive autonomy and authority over hiring, promotion, curricula, research practices and processes of expertise allowed them to act as agents of change, restructuring science, education and research, and shaping state reforms and public policies in their respective fields.

Although the exiles became the absolute majority, not all foreign experts in Turkish civil service were exiles. In addition to the French, Swiss and other nationalities, there were also Germans on secondment or temporary assignment from the Nazi government in Turkish public administrations and educational institutions. We address the challenges posed by Nazi cultural diplomacy in the following section.

CULTURAL DIPLOMACY IN A CONTEXT OF RISING INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS

Germany's influence on the late Ottoman Empire, solidified through the deployment of German officials in its military and civil administration (Ortaylı 1981), had lasting effects, even after defeat in WWI and Turkey's subsequent move under Mustafa Kemal towards greater independence from foreign powers. This persistence was underpinned by pro-German factions in the Republic's bureaucracy and army, including state elites trained in German institutions, as well as Germany's continued investment in maintaining influence. Nazi Germany particularly focused its propaganda efforts on cultural and educational fields, as evidenced by a 1935 report from the Nazi Ministry of Education, praising German experts in Turkey for advancing Germany's intellectual and economic influence (Glasneck 1966).

45 Letter of May 27, 1938, to Johannes Oeschger, We Refugees. "Erich Auerbach on the situation for exiles in Turkey". https://en.we-refugees-archive.org/archive/erich-auerbach-on-the-situation-for-exiles-in-turkey/

46 See Cemil Bilsel's report of 1935, a year after he took office as the new rector of Istanbul University. BCA 30-10-0-0_142-13- 6 (01.06.1935).

The most revealing insight into German cultural imperialism comes from Herbert Scurla's comprehensive report to the "Reich" Ministry of Science, Education, and Culture.[47] Completed after his mission to Istanbul and Ankara in May 1939, following his first investigation in 1937, this document clearly demonstrates how cultural diplomacy served Nazi ambitions and interests. In continuity with earlier German foreign policy, the Nazi government actively worked to secure expert and academic positions in Turkish public institutions for seconded German civil servants.

A key German stronghold was the Ankara Higher Institute of Agriculture (YZE), established in 1930 on a German-inspired scientistic model,[48] with the assistance of a German expert committee invited by the Turkish government in 1928. Its original faculty included four German professors and one Luxembourgian, all working under the rectorate of the German economist and agronomist Prof. Falke. Between 1933 and 1938, approximately twenty-five additional German scholars – including at least four exiles – joined to develop and lead new departments.[49] During this period, the Institute operated predominantly in German, with Turkish assistants (many of whom had been trained in Germany) providing translations. German academics also held key positions in other Ankara institutions, particularly the Faculty of Languages, History and Geography.

However, this German dominance began to decline in 1938 when the Nazi government recalled Falke, followed by other German faculty departures during the war years. By 1942, the YZE had no German professors except for a few exiles, and leadership roles passed to a new generation of Turkish scholars, who had trained under the German faculty (Widmann 2000: 66-9).

Scurla's 1939 report reveals his frustration at the decline of Nazi influence since his first visit in 1937, exposing the tensions underlying this reversal. While German diplomacy viewed the Ankara Institute as a stronghold of extra-territorial influence managed by German academics on secondment, Scurla's report (2009 [1939]) documented growing resistance from Turkish authorities. As an agent of Nazi cultural imperialism, Scurla particularly resented measures reducing the dominance of German language at the Institute.[50] He emphasised the strategies of the Turkish Ministry of Agriculture to take control of the Institute, to reduce and limit the role of Germans and to balance it by bringing in "Turkish elements who had been kept away from it, thanks to the energetic efforts of Professor Gleisberg when he was rector" (Scurla 2009 [1939]: 42). Under the pretext of financial difficulties, the Ministry refused to hire new German academics or renew existing contracts. It rejected the "diplomatic channel for appointments", and restricted faculty communications and relations with the German embassy. Furthermore, despite German efforts, "the school remain[ed] outside the scope of decisions on agricultural policy", being unable to influence policy makers (Scurla 2009 [1939]: 43-6).

47 Halm and Şen (2009) published a "revised and corrected" version of this report translated into French in their book, which includes a second part prepared by Hoss (2009) on the biographies of the exiles cited by Scurla as well as other historical documents (letters, reports, photographs, etc.). The following citations are my own translation from French.

48 According to the official institutional history, Ankara Higher Agriculture College, established in 1930, "adopted the German education system" and was transformed into Higher Agriculture Institute (Yüksek Ziraat Enstitüsü) in October 1933, with faculties of Agriculture, Forestry, Veterinary, Natural Sciences and Arts. It aimed "to modernise the Turkish agriculture, scientifically define its problems and find solutions, educate Higher Agricultural Engineers to serve Turkish agricultural sector, and for research and education purposes in the field of agriculture". Ankara University Faculty of Agriculture. "History". http://www.agri.ankara.edu.tr/en/about-us/

49 See the lists provided by Widmann (2000: 67-9).

50 Turkish authorities had recently abolished the requirement to write the final dissertation in German (Scurla 2009 [1939]: 49).

This resistance had emerged as a "revenge of the context" (Olivier de Sardan 2021). Scurla (2009 [1939]: 43-4) attributed this backlash to the design of the Institute itself, which was "copied from the German model", and "neither its internal structure nor the objectives it had set itself corresponded to the concrete needs of the country". Reporting that parliamentary critics had noted the school's failure to improve Turkish agriculture, Scurla ironically criticised the lack of expertise of officials recruited on the recommendation of German authorities. In particular, he criticised Falke, who was serving as an advisor to the Ministry of Agriculture, for his ignorance of Anatolian agricultural conditions, geological and demographic factors, and climate, his mechanical transplantation ("too much inspiration") of German models in organising the university and poor hiring decisions ("unfortunate choices") for German faculty.

Scurla (2009 [1939]: 44) also blamed the "damaging influence" and "activity of emigrants appointed as experts to the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Economy" for amplifying local resistance. His report disparaged these émigrés, and advocated their replacement by Nazi state scientists to serve the political and economic interests of the "Third Reich".

Part of Scurla's report was devoted to his proposals for filling academic vacancies in Ankara. Of particular importance among these strategic appointments was the technology chair, given Germany's interest "in the exchange of high added-value products value with Turkey". Scurla (2009 [1939]: 54) noted with concern that American and Belgian specialists dominated textile research in Turkey, arguing that, "sending a German fibre specialist would also be important for our economic policy", mirroring "similar efforts in Yugoslavia and Romania". While the Minister of Agriculture had nominated Dr Baade, an émigré expert of the ministry, his "appointment was successfully rejected by the university". Instead, Scurla recommended Dr Wilbrandt, who, unknown to the Nazi ministries, had been an expert in the Turkish Ministry of Economy since 1934, and "according to information from the Secret State Police, there [was] nothing against him, either politically or criminally". Although Wilbrandt remained "rather indifferent to the German cause in Turkey" and "isolated [...] from the German colony", Scurla (2009 [1939]: 50) considered him ideal for the position due to his familiarity with "the Turkish situation".

Biographical research reveals Hans Wilbrandt as a political exile who fled to Turkey in 1934 (Hoss 2009: 207-8). He was active in refugee aid organisations, chairing the Istanbul branch of the Nazi Victims Aid Committee, established by the American IRRC trade unions. Wilbrandt refused the German government's order to join the army in 1944. He was briefly interned with his family after Turkey joined the Allies towards the end of WWII and, once released, resumed his commercial activities in Istanbul before returning to Germany in 1952 to work on development aid at the Kiel Institute.

German surveillance by the embassy, the secret service, commissioned officers like Scurla and seconded experts, was extensive but imperfect. Scurla perhaps also misjudged Christiansen-Weniger, an agricultural expert working for Turkey from 1923. Scurla, portrayed him as ""the most influential German expert at the Ministry" who had "proved himself in the field of cultural policy", having "consistently shown a loyal attitude to the Reich"; and whose "children attend the embassy school and are members of the Hitler Youth". His biography by Hoss (2009: 133-4) claims, however, that his children were associated with this Nazi group against his will, and that "all the members of 'German Colony B', as the exiles in Ankara jokingly called themselves, knew that he was hostile to the Third Reich". Christiansen-Weniger likely operated as a double agent until 1940 when he was appointed as director of an agricultural research institute in occupied Poland. He later returned to the Ankara embassy in 1952 as an agricultural advisor until retirement.

The divide between the "German colony" of the embassy ("Colony A") and the exiles ("Colony B") was less absolute than Scurla assumed, with many maintaining cross-group relationships.[51] In his "Critical Remarks on the Scurla Report" (2009), Neumark notes, despite embassy support, Scurla failed to persuade the Turkish authorities to replace the exiles with "loyal" Germans, underestimating Turkish diplomacy and commitment to independence.

Further research could determine whether Scurla's report reflects broader patterns and strategies of other states exporting expertise. Our analysis reveals how expertise is instrumentalised for indirect influence supported by cultural diplomacy. It also shows that the Turkish authorities were aware of the risks of employing foreign experts and developed effective counter-strategies to mitigate them.

ÉMIGRÉ EXPERTS' CONTRIBUTIONS TO STATE BUILDING

Neumark (1982: 4-7) observes that while a few countries hosted more exiles numerically, their relative impact in Turkey was more significant due to their proportion among the literate population. His own trajectory exemplifies this multilevel influence. Dismissed from his position in Germany in 1933 under anti-Semitic laws, Neumark relocated to Istanbul with his family and taught economics at the Faculty of Law. He led the establishment of the Faculty of Economics and created a transnational scientific platform through the faculty journal he directed. Neumark learned Turkish and contributed extensively to economic sciences in Turkey with his numerous publications. His transnational networks facilitated scientific exchanges, inviting European scholars to lecture at Istanbul University while reciprocally lecturing at institutions like the Sorbonne and Collège de France. In parallel, he contributed to public policy as an advisor to the Ministry of Finance, leading Turkey's tax reforms. After returning to Germany in 1950, Neumark continued to serve in academic and advisory capacities and headed the European Fiscal Committee on tax harmonisation. He leveraged his expertise on Turkey for the benefit of the German state, accompanying political leaders on state visits and advising successive governments until his death (Andic and Andic 1981; Hoss 2009: 174-6; Neumark 1982).

Neumark's (2009: 108) reflections on "Atatürk, founder of a modern and progressive Western-style republic" illustrate his assimilation of Kemalist discourse and interpretation of modernisation as Westernisation. Like Neumark, many émigrés embraced Turkish values, while simultaneously promoting cultural references rooted in their German-Western background, and contributed to social change with a Eurocentric viewpoint. Turkish leaders anticipated this dynamic, desiring the consequent hybridisation based on values they considered universal.

However, some exiles viewed this process critically, often through Orientalist lenses. For instance, in his letter to Walter Benjamin, Auerbach described Turkey's secular, modernising approach as:

> …a fanatical anti-traditional nationalism: rejection of all existing Mohammedan cultural traditions, connection to a fantasised original Turkishness, technical modernisation in the European sense to defeat the hated and admired Europe with its own weapons: hence the preference for European-trained emigrants as teachers, from whom one can learn without having to fear foreign propaganda. The result: nationalism in the superlative with the simultaneous destruction of the historical national character.[52]

51 See for example Eckstein's family friendships in Maksudyan (2024a).

52 See a copy of the letter in online archives of We Refugees. Erich Auerbach to Walter Benjamin: Istanbul – Paris 1937. https://en.we-refugees-archive.org/archive/erich-auerbach-to-walter-benjamin-istanbul-paris-1937/

This critique parallels Kemalist rupture narratives emphasising a sharp break from Ottoman history and traditions, while oversimplifying Turkey's complex transformation. Continuities with Ottoman knowledge transaction policies and the global context of the travelling models during the transition from empire to nation-state (Dogan 2021, 2022) invite a reconsideration of Turkish nation-building and modernisation as a negotiated synthesis, blending diverse governance traditions and epistemologies. Transnational experts formed just one contingent among diverse actors shaping state development (Dogan 2024). Even the German-speaking émigrés, who constituted the majority of Turkey's transnational experts, encompassed a great diversity of intellectual traditions, scientific and disciplinary approaches and political orientations – from social-democrats like Fritz Baade to communists like Margarete Schütte-Lihotzky, from socialists like Ernst Reuter to ordoliberals like Wilhelm Röpke and Alexander Rüstow.

Despite limited resources, émigré experts made distinctive contributions to Turkey's transformation, leaving an intellectual and institutional legacy that endured for generations. They spearheaded university reform, constructed a new international scientific library with their works and translations, and trained future generations across multiple sectors – from public administrators to teachers, scientists and private professionals. They made a significant contribution to language reform and Turkification, playing a key role in establishing a new lexical and semantic repertoire. They worked in terminology commissions, produced lexicons and dictionaries, and translated scientific and literary works (Berk-Albachten 2010). Spanning multiple fields such as law, economics, medicine, chemistry, anthropology, and other professional and scientific disciplines, these efforts created spaces of equivalence with European scientific and professional worlds. As advisors to public authorities, they set policy agendas, diagnosed social problems, and devised solutions in their fields of specialisation.

Among the most influential groups were economists, sociologists and jurists, many of whom were social reformers in their home countries. These social scientists played key roles in shaping economic and social policies and regulations in Turkey. Gerard Kessler, for example, taught labour economics at Istanbul University, introduced a sociology and social policy programme and with his students, established the first Turkish labour union. Ernst Reuter, socialist politician, public administrator and academic, contributed significantly to urban planning and collaborated with Turkish ministries to build public transport systems in Turkish cities. Planning Ankara's construction in the Anatolian steppes, Reuter collaborated with the famous Austrian architect Margarete Schütte-Lihotzky who had previously planned and built entire cities in the USSR's Siberian region. According to Reisman (2006: 45), Schütte-Lihotzky not only embodied the figure of a competent female professional idealised by the Kemalist modernisation project, but also brought innovative designs for working-class housing especially adapted for working women. Architects contributed to new Turkey's construction in very literal terms. Among the professors of architecture of Istanbul faculties, for example, Clemens Holzmeister and Bruno Taut designed educational institutions and iconic public buildings including the parliament and its ministries.[53]

One of the most numerous groups among the exiles was the health professionals, who modernised public health in Turkey. Albert Eckstein, a renowned paediatrician, exemplifies this contribution. Expelled from the Dusseldorf Medical Academy for being Jewish, Eckstein found refuge in Ankara in 1935, accepting the Turkish government's offer to head the paediatric clinic of Numune hospital.

53 Holzmeister's verbal autobiography includes his positive impressions of his experience in Turkey. SALT research archives. "Verbal autobiography of Clemens Holzmeister" https://archives.saltresearch.org/handle/123456789/5260

Alongside his wife Erna, also a paediatrician, Eckstein conducted extensive field trips to Anatolian villages, studying children's health conditions and advising the ministry.[54] Their efforts helped spotlight issues like infant mortality and led to concrete measures to combat diseases (Akar et al., 2007; Maksudyan 2024a).

In addition to these sectors, exiled scholars made significant contributions across various fields, including astronomy, pharmacology, chemistry, biology, mathematics, and physics. Archaeologists, philologists, historians, museologists, librarians, archivists and others contributed through their collaborations with the public authorities and the Turkish Historical Society (Türk Tarih Kurumu) to imagine the Turkish nation (for examples, see Resiman 2006: 61-86). Artists founded conservatories, art academies and symphony orchestras, and introduced opera to Turkey (Resiman 2006: 87-104). Through public policy, research, education, technology and the arts, these transnational experts contributed to shaping Turkey's national identity and development trajectory in dialogue with global modernity.

CONCLUSION

This analysis highlights the impact of North-South scientific circulations on Turkey's development, showing how scientific expertise was woven into governing practices – indeed operationalising the very nationalisation of state-society – and characterised by transnationalism. By historicising the internationalisation of science and its role in governance, it contributes to scholarship challenging the assumed novelty of these phenomena and exposing the unequal structures underpinning knowledge circulations (Benz et al., 2024).

Turkey's selective appropriation of Western models produced a hybrid system that was simultaneously outward-looking (seeking global validation) and inward-driven (anchored in Kemalist objectives). Its reliance on transnational expertise for nation-building and modernisation was an extreme case of international influence in institution-building, enabled by the unique national and international context of the 1930s. While importing foreign expertise was a long Ottoman tradition, the early Republic marked a rupture. The Kemalist government strategically engaged transnational scientists and professionals – especially those fleeing Nazism – to advance nation-building and reforms aligned with international norms, while navigating geopolitical tensions, financial constraints, and local resistance. This experience highlights both the possibilities and limitations of agency in a developing Global South state where infrastructure and resource deficiencies constrained reform implementation.

This experience also underscores how institutional and political choices can empower or marginalise scientists, whether domestic or displaced. From a sociology of expertise perspective, we see how Turkish authorities invested in expertise networks and institutional arrangements that empowered exiles as modernising experts while side-lining parts of the local intelligentsia. Far from being subaltern refugees, these scholars were received as renowned international elites and drivers of reforms. Endowed with symbolic and material resources unavailable to locals, they reshaped science and governance in Turkey, advising ministries and co-authoring legislation, public policy and reform projects. Their activities exemplify intense academia-state entanglement in a transnational setting structured by global-to-local inequalities.

54 See the photographs Eckstein took on these excursions on: Cambridge Digital Library. "Saving Turkey's Children" https://www.cam.ac.uk/stories/eckstein

Yet, despite their privileged status in Turkey, these scholars experienced downward mobility in global scientific fields, with limited international recognition due to Turkey's peripheral position. They leveraged these challenges through ties to transnational scholarly networks extending from academia to influential NGOs such as the Rockefeller Foundation, enabling eventual reintegration into prestigious institutions. Their trajectories illustrate the multidirectional yet unequal exchanges structuring both nationalisation and internationalisation of science and the potential for translation and adaptation.

A socio-biographical lens further exposes persistent inequalities within international markets of expertise – particularly regarding gender and geography. Although expert profiles remained predominantly middle-aged White males from the Global North – especially Germany – with significant cultural, social, and political capital (Dogan 2021), experts recruited during the early Republican era showed greater diversity in intellectual and ideological orientations and trajectories, including a small but growing number of women. While various categories of transnational actors contributed to Kemalist Turkey's wide-scale national construction and reform agenda, "émigré experts" were both numerically and qualitatively the most influential. Their impact extended far beyond the university reform, shaping social, legal, and economic policies. The massive integration of these German-speaking scholars into Turkey's public institutions, alongside other Western and even Nazi-affiliated experts, highlights expertise as a site of collaboration but also competition. Despite resource shortfalls, language barriers, cultural frictions, and local resistance, they played a decisive role in Turkey's development, training new generations, reshaping institutions, and fostering cross-cultural exchange. While economists, jurists, and other social scientists actively participated in policymaking, other academic disciplines, including medicine, architecture, and the arts, also contributed to governmental projects, transforming Turkey from a Eurocentric perspective, and fostering state development and nationalisation as hybridisation.

Even during the interwar years, contemporary benchmarks were set by US and European institutions, establishing an assumption of "global comparability" to which Turkish institutions had to adapt as part of one global system. This analysis challenges the idea that expertise, even in its "scientific" form, can be non-hegemonic or neutral: global power relations invariably shape which systems become the norm. Turkey's case shows how efforts to avoid dependency can reproduce new dependencies.

As an unintended consequence of Turkey's reliance on transnational experts who settled in Turkey, the dominance of German-speaking experts inadvertently reinforced Germany's long-term intellectual and cultural influence. The prevalence of German as a foreign language in Turkish education and the broader professional sphere reinforced path dependencies, increasing Turkey's demand for German language teachers and laying the groundwork for post-war academic and cultural ties with Germany including initiatives like the Goethe Institutes (established in 1956).[55] This strong German influence is rivalled only by the United States, which has gradually occupied the hegemonic position, exporting expertise globally (Dezalay and Garth 2011) and locally in Turkey, expanding its sphere of economic and political influence since the beginning of the Cold War (Erken 2020; Widmann 2000). This legacy invites comparative research on how states today negotiate transnational expertise in a world shaped by power asymmetries.

55 Glasneck (1966) observes that German authorities maintained ties with university graduates who returned to Turkey after studies in Germany and became managers in schools, technical institutes, railways, industry and mining, agricultural institutions and public administrations.

REFERENCES

PRIMARY SOURCES

Dieckmann, Liselotte (1964) Akademische Emigranten in der Türkei, in: Egon Schwarz and Matthias Wegner (Eds.) *Verbannung: Aufzeichnungen deutscher Schriftsteller im Exil*, Hamburg: Wegner, 122–26.

Hirsch, Ernst (2012 [1997]) *Anılarım,* Ankara: Tübitak.

McDonald, James G. (1935) Letter of Resignation Addressed to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, London: Headley Brothers [League document C.13.M.12.1936.XII].

Neumark, Fritz (1982 [1980]) *Boğaziçi'ne Sığınanlar: Türkiye'ye iltica eden Alman ilim siyaset ve sanat adamları 1933 - 1953* [Zuflucht am Bosporus]. Istanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Maliye Enstitüsü.

Neumark, Fritz (2009 [2007]) Remarques critiques sur le rapport Scurla, in: Dirk Halm and Faruk Şen (Eds.) *Exil sous le croissant et l'étoile,* Levallois-Perret: Turquoise.

Nişanyan, Sevan (2002-2024) Nişanyan Sözlük. https://www.nisanyansozluk.com

Schwartz, Philipp (2003 [1995]) *Kader Birliği: Yurt Dışındaki Alman Bilim Adamları Yardımlaşma Cemiyeti* [Notgemeinschaft], Istanbul: Belge Yayınları.

Scurla, Herbert (2009 [1939] L'Activité des universitaires allemands dans les universités scientifiques turques. Rapport du haut conseiller Herbert Scurla sur les résultats de sa mission à Istanbul et à Ankara du 11 au 25 mai 1938, in: Dirk Halm and Faruk Şen (Eds.), *Exil sous le croissant et l'étoile,* Levallois-Perret: Turquoise, 39-104.

The Rockefeller Foundation Annual Report 1931. https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/Annual-Report-1931.pdf

The Rockefeller Foundation Annual Report 1932. https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/Annual-Report-1932.pdf

The Rockefeller Foundation Annual Report 1933. https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/Annual-Report-1933.pdf

UNIGE (2011) Albert MALCHE (1876-1956). http://www.unige.ch/fapse/centenaire/personnes.html

We Refugees. Online documentation. https://en.we-refugees-archive.org/

EXPERT REPORTS PUBLISHED BY THE TURKISH MINISTRY OF EDUCATION:

Amerikan Heyeti [American Committee] (1939) *Amerikan Heyeti raporundan maarif işleri [Educational affairs in the American committee's report],* Istanbul: Devlet Basımevi.

Buyse, Omer (1939) *Teknik Öğretim Hakkında Rapor [Report on technical education],* Maarif Matbaası.

Dewey, John (1939) *Türkiye Maarifi Hakkında Rapor [Turkey Education Report],* Ankara: Milli Egitim Bakanligi.

Kühne, Alfred (1939) *Mesleki Terbiyenin İnkişafına Dair Rapor [Report on the development of vocational education],* Istanbul: Maarif Vekilliği Devlet Basımevi.

Malche, Albert (1939) *İstanbul Üniversitesi Hakkında Rapor. Ana Programa Hazırlıklar, Seri B, No. 5,* Istanbul: Devlet Basımevi, TC. Maarif Vekilliği.

Parker, Beryl (1939) *Türkiye'de Ilk Tahsil Hakkında Rapor [Report on primary education],* Maarif Matbaası.

PRESS ARTICLES:

"Universite kadrosu. Miilga Islahat heyetinden bir zat Universitede yapılan işler hakkında hesap veriyor." *Cumhuriyet*. 12 September 1933.

"Üniversite ıslahat heyetine hücumlar devam ediyor." *Milliyet*. 12 September 1933.

"İlimde de garplılaşacağız" *Son Posta,* 1 August 1933.

REPUBLICAN ARCHIVES OF TURKEY

BCA 30-10-0-0_116-810-3 (14.11.1933)

BCA 30-18-1-2_34-16-7 (13.03.1933)

BCA 30-10-0-0_142-13-3 (17.07.1934)

BCA 30-18-1-2_39-64-1 (14.09.1933)

BCA 30-10-0-0_141-12-1 (16.11.1933)

BCA 30-18-1-2_43-13-6 (07.03.1934)

BCA 30-10-0-0_142-13- 6 (01.06.1935)

Official Gazette no. 63 (06-03-1924).

SECONDARY SOURCES

Akar, Nejat, Arnold Reisman, and Aysu Oral (2007) Albert Eckstein (1891-1950): Modernizer of Turkey's paediatrics in exile, *Journal of medical biography* 15(4): 213-218. http://doi/10.1258/j.jmb.2007.06-54

Andic, Fuat M., and Suphan Andic (1981) Fritz Neumark, Teacher and Reformer: A Turkish View, *FinanzArchiv/Public Finance Analysis* 39(1): 11-19.

Aslan, Cengiz (2020) Atatürk Döneminde Türkiye ve Rusya Arasındaki Eğitim İlişkileri, *Avrasya Uluslararası Araştırmalar Dergisi* 8.22: 18-38.

Benz, Pierre, Johanna Gautier Morin, Elisa Klüger, and Thierry Rossier (2024) International Circulations and Inequalities in the Social Sciences: An Introduction. *Serendipities. Journal for the Sociology and History of the Social Sciences* 8(1-2):1-19. 10.7146/serendipities.v8i1-2.144872.

Berk-Albachten, Özlem (2010) Exile as Translation and Transformation in Early Republican Turkey, *Translation Studies* 3(2): 132-148. https://doi.org/10.1080/14781701003647343

Berkes, Niyazi (1998 [1964]) *The Development of Secularism in Turkey,* Londres: Hurst.

Bourdieu, Pierre (2002) *La noblesse d'État: grandes écoles et esprit de corps*. Paris: Minuit.

Buchanan, R. A. (1986) The Diaspora of British Engineering, *Technology and Culture,* 27(3).

Buzan, Barry, and Lawson, George (2015). *The Global Transformation: History, modernity and the making of international relations*. Cambridge University Press.

de Sardan, Jean-Pierre Olivier (2021) *La Revanche des contextes: Des mésaventures de l'ingénierie sociale en Afrique et au-delà,* Paris: Karthala.

Dezalay, Yves (2004) Les courtiers de l'international, *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* 151-2(1): 4-35. https://doi.org/10.3917/arss.151.0004.

Dezalay, Yves, and Olivier Nay (2015) Le marché des savoirs de réforme : circulations de l'expertise de gouvernement et reproduction des hiérarchies internationales, in: Johanna Siméant (Eds.) *Guide de l'enquête globale en sciences sociales*. CNRS Éd, 173-196.

Dezalay, Yves, and Bryant G. Garth (2011) Hegemonic Battles, Professional Rivalries, and the International Division of Labor in the Market for the Import and Export of State-Governing Expertise, *International Political Sociology* 5(3): 276–293. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-5687.2011.00134.x

Dogan, Aykiz (2021) Knowledge Transaction and State Making from Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic, *European Journal of Turkish Studies* 32. doi:10.4000/ejts.7454.

Dogan, Aykız (2022) L'étatisation turque dans l'entre-deux-guerres et ses acteurs : construire un ordre mondial par l'expertise. PhD diss., University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris.

Dogan, Aykiz (2023a) Modernising Turkey with statistics: implementing ISI expertise in the Turkish statistical reform at the end of the 1920s. *European Review of History*30(1):73-100. doi:10.1080/13507486.2023.2165437.

Dogan, Aykiz (2023b) The League of Nations Advising For Turkey's Statistical Internationalization, in Catherine Brégianni and Roser Cusso (Ed.) *Shaping and Reshaping the Global Monetary Order During the Interwar Period and Beyond*. Athens: Alfeios, 71-108.

Dogan, Aykiz (2024) Studying State Development through the Archive: The Case of Interwar Turkey, *Revue internationale des études du développement* (256):169-202. doi:10.4000/131lk.

Dölen, Emre (2010) *Türkiye Üniversite Tarihi 3, Darülfünun'dan Üniversiteye Geçiş: Tasfiye ve Yeni Kadrolar,* Istanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.

Dölen, Emre (2008) II. Meşrutiyet Döneminde Darülfünun, *Osmanlı Bilimi Araştırmaları* 10(1); 1-46.

Eden, Alp and Gürol Irzik (2012) German mathematicians in exile in Turkey: Richard von Mises, William Prager, Hilda Geiringer, and their impact on Turkish mathematics, *Historia Mathematica* 39(4): 432-459.

Edwards, Zophia (2020) Postcolonial Sociology as a Remedy for Global Diffusion Theory, *The Sociological Review* 68 (6): 1179-95. https://doi.org/10.1177/0038026120916132

Erdem, Murat and Kenneth W. Rose (2000) American Philanthropy In Republican Turkey: The Rockefeller And Ford Foundations, *Milletlerarasi* (2000): 001–027. https://doi.org/10.1501/Intrel_0000000022

Ergin, Osman (1977 [1939]) *Türkiye Maarif Tarihi vol. 1-4,* Eser Kültür Yayınları.

Ergün, Mustafa (1990) Türk Eğitim Sisteminin Batılılaşmasını Belirleyen Dinamikler, *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi* 17: 453-457.

Erichsen, Regine (2005) Das türkische Exil als Geschichte von Frauen und ihr Beitrag zum Wissenschaftstransfer in die Türkei von 1933 bis 1945, *Berichte zur Wissenschafts-Geschichte* 28(4): 337–53. https://doi.org/10.1002/bewi.200401008

Erken, Ali (2020) *America and the Making of Modern Turkey: Science, Culture and Political Alliances,* London, New York: I.B. Tauris.

Eyal, Gil (2013) For a Sociology of Expertise: The Social Origins of the Autism Epidemic *American Journal of Sociology* 118 (4): 863-907. https://doi.org/10.1086/668448

Gellner, Ernest (1990 [1983]) *Nations and Nationalism,* Oxford: Blackwell.

Georgeon, François (1994) La formation des élites à la fin de l'Empire ottoman : le cas de Galatasaray, *Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée* 72(1), 15-25.

Georgiadou, M. (2004) National Socialism and War, in: *Constantin Carathéodory: Mathematics and Politics in Turbulent Times,* Berlin: Heidelberg Springer, 275-419.

Gilliot, Cl.; Repp, R.C.; Nizami, K.A.; Hooker, M.B.; Lin, Chang-Kuan and J.O. Hunwick (2012) Ulamā, in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam.* http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_COM_1278

Glasneck, Johannes (1966) Deutsch–faschistische Propaganda in der Türkei. Methoden der deutsch–faschistischen Propagandatätigkeit in der Türkei vor und während des zweiten Weltkrieges, Univ. Halle–Wittenberg, Halle (Saale).

Göçek, Fatma Müge (1993) Ethnic Segmentation, Western Education, and Political Outcomes: Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Society, *Poetics Today* 507-538.

Gökay, Bülent (2012) *Soviet Eastern Policy and Turkey, 1920-1991,* Routledge.

Gürtunca, Evrim Şencan (2017) The Role of Foreign and Turkish Schools in Changing Late Ottoman Educational Policy: Robert College and Mekteb-i Sultani, *Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi* 17(35): 5-21.

Halm, Dirk, and Faruk Şen (Eds.) (2009 [2007]) *Exil sous le croissant et l'étoile: rapport d'Herbert Scurla sur l'activité des universitaires allemands en Turquie pendant le IIIe Reich,* Levallois-Perret: Turquoise.

Hobsbawm, Eric J. (1992 [1990]) *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality,* Cambridge University Press.

Hoss, Christiane (2009 [2007]) Persécution et chemins d'exil des réfugiés et de leurs familles cités par Scurla, in: Halm, Dirk, and Faruk Şen (Eds.) *Exil sous le croissant et l'étoile,* Turquoise.

İhsanoğlu, Ekmeleddin (1993) Darülfünun, in: *TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi* vol. 8, 521-525. https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/darulfunun

Ipsirli, Mehmet (2004) The Ottoman Ulema (Scholars), *Foundation for Science, Technology and Civilisation,* Manchester.

Karpat, Kemal H. (2002) *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History,* Leiden, Boston: Brill.

Kılıç, Sezen (2005) *Türk-Alman iIişkileri ve Türkiye'deki Alman Okulları,* Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi.

Li, Su (2018) Scholar-Officials, in: *The Constitution of Ancient China,* Princeton University Press.

Liebisch-Gümüş, Carolin (2020) Embedded Turkification: Nation Building and Violence within the Framework of the League of Nations 1919–1937, *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 52 (2): 229-44. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020743819000904

Maksudyan, Nazan (2024a) Erna Eckstein-Schlossmann's Exile Years in Turkey, 1935–1950: A biographical and gendered approach to migration history, *Women's History Review* 33(2): 223–243. https://doi.org/10.1080/09612025.2023.2217496

Maksudyan, Nazan (2024b) Refuge in Research: Walter Ruben's Exile and Internment in Turkey, in: Dakhli, L., Laborier, P., Wolff, F. (Eds.), *Academics in a Century of Displacement*, Migrationsgesellschaften. Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 101–128. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-43540-0_5

Mitchell, Timothy (1988) *Colonising Egypt,* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Ortaylı, İlber (1981) *İkinci Abdülhamit Döneminde Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Alman Nüfuzu*. Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi.

Parmar, Inderjeet (2014) *Foundations of the American Century: The Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations in the Rise of American Power*. NY: Columbia Univ. Press.

Reisman, Arnold (2007a) Jewish refugees from Nazism, Albert Einstein, and the modernization of higher education in Turkey (1933–1945), *Aleph*: 253-281.

Reisman, Arnold (2007b) German Jewish Intellectuals' Diaspora in Turkey: 1933–551, *The Historian* 69(3): 450-478.

Reisman, Arnold (2006) *Turkey's Modernization: Refugees from Nazism and Ataturk's Vision,* Washington: New Academia Pub.

Rodogno, Davide (2012) *Against Massacre: Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire, 1815-1914,* Princeton University Press.

Said, Edward (1979) *Orientalism,* New York: Vintage Books.

Sarmis, Dilek (2019) Psychologies ottomanes et turques (1860-1930). Un laboratoire pour les partages savants, *Revue d'histoire des sciences humaines* 34: 35-66.

Sertdemir Özdemir, Seçkin (2021) Pity the exiled: Turkish academics in exile, the problem of compassion in politics and the promise of dis-exile, *Journal of Refugee Studies* 34(1): 936-952.

Sezer, Ayten (1999) Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e misyonerlerin Türkiye'deki eğitim ve öğretim faaliyetleri, *Hacettepe Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 16.

Shaw, Stanford J. (1993) *Turkey and the Holocaust: Turkey's Role in Rescuing Turkish and European Jewry from Nazi Persecution, 1933-1945,* Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.

Tekeli, İlhan, and Selim İlkin (2009) *1929 Dünya Buhranında Türkiye'nin Iktisadi Politika Arayışları,* Istanbul: Bilge Kültür Sanat.

Tomenendal, Kerstin, Fatma Doğuş Özdemir, and F. Özden Mercan (2010) "German-speaking academic émigrés in Turkey of the 1940s." *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaften* 21(3): 69-99.

Tuori, Kaius (2022) The silenced majority, in: Kmak, Magdalena, and Heta Björklund (Eds.) *Refugees and Knowledge Production: Europe's past and present,* Taylor & Francis.

Ülker, Erol (2005) Contextualising 'Turkification': Nation-Building in the Late Ottoman Empire, *Nations and Nationalism* 11(4): 613-636. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8129.2005.00222.x.

Vatansever, Asli (2020) *At the margins of academia: Exile, precariousness, and subjectivity,* Brill.

Weisband, Edward (1973) *Turkish Foreign Policy 1943-1945: Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics,* Princeton, N.J: Princeton university press.

Widmann, Horst (2000) *Atatürk ve Üniversite Reformu [Exil und Bildungshilfe],* Istanbul, Kabalcı.

Yıldırım, Seyfi (2012) Cumhuriyet Döneminde Türk-Macar Iliskileri Çerçevesinde Istihdam Edilen Macar Uzmanlar, *Cumhuriyet Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi* 8(15): 121-150.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Special thanks to Vincent Gengnagel, Christian Schmidt-Wellenburg, Frédéric Lebaron and Fran Collyer.

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY

Aykiz Dogan, PhD in sociology, postdoctoral fellow at University of Rouen, LASTA (chaire EQAM) and research associate at UMR Développement et Sociétés, University Paris-1 Panthéon-Sorbonne. https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5493-4798