

ARTICLE

# French economists and the symbolic power of (post-)national scopes of capital: Taking sides in discourses of crises, 2008–2021

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## Abstract

The paper argues that economists' position-taking in discourses of crises should be understood in the light of economists' positions in the academic field of economics. This hypothesis is investigated by performing a multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) on a prosopographical data set of 144 French economists who positioned themselves between 2008 and 2021 in controversies over the euro crisis, the French political economic model, and French economics. In these disciplinary controversies, different forms of (post-)national academic capital are used by economists to either initiate change or defend the status quo. These strategies are then interpreted as part of more general power struggles over the basic national or post-national constitution and legitimate governance of economy and society.

## Keywords

Transnationalization, economic thought, economic crisis, field theory, history of the social sciences

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## INTRODUCTION

In France, as in most other European countries, researchers in economics regularly engage in public debates over the current state of the economy, politics, science, and society at large. Following the 2008 world economic crisis, this type of public academic engagement led to a surge of signed editorials, open letters, side-taking for presidential candidates, and even new groups and associations of economists. In the face of these controversies, the prevailing French model of social order and the European monetary, banking, and financial union have been challenged from the left as well as the right, advocating ideas ranging from further European integration to re-nationalisation. Not only does this hold true for political economic viewpoints and their related (de)regulative ideas but also for economics as a science and academic discipline. Many French economists engage in controversies over theoretical paradigms that are being taught, over the significance of mathematics and modelling, or over the desired degree of internationalization. This makes their position-taking political in more ways than one: public interventions are aimed at influencing everyday politics as well as the future of economics as a discipline.

The present paper forwards the hypothesis that economists' discursive position-taking should be understood in the light of economists' engagement in academic practices and, consequently, their position in the field of economists. This hypothesis is investigated by performing a multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) on a prosopographical data set of 144 French economists who positioned themselves in these struggles between 2008 and 2021. The analysis shows that current controversies are fuelled by four very different camps struggling over the state of France's political economy as well as the future of the discipline of economics. First, economists associated with different French heterodox schools of economics often argue for an end to austerity politics from a politically leftist perspective and criticise French economics for a perceived hegemony of neoclassical theory, high degree of mathematization, and lack of practical relevance, calling for more multi-paradigmatic diversity. Second, an orthodox fraction of French economists closely interwoven with the most central and prestigious French academic institutions defends the prevailing disciplinary order against such heterodox challenges. Third, proponents of more internationalized currents join the orthodox fraction, driven by worries that a French special way might marginalize French economics, lead to internal fission as well as disconnect French economists from the global scientific community. Fourth, economists closely associated with French political and corporate institutions and, hence, from a more heteronomous background opt for 'practical' crisis solutions following neoliberal scripts to foster the strength of the French economy. The diverse position takings in political economic and disciplinary controversies are then interpreted as part of more general power struggles over the basic national or post-national constitution and legitimate governance of economy and society.

## **FRENCH ECONOMICS AND ITS MORE RECENT CONTROVERSIES**

French economics as a discipline has evolved in close connection with French political and economic institutions and is relatively state centred, when compared to, for instance, US, UK, or German economics (Fourcade 2009; Maesse 2018). Most of today's key institutions were created after World War II in state-led efforts to reconstruct and modernize the French economy and are aimed at establishing a specially trained elite of public managers and technicians. As Fourcade (2009: 11) points out, this constituted a juxtaposition of, on the one hand, experts in the tradition of state engineers with wide access to data resources and an aptitude for formalization and, on the other hand, a "more literary and juridical style of university-based economic practitioners". This comes as no surprise, since the French academic field and the educational background of French academics are largely shaped by the distinction between general universities and centralized public elite institutions such as the various *grandes écoles* and their corps, as well as specialized state research institutes (Bourdieu 1988). The latter have profited most from the expansion of economics in recent decades. They have become institutional anchor points for major developments in French economics, such as the "disequilibrium" school closely connected to the Centre pour la recherche économique et ses applications (CEPREMAP) and the *École polytechnique* or the "regulation school" linked more to the French statistical institute (INSEE) and, subsequently, the *École des hautes études en sciences sociales* (EHESS) (Fourcade 2009: 203–12).

More recently, the established differentiation of French economics has come under pressure by calls for internationalization. This development is evident in at least three instances. First, an increasing number of French institutions have adopted the standard graduate curriculum taught at North American universities which is now common world-wide, leading to internal differentiation of departments along the lines of mic-mac-metrics plus applied economics (Maeße 2015). Second,

gaining a US PhD has become a viable option, initially in order to pursue an academic career at a university, and subsequently at a grande école or research institute. Third, large research-strong institutions such as the Paris School of Economics (PSE), the Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), or Université Paris Sud (since 2020 Paris-Saclay) have been created, all aiming to compete internationally, for example in world-wide university or department rankings (Hamann and Schmidt-Wellenburg 2020).

These changes have triggered considerable opposition, particularly against increasing mathematization, a perceived hegemony of neoclassical theory, and the lack of practical relevance of teaching. As early as 2000, a public debate was prominently sparked by an open letter that criticized economics teaching, published by students who were mostly enrolled at the École normale supérieure (ENS) and Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Autisme-Économie 2000a, 2000b). It immediately led to a counterstatement by established academics calling to defend economics and its status as a mathematized hard science (Boissieu et al. 2000). This dynamic of heterodox calling into question the status quo of French economics and the orthodox rebuffing has since been reactivated on numerous occasions, most notably in 2012 when the Association française d'économie politique (AFEP, founded in 2009) published an open call for a new section "Économie et Société" (AFEP 2012, cf. 2015) for economists at the Conseil national des universités (CNU), one of the most central reproductive institutions of French academia.

Taking a position in these epistemological debates is at the same time connected to positionings in more political disputes over how to react to economic crises. In the case of the euro crisis, heterodox interventions were made by Les Économistes Atterrés (LEA 2010, 2016) and the Collectif de plus de 120 économistes (Collectif 120 2012), while more mainstream positions were initiated by Thomas Piketty calling for "la démocratisation de l'Europe" (Bozio et al. 2014; Bouju et al. 2018). A more (neo)liberal stance calling for a two-speed Europe was taken by the Groupe Eiffel (2014). More recently, the dynamic was reactivated by an open letter asking to "[a]nnuler les dettes publiques détenues par la BCE" (Toussaint et al. 2021), which was immediately rebuffed as not going far enough from a more heterodox angle (Delatte et al. 2021).

This range of positions can also be found in interventions concerning the French economy. Before and during the global economic crisis, the tone was set by the Attali Commission's neoliberal script to refurbish the French social model: "Pour la libération de la croissance française" (2008, 2010). Just as ambitious, albeit leftist and heterodox, was the "Appel des économistes pour une VI<sup>e</sup> République" (Adam et al. 2013). In 2016, controversies were sparked again by the neoliberal refurbishing of the French labour market, dismissed from a centrist-left position in an open letter initiated by Thomas Piketty (Piketty et al. 2016) and defended in an intervention instigated by Jean Tirole (Tirole et al. 2016). This pattern is again observable in open-eds published in support of French presidential election candidates in 2012 and 2017.<sup>1</sup>

The observed interrelations of various positionings in presidential elections, in controversies over political-economic governance, and in debates about the future of the profession seem to have an elective affinity to the academic positions and standings of economists that can be examined further using a field theoretical framework of analysis.

<sup>1</sup> Here, open-eds published in favour of the following presidential candidates are used: Jean-Luc Mélenchon 2012, 2017, François Hollande 2012, Benoît Hamon 2017, Emmanuel Macron 2017, Nicolas Sarkozy 2012, François Fillon 2017.

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## ACADEMIC ECONOMISTS AND POST-NATIONAL SCOPES OF CAPITAL

Being an academic economist means acquiring and practising a specific profession that is aimed not only at analysing but also at exercising influence and thus helping to constitute the economy (Schmidt-Wellenburg and Lebaron 2018). Economics is as much scientific as it is deeply political and moral, aimed at interventions that are believed to further the common good (Lebaron 2016; Fourcade 2018). The relational similarity of these discursive interventions on different issues is rooted in the relative stability of economists' disciplinary habitus, which are distinct from other disciplines and also differ within the discipline of economics itself (Lenger 2018; Maesse 2021). Depending on the institutions where individuals are trained, they convert to a specific style of thought (Fleck 2004). By acquiring a disciplinary habitus, people invest in certain abilities and institutions, and they are invested through their interests, creating their own position in the overall field of economists (Bourdieu 1998a).

Their habitus allows economists to engage in producing knowledge and, at the same time, positions them vis-à-vis other approaches to economics. This results in constant struggles over the legitimate way of doing economics as well as over peer attention and resources. Since the aim of securing resources in these struggles cannot be voiced in a discursive practice of scientific truth games, where an interest in disinterestedness prevails (Bourdieu 2004: 53), these struggles become organized as symbolic competitions valuing former or potential future scientific findings. In these symbolic struggles, the legitimate order and worth of different scientific practices is overtly contested, since they are presented as epistemological and pure scientific controversies. Those who advocate a more orthodox reading of economics become positioned against those who favour change in academic practices and who engage in different heterodox currents of thought.

Economists' practices are not isolated from the rest of society. Access to the research object has to be negotiated, data, first-hand experience, and intimate insights all become vital research resources, and the ability of research findings to have an effect on the objects studied is seen as a reality check: a considerable number of theoretical approaches and political economic schools have been consecrated by their close ties to states and corporations (Dezalay and Garth 2011; Jatteau 2018; Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002; Schmidt-Wellenburg 2013). Hence, the stakes for changing the economy and how it is regulated are, at the same time, the stakes for influencing academic hierarchies and their symbolic weights, and economists with more heteronomous relations become opposed to more autonomous economists engaging in "purer" scientific competitions.

These inter- and intra-field relations shape homologous positions and thus create elective affinities between certain positions in both scientific and political economic controversies. But how can these homologies best be traced? Three types of capital employed in economists' practices are used to reconstruct the field's structure (Bourdieu 1988, 1998b: 32, 2004: 55–62). First, academic capital is understood as organisational and administrative resources such as holding a position and having funding that allows enduring engagement in teaching economics and producing research. Its symbolic surplus increases with the prestige of the institution and the opportunities to train new generations of economists, for instance by working at the ENS or the École Polytechnique or by sitting on PhD committees. Second, scientific capital as the ability to make a distinctive contribution in a specific field of research that is attributed to scientists by their peers. It shows in engaging on the forefront of theoretical and methodological discussions, in practising the art of writing A-journal-style articles, in being a journal editor, all of which influence the chance of oneself or others being published and cited. More symbolic forms are, for example, citation indices, that objectify reputation consecrated by peer review, or prestigious scientific awards based on decisions by committees. Third,

political and corporate capital also play a decisive role, such as working for consultancies or providing consultancy services, or supervising government and non-government organisations and corporations. These worldly forms of capital gain significance in the field of economists either as experiences that may become objects of research or as contexts for the application of economic governance knowledge, both of which are used to produce scientific positionings. Symbolic forms include memberships and medals, for instance of the Légion d'honneur and other honourable social circles, commemorating moral merits.

The legitimacy of the three forms of capital are only partially based on recognition awarded by communities of peers. Titles and positions are legitimated by referencing political and economic institutions guaranteed by the state, whereas the effectivity of economic policies is proven by the market. For quite some time now, all three reference points of consecration have been nationally anchored: in language and culture, in military and judicial power, and in the reach and impact of production, exchange, and consumption. But this has changed – or is opening up again; properties not linked to the French nation state have started to become important assets in French academic and, in particular, economists' struggles (Fourcade 2006; Lebaron 2013): foreign degrees and research institutes, international journals and publishers, transnational political organisations, and global corporations are all increasingly valued as contexts of academic education and research, making them legitimate stepping stones in some – albeit not all – French economists' careers.

This development has led to a discussion of various new forms of capital, labelled, for instance, as transnational, international, global, or cosmopolitan. Affiliated mostly with the experience of living, working, or studying in another nation state, they are seen as either complementing other capitals, tacitly conceived as national, or viewed as stakes in an international field akin to other social fields (for an overview see Bühlmann 2020). Both usages squander analytical potential due to their engrained methodological nationalism. This can be overcome if we draw on Bourdieu's concept of the field of power and understand the construction of national fields, capitals, and habitus as merely one of several analytical options, aiming at a truly “post-national” field analysis that breaks with the sole dominance of the nation state model and methodological nationalism (Krause 2020: 101).

The concept of the field of power is located on a different analytical level to social fields and is used in three distinct ways that complement each other (Bourdieu 2014: 311). First, it allows us to picture meaning and power relations between fields, capturing the state of societal differentiation. Second, it is the realm of struggles between the elites of various social fields over the value and societal-wide legitimation of different capitals, creating a social hierarchy of fields and associated elites, thus structuring social space. Third, consequently, it is a struggle over the make-up and range of a meta-field power in which projects of creating a symbolic monopoly and establishing a specific perception of the world compete over establishing the main principles of societal vision and division as well as a focal point of societal integration. In line with these three notions, Bourdieu argues that “the state” is an effect of the state of the field of power and its struggles, implying that different and historically contingent forms of stateness are possible, for instance, the dynastic state, the absolutist state, or the nation state.

Further generalizing Bourdieu's concept of the field of power, as Schmitz and Witte (2020) argue with reference to their concept of a global field of power; allows us to detect potentially competing forms of stateness varying in form and reach, among them nation stateness. To differentiate between these, I will use the term “scope” (Schmidt-Wellenburg and Bernhard 2020: 11), because it captures the main stake in the field of power: establishing a central perspective that unites all other perspectives, a social focus point of struggles as well as discussions about social differentiation and

integration, and nourishing its symbolic power by engraining it in the basic dispositions to and perceptions of the world, thus producing a certain form of stateness as a viable illusion (Bourdieu 1994a).

Drawing on recent research, six historically salient scopes can be distinguished. Most certainly, there is a *national scope* that has been the dominant monopolistic project in the field of power since the mid-twentieth century, as Steinmetz (2016) argues. It pushed aside more *local scopes* based on sub-national regional projects of monopolization, as described in great detail by Bourdieu (2014) for the French case and by Elias (1982) more generally. Besides local and national scopes, colonial (Go 2008) and other *imperial scopes* of stateness (Steinmetz 2014) have dominated the field of power, establishing diverse forms of social fields which are located either in the colony or the metropole, or spanning both. As Julian Go (2020) argues, formal imperialism sharply declined in the second half of the twentieth century but the same does not apply to informal imperialism: networks of power that encompass nominally independent nation states. The latter lies at the heart of an *international scope* understood as referencing another nation state as a source of legitimation. Such flows create an international hierarchy of national scopes (Heilbron 2014) that may enforce the hegemony of more referenced nation states. As can be derived from this example, different scopes are not necessarily antagonistic (Kauppi 2018). They may lend themselves to forging alliances not only in a specific social field but also with regard to struggles over the value of different scopes in the generalized field of power (Wagner and Réau 2015: 40 f.). Outcomes of such alliances might be *transnational (regional) scopes* referencing regional power monopolies beyond the nation state, such as the EU, NATO, or Mercosur, by drawing on different nation-state scopes for initial legitimation (Schmidt-Wellenburg 2017, 2021). Finally, we see a *global scope* that references power monopolies that span the world and can most readily be found in context of global markets and political economic institutions that guarantee worldwide legitimacy of practices (Bigo 2011). At the same time, processes, practices, and actors with a global scope should not be perceived as necessarily located on a level above or opposed to those with a national scope: on the contrary, they might be nested in national or subnational spaces or contexts (Sassen 2010), again emphasizing the advantage of using the concept of scope as opposed to level or scale.

Viewed from this analytical perspective, the academic ‘internationalization’ of French economics through, for example, publishing in AAA journals in English, restructuring departments according to US American models, and hiring US PhDs not only undermines the traditional order of the French field of economists but also challenges the dominant national scope and actors aligned to it by imposing new and differing sources of symbolic power. The same applies if work experience in global corporations and banks or globally operating international organisations becomes acknowledged as a stepping stone for economists’ careers: this may well change existing power relations in the underlying field of power. In this development three of the afore mentioned post-national scopes – transnational, international and global – are most prominent alongside a French-national scope. The subsequent empirical analysis aims at uncovering the scope of practices, resources, and properties used by economists and to understand the strategic implications according to economists’ positions in the field.

## DATA AND METHODS

Using 21 open letters, open-eds, and commissions on the EU crisis, the French political economic model, French presidencies, or the future of French economics just over 600 economists were initially identified. From these 144 were selected in a process of theoretical sampling. Following a Grounded Theory framework (Corbin and Strauss 2008) aimed at reconstructing the basic social dimensions and logics that underly such an engagement in political economic position taking, the sampling prioritized initiators and first signees and took care to balance individuals according to the different interventions, with some of the positionings drawing more support than others. In addition, the sampling was balanced for political economic currents, taking the full spectrum from left to right into account, for disciplinary currents, ranging from French heterodox to more mainstream and orthodox economics, and for well-known proponents of the profession. The task was accomplished by drawing on preliminary knowledge (in particular Fourcade 2009; Lebaron 2000, 2001, 2018) and 20 in-depth narrative interviews (all interviewees included in the dataset) conducted to collect narrations on the unfolding of current political economic controversies, to trace career trajectories, and to explicitly identify important friends and foes as well as other decisive agents.

In a first step, the academic careers of those selected were reconstructed using publicly accessible curriculum vitae and additional CV information, thereby using a practice common to the field – writing a CV to objectify one’s position – to identify valuable and sought-after properties. In a second step, categorical variables were created in an inductive process (Corbin and Strauss 2008; Blasius 1987; Schmidt-Wellenburg 2019) covering the aforementioned three types of capital in their respective scopes (see Appendix Table 1 for more details on categories, capitals, and scopes). In addition, sex, age, and position-taking in the public debates were also coded.

In a third step, MCA was performed on the data set to investigate the correspondence between public interventions and certain positions in the field (Le Roux and Rouanet 2010). A multidimensional space is constructed that depicts the structure in the data as geometric distances using 86 variables (189 categories) describing career properties of individuals.<sup>2</sup> In addition, 26 variables (64 categories) are used passively to further describe the space of positions.<sup>3</sup> The first three axes of the space are interpreted here and account for over two thirds (68.1%, see Table 1) of the variance in the data when using Benzécri’s correction (1973). They represent the main principles of division of the space and are used to describe the field’s hierarchies, the diversity of its academic practices, and its links to other fields. In a final step, the discursive position-takings are then passively projected into the space, allowing us to interpret them in the light of the structure of the reconstructed space.

<sup>2</sup> Since the reconstruction is based on CVs of French academic economists, modalities with a French-national as opposed to an international, transnational or global scope dominate. Like-wise, the number of modalities interpreted as academic capital exceeds those interpreted as scientific as well as political and corporate capital. Hence, interpretations of contributions of scopes and capital forms to axes have to be assessed in relation to the contributions made to other axes (see Appendix Table 2 and 3). For the shape of the cloud of individuals see Appendix Figures 1 and 2.

<sup>3</sup> These modalities are not used active, because they are either below 5% (7), could not be comprehensively collected for all individuals, would double information already included in other variables, or describe diverse symbolic forms of capital only accessible to very few individuals, all of which would skew the reconstruction, with especially the latter overemphasizing the higher echelons of the discipline in the representation (see Appendix Table 1).

Table 1: Variances of the first ten axes

<b>Axis</b>	<b>Variance of the axis (eigenvalue)</b>	<b>Percentage of explained variance</b>	<b>Benzécri's modified rates (%)</b>
<b>1</b>	0.087	7.3	36.5
<b>2</b>	0.073	6.1	24.3
<b>3</b>	0.045	3.8	7.2
<b>4</b>	0.044	3.6	6.5
<b>5</b>	0.035	2.9	3.4
<b>6</b>	0.033	2.7	2.8
<b>7</b>	0.032	2.6	2.5
<b>8</b>	0.031	2.6	2.4
<b>9</b>	0.029	2.5	2.0
<b>10</b>	0.028	2.4	1.8

### CURRENT STRUGGLES IN THE FRENCH FIELD OF ECONOMISTS

*The first dimension accounts for 36.5% of the variance in the data and on the left shows characteristics associated with a low overall volume of capital and positions seen as holding little symbolic capital in contrast to properties on the right that indicate a high volume of overall capital and a high level of symbolic capital.<sup>4</sup>*


On the left (Figure 1), we find being a *maître de conférences* (MaîtreC), equivalent to a lecturer, and affiliations with institutions known for heterodox economics: French heterodox economic associations (asADEK\_ARR\_RIODD, asAFEP) supporting paradigms such as the French “regulation school”, political economy, or Keynesianism, working at the Centre de recherche en économie de l'université Paris-Nord (CEPN) known for its affiliation with the *Économie des conventions*, and being a member of Les *Économistes Atterrés* (asEAtt), and international heterodox economic associations (asIIPPE, asSASE, asEAEPE). On the right, the map shows having received a PhD from a UK or US university (PhDUSUK), holding a position at one of the top US universities (UniUStop) such as Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Harvard University, or University of California, or a top British university (UniUKtop) such as the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), Cambridge, or Oxford. Other employment modalities mentioned less frequently having an international scope, such as Swiss and Scandinavian universities (*UniCHScan*), or universities with a European scope, such as the European University Institute in Florence and the Collège d'Europe in Bruges (*EUI\_CEU*), are plotted nearby (all passive). In addition, the academic position of professor (Prof) and being located at one of the top French academic economics institutions, such as PSE or TSE, the *École Polytechnique* (EPoly), the *École nationale de la statistique et de l'administration économique* (ENSAE) and other grandes écoles (GEOth) as well as major research centres such as CEPREMAP, Centre de recherche en économie et statistique (CREST, the research institute of INSEE), Centre d'études prospectives et d'informations internationales (CEPII) are also all to be found to the right.

The increasing degree and importance of the international scope to the right is documented by countries in which foreign research stays of at least six months were spent, such as the UK and Canada (FS\_UKCan) or the US (FS\_US), as well as by affiliation with foreign research institutes (frgRInst) such as the Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) in Germany. Also plotted on the right are

<sup>4</sup> In the following, I will be selectively reporting only properties contributing more than the average of 0.53% to the location of any of the three axes (for further details, see Appendix Table 1).

memberships of international US (*asEMetS*, *asAEA*, latter passive), European (*asEEA*, passive), or global (*asEUAUSGlb*) economic associations. In addition to purely academic positions, we also see affiliations with think tanks: with a national scope the Cercle des économistes (*asCdE*) and the Conseil d'analyse économique (*govCdAE*), with a European scope the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and with a US or international scope the Brookings Institute (*ttBrook*, passive). Political institutions can also be found to the far right, albeit mostly those with large economics research units (Mudge and Vauchez 2018), for instance, with an international scope various central banks (*govCB*), with a transnational regional scope the European Central Bank (*govECB*), and with a global scope the UN, the World Bank, and/or the International Monetary Fund (*govUNWBIMF*). National political institutions, such as the French president's or prime minister's office (*govPPM*), are located closer to the centroid.

Figure 1: dimension 1/2, active (solid squares, bold) and passive (transparent triangles, italics) variables



Not only does the volume of capital increase along the first axis towards the right but so does its recognition as a symbolic form of capital. Symbolic forms of capital are those that stem from recognition of an agent's position or performance as legitimate due to his or her abilities being perceived as original or genial (and not as a field effect). In science, citations are the main mechanism creating symbolic capital and citation indexes such as the h-index by Web of Science are used in the field to objectify symbolic differences. The trajectory of the h-index increases along the first axis from left to right (HI) (see Figure 2) and mirrors the post-national hierarchy built into the field, since it acknowledges in particular texts published in English and in international journals. It is paralleled by the number of scientific awards (*PSciNG*, passive), mostly with a national scope.<sup>5</sup>

Overall, four major properties of the first axis can be noted. First, academic capital contributes most to the first axis when compared to political and corporate capital as well as scientific capital (Appendix Table 2). This is not surprising, since properties associated with academic capital dominate the careers of economists who engage in political economic controversies. Second, when comparing the contribution of the three forms of capital with their average contribution it becomes obvious that scientific capital is overrepresented on this axis and political and corporate capital contributes only slightly below average, pointing to the special contribution of scientific capital to the overall capital volume. Third, the symbolic quality of properties also increases along the first axis, locating the most acclaimed and prestigious properties to the right, many of which are associated with scientific capital. Fourth, the first axis also shows the post-nationalisation of French economics, with nationally affiliated properties located to the left and in the centre, properties affiliated with an international scope referencing European nation-states beyond France and a transnational scope linked to EU contexts further right and properties associated with internationalized US-American and global institutions to the far right, a hierarchy well documented for various scientific fields (Heilbron 2014). The importance of post-national scopes is confirmed when comparing the contribution of different scopes to the first axis (Appendix Table 3): properties with a French-national scope contribute below, whereas properties with a global, inter-, and transnational scope contribute above average to the first axis.


*The second dimension accounts for 24.3 % of the variance in the data and opposes an autonomous academic pole at the top linked to academic and scientific capital from heteronomous regions at the bottom linked to political and corporate capital.*

At the top (see Figure 1), we find academic positions such as holding a professorship (Prof) and a leading position (UniPresC) at a French research institute (FRInst); employment at Paris Panthéon-Sorbonne (P1), Paris-Nanterre (P10), EHESS, PSE, a French university located outside of Paris (UniFother), or national academies (*asNatAcad*, passive). This is complemented by important career steps towards these academic positions, such as holding a PhD from EHESS (PhDEHESS) and having succeeded in obtaining a habilitation (hab) or post-doctoral degree. More heterodox contexts of scientific exchange and training are also located here, such as the Association française d'économie politique (*asAFEP*), Les Économistes Atterrés (*asEAtt*) and the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics (*asSASE*). Other modalities close by are linked to research practices and scientific production, such as receiving research grants (all passive, *gCNRS\_ANR*, *gMin*, *gFrgother*, *gUKUS*, *gERC*), shaping scientific output as managing editor of journals (*JManEd>1*), engaging in the governance of the Agence nationale de la recherche (*govANR*), cooperating with the Ministry of National Education (*govMinEN*), and being a member of the Association française de science

<sup>5</sup> For the various awards, see Figure 1 and Appendix Table 1.

économique (asAFSE). The interpretation of this as an autonomous pole of the field producing scientific research output and shaping economists is further reinforced by the number of PhD jury memberships (TMJry) increasing and birthyear decreasing (38-49 to 70-84, passive) towards the top (see Figure 2). Economists located here are younger and more likely to be women (*f*), with the deviation to being a male economist (*m*), located below along the axis (Figure 1), being notable at a scaled distance of 0.6 (Le Roux and Rouanet 2010: 59).

Figure 2: dim 1/2, passive variables with active variables h-Index (HI) and PhD committee memberships (TMJry)



At the lower end of the second dimension (see Figure 1), most references to academic resources are linked to their absence: not holding a PhD (*n\_PhD*); having no university position (*n\_UniPos*); not being a member of a foreign research institute (*n\_frgRInst*); not having a Web of Science Hirsch index (*n\_HI*); and never having been a member of a PhD jury (*n\_TMJry*). Here, political affiliations are important, for example, in the form of relationships to liberal and cooperative think tanks (*ttLibCorp*), such as Institut Montaigne, Institut de recherches économiques et fiscales, the Institute for Human Studies, or the Mont Pèlerin Society; working for or consulting the Ministry of Finance, Economics and Industry (*govMinFEI*) and various government agencies (*govAgcy*), such as INSEE, Cours des comptes, Autorité des marchés financiers; being a member of other government councils (*govCdoth*); and consulting the prime minister and/or the president (*govPPM*) or the Assemblée

Nationale (govAN). In addition, connection to the corporate world, be it insurance companies (crpInsur); service and trade (crpSerTr); media (crpMedia); consulting and accounting (crpCons); or the financial industry (crpFinI) and banking (crpBank) are also located here. This interpretation is supported by the passively projected number (see Figure 2) of consulting engagements and/or of jobs with companies (*CorpN*) and with political institutions (*GovN*) increasing along the second axis towards the bottom. As mentioned above, economists at the heteronomous pole are older and more likely male, who have made their career and built strong engagements with the political and, in particular, the corporate world. The close relations to ‘society’ that prevail here then become symbolically consecrated by appointments as chevalier (*PChLdH*) or officier (*POffLdH*) of the Légion d’honneur or being co-opted as a member of the Ordre national du mérite (*POndM*) (see Figure 1, all passive).


When focusing on the scope of modalities that mainly contribute to the variance of the second axis, we see that relationships to French nation-state institutions contribute above average and more than they contribute to the first and third axes (Appendix Table 3). At the heteronomous pole next to French media companies, banks, or corporate finance, various political and administrative institutions can be found, providing funding and opportunities to put one’s knowledge into action as well as access to unique empirical insights and potential careers beyond academia. Only at the autonomous pole do post-nationally scoped properties play a certain role in building scientific careers, indicating the possibility of relative autonomy from French state institutions in this region of the space, a hint to be further explored when looking at the third axis.

*The third dimension accounts for 7.2 % of the overall variance and opposes a dominating academic orthodox pole of reproduction associated with high institutional seniority to two types of institutional challengers: on the one side dominated French heterodox economists and, on the other side, internationally acclaimed economists aiming at a new orthodoxy.*

At the top of the third axis (see Figure 3), we again encounter reproductive organisational forms of academic capital, such as holding a PhD from Panthéon-Sorbonne (PhDP1), having a position at Paris 1 (P1), École nationale de la statistique et de l’administration économique (ENSEA), École nationale d’administration (ENA), École Polytechnique (EPoly), or PSE. These are complemented by positions as director (*riDir*, passive) and/or fellow (*riFlw*, passive) of a major research institute such as the Centre d’économie de la Sorbonne (CES), CREST, CEPREMAP, and IZA, or university research centres (uRCdiv) and membership of the Institut universitaire de France (asiUF). The national institutional centrality of this area is confirmed by the fact that the AFSE is located right in its midst. All of the institutions named are well established in French economics, emanate an aura of public dignification, have for a long time been key gatekeepers for traditional academic careers of French economists and constitute the orthodox pole of reproduction of this space. This becomes even more apparent when we look at the other side of the third dimension.


At the bottom left are economics associations (asADEK\_ARR\_RIodd, asAFEP) and institutions (P13, CEPN) linked to heterodox economics with a French national scope or with a post-national scope (asEAEPE, asSASE, asIIPPE), all of which are relatively young when compared to institutions located at the top. The less powerful and less prestigious positions of maître de conférences (MaîtreC) and researcher (*riRes*, passive) are all located close by together with not being a member of PhD juries (n\_TMJry) and having no (n\_HI) or a low h-index (HI1). Taken together, heterodox economists seem to have little influence on the reproduction of the discipline, albeit engaging in the Conseil national des universités (asCNU).

Figure 3: Dim 1/3, active (solid squares, bold) and passive (transparent triangles, italics) variables



Also low on the third axis, but to the right, more prestigious properties with post-national scopes can be found: being employed at a European, lower-ranking US, or Canadian (*UniUsEuCa*), top British (*UKtop*), Swiss, or Scandinavian (*UniCHScan*, passive) university, foreign research stays in the US and Canada (*FS\_UKCan*), Belgium (*FS\_Bel*), or in other countries worldwide (*FS\_World*), and holding a PhD from the US or UK (*PhDUSUK*). In addition, membership of the American Economic Association (*asAEA*), the European Economic Association (*asEEA*), and various non-French national academies (*asNatAcad*) can also be found here (all passive). All of these properties challenge the reproductive orthodoxy of French academic careers and are linked to post-national sources of legitimation beyond the French nation state. Even the French academic institutions located close by are known for their worldly aura or perceived as internationally acclaimed: other grandes écoles (*GEoth*), EHESS, Sciences Po (*SciPo*), HEC Paris, and other high-ranking business schools (*Hec+*), and the TSE.

Figure 4: dim 1/3, passive variables




Hence, the differentiation of the autonomous pole revealed by the third axis as one of high as opposed to low institutional seniority, is linked to the degree of post-nationalization: Some of those challenging the principle of seniority hold considerable amounts of post-nationally scoped forms of capital, such as working for or consulting non-French governments (govWWdDiv) and global political economic institutions (govUNWBIMF) and having high numbers of research stays abroad (see Figure 4, FSG4-6 and FSG>6). Here, to the lower right, ties to highly valued national and post-national academic as well as political institutions also guarantee a considerable amount of influence on the reproduction of the field, as shown by the location of being a member of more than five PhD juries (TMJry>5), having a high Hirsch index (HI>11), being managing editor of more than one journal (JManEd>1), and engaging in the government of the Agence nationale de la recherche (govANR). Those economists located here can be termed a scientifically highly successful avant-garde, contesting more traditional careers and institutions in the context of French economics.

### Controversies in and over space

Discursive position-taking in debates on the future of French economics, the EU crisis, the crisis of the French economy, and the presidential elections of 2012 and 2017 can now be viewed in light of this space of French economists. For this purpose, having signed an open letter or petition is passively projected into the space.

As expected, the calls published by AFEP “Pour une nouvelle section d’économie « Économie et Société » au CNU” (*uAFEPsec13*) and “Pétition pour le pluralisme, maintenant !” (*uAFEPpl15*) are deeply rooted in the camp of French heterodox economics (see Figures 5 and 6). Creating a new section at the CNU and thus securing institutional mechanisms for consecrating the reproduction of one’s own schools of thought was a viable option for heteronomous economists: it would have secured and potentially strengthened their position, a position constituted by scarce and seemingly diminishing access to traditional French positions of power and post-nationally acclaimed forms of symbolic capital. At the same time, this would have been a fissure of the field of French economics, a development not only loathed by the French academic institutional orthodoxy but also by the post-nationally acclaimed mainstream, as it would have significantly curtailed their influence. The two camps opposing a new section at the CNU might only partially share epistemological positions but they seem to be united with regard to a potential loss of access to reproductive power within the field. Hence, it does not really come as a surprise that the effort to establish a new section was halted due to an intervention by Jean Tirole, with Tomas Piketty not becoming involved himself, although he was most probably not antipathetic to many of the heterodox revolutionaries’ scientific points of view (Nathan 2015). In the aftermath, the heterodox side was even accused of negating, albeit not the holocaust, but reality and scientific logic as presented by proponents of the orthodox pole (Cahuc and Zylberberg 2016).

Figure 5: dim 1/2, signatures on open letters (passive)



These seemingly purely epistemological and academic controversies were taken to a more political arena by Les Économistes Atterés, also deeply rooted in heterodox economics. In their analysis of the 2008 crisis “Crise et dettes en Europe” (*uEAtt10*) and “Pour sortir de l’impasse économique” (*uEAtt16*) they strongly criticize European institutions’ policies backed by the French government. In addition to politicians, they blame mainstream economics for facilitating, if not participating in, the developments building up to the crisis, for being incapable of handling the crisis itself, and for instrumentally shifting the costs to bear on those already most deprived. In 2012, the Collectif de plus de 120 économistes published “Non au traité budgétaire européen” (*uNTB12*) targeting the European Fiscal Compact much along the same lines, while being less critical of mainstream economics. In all three instances, the issue of abandoning the economics mainstream is taken to the political realm, highlighting the consequences of political decisions taken on the basis of economic expertise and understanding economics as a moral (as opposed to a purely technical) science. In these heterodox positionings, a certain national sentiment can be felt that resonates with their desire to refurbish French economics and is strategically in line with their nationally scoped field positions regarding all three axes.


In contrast, the letter “Pour une union politique de l’euro” (*uPupEuro*) initiated by Thomas Piketty in 2014 strikes a different note: It advocates for complementing the fiscal and economic integration of the EU with a new form of legislative institution that is democratically legitimized by the European people. The signatories of the letter constitute a broader coalition and are located closer to the orthodox academic institutional pole high on axis three and more connected to institutions with a transnational European scope. The same applies to those who signed “Manifeste pour la démocratisation de l’Europe” (*uTDem*) in 2018. The difference evident between heterodox, often perceived as leftist, economists and more moderate left positions held by economists located at the heart of orthodox academic institutions, is again reactivated in 2021: the call “Annuler les dettes publiques détenues par la BCE pour reprendre en main notre destin” (*uAdette21*) initiated by, among others, Thomas Piketty, Laurence Scialom, Jézabel Couppey-Soubeyran, and Gaël Giraud leads to a direct reaction from a more leftist and heterodox position by, among others, Éric Monnet and Bruno Tinel: “Vouloir effacer la dette que nous possédons déjà est un leurre” (*uNonAdette21*).

Far afield from this controversy we find the call for a “political community of the euro” (*uEif14*) published by members of the Groupe Eiffel in 2014. In the French discursive context, it is perceived as a (neo)liberal intervention to strengthen European freedoms, increase fiscal and economic policy control on a European level more generally and create a two-speed Europe. Its location low on the second axis and to the right but high on the third axis indicates that its signatories are deeply involved with the French corporate world and political institutions as well as with the core of those orthodox academic institutions that produce classic French state economists and hold considerable power in engineering the French-cum-European political economy.

The underlying logic holds true when switching to discussions revolving around the French welfare state and capitalism. In 2008, the “Commission pour la libération de la croissance française” (*uAttali*) headed by Jacques Attali proposed unchaining French economic growth by deregulating (labour) markets and professions, increasing competition by activating employees, lowering social welfare expenses, and reducing the obligations of employers, public debt, and red tape – the usual neoliberal solutions advocated the world over at the time. Members of both Attali commissions can be found close to the Groupe Eiffel on the first plane due to their involvement with the corporate and political world. A stark contrast to the Attali commissions is the “Appel des économistes pour une VIe République” (*uIVRep13*) published in 2013 and initiated by, among others, Philippe Batifoulier,

Dany Lang, and Robert Salais. Diagnosing a failure of mainstream French political institutions due to their submission to finance capitalism, the signatories call for a new and more democratic republic, an end to austerity politics and a counter-hegemonic project to neoliberalism. As can be seen from this interlinking of neoliberalism critique on a political and scientific level, the signatories are primarily located in the area of heterodox French economics.

Figure 6: dim 1/3, signatures on open letters (passive)



A more middle-of-the-road intervention can be seen in the open letter “La ‘loi travail’ ne réduira pas le chômage” (*uPikEIK*) speaking out against the reorganization of the French labour market. The letter was initiated by Thomas Piketty and signed by those who had also signed his intervention for a political union of the euro two years previously. The signatories argue that the desired positive effects are not covered by economic research: reducing barriers to lay off employees and curtailing the power of unions to negotiate collective agreements to make hiring and firing more attractive do not necessarily lead to a reduction in unemployment nor to an improvement in living conditions. Instead, they propagate a complete abolishment of the “Contract à durée déterminée” and a broader political approach to unemployment.

Immediately, a second letter (*UTirEIK*) was initiated by Jean Tirole in favour of the new law, arguing that a reduction in the high level of permanency of “Contrat à durée indéterminée” will free up the labour market and help the most deprived, in particular, to get a foot in the door. Not only does the

letter argue that more flexibility, fewer opportunities to litigate, and more individual vocational training will lead to lower unemployment but also that recent Spanish reforms prove the effectiveness of similar measures.

Signatories of both letters are located in the top right of both planes (Figures 5 and 6) close to the orthodox reproductive pole of French economics. In their relation to each other, the overall structure of the space is reproduced on a smaller scale: those in favour of the new labour law (also known Loi El Khomri) are located more to the right on the first axis and lower on the second and third axes, indicating relations to the corporate and political realm as well as more internationalized careers. Those against hold less overall power and are more deeply ingrained in distinctly French elite academic institutions.

The pattern that emerges is illustrated by the controversies over political economic policies pursued that we see when we look at the open-eds published in support of different candidates for the 2012 and the 2017 presidencies (all passive figure 5 and 6).<sup>6</sup> Support for the far-left candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon (*uMel12*, *uMel17*) is located in the midst of the heterodox French economists. Support for the socialist candidates François Hollande in 2012 (*uHol12*) and Benoît Hamon (*uHam17*) in 2017 is located in the first quadrant on both planes but close to the first axis, with Emmanuel Macron in 2017 (*uMac17*) couched in between. All three of these centrist open-eds are signed by generally powerful economists from the autonomous pole as well as the heteronomous pole (high and low on axis 2) and from the academic orthodox institutions as well as the internationalized mainstream (high and low on axis 3). In contrast, support for the conservative candidates Nicolas Sarkozy in 2012 (*uSac12*) and the strictly conservative candidate François Fillon (*uFil17*) in 2017 holds considerably less influence in this space of academic economists, is more engaged than all other support in the corporate and political world, and has only weak relations to the French academic institutional orthodoxy as well as to internationalized mainstream economics.

## DISCIPLINARY AND POLITICAL CONTROVERSIES IN LIGHT OF POST-NATIONAL DYNAMICS

As the above analysis has shown, there is a diversity of post-national scopes of capital and associated economists' careers. Particularly in the upper echelons of the reconstructed space, we encounter links to international universities, scientific associations, and academies, often located in the US, as well as to more political institutions such as US think tanks and the Federal Reserve. We also see relations to political institutions with a global scope here, such as the IMF, the UN, and the World Bank, and to institutions with a transnational European scope, such as the ECB. This region is the one most closely aligned to international mainstream economic thought, and one more likely to advocate (neo)liberal economic policies.

Yet powerful positions do not rest solely on ennobling their French careers with post-national scopes of capital. A more nationally anchored dominant fraction closely linked to the traditional French reproductive institutions of the field, such as ENA, ENSAE, and the École Polytechnique, is positioned vis-à-vis the 'newer' and globally asserted fraction. This bifurcation in the realm of dominant French economists can be described as one between scientific capital, which is more easily

<sup>6</sup> Open-eds in support of Marine Le Pen were not published in the 2012 and 2017 elections (see also Lebaron 2016).

vamped with post-national scopes, and academic capital, which has a closer affiliation to nation-state institutions. Both dominant fractions do, however, ally against heterodox currents in French economics and their endeavour to pluralize the discipline, often in an ex-negativo way: epistemological and political differences become marginalized in an effort to keep contenders at bay. This may well strengthen the power invested in the central elite institutions of the French economic field and lead to only a marginal ‘internationalizing’ of French economics.

As far as the heterodox fraction of French economics is concerned, a similar ex-negativo effect may occur: less likely to build up the capital endowments through their careers that can be expanded or ennobled post-nationally, neither in a transnational European context nor in an international US context, they almost inevitably become the defenders of a specifically French branch of economics. The same seems to apply to policy ideas with regard to France or the European context which, inspired by heterodox thought, are politically left and have a distinct national focus.

This stands in contrast to the two dominant fractions’ policy positionings. The more nationally anchored have close relations to political institutions of national scope, such as France Stratégie, the Conseil d’analyse économique, and various ministries, as well as to political institutions of a transnational European scope, such as the European Commission and the European Parliament. Here, politically rather centrist and statist, at most slightly left leaning positions are advocated, that are aligned with more (neo)liberal policy positionings in the project of putting European economics and its transnational governance on the global map. Those who are more internationalized differ considerably by emphasizing more deregulatory, market-enhancing, and activating aspects of policies, particularly with regard to the French political economy.

Finally, and opposed to the three fractions outlined above, we encounter economists who have close links to the political and corporate realm primarily with a national scope. This heteronomous area of the field is conservative in all three regards: epistemologically, institutionally, and politically. It supports economic policies by centre-right candidates focused on the French political economy, does not question the prevailing economic mainstream’s teaching and beliefs in the traditional institutions of French economics, albeit not being actively engaged. Following Sapiro (2018: 170), this constitutes a “conservative nationalism” as opposed to a “left-wing nationalism” that is more inherent to heterodox economists’ positions.

It can be concluded that not only does the engagement of economists in the French political debates on the French and European economy show a close resemblance to their engagement in the debates on the current state and future of French economics but also that their links to national, transnational, international, or global institutions and hence national or various post-national scopes and sources of legitimation, affects their position-taking and their strategic interventions for change – or not – in the political economy as well as in the field of economists. But it has to be kept in mind, that the empirical analysis presented here is limited in its scope, since it focusses on those economists that have engaged in political economic issues and controversies discussed in a French context. All the same, those engaging in these controversies hold credible and important positions in the overall field, making it a highly interesting task to interpret the findings in the light of strategic dynamics in an overall French field of economists.

Generally, introducing post-national forms of capital to struggles in nationally anchored academic fields can potentially work for dominant incumbents already successful in the field, as well as for dominated challengers who seek to topple the hierarchy of the field and establish their own trait as a contribution to the autonomy of the field (Boncourt 2016: 386). But, as we have seen, opportunities

to access post-national scopes of capital are not distributed evenly throughout the field. Heterodox currents in particular have a hard time forging transnational relationships when they are not part of an internationally active paradigm, have a relatively low degree of mathematization, and do not value formal modelling highly.

In contrast, dominant fractions linked to mainstream economics may more easily use national prestige to also gain post-national recognition, which can then be reimported into national controversies to secure and bolster their positions. In the case of the French field of economists, this has led to a coalition of dominant fractions holding nationally as well as post-nationally scoped capital. This coalition has succeeded in fending off attempts to dismantle the core reproductive national institutions of the field, thus stabilizing its own dominance and indirectly increasing the value of post-national scopes (Wagner and Réau 2015: 45). Examples of this are the founding of the PSE, the TSE, and the Université Paris-Sud, initially to (re)gain influence in global scientific contexts, while at the same time functioning as a viable strategy of the ruling factions to maintain their supremacy in the national realm (Dezalay 2004: 11).

To date, these developments have by no means broken the dominance of national scopes in the French field of economists, albeit leading to a rise of the importance of post-national scopes regarding economists' careers as well as regarding policy positionings. This also has consequences for the field of power, since academic elite institutions not only forge the careers of academic economists but also those of a professional elite more generally (Bourdieu 1994b), thus influencing the general perception of the economy and of its relation to politics and society at large. Hence, discursive position-takings articulated in the academic context also become stakes in the wider field of power and its struggles over the legitimate forms of domination and their reach.

The subtle relations and struggles that constitute the field of power have not been researched in depth here. Thus, we can only very cautiously assess the impact that changes in the French field of economists have on the French field of power. Since 2008, and when compared to developments in the last decade of the twentieth century, fractions of economists pushing for post-nationalisation do seem to have consolidated their position and economists' fractions with a national scope appear to be in a slow decline. At the same time, recent developments such as the climate and energy crisis as well as the war in Ukraine may well have lasting effects on the position-taking and consequently the positions of economists in the field of power. In a more political context, the 2022 French presidential and parliamentary elections have already shown that nationally scoped coalitions are possible, especially beyond academic fields, that might well influence the state of the (French) field of power and lead to a surge in renationalization. Further research across different fractions of the field of power and into different national settings is urgently needed to assess these current developments.

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## Appendix

Table 1: Contributions of active categories to axes 1–3 and passive categories

	variables	scope <sup>7</sup>	category	N	Contribution in percent <sup>8</sup>		
					axis 1	axis 2	axis 3
active categories	PhD	F	n_PhD	26	0.0	<b>3.8</b>	0.0
			PhDEHESS	14	0.0	<b>0.9</b>	0.0
			PhDFother	19	0.5	0.0	<b>0.7</b>
			PhDP1	38	0.1	<b>0.6</b>	<b>2.7</b>
			PhDP10	13	0.1	0.4	0.2
			PhDP9	8	0.1	<b>0.9</b>	0.0
			PhDPother	9	0.0	0.1	0.3
		IN	PhDUSUK	17	<b>3.0</b>	0.3	1.0
	Habilitation	F	hab	28	0.1	<b>1.4</b>	0.1
			n_hab	116	0.0	0.3	0.0
	University position	F	AProf	12	0.0	0.1	0.0
			Emerit	17	0.2	0.0	0.1
			MaîtreC	15	<b>2.1</b>	0.3	<b>1.2</b>
			n_UniPos	45	<b>2.3</b>	0.0	0.1
			Prof	55	<b>1.5</b>	<b>1.5</b>	0.2
	Leading position at university	F	n_UniPresC	111	0.0	0.5	0.1
			UniPresC	33	0.1	<b>1.7</b>	0.2
	Position at one of the 20 highest ranked US universities according to Times Higher Education	IN	n_UniUStop	116	<b>0.9</b>	0.1	0.2
			UniUStop	28	<b>3.6</b>	0.2	<b>0.6</b>
	Position at a US university not ranked in the top 20, a European, or Canadian university	IN	n_UniUsEuCa	120	0.1	0.3	0.4
			UniUsEuCa	24	0.4	<b>1.5</b>	<b>2.1</b>
	Position at one of the 15 highest ranked British universities according to Times Higher Education	IN	n_UniUKtop	134	0.1	0.1	0.1
			UniUKtop	10	<b>1.9</b>	<b>1.1</b>	<b>1.7</b>
	Position at an Asian, African, or South- or Central-American university	IN	n_UniAAA	127	0.0	0.2	0.4
			UniAAA	17	0.0	<b>1.4</b>	<b>3.1</b>
	Position at a French university outside Paris region	F	n_UniFother	83	0.0	<b>1.4</b>	0.1
			UniFother	61	0.0	<b>1.9</b>	0.1
	Position at Paris 1	F	n_P1	112	0.0	0.4	<b>0.9</b>
			P1	32	0.1	<b>1.3</b>	<b>3.0</b>
	Position at Paris 2, 7, 8, or 12	F	n_Poth	136	0.0	0.0	0.1
			Poth	8	0.3	0.0	<b>1.0</b>
	Position at Paris 9	F	n_P9	125	0.0	0.1	0.0
P9			19	0.1	<b>0.8</b>	0.1	
Position at Paris 10	F	n_P10	131	0.0	0.1	0.1	
		P10	13	0.0	<b>1.0</b>	<b>0.7</b>	
Position at Paris 13	F	n_P13	132	0.1	0.0	0.1	
		P13	12	<b>0.7</b>	0.1	<b>1.6</b>	
Position at École polytechnique	F	n_EPoly	125	0.2	0.0	0.1	
		EPoly	19	<b>1.3</b>	0.0	<b>0.8</b>	
	F	n_ENSAE	19	0.1	0.0	0.2	

<sup>7</sup> Properties here can be distinguished as having a French-national (F), international (IN), EU-transnational (TN) or global (G) scope, with properties not specifically scoped assumed as French. Non-French scopes are hence slightly underrepresented in case of properties where a construction of categories according to scope would have led to Non-French categories with very low numbers. Intentionally left blank in cases where scope does not apply.

<sup>8</sup> Contributions of categories exceeding the average contribution of 0.53% are printed in bold.

	Position at École nationale de la statistique et de l'administration économique		ENSAE	125	<b>0.8</b>	0.0	<b>1.3</b>
	Position at Institut d'études politiques de Paris (Science Po)	F	n_SciPo	118	0.2	0.1	0.1
			SciPo	26	<b>0.9</b>	0.4	0.4
	Position at École des hautes études en sciences sociales	F	n_EHESS	127	0.0	0.1	0.0
			EHESS	17	0.1	<b>0.9</b>	0.3
	Position at École normale supérieure	F	n_ENS	123	0.1	0.1	0.0
			ENS	21	0.3	0.5	0.2
	Position at Paris School of Economics	F	n_PSE	121	0.2	0.3	<b>0.7</b>
			PSE	23	<b>1.0</b>	<b>1.3</b>	<b>3.5</b>
	Position at Toulouse School of Economics	F	n_TSE	135	0.1	0.0	0.1
			TSE	9	<b>1.4</b>	0.0	<b>0.9</b>
	Position at École des hautes études commerciales and other top business schools	F	n_HEC+	129	0.0	0.0	0.1
			HEC+	15	0.3	0.2	<b>1.0</b>
	Position at Conservatoire national des arts et métiers	F	n_CNAM	137	0.0	0.0	0.0
			CNAM	7	0.0	0.5	0.0
	Position at École nationale d'administration	F	n_ENA	134	0.0	0.0	0.0
			ENA	10	0.3	0.0	<b>0.6</b>
	Position at other grande école	F	n_GEoth	131	0.1	0.0	0.2
			GEoth	13	<b>0.9</b>	0.1	<b>1.7</b>
	Centre for Economic Policy Research	TN	n_CEPR	123	<b>0.6</b>	0.1	0.1
			CEPR	21	<b>3.5</b>	<b>0.6</b>	<b>0.7</b>
	German Institute of Labour Economics	IN	n_IZA	131	0.1	0.0	0.3
			IZA	13	<b>0.9</b>	0.4	<b>2.8</b>
	Centre d'économie de l'université Paris-Nord	F	n_CEPN	137	0.1	0.0	0.1
			CEPN	7	<b>1.1</b>	<b>0.6</b>	<b>2.3</b>
	Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne	F	n_CES	134	0.0	0.0	0.1
			CES	10	0.3	<b>0.6</b>	<b>1.3</b>
	Centre des Etudes de l'Emploi	F	n_CEE	137	0.0	0.1	0.0
			CEE	7	0.0	<b>1.0</b>	0.1
	Centre de recherche en économie et statistique, research centre of INSEE	F	n_CREST	130	0.1	0.0	0.3
			CREST	14	<b>0.7</b>	0.3	<b>3.2</b>
	Centre pour la recherche économique et ses applications	F	n_CEPREMAP	130	<b>0.7</b>	<b>1.3</b>	<b>1.1</b>
			CEPREMAP	14	0.1	0.1	0.1
	Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques	F	n_OFCE	135	0.0	0.0	0.0
			OFCE	9	0.0	0.3	0.0
	Centre d'études prospectives et d'informations internationales	F	n_CEPII	132	0.1	0.0	0.0
			CEPII	12	<b>1.5</b>	0.0	0.2
	Foreign Research Institute	IN	n_frgRInst	102	<b>0.8</b>	<b>0.6</b>	0.0
			frgRInst	42	<b>2.0</b>	<b>1.4</b>	0.1
	French research institute	F	n_FRInst	72	0.0	<b>1.9</b>	0.0
			FRInst	72	0.0	<b>1.9</b>	0.0
	Foreign stay of more than six months in the US	IN	n_FS_US	109	<b>1.1</b>	0.2	0.2
			FS_US	35	<b>3.3</b>	0.5	<b>0.8</b>
	Foreign stay of more than six months in the UK or Canada	IN	n_FS_UKCan	125	<b>0.1</b>	0.1	0.5
			FS_UKCan	19	<b>0.7</b>	0.5	<b>3.2</b>
	Foreign stay of more than six months in other EU states	IN	n_FS_EUother	128	0.1	0.2	0.1
			FS_EUother	16	0.5	<b>1.8</b>	0.4
	Foreign stay of more than six months in Belgium	IN	n_FS_Bel	128	0.0	0.0	0.1
			FS_Bel	16	0.2	0.4	<b>1.2</b>
	Foreign stay of more than six months, rest of world	IN	n_FS_World	18	0.0	0.1	0.3
			FS_World	126	0.0	<b>0.8</b>	<b>1.9</b>
	Member of a PhD jury	F	n_TMJry	40	0,0	<b>1,4</b>	0,4
			TMJry1	44	0,2	<b>0,8</b>	0,0
			TMJry2/3	24	0,0	<b>1,0</b>	<b>2,8</b>
			TMJry4/5	22	0,0	<b>1,0</b>	0,0
			TMJry>5	14	<b>1,2</b>	<b>1,1</b>	<b>1,3</b>
<i>scienti fic</i>	Hirsch index by World of Science, quintiles and no HI	G	n_HI	32	0,5	<b>2,9</b>	0,0
			HI1	25	0,2	0,1	0,2
			HI2/3	27	0,3	0,0	0,2
			HI4/5	18	0,0	0,4	0,2

		HI>5	22	0,1	<b>1,0</b>	<b>1,1</b>
		HI>11	20	<b>2,3</b>	0,4	0,1
Managing editor of journal	F	JManEd>1	22	0.0	<b>2.2</b>	<b>2.0</b>
		JManEd1	30	0.3	0.3	<b>1.0</b>
		n_JManEd	92	0.1	<b>1.1</b>	0.0
Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics	G	n_asSASE	133	0.1	0.1	0.2
		asSASE	11	<b>0.9</b>	<b>1.8</b>	<b>2.2</b>
Association recherche et régulation, Réseau international de recherche sur les organisations et le développement durable, Association pour le développement des études Keynésiennes	F	n_asADEK_ARR_RIODD	133	0.2	0.1	0.1
		asADEK_ARR_RIODD	11	<b>2.2</b>	<b>0.8</b>	<b>1.8</b>
International Initiative for Promoting Political Economy	G	n_asIIPPE	135	0.1	0.1	0.1
		asIIPPE	9	<b>1.6</b>	<b>0.9</b>	<b>1.4</b>
Various university research centres	F	n_uRCdiv	137	0.0	0.0	0.0
		uRCdiv	7	<b>0.9</b>	0.1	0.1
Various US, UK, and Canadian economic associations	IN	n_asEAUSglb	131	0.1	0.1	0.0
		asEAUSglb	13	<b>0.9</b>	<b>0.6</b>	0.0
Various French economic associations	F	n_asEAF	128	0.0	0.0	0.2
		asEAF	16	0.0	0.3	<b>1.7</b>
Various European economic associations	TN	n_asEAEU	128	0.0	0.1	0.0
		asEAEU	16	0.2	<b>1.0</b>	0.0
European Association for Evolutionary Economy	TN	n_asEAEPE	136	0.1	0.0	0.1
		asEAEPE	8	<b>1.3</b>	<b>0.6</b>	<b>2.0</b>
Association française de science économique	F	n_asAFSE	114	0.1	0.4	0.2
		asAFSE	30	0.5	<b>1.5</b>	<b>0.7</b>
Institut universitaire de France	F	n_asIUUF	129	0.1	0.2	0.1
		asIUUF	15	<b>0.9</b>	<b>1.6</b>	<b>1.0</b>
Cercle des économistes	F	n_asCdE	123	0.3	0.1	0.0
		asCdE	23	<b>1.6</b>	0.4	0.0
Association française d'économie politique	F	n_asAFEP	124	0.4	0.2	0.4
		asAFEP	20	<b>2.7</b>	<b>1.5</b>	<b>2.5</b>
Les Économistes Atterrés	F	n_asEAtt	95	<b>1.5</b>	<b>0.6</b>	0.3
		asEAtt	49	<b>3.0</b>	<b>1.2</b>	<b>0.6</b>
Conseil national des universités section sciences économiques	F	n_asCNU	133	0.1	0.0	0.1
		asCNU	11	<b>0.7</b>	0.4	<b>1.7</b>
Econometric Society	IN	n_asEMetS	129	0.3	0.1	0.1
		asEMetS	15	<b>2.8</b>	0.5	0.5
Private French research institute	F	n_pFRInst	125	0.1	0.0	0.1
		pFRInst	19	<b>1.0</b>	0.1	<b>0.9</b>
Liberal-critical and left think tank	F	n_ttLibCrtLft	128	0.0	0.0	0.0
		ttLibCrtLft	16	0.2	0.0	0.0
Liberal and corporative think tanks	F	n_ttLibCorp	115	0.2	0.2	0.0
		ttLibCorp	29	<b>0.8</b>	<b>0.9</b>	0.0
European Commission and other EU institutions	TN	n_govEU	119	0.3	0.0	0.0
		govEU	25	<b>1.3</b>	0.0	0.0
European Central Bank	TN	n_govECB	134	0.1	0.0	0.0
		govECB	10	<b>1.4</b>	0.1	0.2
Agence nationale de la recherche	F	n_govANR	131	0.1	0.1	0.2
		govANR	13	<b>1.0</b>	<b>1.5</b>	<b>1.6</b>
Ministère de l'économie, des finances et de l'industrie, Treasury	F	n_govMinFEI	38	0.5	0.3	0.1
		govMinFEI	106	<b>1.5</b>	<b>0.7</b>	0.2
Ministère du Travail	F	n_govMinTrv	135	0.0	0.0	0.1
		govMinTrv	9	0.0	0.1	<b>0.9</b>
Ministère de l'éducation nationale, Haut conseil de l'évaluation de la recherche et de l'enseignement supérieur	F	n_govMinEN	130	0.0	0.1	0.0
		govMinEN	14	0.0	<b>1.2</b>	0.0
Other ministries	F	n_govMinoth	118	0.0	0.0	0.1
		govMinoth	26	0.0	0.0	0.4
Conseil d'analyse économiques	F	n_govCdAE	93	<b>1.6</b>	0.2	0.0
		govCdAE	51	<b>2.8</b>	0.3	0.1
	F	n_govCdoth	113	0.3	0.4	0.2

passive categories		Other councils to French government		govCdoth	31	<b>1.3</b>	<b>1.4</b>	<b>0.7</b>
		France Stratégie	F	n_govFStrg	124	0.0	0.0	0.1
				govFStrg	20	0.1	0.0	0.3
		French president and prime minister's office	F	n_govPPM	128	0.1	0.1	0.3
				govPPM	16	<b>1.2</b>	<b>0.8</b>	<b>2.4</b>
		Banque de France	F	n_govBdF	125	0.1	0.0	0.1
				govBdF	19	<b>0.9</b>	0.2	0.5
		Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques, Autorité des marchés financiers, other French agencies	F	n_govAgcy	111	0.1	0.1	0.0
				govAgcy	33	0.2	0.4	0.0
		Assemblée nationale, sénat	F	n_govAN	135	0.0	0.0	0.0
				govAN	9	0.1	<b>0.6</b>	0.0
		Central banks	IN	n_govCB	133	0.2	0.0	0.0
				govCB	11	<b>2.3</b>	0.1	0.1
		Various governments worldwide	IN	n_govWWDiv	134	0.1	0.0	0.1
				govWWDiv	10	<b>1.0</b>	0.0	<b>1.2</b>
		Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development	G	n_govOECD	132	0.0	0.0	0.0
				govOECD	12	0.0	0.1	0.1
		United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund	G	n_govUNWBIMF	121	<b>0.6</b>	0.0	0.1
				govUNWBIMF	23	<b>3.0</b>	0.0	<b>0.7</b>
		Media corporations	F	n_crpMedia	111	0.2	<b>0.6</b>	0.3
				crpMedia	33	<b>0.8</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>1.0</b>
		Banks	F	n_crpBank	123	0.1	0.3	0.0
				crpBank	21	0.4	<b>1.7</b>	0.1
		Financial industry and funds	F	n_crpFinI	128	0.1	0.1	0.1
				crpFinI	16	<b>0.8</b>	<b>0.6</b>	<b>1.0</b>
		Service and trade corporations	F	n_crpServTr	125	0.0	0.4	0.0
				crpServTr	19	0.1	<b>2.4</b>	0.2
		Insurance companies	F	n_crpInsur	128	0.1	0.4	0.1
		crpInsur	16	<b>0.6</b>	<b>3.1</b>	<b>0.8</b>		
Management consulting and law firms	F	n_crpCons	126	0.0	0.1	0.0		
		crpCons	18	0.3	<b>0.9</b>	0.3		
socio-statistics	Sex	f	18	–	–	–		
		m	126	–	–	–		
	Age groups (year of birth)	n_birth	20	–	–	–		
		38-49	37	–	–	–		
		50-59	29	–	–	–		
		60-69	28	–	–	–		
		70-84	30	–	–	–		
	academic capital	European University Institute, Collège d'Europe	TN	EUI_CEU	6	–	–	–
		Position at a Swiss or Scandinavian university	IN	UniCHSca	10	–	–	–
		Research fellow at research institute/laboratory	F	riFlw	36	–	–	–
		Researcher at research institute/laboratory	F	riRes	21	–	–	–
		Leading position at research institute/laboratory	F	riDir	47	–	–	–
Grants CNRS, ANR		F	gCNRS_ANR	17	–	–	–	
Grants from ministries		F	gMin	17	–	–	–	
Grants from US and UK institutions		IN	gUSUK	14	–	–	–	
Grants from European Research Council		TN	gERC	9	–	–	–	
Grants from other French institutions		F	gFrother	14	–	–	–	
Number of foreign stays longer than six months	n_FSG	81	–	–	–			
	FSG1	13	–	–	–			
	FSG2	23	–	–	–			
	FSG3	6	–	–	–			
	FSG4-6	9	–	–	–			

<i>scientific capital</i>	Number of scientific awards	F	FSG>6	12	-	-	-	
		F	n_PSciNG	89	-	-	-	
		F	PSciNG_1	27	-	-	-	
		F	PSciNG2_3	12	-	-	-	
	Award for research program	F	PSciNG>3	16	-	-	-	
	Award for PhD thesis	F	PSciResP	23	-	-	-	
	Award for young economist, economist or econ. book of the year	F	PSciTh	18	-	-	-	
	Médaille de bronze, d'argent, d'or CNRS	F	PscideA	29	-	-	-	
	Lauréat Académie des sciences morales et politiques	F	PMcNrs	7	-	-	-	
	Non-French national academies	IN	asNatAcad	8	-	-	-	
	European Economic Association	TN	asEEA	8	-	-	-	
	American Economic Association	TN	asAEA	7	-	-	-	
<i>political and corporate capital</i>	Think tank Brookings Institute	IN	ttBrook	10	-	-	-	
	Chevalier de la Légion d'honneur	F	PChLdH	24	-	-	-	
	Officier de la Légion d'honneur	F	POffLdH	9	-	-	-	
	Ordre national du mérite	F	POndM	19	-	-	-	
	Number of consulting or employment government institutions	n_GovN			38	-	-	-
		GovN>6			22	-	-	-
		GovN1/2			35	-	-	-
		GovN3/4			28	-	-	-
		GovN5/6			21	-	-	-
	Number of consulting or employment corporations	CorpN>4			11	-	-	-
		CorpN1			15	-	-	-
		CorpN2			17	-	-	-
CorpN3/4				17	-	-	-	
n_CorpN				84	-	-	-	
<i>positionings on political economic issues</i>	AFEP "Pour une nouvelle section d'économie «Économie et Société» au CNU" 2013		uAFEPsec13	7	-	-	-	
	AFEP "Pétition pour le pluralisme, maintenant!" 2015		uAFEPpl15	10	-	-	-	
	Les Économistes Atterrés "Pourquoi nous sommes des économistes atterrés" 2010		uEAtt10	37	-	-	-	
	Les Économistes Attères "Pour sortir de l'impasse économique" 2016		uEAtt16	36	-	-	-	
	Collectif de plus de 120 économistes "Non au traité budgétaire européen" 2012		uNTB12	17	-	-	-	
	"Appel des économistes pour une VIe République" 2013		uVIRep13	8	-	-	-	
	Rapport de la Commission pour la libération de la croissance française 2008 and 2010		uAttali	5	-	-	-	
	"Manifeste pour une union politique de l'euro" 2014		uPupEuro	9	-	-	-	
	Groupe Eiffel "Pour une communauté politique de l'euro" 2014		uEif14	2	-	-	-	
	"Le projet de loi El Khomri représente une avancée pour les plus fragiles" 2016		uTirEIK	21	-	-	-	
	"La 'loi travail' ne réduira pas le chômage" 2016		uPikEik	9	-	-	-	
	"Manifeste pour la démocratisation de l'Europe" 2018		uTDem	10	-	-	-	
	"Annuler les dettes publiques détenues par la BCE pour reprendre en main notre destin" 2021		uNonAdett21	21	-	-	-	
	"Vouloir effacer la dette que nous possédons déjà est un leurre" 2021		uAdett21	15	-	-	-	


Table 2: Contributions of active categories to axes 1–3 grouped according to type of capital

	contribution in percent			
	<i>average</i>	<i>axis 1</i>	<i>axis 2</i>	<i>axis 3</i>
<b>academic capital</b>	50.8	44.8	53.4	61.4
<b>scientific capital</b>	20.6	27.2	23.9	22.8
<b>political and corporate capital</b>	28.6	28.0	22.8	15.8

Table 3: Contributions of active categories to axes 1–3 grouped according to type of scope


	contribution in percent			
	<i>average</i>	<i>axis 1</i>	<i>axis 2</i>	<i>axis 3</i>
<b>French-national scope</b>	70.9	54.1	74.7	64.7
<b>international scope</b>	16.4	27.3	14.7	25.6
<b>transnational scope</b>	5.3	8.7	2.6	3.2
<b>global scope</b>	7.4	9.8	7.9	6.5

Graph 1: dim 1/2, cloud of individuals





Graph 2: dim 1/3, cloud of individuals





## Author biography

Christian Schmidt-Wellenburg, Dr. rer. pol., is Assistant Professor at the Chair of General Sociology at the University of Potsdam and researcher in the DFG-Project 429041218 Networks, paradigms and careers. Research areas: transnationalization, European integration, political sociology of the social sciences, field and discourse analysis, and relational sociological theory. Recent publications: "Europeanization, stateness, and professions: What role do economic expertise and economic experts play in European political integration?" *EJCPS* 4(4): 430–456, 2017; *Charting transnational fields*, Routledge, 2020; "Divorce à l'allemande: Luttes symboliques et tensions institutionnelles dans la sociologie allemande contemporaine" *ARSS* 243–4: 111–123, 2022, "Divided we stand, united we fall? Structure and struggles of contemporary German sociology", *International Review of Sociolgy*, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03906701.2023.2244170>.